METACOGNITION, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AGGRESSION AND

PASSIONATE LOVE AMONG WOMEN

JUNE 2017 JOSE KURIEN

METACOGNITION, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AGGRESSION AND
PASSIONATE LOVE AMONG WOMEN

Dissertation submitted to Osmania University, Hyderabad

In partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of

M. Phil. in Clinical Psychology, 2017

Submitted by

JOSE KURIEN

Registration no: 1266-15-331-007

Under the guidance of

Dr. Saroj Arya

Professor, Institute of Mental Health

Sweekaar Academy of Rehabilitation Sciences, Secunderabad- 500003

 DECLARATION

I, Jose Kurien, hereby declare that the study presented in this dissertation was conducted by me

under the supervision of Dr. Saroj Arya, Professor, Institute of Mental Health, Sweekaar

Academy of Rehabilitation Sciences, Secunderabad.

I also declare that no part of this study has either been previously published or submitted as a

dissertation for any degree or diploma course in any University.

Place: Secunderabad JOSE KURIEN

Date:
 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this dissertation entitled “Metacognition, Emotional Intelligence,

Aggression and Passionate Love among Women” is a bonafide work carried out by Jose Kurien

in Institute of Mental Health, Sweekaar Academy of Rehabilitation Sciences, Secunderabad, under

my supervision and guidance.

This is to certify that this work submitted by the candidate as a dissertation in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the M. Phil in Clinical Psychology has not formed the basis for the award

of any degree or diploma to any candidate. This is a bonafide record of the candidate’s personal

effort.

Guide:

Dr. Saroj Arya

Professor
Institute of Mental Health
Sweekaar Academy of Rehabilitation Sciences
Secunderabad-03

Forwarded:

Dr. Bhasi Sukumaran

The Head of Department
Institute of Mental Health
Sweekaar Academy of Rehabilitation Sciences
Secunderabad-03

Place: Secunderabad

Date:
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank the Chairman Dr. P. Hanumantha Rao of Sweekaar Academy of

Rehabilitation Sciences, Secunderabad.

I am extremely grateful to Dr. Bhasi Sukumaran, The Head of Department, Institute of Mental

Health, Sweekaar Academy of Rehabilitation Sciences, Secunderabad.

I express my heartfelt gratitude and sincere thanks to Dr. Saroj Arya, my guide and Professor,

Institute of Mental Health who provided remarkable guidance, valuable suggestions,

encouragement and co-operation, and contributed her treasured time and knowledge to the positive

development of this project. I admire her unconditional positive regard, ability to listen

empathetically and patiently, genuineness, commitment, and brilliance in guiding me in this

endeavor.

I also express my sincere thanks to all the participants of this study for their valuable co-operation.

I am thankful to all the faculty members and non – teaching staff of Institute of Mental Health for

their encouragement and support in the completion of this dissertation.

I would also like to thank my parents and family members for their support throughout the

endeavor.
 CONTENTS

Page No.

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………… 2

Chapter 1 Metacognition……………………………………………………………... 9

Chapter 2 Emotional Intelligence……………………………………………………. 16

Chapter 3 Aggression…………………………………………………………………. 30

Chapter 4 Love………………………………………………………………………… 35

Chapter 5 Methods……………………………………………………………………. 42

Chapter 6 Results……………………………………………………………………… 56

Chapter 7 Discussion………………………………………………………………….. 71

Chapter 8 Summary…………………………………………………………………… 87

References 96

Appendices 109
 INTRODUCTION

1
 INTRODUCTION

The concept of love and understanding of women always have been an enigma from time

immemorial despite the huge amount of thought put on it by several cultures over centuries and

the systematic research done during the modern times. Research on metacognition and emotional

intelligence has changed the field of psychology to a great extent and how we look at the concept

of human mind. Aggression always been a topic of interest from the very beginning of the field of

psychology or even before that when the field of psychology got detached from that of philosophy.

So looking at all these factors together seems an interesting proposition.

Metacognition

The knowledge and regulation of one’s thought processes is often referred to as “metacognition”.

As Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach (2006) note, the domain of metacognition seems

to lack coherence. However, practically all the literature on the subject of metacognition refers to

the pioneering work of Flavell. He introduced metacognition as “knowledge and cognition about

cognitive phenomena” (1979), which is also referred to in terms such as “thinking about thinking”

or “higher order cognition of cognition” (e.g. Alexander et al., 1995; Hacker, 1998; and Veenman

et al., 2006). Flavell defined metacognition as consisting of both a component of knowledge, and

experiences and regulation (1979). According To Flavell (1993) metacognition includes

knowledge about the nature of people as cognizers, about the nature of different cognitive tasks,

and about possible strategies that can be applied to the solution of different tasks. It also includes

executive skills for monitoring and regulating one’s cognitive activities.

Emotional Intelligence

Emotional Intelligence cuts across the cognitive and emotional systems and is at one time unitary

and multidimensional, being sub-divisible into four branches. The first branch, emotional

2
perception/identification, involves perceiving and encoding information from the emotional

system. The second branch, emotional facilitation of thought, involves further processing of

emotion to improve cognitive processes with a view to complex problem solving. The third branch,

emotional understanding, is in some ways the obverse of the second: it concerns cognitive

processing of emotion. The fourth and final branch, emotion management, concerns the control

and regulation of emotions in the self and others (Mayer, Salovey, et al., 2000).Emotions are

contextualized, emergent phenomena, such that there are no right or wrong responses—no

accuracy in an absolute sense. However, some responses are better than others. Usually, judgments

about the desirability of a response are culturally and temporally situated. Thus, it is sensible to

measure emotional intelligence in terms of an individual’s understanding and use of this

consensual knowledge.

Aggression

Aggression acquires personal meaning for each individual as their aggressive impulses emerge

and take shape in the context of their relationships. In other words, our destructive feelings acquire

meanings from the ways others evoke, receive and understand our aggressive initiatives and

responses. Destructiveness is evoked when the sense of self feels endangered. In particular, the

prolonged dependency of human beings on others during infancy inclines us to experience

responsive failures as threats to our psychological, and sometimes physiological, survival

throughout life (Mitchell 1993).

If direct aggression is discouraged in females, it is likely that they instead resort to indirect forms

of aggression. The common feature of this type of aggression is that the aggressor can stay

unidentified and thereby avoid both counterattack from the aggressor and disapproval from the

rest of the community. According to Buss (1963), "indirect aggression may be verbal (spreading

nasty gossip) or physical (a man sets fire to his neighbor's home)." Archer and Coyne (2005) have

3
argued that a fuller understanding of the significance of indirect aggression can only be gained by

appreciating that it has different functions than direct aggression. Instead of putting the other

individual at an immediate competitive disadvantage, by physically injuring them, indirect

aggression may serve to remove a competitive rival from the arena of competition by excluding

them from a social group. A second major function of indirect aggression is to adversely influence

the social standing of another individual.

Love

Love is a form of value, and value takes many forms. It begins with drive in the unconscious core

of the self. Core value is bound up with drive in relation to the self-preservative instincts, such as

hunger. For micro-genetic theory, the core category and the drive do not come together but are

fused from the beginning in a single construct. Specifically, every affect has a conceptual frame

and every concept has an affective tonality. The broader implications of this view are that feeling

is the process of becoming and concepts (objects) are the substance of being (Brown, 2005).

The debate in psychology whether love is volition or need, that is, intentional or involuntary, or

what role decision plays in falling in love, reflects the proximity of the dominant segment to drive

or to desire. The closer to drive, the more love is like unconscious need. The closer love is to

desire, the more it is like wish, want, and intentional feeling. Volition does not precede and

motivate action or emotion but is part of the same phase to which emotion develops. More

precisely, the phase of desire is also one of volition, choice, and intentionality (Brown, 2012).

Need for Study

Researchers have observed relationship between cognitive knowledge and cognitive monitoring.

As literature suggests metacognitive experiences that allow one to monitor and regulate one’s

cognition play a major role in the development and refinement of metacognitive knowledge.

Emotion-related self-regulation which refers to monitoring and regulating the impact of emotions

4
and motivational states on one’s performance parallels the regulation of cognition involved in the

executive functioning dimension of metacognition. Metacognition also entails affective and

motivational states, including concepts such as effortful control and inhibitory control.

Emotional Intelligence cuts across the cognitive and emotional systems and is at one time unitary

and multidimensional. Emotional facilitation of thought, involves further processing of emotion

to improve cognitive processes with a view to complex problem solving. Understanding when and

why we will feel pride, love, jealousy, and rage is a key component of emotional intelligence.

Metacognitive awareness draws on emotion concepts and is necessary for labelling an emotion,

for putting the emotion in a broader context, and for understanding an emotion. Negative emotions

have the potential for functional utility because there are times when the effects of negative

emotions are useful. Recognizing this potential for benefit is the key to understanding why it is

neither odd nor self-contradictory to claim that negative emotions can be useful or even desirable.

As early as 3 years of age, and across many cultures, females found to have greater ability than

males to perceive facial expressions of emotion.

Aggression in females is found to be less stable than in males. Female perpetrators use a form of

indirect aggression termed “social manipulation” more often than male perpetrators do. Indirect

aggression is typically a lower cost form of aggression than direct forms are, achieved either by

hiding the aggressor’s identity or by enabling them to deny aggressive intent. Indirect aggression

is perhaps most well developed in the social networks of female adolescence and young women,

and this fits with its suggested function, to reduce the social standing of potential rivals. Similar to

dieting, anorexia nervosa has been proposed to be a direct consequence of female intra-sexual

competition.

Love is the ultimate valuation of a thing, to which all desires are subordinate. There is nothing

more important than what is loved, which is to say that love, regardless of whether or not it is

5
implemented, realizes a value of immense signification. Core value is bound up with drive in

relation to the self-preservative instincts, such as hunger. The debate in psychology whether love

is volition or need, that is, intentional or involuntary, or what role decision plays in falling in love,

reflects the proximity of the dominant segment to drive or to desire. The closer to drive, the more

love is like unconscious need. The closer love is to desire, the more it is like wish, want, and

intentional feeling. Sadism is pleasure in pain inflicted on others, often linked to the sexual drive.

Masochism may be the enjoyment of such pain, but it is also a way of offering one’s self for

reciprocity or engagement. One can love or need a person so much that he/she accepts punishment

for interest. Some people require abuse and put up with constant rejection, even brutality, to satisfy

a need or in the hope of gaining love in return. Sadism and its opposite are not fully sexual nor are

they part of love but are related to aggression and defense as vectors for the drives. When giving

becomes sexualized, and reciprocity becomes punitive and the delicate balance of mutual surrender

that love requires is exploited in carnality or enslavement. The drive to individuation is opposed

to that for community, which is manifest in the security that family affords, not only for the child

but in the shared labor and mutual aid essential to marriage or its equivalent. Community reaches

its limit in abdication, individuation in alienation. Love resolves these competing pressures, one

to an extreme of independence, the other to possible loss of self. Possessiveness in love is closer

to hunger than sexuality, even with a sexual character, since the signature of true love is surrender,

not ownership. A desperate need for a beloved or a pathological jealousy may appear as great

passion, but it derives from the transition of predation to sexual capture. An intense love can vanish

with a word, evaporate on a misunderstanding, or insensitive remark. How fragile is a love that

cannot withstand a foolish jest, a jealous glance, a moment of detachment, a slight coolness, an

oversight, or lack of ardor?

6
In this context, establishing a statistical correlation/ association between the variables of

metacognition, emotional intelligence, aggression and love among women would be desirous.

Metacognitive awareness is being selected as representative variable of metacognition as

correlation between them has already been established. Both direct aggression & indirect

aggression together representing the total aggression and passionate love is selected to represent

the broader concept of love, to arrive at a general perspective.

The dissertation is divided into 9 chapters. The present introductory chapter is intended to provide

context and background for the study. Chapter 1 provides a review about the concept of

metacognition and the variable meta-awareness. Chapter 2 provides a review about the concept of

emotional intelligence. Chapter 3 provides a review about the concept of aggression. Chapter 4

provides a review about the concept of Love. Chapter 5 outlines the methodology adopted for the

current study. Chapters 6 and 7 presents the results and discussion of the findings in the context

of existing literature. Chapters 8 and 9 presents the summary and conclusion of the research.

References and appendices are provided in the last segment of the dissertation.

7
 CHAPTER -1

METACOGNITION

8
 CHAPTER -1
METACOGNITION

The knowledge and regulation of one’s thought processes is often referred to as “metacognition”.

Metacognition consists of two components: knowledge and control. Metacognitive knowledge

pertains to one’s knowledge about how one’s cognition operates (“I know that I do not memorize

names well”), whereas metacognitive control pertains to how one controls one’s cognitive

operations. Nelson and Narens (1990,) conceptualized metacognition as operating at two levels:

the objective level and the meta-level. The objective level carries out cognitive operations, whereas

the meta-level controls activities that occur at the objective level.

The triarchic theory of Intelligence by Sternberg (1994) supports the view that metacognitive

activities, referred to as meta-components, are of particular relevance in cognitive performance.

As Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters and Afflerbach (2006) note, the domain of metacognition seems

to lack coherence. Practically all the literature on the subject of metacognition refers to the

pioneering work of Flavell. He introduced metacognition as “knowledge and cognition about

cognitive phenomena” (1979), which is also referred to in terms such as “thinking about thinking”

or “higher order cognition of cognition” (e.g. Alexander et al., 1995; Hacker, 1998; and Veenman

et al., 2006). Flavell defined metacognition as consisting of both a component of knowledge, and

experiences and regulation (1979). Building on the contributions of Flavell, Brown shifted the

focus to the monitoring and regulatory aspects of metacognition in her articles of the late seventies

(e.g. Brown, Campione & Barclay, 1979). On the other hand, Kluwe’s articles, published in the

eighties, focus on executive control as a key concept within the domain of metacognition in which

he makes the distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge (e.g. Kluwe, 1982).

9
Along with the discussion about the concept of metacognition, many terms have been developed

over the years, for example: metacognitive beliefs, metacognitive awareness, metamemory,

executive skills, self-regulation, metacognitive skills and so on (Veenman et al., 2006). Though

the diverse conceptualizations have differential focal points, the most common distinction seems

to separate metacognitive declarative knowledge (about the interactions between the

characteristics of a person, task and strategy), from metacognitive procedural knowledge

(exhibited in metacognitive skills concerning the regulation of, and control over cognitive

processes and learning) (Veenman, et al., 2005; 2006). Shraw and Graham (1997) for instance,

make the distinction between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive control. In their view,

metacognitive knowledge includes different kinds of metacognitive awareness, and metacognitive

control processes consist of skills that help a person use that knowledge to regulate cognitive

processes. Alexander et al. (1995) also use a comparable distinction between declarative

metacognitive knowledge and a more procedural aspect to which they refer to as cognitive

monitoring. Besides these two factors, they have chosen to add a third factor: “strategy regulation

and control” which they use as a separate indicator of the metacognition referring to a strategy or

task. Yore and Craig (1992) use a definition of metacognition as consisting of the awareness and

executive control of cognition.

Alexander et al. (1995) have not only assessed the development of metacognition tied to age, but

in addition have proposed four possible models for the development of metacognition in relation

to intelligence. They elaborated multiple possible hypotheses concerning this development. One

is the model of metacognitive abilities that develop in a monotonic fashion, parallel to the increase

of intellectual abilities over the years; “the monotonic development hypothesis”. In this model,

children of high intelligence will maintain monotonic superiority over children of lower

intelligence throughout life. Another possible model is provided by the “acceleration hypothesis”

10
in which we see effects of higher intelligence becoming larger with age. The third hypothesis posed

is the “ceiling hypothesis” that states that highly intelligent children develop metacognitive skills

faster, but effects diminish over time with lower intelligence children catching up eventually.

Finally, if there were no coherence between intelligence and metacognitive skills, Alexander, 1995

et al. state, no separate theory would be needed. The review of empirical evidence by Alexander,

1995 et al. pre-dominantly suggests acceleration or alternatively, a monotonic relationship between

intelligence and metacognition. The monotonic hypothesis seems to be the explanation most in

line with the ideas of general intelligence theorists, but most previous research lending support for

this hypothesis was done on average and retarded children, and much less on children of high

ability.

Cultural Orientations and Influences

According to Freeman factors such as positive and supporting interactions, meaningful stimulation

of learning, a variety of experiences, freedom and materials to play and experiment and real

emotional support will be positive factors in the development of both abilities and metacognitive

skills (Freeman, 1993). Moreover, another factor of interest that may influence metacognitive

skills, as well as intellectual abilities, is “‘culture”. Culture is a package concept that comes as a

whole. It influences patterns of relationships, undermining the universality of certain theories and

models. In the assessment of intelligence, school performance or any other concept in different

cultural settings the validity of score comparisons has been - and still is - the focus of ample

scientific research and debate (e.g., Jensen, 1985; Helms-Lorenz, Van de Vijver & Poortinga,

2003). Subject related factors that can influence test performance of natives and migrants are:

verbal abilities, cultural norms and values, test-wiseness, and acculturation strategy. Most tests

call for high verbal abilities and skills. Natives and migrants differ in mastery of the native

language and cultural knowledge. Test instructions and item phrasing can unintentionally cause

11
bias and reduce the validity of inferences drawn from score comparisons (e.g., Van de Vijver &

Poortinga, 1997).

Measuring Metacognitive Skills

The central problem related to metacognition research is its estimation in the individual's cognitive

process while solving a problem or learning. This is a practical obstacle caused by the fact that

metacognition is an inner awareness or process rather than an overt behaviour (White, 1986), and

because individuals themselves are often not aware of these processes (Rowe, 1991).

In measuring metacognitive skills, most often verbal report techniques are used. These techniques

comprise off-line and on-line methods. Off-line methods frequently used in research on

metacognitive skills are questionnaires or interviews (compare Chan, 1996; Jakobs, & Paris, 1987;

Malpass, et al., 1999; Minnaert & Janssen, 1999; Perleth, 1992; Swanson, 1992; Yore & Craig,

1992). These off-line methods have the advantage that the collection of data is simple and takes

relatively less time. Interviews have the additional advantage that it is possible to continue

questioning until the meaning of the answer is clear. Disadvantages of both methods however, are

the possibility that learners may have forgotten, or simply might not mention, several relevant

learning activities. Also, the effects of reflection-skills of students and social pressure may

influence the responses. Questionnaires appear to be less suitable for elementary school pupils

(Van-Hout-Wolters, 2000).

An on-line method, which is used in assessment of metacognition, is the “thinking-aloud method”

in which the students are asked to think aloud during the performance of a task (compare Swanson,

1990; Veenman et al. 1997; 2000; 2004; 2005). The thinking aloud of the subjects is usually

recorded and transcribed. These transcriptions are then judged on metacognitive verbalizations.

This method is typically used in research but not often in educational practice. Assessment by

means of thinking aloud protocols, in which information is gathered during the learning activities,

12
has the advantage that little information is lost (Van Hout-Wolters, 2000). Disadvantages of

thinking-aloud protocols are found in the fact that the gathering and analyses of data is relatively

complex and time-consuming. Therefore, this on-line method is not frequently applied to large

groups of subjects. Besides, these measures may also be influenced by social desirability (Van

Hout- Wolters, 2000).

