Understanding Criminal Evidence Rules
Understanding Criminal Evidence Rules
WHAT IS EVIDENCE?
Rule of Evidence – expresses the mode of manner of proving the facts and
circumstances upon which the party relies to establish the fact in dispute (Ruporto Martin,
Rules of Court in the Philippines. Vol. V. citing 20 Am. Jur. 34, p. 1)
Material evidence – tends to prove the fact in issue as that issue is determined by the
rules of substantive law and pleadings (Jaime R. Nuevas, Remedial Law Reviewer, 1971 Ed.,
citing Wigmore, Student’s Ed., p. 530)
Competent evidence – not excluded by law in a particular case (Bautista vs. Aparece,
(CA ), 51 O.G. 805 )
Direct and circumstantial evidence – direct evidence proves the fact in dispute without
the aid of any inference or presumption., while circumstantial evidence is the proof of a fact or
facts from which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of the particular fact in dispute
may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence (5 Moran, Remedial Law Review, p.
2)
Primary or best and secondary evidence – primary or best evidence is that which the
law regards as affording the greatest certainty of the fact in question, while secondary evidence
is that which is inferior to the primary evidence and is permitted by the law only when the best
evidence is not available ( 5 Moran, op. cit., p. 3 )
Positive and negative evidence – evidence is positive when the witness affirms that a
fact did or did not occur, and negative when the witness states he did not see or know of the
occurrence of a fact (People vs. Ramos, L-30420, Sept. 22, 1971)
Prima facie evidence – evidence which suffices for the proof of a fact in issue until
rebutted or overcome by other evidence (Nuevas, citing Cal. Code of Civil Procedure, Sec.
1833, p. 531)
Real evidence – object (real) evidence is that which is addressed to the senses of the
tribunal, as where objects are presented for the inspection of the court ( Franciso, citing 1
Jones on Evidence, 2nd ed., Sec. 16, p. 9 0)
Testimonial evidence – testimony given to the court of deposition by one who has
observed that to which he is testifying; or one who, though who has not observed the facts, is
nevertheless qualified to give an opinion relative to the fact ( Francisco, citing Gilbert, Law
Summaries of Evidence, p. 9 )
Our entire rule s of evidence have been incorporated in the Revised Rules of Court
Evidence is the means of proof: proof is the effect of evidence, the establishment of as
fact by evidence. Proof results as a probative effect of evidence and is the conviction or
persuasion of mind resulting from a consideration of the evidence (Jaime R. Nuevas, Remedial
Law Reviewer, 1971 Ed., p. 531)
The law of evidence deals with the rules to be followed in presenting a matter of fact to a
court for its use in the judicial investigation. (1) it prescribes the manner of presenting the
evidence personally by one who knows the thing, the subject to cross-examination, or by
means of a preposition (2) it fixes the qualification and the privileges of witnesses, and the
mode of examining them (3) and chiefly, it determines, as among probative matter, what
classes of things shall not be received (Ruperto Martin, Rules of Courts in the Philippines,
Vol. V, 1978 Ed., pp. 1-2)
The object of the law of evidence is to have a specific inquiry of the truth to establish the
truth by the use of the perceptive and reasoning faculties (Martin, supra., p. 2)
Factum probandum is the ultimate fact or the fact to be established; factum probans is the
evidentiary fact, or the fact by which the factum probandum is to be established ( Nuevas, citing
Wigmore 5-9, p. 531-532 )
ARE THE RULES OF EVIDENCE THE SAME, IN CRIMINAL AS WELL AS IN CIVIL CASES?
Yes, the rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings
except as otherwise provided by law or these rules (Sec. 2, Rule 128)
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or
these rules (Sec. 3, Rule 128)
In order that the evidence may be admissible, two requisites must concur, namely:
a. that is relevant to the issue; and
b. that is competent. That is, that it does not belong to the class of evidence
which is excluded by the law or Rules of Evidence ( Vicente Francisco, The
Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. VII, 1990 Ed., p. 19 )
Evidence to be relevant must throw light upon, or have logical relation to the facts in
issues to be established by one party or disproved by the other ( Ruperto G. Martin, Rules of
Court in the Philippines, Vol. V., 1987 ed., citing 20 Am. Jur. 240, p. 9 )
Evidence is competent when it is not excluded by any of the rules of evidence such
as when it is hearsay or because it is not best evidence which is within the power of a party to
produce. Evidence must not only be logically relevant, but must be of such character as to be
receivable in courts of justice ( Ruperto G. Martin, Ibid., citing Gilbert Law Summaries on
Evidence, p. 3 )
Evidence illegally obtains is admissible, the reason being that exclusion of such kind
of evidence is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure ( Stonehill vs. Diokno, L-19550, June 19, 1967 )
WHAT ARE THE TWO AXIOMS OF ADMISSIBILITY WHICH UNDERLIE THE ENTIRE
STRUCTURE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE?
