FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 219645, September 21, 2016 ]

VICTORIA CABBIGAT, PETITIONER, V. JACINTO DUMULAG,
RESPONDENT.

Sirs and Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September
21, 2016, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 219645 - VICTORIA CABBIGAT, Petitioner, v. JACINTO DUMULAG,

Respondent.

Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution[1] dated November 9, 2015

filed by petitioner Victoria Cabbigat (Cabbigat). In said Resolution, we denied the
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court for
Cabbigat's failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in its challenged Decision[2] dated February 25, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No.
131815.

The instant Petition arose from a land dispute case filed in 2009 by respondent Jacinto
Dumulag (Dumulag) against Cabbigat before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Hapao, Hungduan, Ifugao, docketed as Barangay Case No. 24, S-2009.

On August 16, 2009, the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo issued an Arbitration Award in

Barangay Case No. 24, S-2009 in favor of Dumulag and against Cabbigat, which states,
in the vernacular: "DAKMI AN NANGIPANUH YA ATHITU DI NANGIPANUH MI,
INBASAR MI HI HINAPIT DI WITNESSES, EBIDENSYA YA OCUIAR INSPECTION YA
NAN PINGNGIT DI KAIHA AN NGATUN DI PAYO AD BUHUCAN YA BAGIN
JACINTO DUMULAG"[3] Translated to English, the Arbitration Award reads: "We
the pangkat members based our decision on the testimony of the witnesses, evidence
presented and the ocular inspection and we found that the land beside the road and
located above the rice field at Buhuan is owned by Jacinto Dumulag."[4] The parcel of
land thus awarded to Dumulag would hereinafter be referred to as the "subject property."

Cabbigat repudiated under oath before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo on September 4,

2009 the "settlement agreement for arbitration" on the ground that her consent was
vitiated by fraud.[5]
In December 2010, Dumulag sold a portion of the subject property to spouses Peter and
Marilou Buyayo (spouses Buyayo), who immediately occupied the portion they bought.

Cabbigat instituted on February 15, 2011 an action for forcible entry against the spouses
Buyayo before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Banaue-Hungduan-Mayoyao,
Banaue, Ifugao, docketed as Civil Case No. 719. In a Decision[6] dated October 18, 2011,
the MCTC declared that the spouses Buyayo have the better right to possess the land in
controversy. Cabbigat filed an appeal of the said MCTC Decision before the Regional
Trial Court of Banaue, Ifugao, Branfch 34 (RTC-Branch 34), docketed as Civil Case No.
126. RTC-Branch 34 rendered a Decision[7] on May 4, 2012, reversing the MCTC
judgment in Civil Case No. 719, declaring Cabbigat the rightful owner and possessor of
the land in dispute, and ordering spouses Buyayo to cease and desist from disturbing
Cabbigat's peaceful possession and to remove whatever construction they built on said
land. RTC-Branch 34 denied the spouses Buyayo's Motion for Reconsideration in an
Order dated July 13,' 2012, and the spouses Buyayo received a copy of said Order on July
2Q, 2012. On October 15, 2012, Cabbigat filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment in
Civil Case No. 126 before RTC-Branch 34, pointing out that the spouses Buyayo did not
file an appeal within 15 days from notice of the Order dated July 13, 2012 denying their
Motion for Reconsideration. As it turned out, the spouses Buyayo subsequently filed on
September 17, 2012 a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 126708,alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-
Branch 34 in issuing its Decision dated May 4, 2012 and Order dated July 13, 2012 in
Civil Case No. 126. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution[8] dated November 29, 2012,
dismissed the spouses Buyayo's Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy. The
said Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 126708 became final and executory on July 8, 2013.

In the meantime, on October 4, 2012, Dumulag filed a Petition for Execution before the
MCTC, seeking the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the Arbitration Award
dated August 16, 2009 of the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo in Barangay Case No. 24, S-
2009. Dumulag's Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 736. Cabbigat filed an Answer
with Motion to Dismiss on November 26, 2012, arguing that Dumulag's Petition lacked a
cause of action as the Arbitration Award was timely and properly repudiated. Also,
Dumulag had no more interest in the subject property as he had already sold the same to
the spouses Buyayo. In its Decision dated May 4, 2012 in Civil Case No. 126, RTC-
Branch 34 upheld Cabbigat's ownership of the subject property as against the spouses
Buyayo's claim; and since said Decision already became final and executory, res
judicata had set in.

The MCTC rendered its Decision[9] on March 12, 2013, denying Dumulag's Petition for
lack of merit and dismissing the same. The MCTC reasoned:
At the outset, this is an attempt of [Dumulag] to thwart the decision
rendered by the RTC. To repeat, in Civil Case No. 719, Victoria sued Peter
and Marilou Buyayo ([spouses Buyayo]) before this court for recovery of
 ownership of land. The [spouses Buyayo] used the arbitration award to
prove that it was [Dumulag] who owned the land. The RTC already
disposed this issue finding [Cabbigat] as the owner of the land. The
defenses of the [spouses Buyayo] is applicable to [Dumulag] since the
[spouses Buyayo] merely relied on the claim of ownership of [Dumulag].

The RTC appreciated the evidence of [Cabbigat] over the [spouses

Buyayo's] evidence. The Arbitration Award submitted by the [spouses
Buyayo] was of scant consideration. Thus, while it may be true that it is
now Jacinto Dumulag who filed this instant petition for execution over the
same land in dispute, the principle of res judicata sets in.