Metacognitive Skill Training Effects

The teaching of metacognitive skills have seen to be a great stimulating factor for the development

of learning and abilities as evidenced in the Thinking Actively in a Social Context (TASC)

program in Africa. This TASC program proceeds from different conceptions of intelligence from

Vygotsky and Feuerstein to Sternberg’s theory of intelligence. Children are taught how, and when,

to use strategies, and are given ample practice in the application of skills and strategies that are

significant and relevant to the learners. Several studies have shown that training metacognitive

skills can benefit the working method and performance of students. For example, in the

intervention-study by Verschaffel, De Corte, Lasure, Van Veerenberg, Bogaerts and Ratinckx

(1999), the results point to a significant positive effect of a learning environment aimed at the

development of metacognitive strategies in the mathematics curriculum which results in an

increase in the upper elementary school pupils’ problem solving skills. Furthermore, the

metacognition-oriented mathematics method for heterogeneous classrooms ‘IMPROVE’ by

Maverech and Kramarski (1997) showed that seventh grade students who had been working with

the method, significantly outperformed the non-treatment control group on measures of

mathematics achievement, particularly in mathematical reasoning. The students using this method

were instructed in new concepts, metacognitive questioning, previewing, verification and reducing

difficulties, and were supported in practice, obtaining of mastery, and enrichment. Veenman et al.

(2006) remarked that in supporting students by providing metacognitive instruction, the instruction

13
will have to be embedded in the content matter, must inform learners about the usefulness of

metacognitive skills and the training should be of considerable duration to guarantee thorough and

maintained appliance. They argued that all successful instructional programs should attend to

explaining: What to do, When to do it, Why do it, and How to do it, the so-called “WWW&H

rule”. Bearing in mind that metacognitive skillfulness appears to positively affect the performance

of minority students, similar metacognitive training programs can thus be useful in the stimulation

of performance among children with different cultural backgrounds, provided that possible cultural

barriers are taken into consideration in instruction and evaluation.

*** ~~~~~~~***

14
 CHAPTER -2

EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

15
 CHAPTER -2
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Despite its historical roots, the concept of Emotional Intelligence (EI) is one of the most recently

defined categories of intelligence in the field of psychology, appearing at the beginning of the

1990s as a result of contemporary development which required a non-traditional vision of the

concept of intelligence (Pfeiffer, 2001). Mayer and Salovey (1997) suggest that 18th century as

the time of origin of the concept of emotional intelligence, when scientists divided the brain into

three parts dedicated severally to cognition, affect, and motivation. The concept of emotional

intelligence aroused general interest because of the efficacy of its practical applications in

improving the individual’s skills in facing the new-age challenges, combined with the

dissemination of both concept and basic components through a number of new books and articles

by researchers including Bar-on (1988), Garnder (1999).

Mayer and Salovey (1990) are credited with originating the term “emotional intelligence,”

considering it a form of social intelligence entailing the individual’s ability of both self-control

and of influencing emotions and feelings of others; the ability to distinguish different feelings and

emotions and use these skills to guide and influence ways of thought and action. According to him,

Emotional Intelligence cut across the cognitive and emotional systems and is at one time unitary

and multidimensional, being sub-divisible into four branches. The first branch, emotional

perception/identification, involves perceiving and encoding information from the emotional

system. The second branch, emotional facilitation of thought, involves further processing of

emotion to improve cognitive processes with a view to complex problem solving. The third branch,

emotional understanding, is in some ways the obverse of the second: it concerns cognitive

processing of emotion. The fourth and final branch, emotion management, concerns the control

and regulation of emotions in the self and others (Mayer, Salovey, et al., 2000).

16
Cooper (1996) has conceptualized emotional intelligence as comprising emotional awareness of

self and others, interpersonal connections, resilience, creativity, compassion, and intuition (to

name but a few abilities) and developed an operational index: the EQ Map. Goleman’s (2001)

conceptualization of Emotional Intelligence rests on other aspects of what is known today of

cognition, personality, motivation, emotions, neurobiology, and intelligence, rather than on this

(problematic) definition in isolation.

Emotional Intelligence and Gender

Goleman (1995, p. 132) suggests that ‘‘Women, on the average, experience the entire range of

emotions with greater intensity and more volatility than men—in this sense, women are more

emotional than men’’. In contrast, citing his normative sample, Bar-On (2000) notes no differences

between males and females regarding overall emotional and social competence, though both

gender groups do show slight differences (in their favor) in some domains. (Females score higher

on interpersonal skills, men score higher on stress management and adaptation). In fact, existing

personality data (e.g., Feingold, 1994) suggest that women score higher on some of the personality

traits linked to EI, especially agreeableness and its components such as trust and tender-

mindedness. Men, on the other hand, score higher on others, such as emotional stability, and there

is no gender difference on still other relevant traits, such as conscientiousness and impulsivity.

Emotional Intelligence and Ethnicity

As for gender differences, the available information on ethic differences in EI is both scant and

contradictory. Goleman’s (1995) conceptualization clearly implies that citizens of diverse, racial

and cultural origins can possess EI, in equal measure. Supporting this proposition, Bar-On (2000),

in examination of a North American sample, claims that there were no significant differences on

social and EI between various ethnic groups administered the EQ-i. However, using the Multi-

factor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS), Roberts, Zeidner, et al. (2001) reported a rather

17
unusual phenomena. Using consensual scores there appeared no difference between ethnic groups,

and yet when expert scoring was used Whites outperformed minority groups on many of the sub-

scales.

Emotional Intelligence and Age Differences

Roberts, Zeidner, et al. (2001) reported that the types of investigation carried out to examine age

differences has been both meager and contradictory. Bar-On (2000), for example, claims relatively

small differences across the life-span, whereas Mayer, Salovey, et al. (2003) claim that increasing

age differences are required of the MEIS, if it measures a legitimate form of intelligence. In

providing preliminary data, they compared a sample of adolescents with a population of university

students; two samples too close in age to make definitive statements.

Emotional Intelligence and Social Class

Among the earliest documented of the various group differences studied, it was the observation

that children of ‘‘superior’’ social class outperformed children of ‘‘inferior’’ social class on

measures of general intelligence (see, e.g., Terman & Merrill, 1937). These social class differences

appear to have remained with us to the present point in time (see Mackintosh, 1998; Mascie-Taylor

& Gibson, 1978; Waller, 1971). Roberts, Zeidner, et al. ( 2001) reports that despite extravagant

claims to the contrary, it remains entirely possible, given close links that we have already alluded

to in respect of crystallized intelligence, that EI is positively associated with social class.

Emotion as an Adaptive Function

Cognitive emotion theory is compatible with biological and basic emotions approaches in

attributing broadly adaptive functions such as communication to emotion. It goes beyond such

approaches in specifying and differentiating multiple functions of emotion and linking them to

different components of the cognitive architecture. One of the distinctions often made (e.g.,

18
Ketelaar & Clore, 1997) is between emotion as information and emotion as motivation. The former

refers to the capacity of emotion (or, rather, the signals associated with emotion) to provide

information distinct from language like codes. The Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1996) model

describes the coordinative function of emotion signals. Emotion as information may influence

processing at different levels simultaneously, serving as input both to automatic biasing of discrete

processors and to higher-level executive function. Ketelaar and Clore (1997) make the intriguing

suggestion that emotions may signal the likely long-term outcome of encounters, based on evolved

routines for evaluation of the cues provided by a situation. Emotion as motivation refers to the

power of affect to elicit behaviors that increase happiness and prevent negative affect. Again, the

time factor may be important: Ketelaar and Clore (1997) argue that emotions regulate the

commitment of effort to long-term strategies, such as delaying immediate gratification in favor of

a long-term goal. As indicated above, it is uncertain whether emotions are rigidly tied to

evolutionary imperatives. The more pertinent aspect of Ketelaar and Clore’s (1997) position is that

emotions may be linked to processes for weighing up the value of response choices that are distinct

from conscious ratiocination (though still cognitive). The idea resembles Damasio’s (1994) view

that emotions facilitate social-problem solving, but Ketelaar and Clore’s formulation makes more

contact with the behavioral-research literature. For example, they describe how experimental

inductions of guilt influence behavior in a ‘‘prisoner’s dilemma’’ game in which the person has to

decide whether to behave cooperatively or antagonistically toward (in this case) a computer

opponent. Guilt (or whatever cognitions underpin guilt) tended to restrain people from taking

advantage of or retaliating against their opponent.

Emotional Intelligence and Brain

There is converging evidence from both neuroscience and cognitive science that EI may be a

quality of an executive control system for emotion regulation, supported by sites in the frontal

19
cortex (Rolls, 1999). Lesions to areas such as orbitofrontal cortex lead to substantial deficits in

social problem-solving (Bechara et al., 2000). More general control systems for attention and

decision-making also reside in frontal cortex (Shallice & Burgess, 1996). From the cognitive

perspective, the problems of modularity may be avoided if it is supposed that EI relates to some

superordinate executive system, of the kind established by experimental studies (Wells &

Matthews, 1994). The idea is also compatible with current theory linking EI to aspects of self-

regulation (Mayer et al., 2000), or to effective coping (Bar-On, 2000; Salovey et al., 1999). EI may

describe an executive system that makes adaptive selections of evaluative and action-oriented

processing routines. Nevertheless, the executive hypothesis faces significant difficulties. Like any

other cognitive system, it is supported by multiple components, and it is unclear which components

are critical. Furthermore, much of the wisdom of the executive resides in its store of procedural

knowledge in long-term memory (Wells & Matthews, 1994), whose quality reflects a variety of

factors including exposure to supportive learning environments and transferability from past to

present circumstances.

According to appraisal theorists, emotions are tightly coupled with specific computational

operations. Analyzing a stimulus as threatening implies anxious emotion, and vice versa. The

implication is that EI may be a quality of these computations of the personal relevance of the

stimulus. Hence EI can be conceptualized as either the efficiency or positive bias of these

computations. The emotionally intelligent person might have more accurate evaluations of

significant stimuli, or they might be biased towards evaluation of stimuli as positive rather than

negative, leading to qualities such as optimism, happiness, and positive self-beliefs (see Bar-On,

2000).

20
Research on Emotional Intelligence and Coping

A modicum of research has been conducted linking EI components to effective coping strategies.

Bar-On (1997) reports that the EQ-i correlates moderately with high task-focused coping and low

emotion-focused coping. However, exactly this result would be expected based on the high

correlation between EQ-i and neuroticism, which is similarly related to coping (Endler & Parker,

1990, 1999). Ciarrochi, Chan, and Bajgar (2001) report a study of the Schutte et al. (1998) in which

EI scale in adolescents that did not address stress directly but provided some mixed findings. On

the positive side, EI was related to perceived social support. The authors also found that a subscale

of the EI measure, ‘‘Managing Self-Relevant Emotions,’’ related to emotional content in stories

generated by participants, depending on the type of mood previously induced, an effect attributed

to use of mood-regulation strategies such as mood repair (negative mood induction) and mood

maintenance (positive induction). On the negative side, EI failed to moderate emotional response

to negative and positive mood inductions used in the study, so the mood management strategies

attributed to EI did not appear to be effective in regulating mood in this context. Results of studies

using the Multi-factor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS) have been somewhat confusing.

Ciarrochi, Chan, and Caputi (2000) suggest that the MEIS indexes individual differences in mood

management but the evidence for this claim is somewhat indirect, and EI had no effect on negative

mood response. A study on a female sample found that skill at mood repair was not meaningfully

associated with active coping but rather associated with less trait and state passive coping (Salovey,

Stroud, Woolesy & Epel, in press). These differences may well be attributed to gender differences

in the EI-coping relation.

Emotional Disorders

The mood disorders and anxiety disorders describe a group of conditions in which mood must be

altered for the diagnosis to be made. Various anxiety disorders (e.g., generalized anxiety, panic

21
disorder, phobia) require the presence of unusual or intense fear or anxiety. Negative emotions

must be accompanied by other criteria for a clinical diagnosis to be made. For a major depressive

episode to be diagnosed, the patient, in addition to meeting other criteria, must experience either

depressed mood for most of nearly every day or marked decrease in interest or pleasure in nearly

all activities. Positive moods may also be a sign of pathology. Bipolar disorders are characterized

by alternating episodes of depression and mania, i.e., abnormal, persistent elevation of mood.

Principal symptoms of some anxiety and mood disorders in DSM include:

1. Generalized Anxiety Disorder

 For more than half the days in at least 6 months, the patient experiences excessive anxiety

and worry about several events or activities.

 The patient has trouble controlling these feelings.

 Other anxiety and worry symptoms include feeling restless, tired, and irritable. May have

trouble concentrating and sleeping.

 Symptoms cause clinically important distress or impair work, social or personal functioning.

2. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

 Patient must have obsessions or compulsions (or both) which cause severe distress, and

interfere with social or personal functioning.

 Obsessions. Recurring, persisting thoughts, impulses or images inappropriately intrude into

awareness and cause marked distress or anxiety. The patient tries to ignore or suppress these

ideas or to neutralize them by thoughts or behavior.

 Compulsions. The patient feels the need to repeat physical behaviors (checking the stove to

be sure it is off, hand washing) or mental behaviors (counting things, silently repeating

words). These behaviors aim to reduce or eliminate distress, but they are not realistically

related to the events they are supposed to counteract.

22
3. Panic Disorder (may be diagnosed with or without agoraphobia)

 The patient experiences recurrent panic attacks, defined as the sudden development of a

severe fear or discomfort that peaks within 10 minutes. During this discrete episode, 4 or

more of the following symptoms occur:

Chest pain or other chest discomfort, Chills or hot flashes, Choking sensation, De-

realization (feeling unreal) or depersonalization (feeling detached from self ), Dizzy,

lightheaded, faint or unsteady, Fear of dying, Fears of loss of control or becoming insane,

Heart pounds, races or skips beats, Nausea or other abdominal discomfort, Numbness or

tingling, Sweating, Shortness of breath or smothering sensation, Trembling.

 For a month or more after at least 1 of these attacks, the patient has had 1 or more of:

Ongoing concern that there will be more attacks, Worry as to the significance of the attack

or its consequences (for health, control, sanity), Material change in behavior, such as

doing something to avoid or combat, the attacks.

4. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

 The patient has experienced or witnessed an unusually traumatic event that involved actual

or threatened death or serious physical injury to the patient or to others, and the patient felt

intense fear, horror or helplessness.

 Patient repeatedly relives the event through, e.g., intrusive recollections, distressing dreams,

‘flashbacks’, accompanied by distress and physiological reactivity to cues that symbolize or

resemble the event.

 Patient repeatedly avoids thinking about the event, and situations that recall the event

 Patient has numbing of general responsiveness; e.g., feels detached from other people

23
5. Social Phobia

 The patient strongly, repeatedly fears at least one social or performance situation that

involves facing strangers or being watched by others. The patient specifically fears showing

anxiety symptoms or behaving in some other way that will be embarrassing or humiliating.

 The phobic stimulus almost always causes anxiety, which may be a cued or situationally

predisposed panic attack.

 The patient either avoids the situation or endures it with severe distress or anxiety.

 Either there is marked distress about having the phobia or it markedly interferes with the

patient’s usual routines or social, job or personal functioning.

6. Major Depression

 At least one major depressive episode, i.e., in the same 2 weeks, the patient has had 5 or more

of the following symptoms, occurring for most of nearly every day. Either depressed mood

or decreased interest or pleasure must be one of the five:

Mood. Patient reports depressed mood or appears depressed to others; Interests. Interest or

pleasure is markedly decreased in nearly all activities; Eating and weight. Marked change in

appetite or actual weight; Sleep. The patient sleeps excessively or not enough; Motor activity.

The patient’s activity is agitated or retarded; Fatigue. There is fatigue or loss of energy; Self-

worth. The patient feels worthless or inappropriately guilty; Concentration. The patient is

indecisive or has trouble thinking or concentrating; Death. The patient has repeated thoughts

about death, suicide or has made a suicide attempt.

 Symptoms cause clinically important distress or impair work, social or personal functioning.

24
Non-Emotional aspects of Emotional Intelligence in Mental Disorders

Many of the defining characteristics of EI refer not directly to emotional state, but to qualities

related to awareness and management of emotion. In some disorders, dysfunction of these qualities

is more apparent than any overall mood disturbance. Impaired self-control is one such quality.

Disorders associated with poor impulse control fall under several DSM headings, including

personality disorders (e.g., antisocial personality), and bipolar disorder (during manic episodes).

Severely disorganized behavior is an important criterion, though not a necessary one, for

schizophrenic disorders. In the disorganized type of schizophrenia, both severe disorganization

and flat or inappropriate affect must be present. Impulse control disorders, which refers to

conditions defined by lack of control include intermittent explosive disorder (episodes of

disproportionate aggression), kleptomania, pyromania, pathological gambling, and

trichotillomania (persistent hair-pulling and extraction). Often, these conditions are associated

with anxiety before the impulsive act and relief afterwards. In children, impulsivity is a common

feature of attention- deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).

Another feature of low EI is interpersonal difficulties due to lack of insight into others’ feelings

and motives. Difficulties in relating to others are common in various mental disorders, including,

personality disorders. Pervasive developmental disorders in which the child fails to develop social

skills, notably autistic disorder, whose diagnosis requires at least 2 indicators of impaired social

interaction, such as deficiencies in use of nonverbal behavior, lack of appropriate peer

relationships, and lack of social or emotional reciprocity. Social dysfunction due to inaccurate

appraisal of others may also be experienced by mood and anxiety patients, and by schizophrenics.

Research on Disorders involving Emotions

Several disorders are not overtly associated with emotion or emotion regulation criteria, but are

nevertheless linked to emotion by research. At the diagnostic level, it is not uncommon for various

25
medical and psychiatric disorders to be comorbid with anxiety and/or mood disorder (Kroenke,

Jackson & Chamberlin, 1997). Carson et al. (2000) studied 300 patients referred to a general

neurology clinic. Of these patients 140 met criteria for at least one DSM-IV mental disorder. These

patients presented with poorer physical and somatic function, worse somatic symptoms, and more

pain. Consistent with these results, neurotic personality (high N) tends to be linked to DSM-IV

somatoform disorders, in which the patient complains of recurring physical symptoms for which

no organic basis is found. Somatization disorder is defined entirely in terms of somatic symptoms

such as pain and gastrointestinal symptoms. By contrast, hypochondriasis is defined in terms of

clinically significant distress resulting from symptoms, rather than the symptoms themselves,

together beliefs that one has or is developing a serious disease. Even in nonclinical samples, N is

associated with number of medical symptoms reported (Costa & McCrae, 1985) and with measures

of hypochondriasis and health anxiety (Cox et al., 2000; Wells, 1994). N is also linked to some

specific somatoform complaints, such as globus pharynges, feeling a lump in the throat, in the

absence of any physical cause (Deary, Wilson & Kelly, 1995). Likewise, N is also linked to

psychosomatic illnesses (Kirmayer et al., 1994), in which psychological factors contribute to actual

diseases such as ulcer, and it is often difficult to distinguish the psychological and medical

consequences of this personality dimension.

Another major classification in DSM is for substance-related disorders. Again, criteria for

substance use make no overt reference to emotion, but N tends to be elevated in chronic users of

various legal and illegal substances, including alcohol (Martin & Sher, 1994) and opiate drugs

(Doherty & Matthews, 1988). The causal role of N is uncertain, however, in that N scores tend to

drop as alcoholism is treated, implying an effect of the disorder on personality (Shaw et al., 1997).

Conversely, other evidence suggests that substance use may sometimes be a coping strategy

adopted by stress-vulnerable individuals intended to neutralize the impact of some threat (Riskind,

26
Gessner & Wolzon, 1999). Other groups of DSM-IV conditions known to be linked to higher N

include eating disorders (Goldner et al., 1999), sexual disorders (Eysenck, 1976; Kennedy et al.,

1999), and sleep disorders (Dorsey & Bootzin, 1997). Broadly, these findings suggest that the

vulnerability to emotional disturbance associated with N may be expressed in a variety of disorders

that are not explicitly emotional, although in some cases the causal association between negative

affectivity and disorder may be complex.