The following: none but facts having rational probative value are admissible, which is
the axiom on relevancy; and all facts having rational probative value are admissible, unless
some specific rule forbids, which is the axiom on competency ( Nuevas, citing 1 Wigmore 289-
95, p. 532 )
They are:
a. multiple admissibility;
b. conditional admissibility;
c. curative admissibility
This means evidence which is [plainly relevant and competent for two or more purposes.
When this happens, such evidence will be received if it satisfies all the requirements prescribed
by law in order that it may be admissible for the purpose for which it is presented, even if it
does not satisfy the other requisites for its admissibility for other purposes (People vs. Yatco.
97 Phil. 940)
It means that the evidence which appear to be material is admitted by the court subject
to the condition that its connection to other facts subsequently to be proved will be established
(People vs. Yatco. Supra)
Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matter shall not be allowed, except when it tends in
any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact of issue (Sec. 4,
Rule 128)
The purpose of the rule on relevancy is to restrict the field of inquiry to its proper scope
and to prevent the issues of becoming beclouded. It also aims to prevent surprise on the
litigant, or the subjection to the party to the necessity of meeting the evidence that is possibly
prejudicial and of which he has no means of anticipating (Martin, p. 15 citing 2 Jones on
Evidence, 2nd Ed., 1086, 1087)
Collateral matters are those other than the facts in issue and which are offered as a
basis for inference as to existence of the facts in issue (Sec. 4, Rule 129)
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue (Sec. 4, Rule
128 )
a. Prospectant collateral matters are those preceding of the fact in issue but
pointing forward to it, like moral character, motive; conspiracy, etc.
b. Concomitant collateral matters are matters are those accompanying the fact in
issue and pointing to it, like alibi, or opportunity and incompatibility;
c. Retrospectant collateral matters are those succeeding the fact in issue but
pointing forward to it, like flight and concealment, behavior of the accused upon being
arrested; finger prints or foot prints; articles left at the scene of the crime which may
identify the culprit ( Judge Ed Vincent S. Albano, Remedial Law Reviewer 1 st Ed. 1995,
Rex Book Store, p. 888 citing 1 Wigmore 442-43 )
The basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest, if they are to rest upon reason, is
their adaptation to the successful development of the truth; and the rule of evidence at one time
though necessary to the ascertainment of truth should yield to the experience has clearly
demonstrate the fallacy or unwisdom of the old rule (Nuevas Remedial Law Reviewer, 1971
Ed., A & J Publishing, p. 534 citing Funk vs. U.S., 290 U.S. 391)
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act
on without proof because they already know them. It means no more than that the court will
bring to its aid and consider, without proof of the facts, its knowledge of those matter of public
concern which are known by all well-informed persons ( Martin, Revised Rules of Evidence,
1985 Ed., Premium Book Store, p. 3 citing C.J.S. 509 )
It displaces evidence since, as it stands for proof, it fulfills the object which evidence is
designed to fulfill and make evidence unnecessary. (Nuevas, Ibid., p. 535 citing State vs. Main,
69 Conn 123)
The doctrine of judicial notice is based upon obvious reasons of convenience and
expediency and operated to have trouble, expense and time which would be lost in
establishing, in the ordinary way, facts which do not admit of contradiction (Nuevas, Ibid., p.
535 citing 20 Am., Jur. 47; Tracy’s Handbook, 62 ed., p. 44)
WHEN IS JUDICIAL NOTICE MANDATORY?
