National Law Institute University, Bhopal
Trimester-XI
Jurisprudence-I
The Comparative study of Legal Positivism & Historical school of
thought: A critique on legislation
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Preface
This Research Project is the output of analysis of “The Comparative study of Legal
Positivism & Historical school of thought: A critique on legislation ”. It has been my pleasure to
introduce this project which has given me immense scope towards comprehending critical
areas of the selected topic and thereby to focus on the issue and consequences related to the
same.
This Research Project is based on several data basis, which have been successfully
analyzed in such a manner so as to give the reader an easy access to the technicalities which
may crept in.
In the course of my research, I learned that no task can be completed in professional
isolation without interaction with others. Discussions arising from differences of opinion or
approach, and particularly criticism, can of course be time consuming and even painful to
deal with, but I believe it has not only kept me from making mistakes, but also added clarity.
I owe much to those who invited me to contribute on equal terms in their field of expertise
and thereby made my research enjoyable. I am grateful for the sharing of information, the
professional guidance and the skilled feedback of those who became involved in my work.
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Table of Contents
HISTORICAL SCHOOL OF JURISPRUDENCE.................................................................................4
SAVIGNY..................................................................................................................................................5
HENRY MAINE........................................................................................................................................7
LEGAL POSITIVISM..............................................................................................................................9
AUSTIN....................................................................................................................................................10
BENTHAM..............................................................................................................................................13
ANALYSIS...............................................................................................................................................16
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................................................16
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HISTORICAL SCHOOL OF JURISPRUDENCE
The historical school antedates the work of Kelsen, but the reason for postponing
discussion ofthe historical thesis is that, in opposition to the doctrine of the pure science of
law, the historicalschool considered law in direct relationship to the life of the community
and thus laid thefoundation on which the modern sociological school has built. The
eighteenth century was anage of rationalism; it was believed possible by arm-chair
deliberation to construct a universal andunchangeable body of laws that would be applicable
to all countries, using as a premises thereasonable nature of man. The historical school in part
was a result of the surge of nationalismthat arose at the end of the eighteenth century. Instead
of the individual, writers began toemphasis the spirit of the people, the Volksgesit.
In 1814 a programme for the school wasenunciated by Savigny. The central question
was ‘how did law come to be?’ Law evolved, as did language, by a slow process and, just as
language is a peculiar product of a nation’s genius, so isthe law. The source of law is not the
command of the sovereign, not even the habits of acommunity, but the instinctive sense of
right possessed by every race. Custom may be evidenceof law, but its real source lies deeper
in the minds of men. ‘The living of law’ is the secret of itsvalidity. In those matters with
which he is directly concerned every member of the communityhas an instinctive sense as to
what is right and proper, although naturally he will have no viewson matters which are
beyond his experience. Thus the mercantile community will have anintuitive appreciation of
the rules that should govern bills of exchange, a peasant of the doctrinesthat should be
applied to agriculture. Such is the approach of the historical school, and itnaturally led to a
distrust of any deliberate attempt to reform the law. Legislation can succeedonly if it is in
harmony with the internal convictions of the race to which it is addressed. If itgoes farther, it
is doomed to failure.
The contribution of the historical school to the problem of the boundaries of
jurisprudence is thatlaw cannot be understood without an appreciation of the social milieu in
which it has developed.The slow evolution of law was stressed and its intimate connection
with the particularcharacteristics of people. Ever since Savigny wrote, the values which
jurisprudence can gainfrom a proper use of the historical method have been well recognized,
and in England Maine andVinogradoff have kept the interest in these problems alive. Writers
of legal history such asPollock and Maitland or Sir William Holdsworth have provided
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surveys whose value for thejurist lies in the clear demonstration of the close connection
between the common law and thesocial and political history of England.
In particular the historical school destroyed forever the shibboleth of immutable rules of
law,discovered by abstract reason; they demonstrated that just as in the case of the human
body,transplants of legal systems or constitutions may be defeated by the immunological
reaction ofthe receiving country.
SAVIGNY
Von Savigny was a Prussian (now German) statesman and historian. The basis of
Savigny’sconviction derived from his experience of the French Revolution and the
Napoleonic conquests. Inthe aftermath of the destruction of the French, revolutionary
ideology guided by the peoples’reasoning flourished. To Savigny and other like minds, this
was unacceptable. This is essentiallybecause embracing such philosophy would make
mincemeat of the tradition and mores of thepeople. In fact, such idea would denigrate the
traditional institutions to which the people wereaccustomed. According to him, the essence of
the law would be discoverable through theunderstanding of the spirit of the people, the
volksgeist.