Emotional Intelligence as a Diagnostic Criterion

Evidently, emotional disturbance is central to many disorders. A large proportion of mental

disorders are linked to direct or indirect expression of negative affect, or to aspects of EI, such as

self-control and interpersonal relationships. However, the diversity of mental disorders linked to

emotional disturbance mitigates against any clear-cut relationship between low EI and

psychopathology. Grouping together emotional disorders, impulse control disorders, autism,

somatoform disorders, substance abuse, and eating, sexual and sleep disorders into a superordinate

EI category makes little sense clinically. Despite overlaps, these conditions have distinct etiologies

and require different treatments. The position that low EI is one of many factors associated with

vulnerability to a range of clinical pathologies is perhaps tenable, but low EI fails to emerge from

DSM-IV as a clear diagnostic criterion. Attributing disorders to low EI is likely to be circular, in

the absence of compelling evidence that EI exists independent of diagnoses that themselves have

varying degrees of reliability. Furthermore, a more coherent set of diagnostic categories may be

obtained by focusing on negative affectivity or N. Although excessive negative emotion is

primarily a quality of the anxiety and mood disorders, there is considerable comorbidity between

these disorders and those in which negative emotion appears to be expressed indirectly, e.g.

through somatoform disorder. Anxiety and depression are also often comorbid with impulse-

control disorders such as ADHD (Biederman et al., 1991), and with disorders related to poor social

27
skills such as autism and Asperger syndrome (Green et al., 2000; Kim et al., 2000). N is elevated

in children with ADHD (White, 1999), though there has been little work on autism and personality

traits. Generally, it appears that N operates as a generalized vulnerability factor that may interact

with other diathesis and stressor factors to produce a range of more specific pathologies, although

there may be some mutual, reciprocal influence between personality and pathology over time

(Widiger & Trull, 1992). However, it is difficult to make the case that N should be re-

conceptualized as low EI, despite the substantial correlations between personality-like measures

for the two constructs. The conclusions are tentative because of difficulties with DSMIV and the

similar World Health Organization ICD-10 scheme. There are continuing problems with validating

the different diagnostic categories, as separate, unitary entities due to lack of conclusive evidence,

and conceptual disagreements on how mental disorders should be distinguished from each other,

and from normal functioning (Widiger & Clark, 2000). According to Farmer and McGuffin (1999),

no classificatory scheme may claim validity, because the causes of most disorders are uncertain.

In addition, empirical data on specific groups of disorders, notably the personality disorders,

conflict with the distinctions made in DSM-IV (Widiger, 1997). Although anxiety and depression

appear to be clinically distinct, they are frequently comorbid, and scales for the two syndromal

conditions are highly correlated (Watson & Clark, 1997). It may be that a hierarchical model is

required, such that anxiety and depression are lower-order dimensions linked to an overarching

general negative affect factor (Mineka, Watson & Clark, 1998; Steer et al., 1995).

*** ~~~~~~~***

28
 CHAPTER -3

AGGRESSION

29
 CHAPTER -3
AGGRESSION

The first comprehensive theoretical account of the etiology of aggression which assigned a major

role to learning theory was the monograph, Frustration and Aggression by Dollard, Doob, Miller,

Mowrer, and Sears (1939), a group of psychologists at Yale University. The Yale group's

hypothesis about instigation to injure the frustrator finds a close parallel in Freud's (1915)

statement that "if the object is a source of unpleasant feelings ... " this can eventually lead to "an

aggressive inclination against the object ... an instigation to destroy it" (p. 137). The premise thus

of the frustration-aggression hypothesis is that when people become frustrated (i.e., when their

goals are thwarted), they respond aggressively. The basic premise that frustration was a necessary

precursor to aggression, was questioned by a number of researchers (Buss, 1963; Cohen, 1955;

Pastore, 1952). Neal Miller (1941) had denied the inevitability of aggression as a response to

frustration with the statement that, "Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types

of responses, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression" (p. 338). New and

developing research placed a greater emphasis on external environmental cues as elicitors of

aggression than it did on inherent or drive factors (Bandura, 1973; Eron, 1987).

Bandura (1973) proposed that aggressive behavior is learned and maintained through

environmental experiences either directly or vicariously, and that learning of aggression is

controlled by reinforcement contingencies and punishment in a fashion similar to the learning of

any new behaviors (Bandura, 1973, p. 57). Bandura (1973) points out that according to a social-

learning model, aggression is usually seen as being controlled by positive reinforcement; in

contrast, from a drive model perspective, aggression is usually mediated by negative reinforcement

or the escape from an aversive situation. The model that Rowell Huesmann (1977, 1980, 1982,

1988) and Eron (Eron, 1982, 1987; Huesmann & Eron, 1984) proposed to explain the development

30
of aggression was based on the models of human cognition which had been elaborated in the 1960s

and 1970s by information processing theorists. According to social-cognitive theory, cognitive

representations of anticipated positive consequences for aggressive behavior serve as motivators

of behavior. These positive consequences can include tangible rewards (e.g., desired objects),

psychological benefits (e.g., control or dominance over others), self-evaluations (e.g., increased

feelings of self-worth), and social reactions (e.g., status among peers). Studies of preadolescent

children have shown that aggressive children are more likely than their less aggressive peers to

predict that aggressive behavior will result in tangible rewards and termination of aversive

behavior toward them by others (Perry, Perry, & Rasmussen, 1986), as well as psychological

reinforcement based on control over peers (Boldizar, Perry, & Perry, 1989).

Research on Aggression in Females

Traditionally, men and boys have been regarded as more aggressive than women and girls. This is

supported by the fact that, with few exceptions, males are more aggressive than females in most

animal species. A review of these issues was presented by Moyer (1977). In humans, there is

evidence for a higher level of physical aggression in males than in females. Criminal statistics

show that men outnumber women as perpetrators of physical violence in all societies. Reviews

have usually found males to score higher on measures of aggression than females (Frodi,

Macaulay, & Thome, 1977; Frost & Averill, 1982; Huesmann & Eron, 1984; Huesmann, Eron,

Lefkowitz, & Walder, 1984; Lambert, 1985; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; Rauste-von Wright, 1989).

In an international follow-up study in six countries (Huesmann & Eron 1986), the self-ratings of

boys correlated positively with their peer rated aggression in most countries and samples, but for

girls, the correlations between self-ratings and peer-ratings were generally poor. This result may

reflect the difficulty a girl has in admitting that she is aggressive, and in thinking about and

analyzing her own aggressive reactions.

31
Direct aggression with females as perpetrators may depend, in relative terms, more than its male

counterpart on the situation than on norms of behavior. This suggestion is based on findings that

females are likely to react aggressively, similarly to males, if the setting seems to call for it.

Females will be aggressive, for instance, if they are provoked, or if the aggression is seen by them

to be justified in the situation, but typically they will not show as much unprovoked aggression as

males do (Frodi et al., 1977; Lambert, 1985). This fact may well be due to culturally determined

sex roles in regard to aggression. Pulkkinen (1987) suggests that the behavior of males tends to be

more of the offensive type, whereas that of females is confined more to the defensive type. The

distinction between offensive and defensive aggression is, however, problematic due to the fact

that what should be regarded as a provocation is not self-evident. There is also evidence suggesting

that women do not become provoked as easily as men. According to Zillman (1979), women are

more effective in minimizing the provocations and in handling annoyance in other ways than by

counter aggression. Zillman thinks that the conflict solution strategies used by women are often

more efficient than those used by men, since the latter often lead to an escalation of the conflict.

If direct aggression is discouraged in females, it is likely that they instead resort to indirect forms

of aggression. This would show only in measurements indicating indirect instead of direct

aggression. The common feature of this type of aggression is that the aggressor can stay

unidentified and thereby avoid both counterattack from the aggressor and disapproval from the

rest of the community. According to Buss (1961, p. 8), "indirect aggression may be verbal

(spreading nasty gossip) or physical (a man sets fire to his neighbour’s home)." Measurement

techniques usually do not detect indirect aggression precisely because it is indirect, and the

perpetrator will disguise her or his aggression, or refrain completely from aggressive behaviour if

she or he is aware of being observed. If asked about one's own aggression in a questionnaire, the

person who uses indirect forms of aggression would typically also be expected to deny being

32
aggressive. A typical feature of psychological follow-up studies is that aggression in females is

found to be less stable than in males (Huesmann et al., 1984; Huesmann & Eron, 1986; Olweus,

1984; Pulkkinen, 1987).

*** ~~~~~~~***

33
 CHAPTER -4

LOVE

34
 CHAPTER -4
LOVE

Love is a form of value, and value takes many forms. It begins with drive in the unconscious core

of the self. Core value is bound up with drive in relation to the self-preservative instincts, such as

hunger. For microgenetic theory, the core category and the drive do not come together but are

fused from the beginning in a single construct. Specifically, every affect has a conceptual frame

and every concept has an affective tonality. The broader implications of this view are that feeling

is the process of becoming and concepts (objects) are the substance of being (Brown, 2005).

The debate in psychology whether love is volition or need, that is, intentional or involuntary, or

what role decision plays in falling in love, reflects the proximity of the dominant segment to drive

or to desire. The closer to drive, the more love is like unconscious need. The closer love is to

desire, the more it is like wish, want, and intentional feeling. Volition does not precede and

motivate action or emotion but is part of the same phase to which emotion develops. More

precisely, the phase of desire is also one of volition, choice, and intentionality. Love can begin

with need and evolve to desire or it can begin with desire and descend to need, and find its

complement in the needs of the beloved (Brown 2012).

The idea that love is an illusion, that is, a distorted perception, or even a delusion or false belief,

is ingrained in skeptical thought. This view owes to the irrationality of love, its fragility, loss,

betrayal, and the disillusionment that often follows. For some, only facts are real, for others, only

feelings. Emily Dickinson wrote that the deeper the love, the less the illusion. It is not love that is

illusory, but the common illusion of being in love when a genuine fusion of the lovers has not

occurred. A deep love is more real in the intensity of feeling, which is an outcome of the evolution

of energy that is the life of all matter. The beloved can be purely imaginary, absent, abusive, or

dead. But even with the absence of an actual other, we can truly say we are in love and that the

35
love is not delusion, but we can have the delusion we are loved in return. Even in cases of obsessive

love or homicidal jealousy, when there are no grounds to believe in the other’s love or infidelity,

we cannot say the love one feels is unreal, or no less real than any other mental phenomenon

(Brown 2012).

Freud tried to account for relation of feeling to memory, to idea, dream and object by postulating

the cathexis of memory traces by libidinal drive energy. He argued that memory traces were static

entities deposited by perceptions. For Freud, one meaning of the timelessness of the Ucs concerned

the identity of registration and retention (Leowald, 2000). The perception-memory trace was, in

the metapsychology, transformed to a drive-representation or idea when it was activated—

cathected—by libidinal drive energy, but how circulating energy locates the trace, or the trace

attracts the energy was not discussed. The concept that sexual drive energy binds with a trace to

form an idea is untenable. How among the innumerable memories, or potential neural

configurations that correspond to memories, does drive energy find the proper trace? How does

the trace attract the energy? Is there a physical “address” on the trace that lures the energy; is

energy uniform or differentiated into distinct feelings that map to the specific ideas? In spite of the

many problems with a combinatorial theory, the notion survives to the present, for example in the

view of the brain in terms of older limbic areas for emotion and the association to memory images,

and neocortical zones for thought and ”higher” cognition. For micro-genetic theory, traces are not

static entities but consist of the entire sequence from core to surface in the arousal of a mental

content, while drive energy is derived to a succession of states of feeling and the “trace” and its

feeling-tone develop through intermediate stages. On the micro-genetic view, the “structure” of

mind is temporal, not spatial (Brown 2012).

Contemporary accounts of love tend to describe what passes between a subject and an object, a

lover, and a beloved, each “bringing to the table” some attributes, emotions, and values in a

36
relationship that is like a negotiation in that it rests on the cooperative interaction of separate

individuals. For some this negotiation is a contestation of power, the completion of an inventory

or a resolution of complimentary obligations. Others see it as pathology, a neurotic alliance, a

projection of the subject’s needs onto the other or, on a more rational plane, a bestowal, a judgment,

or appraisal of what is desirable or undesirable. On this view, value is transferred to the other,

much like to any other object, and a judgment is made as to whether the value is justified by the

qualities. This entails that the subject encounters the other as a mirror of the self or as a supplement

for what is lacking, as if adding the other will harmonize with, magnify or compensate for what is

present or lacking in the self. Subject and object are autonomous units that combine with greater

or lesser success. The romantic ideal of oneness gives way to shared interests, mutual benefits and

equality of labor, more like a partnership or contractual relation than a unity of souls. This way of

thinking, which can be occasioned by hard work and the pressure to survive, is now the outcome

of an analytic materialism in which couples are conceived as the interlocking parts of a machine,

a collection of autonomous units that interact through surface contacts, while the romantic ideal of

the soul-mate is treated with contempt or cynicism (Brown 2012).

Another way to look at the nature of passionate and true love begins with subjectivity and attempts

to go from the inner life of the lover to an intra-psychic absorption of the beloved. It accepts the

other as an entity independent of the subject but apprehends the other as intra-psychic yet extra-

personal, a creation of the self’s imagination. Love and allied states such as affection, interest,

desire, compassion, or for that matter rejection and disappointment can be interpreted in relation

to their psychic infra-structure. The subjectivities of lover and beloved are not interactive but

assimilative. The authenticity of the love depends on the degree of coherence across corresponding

yet inaccessible psyches as well as the mutuality of need, desire, and genuine giving that each

offers and receives. On this view, the beloved is infused with the subjectivity of the lover, truly

37
possessed, and created in the conceptual imagination as the center of a cognized world. The

stronger is the imagination, the greater the fantasy, the more facile the formation of an ideal, the

deeper, that is, the more subjective, the love and the less the objectivity. Conversely, the more

objective the love, the less love there is. To see one’s beloved in an objective manner is to accept,

to approve, to judge, and appraise, but not to truly love. This follows if idealization is essential to

loving. The unmitigated fact is that love has to be unreal to be true or, rather, the unreal has to be

the heart’s only reality. Regardless of whether one agrees with this assertion, to interpret love as

an intra-psychic ideal rather than an inter-personal bond leads to insights inaccessible to

conventional theory. Love is an assimilation of selves, not a fixation on attributes, though

idealization is for those attributes that distinguish the beloved from others. In a word, the self of

the beloved is inculcated in relation to need, with the qualities idealized to reinforce and justify

that love. Were this not true, love could not survive aging or illness, in which some attributes are

lost or altered. Conversely, we know that the attributes of a childhood sweetheart, frozen in time,

grow ever fonder in recollection, as do those of a loved one after death. This follows if true love

is an intra-psychic assimilation, not an interpersonal association. An illusion is a derailed

perception; a delusion is a false belief. One can falsely believe that one loves or is loved, and

misperceive the intentions of a lover. Lovers can be delusional, but is love itself an illusion or

delusion, unlike other psychic phenomena? (Brown 2012)

From an evolutionary standpoint, jealousy is part of the instinctual repertoire that helps to

safeguard paternity for males and, for females, serves to ensure protection and assistance in child-

rearing (Buss, 1994). Regardless of its utility or adaptive value, the psychic structure of jealousy

is similar in men and women, with slight though not unimportant biases. These include the

tendency, in men, for greater discomfort over sexual infidelity, while for women an infidelity that

involves a transfer of affection tends to trump distress over casual sex. If men are less faithful than

38
women, it may reflect a difference in libido, opportunity, egocentricity, or risk-taking. The greater

ability of men to limit infidelity to a purely sexual encounter without emotional engagement allows

them to encapsulate the activity in states of objectified action that is relatively affect-free. Perhaps

for this reason, men tend to be more vindictive for sexual indiscretion than emotional reallocation,

and women more forgiving for sexual dalliance but not an affair of the heart (Brown 2012).

The drive to individuation is opposed to that for community, which is manifest in the security that

family affords, not only for the child but in the shared labor and mutual aid essential to marriage

or its equivalent. Community reaches its limit in abdication, individuation in alienation. Love

resolves these competing pressures, one to an extreme of independence, the other to possible loss

of self. We see these pressures at work at many social levels: autonomy of self and oneness with

the other; individuality and dependency; solitude and companionship; and the claims of the

individual versus those of the community that are central to so many legal and moral issues. We

should also examine anger, jealousy, and rejection in this light, that is, in the tension of self-giving

and self-protection. Possessiveness in love is closer to hunger than sexuality, even with a sexual

character, since the signature of true love is surrender, not ownership. A desperate need for a

beloved or a pathological jealousy may appear as great passion, but it derives from the transition

of predation to sexual capture (Brown 2012).

Psychoanalytic Theory of Love and Pathology

The prevalence of selfish need over unselfish giving, the uncertainty of love or its pretense, the

diversity of unions between and among the sexes, and the natural evolution of love over time, and

at different points in the life cycle, are all responsible for the cynicism that attends to discussions

of true love. There are also the covert motives, the self-interest, the counterfeit, the delusion, and

the covetousness that drive most human behaviors. To the extent love is a conscious decision, the

feeling is diminished, while to the extent it is a passion, it is mocked for lack of discernment. Love

39
as rational appraisal cannot be resolved with the union of genuine loving, though the natural

relaxation of passionate beginnings allows reason to creep into feeling as desire wanes and is

refined to subtler affect-ideas. We do not all find love, or if we find it, keep it, and we may have

to choose between a rapture that passes and an affection that is less passionate but enduring. There

is also the opposition of desire with a calculus of utility and the consumerism and corruption of

the deeper sensitivities, which make us believe that love is for the young, the innocent, or the

guileless. There is the fact that unfulfilled desire may persist, but once satisfied may not recur, so

that the sought-after fusion of lovers is the death of longing. If autonomy and self-sufficiency are

the goal, love can be seen as pathology. If it is interpreted as a need, it is a weakness to be

compensated. If a distraction, it is not worth the bother; if an obsession, it needs a cure. The analytic

mind asks if love is an illusory surrogate for an uncompromising objectivity in which a life without

illusion is a life without meaning. The impulse to self-protection leaves no room for the

vulnerabilities on which love depends. Selfishness, isolation, lack of generosity, and the

displacement of feeling to surrogate pursuits are some of its manifestations. The misanthrope and

sociopath are the extremes. The fundamental defect of character is a resistance to the assimilation

of the other that is essential to the attainment of oneness.

Love is the ultimate valuation of a thing, to which all desires are subordinate. There is nothing

more important than what is loved, which is to say that love, regardless of whether or not it is

implemented, realizes a value of immense signification. Apart from the self-preservative drives, a

genuine love for a person, for a thing or an occasion, from the perspective of the individual,

announces an object of the greatest possible value. Love and death, arising and perishing, creation

and destruction, are thematic in life and literature. A metaphoric death at a moment of great passion

is a feeling not unknown to most people (Brown 2012).

*** ~~~~~~~***
40
 CHAPTER -5

METHODS

41
 CHAPTER -5

METHODS

Aim of the Study

The aim of the present study was to understand the relationship between metacognitive awareness,

emotional intelligence, aggression and passionate love among the female population, with the

following implications:

 Establishing statistically valid relationship among the variables of Metacognition. Emotional

intelligence, Aggression and Passionate love among women.

 Understanding the relationship between metacognition and emotional intelligence to propose

viability of research looking at possible therapeutic intervention strategies to address

affective disorders through enhancing or changing metacognition.