The [spouses Buyayo] were mere buyers. They bought the land from
Jacinto Dumulag. When they were sued, they asserted the ownership of the
vendor [Dumulag]. They submitted the arbitration award including
documents to prove the ownership of the vendor.: As it was earlier said,
this was resolved by the RTC in favor of [Cabbigat] and the decision
became final and executory. While this court ruled in favor of the [spouses
Buyayo], the decision was reversed by the RTC. It is the decision of the
RTC which will prevail. [Dumulag] should not test this court again by
simply changing one of the parties bringing the: same evidence over the
same land in dispute.

xxxx

All said, the petition must fail.

The MCTC denied Dumulag's Motion for Reconsideration in an Order[10] dated April 10,
2013. j

Dumulag appealed before the RTC-Branch 34, docketed as Civil Case No. 137. The
RTC, in its Decision[11] dated August 26, ioi3, denied Dumulag's appeal for lack of merit
and affirmed the MCTC judgment dismissing the case.

Undeterred, Dumulag sought recourse from the Court ofj Appeals by filing a Petition for
Review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 131815.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on February 25, 2015, in Dumulag's
favor. According to the Court of Appeals, the Arbitration Award already became final,
with the force and effect of a final judgment, because Cabbigat failed to repudiate the
Arbitration Award within 10 days from the date of its execution, as prescribed by!
Sections 11 and 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise kn6wn as the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law. The Court of Appeals rationalized:
 [T]he case of Galuba v. Laureta emphasizes on the strict adherence to the
ten (10)-day period and parties who fail to do so should face the
consequences of abiding by the arbitration award:

xxxx

"Pursuant to P.D. 1508, Section 12, Rule VI of the Katarungang

Pambarangay Rules which were promulgated "for the amicable settlement
of disputes at the barangay level, without judicial recourse," also provides
that "failure to repudiate the settlement or the arbitration agreement
within the time limits respectively set [in Section 10 thereof], shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to challenge on said grounds," i.e., fraud,
violence or intimidation.

Any party, therefore, who fails to avail himself of the remedy set forth in
Section 13 must face the consequences of the amicable settlement for he
can no longer file an action in court to redress his grievances arising
from said settlement.

xxxx

Having failed to repudiate the amicable settlement within the ten-day

period, petitioner is left with norecourse but to abide by its terms. He,
therefore, acted correctly when he eventually fully satisfied his obligation
pursuant to the amicable settlement, thereby, rendering his case moot and
academic. "

xxxx

Given the applicable law and jurisprudence, this Court is persuaded to

affirm the findings of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in MCTC Civil
Case No. 719 when it ruled that the settlement became final and executory,
thus leaving nothing more to repudiate. [I]t is clear from the records that the
Arbitration Award was rendered on 16 August 2009 in favor of [Dumulag]
while the repudiation was filed on 04 September 2009, after the lapse of
nineteen (19) days from the date of the award, which is far beyond the
period provided by law.[12]
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected Cabbigat's other arguments against the validity of
the Arbitration Award, thus: (a) there was no statutory basis for Cabbigat's argument that
the 10-day period to repudiate should be reckoned from the date she came to know of the
Arbitration Award, i.e., August 30, 2009, and neither was there any evidence to
substantiate that Cabbigat indeed only received notice of said Award on such date; and
(b) there was no violation of Cabbigat's due process as the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo afforded the parties in Barangay Case No. 24, S-2009 three hearings
and complied with the written form for settlements and awards under Section 13 of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

The Court of Appeals further adjudged that the Decision dated May 4, 2012 of the RTC-
Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 126 did not constitute res judicata in the present case:
Contrary to the findings of res judicata by the lower courts in MCTC Civil
Case No. 736 and RTC Civil Case No. 137, this Court rules in the negative.
The most recent case of Arigo v. Swift revisits the well-entrenched doctrine
of res judicata and its elements to warrant its existence, viz.:
xxxx

"x x x (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former
judgment must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i)
identity of parties or at least such as representing the same
interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of
the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and, (in) identity of causes of
action in both actions such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration."

xxxx
The said lower courts have ruled that the Decision in RTC Civil Case No.
126 filed by [Cabbigat] against spouses Buyayo effectively constitutes a bar
to the present case for the execution of the arbitration award as the Regional
Trial Court had already disposed of this issue, having found [Cabbigat] as
the proper owner and possessor of the subject property. Moreover, there is
an identity in the evidence submitted, the subject matter involved, as well
as a substantial identity of parties as [Dumulag] is privy to the spouses
Buyayo, having sold a portion of the subject property to the latter.

It can be gleaned from the records that although there may have been
identical facets in both cases, it is clear that there is a glaring disparity in
the cause of action for both cases. In MCTC Civil Case No. 736 and RTC
Civil Case [No.] 137, the cause of action is for the "execution of the
arbitration award" or the recovery of the ownership of the land, while in
MCTC Civil Case No. 719 and RTC Civil Case No. 126, the cause of
 action is "forcible entry with prayer for preliminary injunction." The former
action is an ordinary civil action while the latter is a special civil action
with a special procedure under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the
case of De Jesus y Ladao v. Mendoza is instructive:
xxxx