Savigny’s tract entitled Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence
(1814)summarized his historical approach to law as follows: We first enquire of history how
law hasactually developed among nations of the nobler races ... That which binds a people
into onewholeis the common conviction of the people, the kindred consciousness of an
inward necessity,excluding all notion of an accidental and arbitrary origin. He saw law as
reflective of the spirit ofthe people. To him, the growth of legal principles is not in vacuo, not
revolutionary, not accidentalbut evolutionary. He believed that legislation does not, as law
does, bear the peculiar marks of thepeople. Laws are to be found, not made, and are
idiosyncratic and reflective of the volkgeist.
According to Savigny, legal development passes through the early stage of unwritten
custom, thencodification of those customs and, lastly, purposeful legislation. The evolution of
law is equallytied to the people’s language and the totality of itsbeliefs system. However, as
the law becomesmore complex, it is easier to lose contact with customs or the volkgeist. The
reasons for this aretwo- fold – division of functions and classes, and the technicalization of
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the law. On the secondreason, Elegido suggests that there is no indigenous comparator for
such legal concepts as, forexample, CIF contracts or land registration.
On the fate of legislation in a State, Savigny states that legislation is of subsidiary
importance inlegal development. According to him, ‘living law’ emerges neither from the
commands of thesovereign nor from the arbitrary will of a legislator but from the people. In
this regard, Savignystates that legislation would be effective only when its contents reflect the
values and virtues of thepeople’s customs. It should be recalled that Savigny said this despite
the fact that he was the headof the Prussian Department for the Revision of Statutes.
Perhaps, because he was a scholar of classical Roman law, he relied on Roman law
for guidance inhis exposition of the legal path that was befitting his country. To him, Roman
law seems to have‘eternal significance’ for the intellectual underpinning of the volksgeist.
For example, Savigny’sHistory of Roman Law in the Middle Ages (1831) is suggestive of the
existence of conceptsbordering on the ‘nature of things,’ or natural law.
Unlike the claim made by natural law theorists, Savigny canvassed the view of legal
relativism. Inother words, there is no universal law as every law is culture- specific and
limited by time, spaceand geography. The implication of this position is that law is not as
durable as the natural lawschool suggests and, more important, its contents are a function not
of metaphysical demands butof the exigencies of the society in question.
With this background in mind, the following could be said of the historical approach to law
ascanvassed by Savigny:
a) The concept of received law is anathema;
b) Law is inferior to the custom of the people. Therefore, custom of the people must be
their laws;
c) Law personifies the people, and signifies a paradigm of their values;
d) There is no universal law. The universality of law is limited by geography and
culture;
e) Law is not static. It is amenable to development;
f) There is no law giver. Law comes from the people.
According to him, the growth of law is a function of the interface or interaction between
onegeneration and another generation. The strength or weakness of the law is traceable to the
people.Law and language flourish when the people flourish and die when the people lose
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theirindividuality. Therefore, he said that: Law grows with the growth and strengthens with
thestrengthof the people and finally dies away as the nation loses its nationality or as a people
loses itsindividuality. The morale here is that law exists to serve humankind, not the other
way round.Consequently, there should be no room for unjust laws or laws that are
inconsistent with theaspiration of the people.
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HENRY MAINE
In continuation of our examination of the historical school of jurisprudence, we will
focus on theworks of Henry Maine in this Unit. We will look at the three stages of legal
development, staticand progressive societies, and the change from status to contract.
Stages in Legal Development
Maine’s deep knowledge of early society resulted in his emphasis on man’s deep
instincts,emotions and habits in historical development. According to him, law can be
understood as a latestage in a slow-evolving pattern of growth. He believes there are three
stages in legal developmentin early societies – law as the personal commands and judgements
of patriarchal rulers; law ascustom upheld by judgements; and law as code.
In the first stage, absolute rulers dominated. It was the age of the divine rights of
kings, where theking could do no wrong. System of rulership was absolutist and draconian.
There were noprinciples governing governance; only the whim and caprice of the king
reigned. Recall Austin’scommander, who was above the law, and whose commands must be
obeyed by inferiors.