A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality,
the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time and the geographical
divisions ( Sec. 1, Rule 129, Revised Rules on Evidence )
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites, namely:
a. the matter be common and general knowledge;
b. the matter must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and
c. the matter must be known to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court
( Martin, Ibid. p. 35 citing 1 Jones on Evidence, 2 nd ed., 643; 20 Am. Jur. 48 )
A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions (Sec. 2, Rule 129 )
During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of the party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court. On its own initiative or
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case (Sec. 3, Rule 129 )
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof ( Sec. 4, Rule 129 )
Through admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made ( Sec. 4, Rule 129 )
Objects as evidenced are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is
relevant to the fact in issue, it mat be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court ( Sec. 1,
Rule 130 )
Proof which is addressed directly to the senses of the court is a most convincing and
satisfactory class of proof (Martin, p. 57 citing 20 Am. Jur.) object evidence is usually the most
trustworthy type of evidence (Martin, citing Gilbert Law Summaries on Evidence, p. 1)
The following:
a. the evidence must e relevant; ( Sec. 1, Rule 130 )
b. indecent or improper objects should be excluded, unless the same is
necessary for ascertaining the truth; ( Brown vs. Swineford, 28 Am. Rep. 582 )
c. repulsive objects should also be excluded if not absolutely necessary for
the administration of justice (Knowless vs. Crampton, 55 Conn. 366 )
It is the best and the highest form of proof (Gentry vs. Mominiss, 3 Dana, Ky. 382 )
The object must be first identified, which means that it must be shown, by independent
evidence, that the object offered is the thing in dispute ( People vs. Besold, 154 Cal. 363)
The following:
a. the original of a document is one of the contents of which are the subject of inquiry
b. when a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals
c. when an entry is repeated in a regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as
originals ( Sec. 4, Rule 130 )
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on its part, may prove its contents by a copy or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic documents, or by the testimony of witness in the order stated ( Sec. 5, Rule 130 )
If the document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party he must have a
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence,
he fails to produce that document secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its
lost ( Sec. 6, Rule 130 )
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer and is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public office in
custody thereof ( Sec. 7, Rule 130 )
No. A party who calls for the production of a document and inspects the same is not
obliged to offer it as evidence
Parol evidence literally means oral or verbal testimony of a witness ( Ballentine’s Law
Dict.., 2nd Ed., p. 932 ) However, in the application of the rule, it has been extended to writings
other than the complete written agreement of the parties ( Phil. Sugar Estates Dev. Co. vs.
Gov’t of P.I. 247 U.S. 385; Woodhous vs. Halili, 93 Phil. 526 ) Another term for parol evidence
is intrinsic evidence or evidence aliunde ( Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405 )
STATE THE RULE WHEN THE TERMS OF AGREEMENT ARE PUT TO WRITING
A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading;
a. an intrinsic ambiguity mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement;
b. the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
c. the validity of written agreement;
d. the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after
the execution of the written agreement
The language of writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning; it bears in the
place of execution, unless the parties intended otherwise (Sec. 10, Rule 130)
All persons who can perceive, and perceiving can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses
Neither religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a
crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.(Sec. 20, Rule
130 )
a. those whose mental condition, at the time of there production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others; and
b. children whose mental maturity is such to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully ( sec. 21, rule 130 )
What renders insane persons incompetent to testify is their insanity “ at the time of their
production “ Insanity at the time of the occurrence on which as witness is called upon to testify
merely affects his credibility, not his competency ( Moran, Remedial Law Reviewer, p. 578 )
A deaf and dumb person may testify in any manner satisfactory to the court, as by writing
or signs through an interpreter. (People vs. De Leon 50 Phil. 539) If he testifies by signs, there
must be an interpreter with whom he may have an understanding by such means (Territory vs.
Duran 3 N.M. 189) Otherwise he cannot testify (People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385)
If the witness at the time of his examination, is so intoxicated by opium or other drugs that
he is deprived of his mental powers to such a degree as to be capable of making known his
perceptions, he is disqualified from testifying. Otherwise, he is competent
It is a doctrine laid down in modern decisions that the test of an infant’s competency to
testify is his capacity to receive just impressions truly. If he possesses the necessary mental
capacity to that effect and comprehends the obligation of an oath, he is a competent witness
(Moran, Ibid., p. 579 citing Wheeler vs. U.S. 523)
During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other or
the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants ( Sec. 22, Rule 130 )
WHAT IS THE REASON FOR THE RULE FORBIDDING ONE SPOUSE TO TESTIFY
FOR OR AGAINST THE OTHER?