"A judgment rendered in an action of forcible entry and

detainer is not res judicata in and is nobar to the successful
prosecution of a later action between the same parties for the
recovery of the property in litigation. "

xxxx
In the recovery of the subject property, the issue is ultimately one of
ownership while in forcible entry cases, the only issue to be resolved is the.
question of who is entitled to the physical and material possession of the
property; the ownership or the title to the subject property is not involved,
except for provisional purposes. Thus, aside from the difference in the
issues involved to bolster the claim that there is no res judicata present in
the case at bench, the assertion of [Cabbigat] that she is the rightful owner
of the subject property by virtue of the Decision in RTC Civil Case No. 126
bears no weight. As the action she had filed is one of ejectment, the latter
can only invoke her right to possess the subject property, not her right to
ownership. As stated in the case of Barbra v. Court of Appeals:

xxxx
"In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, inferior courts, nonetheless,
have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the
issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the
issue of possession. Such decision, however, does not bind
the title or affect the ownership of the land or building,
neither shall it bar an action between the same parties
respecting the title to the land or building nor be held
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the
same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession, "xx x.13
Lastly, the Court of Appeals clarified that Dumulag still possessed an interest in the
subject property because he only sold a portion of it to the spouses Buyayo. Thus,
Dumulag was well within his right to file a petition for the execution of the Arbitration
Award as to the remaining portion of the subject property.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition [is] GRANTED. The
26 August 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming the 12
March 2013 Decision of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Arbitration Award rendered on 16
August 2009 is declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.[14]
In its Resolution[15] dated July 8, 2015, the Court of Appeals denied Cabbigat's Motion
for Reconsideration.

Hence, Cabbigat came before us through a Petition for Review on Certiorari with a lone
assignment of error, viz.:
The Court of Appeals committed serious error of law in not deciding and/or
granting [Cabbigat's] prayer of dismissing the Petition for Review and
reversing and setting aside the Decisions of MCTC Banaue and RTC
Branch 34 of Banaue, Ifugao directly going against the principle of res
judicata; and the blatantly erroneous application of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law (P.D. No. 1508).[16]
We issued a Resolution dated November 9, 2015 denying the Petition for Cabbigat's
failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its
Decision dated February 25, 2015 and Resolution dated July 8, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No.
131815.

Since Cabbigat's Motion for Reconsideration does not proffer any new issue or argument,
we are not persuaded to reverse our Resolution dated November 9, 2015. However, we
still deem it necessary to issue this Resolution to correct the apparent misapplication of
Section 418 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, as amended by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, by the Court of Appeals in
its Decision dated February 25, 2015.

There is no dispute in the case at bar that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of Barangay
Hapao, Hungduan, Ifugao, conducted arbitration proceedings and rendered an Arbitration
Award on August 16, 2009 in Barangay Case No. 24, S-2009 in favor of Dumulag and
against Cabbigat.

Arbitration is "a process for the adjudication of disputes by which the parties agree to be
bound by the decision of a third person or body in place of a regularly organized
tribunal."[17] Arbitration[18] at the barangay level is governed by the following provisions
of the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended:
Sec. 413. Arbitration. - (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings,
agree in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon
 chairman or the pangkat. Such agreement to arbitrate may be repudiated
within five (5) days from the date thereof for the same grounds and in
accordance with the procedure hereinafter prescribed. The arbitration award
shall be made after the lapse of the period for repudiation and within ten
(10) days thereafter.

(b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or dialect known

to the parties. When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language
or dialect, the award shall be written in the language or dialect known to
them.

xxxx

Sec. 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award. - The

amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of
a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the
date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or
a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or
municipal court.

However, this provision shall not apply to court cases settled by the lupon
under the last paragraph of Section 408 of this Code, in which case the
compromise settlement agreed upon by the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat chairman shall be submitted to the court and upon
approval thereof, have the force and effect of a judgment of said court.

Sec. 417. Execution. - The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be

enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of
the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced
by action in the appropriate city or municipal court. (Emphases ours.)
In relation to the foregoing, the Katarungang Pambarangay Circular No. 1, dated June 1,
1992, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and
Regulations, further provides:

RULE VI
Amicable Settlement of Disputes
xxxx

Sec. 15. Effect of settlement by arbitration or conciliation. — The amicable

settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from date of the
settlement or date of receipt of the award, unless repudiation of the
 settlement has been made or a petition for nullification of the award has
been filed before the proper local trial court.
By the plain and clear language of the law, the arbitration award will have the force and
effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of 10 days from date of receipt of
the award, unless a petition for nullification of the award has been filed before the
appropriate trial court.

By her own allegation, Cabbigat received a copy of the Arbitration Award dated August
16, 2009 on August 30, 2009.Cabbigat had 10 days, or until September 9, 2009, to file a
petition for nullification of said Award before the appropriate trial court. This Cabbigat
failed to do. Consequently, the Arbitration Award attained the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court.

Cabbigat argued that the Arbitration Award did not become final because she timely
executed her Repudiation dated September 4, 2009. Preceding from Cabbigat's argument,
the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated February 25, 2015, cited Section 418 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, as amended, which states:
Sec. 418. Repudiation. - Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10)
days from the date of settlement,repudiate the same by filling with the
lupon chairman a statement to that effect sworn to before him, where the
consent is vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation. Such repudiation
shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of the certification for filing a
complaint as hereinabove provided. (Emphases ours.)
The Court of Appeals did not accord any legal effect to Cabbigat's Repudiation for it was
executed beyond the 10-day prescriptive period set in the foregoing provision.

We find though that repudiation has no application at all in this case. What may be
repudiated under the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended, are: (1) an amicable
settlement, as provided under Sections 416 and 418; and (2) an agreement to arbitrate, per
Section 413, in relation to Section 418, of the Local Government Code of 1991, as
amended.

Amicable settlement, as opposed to an arbitration award, are executed by the parties

following the mediation efforts of the Lupon Chairman or conciliation proceedings by
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. Mediation and Conciliation are "interchangeable terms
indicating the process whereby disputants are persuaded by the Punong Barangay or
Pangkat to amicably settle their disputes."[19] These are governed by Sections 408 to 412
of the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.