 Understanding the relationship between metacognition and emotional intelligence to propose

viability of research looking at possible therapeutic intervention strategies to address

disorders involving cognition through enhancing or changing metacognition and/or

emotional intelligence.

 Understanding the relationship between metacognition and aggression to propose viability

of research looking at possible therapeutic intervention strategies to address disorders

involving element of aggression viz impulse control disorders, personality disorders,

relationship and systemic problems through enhancing or changing metacognition.

 Understanding the relationship between metacognition and aggression to propose viability

of research looking at possible practice strategies to contain aggressive drive within healthy

limits through enhancing or changing metacognition among normal population as a

preventive strategy against mental ill health.

42
 Understanding the relationship between emotional intelligence and aggression to propose

viability of research looking at possible therapeutic intervention strategies to address

disorders involving element of aggression viz impulse control disorders, personality

disorders, relationship and systemic problems through strategies aimed at improving

emotional intelligence.

 Understanding the relationship between emotional intelligence and aggression to propose

viability of research looking at possible practice strategies to contain aggressive drive within

healthy limits through strategies aimed at improving emotional intelligence among normal

population as a preventive strategy against mental ill health.

 Understanding the relationship between metacognition and passionate love to propose

viability of research looking at possible strategies to optimize expression of love as a

therapeutic intervention to address disorders involving cognition or metacognition.

 Understanding the relationship between metacognition and passionate love to propose

viability of research looking at possible practice strategies to optimize expression of love

through enhancing or changing metacognition among normal population as a preventive

strategy against mental ill-health as well as an opportunity for maximization of mental

functions or achieving self-actualization.

 Understanding the relationship between emotional intelligence and passionate love to

propose viability of research looking at possible practice strategies to optimize expression of

love through improving emotional intelligence among normal population as a preventive

strategy against mental ill-health as well as an opportunity for maximization of mental

functions or achieving self-actualization.

43
  Understanding the relationship between emotional intelligence and passionate love to

propose viability of research looking at possible strategies to optimize expression of love as

a therapeutic intervention to address affective disorders

 Understanding the relationship between passionate love and aggression to propose viability

of research looking at possible therapeutic intervention strategies to address disorders

involving element of aggression viz impulse control disorders, personality disorders,

relationship and systemic problems through optimizing expression of love.

 Understanding the relationship between aggression and passionate love to propose viability

of research looking at possible practice strategies to optimize the balance between expression

of love as well as aggression as a preventive strategy against mental ill-health as well as an

opportunity for maximization of mental functions or achieving self-actualization.

Objectives

 To find out the correlation that may exist between metacognitive awareness and emotional

intelligence among women.

 To find out the correlation that may exist between metacognitive awareness and aggression

among women.

 To find out the correlation that may exist between metacognitive awareness and passionate

love among women.

 To find out the correlation that may exist between emotional intelligence and aggression

among women.

 To find out the correlation that may exist between emotional intelligence and passionate love

among women.

 To find out the correlation that may exist between aggression and passionate love among

women

44
Hypotheses

Following were the hypotheses of the study:

 There will be significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and emotional

intelligence among women.

 There will be significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and aggression

among women.

 There will be significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and passionate love

among women.

 There will be significant relationship between emotional intelligence and aggression among

women.

 There is significant relationship between emotional intelligence and passionate love among

women

Design

Within group design correlational study with purposive sampling employing cross sectional

assessment method was used.

Sample

Purposive sampling was used for the present study. With the assumption that the variables follow

normal distribution, the size of sample was set with lower limit of 30 to apply parametric tests for

analysis and the desirable limit was set at 107 to keep the error within 5% (error prob. = .05) and

95% confidence limit (power = .95) with conventional large effect size (0.5) (Two independent

Pearson’s r, two tail, allocation ratio N1/N2 = 1, critical z = 1.959964). Sample consisted of

women ready to participate in the study who matched the inclusion and exclusion criteria.

45
Study Locale

Participants of the study were from Sweekaar Academy of Rehabilitation Sciences, Secunderabad;

National Institute for the Empowerment of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities, Manovikas

Nagar, Secunderabad; Eashwari Bai Memorial College of Nursing, West Marredpalli,

Secunderabad; Krishna Institute of Medical Sciences & College of Physiotherapy, Minister Road,

Secunderabad; Mount Litera Zee School, Hayatnagar, Hyderabad and a few residential apartments

from the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad.

Inclusion Criteria

 Women in the age range 18 years to 40 years

 Able to read and speak English language

Exclusion Criteria

 Previous or current diagnosis of mental illness

 Presence of disability

 History of diagnosed substance abuse/ dependency

 Presence of significant medical complication

Tools

A) Socio – demographic data sheet

B) Metacognitive awareness Inventory

C) Emotional Intelligence Scale

D) Indirect, Direct Aggression Questionnaire

E) Passionate love scale

46
Description of the Tools

 Socio – demographic Data Sheet

Socio-demographic data sheet for this study includes information about the participant’s socio-

demographic variables like age, education, occupation/vocation, marital status, mother tongue

and place of living (appendix 2).

 Metacognitive Awareness Inventory

Metacognitive awareness inventory was developed by Gregory Schraw and Rayne Sperling

Dennison (1994) as a self-report instrument to measure adult metacognitive awareness. It has

52 items classified into eight sub components subsumed under two broad categories knowledge

of cognition and regulation of cognition. Every true item is scored 1 and every false item is

scored 0. Knowledge of cognition can be divided into three subcomponents: declarative

knowledge (knowledge about self and strategies), procedural knowledge (knowledge about

how to use strategies) and conditional knowledge (knowledge about when and why to use 36

strategies) (Schraw & Dennison, 1994). Regulation of metacognition includes five areas:

planning (goal setting), information management (organizing), monitoring (assessment of

one’s learning and strategy), debugging (strategies used to correct errors) and evaluation

(analysis of performance and strategy effectiveness after a learning episode) (Schraw &

Dennison, 1994).

The MAI was subjected to factor analysis. The first analysis produced a 6-factor solution with

coefficient alpha for five of the six factors below 0.80 (Schraw & Dennison, 1994). Next, the

authors of the test forced a two-factor solution with factor one corresponding to knowledge of

cognition and factor two to regulation of cognition. Six items loaded equally on factor one and

two (items 27, 34, 34, 40, 43, and 44), and two items failed to load on either factor (items 4

and 48). The coefficient alpha for items loading on each factor was as high as 0.91, indicating

47
 high internal consistency, and the coefficient alpha for the whole instrument reached 0.95

(Schraw & Dennision, 1994). The two factors accounted for 65% of the sample variance. The

authors suggest that the results indicated that the MAI reliably measures knowledge of

cognition and regulation of cognition based on a two-factor solution (Schraw & Dennison,

1994) (Appendix 3).

 Emotional Intelligence Scale

Emotional intelligence scale is a 33 item self-report measure of emotional intelligence

developed by Schutte et al. (1998), using four sub-scales: emotion perception, utilizing

emotions, managing self- relevant emotions, and managing others’ emotions. It is structured

off of the EI model by Salovey and Mayer (1990). Every item is rated on a 5 point Likert scale

and item number 5, 28 and 33 are reverse scored. From the norms available, average score for

females is 131, that for males is 125, that for therapist is 135 and that for prisoners is 120.

Schutte and her colleges report a reliability rating of 0.90 for their emotional intelligence scale.

The EI score, overall, is fairly reliable for adults and adolescents; however, the utilizing

emotions sub-scale has shown poor reliability (Ciarrochi, Chan & Bajgar, 2001).

The self-report instrument is purported to measure an individual’s perceptions of the extent to

which s/he can appraise and regulate emotions in self and others, and utilize emotions for

problem solving (Schutte et al., 1998). In the initial validation study, Schutte et al. used a set

of 62 items derived from the model of Salovey and Mayer (1990). Exploratory factor analysis

on data from 346 participants yielded a 4-factor model. The authors argued that by removing

29 items and reanalyzing the data, an adequate 1-factor solution was produced. Schutte et al.

reported adequate internal consistency reliability (r = .87 to .90) and acceptable test-retest

reliability (r= .78) for the one-dimensional scale. Furthermore, there was evidence that the EIS

was distinct from established measures of the Big Five. Subsequent validation studies rightly

48
questioned the one-dimensional structure of the EIS and sought to establish a multifactorial

solution. For instance, Petrides and Furnham (2000) sought to test the hypothesis, via

confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), that the EIS measured a general factor of EI. Results

indicated that the general factor model provided a poor fit to the data (e.g., comparative fit

index: CFI = .51, root mean square error of approximation: RMSEA = .11). Consequently,

Petrides and Furnham (2000) followed their CFA analysis with an unrestricted (exploratory)

principal components analysis and extracted four components: optimism/mood regulation,

appraisal of emotions, social skills, and utilization of emotions. Saklofske, Austin, and Minski

(2003) subjected the EIS to CFA and found moderate support for the 4-factor model. Gignac,

Palmer, Manocha, and Stough (2005) recognized the limitations associated with the use of

exploratory data-driven procedures to demonstrate factorial validity (see Thompson & Daniel,

1996) and sought to establish whether a theoretically derived solution would yield improved

psychometric properties. Following an assessment of content validity, 28 items representative

of six dimensions of EI were extracted for further analysis. CFA results suggested that the

hypothesized 6-factor model could not be completely recovered. Specifically, a nested-factors

model with a first-order general factor, and four nested factors corresponding to appraisal of

emotions in the self, appraisal of emotions in others, emotional regulation of the self, and

utilization of emotions in problem solving were identified, in conjunction with a first-order

acquiescence factor. There was no evidence to suggest the existence of an independent

emotional expression or emotional regulation of others factor. Gignac et al. (2005) argued that

further validation work on the scale was needed if the intention of the scale was to assess the

theoretical model proposed by Salovey and Mayer (1990). Lane et al. (2009) sought to expand

on the work of Gignac et al. (2005) by establishing a factor structure consistent with theoretical

49
 proposals of Salovey and Mayer (1990). A principle reason for investigating the EIS offered

by Lane et al. was to determine the validity of the scale for use with an athletic population.

Lane et al. scrutinized the 33- items of the EIS for content validity and categorized them into

one of six dimensions based on EI theory (appraisal of own emotions, appraisal of others’

emotions, regulation of own emotions, social skills/regulation of others’ emotions, utilization

of emotion, and optimism). CFA yielded a poor fit to the data for a single-factor solution

typically used in the literature and an acceptable fit to the data for the theoretically derived 6-

factor solution. In an attempt to improve model fit, Lane and colleagues re-specified the model:

Using CFA results in conjunction with content validity results they removed 13 items that

contained no emotional content. Lane et al. (2009) argued that by definition items that assess

EI should contain reference to feelings in general and references to specific emotions. As the

above procedure removed all but 1 item from the optimism scale, this factor was discarded

from further analyses. Subsequent CFA on the remaining 19 items resulted in acceptable fit

indices for the single-factor solution and good fit indices for the 5-factor solution The

multifactorial solution offered by Lane et al. (2009) holds promise as it closely resembles

Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) conceptualization of EI (Appendix 4).

 Indirect, Direct Aggression Questionnaire

The Indirect and Direct Aggression Questionnaire (I-DAQ) is a test that has been developed

to assess both indirect and direct aggression (verbal and physical) in age groups ranging from

adolescents to the elderly by Ruiz-Pamies, M et al.(2014). Each item is rated on a 5 point Likert

scale and item number 1, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24 and 26 are reverse scored. It tool

assess three traits: Physical Aggression (PA), Verbal Aggression (VA) and Indirect Aggression

(IA) and is gender sensitive. Taking into account that the limitations of the existing

questionnaires are not related to the content of their items, the questionnaire was developed

50
 from items drawn from different aggression questionnaires (Anguiano-Carrasco & Vigil-Colet,

2011; Buss & Durkee, 1957; Buss & Perry, 1992; Connelly, Newton, & Aarons, 2005; Infante

& Wigley, 1986; Kaukiainen et al., 2001; Lawrence, 2006; Toldos, 2005). 55 items rated by

15 expert judges with experience in personality test development were assigned into

dimensions of PA, VA, & IA. Eliminating 12 ambiguous items, 43 items were used for the

pilot study and the items with loadings lower than λ = .30 on the content factor or with complex

loadings (greater than λ = .30 on more than one content factor) were removed. Fit of the three-

factor model was tested using the semi-restricted model. The goodness of fit indexes were NFI

= .97; CFI = .98; AGFI = .97; RMRS = 0.04 and RSMEA = .078 (90% C.I. = .074 –.083),

which indicated a good fit to the proposed model taking into account the cut-off values

proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999). Appropriate congruence coefficients between the expected

and the obtained solutions were observe (threshold value of .85) (Hopwood & Donnellan,

2010). The correlations among factors ranged from .32 to .44. All the scales showed adequate

factor reliabilities. I-DAQ is also sensitive to the sex differences usually found in aggression

measures (Archer, 2004; Morales-Vives & Vigil-Colet, 2010) (Appendix 5).

 Passionate Love Scale

Passionate love scale was developed by Hatfield, E & Sprecher, S (1986). It is a 30 item

questionnaire and focuses on cognitive, emotional and behavioral components of passionate

love. Each item is rated on a 9 point Likert scale. The PLS scale was specifically designed to

assess the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral components of passionate love. The cognitive

components consist of: Intrusive thinking; preoccupation with the partner; Idealization of the

other or of the relationship; Desire to know the other and be known by him/her. Emotional

components consist of: Attraction to the partner, especially sexual attraction; Positive feelings

when things go well; Negative feelings when things go awry; Longing for reciprocity—

51
passionate lovers not only love, but they want to be loved in return; Desire for complete and

permanent union; and Physiological (sexual) arousal. Finally, behavioral components consist

of Actions aimed at determining the other’s feelings; Studying the other person; Service to the

other; and Maintaining physical closeness. Hatfield and Sprecher (1986) reported a coefficient

alpha of .91 for the 15- item version and .94 for the 30-item version. Others have also reported

high levels of reliability for the scale (e.g., Sprecher & Regan, 1998). The PLS appears to be

primarily one-dimensional, with one primary factor emerging from a principal components

factoring. The scale is uncontaminated by a social desirability bias, as indicated by a non-

significant correlation between respondents’ scores on the PLS and their scores on the 1964

Crowne and Marlowe Social Desirability Scale (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986). There is some

evidence for the construct validity of the PLS. For example, it has been found to be associated

positively with conceptually similar scales and measures (Aron & Henkemeyer, 1995; Hatfield

& Sprecher, 1986; Hendrick & Hendrick, 1989; Sprecher & Regan, 1998).

Researchers have used the PLS in exploring many different topics, including cross-cultural

differences in passionate love (Hatfield & Rapson, 2005; Hatfield, Rapson, & Martel, 2007;

Landis & O’Shea, 2000), prototype approaches to love (Fehr, 2005), neural bases of passionate

love (Aron et al., 2005; Bartels & Zeki, 2004), changes in passionate love over the family life

cycle (Tucker & Aron, 1993), correlates of sexual desire (Beck, Bozman, & Qualtrough, 1991),

the effects of an emotionally focused couples therapy (James, 2007), degree of bonding with

an abusive partner (Graham et al., 1995), and the effects of having married couples engage in

novel activities (Aron, Norman, Aron, McKenna, & Heyman, 2000). The PLS is copyright by

Hatfield and Sprecher (1986). Permission is given to all clinicians and researchers who wish

to use the scale in their research (free of charge) (Appendix 6).

52
Procedure

After formulating the research problem, necessary permission and ethical approval was obtained

from the department. Test instruments were selected after a thorough internet search, with studies

establishing the reliability & validity and free right to use it for non-commercial use. Prior

permission was obtained from Institute of Mental Health and Institute of Speech and Hearing,

Sweekaar Academy of Rehabilitation Sciences to collect data from its members. To obtain as

representative a sample as possible, participants were chosen as per hailing from as much different

states in India as possible and from foreign students doing internship in the institute. To further

reduce bias in the sample, more than twice as much data collected from the institute was collected

from different parts of Hyderabad giving priority to participants hailing from different places of

origin/ with different mother tongue. Participants were briefed regarding the study as well as about

the nature of psychological test they have to undergo. They were assured of confidentiality of the

test results. They were also informed of their right to know the test results. Prior consent was

obtained from the participants after ensuring their free will to participate as well as no coercion or

enticements being felt by the participants.

Statistical Analysis

The data was entered into the profile sheet and was entered into the statistical software (version

21). Parametric and non-parametric tests were employed where ever appropriate. Descriptive

statistics like mean, standard deviation, variance, frequency and percentage analysis was carried

out on the socio-demographic data for deeper understanding of the sample. One-Sample

Kolmogorov – Smirnov Test was done to find out the distribution of the variables. After

ascertaining normality of distribution, Pearson’s correlation was used to determine the degree of

relationship. Regression analysis was carried out to determine the variance of predictor on criterion

variables. Descriptive statistics, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Independent sample Mann-Whitney U

53
Test and Independent Sample Kruskal-Wallis Test was further carried out to analyze the data on

the available categories and comment beyond the starting hypotheses.

*** ~~~~~~~***

54
 CHAPTER - 6

RESULTS

55
 CHAPTER - 6

RESULTS

The current study involved a single group (within group design) of women in the age range 18 to

40 years. Initial analysis involved the distribution of population characteristics. The mean age of

the group was 25.5 years.

Table 1. Mean Age of Participants

N Mean Std. Variance
Deviation
Age (years) 97 25.51 6.532 42.669

Chart 1. Distribution of Age of the Participants

The participants in the study were from ten states in India and one woman was an internee from

Sweden. The distribution of data across locale is given in table 2.

56
Table 2. Distribution of Participants across Locale.

Frequency Percent
Andhra Pradesh, India 3 3.1
Assam, India 1 1.0
Chhattisgarh, India 1 1.0
Karnataka, India 5 5.2
Kerala, India 12 12.4
Maharashtra, India 1 1.0
Punjab, India 1 1.0
Rajasthan, India 2 2.1
Skane, Sweden 1 1.0
Tamil Nadu, India 1 1.0
Telengana, India 69 71.1
Total 97 100.0

Among the participants 24.7 % were late adolescents and 75.3 % were early adults. 49.5 % of them

were students, 14.4% were un-employed and 36.1% were employed. 32% of the participants were

either doing or have completed their research degree. 35.1% of the participants were married while

64.9% were single.

Table 3. Distribution of Participants according to Age Category, Employment Status,

Educational Qualification and Marital Status

Category Frequency Percentage

Early Adulthood 73 75.3
Late Adolescence 24 24.7
Employed 35 36.1
Student 48 49.5
Un-Employed 14 14.4
Non Research Degree 66 68.0
Research Degree 31 32.0
Married 34 35.1
Single 63 64.9

57
All the variables followed random sequence and normal distribution, viz. Metacognitive

Awareness (Mean = 42.20, SD = 6.04, Runs test sig .203, Kolmogorov-Sirinov test sig .454);

Emotional Intelligence (Mean = 126.72, SD = 8.26, Runs test sig .123, Kolmogorov-Sirinov test

sig .861); Aggression (Mean = 73.53, SD = 7.43, Runs test sig .284, Kolmogorov-Sirinov test sig

.879); Passionate Love (Mean = 205.73, SD = 38.51, Runs test sig .077, Kolmogorov-Sirinov test

sig .063).

