G.R. No.

195649               April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA,
Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0
is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the
Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for
finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a
Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his

subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. 4 On the same day an Order of Approval
of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I
divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United
States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." 10To
further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a
computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has
been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The
said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June
2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November
2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following
pertinent travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent
to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to
present evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the
following documents as evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines

dated 03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-
time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously
residing in his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del

Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay
and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the
Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations
Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of
Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April
1986; and
 5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that
Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy
based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for
disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was
dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his
contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet
the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s
claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements
of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real
intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim
that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by
the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity
and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely,
one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges
reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is
hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the
ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution
is contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence
consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show
that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American

citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not
perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of
time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
 5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction
over the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo
warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan,
and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in
the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with
an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while
the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of
the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed
as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his
Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that
intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-
placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or
benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications
for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646
which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final
judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second
placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive
portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section
44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as
one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed
by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of
proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and
granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced
his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at
that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior
to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport
does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s
reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et
al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his
oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict
policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their
citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects
strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case,
respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures
by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of
Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned
case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport.

Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18,
2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was
actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of
his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his
passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31,
2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010.
This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might
be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control during that time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use
of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more

appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by
birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this
assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the
instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to
have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear,
unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved
in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his
allegiance to the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment
of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned
citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine
citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the
purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection
with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any
of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a
candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his
election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent
obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with
the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having
received the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that
where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was
adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest number of
votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of
vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional and statutory
provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the
sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when
they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to
run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling
be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC
En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US
passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado
is qualified to run for public office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First
Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of
Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed
reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is
disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed
seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public
office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has

not yet been any proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc.
As the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends
that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in
the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the
second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First
Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention
may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been
no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC
En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the
exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC 30 are present and
therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of
the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and
respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be
sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is
only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the
disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not
divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the
Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after
performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public
office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July
2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit
of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run
for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when,
after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his
foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country
before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to
determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November
2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run
counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign
passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect
declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with
all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at
any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation
of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the
foreign country which granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, 35 it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced
his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" 37
and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges
of the United States of America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not
divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to
his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the
instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through
a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual
citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the
mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of
foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take
not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally
renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual
citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was
qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven
days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American
passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously.
Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." 42 This
does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for
he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for
any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier
renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign
citizen, to hold any public office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not
notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he
was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who
sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make
his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was
still a positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this
country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession
of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If
indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would
not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that
after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he
used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo
his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his
earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant
civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire
dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving
of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the
Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public
office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes 45 which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once
again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to
an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill
the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent,
Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and
Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in
that he was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4,
1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for
seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was
comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of
fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible
to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast
between the two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud
or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person
ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the
ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a
plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which
case the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns
accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the election and the returns are so
tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the
manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the
only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict
sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found
that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in
an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in
favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the
one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other,
the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single individual. 48
(Emphasis supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a
contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First
Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the
person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being
confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded
his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the
municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the
only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the
office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer
cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge
exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected
municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said
order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and,
although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause,
unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be entered
accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal
basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with
another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another
candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the
Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of
votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By
express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by
virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility
might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the
opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate
remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but
necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor
cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility
to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed
or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective
public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate.
When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number
of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect
in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder
the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as
well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who
should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC 50 when we
pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a
person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis
supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC 52 where the
Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without
qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a
sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue
involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions
relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of
interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps
before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of
the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above
ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application
of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity
of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the
law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the
basic information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for
office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the
LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive
of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a
COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition
to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a
candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying
their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their
COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC,
concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification
case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the
election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by
ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken
through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy.
When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is
made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to
set in.1âwphi1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from

among the qualified candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he
obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC 54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55
that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is
still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not
constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of
eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to
the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC 56 that when the voters are well
aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes
in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes
may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules
affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification
is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can
be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer
among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because
Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed
his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as
the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It

does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual
from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed,

Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of
candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall
under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is
thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections
because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and
he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the
elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be
not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted.
This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the

COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local
elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on
Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 38-49.
2
Id. at 50-67.
3
Id. at 229, Exhibit "1-MR," Certificate of Live Birth.
4
Id. at 241, Exhibit "12-MR," Oath of Allegiance.
5
Id. at 239, Exhibit "10-MR," Order of Approval.
6
Ibid, Note 2 and Annex "1" of Duly Verified Answer, Rollo, p. 160 and Annex "2" of Memorandum for Respondent, Rollo, p. 178.
7
Ibid, p. 160 and 178.
8
Id. at 139, Annex "B" of Petition for Disqualification; Id. at 177, Annex "1" Memorandum for Respondent.
9
Id. at 134, Petition to Disqualify Rommel Cagoco Arnado and/or to Cancel his Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
in Connection with May 10, 2010 Local and National Elections.
10
Id. at 140, Certification.
11
Id. at 191, Exhibit "A" of Memorandum for Petitioner filed before the Commission on Elections.
12
Id. at 192, Exhibit "C" of Memorandum for Petitioner filed before the Commission on Elections.
13
Records, pp. 76-77.
14
Rollo, p. 42, Resolution dated 5 October 2010, penned by Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, and concurred in by Commissioner Armando C. Velasco and
Gregorio Y. Larrazabal.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 43.
17
Id. at 44.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 46-47, Resolution dated 5 October 2010.
20
Id at 48.
21
Id. at 214, Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
22
Id. at 193-211, Verified Motion for Reconsideration; id. at 212-246, Amended Motion for Reconsideration; id. at 247-254, Rejoinder to Petitioner’s
Comment/Opposition to Respondent’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
23
Id. at 224, Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
24
A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the OEC and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or
possessing some grounds for disqualification may be filed on any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation. (Sec. 4.B.1. COMELEC Resolution No. 8696).
25
Rollo, pp. 64-66, COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 2 February 2011.
26
Id. at 69, Separate Concurring Opinion.
27
Id. at 72-73, Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, citing the cases of Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574 [2000]; Santos v.
COMELEC, 103 SCRA 628 [1981]; Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102 [1961]; and Reyes v. COMELEC, 97 SCRA 500 [1980].
28
367 Phil. 132 (1999).
29
Id. at 142-143.
30
G.R. No. 105919, 6 August 1992, 212 SCRA 309.
31
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
32
See excerpts of deliberations of Congress reproduced in AASJS v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, 11 May 2007, 523 SCRA 108.
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative
branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact
been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:
xxxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist — the retention of foreign citizenship, and the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out
that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by
reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution.
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public
interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in
one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is
transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the
Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine government will have no
concern and competence over. Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the
measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he
explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to
the foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual
citizenship and dual allegiance. Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces
his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a
foreign parliament but a Member of the House.
xxxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However,
he said that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is
hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing
about the other citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of
allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears
allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is
required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer
the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country. (Emphasis supplied)
33
See Discussion of Senators Enrile and Pimentel on Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code, reproduced in Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19
February 2009, 580 SCRA 12.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and
thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has
not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and
Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE:
Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship " is disqualified to run for any elective local
position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a
natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or
give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his
citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE:
Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a
citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE:
But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening
himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino
citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE:
But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested
upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under
this disqualification.
34
Supra note 28 at 153.
35
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or
more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
36
See Note 7.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
See Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12.
40
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship; x x x.
41
Fivaldo v. COMELEC, 255 Phil. 934, 944 (1989).
42
Rollo, p. 46, Resolution dated 5 October 2010.
43
Id. at 219, Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
44
Id. at 66, Resolution dated 02 February 2011.
45
23 Phil. 238 (1912).
46
Id. at 240.
47
Id. at 255.
48
Id at 254-255.
49
Id. at 258
50
Supra note 41.
51
Id. at 944-945.
52
G.R. No. 180051, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 590, 614-615.
53
Id. at 615, citing Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 635, Saya-ang v. COMELEC, 462 Phil. 373 (2003).
54
G. R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012.
55
G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 9 October 2012.
56
G.R. No. 105111, 3 July 3 1992, 211 SCRA 297, 312.