We stress that what is involved herein is an Arbitration Award by the Pangkat ng

Tagapagkasundo (not an amicable settlement), which can only be challenged by a party
by the filing of a petition to nullify before the appropriate trial court within 10 days from
receipt of notice of such Award.

The agreement to arbitrate under Section 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991, as
amended, is the agreement in writing of the parties "that they shall abide by the
arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat." Said agreement may be
repudiated within five days from its execution on the ground that the party's consent to
the same was vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation. This is evidently different from
the arbitration award made by the Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa or
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo at the end of the arbitration proceedings, finally
resolving the dispute.

Cabbigat's allegations/arguments reveal that she was not actually repudiating the
agreement to arbitrate but was challenging the Arbitration Award itself. We are
reproducing below the contents of Cabbigat's Repudiation:
I/WE hereby repudiate the settlement agreement for arbitration on the
ground that my/our consent was vitiated by:

()-Fraud

' - That it is not true that the Pangkat Members based their decision on what
they heard from my statement and my witnesses.

- that the boundary specified in my declaration is the irrigation in which the

Pangkat Members did not base their decision.

- that [Dumulag] has no right to claim any part of my residential lot because
it is an inheritance from my parents and that, the parents of Mr. Jacinto
Dumulag only bought the rice field [from] the parents of Mr. Ciriaco Gano.

- that in May, 1970, Mrs. Angelina Gano and Mrs. Rosita * Magatolmi did
not continue to build their Sari-Sari store located at Buhucan because my
late father [stopped] them from doing so.

- that the house of Bayong Umiki above the rice field of Jacinto Dumulag
was permitted by my late father and the house of Mrs. Teresa Tayaban,
before its construction, was permitted by me, and

, - that below the irrigation was a Pul-ing, when the rice is harvested it only
consist of 1 or 2 bundles of rice. This pul-ing was witnessed by many
people, passing through the irrigation and by those tending their kaingins.

This 4th day of September, 2009.[20]

Essentially, Cabbigat's Repudiation focused on the merits of her claim of ownership over
the subject property and questioned the basis for the Arbitration Award of the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo in Dumulag's favor. We reiterate that the only way Cabbigat could have
freed herself from the binding effect of the Arbitration Award was to file a petition to
nullify the same before the proper trial court.

In the Petition at bar, the Arbitration Award dated August 16, 2009 of the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo acquired the force and effect of a final judgment on September 9, 2009,
thus, said Award became immutable and unalterable. It was merely ministerial for the
MCTC to enforce or execute the Arbitration Award.

A final judgment becomes immutable and unalterable, as we declared in Heirs of

Shomanay Paclit v. Belisario[21]:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it
or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional
errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite
time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus
setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by
settling justiciable controversies with finality.
We also held in Tabalno v. Dingal, Sr.[22] that "[t]he principle of immutability of a final
judgment stands as one of the pillars supporting a strong, credible, and effective court.
The principle prohibits any alteration, modification, or correction of final and executory
judgments as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution
of the judgment."

We are aware that the doctrine of finality of judgment admits of several exceptions, to
wit: (1) the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments, and (3) whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.[23] None of these circumstances exist in this case. Thus, there is no special or
compelling circumstance for us to set aside the Arbitration Award which had become
final. Cabbigat is merely reiterating the merits of her claim of ownership over the subject
property, which was precisely the subject matter of the Arbitration Award.
We are not bound in this case by the final judgment in the forcible entry case initiated by
Cabbigat against the spouses Buyayo. The Arbitration Award became final
on September 9, 2009, way before the finality of the Resolution dated November 29,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126708 (dismissing the spouses
Buyayo's

Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy and rendering final the Decision dated
May 4, 2012 of the RTC-Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 126. The said decision declared
Cabbigat the owner of the subject property and ordered the spouses Buyayo to vacate the
said property) on July 8, 2013.

Furthermore, the forcible entry case only settled the issue of possession of the subject
property, not ownership, and for this reason, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the
judgment in the forcible entry case would not constitute res judicata in the present case.
Our pronouncements in Baluyo v. De la Cruz[24] are instructive on this point:
In ejectment cases, such as in forcible entry, the only question to be
resolved is who between the contending parties is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership set forth by the parties-litigants. In ejectment cases, possession
means nothing more than actual physical possession (possession de facto);
it is not juridical possession (possession de jure), which gives the transferee
a right over the thing that he may set up even against the owner. Thus, "an
ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has
presented proof of ownership of the subject property."

Issues regarding the validity of title to property can be assailed only in an

action expressly instituted for that specific purpose, either in an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. A forcible entry action such as the
present case, which by nature is an accion interdictal, is merely a quieting
process and never determines actual title to an estate.

However, where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties to an

ejectment case, the courts may provisionally pass upon the same in order
to determine who has the better right to possess the property. We stress that
the adjudication of the issue of ownership is merely provisional and would
not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.
Finally, the Court of Appeals herein correctly noted that Dumulag only sold a portion of
the subject property to the spouses Buyayo, consequently, he remained the owner of the
unsold portion of said property with legal interest to seek the enforcement or execution of
the Arbitration Award dated August 16, 2009. Dumulag properly filed his Petition for
Execution of the Arbitration Award before the MCTC on October 4, 2012 pursuant to
Section 417, Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), Title One (The Barangay), Book III
(Local Government Units) of the Local Government Code, since he could no longer seek
enforcement of the said Award by the Lupon ng Tagapagkasundo given that more than
six months had passed from the date the Award was rendered, i.e., August 16, 2009.

WHEREFORE, we RESOLVE to DENY with FINALITY the Motion for

Reconsideration of petitioner Victoria Cabbigat.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Division Clerk of Court

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 219645, September 21, 2016 ]
VICTORIA CABBIGAT, PETITIONER, V. JACINTO DUMULAG,
RESPONDENT.