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics & Test of Normality

N Mean Std. Skewness Kurtosis One- One-Sample

Dev. Sample Kolmogorov
Runs – Smirnov
Study Test Test
Variables
Statistic Std. Statistic Statistic Std. Statistic Std. Sig. Asymptotic
Error Error Error Sig. (2 sided
test)
Metacognitive 90 42.20 .637 6.041 -.084 .254 -1.016 .503 .203 .454
Awareness
Emotional 86 126.72 .891 8.259 .077 .260 -.670 .514 .123 .861
Intelligence
Indirect Direct 88 73.53 .792 7.428 -.270 .257 -.659 .508 .284 .879
Aggression
73 205.73 4.50 38.509 -.729 .281 -.569 .555 .077 .063
Passionate Love
7
Valid N (list 55
wise)

58
Chart 2. Distribution of Metacognitive Awareness

Chart 3. Distribution of Emotional Intelligence

59
Chart 4. Distribution of Aggression

Chart 5. Distribution of Passionate Love

60
The central tendencies of all the dependent variables across categorizing variables of age,

employment status, educational qualification and marital status were found to be as follows.

Table 5. Distribution of Central Tendencies across Study Variables

Metacognitive Emotional Indirect-Direct Passionate

Awareness Intelligence Aggression Love
Category

Mean 43.61 126.87 73.30 208.17

Early Adulthood SD 5.824 8.021 7.855 37.406
Median 45.00 126.00 73.00 220.50
Mean 37.57 126.21 74.29 199.67
Late Adolescence SD 4.214 9.265 5.968 41.430
Median 37.00 126.00 75.00 216.00
Mean 41.76 126.85 72.97 209.45
Non Research
SD 5.756 8.454 7.091 36.671
Degree
Median 41.00 126.00 73.00 223.50
Research Degree Mean 43.18 126.44 74.63 188.54
SD 6.634 7.963 8.049 43.548
Median 44.50 127.00 76.00 206.00
Employed Mean 44.47 127.28 73.00 216.29
SD 5.507 8.592 8.972 32.289
Median 44.50 125.50 73.00 228.00
Student Mean 39.80 125.68 73.26 194.92
SD 5.716 7.805 6.709 40.330
Median 38.50 126.00 73.00 204.50
Un-Employed Mean 44.57 128.62 76.00 216.11
SD 5.585 8.996 4.748 40.922
Median 45.50 129.00 75.50 244.00
Married Mean 45.13 127.30 73.29 219.04
SD 4.831 9.356 6.347 33.533
Median 46.00 125.50 73.00 227.50
Single Mean 40.59 126.41 73.67 197.44
SD 6.070 7.679 8.005 39.418
Median 40.00 126.00 75.00 203.00

61
The distribution of emotional intelligence, aggression and passionate love remained the same

across age category (Mann- Whitney U Test Sig. 0.831, .739 & .404 respectively); but

metacognitive awareness did not follow same distribution across the age category (Table 6).

However the distribution of all the variables remained the same across the categories of educational

qualification (Table 7). The distribution of metacognitive awareness and passionate love did not

remain the same across married and unmarried women (Mann- Whitney U Test Sig. 0.000 & .017

respectively). But the distribution remained the same among married and unmarried women for

emotional intelligence and aggression (Mann- Whitney U Test Sig. 0.751 & .750 respectively)

(Table 8). The distribution of metacognitive awareness and passionate love did not remain the

same across categories of occupational status i.e. student, unemployed and employed women

(Kruskal- Wallis Test Sig. 0.001 & .038 respectively). Also, the distribution of emotional

intelligence and aggression remained the same across the categories of occupational status as

student, unemployed and employed women (Kruskal- Wallis Test Sig. 0.575 & .549 respectively)

(Table 9).

62
Table 6. Test of Normality and Distribution of Variables across Age Category

Age Category Kolmogorov- Independent

(Late Smirnova sample Mann-
Study Variables Adolescence Vs Whitney U Test
Early Adulthood)
Statistic df Sig. Sig.
Metacognitive EA .132 43 .058 .000
Awareness LA .255 13 .021
Emotional EA .099 43 .200 .831
Intelligence LA .140 13 .200
EA .082 43 .200 .739
Aggression
LA .184 13 .200
Passionate EA .192 43 .000 .404
Love LA .192 13 .200

Table 7. Test of Normality and Distribution of Variables across Educational Qualification

Education (Non Kolmogorov- Independent

a
Research Degree Smirnov sample Mann-
Study Variables
Vs Research Whitney U Test
Degree) Statistic df Sig. Sig.
Metacognitive NR .146 47 .014 .281
Awareness R .215 9 .200
Emotional NR .104 47 .200 .805
Intelligence R .215 9 .200
Indirect Direct NR .099 47 .200 .261
Aggression R .184 9 .200
NR .177 47 .001 .084
Passionate Love
R .195 9 .200

63
Table 8. Test of Normality and Distribution of Variables across Marital Status

Marital Status Kolmogorov- Independent

(Single Vs Smirnova sample Mann-
Study Variables
Married) Whitney U Test
Statistic df Sig. Sig.
Metacognitive M .119 24 .200 .000
Awareness S .163 32 .030
Emotional M .105 24 .200 .751
Intelligence S .086 32 .200
Indirect- Direct M .121 24 .200 .750
Aggression S .108 32 .200
M .217 24 .005 .017
Passionate Love
S .157 32 .043

Table 9. Distribution of Variables across Employment Status

Employment Kolmogorov- Independent

Status (Student, Smirnov Sample Kruskal-
Study Variables
Unemployed or Wallis Test
Employed) Statistic df Sig. Sig.
Metacognitive E .112 24 .200 .001
S .226 25 .002
Awareness
UE .243 7 .200
E .137 24 .200 .575
Emotional S .108 25 .200
Intelligence .159 7 .200
UE

E .096 24 .200 .549

S .128 25 .200
Indirect- Direct
.190 7 .200
Aggression UE

E .239 24 .001 .038

Passionate Love S .161 25 .095
UE .386 7 .002

64
Pearson’s correlation analysis was carried out to find the relationship between the variables.

Metacognitive awareness was found to be correlated with emotional intelligence at .01 significance

level (r= .374, sig (2 tailed) = .000) (Table 10). No other variables were found to be related to

each other.

Regression analysis of metacognitive awareness as predictor of emotional intelligence was done.

The amount of variance in emotional intelligence (R square = .140, beta = .374, Sig = .000)

approached significant level at 95 % confidence level (Table 11). The regression equation is:

Emotional intelligence = 0.517 x Metacognitive awareness + 104.688

65
Table 10. Results of Correlation Analysis between Metacognitive Awareness, Emotional
Intelligence, Aggression and Passionate Love.

Metacognitive Emotional Indirect Passionate

Study Variables Awareness Intelligence Direct Love
Aggression

Pearson 1 .374** .113 .154

Correlation
Metacognitive
Awareness Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .316 .209

N 90 83 81 68

Pearson .374** 1 -.014 .037

Correlation
Emotional
Intelligence Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .906 .772

N 83 86 77 63

Pearson .113 -.014 1 .076

Correlation
Indirect Direct
Aggression Sig. (2-tailed) .316 .906 .546

N 81 77 88 66

Pearson .154 .037 .076 1

Correlation
Passionate
Love Sig. (2-tailed) .209 .772 .546

N 68 63 66 73

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

66
Table 11. Model Summary of Linear Regression of Metacognitive Awareness as predictor
of Emotional Intelligence.
R R Square Adjusted Std. Error Change Statistics
R Square of the R Square F Change df df Sig. F Change
Estimate Change 1 2
.374a .140 .129 7.790 .140 13.195 1 81 .000

ANOVAa
Sum of df Mean F Sig.
Squares Square
Regression 800.836 1 800.836 13.195 .000b
Residual 4916.031 81 60.692
Total 5716.867 82
a. Dependent Variable: Emotional Intelligence
b. Predictors: (Constant), Metacognitive Awareness

Correlation Coefficients
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 104.688 6.106 17.145 .000
Metacognitive .517 .142 .374 3.633 .000
Awareness

Residuals Statistics a
N = 83 Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Predicted Value 120.72 131.58 126.65 3.125
Std. Predicted Value -1.898 1.577 .000 1.000
Standard Error of .858 1.843 1.177 .280
Predicted Value
Adjusted Predicted Value 120.52 131.87 126.66 3.125
Residual -17.028 16.558 .000 7.743
Std. Residual -2.186 2.125 .000 .994
Stud. Residual -2.215 2.139 -.001 1.005
Deleted Residual -17.487 16.773 -.013 7.911
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.271 2.189 .000 1.015

67
Chart 6. Distribution of Regression Standardized Residual of Emotional Intelligence as
predicted by Metacognition.

Chart 7. Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual

68
Chart 8. Scatter Plot of Regression Standardized Predicted value Vs Observed value of
Emotional Intelligence.

Chart 9. Scatter Plot of Regression Studentized Residual Vs Emotional Intelligence.

69
 CHAPTER -7

DISCUSSION

70
 CHAPTER -7
DISCUSSION

The aim of the present study was to understand the relationship between metacognition, emotional

intelligence, aggression and passionate love among women.

In the present study a total of 130 participants gave consent to be part of the study. Leaving aside

carelessly filled and partially filled questionnaires, data was available from 108 participants.

Further filtering of data was carried out by eliminating data from participants whose response was

among extreme values for more than two variables. This brought down the number of actual

sample to 97 with 90 valid data for the variable metacognitive awareness, 86 for emotional

intelligence, 88 for indirect-direct aggression and 73 for passionate love. Hence the achieved

power for correlation between metacognitive awareness and emotional intelligence (effect size =

.5, sample size = 83) was 0.88 (critical z 1.96), that between metacognitive awareness and

aggression (effect size = .5, sample size = 81) was 0.88 (critical z = 1.96), that between

metacognitive awareness and passionate love (effect size = .5, sample size = 68) was 0.81, that

between emotional intelligence and aggression (effect size .5, sample size = 77) was 0.86, that

between emotional intelligence and passionate love (effect size = .5, sample size = 63) was 0.78

(critical z = 1.96) & that between aggression and passionate love (effect size = .5, sample size =

66) was 0.80 (critical z = 1.96). The mean age of the participants was 25.5 years with 73

participants in their early adulthood and 24 participants in their late adolescence. The sample had

an all India representation with participants from ten states in India as well as one foreign national

who was an internee taken from Sweekaar Academy of Rehabilitation Science. 34 of the

participants were married and 63 of the rest of the participants were single. 48 of the participants

71
were students, 35 of them were employed and 14 of them were unemployed (house wives). Among

all the participants 66 of them were either doing or had completed their research degree.

The distribution of the variables followed normal distribution (refer table 4). However the

distribution did not remain the same for all the set of variables across categorizing variables of

age, employment status and marital status. This result need to be taken with caution since the

primary aim of the sampling was not collecting data across these categories and hence the number

of data available in each category differed considerably. Also they were skewed with respect to

native place, educational category in a few subjects, and profession related to interaction with

clients in a curative setting (i.e. human caring involved viz, clinical psychology, rehabilitation,

speech and audiology, physiotherapy and nursing). Except a few, most of them had research degree

in psychology or rehabilitation. Hence any attempt at generalization of the result obtained over the

categories would be immature. However looking at the result with impartiality and with an aim to

find further hypotheses for future research would only be modest. In that view following discussion

is presented, before the main aim of the study are put to scrutiny.

The distribution of metacognitive awareness did not remain the same across age category of early

adulthood and late adolescence (refer table 6). Also the mean of metacognitive awareness was

found to be high among Early Adults (EA) in comparison with Late Adolescents (LA), (EA - Mean

= 43.61, SD = 5.824; LA - Mean = 37.57, SD = 4.214). It may be rationally inferred that the

metacognitive process continue to develop over the age as one gets more accustomed to knowledge

about their own thoughts. This has further implication in the intervention aspects in clinical

psychology that training in metacognitive skills be carried out even after one has entered into her

early adulthood and its evidence based practice may be established. Also, metacognitive therapy

may be more suitable and less time consuming for the early adults in comparison with late

adolescents among women because of their higher metacognitive awareness. The fact that

72
distribution of metacognitive awareness remained same but the mean was found to be higher

among research scholars (NR- Mean = 41.76, SD = 5.756; R- Mean = 43.18, SD = 6.634) together

with change observed over the age (early adulthood) also indicate that the intellectual involvement

over a period of time might improve metacognitive awareness among women. But the result could

also be due to the fact that those with higher metacognitive intelligence were successful in pursuing

education up to research degree, hence further research is needed to ascertain the fact. Also, most

of the research degree holders were from the field of clinical psychology or rehabilitation which

might have helped them improve their metacognitive skills as part of their studies and professional

requirements. The distribution of metacognitive awareness did not remain the same across the

category of employment (refer table 9). This, together with the fact that mean value of

metacognitive awareness is lower for Students (S) compared to Employed (E) or Unemployed

(UE) groups (E- Mean = 44.47, SD = 5.507; UE- Mean = 44.57, SD = 5.585; S- Mean = 39.80,

SD = 5.716), is showing that the effort to know about one’s own thought happen at a lesser extent

among the women students. This could be due to the casual factor that students are usually busy

with their studies rather than knowing about their cognitive processes. This suggests that

metacognitive skills of knowing one’s own thought and controlling them develop only on

conscious effort put for the same, rather than as gradual developmental process over the age. This

fact need to be read together with the finding of the study that early adults have better

metacognition in comparison with late adolescents. Again, the distribution of metacognition did

not remain the same across married and single women (refer Table 8). Also the mean of

metacognitive awareness was higher among married (M) women compared to single (S) women

(M- Mean = 45.13, SD = 4.831; S- Mean = 40.59, SD = 6.070). Inference from this result requires

further research as to whether the factors other than those already mentioned above viz, higher age

and current non engagement in studies (distraction away from being aware of one’s thoughts

73
among women students) contribute to the observed higher metacognition among married women.

One possibility could be the presence and interaction with the partner makes married women more

aware of their own thoughts and cognitive processes. Here again partner temperaments and

relationship pattern need to be considered for meaningful insight into the process. However, the

mere fact that metacognition is higher among married women makes them suitable candidates for

metacognitive therapy as an intervention strategy over a shorter time period.

Distribution of emotional intelligence did not change across the category of age. Also, the mean

value of emotional intelligence remained nearly the same among early adults (EA) as well as

among late adolescents (LA) (EA- Mean = 126.87, SD = 8.021; LA- Mean = 126.21, SD = 9.265).

This is unexpected finding that age and associated experiences does not influence improvement in

emotional intelligence among women. This could be due to sampling bias discussed above. But

distribution of emotional intelligence did not change across any of the categories of education,

employment status and marital status among women. Also, the mean value remained more or less

the same (refer table 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9). Hence the chances are that emotional intelligence could be an

entity which is more or less static or remains within a range for an individual or at least for a

women. But for establishing that, appropriate sampling method may be chosen along with suitable

research design. This is despite the fact that correlation exists between metacognitive awareness

& emotional intelligence and metacognition changes across categories of age, employment status

and marital status. However, this finding is in agreement with the claim Bar-On (2000) put up, that

relatively small differences in emotional intelligence exist across the life-span. Even though we

have to consider what Roberts, Zeidner, et al. (2001) reported, that the types of investigation

carried out to examine age differences has been both meager and contradictory. Cultural aspects

in emotional intelligence also need to be addressed for a better understanding, considering the fact

that 74.2 % of the sample for the present study was from single mother tongue background and

74
many other participants were also residents of the same cultural setting for quite some time. Non-

significant change of emotional intelligence of women across the categories of age, employment

status, educational qualification and marital status should draw attention of psychotherapists in

that, affective therapy may not be a suitable intervention strategy among women.

The distribution of indirect-direct aggression also did not change across the categories of age,

education, employment status or marital status and the mean value remained more or less the same

across the categories (refer table 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9). This again maybe pointing to the fact that

aggression remains the same in a woman’s life from adolescence till end of early adulthood despite

other intervening factors like employment status, educational qualification or marital status. Again,

to establish such a finding sampling need to be done with a view to avoid cultural aspects in

expression of aggression, wide range of educational and employment category, equal and larger

number of participants in all category including marital status, partner traits and their aggression,

socio economic status etc. But the finding is similar to that reported by follow-up studies viz.

aggression in females is found to be less stable than in males (Huesmann et al., 1984; Huesmann

& Eron, 1986; Olweus, 1984; Pulkkinen, 1987), hence remains the same.

The distribution of passionate love remained the same among early adults and late adolescents

(refer table 6) but the mean value was found to be higher for early adults (EA- Mean = 208.17, SD

= 37.406; LA- Mean = 199.67, SD = 41.430). This may be assumed to be due to the fact that early

adults enter into relationship more in comparison with late adolescents in the cultural setting from

which the sample was drawn. The distribution of passionate love remained the same across the

category of education but higher central tendencies were observed among non-research (NR)

degree holders in comparison with research scholars (R) (refer table 5 & 7) (NR- Mean = 209.45,

SD = 36.671, Median = 223.50; R- Mean = 188.54, SD = 43.548, Median = 206.00). Considering

the fact that the research scholars in the present sample was predominantly from the field of clinical

75
psychology and rehabilitation, it may be inferred that understanding the psychological process and

emotional expressions behind relationship and among people may have been a negatively

motivating factor for the women to enter into passionate love. Also majority of the research degree

holders participated in the study were unmarried, hence non commitment in the relationship

(whether existed or not) might be a crucial factor for women to go into passionate love relationship.

Moreover, as discussed above, the sampling need to be modified as the huge difference in number

is evident in the present sample (NR – 60, R – 13). The distribution of passionate love did not

remain the same across employment status (refer table 9). The mean of passionate love score was

found to be lower for the female students in comparison with employed and unemployed women

(E- Mean = 216.29, SD = 32.289; UE – Mean = 216.11, SD = 40.922; S – Mean = 194.92, SD =

40.330). This again could be due to the fact that students were not married or not into committed

relationship in the cultural background from which the sample was taken. Also, the distribution of

passionate love did not remain the same across marital status (refer table 8) and the mean score of

passionate love was higher for married women (M- Mean = 219.04, SD = 33.533; S- Mean =

197.44, SD = 39.418). Hence from all the above results it may be inferred that passionate love

improves among women as they enter into committed relationship. Again establishing this fact

with generalizability requires further research with appropriate sampling. This is particularly

important for making any inference regarding passionate love, as most number of extreme value

elimination happened for the variable passionate love (N = 73, Missing values 24) in the present

study.

Coming to the main aim of the present study, viz to understand the relationship among

metacognition, emotional intelligence, aggression and passionate love, Pearson’s correlation was

carried out.

76
Significant correlation was found between metacognitive awareness and emotional intelligence

(r= .374, Sig. at .01 level). This is in agreement with the already published literature. Cross and

Paris (1988) note that metacognition includes affective and motivational states. Similarly,

Martinez (2006) argues that metacognition entails the management of affective states, and that

metacognitive strategies can improve persistence and motivation in the face of challenging tasks.

Paris and Winograd (1990) concur, arguing that affect is an inevitable element of metacognition,

because as students monitor and appraise their own cognition, they will become more aware of

strengths and weaknesses. Eisenberg (2010) reviews the research on young children’s emotion-

related self-regulation, which is the set of “processes used to manage and change if, when, and

how one experiences emotions and emotion-related motivation and physiological states and how

emotions are expressed behaviorally” (p. 681). This emotion-related self-regulation refers to

monitoring and regulating the impact of emotions and motivational states on one’s performance

and parallels the regulation of cognition involved in the executive functioning dimension of

metacognition. Mayer and Salovey (1997) defined emotional intelligence as the ability to perceive,

appraise, and express emotions accurately; the ability to access and generate feelings to facilitate

cognitive activities; the ability to understand emotion-relevant concepts and use emotion-relevant

language; and the ability to manage one’s own emotions and the emotions of others to promote

growth, well-being, and functional social relations. Implications of the findings are that research

may be carried out to design intervention strategies to address affective disorders through

enhancing or changing metacognition. Also, research might be carried out to design intervention

strategies to address disorders involving cognition through enhancing or changing metacognition

and/or emotional intelligence. Even with this modest finding it is rational to practice such

therapeutic interventions in the said situations in clinical settings with appropriate evaluation of

the client.