The second stage is heralded by the decline of the power and might of patriarchal
rulers. In theirplace, the oligarchies of political and military rulers emerged. The oligarchies
claimed monopolyof control over the institutions of law. Maine maintains that the
judgements of the oligarchiesevolved or solidified into the basis of customs. But the customs
are largely unwritten, givinginterpreters the opportunity to enjoy a monopoly of explanation.
In the third stage, which represents the breaking of the monopoly of explanation,
codificationcharacterizes the legal system. Examples include the Roman Twelve Tables and
Solon’s AtticCode.
Static and Progressive Societies
Maine further propounded that for the purpose of the development of law, society can
becategorized into two: static society and progressive society. Static or stationary societies
did notmove beyond the concept of code-based law. In this society, reference to the code
answered alllegal questions. According to Maine, members of the society were lulled into the
belief in thecertitude of code and were, therefore, unwilling to reform the law.
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On the other hand, progressive societies were to be found in Western Europe. These
societies weredynamic and amenable to legal reform. They brought about the development
and expansion oflegal institutions.
In the development of law in progressive societies, Maine identified the characteristic
use of threeagencies – legal fictions, equity and legislation. Legal fictions are mere
suppositions aimed atachieving justice by overcoming the rigidities of the formal law. Cast
your mind back to the clashbetween common law and equity which was finally resolved in
favour of equity through theJudicature Act 1875.
According to Maine, legal fictions help to ameliorate the harshness of the law. A
classical examplehe gave was the institution of the Roman fiction of adoption. He called
equity a secondary systemof law. It claimed a superior sanctity inherent in its principles
which exist side by side with the law.
In many cases, it could displace the law. Recall again the conflict between common
law and equitythat we referred to in the preceding paragraph. Legislation represents the final
development of the law. It is an institution through which variouslaws in the society are
reduced into writing or codes.
The raw material Maine used for his legal analysis was Roman law. In Roman law,
Pater Familiawas the only person invested with capacity to contract. He alone could act for
and on behalf of hiswife, children and slaves. Subsequently, there was development from
pater familia to familia andto persona, the highest form of development of the person.
Maine is also known to have commented on ‘status’ and ‘contract.’ He said that “the
movement ofprogressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract.” In
explaining thisstatement, Maine said that in early times an individual’s position in his social
group remainedfixed; it was imposed, conferred or acquired. He just stepped into it. He
accepted such fate as hefound it. He could do nothing about it. Later on, however, there came
a time when it was possiblefor an individual to determine his own destiny through the
instrumentality of contract. No longerwas anything imposed on him from external forces; he
was now in charge: from slavery andserfdom, from status determined at birth, from master-
servant relationship to employer-employeecontract. The morale is that society moves from
status to contract. In ancient law, (statusinheritance) was of the essence but in modern society
it is consideration (contract).
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LEGAL POSITIVISM
(ANALYTICAL SCHOOL OF JURISPRUDENCE)
Legal positivism is regarded as one of the most influential schools of thought in
legaljurisprudence around the world. This theory was developed to a great extent by jurists
such asJohn Austin and Jeremy Bentham around the 18th and 19th century. Subsequently,
this school ofthought was taken forward by influential jurists such as Herbert Lionel
Adolphus Hart andJoseph Raz.
The above jurists have significant differences in their views but the common idea that
all of theabove jurists have is that they analyse law as it is.1Therefore, they have the common
objective ofhelping people understand the law of the land as it is and not as it ought to be.
Therefore, thelegal positivist school only aims to identify the law as it is laid down by a
superior body and nothow it should have been.
Moreover, the other common theme between all the jurists of the legal positivist
school was thatthey kept law and moral principles on a completely separate footing. The legal
positivistsbelieved that law had no relation to the moral principles.2However, they were of
the opinion thatlaw often reflects the morality of the people that it controls. Therefore, they
said that the lawdoes not have to be in consonance with the principles of morality and ethics
and rather law iswhat is laid down by the superior body.
Depending on the weightage given to the moral principles, legal positivists can be
divided intopositive positivists and negative positivists. Positive positivists such as Hart were
of the opinionthat the moral principles do exist in the universe but it is not required for the
law to abide bythem. Hart writes that ‘it is in no sense a necessary truth that law satisfy
demands of morality,though in factthey have often done so’.3 Therefore, they do not negate
the existence of moral principles. However,Negative Positivists are those who completely
negated the existence of the principles of ethicsand morality. Therefore, they did not believe
in the existence of moral principles. This includesjurists such as John Austin.