Sirs and Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September
21, 2016, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 219645 - VICTORIA CABBIGAT, Petitioner, v. JACINTO DUMULAG,

Respondent.

Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution[1] dated November 9, 2015

filed by petitioner Victoria Cabbigat (Cabbigat). In said Resolution, we denied the
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court for
Cabbigat's failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in its challenged Decision[2] dated February 25, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No.
131815.

The instant Petition arose from a land dispute case filed in 2009 by respondent Jacinto
Dumulag (Dumulag) against Cabbigat before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Hapao, Hungduan, Ifugao, docketed as Barangay Case No. 24, S-2009.

On August 16, 2009, the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo issued an Arbitration Award in

Barangay Case No. 24, S-2009 in favor of Dumulag and against Cabbigat, which states,
in the vernacular: "DAKMI AN NANGIPANUH YA ATHITU DI NANGIPANUH MI,
INBASAR MI HI HINAPIT DI WITNESSES, EBIDENSYA YA OCUIAR INSPECTION YA
NAN PINGNGIT DI KAIHA AN NGATUN DI PAYO AD BUHUCAN YA BAGIN
JACINTO DUMULAG"[3] Translated to English, the Arbitration Award reads: "We
the pangkat members based our decision on the testimony of the witnesses, evidence
presented and the ocular inspection and we found that the land beside the road and
located above the rice field at Buhuan is owned by Jacinto Dumulag."[4] The parcel of
land thus awarded to Dumulag would hereinafter be referred to as the "subject property."

Cabbigat repudiated under oath before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo on September 4,

2009 the "settlement agreement for arbitration" on the ground that her consent was
vitiated by fraud.[5]

In December 2010, Dumulag sold a portion of the subject property to spouses Peter and
Marilou Buyayo (spouses Buyayo), who immediately occupied the portion they bought.

Cabbigat instituted on February 15, 2011 an action for forcible entry against the spouses
Buyayo before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Banaue-Hungduan-Mayoyao,
Banaue, Ifugao, docketed as Civil Case No. 719. In a Decision[6] dated October 18, 2011,
the MCTC declared that the spouses Buyayo have the better right to possess the land in
controversy. Cabbigat filed an appeal of the said MCTC Decision before the Regional
Trial Court of Banaue, Ifugao, Branfch 34 (RTC-Branch 34), docketed as Civil Case No.
126. RTC-Branch 34 rendered a Decision[7] on May 4, 2012, reversing the MCTC
judgment in Civil Case No. 719, declaring Cabbigat the rightful owner and possessor of
the land in dispute, and ordering spouses Buyayo to cease and desist from disturbing
Cabbigat's peaceful possession and to remove whatever construction they built on said
land. RTC-Branch 34 denied the spouses Buyayo's Motion for Reconsideration in an
Order dated July 13,' 2012, and the spouses Buyayo received a copy of said Order on July
2Q, 2012. On October 15, 2012, Cabbigat filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment in
Civil Case No. 126 before RTC-Branch 34, pointing out that the spouses Buyayo did not
file an appeal within 15 days from notice of the Order dated July 13, 2012 denying their
Motion for Reconsideration. As it turned out, the spouses Buyayo subsequently filed on
September 17, 2012 a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 126708,alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-
Branch 34 in issuing its Decision dated May 4, 2012 and Order dated July 13, 2012 in
Civil Case No. 126. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution[8] dated November 29, 2012,
dismissed the spouses Buyayo's Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy. The
said Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 126708 became final and executory on July 8, 2013.
In the meantime, on October 4, 2012, Dumulag filed a Petition for Execution before the
MCTC, seeking the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the Arbitration Award
dated August 16, 2009 of the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo in Barangay Case No. 24, S-
2009. Dumulag's Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 736. Cabbigat filed an Answer
with Motion to Dismiss on November 26, 2012, arguing that Dumulag's Petition lacked a
cause of action as the Arbitration Award was timely and properly repudiated. Also,
Dumulag had no more interest in the subject property as he had already sold the same to
the spouses Buyayo. In its Decision dated May 4, 2012 in Civil Case No. 126, RTC-
Branch 34 upheld Cabbigat's ownership of the subject property as against the spouses
Buyayo's claim; and since said Decision already became final and executory, res
judicata had set in.

The MCTC rendered its Decision[9] on March 12, 2013, denying Dumulag's Petition for
lack of merit and dismissing the same. The MCTC reasoned:
At the outset, this is an attempt of [Dumulag] to thwart the decision
rendered by the RTC. To repeat, in Civil Case No. 719, Victoria sued Peter
and Marilou Buyayo ([spouses Buyayo]) before this court for recovery of
ownership of land. The [spouses Buyayo] used the arbitration award to
prove that it was [Dumulag] who owned the land. The RTC already
disposed this issue finding [Cabbigat] as the owner of the land. The
defenses of the [spouses Buyayo] is applicable to [Dumulag] since the
[spouses Buyayo] merely relied on the claim of ownership of [Dumulag].

The RTC appreciated the evidence of [Cabbigat] over the [spouses

Buyayo's] evidence. The Arbitration Award submitted by the [spouses
Buyayo] was of scant consideration. Thus, while it may be true that it is
now Jacinto Dumulag who filed this instant petition for execution over the
same land in dispute, the principle of res judicata sets in.