The rule forbidding one spouse to testify or against the other is based on principles which
are deemed important to preserve the marriage relation as one of full confidence and affection,
and that this is regarded as more important in public welfare than that the exigencies of the
lawsuits should authorize domestic peace to be disregarded for the sake of ferreting out some
fact within the knowledge of strangers ( U.S. vs. Concepcion, 31 Phil 182 )
IN ONE CASE, THE DEFENDANT, WHO WAS ACCUSEDOF KILLING HIS SON TESTIFIED
IN HIS OWN BEHALF DID NOT LIMIT HIMSELF TO DENYING THAT HE WAS A KILLER
BUT WENT FURTHER AND IMPUTED THE CRIME TO HIS WIFE. MAY THE WIFE BE
ALLOWED TO TESTIFY IN REBUTTAL AGAINST THE HUSBAND’S CONSENT?
Yes. In giving such testimony, the husband must, in all fairness, be held to have intended
all its natural and necessary consequences. By his said act, the husband – himself exercising
the very right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground of their marital relations – must
be taken to have waived all objections to the latter’s testimony upon rebuttal, even considering
that such object would have been available at the outset. (People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil 694)
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following
cases:
a. the husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication receive in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in the criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants;
b. an attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a
view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquiring in such capacity;
c. a person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics.
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following
cases:
a. The husband of the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without
the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants;
d. A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession
made to or any advice given by him in his professional character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs;
The reason is to preserve the peace of families and maintain the sacred institution of
marriage. (Nuevas, Ibid., p. 559 citing Mever svs. State, 40 Fla. 216).
The privilege is claimable by the spouse not called as a witness, so that it is waivable only
by him or her; and it is waivable by any act of such spouse which might be considered as an
express or implied consent to the disclosure of the communication. (Neuvas, Ibid., citing
People vs. Hayes, 140 N.Y. 484).
The following:
a) There must be a relation of attorney and client;
b) There must be a communication by the client to the attorney, or advice thereon
given by the latter to the former;
c) The communication or advice must have been given confidentially;
d) The communication must have been made in the course of professional
employment.
The reason is to promote the confidence of the people in attorneys for their work is
essential to the administration of justice and to encourage the freedom of consultation of
lawyers for clients. (Nuevas, Ibid., p. 561 citing Fosters vs. Hall, 12 Pick 89; Alexander vs.
U.S., 138 U.S. 353)
YES, because those communications are not covered by the privilege for the reason that a
lawyer is not supposed to be consulted on a future crime or wrong. (Matthews vs. Hoaglang, 21
Atl. 1054)
NO, for those communications are protect by the privilege. (Alexander vs. U.S., 138 U.S.
353)
This privilege does not apply to an action filed by the lawyer against his client, and this
exception is for the protection of the lawyer. (Hunt vs. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464)
The following:
The reason is to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure by patient to
physician of all symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced
disclosure and publication on the witness stand. (Nuevas, Ibid., 562 citing Will of Bruendl, 102
Wis. 47)
WHEN IS THERE PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF A PHYSICIAN?
There is such employment of a physician when he is called for the purpose of treatment,
whether curative, preventive or palliative. (Smart vs. Kansas City, 208 Mo. 162) There is no
professional employment when a physician is consulted for an unlawful purpose, like the
procuring of an abortion. (Nuevas, Ibd., p. 563 citing Seifert vs. State, 67 N.E. 100)
The privilege applies not only to the testimony of the physician on the stand, but also to
affidavits, certificates, prescription, and hospital records. (Krap vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
143 Mich. 309)
The following:
The reason is to preserve the sanctity of the confessional institution. (People’s vs.
Philipps, 1 West L.J. 109)
The following:
The privilege is intended not for the protection of public officers, but for the protection of
public interest. (Morn, Ibid., p. 599 citing Vogel vs. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311)
The public officer is privileged not to testify to official secrets, not only during his term of
office, but also afterwards. The law, therefore, intends that secrecy be permanent. (Moran,
Ibid., p. 509)
WHAT IS AN ADMISSION?
The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him. (Sec. 26, Rule 130)
Admissions are receivable against the party who made them, but not in his favor, because
then they would be self-serving evidence (5 Moran, Comments, p. 212, 1963 Ed.)
Self-serving evidence is an admission favorable to the party making it. (Lichauco vs.
Atlantic Gulf, etc., 84 Phil. 330). It is not admissible in evidence because of its hearsay
character, and for the further reason that a man may be safely believed if he declares against
his own interest, but not if he advocates his interest. (Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf, etc., supra).