77
Other finding of the present study is that there is no significant relationship between metacognitive

awareness and aggression (refer table 10). This could also be rationally understood that

metacognitive awareness requires knowing about one’s own thoughts which itself serves as a

monitoring function (metacognition by definition being able to know one’s cognitive processes

and able to control it). Aggression is mostly instinctual and acted upon with suppression of

monitoring the thoughts and cognition. Even on the thought out acts of aggression or suppression

of aggression, the simultaneous monitoring of cognition and thoughts seems to be suspended for

the moment. And for those having impulsivity and which is manifested in their aggressive

behavior, it is a rare chance that monitoring of cognitive processes and control of the same is

employed with efficiency during impulsive acts.

No correlation was found between metacognition and passionate love (refer table 10). This may

also be understood in the same rationality that when one is in passionate love, that person

especially a woman will tend not to focus on or monitor her own thoughts and cognitions.

No correlation was found between emotional intelligence and aggression (refer table 10).

According to the framework of emotional intelligence, one must be competent at understanding

one’s emotions; be able to process emotional information accurately and efficiently; and have the

insight to skill fully use one’s emotions to solve problems, make plans, and achieve in one’s life

(Salovey & Mayer, 1989–1990). Hence having emotional intelligence goes against the aggressive

instinct. But then the other argument will be why it is not negatively correlated. The answer lies in

the same definition. When one is being able to process emotional information accurately and

efficiently; and have the insight to skill fully use one’s emotions to solve problems, make plans,

and achieve in one’s life, the aggression element need not always be left out. According to Schwarz

& Bless, (1991) a careful, analytical approach that avoids risk taking may often be most

appropriate in times of threat or stress. Negative emotions occur when something has gone wrong

78
or threatens to go wrong. They occur when there is a problem, when goals are at risk, or when

resources seem inadequate. Negative emotions have the potential for functional utility because

there are times when the effects of negative emotions are useful. Recognizing this potential for

benefit is the key to understanding why it is neither odd nor self-contradictory to claim that

negative emotions can be useful or even desirable. For example, anger involves a readiness to be

confrontational and antagonistic, and to the extent that confrontation and antagonism are adaptive

under conditions that induce anger, this readiness will facilitate adaptive behavior.

No correlation was found between emotional intelligence and passionate love (refer table 10).

According to Brown J.W., (2012) love is the ultimate valuation of a thing, to which all desires are

subordinate. There is nothing more important than what is loved, which is to say that love,

regardless of whether or not it is implemented, realizes a value of immense signification. Apart

from the self-preservative drives, a genuine love for a person, for a thing or an occasion, from the

perspective of the individual, announces an object of the greatest possible value. From this stand

point we can understand that when a women is in passionate love, the person tends to sub serve

everything the emotional intelligence will naturally would have modulated, in the pursuit of the

ultimate valuation.

No correlation was found between aggression and passionate love (refer table 10). According to

Brown J. W (2012) aggression is the core of what is derived to the self-assertiveness of want,

including a variety of egocentric feelings—greed, arrogance, hate, pride, contumely—in which the

satisfaction of the will at the expense of the other is centered primarily in the acquisition of goods

or the protection of goods possessed. There is immediate discharge into pre-objects as drive-energy

fills the act completely and unselfconsciously. This drive is in essence going against the ultimate

valuation expressed in love. Hence a non-correlation between the variables is a rational finding.

79
Linear regression analysis was done to find the predictive ability of metacognitive awareness on

emotional intelligence. The amount of variance in emotional intelligence (R square = .140, beta =

.374, Sig = .000) was significant level at 95 % confidence level (Table 11). The R square value is

14% which suggest that other factors also contributing to the dependent variable.

Limitations of the study

For the present study, sample was collected from women aged 18 to 40 who can speak English.

This is a poor reflection of the women population the study was trying to explore. Including a

larger age range with women in their late adulthood might give a different result. Stratified

sampling or quota sampling representing percentage of aged women in each category may give

better results with generalizability. Also, majority of the data collected was from those either

studying or completed education in the field of psychology, rehabilitation, nursing or

physiotherapy. Nearly 75% of the sample obtained was from one linguistic group. All these factors

have compromised the representative nature of sample and the statistic may well me differing from

the parameters. Also, the number of sample varied drastically based on the categorizing variables

even though primary aim of the sampling for the present study was not to make comparison based

on scores across categories. Hence the inference made through non parametric test on categorizing

variables may not be generalizable given the fact that it was skewed in number, educational

qualification, marital status and employment status from profession involving human caring. The

planned sample size needed for generalizability with 5% error bound on estimate was 107.

However after eliminating the extreme values and erroneously filled up questionnaires, total

sample size came down to 97 with valid data for metacognition being 90, that for emotional

intelligence being 86, that for aggression being 88 and that for passionate love being 73. This

eventually reduced the available number of data for correlation between metacognitive awareness

and emotional intelligence to 83, that between metacognition and aggression to 81, that between

80
metacognition and passionate love to 68, that between emotional intelligence and aggression to

77, that between emotional intelligence and passionate love to 63 and that between aggression and

passionate love to 66. Hence the power achieved for correlation between metacognitive awareness

and emotional intelligence came down to .88, that between metacognition and aggression to .88,

that between metacognition and passionate love to .81, that between emotional intelligence and

aggression to .86, that between emotional intelligence and passionate love to .78 and that between

aggression and passionate love to .8 at the effect size of 0.5. Sperling et al (2004) utilizing the MAI

to determine college student metacognitive awareness, found a significant correlation between the

knowledge of cognition factor and the regulation of cognition factor. Even though previous

available research established correlation with metacognition and metacognitive awareness and

hence metacognitive awareness was selected as the representative variable for metacognition, the

actual correlation between metacognition and other variables of emotional intelligence, aggression

and passionate love might be different from the correlation between metacognitive awareness and

the said variables. The inference drawn regarding intervention strategies based on statistics would

have been more meaningful if a tool for measuring metacognition (involving control of cognition

and executive functions) was used rather than that measuring a component of it namely

metacognitive awareness. Similar logic holds for using a scale for passionate love in lieu of

expressive love or ability to love or attitude towards love for representing the broader concept of

love. Then the correlation effect would have had further meaningful insight into the intervention

strategies. Understanding of semantics of the test items play a crucial role especially when it is a

rating scale. Since the questionnaires used for the assessment were in English and the participant’s

mother tongue was not English, this might have affected the scoring to a certain extent. Application

of statistical tools without removing outliers and extreme scores revealed that the distribution of

scores for the variable passionate love did not follow normal distribution. Also elimination of most

81
number of extreme values (24) happened for the variable of passionate love and for passionate

love most number of people left the questionnaire unfilled, partially filled or erroneously filled as

per the given direction. Cultural factor might have also played a role in giving information

regarding passionate love. Hence applying parametric tests for finding the correlation with a

possibility of the distribution in actual population not following normal distribution, can give

erroneous or non-robust results. Also, it to be noted that with passionate love scores not following

normal distribution (ie, with extreme scores and outliers included), application of non-parametric

statistics revealed correlation between metacognitive awareness and passionate love (spearman’s

rho = .231, significant at .05 level). Hence larger sampling across cultures need to be taken before

inference can be drawn about the relationship between the variables of metacognitive awareness

and passionate love.

Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) was the instrument used to measure participant’s

metacognitive awareness. According to available literature metacognition is difficult to assess

because it is often implicit and, therefore, not directly observable (Flavell, 1979; Schraw, 2000;

Tobias & Everson, 2009). Attempts to quantify metacognition and assess it quickly and efficiently

led to the development of the MAI (Schraw & Dennison, 1994). One limitation of the MAI is that

the participants must be aware of their cognition to respond appropriately to the 52 items. Reliance

on the participants to assess their own thinking can lead to inaccuracies in responses. Also, the

MAI factor analysis conducted by Schraw and Dennison (1994) revealed that the items factored

on the two categories of metacognition, knowledge and regulation of cognition, but did not factor

on the distinct subcomponents of metacognition, rendering the analysis of the subcomponents

questionable. In previous studies, the scores for knowledge of cognition and regulation of

cognition were positively correlated in the moderate to high range (Schraw & Dennison, 1994;

82
Sperling, Howard, Staley, & DuBois, 2004). To what extent metacognition of the participants were

truly reflected in the study with the tool employed is debatable.

Conclusion

The study convincingly and conclusively established the fact that there exist a significant

relationship between metacognitive awareness and emotional intelligence among women. The

other findings of the study are; there is no significant relationship between metacognitive

awareness and aggression, between metacognitive awareness and passionate love, between

emotional intelligence and aggression, between emotional intelligence and passionate love &

between aggression and passionate love. Present study revealed that scores of metacognitive

awareness, emotional intelligence, indirect-direct aggression and passionate love follows normal

distribution with mean and standard distribution as follows. Metacognitive awareness (Mean =

42.20, SD = 6.04), Emotional Intelligence (Mean = 126.72. SD = 8.26), Aggression (Mean = 73.53.

SD = 7.43) and Passionate love (Mean = 205.73, SD = 38.51). The study also revealed that

metacognitive awareness significantly predict emotional intelligence among women.

Future Research

 The present study was to find the relationship between metacognition, emotional

intelligence, aggression and passionate love among women. The study may be extended

including both genders to improve upon generalizability and to draw conclusion on

interventions strategies.

 The research may be repeated to find the difference across gender so as to find out how the

relationship among the variables varies and to find out what specific factors could be

contributing to the same. This will give leverage in choosing therapeutic strategies across

gender.

83
 The present study gives direction for future research studies to find out how intervening

variables like age, education, social status, employment status, marital status, cultural

background etc affect the relationship between the variables of metacognition, emotional

intelligence, aggression and love.

 The study need to be carried out to find out how personality traits affects the relationship

between metacognition, emotional intelligence, aggression and love.

 Present study established regression of metacognitive awareness on emotional intelligence.

However R square value was only 14% suggesting influence of other variables. Also,

present study rejects any correlation between emotional intelligence and aggression as well

as passionate love. Hence further research is needed to find out what other factors along

with metacognitive awareness will significantly and adequately predict emotional

intelligence in women. This research can be repeated for men as well as including both the

genders.

 Also, research may be carried out to establish suitability of therapy viz metacognitive,

affective or supportive psychotherapy for affective disorders among women based on their

level of metacognitive awareness or emotional intelligence. And prior screening based on

the same during clinical interview can be carried out resulting in time saving as well as in

choice of suitable intervention strategy. This may be repeated across genders and including

both genders.

 As the present study already established significant relationship between metacognitive

awareness and emotional intelligence and the predictive ability of metacognitive awareness

on emotional intelligence, research may further be extended to integrate metacognitive

therapy and affective therapy.

84
 Present study established significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and

emotional intelligence among women. Further research may be carried out to find the

relationship between emotional intelligence and components of metacognitive awareness

viz knowledge about declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, conditional

knowledge, planning, information management strategies, comprehension monitoring,

debugging strategies and evaluation. This will give meaningful insight into the

metacognitive process as well as emotional intelligence. This research can be repeated

among males as well as including both the genders.

 Research may be carried out to establish the efficacy of affective therapy among women,

as the extended analysis of the available data from the present study indicated that

distribution of emotional intelligence remains the same among women across the

categories of age, educational qualification, employment status and marital status with

more or less similar mean value.

 For the present study exclusion criteria included current or previous history of mental

illness, disability, substance abuse and sever medical complications. Research may be

extended to find the relationship between metacognition, emotional intelligence,

aggression and love across all the ICD diagnostic categories. This will give insight into the

fact that how different categories of mental illness affect these variables as well as

relationship among them. This will also give meaningful insight into which therapies can

be best chosen for different diagnostic categories. The research may be done among men,

including both genders and among children.

 Future research may be carried out to find suitability of metacognitive Vs affective

therapies across age categories of adolescence, early adulthood, middle adulthood, late

adulthood and among children.

85
 CHAPTER -8

SUMMARY

86
 CHAPTER -8
SUMMARY

Study in Retrospect
The study is entitled “Metacognition, Emotional Intelligence, Aggression and Passionate Love

among Women”. The aim of the study is to understand the relationship between metacognition,

emotional intelligence, aggression and passionate love among female population and to establish

statistically valid relationship among those variables. The hypotheses of the study are

1. There will be significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and emotional

intelligence among women.

2. There will be significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and aggression among

women.

3. There will be significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and passionate love

among women.

4. There will be significant relationship between emotional intelligence and aggression among

women.

5. There will be significant relationship between emotional intelligence and passionate love

among women.

6. There will be significant relationship between aggression and passionate love among women.

Purposive sampling was used for the study. After eliminating extreme responses and erroneous

responses, the study consisted of 97 participants with informed consent. Metacognitive awareness

inventory developed by Gregory Schraw and Rayne Sperling Dennison (1994), Emotional

intelligence scale developed by Schutte et al. (1998), Indirect and direct aggression questionnaire

(I-DAQ) developed by Ruiz-Pamies, M et al.(2014) and Passionate love scale developed by

Hatfield, E & Sprecher, S (1986) are used for the present study. The statistical techniques used in

87
the study include mean, standard deviation, median, percentage analysis, Kolmogorv-Smirinov

test, Mann-Whitney U test, Kruskal-Wallis test, Pearson’s correlation and linear regression

analysis.

Major Findings of the Study are:

Major finding derived from the statistics are the following

1. The distribution of metacognitive awareness, emotional intelligence, aggression and

passionate love follow normal distribution.

2. There exists significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and emotional

intelligence among women.

3. There is no significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and aggression

among women.

4. There is no significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and passionate love

among women.

5. There is no significant relationship between emotional intelligence and aggression among

women.

6. There is no significant relationship between emotional intelligence and passionate love

among women.

7. There is no significant relationship between aggression and passionate love among women.

8. Metacognitive awareness significantly predict emotional intelligence among women.

Tenability of Hypotheses

Tenability of the hypothesis may be tested on the basis of results from the data collected.

Hypothesis 1 states that

There is significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and emotional intelligence

among women.

88
Findings of the study fully substantiate this hypothesis. Pearson’s correlation coefficient

obtained for the correlation between metacognitive awareness and emotional intelligence is

significant at .01 level of significance (r = .374).

Hypothesis 2 states that

There is significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and aggression among women.

Findings of the study reject this hypothesis. Pearson’s correlation coefficient obtained for the

correlation between metacognitive awareness and aggression is non-significant at .01 level of

significance (r = .113).

Hypothesis 3 states that

There is significant relationship between metacognitive awareness and passionate love among

women.

Findings of the study reject this hypothesis. Pearson’s correlation coefficient obtained for the

correlation between metacognitive awareness and passionate love is non-significant at .01 level of

significance (r = .154).

Hypothesis 4 states that

There is significant relationship between emotional intelligence and aggression among women.

Findings of the study reject this hypothesis. Pearson’s correlation coefficient obtained for the

correlation between emotional intelligence and aggression is non-significant at .01 level of

significance (r = -.014).

Hypothesis 5 states that

There is significant relationship between emotional intelligence and passionate love among

women.

89
Findings of the study reject this hypothesis. Pearson’s correlation coefficient obtained for the

correlation between emotional intelligence and passionate love is non-significant at .01 level of

significance (r = .037).

Hypothesis 6 states that

There is significant relationship between aggression and passionate love among women. Findings

of the study reject this hypothesis. Pearson’s correlation coefficient obtained for the correlation

between aggression and passionate love is non-significant at .01 level of significance (r = .076).

Implications of the Study

1. Findings of the study substantiate significant relationship between metacognition and

emotional intelligence among women. It is modest to assume that improving metacognitive

skills will have a positive effect on ability to evaluate one’s emotions accurately and plan

effectively to achieve in life, as the person is able to monitor her cognitive process. Hence

any research looking at possible therapeutic intervention strategies to address affective

disorders through enhancing or changing metacognition among women and to a general

population is a valid proposition.

2. Also, improving skills to monitor one’s emotions is bound to have enhancing effect on the

ability to monitor one’s cognition. Hence research looking at possible therapeutic

intervention strategies to address disorders involving cognition through enhancing or

changing metacognition and/or emotional intelligence is a valid proposition.

3. Findings of the study reject any significant relationship between metacognition and

aggression among women. Hence to address disorders involving element of aggression viz

impulse control disorders, personality disorders, relationship and systemic problems, effect

of employing metacognitive therapy among women might be questionable. Further

research may be carried out to establish this fact and through comparative study behavioral

90
 or other appropriate intervention strategies might be suggested as evidence based practice.

Also, research might be carried out to establish the fact in general population.

4. And research can be done to establish what other factors will be able to contain aggressive

drive within healthy limits among normal population as a preventive strategy against

mental ill health, considering the fact that one’s ability to know and monitor one’s own

cognitive process not necessarily be effective in reducing aggressive drive among women.

5. Findings of the study reject any significant relationship between metacognition and

passionate love among women. Hence to address relationship problems and systemic

problems where lack of love among the members is the predisposing factor or the root

cause, effect of employing metacognitive therapy among women might be questionable.

Further research may be carried out to establish this fact and appropriate intervention

strategies that will equip the person to develop love might be devised.

6. Research can be done to establish what other factors influence the expression of love

considering the fact that one’s ability to know and monitor one’s own cognitive process

not necessarily result in expression of passionate love among women. And whether pursuit

of love help people achieve self-actualization, given the fact that knowing about one’s own

cognitive process and controlling them doesn’t influence that person’s love, with the

assumption that knowing and controlling one’s own cognitive process if not necessarily

help one achieve self-actualization but at least enhance the process.

7. Findings of the study reject any significant relationship between emotional intelligence and

aggression among women. Hence to address disorders involving element of aggression viz

impulse control disorders, personality disorders, relationship and systemic problems, effect

of employing affective therapy or integrative cognitive-affective therapy among women

might be questionable. Further research may be carried out to establish this fact and through

91
 comparative study, behavioral or other appropriate intervention strategies might be

suggested as evidence based practice. Also, research might be carried out to establish this

fact in general population.

8. Research may be done to establish what other factor will be able to contain aggressive drive

within healthy limits among normal population as a preventive strategy against mental ill

health, considering the fact that one’s ability to know and monitor one’s own emotions

need not necessarily be effective in reducing aggressive drive among women.

9. Findings of the study reject any significant relationship between emotional intelligence and

passionate love among women. Hence to address relationship and systemic problems

where lack of love among the members is the predisposing factor or root cause, effect of

employing affective therapy or cognitive affective therapy among women might be

questionable. Also, it follows form the results that expression of love or ability to be in

passionate love need not be focused during the intervention strategy to address affective

disorders. Further research may be carried out to establish this fact and appropriate

intervention strategies that will equip the person to develop love might be devised, given

the fact that being able to monitor and control one’s emotions need not necessarily

influence that person’s ability to express love or be passionately in love.

10. Research can be done to establish what other factors influence the expression of love

considering the fact that one’s ability to know and monitor one’s own emotions need not

necessarily result in expression of passionate love among women. And whether pursuit of

love help people achieve self-actualization given the fact that knowing about one’s own

emotions and controlling them doesn’t influence that person’s love, with the assumption

that knowing and controlling one’s own emotions if not necessarily help one achieve self-

actualization but at least enhance the process. Other assumption behind the suggestion

92
 being that the ability to be in passionate love motivates the people to undertake actions

beyond daily activities and even towards self-actualization which might need to be

established through research.