The [spouses Buyayo] were mere buyers. They bought the land from
Jacinto Dumulag. When they were sued, they asserted the ownership of the
vendor [Dumulag]. They submitted the arbitration award including
documents to prove the ownership of the vendor.: As it was earlier said,
this was resolved by the RTC in favor of [Cabbigat] and the decision
became final and executory. While this court ruled in favor of the [spouses
Buyayo], the decision was reversed by the RTC. It is the decision of the
RTC which will prevail. [Dumulag] should not test this court again by
simply changing one of the parties bringing the: same evidence over the
same land in dispute.

xxxx

All said, the petition must fail.

The MCTC denied Dumulag's Motion for Reconsideration in an Order[10] dated April 10,
2013. j

Dumulag appealed before the RTC-Branch 34, docketed as Civil Case No. 137. The
RTC, in its Decision[11] dated August 26, ioi3, denied Dumulag's appeal for lack of merit
and affirmed the MCTC judgment dismissing the case.

Undeterred, Dumulag sought recourse from the Court ofj Appeals by filing a Petition for
Review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 131815.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on February 25, 2015, in Dumulag's
favor. According to the Court of Appeals, the Arbitration Award already became final,
with the force and effect of a final judgment, because Cabbigat failed to repudiate the
Arbitration Award within 10 days from the date of its execution, as prescribed by!
Sections 11 and 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise kn6wn as the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law. The Court of Appeals rationalized:
[T]he case of Galuba v. Laureta emphasizes on the strict adherence to the
ten (10)-day period and parties who fail to do so should face the
consequences of abiding by the arbitration award:

xxxx

"Pursuant to P.D. 1508, Section 12, Rule VI of the Katarungang

Pambarangay Rules which were promulgated "for the amicable settlement
of disputes at the barangay level, without judicial recourse," also provides
that "failure to repudiate the settlement or the arbitration agreement
within the time limits respectively set [in Section 10 thereof], shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to challenge on said grounds," i.e., fraud,
violence or intimidation.

Any party, therefore, who fails to avail himself of the remedy set forth in
Section 13 must face the consequences of the amicable settlement for he
can no longer file an action in court to redress his grievances arising
from said settlement.

xxxx

Having failed to repudiate the amicable settlement within the ten-day

period, petitioner is left with norecourse but to abide by its terms. He,
therefore, acted correctly when he eventually fully satisfied his obligation
pursuant to the amicable settlement, thereby, rendering his case moot and
academic. "
 xxxx

Given the applicable law and jurisprudence, this Court is persuaded to

affirm the findings of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in MCTC Civil
Case No. 719 when it ruled that the settlement became final and executory,
thus leaving nothing more to repudiate. [I]t is clear from the records that the
Arbitration Award was rendered on 16 August 2009 in favor of [Dumulag]
while the repudiation was filed on 04 September 2009, after the lapse of
nineteen (19) days from the date of the award, which is far beyond the
period provided by law.[12]
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected Cabbigat's other arguments against the validity of
the Arbitration Award, thus: (a) there was no statutory basis for Cabbigat's argument that
the 10-day period to repudiate should be reckoned from the date she came to know of the
Arbitration Award, i.e., August 30, 2009, and neither was there any evidence to
substantiate that Cabbigat indeed only received notice of said Award on such date; and
(b) there was no violation of Cabbigat's due process as the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo afforded the parties in Barangay Case No. 24, S-2009 three hearings
and complied with the written form for settlements and awards under Section 13 of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

The Court of Appeals further adjudged that the Decision dated May 4, 2012 of the RTC-
Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 126 did not constitute res judicata in the present case:
Contrary to the findings of res judicata by the lower courts in MCTC Civil
Case No. 736 and RTC Civil Case No. 137, this Court rules in the negative.
The most recent case of Arigo v. Swift revisits the well-entrenched doctrine
of res judicata and its elements to warrant its existence, viz.:
xxxx

"x x x (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former
judgment must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i)
identity of parties or at least such as representing the same
interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of
the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and, (in) identity of causes of
action in both actions such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration."
 xxxx
The said lower courts have ruled that the Decision in RTC Civil Case No.
126 filed by [Cabbigat] against spouses Buyayo effectively constitutes a bar
to the present case for the execution of the arbitration award as the Regional
Trial Court had already disposed of this issue, having found [Cabbigat] as
the proper owner and possessor of the subject property. Moreover, there is
an identity in the evidence submitted, the subject matter involved, as well
as a substantial identity of parties as [Dumulag] is privy to the spouses
Buyayo, having sold a portion of the subject property to the latter.

It can be gleaned from the records that although there may have been
identical facets in both cases, it is clear that there is a glaring disparity in
the cause of action for both cases. In MCTC Civil Case No. 736 and RTC
Civil Case [No.] 137, the cause of action is for the "execution of the
arbitration award" or the recovery of the ownership of the land, while in
MCTC Civil Case No. 719 and RTC Civil Case No. 126, the cause of
action is "forcible entry with prayer for preliminary injunction." The former
action is an ordinary civil action while the latter is a special civil action
with a special procedure under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the
case of De Jesus y Ladao v. Mendoza is instructive:
xxxx

"A judgment rendered in an action of forcible entry and

detainer is not res judicata in and is nobar to the successful
prosecution of a later action between the same parties for the
recovery of the property in litigation. "

xxxx
In the recovery of the subject property, the issue is ultimately one of
ownership while in forcible entry cases, the only issue to be resolved is the.
question of who is entitled to the physical and material possession of the
property; the ownership or the title to the subject property is not involved,
except for provisional purposes. Thus, aside from the difference in the
issues involved to bolster the claim that there is no res judicata present in
the case at bench, the assertion of [Cabbigat] that she is the rightful owner
of the subject property by virtue of the Decision in RTC Civil Case No. 126
bears no weight. As the action she had filed is one of ejectment, the latter
can only invoke her right to possess the subject property, not her right to
ownership. As stated in the case of Barbra v. Court of Appeals:

xxxx
 "In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, inferior courts, nonetheless,
have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the
issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the
issue of possession. Such decision, however, does not bind
the title or affect the ownership of the land or building,
neither shall it bar an action between the same parties
respecting the title to the land or building nor be held
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the
same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession, "xx x.13
Lastly, the Court of Appeals clarified that Dumulag still possessed an interest in the
subject property because he only sold a portion of it to the spouses Buyayo. Thus,
Dumulag was well within his right to file a petition for the execution of the Arbitration
Award as to the remaining portion of the subject property.