Therefore, we can clearly infer that the legal positivist school does not completely
negate theexistence of moral principles and to some extent also articulates that the law may
be based onthe principles of morality and ethics. Their view is that even the moral standards
attain a legalstatus only through some form of official promulgation.4
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The school of legal positivism seeks to demarcate between law as it is and law as it
ought to be.It does not analyse the Censorial nature of law, that is, law as it ought to be and
concentrates onthe law as it is given by a superior authority.
Two of the main jurists associated with the legal positivist school are John Austin and
JeremyBentham. Their main idea of law was similar but they differed in certain aspects.
These two jurists played a huge role in developing this school and are considered to be the
greatest writersin the field of legal positivism.
AUSTIN
John Austin (1790-1859) was a prominent British legal philosopher who takes the
credit forformulating the first systematic alternative to both ‘natural law theories of law’ and
‘utilitarianapproaches to law’. Austin’s theory of law is a form of analytic jurisprudence.
John Austin isbestknown for his work related to the development of the theory of legal
positivism. Austin madeattempts to clearly separate ‘moral rules’ from what is known as the
‘positive law’.
Austin also embraced the idea of law being the sovereign command much like Hobbes
andBentham before him. Austin’s jurisprudence was shaped on the lines of Jeremy
Bentham’sthoughts but Austin was in no manner whatsoever Bentham’s intellectual clone.
Austin andBentham had their differences which we shall also be taken a note of in this paper.
Austin’s Utilitarianism
John Austin’s this particular reading of utilitarianism, has been the part of his work
thatreceivedthe most attention in his own day. The primary source of moral rules, as per
Austin, was the lawof God as revealed in the scriptures. Like Thomas Aquinas, Austin also
opined that there is apart of the law of God that is unrevealed and must be discovered by
resorting to reasoning. As itis understood clearly that God wills the greatest happiness of all
his creatures,reason brings us tothe principle of utility. Austin noted that we have to infer the
laws of godwhich is not expressedor revealed in any manner from the probable effects of our
actions on the greatest happiness ofall, or even from the tendencies of actions of the humans
which are to increase or diminish thataggregate. He believed that utility is the index for the
discovery of divine pleasure.
It has to be understood that Austin, much like Bentham, also reasoned that aggregate
happinessis served by identifying the law with sovereign will. Austin however, included
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moral dictates ofthe scriptures in the category of ‘law’. This lead him to the create a subset of
‘laws properly socalled’ – which was named subsequently as ‘positive law’. This was done
primarily to signify lawsmade by the sovereign and its delegates.
Austin’s Taxonomy
Austin attempted to classify all that he opined was the proper subject of jurisprudence.
Addingto the laws of political sovereign, this was inclusive of divine law, moral law,
customary laws,laws of private associations, laws of households, and also international
law.As per Austin, only some of these laws are what he called ‘laws properly so called’.
While theothers are laws by analogy meaning laws only in the figurative sense, the criteria
for a law to be‘properly so called’ is that it derives from authority.Austin believed that laws
by analogy are not law per se but are positive morality. This is inclusiveof rules which are of
non-obligatory nature such as rules of social etiquette, moral rules etc. Italso covers
customary law, international law and constitutional law which, as per the generalopinion, are
considered binding.
Laws Properly So Called and Positive Law
There exist primarily two kinds of authority in Austin’s legal universe: the authority of
theChristian scriptures and the authority of the political superior.Divine law is understood to
be that which is set by God himself for the creatures. The scripturesare known to be the
source of divine law. The political superior is the direct source of humanlaw properly so
called which Austin termed as ‘positive law’. As per Austin, positive law was theexclusive
concern of jurisprudence whereas the law of god was primarily the subject of theology.
A further subdivision of positive law was introduced by Austin. Austin went on to
distinguishlaws set directly by the political superior or what was understood to be as
sovereign from thelaws which were set by private citizens in quest of their legal rights. The
laws made by the onesauthorised to do so or the subordinate political superiors like ministers,
judges etc constitute asthe laws set directly by the sovereign.
Austin gave illustrations regarding what constituted to be the laws made by private
citizens inpursuance of their legal rights. One such illustration of the laws made by private
citizen was ofrules made by the guardians for their wards and those rules imposed upon the
slaves by the slaveowners. So, as all the legal rights happen to be founded by laws of the
sovereign, the ultimatesource of these private powers remains the sovereign.