CLASSIFY ADMISSIONS
1. Judicial or those made on the record, or in connection with the judicial proceeding
in which it is offered;
2. Extra-judicial, or those made elsewhere, irrespective of time, place, or to whom
made. (Martin, Revised Rules on Evidence, p. 209 citing The Chamberlayne Trial
Evidence, p. 42)
Admission operates equally in both civil and criminal cases and with the same effect, while
confession is an admission by the person accused of having committed the act of which he is
accused. “It pertakes largely of the nature of an offer to compromise with the criminal
authorities. (Martin, Ibid., p 210 citing The Chamberlayen Trial Evidence, p. 441).
In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a lea of guilty to a lesser
offense, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer. (Sec.
27, Rule 130).
GIVE THE EFFECTS OF AN OFFER TO COMPROMISE.
DEFINE COMPROMISE
STATE THE RULE OF RES INTER ALIOS ACTA AND THE EXCEPTIONS.
GIVE THE REASON FOR THE RULE OF RES INTER ALIOS ACTA
On the principle good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s acts, conduct and
declarations are binding upon him and, therefore, evidence, against him. Yet, it does not only
seem inconvenient, but also manifestly, unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither can their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. (Nuevas, Ibid, p.
568 citing Stack on Evidence, 35d., pp. 58-59)
The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scoop of his authority
and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence of the
partnership or agency, against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of
a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party. (Sec. 29, Rule
130).
The act or declaration of a conspiractor relating to the conspiracy and during its existence,
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. (Sec. 30, Rule 130).
This rule refers to extrajudicial acts and declarations of a conspiractor, and not to his
testimony as a witness at the trial. (People vs. Dacanay, supra).
Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. (Sec.
31, rule 130).
DEFINE PRIVIES.
The word “privies” denotes not only the idea of succession in right of heirship or
testamentary legacy, but also succession by virtue of acts intervivos, as by assignment,
subrogation, or purchase – in fact any act whereby the successor is substituted in the place of
the predecessor in interest. (Alpuerto vs. Pastor & Roa, 38 Phil. 785).
GIVE THE RULE ON ADMISSION BY SILENCE, THE REASON THEREFORE, AND THE
EXCEPTION, IS ANY.
An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a
party who does or say nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action
or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in
evidence against him. (Sec. 32, Rule 130). This rule applies to both civil and criminal cases.
The reason is the recognized rule that if a man remains silent when he ought to speak, he will
be debarred from speaking later. Qui tacet consentire videtur or silent means consent.
(Gabriel vs. Baens, 56 Phil. 314)
1. Where no good reason exists for the party to comment on the act or declaration as
when the act or declaration was not specifically directed to the party who remained
silent (80 A.L.R., Anno., 1272)
2. When the party had no opportunity to comment on the act or declaration; (People vs.
Ranario, 49 Phil. 220)
3. Where the act or declaration was made in the course of an official investigation; (U.S.
vs Dela Cruz 12 Phil. 87)
The basis of such rule is that the natural reaction of one accused of the commission of a
crime or of the implication therein is to deny the accusation if it is unjust or unfounded. (Martin,
Revised Rules on Evidence, p. 252 citing Mathews vs. State, 55 Ala, 187, 28 Ann. Rep. 698)
DEFINE CONFESSION
The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged or of any
offence necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. (Sec. 33, Rule
130).
No, because it is enough that the force or violence were employed upon the person of his
co-accused, in his presence and within his observation, such that he had reasonable grounds
to believe that he would suffer the same maltreatment. (U.S. vs. Baluyot, 1 Phil. 451)
It must be a threat of bodily harm or injury and accompanied by overt acts showing
determination to carry out the threat. (People vs. Cabrera, 82 Phil 839).
It must be a promise of immunity from or leniency in the criminal prosecution and made by
a person who is in a position to grant the same. (People vs. Hernandez, 91 Phil. 334)
A confession is admissible only against the accused who made it and not against his co-
accused, for, as against the latter, the confession would be hearsay and res inter alios acta
(People vs. Talledo, 85 Phil. 533)
Unless such confession can be considered as part of the res gestae, it cannot be received
in favor of the accused for the reason that the same is hearsay. (People vs. Catalino, L-25403,
March 15, 1968) Besides, the court before which said extra-judicial confession is offered has
ample power to determine its credibility, and the court may discard the same if it finds the
confession in inherently improbable. (Ibid)
Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to
prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage,
and the like. (Section 34, Rule 130).