The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition [is] GRANTED. The
26 August 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming the 12
March 2013 Decision of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Arbitration Award rendered on 16
August 2009 is declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.[14]
In its Resolution[15] dated July 8, 2015, the Court of Appeals denied Cabbigat's Motion
for Reconsideration.

Hence, Cabbigat came before us through a Petition for Review on Certiorari with a lone
assignment of error, viz.:
The Court of Appeals committed serious error of law in not deciding and/or
granting [Cabbigat's] prayer of dismissing the Petition for Review and
reversing and setting aside the Decisions of MCTC Banaue and RTC
Branch 34 of Banaue, Ifugao directly going against the principle of res
judicata; and the blatantly erroneous application of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law (P.D. No. 1508).[16]
We issued a Resolution dated November 9, 2015 denying the Petition for Cabbigat's
failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its
Decision dated February 25, 2015 and Resolution dated July 8, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No.
131815.

Since Cabbigat's Motion for Reconsideration does not proffer any new issue or argument,
we are not persuaded to reverse our Resolution dated November 9, 2015. However, we
still deem it necessary to issue this Resolution to correct the apparent misapplication of
Section 418 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, as amended by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, by the Court of Appeals in
its Decision dated February 25, 2015.

There is no dispute in the case at bar that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of Barangay
Hapao, Hungduan, Ifugao, conducted arbitration proceedings and rendered an Arbitration
Award on August 16, 2009 in Barangay Case No. 24, S-2009 in favor of Dumulag and
against Cabbigat.

Arbitration is "a process for the adjudication of disputes by which the parties agree to be
bound by the decision of a third person or body in place of a regularly organized
tribunal."[17] Arbitration[18] at the barangay level is governed by the following provisions
of the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended:
Sec. 413. Arbitration. - (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings,
agree in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon
chairman or the pangkat. Such agreement to arbitrate may be repudiated
within five (5) days from the date thereof for the same grounds and in
accordance with the procedure hereinafter prescribed. The arbitration award
shall be made after the lapse of the period for repudiation and within ten
(10) days thereafter.

(b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or dialect known

to the parties. When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language
or dialect, the award shall be written in the language or dialect known to
them.

xxxx

Sec. 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award. - The

amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of
a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the
date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or
a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or
municipal court.

However, this provision shall not apply to court cases settled by the lupon
under the last paragraph of Section 408 of this Code, in which case the
compromise settlement agreed upon by the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat chairman shall be submitted to the court and upon
approval thereof, have the force and effect of a judgment of said court.
 Sec. 417. Execution. - The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be
enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of
the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced
by action in the appropriate city or municipal court. (Emphases ours.)
In relation to the foregoing, the Katarungang Pambarangay Circular No. 1, dated June 1,
1992, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and
Regulations, further provides:

RULE VI
Amicable Settlement of Disputes
xxxx

Sec. 15. Effect of settlement by arbitration or conciliation. — The amicable

settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from date of the
settlement or date of receipt of the award, unless repudiation of the
settlement has been made or a petition for nullification of the award has
been filed before the proper local trial court.
By the plain and clear language of the law, the arbitration award will have the force and
effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of 10 days from date of receipt of
the award, unless a petition for nullification of the award has been filed before the
appropriate trial court.

By her own allegation, Cabbigat received a copy of the Arbitration Award dated August
16, 2009 on August 30, 2009.Cabbigat had 10 days, or until September 9, 2009, to file a
petition for nullification of said Award before the appropriate trial court. This Cabbigat
failed to do. Consequently, the Arbitration Award attained the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court.

Cabbigat argued that the Arbitration Award did not become final because she timely
executed her Repudiation dated September 4, 2009. Preceding from Cabbigat's argument,
the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated February 25, 2015, cited Section 418 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, as amended, which states:
Sec. 418. Repudiation. - Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10)
days from the date of settlement,repudiate the same by filling with the
lupon chairman a statement to that effect sworn to before him, where the
consent is vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation. Such repudiation
shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of the certification for filing a
complaint as hereinabove provided. (Emphases ours.)
The Court of Appeals did not accord any legal effect to Cabbigat's Repudiation for it was
executed beyond the 10-day prescriptive period set in the foregoing provision.
We find though that repudiation has no application at all in this case. What may be
repudiated under the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended, are: (1) an amicable
settlement, as provided under Sections 416 and 418; and (2) an agreement to arbitrate, per
Section 413, in relation to Section 418, of the Local Government Code of 1991, as
amended.

Amicable settlement, as opposed to an arbitration award, are executed by the parties

following the mediation efforts of the Lupon Chairman or conciliation proceedings by
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. Mediation and Conciliation are "interchangeable terms
indicating the process whereby disputants are persuaded by the Punong Barangay or
Pangkat to amicably settle their disputes."[19] These are governed by Sections 408 to 412
of the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.