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As per Austin, only those norms which have been authoritatively established by God
or bysovereign are proper laws. Laws improperly so called are generally based on opinion
and notauthority.
Austin’s Positive Law
Austin defined positive law as comprising of commands of a political sovereign backed
bysanctions on the ones who disobey the commands.
There are primarily three key constituents of this concept of law:
1. Political sovereign
2. Command
3. Sanction
Austin noted that a society which does not have a political sovereign does not have law in
thestrict sense of positive law. Political sovereign was regarded as a necessary feature of a
politicalsociety which considers or claims itself to be independent. Austin was of the notion
that wherethere is no sovereign, there is no independent political society where as the vice
versa is also true.
As pointed out by Austin, positive law is the result of a sovereign’s command. A
command isanimperative that creates a duty by the presence of a sanction which would
follow if there is anincidence of non-compliance.8 Command is something which is of such
importance that it cannever be distinguished from duty and sanction and they can all be
considered to be variedaspects of a single event. Where ever there exists a duty, there will
also be the presence of acommand; while where there is a command, there also is a duty. The
duty arises from theexistence of punishment or sanction of sorts which follow in case of non-
compliance or whenthere is a breach of duty.
As pointed out by Austin, the three kinds of commonly termed laws that are not
imperative,meaning, they are not laws properly so called but still they can justifiably be
included withinjurisprudence are:
1. Declaratory laws – Austin, in this point, conceded that imperative rules may be enactedin
the guise of it being considered a declaration. The declaratory laws are those which donot go
on to form new duties but only clarify or provide the interpretation of existinglegal relations.
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2. Laws brought in order to repeal law- The process of repealing some laws may
imposenew duties or they can even go on to revive some of the former laws. As per Austin,
theLaws to repeal law are not imperative commands.
3. Laws of imperfect obligation – Austin stated that laws of imperfect obligation are
thoselaws which do not have any sanctions attached for their breach or punishment
whichwould follow in case of a non-compliance. An illustration of laws falling under
thiscategory would be: the statutory duty of the city council to keep the streets clean andtidy.
As per Austin’s definition, the laws creating rights and liberties are laws properly so
called as theyare imperative in nature. They are considered as imperative as they happen to
create duties thatare correlative on the part of other people to oblige to.
Austin also attempted to point out the differences between positive law and positive
morality. Asper Austin, moral rules that resemble positive law make up positive morality.
There are variousrules of positive morality that are co-extensive with rules of positive law.
For example: rulesagainst killing someone, stealing, raping, assaulting.
As per Austin, whenever there is a conflict between positive law and positive
morality, positivelaw would prevail. Though Austin was a man who maintained that
sovereign is bound to obeythe divine law, he considered it to be a moral duty, and stated that
even if the sovereign everlegislated against the divine law, it will still be the law. Austin
further adds that any other viewinthis regard would not only be wrong but it would be
pernicious as it could lead to anarchy.
BENTHAM
Jeremy Bentham, the English jurist and philosopher, is regarded as the greatest figure
in thehistory of British Legal positivism. In simple terms, Bentham’s definition of law can be
given asthe will of the sovereign. He was of the opinion that rules which are derived
exclusivelyfrom thecommands of a sovereign authority form the law of the land. Therefore,
he stated that ruleswhich are derived from the will of the sovereign would produce more clear
as well as morecertain laws than the rules which are generated within a common law system.
Therefore, according to Jeremy Bentham, ‘law is defined as an assemblage of signs
declarative of a volitionconceived or adopted by the sovereign in a state, concerning the
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conduct to be observed in a certain case by a certainperson or a class of persons, who in the
case in question are subject to his power’.
Therefore, Bentham clearly states that law, which is the will of the sovereign,
regulates theconduct of the people to which it applies. Therefore, the law is what is laid down
by thesovereign. The people who are subject to the law have to regulate their conduct in
accordancewith this will of the sovereign. Moreover, Bentham says that the law does not
have to be inconsonance with the principles of ethics. Therefore, law is whatever is laid down
by thesovereign.
According to the Bentham, a sovereign is the highest superior body which does not
owe anyobedience to any other body. It is the sovereign which claims habitual obedience
from thepeople living in a politically organized group.Therefore, the sovereign does not owe
anyallegiance to any other body or group. It is the will of this sovereign body which is known
aslaw.