To admit the proof of crimes other that the particular one with the accused is charged
would be unfair to the accused. It will compel the defendant to meet the charges of which the
indictment gives him no information, confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of issue, and
thus diverts the attention of the court from the charge immediately before it. In fact it would be
allowing evidence of collateral offenses as substantive evidence of the offense on trial (Martin,
Revised Rules on Evidence, p. 290 citing 20 Am. Jur. 288-289
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, exception as otherwise provided in these rules.
(Sec. 36, Rule 130)
Hearsay evidence is that which derives its value, not solely from the credit to be given to
the witness upon the stand, but in part from the veracity and competency of some other person.
(Clement vs. Packer, 125 U.S. 309) It is not limited to oral testimony; it also includes writings.
(Nuevas, Ibid., p. 576 citing 20 Am. Jur. 400)?
Hearsay evidence is not admissible because it knows of his own knowledge a witness can
testify only on facts which he knows of his own knowledge (Sec. 36, rule 130); and,
furthermore, to preserve the right of parties ot cross-examine the original witness or person
claiming to have knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. (People vs. Pagkaliwagan, 76
Phil. 457) The right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witnesses is essential in the
administration of justice for it is the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimony, and this right is not available in respect of hearsay evidence since the declarant is
not in court. (Nuevas, Ibid., p. 576 citing Donnelly vs. United States, 228 U.S. 243)
The following:
a) Dying declaration;
b) Declaration against interest;
c) Act or declaration about pedigree;
d) Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree;
e) Common reputation;
f) Part of the res gestae;
g) Entries in the course of business;
h) Entries in official records;
i) Commercial lists and the like;
j) Learned treatises; and
k) Testimony or disposition at a former proceeding.
The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death,
may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. (Sec. 37, Rule 130, Revised Rules on
Evidence)
A dying declaration is that made by a person at the point of death, concerning the case
and circumstances of the injury from which he thereafter dies. (Moran, Remedial Law Review,
p. 619)
A dying declaration is admissible on two grounds, namely, (a) necessity and (b)
trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarants’s death makes it impossible to obtain his
testimony is the best evidence of the crime. (U.S. vs. Virrey, 37 Phil. 618) Trustworthiness,
because it is made at the point of death, a situation so solemn and awful as creating an
obligation equal to that created by a positive oath administered in a court of justice. (U.S. vs.
Gil, 13 Phil. 530)
It must be received with utmost care and given the same weight as the testimony of a
living witness. (People vs. Almendralejo, 48 Phil. 268)
IS IT NECESSARY THAT THE DECLARANT STATE EXPLICITY THAT HE HAD GIVEN HOE
OF LIVING?
No. it is not necessary to the validity or admissibility of a declaration that the declarant
expressly state that he has lost all hope of recovery; it is sufficient that the circumstances are
such to lead inevitably to the conclusion that at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died. (Peole vs. Serrano,
58 Phil. 669)
No. The force of dying declaration is not affected by the circumstances that the declarant
did not die until many hours or days afterwards provided he finally did die from the wound,
whose gravity did not diminish from the time he made his declaration until the hour of his death.