11. Findings of the study reject any significant relationship between aggression and passionate

love among women. Hence to address relationship and systemic problems where lack of

love among the members is the predisposing factor or the root cause, taming aggressive

drive need not be taken as the prime focus to solve such problems. Also, it follows form

the results that expression of love or ability to be in passionate love need not be focused

during the intervention strategy to address disorders involving element of aggression viz

impulse control disorders, personality disorders, relationship and systemic problems.

Further research may be carried out to establish this fact and appropriate intervention

strategies that will equip the person to develop love might be devised, given the fact that

aggressive drive need not necessarily influence that person’s ability to express love or be

passionately in love.

12. Research can be done to establish what other factor influence the expression of love

considering the fact that aggressive drive need not necessarily hinder the expression of

passionate love among women. Further research may be carried out looking at possible

practice to optimize the balance between expression of love as well as aggression as a

preventive strategy against mental ill-health as well as an opportunity for maximization of

mental functions or achieving self-actualization.

13. Finding of the study establishes significant predictability of metacognitive awareness on

emotional intelligence among women. Hence any tool employed to assess metacognitive

awareness during the clinical interview may discriminate sufficiently as whether to use

metacognitive therapy, affective therapy or supportive therapy to address affective

93
 disorders among women. This might bring down the time spent on therapeutic process and

might aid to move towards brief therapy modes in the said intervention strategies.

14. From the findings of the present study, it is modest to suggest research aimed at integrating

metacognitive and affective therapy at theoretical level.

*** ~~~~~~~***

94
 REFERENCES

95
 References

Alexander, J. M., Carr, M., & Schwanenflugel, P. J. (1995). Development of metacognition in

gifted children: Directions for future research. Developmental Review, 15(1), 1-37.

Anguiano-Carrasco C., & Vigil-Colet A. (2011). Assessing indirect aggression in aggressors and
targets: Spanish adaptation of the Indirect Aggression Scales. Psicothema, 23, 146–152.

Archer J. (2004). Sex differences in real-world settings: A meta-analytic review. Review of

General Psychology, 8, 291–332. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.8.4.291.

Archer J, Coyne SM. 2005. An integrated review of indirect, relational, and social aggression.
Personality and Social Psychology Review 9: 212–230

Aron, A., Fisher, H., Mashek, D. J., Strong, G., Li, H., & Brown, L. L. (2005). Reward, motivation,
and emotion systems associated with early-stage intense romantic love. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 94, 327-337.

Aron, A., & Henkemeyer, L. (1995). Marital satisfaction and passionate love. Journal of Social
and Personal Relationships, 12, 139-146.
Bandura, A. (1973). Aggression: A social learning analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Bar-On, R. (1988). The development of an operational concept of psychological wellbeing.

Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Rhodes University, South Africa.

Bar-On, R. (1997). The Emotional Intelligence Inventory (EQ-i): Technical manual. Toronto:
Multi-Health Systems.

Bar-On, R. (2000). Emotional and social intelligence: Insights from the Emotional Quotient
Inventory. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (eds.), The handbook of emotional intelligence (pp.
363–388). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Bartels, A. & Zeki, S. (2004). The neural correlates of maternal and romantic love. Neuroimage,
21, 1155-1166.

Bechara, A., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Poor judgment in spite of high intellect:
Neurological evidence for emotional intelligence. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (eds.), Handbook
of Emotional Intelligence. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

96
Beck, J. G., Bozman, A. W., & Qualtrough, T. (1991). The experience of sexual desire:
Psychological correlates in a college sample. The Journal of Sex Research, 28, 443-456.
Biederman, J., Newcorn, J., & Sprich, S. (1991). Comorbidity of attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder with conduct, depressive, anxiety, and other disorders. American Journal of Psychiatry,
148, 564–577.

Boldizar, J. P., Perry, D. G., & Perry, L. C. (1989). Outcome values and aggression. Child
Development, 60, 571 – 579
Brown, J. W. (2005). Process and the Authentic Life. Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag.

Brown, J.W. (2012). Love and other emotions. On the process of feeling. London: Karnac Books
Ltd

Brown, A. L., Campione, J. C., & Barclay, C. R. (1979). Training and self-checking routines for
estimating test readiness: Generalization from list learning to prose recall. Child Development, 50,
501-512.

Buss, A. (1963). Physical aggression in relation to different frustrations. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 67, 1-7.

Buss, D. (1994). The Evolution of Desire. New York: Basic Books.

Buss A. H., & Durkee A. (1957). An inventory for assessing different kinds of hostility. Journal
of Consulting Psychology, 21, 343–349. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0046900.

Buss A. H., & Perry M. (1992).The Aggression Questionnaire. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 63, 452–459. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.63.3.452.

Carson, A. J., Ringbauer, B., MacKenzie, L., Warlow, C., & Sharpe, M. (2000). Neurological
disease, emotional disorder, and disability—they are related: A study of 300 consecutive new
referrals to a neurology outpatient department. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry,
68, 202–206.

Chan, L. K. S. (1996). Motivational orientations and metacognitive abilities of intellectually gifted

students. Gifted Child Quarterly, 40(4), 184-193.

Ciarrochi, J., Chan, A., & Bajgar, J. (2001). Measuring emotional intelligence in adolescents.
Personality & Individual Differences, 31, 1105–1119.

Ciarrochi, J., Chan, A., & Bajgar, J. (2001). Measuring emotional intelligence in adolescents.
Personality & Individual Differences, 31, 1105–1119.
97
Ciarrochi, J., Chan, A., & Caputi, P. (2000). A critical evaluation of the emotional intelligence
construct. Personality and Individual Differences, 28, 539–561.

Cohen, R. (1955). Social norms, arbitrariness of frustration and status of the agent of frustration in
the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51, 222-226.

Connelly C. D., Newton R. R., & Aarons G. A. (2005). A psychometric examination of English
and Spanish versions of the revised Conflict Tactics Scales. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 20,
1560–1579. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260505280341.

Costa, P. T., Jr. & McCrae, R. R. (1985). Hypochondriasis, neuroticism, and aging: When are
somatic complaints unfounded? American Psychologist, 40, 19–28.

Cox, B. J., Borger, S. C., Asmundson, G. J. G., & Taylor, S. (2000). Dimensions of
hypochondriasis and the five-factor model of personality. Personality & Individual Differences,
29, 99–108.

Damasio, A. R. (1994). The brain binds entities and events by multiregional activation from
convergence zones. In H. Gutfreund, G. Toulouse, et al. (eds.), Biology and computation: A
physicist’s choice (pp. 749–758). Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co.

Deary, I. J., Wilson, J. A., & Kelly, S. W. (1995). Globus pharyngis, personality, and psychological
distress in the general population. Psychosomatics, 36, 570–577.

Doherty, O., & Matthews, G. (1988). Personality characteristics of opiate addicts. Personality and
Individual Differences, 9, 171–172.

Dollard, J., Doob, L. W., Miller, N. E., Mowrer, 0. H., & Sears, R. R. (1939). Frustration and
aggression. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dorsey, C. M., & Bootzin, R. R. (1997). Subjective and psycho-physiologic insomnia: An

examination of sleep tendency and personality. Biological Psychiatry, 41, 209–216.

Endler, N., Denisoff, E., & Rutherford, A. (1998). Anxiety and depression: Evidence for the
differentiation of commonly co-occurring constructs. Journal of Psychopathology & Behavioral
Assessment, 20, 149–171.

Endler, N., & Parker, J. (1990). Multidimensional assessment of coping: A critical review. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 844–854.

98
Eron, L. D. (1982). Parent-child interaction, television violence and aggression of children.
American Psychologist, 42, 435-442.

Eron, L. D. (1987). The development of aggressive behavior from the perspective of a developing
behaviorism. American Psychologist, 42, 435-442.

Eysenck, H. J. (1976). Sex and personality. London: Open Books.

Farmer, A., & McGuffin, P. (1999). Comparing ICD-10 and DSM-IV. British Journal of
Psychiatry, 175, 587–588.
Fehr, B. (2005). Prototype-based assessment of laypeople’s views of love. Personal Relationships,
1, 309-331.
Feingold, A. (1994). Gender differences in personality: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin,
116, 429–456.

Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring. A new area of cognitive

developmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906-911.

Freud, S. (1957). Instincts and their vicissitudes. Standard Edition (Vol. 14, pp. 109-140).
London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1915).

Freeman, J. (1993). Parents and families in nurturing giftedness and talent. In K. A. Heller, F. J.
Mönks, & A. H. Passow (Eds.), International handbook of research and development of giftedness
and talent (pp. 669-684). Oxford: Pergamon.

Frodi, A., Macaulay, J., & Thome, P. R. (1977). Are women always less aggressive than men? A
review of the experimental literature. Psychological Bulletin, 84, 634-660.

Frost, W. D., & Averill, T. R. (1982). Difference between men and women in the everyday
experience of anger. In: J. R. Averill (Ed.), Anger and aggression: An essay one motion. (pp. 281-
316). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Garnder, H. (1999). Intelligence reframed. New York: Basic Books.

Gignac, G.E., Palmer, B.R., Manocha, R. and Stough, C. (2005) An examination of the factor
structure of the Schutte self-report emotional intelligence (SSREI) scale via confirmatory factor
analysis. Personality and Individual Differences 39, 1029-1042.

Goleman, D. (2001). Emotional intelligence: Perspectives on a theory of performance. In press.

99
Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional Intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ. New York: Bantam
Books.

Goldner, E. M., Srikameswaran, S., Schroeder, M. L., Livesley, W. J., & Birmingham, C. L.
(1999). Dimensional assessment of personality pathology in patients with eating disorders.
Psychiatry Research, 85, 151–159.

Graham, D. L., Rawlings, E. I., Ihms, K., Latimer, D., Foliano, J., Thompson, A., Suttman, K.,
Farrington, M., & Hacker, R. (1995). A scale for identifying “Stockholm syndrome” reactions in
young dating women: factor structure, reliability, and validity. Violence and Victims, 10, 3-22.

Green, J., Gilchrist, A., Burton, D., & Cox, A. (2000). Social and psychiatric functioning in
adolescents with Asperger syndrome compared with conduct disorder. Journal of Autism &
Developmental Disorders, 30, 279–293.

Hacker, D. J. (1998). Definitions and empirical foundations. In D. J. Hacker, J. Dunlosky, & A. C.

Graesser (Eds.), Metacognition in educational theory and practice (pp. 1-23).Mahwah, New
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

Hatfield, E., & Rapson, R. L. (2005). Love and Sex: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. Lanham, MD:
University Press of America

Hatfield, E, Rapson, R. L., & Martel, L. D. (2007). Passionate love and sexual desire. In Shinobu
Kitayama & Dov Cohen. (Eds.) Handbook of cultural psychology. New York: Guilford Press, pp.
760-779

Hatfield, E., & Sprecher, S. (1986). Measuring passionate love in intimate relations. Journal of
Adolescence, 9, 383-410.

Helms-Lorenz, M., van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Poortinga, Y. H. (2003). Cross-cultural differences
in cognitive performance and Spearman's hypothesis: G or c? Intelligence, 31, 9-29.

Hendrick, C., & Hendrick, S. S. (1989). Research on love: Does it measure up? Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 784-794.

Hopwood C. J., & Donnellan M. B. (2010). How should the internal structure of personality
inventories be evaluated? Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14, 332–346.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868310361240.

Hu L., & Bentler P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indices in covariance structure analysis:
Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling, 6, 1–55.

100
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10705519909540118.

Huesmann, L. R. (1977). Formal models of social behavior. Paper presented at the meeting of the
Society for Experimental Social Psychology, Austin, Texas.

Huesmann, L. R. (1980). Encoding specificity in observational learning. Paper presented at a

Colloquium at Institute of Psychology, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland.

Huesmann, L. R. (1982). Television violence and aggressive behavior. In D. Pearl, L. Bouthilet &
P. Lazar (Eds. ), Television and behavior: Ten years of scientific programs and implications for
the SO's. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Huesmann, L. R. (1988). An information model for the development of aggression. Aggressive

Behavior, 14, 13-24.

Huesmann, L. R., & Eron, L. D. (1984). Cognitive processes and the persistence of aggressive
behavior. Aggressive Behavior, 10, 243-251.

Huesmann, L. R., Eron, L. D., Lefkowitz, M. M., & Walder, L. 0. (1984). The stability of
aggression over time and generations. Developmental Psychology, 20, 1120-1134.

Infante D. A., & Wigley C. J. (1986). Verbal aggressiveness: An interpersonal model and measure.
Communication Monographs, 53, 61–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03637758609376126.

Jacobs, J. E., & Paris, S. G. (1987). Children’s metacognition about reading: Issues in definition,
measurement, and instruction. Educational Psychologist, 22(3&4), 255-278.

James, P. (2007). Effects of a communication training component added to an emotionally focused

couples therapy. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 17 263-275.

Jensen, A. R. (1985). The nature of the black-white difference on various psychometric tests:
Spearman’s hypothesis. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 193-263.

Kaukiainen A., Salmivalli C., Björkqvist K., Österman K., Lahtinen A., Kostamo A., &
Lagerspeltz K. (2001). Overt and covert aggression in work settings in relation to the subjective
well-being of employees. Aggressive Behavior, 27, 360–371.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ab.1021.abs.

Kennedy, S. H., Dickens, S. E., Eisfeld, B. S., & Bagby, R. M. (1999). Sexual dysfunction before
antidepressant therapy in major depression. Journal of Affective Disorders, 56, 201–208.

101
Ketelaar, T., & Clore, G. L. (1997). Emotion and reason: The proximate effects and ultimate
functions of emotions. In G. Matthews (ed.), Cognitive science perspectives on personality and
emotion (pp. 355–396). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Kim, J. A., Szatmari, P., Bryson, S. E., Streiner, D. L., & Wilson, F. J. (2000). The prevalence of
anxiety and mood problems among children with autism and Asperger syndrome. Autism, 4, 117–
132.

Kirmayer, L. J., Robbins, J. M., & Paris, J. (1994). Somatoform disorders: Personality and the
social matrix of somatic distress. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103, 125–136.

Kroenke, K., Jackson, J. L., & Chamberlin, J. (1997). Depressive anxiety disorders in patients
presenting with physical complaints: Clinical predictors and outcome. American Journal of
Medicine, 103, 339–347.

Kluwe, R. H. (1982). Cognitive knowledge and executive control: metacognition. In D. R. Griffin

(Ed.), Animal mind – human mind (pp. 201-224). New York: Springer- Verlag.

Lambert, W. E. (1985). What happens to children when they act aggressively in six cultures?
In: F. R. Brush & J. B. Overmeier (Eds.), Affect, conditioning, and cognition: Essays on the
determinants of behavior (pp. 325-339). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Landis, D. & O’Shea (2000). Cross-cultural aspects of passionate love; An individual difference
analysis. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31, 754- 779.

Lane, A.M., Meyer, B.B., Devonport, T.J., Kevin, A.D., Thelwell, R., Gill, G.S., Diehl, C.D.P.,
Wilson, M. and Weston, N. (2009) Validity of the emotional intelligence scale for use in sport.
Journal of Sports Science and Medicine 8, 289-295.

Lawrence C. (2006). Measuring individual responses to aggression-triggering events:

Development of the Situational Triggers of Aggressive Responses (STAR) scale. Aggressive
Behavior, 32, 241–252. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ab.20122.

Leowald, H. (2000). The Essential Leowald. College Park, MD: University of Maryland
Publishing.

Maccoby, E. E., & Jacklin, C. N. (1974). The psychology of sex differences. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.

Mackintosh, N. J. (1998). IQ and human intelligence. New York: Oxford University Press.

102
Malpass, J. R., O’Neil, J. H. F., & Hocevar, D. (1999). Self-regulation, goal orientation, self-
efficacy, worry, and high-stakes math achievement for mathematically gifted high school students.
Roeper Review, 21(4), 281-289.

Martin, E. D., & Sher, K. J. (1994). Family history of alcoholism, alcohol use disorders, and the
five-factor model of personality. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 55, 81–90.

Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (2000). Competing models of emotional intelligence.
In R. J. Sternberg (ed.), Handbook of human intelligence (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge
University Press.

Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., Caruso, D. R., & Sitarenios, G. (2003). Measuring emotional intelligence
with the MSCEIT V2.0. Emotion, 3(1), 97–105

Mevarech, Z. R., & Kramarski, B. (1997). IMPROVE: A multidimensional method for teaching
mathematics in heterogeneous classrooms. American Educational Research Journal, 34(2), pp.
365-395.

Mascie-Taylor, C. G., & Gibson, J. B. (1978). Social mobility and IQ components. Journal of
Biosocial Science, 10, 263–276.

Miller, N. E. (1941). The frustration-aggression hypothesis. Psychological Review, 48, 337- 342.
Parke, R. D., & Slaby, R. G. (1983). The development of aggression. In P. H. Mussen (Ed.),
Handbook of child psychology (4th ed., pp. 547-642). New York: Wiley.

Mineka, S., Watson, D., & Clark, A. (1998). Comorbidity of anxiety and unipolar mood disorders.
Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 377–412.

Minnaert, A., & Janssen, P. J. (1999). The additive effect of regulatory activities on top of
intelligence in relation to academic performance in higher education. Learning and Instruction, 9,
77-91.

Mitchell, S.A. (1993) ‘Aggression and the endangered self ’, Psychoanalytic Quarterly 62(3): 351-
82.

Morales-Vives F., & Vigil-Colet A. (2010). Are there sex differences in physical aggression in the
elderly? Personality and Individual Differences, 49, 659–662.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.05.034.

Moyer, K. E. (1977). The psychobiology of aggression. New York: Harper & Row.

103
Nelson, T.O. and Narens, L. (1990). Meta-memory: a theoretical framework and new findings.
In Bower, G.H., Ed., The psychology of learning and motivation (pp.125–173). New York, NY:
Academic Press.

Oatley, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. (1996). The communicative theory of emotions: Empirical tests,
mental models, and implications for social interaction. In L. L.Martin & A. Tesser (eds.), Striving
and feeling: Interactions among goals, affect, and self-regulation (pp. 363–393). Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Olweus, D. (1984). Development of stable aggressive reaction patterns in males. In: D. C.

Blanchard (Ed.), Advances in the study of aggression (Vol. 1, pp. 000-000). Orlando, FL:
Academic Press.

Pastore, N. (1952). The role of arbitrariness in the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Journal of

Abnormal & Social Psychology, 47, 728-731.

Perleth, C. (1992). Strategy use and metamemory in gifted and average primary school children.
In K. A. Heller, & E. A. Hany (Eds), Competence and responsibility, the third European
conference of the European council for high ability (pp. 46-52). Seattle: Hogrefe & Huber.

Perry, D. G., Perry, L. C., & Rasmussen, P. (1986). Cognitive social learning mediators of
aggression. Child Development, 57, 700-711.

Petrides, K.V. and Furnham, A. (2000) On the dimensional structure of emotional intelligence.
Personality and Individual Differences 29, 313-320.
Pfeiffer, S. I. (2001). Emotional intelligence: A popular but elusive construct. Report Review, 23,
138-142.

Pulkkinen, L. (1987). Offensive and defensive aggression in humans: A longitudinal perspective.

Aggressive Behavior, 9, 197-212.

Rauste-von Wright, M. (1989). Physical and verbal aggression in peer groups among Finnish
adolescent boys and girls. International journal of Behavioral Development, 12, 473- 484.