We stress that what is involved herein is an Arbitration Award by the Pangkat ng

Tagapagkasundo (not an amicable settlement), which can only be challenged by a party
by the filing of a petition to nullify before the appropriate trial court within 10 days from
receipt of notice of such Award.

The agreement to arbitrate under Section 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991, as
amended, is the agreement in writing of the parties "that they shall abide by the
arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat." Said agreement may be
repudiated within five days from its execution on the ground that the party's consent to
the same was vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation. This is evidently different from
the arbitration award made by the Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa or
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo at the end of the arbitration proceedings, finally
resolving the dispute.

Cabbigat's allegations/arguments reveal that she was not actually repudiating the
agreement to arbitrate but was challenging the Arbitration Award itself. We are
reproducing below the contents of Cabbigat's Repudiation:
I/WE hereby repudiate the settlement agreement for arbitration on the
ground that my/our consent was vitiated by:

()-Fraud

' - That it is not true that the Pangkat Members based their decision on what
they heard from my statement and my witnesses.

- that the boundary specified in my declaration is the irrigation in which the

Pangkat Members did not base their decision.

- that [Dumulag] has no right to claim any part of my residential lot because
 it is an inheritance from my parents and that, the parents of Mr. Jacinto
Dumulag only bought the rice field [from] the parents of Mr. Ciriaco Gano.

- that in May, 1970, Mrs. Angelina Gano and Mrs. Rosita * Magatolmi did
not continue to build their Sari-Sari store located at Buhucan because my
late father [stopped] them from doing so.

- that the house of Bayong Umiki above the rice field of Jacinto Dumulag
was permitted by my late father and the house of Mrs. Teresa Tayaban,
before its construction, was permitted by me, and

, - that below the irrigation was a Pul-ing, when the rice is harvested it only
consist of 1 or 2 bundles of rice. This pul-ing was witnessed by many
people, passing through the irrigation and by those tending their kaingins.

This 4th day of September, 2009.[20]

Essentially, Cabbigat's Repudiation focused on the merits of her claim of ownership over
the subject property and questioned the basis for the Arbitration Award of the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo in Dumulag's favor. We reiterate that the only way Cabbigat could have
freed herself from the binding effect of the Arbitration Award was to file a petition to
nullify the same before the proper trial court.

In the Petition at bar, the Arbitration Award dated August 16, 2009 of the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo acquired the force and effect of a final judgment on September 9, 2009,
thus, said Award became immutable and unalterable. It was merely ministerial for the
MCTC to enforce or execute the Arbitration Award.

A final judgment becomes immutable and unalterable, as we declared in Heirs of

Shomanay Paclit v. Belisario[21]:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it
or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional
errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite
time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus
setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the
 enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by
settling justiciable controversies with finality.
We also held in Tabalno v. Dingal, Sr.[22] that "[t]he principle of immutability of a final
judgment stands as one of the pillars supporting a strong, credible, and effective court.
The principle prohibits any alteration, modification, or correction of final and executory
judgments as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution
of the judgment."

We are aware that the doctrine of finality of judgment admits of several exceptions, to
wit: (1) the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments, and (3) whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.[23] None of these circumstances exist in this case. Thus, there is no special or
compelling circumstance for us to set aside the Arbitration Award which had become
final. Cabbigat is merely reiterating the merits of her claim of ownership over the subject
property, which was precisely the subject matter of the Arbitration Award.

We are not bound in this case by the final judgment in the forcible entry case initiated by
Cabbigat against the spouses Buyayo. The Arbitration Award became final
on September 9, 2009, way before the finality of the Resolution dated November 29,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126708 (dismissing the spouses
Buyayo's

Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy and rendering final the Decision dated
May 4, 2012 of the RTC-Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 126. The said decision declared
Cabbigat the owner of the subject property and ordered the spouses Buyayo to vacate the
said property) on July 8, 2013.

Furthermore, the forcible entry case only settled the issue of possession of the subject
property, not ownership, and for this reason, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the
judgment in the forcible entry case would not constitute res judicata in the present case.
Our pronouncements in Baluyo v. De la Cruz[24] are instructive on this point:
In ejectment cases, such as in forcible entry, the only question to be
resolved is who between the contending parties is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership set forth by the parties-litigants. In ejectment cases, possession
means nothing more than actual physical possession (possession de facto);
it is not juridical possession (possession de jure), which gives the transferee
a right over the thing that he may set up even against the owner. Thus, "an
ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has
presented proof of ownership of the subject property."
 Issues regarding the validity of title to property can be assailed only in an
action expressly instituted for that specific purpose, either in an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. A forcible entry action such as the
present case, which by nature is an accion interdictal, is merely a quieting
process and never determines actual title to an estate.

However, where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties to an

ejectment case, the courts may provisionally pass upon the same in order
to determine who has the better right to possess the property. We stress that
the adjudication of the issue of ownership is merely provisional and would
not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.
Finally, the Court of Appeals herein correctly noted that Dumulag only sold a portion of
the subject property to the spouses Buyayo, consequently, he remained the owner of the
unsold portion of said property with legal interest to seek the enforcement or execution of
the Arbitration Award dated August 16, 2009. Dumulag properly filed his Petition for
Execution of the Arbitration Award before the MCTC on October 4, 2012 pursuant to
Section 417, Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), Title One (The Barangay), Book III
(Local Government Units) of the Local Government Code, since he could no longer seek
enforcement of the said Award by the Lupon ng Tagapagkasundo given that more than
six months had passed from the date the Award was rendered, i.e., August 16, 2009.

WHEREFORE, we RESOLVE to DENY with FINALITY the Motion for

Reconsideration of petitioner Victoria Cabbigat.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Division Clerk of Court