Bentham, however, states that the power of the sovereign is not absolute as is the
view of JohnAustin. Bentham is of the view that the power of the sovereign can be limited as
well as divided.Therefore, he is of the opinion that a sovereign can, by his own will, limit his
own powers byentering into agreements with certain external agencies which would put
restriction on thepowerof the sovereign. Jeremy Bentham’s concept of sovereignty is not
absolute in nature and can berestricted to a certain extent.
Another important feature of law according to Bentham is that it should be backed
bysanctions.Therefore, the will of the sovereign must always be backed up by sanctions for it
tobecome law. Bentham talked about the positive as well as negative side of sanctions,
unlikeAustin, who only talked about the negative side of it. Bentham was of the view that
rewardsshould be given to the people who follow the law while punishments should be
inflicted uponthose who break the law. This was to encourage people to be law abiding and
moreover,discourage them to break the law.Therefore, according to Bentham, law is the will
of the sovereign backed by sanctions.
Principle of Utility
Jeremy Bentham also gave his famous theory of utility. According to Bentham, any person
isgoverned by two masters, that is, pain and pleasure. Every man wants to increase the
pleasureand diminish the pain. Therefore, any law should be made by keeping in mind this
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theory ofutility. Every law should be promulgated by the sovereign in such a way that it
diminishes thepain and maximises the pleasure of the people who would be governed by that
particular law.
Therefore, every law should be measured by the yardstick of public utility, that is,
how muchpain is it causing to the people and how much pleasure is the person getting from
the law. Anylaw should aim at maximising pleasure and minimising the pain of the persons
whom it governs.Along with the Principle of Utility, Jeremy Bentham proposed the
codification of all the laws andstated that the uncodified body of rules that was part of the
English Law was not worthy ofbeing called as law.Therefore, Jeremy Bentham played a
crucial role in the development of the theory of LegalPositivism.
Points of Difference Between Analytical School and Historical School of Jurisprudence:
Analytical School Historical School Historical School
Law is the creation of state. Law is found and not made. Law is
selfexistent.
Without a sovereign, there can be no law. Law is an antecedent to the state and exists
even before a state organisation comes into
being.
The hall-mark of law is enforcement by Law is independent of political authority
the sovereign. and
enforcement. It is enforced by the sovereign
because it is already law; it does not become
law because of enforcement by the
sovereign.
The typical law is statute. The typical law is custom.
Judges should confine themselves to a In constructing a statute judges should
purely syllogistic method. consider the history of the legislation in
question.
Law rests upon the force of politically Law rests on the social pressure behind the
organised society. rules of conduct which it enjoins.
Emphasis is on empirical a priori method. Emphasis is no comparative method.
Law is the command of the sovereign. Law is the rule whereby the invisible
border.
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ANALYSIS
Historical school in its ideal condition would require an accurate record of the history
of all legalsystems as itsmaterial whereas analytical school requires only theexisting legal
systems. Its aim isto show how a given rule came to be what it is whereas analytical school
answers “why it is, whatitis? It uses evolutionary history and hundreds of legal systems as its
subject-matter whereas analytical school examines the available subject-matter, its structure,
and rules in order to reach itsprinciples and theories by analysis.
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FriedmannW.,Legal Theory,5th edi., Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt.
Ltd.,Delhi,2002,p.g.213
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Dec., 1911), pp. 140-168
Dias, R.W.M , Jurisprudence, 5th Edn.,(Delhi & U.K., Aditya Books Private
Limited,Butterworths,1994)pp. 420436
Austin, John (1832/1995),The Province of Jurisprudence Determined , W. Rumble
(ed.),Cambridge University Press.
Austin, John, 1832, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, W. Rumble (ed.),
Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Bentham, Jeremy (1970),Of Laws in General , (H.L.A. Hart,ed., London).
Bentham, Jeremy, 1789, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, J. H.
Burns& H.L.A. Hart (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Savigny, Friedrich Karl von, 1975, On the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and
Jurisprudence,Abraham Hayward (trans.), New York: Arno Press.
Schwarz, Andreas B., 1934, “John Austin and the German Jurisprudence of His Time,”
Politica, 1:178–199.
Rodes, E (Jr) 2004 The Historical School Of Jurisprudence, 49 Am. J. Juris. 165
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