Riskind, J. H., Gessner, T. D., & Wolzon, R. (1999). Cognitive vulnerability to alcohol dependence
in an inpatient sample: Implications of the looming maladaptive style. Unpublished Manuscript.
Roberts, R. D., Zeidner, M., & Matthews, G. (2001). Does emotional intelligence meet traditional
standards for an intelligence? Some new data and conclusions. Emotions, 1, 196–231.

104
Rolls, E. T. (1999). The brain and emotion. New York: Oxford University Press. Rowe, H. A. H.
(1991). Observing thinking and learning processes. In G. Evans (Ed.) Learning teaching cognitive
skills (pp. 9-26). Melbourne: A.C.E.R.

Ruiz-Pamies, M., Lorenzo-Seva, U., Morales-Vives, F., Cosi, S., & Vigil-Colet, A. (2014). I-
DAQ: A new test to assess direct and indirect aggression free of response bias. The Spanish
Journal of Psychology, 17, 1-8.
Saklofske, D.H., Austin, E.J. and Minski, P.S. (2003) Factor structure and validity of a trait
emotional intelligence measure. Personality and Individual Differences 34, 707–721.
Salovey, P., Bedell, B. T., Detweiler, J. B., & Mayer, J. D. (1999). Coping intelligently: Emotional
intelligence and the coping process. In C. R. Snyder (ed.), Coping: The psychology of what works
(pp. 141–164). New York: Oxford University Press.

Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional Intelligence. Imagination, Cognition and
Personality, 9, 185-211.

Salovey, P., Stroud, L. R., Woolery, A., & Epel, E. S. (under review). Perceived emotional
intelligence, stress reactivity, and health: Further explorations using the trait meta-mood scale.
Psychology and Health. In Press

Schraw, G. (2000). Assessing metacognition: Implications of the Buros symposium. In G. Schraw

& J. C. Impara (Eds.), Issues in the measurement of metacognition (pp. 297-321). Lincoln,
Nebraska: Buros Institute of Mental Measurements.

Schraw, G., & Dennison, R. S. (1994). Assessing metacognitive awareness. Contemporary

Educational Psychology, 19(4), 460-475. doi:10.1006/ceps.1994.1033.
Schutte, N. S., Malouff, J. M., Hall, L. E., Haggerty, D. J., Cooper, J. T., Golden, C. J., &
Dornheim, L. (1998). Development and validation of a measure of emotional intelligence.
Personality and Individual Differences, 25, 167–177.

Shallice, T., & Burgess, P. (1996). The domain of supervisory processes and the temporal
organization of behaviour. In A. C. Roberts & T. W. Robbins (eds.), The prefrontal cortex:
Executive and cognitive functions (pp. 22–35). New York: Oxford University Press.

Shaw, G. K., Waller, S., Latham, C. J., Dunn, G., & Thomson, A. D. (1997). Alcoholism: A long-
term follow-up study of participants in an alcohol treatment programme. Alcohol & Alcoholism,
32, 527–535.

Shraw, G., & Graham, T. (1997). Helping Gifted students Develop Metacognitive Awareness.
Roeper Review, 20(1), 4-8.

105
Sperling, R. A., Howard, B. C., Staley, R. & DuBois, N. (2004). Metacognition and self- regulated
learning constructs. Educational Research and Evaluation, 10(2), 117-139.
doi:10.1076/edre.10.2.117.27905

Sprecher, S., & Regan, P. C. (1998). Passionate and companionate love in courting and young
married couples. Sociological Inquiry, 68, 163-185

Steer, R. A., Clark, D. A., Beck, A. T., & Ranieri, W. F. (1995). Common and specific dimensions
of self-reported anxiety and depression: A replication. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104, 542–
545.

Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Intelligence. In R. J Sternberg (Ed.), Thinking and problem solving (pp.
263-288). San Diego: Academic Press, Inc.

Swanson, H. L. (1990). Influence of metacognitive knowledge and aptitude on problem solving.

Journal of Educational Psychology, 82(2), 306-314.

Terman, L. M., & Merrill, M. A. (1937). Measuring intelligence: A guide to the administration of
the new revised Stanford-Binet tests of intelligence. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Thompson, B. and Daniel, L.G. (1996) Factor analytic evidence for the construct validity of scores:
A historical overview and some guidelines. Educational and Psychological Measurement 56, 197-
208.
Tobias, S., & Everson, H. T. (2009). Metacognition and children’s writing. In D. J. Hacker, J.
Dunlosky, & A. C. Graesser (Eds.), Metacognition in educational theory and practice (pp. 107-
126). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Toldos M. P. (2005). Sex and age differences in self-estimated physical, verbal and indirect
aggression in Spanish adolescents. Aggressive Behavior, 31, 13–23.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ab.20034.

Tucker, P., & Aron, A. (1993). Passionate love and marital satisfaction at key transition points in
the family life cycle. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 12, 135-147.

Van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Poortinga, Y. H. (1997). Towards an integrated analysis of bias in cross-
cultural assessment. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 13(1), 29-37.

Van Hout-Wolters, B. (2000). Assessing active self-directed learning. In R. Simons, J. van der
Linden, & T. Duffy (Eds.), New learning (pp. 83–101). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Veenman, M.V.J., Elshout, J.J. and Meijer, J. (1997). The generality vs. domain-specificity of

106
metacognitive skills in novice learning across domains. Learning Instruction, 7, 187–209.

Veenman, M. V. J., Kerseboom, L., & Imthorn, C. (2000). Test anxiety and metacognitive
skillfulness: Availability versus production deficiencies. Anxiety, Stress, and Coping, 13,
391-412.

Veenman, M. V. J., Kok, R., & Blöte, A. W. (2005). The relation between intellectual and
metacognitive skills in early adolescence. Instructional Science, 33, 193-211.

Veenman, M. V. J., & Spaans, M. A. (2005). Relation between intellectual and metacognitive
skills: Age and task differences. Learning and Individual Differences, 15,159-176.

Veenman, M. V. J., Wilhelm, P., & Beishuiszen, J. J. (2004). The relation between intellectual and
metacognitive skills from a developmental perspective. Learning and Instruction, 14, 89-109.

Veenman, M. V. J., Van Hout-Wolters, B. H. A. M., & Afflerbach, P. (2006). Metacognition

and learning: Conceptual and methodological considerations. Metacognition Learning, 1, 3-14.

Veenman, M. V. J., Wilhelm, P., & Beishuizen, J. J. (2004). The relation between intellectual
and metacognitive skills from a developmental perspective. Learning and Instruction, 14, 89-109.

Verschaffel, L., De Corte, E., Lasure, S., Van Vaerenberg, G. Bogaerts, H., Ratinckx, E.
(1999). Learning to solve mathematical application problems: A design experiment with fifth
graders. Mathematical Thinking and Learning, 1(3), 195-229.

Waller, J. H. (1971). Differential reproduction: Its relation to IQ test score, education, and
occupation. Social Biology, 18, 122–136.

Wells, A. (1994). A multi-dimensional measure of worry: Development and preliminary validation

of the Anxious Thoughts Inventory. Anxiety, Stress, and Coping, 6, 289–299.

Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1997). Measurement and mis-measurement of mood: Recurrent and
emergent issues. Journal of Personality Assessment, 68, 267–296.

Wells, A., & Matthews, G. (1994). Attention and emotion: A clinical perspective. Hove, England:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

White, R. T. (1986). Origins of PEEL. In J. R. Baird and I. J. Mitchell (Eds.), Improving the quality
of teaching and learning: An Australian case study – the PEEL Project (pp. 1- 7). Melbourne:
Monash University.

107
White, J. D. (1999). Personality, temperament, and ADHD: A review of the literature. Personality
& Individual Differences, 27, 589–598.

Widiger, T. A. (1997). Personality disorders as maladaptive variants of common personality traits:

Implications for treatment. Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 27, 265–282.

Widiger, T. A., & Clark, L. A. (2000). Toward DSM-V and the classification of psychopathology.
Psychological Bulletin, 126, 946–963.

Widiger, T. A., & Trull, T. J. (1992). Personality and psychopathology: An application of the five-
factor model. Journal of Personality, 60, 363–393.

Yore, L. D., & Craig, M. T. (1992). Middle school students’ metacognitive knowledge about
science reading and science text: Objective assessment, validation and results. East Lansing, MI:
National Center for Research on Teacher Learning. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No.
ED356134)

Zillman, D. (1979). Hostility and aggression. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

***~~~~~~~***

108
 APPENDICES

109
 Sweekaar Academy of Rehabilitation Sciences
Department of Psychology, Secunderabad.
Consent Form

You are requested to participate in a research study entitled “Metacognition, Emotional

Intelligence, Aggression and Passionate Love among Women” conducted by Mr. Jose Kurien,
under the guidance of Dr. Saroj Arya, Head Of Department, Department of Clinical Psychology,
Institute of Mental Health, SWEEKAAR Academy of Rehabilitation Sciences, Secunderabad.

You may not be expected to get any direct benefit from being a part of this study. But the results
of the research may provide benefits to the society in the form of advancing of psychological
intervention especially for women.
We assure you that the collected details from you for the study will be kept confidential. Your
participation/non-participation in this study will not affect your relationship with the researcher or
the institution where you are associated.

I----------------------------------------------------------------------, hereby declare that, I am willing to

undergo the psychological assessment under the study entitled “metacognition, emotional
intelligence, aggression and passionate love among women” conducted by Mr. Jose Kurien. I
understood that the information collected from me for the study will be kept confidential. I have
been explained about the nature, purpose and the procedure involved in the study. I can withdraw
from this study at any time without giving any reason.

________________________________________

(Signature with name of the participant)

_______________________________________

(Signature of the researcher)

Date:____________________

110
 Socio-Demographic Data Sheet

Participant No: Date :

Age:

Birth order: First/Middle/Last

Education:

Occupation/ Vocation:

Marital status: Married / Unmarried, if married

• Alive / Dead / Separated , if dead/separated when and how:

• Age of spouse:
• Years of married life :
• Education:
• No of Children / with sex

Economic Status: Lower / Lower Middle/ Upper Middle / Upper

Habitat: Rural/ Semi-rural/ Urban

Place of Origin:

Mother tongue:

Family type: Nuclear/ Joint

No of family members:

Any significant medical complication:

Any previous or current diagnosis of mental illness:

Any Disability:

Any history of diagnosed substance abuse/ dependency:

111
 Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI)

Check True or False as appropriate. True False

1. I ask myself periodically if I am meeting my goals.

2. I consider several alternatives to a problem before I answer.

3. I try to use strategies that have worked in the past.

4. I pace myself while learning in order to have enough time.

5. I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses.

6. I think about what I really need to learn before I begin a task

7. I know how well I did once I finish a test.

8. I set specific goals before I begin a task.

9. I slow down when I encounter important information.

10. I know what kind of information is most important to learn.

11. I ask myself if I have considered all options when solving a problem.

12. I am good at organizing information.

13. I consciously focus my attention on important information.

14. I have a specific purpose for each strategy I use.

15. I learn best when I know something about the topic.

16. I know what the teacher expects me to learn.

17. I am good at remembering information.

18. I use different learning strategies depending on the situation.

19. I ask myself if there was an easier way to do things after I finish a task.

20. I have control over how well I learn.

21. I periodically review to help me understand important relationships.

112
22. I ask myself questions about the material before I begin.

23. I think of several ways to solve a problem and choose the best one.

24. I summarize what I’ve learned after I finish.

25. I ask others for help when I don’t understand something.

26. I can motivate myself to learn when I need to.

27. I am aware of what strategies I use when I study.

28. I find myself analyzing the usefulness of strategies while I study.

29. I use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my weaknesses.

30. I focus on the meaning and significance of new information.

31. I create my own examples to make information more meaningful.

32. I am a good judge of how well I understand something.

33. I find myself using helpful learning strategies automatically.

34. I find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension.

35. I know when each strategy I use will be most effective.

36. I ask myself how well I accomplish my goals once I’m finished.

37. I draw pictures or diagrams to help me understand while learning.

38. I ask myself if I have considered all options after I solve a problem.

39. I try to translate new information into my own words.

40. I change strategies when I fail to understand.

41. I use the organizational structure of the text to help me learn.

42. I read instructions carefully before I begin a task.

43. I ask myself if what I’m reading is related to what I already know.

44. I reevaluate my assumptions when I get confused.

113
47. I try to break studying down into smaller steps.

48. I focus on overall meaning rather than specifics.

49. I ask myself questions about how well I am doing while I am learning something new.

50. I ask myself if I learned as much as I could have once I finish a task.

51. I stop and go back over new information that is not clear.

52. I stop and reread when I get confused.

Schraw, G. & Dennison, R.S. (1994). Assessing metacognitive awareness. Contemporary

Educational Psychology, 19, 460-475.

114
 Emotional Intelligence Scale

Instructions: Indicate the extent to which each item applies to you using the following scale:

1 = strongly disagree
2 = disagree
3 = neither disagree nor agree
4 = agree
5 = strongly agree
_____ 1. I know when to speak about my personal problems to others.

_____ 2. When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times I faced similar obstacles and overcame

them.

_____ 3. I expect that I will do well on most things I try.

_____ 4. Other people find it easy to confide in me.

_____ 5. I find it hard to understand the nonverbal messages of other people.

_____ 6. Some of the major events of my life have led me to re-evaluate what is important and not

important.

_____ 7. When my mood changes, I see new possibilities.

_____ 8. Emotions are some of the things that make my life worth living.

_____ 9. I am aware of my emotions as I experience them.

_____ 10. I expect good things to happen.

_____ 11. I like to share my emotions with others.

_____ 12. When I experience a positive emotion, I know how to make it last.

_____ 13. I arrange events others enjoy.

_____ 14. I seek out activities that make me happy.

_____ 15. I am aware of the nonverbal messages I send to others.

115
_____ 16. I present myself in a way that makes a good impression on others.

_____ 17. When I am in a positive mood, solving problems is easy for me.

_____ 18. By looking at their facial expressions, I recognize the emotions people are experiencing.

_____ 19. I know why my emotions change.

_____ 20. When I am in a positive mood, I am able to come up with new ideas.

_____ 21. I have control over my emotions.

_____ 22. I easily recognize my emotions as I experience them.

_____ 23. I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome to tasks I take on.

_____ 24. I compliment others when they have done something well.

_____ 25. I am aware of the nonverbal messages other people send.

_____ 26. When another person tells me about an important event in his or her life, I almost feel

as though I have experienced this event myself.

_____ 27. When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to come up with new ideas.

_____ 28. When I am faced with a challenge, I give up because I believe I will fail.

_____ 29. I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them.

_____ 30. I help other people feel better when they are down.

_____ 31. I use good moods to help myself keep trying in the face of obstacles.

_____ 32. I can tell how people are feeling by listening to the tone of their voice.

_____ 33. It is difficult for me to understand why people feel the way they do.

Source: Schutte, N.S. (1998). Development and validation of a measure of emotional intelligence,
Personality and Individual Differences, 25, 167-177.

116
 Scoring for the Emotional Intelligence Scale:

Reverse score (1=5, 2=4, 3=3, 4=2, 5=1) items 5, 28, 33.

Add all the numbers in front of all 33 items.

Average scores:

For females = 131

For males = 125

For therapists = 135

For prisoners = 120

117
Sex: Women □ Man □ Age: ______

INDIRECT, DIRECT AGGRESSION QUESTIONNAIRE (I-DAQ)

The phrases listed below refer to different ways of acting and thinking. Read each one and mark
with an X the alternative, of the five listed, that best fits your way of being. The response for each
statement alternatives are:

1. Completely disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree 5. Completely agree

Make sure you answer all the phrases.

1. No matter how much people get at me, I avoid getting into fights.

2. I have said anything bad or nasty about anyone.

3. I like to plan secretly to bother the other one.

4. When somebody annoys me I do something to try and make he/she looks stupid.

5. When I argue I avoid yelling.

6. If I have to resort to violence to protect my rights, I will.

7. I rarely argue calmly.

8. I sometimes put off until tomorrow what you ought to do today

9. If it is necessary I’ll shout to impose my opinion.

10. I find it difficult for me to take advantage of the feelings of others in order to obligue them to

do something.

11. When I’m angry with someone I know I leave them out of activities on purpose.

12. Even when I’m angry, I do not speak in an aggressive manner.

13. I have taken advantage of someone.

14. If someone I know messes with me, I try not to turn others against them.

15. When arguing, I tend to raise my voice.

118
16. Even if there is someone in a group who I do not like, I try not to exclude them.

17. When someone annoys me or pushes me, I would rather leave than fight.

18. When I’m angry with a friend I get other people to stop talking to them.

19. I prefer to get out of the way and stay out of trouble whenever someone is hassling to me.

20. There are people who pushed me so far that we came to blows.

21. I have taken anything (even a pin or button) that belonged to someone else.

22. I don’t often have family disputes.

23. When I’m angry with somebody I say unpleasant things about them even though they may not

be true.

24. I don’t often exclude people I don’t like from the conversation.

25. I’m an aggressive person.

26. Even if I was angry with someone I would never make false accusations about them.

27. When I am angry with someone insult you.

Scoring for the Indirect, Direct Aggression Questionnaire (I-Daq):

Reverse score (1=5, 2=4, 3=3, 4=2, 5=1) items 1, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24 & 26.

Add all the numbers in front of all 27 items.

119
 PASSIONATE LOVE SCALE
1. Since I’ve been involved with ____________, my emotions have been on a roller coaster.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

2. I would feel deep despair if ____________ left me.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

3. sometimes my body trembles with excitement at the sight of ____________

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

4. I take delight in studying the movements and angles of ____________’s body.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

5. Sometimes I feel I can’t control my thought; they are obsessively on ____________.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

6. I feel happy when I am doing something to make ____________ happy.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

7. I would rather be with ____________ than anyone else.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

8. I’d get jealous if I thought ____________ were falling in love with someone else.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

9. No one else could love ____________ like I do.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

10. I yearn to know all about ____________.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

11. I want ____________ -- physically, emotionally, and mentally.

120
not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

12. I will love ____________ forever.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

13. I melt when looking deeply into ____________’s eyes.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

14. I have an endless appetite for affection from ____________.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

15. For me, ____________ is the perfect romantic partner.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

16. ____________ is the person who can make me feel the happiest.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

17. I sense my body responding when ____________ touches me.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

18. I feel tender toward ____________.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

19. ____________ always seems to be on my mind.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

20. If I were separated from ____________for a long time, I would feel intensely lonely.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

21. I sometimes find it difficult to concentrate on work because thoughts of ____________ occupy
my mind.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

22. I want ____________ to know me – my thoughts, my fears, and my hopes.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

121
23. Knowing that ____________ cares about me makes me feel complete.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

24. I eagerly look for signs indicating ____________’s desire for me.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

25. If ____________ were going through a difficult time, I would put away my own concerns to
help him/her out.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

26. ____________ can make me feel effervescent and bubbly.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

27. In the presence of ____________, I yearn to touch and be touched.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

28. An existence without ____________ would be dark and dismal.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

29. I possess a powerful attraction for ____________.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

30. I get extremely depressed when things don’t go right in my relationship with ____________.

not at all true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 definitely true

Note: Items 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 24, 29, 30 make up the shortened version.

122
 Scoring for Passionate Love Scale:

Scoring is either kept continuous or broken into the following classifications (for the 15 item
shortened version):

• 106-135 points = Wildly, even recklessly, in love.

• 86-105 points = Passionate, but less intense.

• 66-85 points = Occasional bursts of passion.

• 45-65 points = Tepid, infrequent passion.

• 15-44 points = The thrill is gone.

*** ~~~~~~~***

123