(Ruperto Martin, Revised Rules on Evidence, Vol. IV, Premium Book Store, 1989 Ed., pp. 311-
312 citing Moore vs. State, 96 Ten. 209 and U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 14)
Opinions in dying declarations are inadmissible. Dying declarations should consist solely
of facts, and not of conclusions, mental impressions or opinions. Thus, a dying statement that
the deceased thought or believed the accused had shot him, or that he expected the accused
would try to kill him, is inadmissible where the deceased did not see his assailant, but based
his declaration wholly upon threats which had been made by the accused. (Ruperto Martin,
Ibid., p. 318 citing state vs. Horn, 204, No. 528, 103 S.W. 96)
The declarant’s belief must be that death was inevitable, not merely possible, nor even
probably, but sure. In other words, the declarant, at the time he makes his declaration, must
have no hope of recovery. If at the time he had an expectation, even only a little hope of
recovery, the declaration would be inadmissible. Fear, or even belief, that illness end in death,
if consistent with hope, is not sufficient. There must be a settled hopeless expectation. (Mora,
Ibid., p. 621)
The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of
the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary
to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third person. (Sec. 38, Rule 130)
It is admissible on two grounds, name, (a) necessity, and (b) trustworthiness. Necessity,
because the declarant is dead or not available as witness, and trustworthiness, because it is
against the declarant’s interest, and therefore, a guarantee of its truth. (Jaime R. Nuevas,
Remedial Law Reviewer, 1971 Ed., A & J Publishing, p. 581 citing Fitch vs. Chapman, 10
Conn. 11; Smith vs. Moore, 142 N.C. 277)
It is admissible on two grounds, namely (a) necessity and (b) trustworthiness. Necessity,
because facts about pedigree are usually those which occurred long before the trial and known
to only a few persons, and trustworthiness, because those facts are matters which members of
the family are presumed to be interested in ascertaining the truth. ([Link], Ibid., p. 582
citing Fulkenson vs. Holmes, 117 U.S. 389; III Wigmore 218; Tracy’s Handbook, 62 Ed., p. 259
1. Relationship;
2. Family genealogy;
3. Birth;
4. Marriage;
5. Death;
6. Dates when the places where these facts occurred;
7. Names of relatives; and
8. Facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. (Sec. 39, Rule 130)
1. the reputation or tradition must refer to the pedigree of any member of such family;
2. the reputation or tradition must have been formed previous to the controversy, i.e.,
ante litem motam and
3. the witness testifying thereto must be a member of the familiy. (R. Martin, Ibid., p. 340)
No; fact of pedigree, if provable by reputation, can be proved only by reputation in the
family, but not by reputation in the community, except marriage which is provable by both
family and common reputation. (Sison vs. Amblada, 30 Phil. 118)
1. The reputation refers to a matter of public or general interest more than thirty (30)
years old; or to marriage or moral character;
2. The reputation is ancient:
3. The reputation was formed ante litem motam; and
4. The reputation is one formed in the community interested. (Sec. 41, Rule 130)
It is not hearsay if common reputation is the fact in issue, or part thereof. Thus, in a
prosecution for maintenance of a house of ill-fame, a gambling house, or an opium joint, the
reputation of the house itself is the issue, so that testimony of witnesses thereto is not hearsay.
(U.S. vs. Choa Chick, 36 Phil. 831)
Res gestae literally means, “thing done,” and includes the circumstances, facts and
declarations incidental to the main fact or transaction necessary to illustrate its character. It is
so connected therewith as to constitute a part of the transaction. (R. Martin, Ibid., p. 349 citing
Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, p. 348)
What is admissible as part of the res gestae is not the details of an occurrence, but the
human assertions or statements about those details.
The requisites for the admissibility of this kind of evidence as an exception to the rule
excluding hearsay are the following:
1. Statements must have been made while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequently thereto;
2. Such statements must be spontaneous; and
3. Such statements must relate to the circumstances of the startling occurrence. (R.
Martin, Ibid., p. 350- 351 citing 32 C.J.S. and People vs. Ricaplaza, 23 SCRA 374)
The principle rests upon the common experience that utterances made under such
circumstances are devoid of self-interest, and are in the same category as exclamations. The
probability of falsehood is so remote as to be negligible. (People vs. Gondayao, 30 SCRA 226)
They are admissible on two ground, namely, (a) necessity and (b) trustworthiness.
Necessity, because such natural and spontaneous utterances are more convincing than the
testimony of the same person on the stand; and trustworthiness, because those statements are
made instinctively. (Jaime Nuevas, Ibid., p. 587 citing Mobile vs. Ascraft, 48 Ala. 31 and
Wesley vs. State, 53 Ala. 182)
If the requsites of a dying declaration do not concur, the declaration may be admitted as
part of the res gestae. (People vs. Talledo, 85 Phil. 533)
WHAT IS AN EQUIVOCAL ACT FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE ON VERBAL ACTS?
An equivocal act is one susceptible of various interpretations. (Allen vs. Duncan, 11 pick
308)
Verbal acts are statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue and
giving it legal significance. Such declarations are called verbal acts, because they are
considered as verbal parts of the equivocal or ambiguous acts which they explain. For
example, when one delivers money to another, such act does not by itself show whether the
money is intended, say as a gift or as a payment of a debt. But if the act of delivery is
accompanied by the statement that the money is for payment of a debt, or is a birthday gift, the
statement gives legal significance to the act.
MAY AN EQUIVOCAL ACT EXTEND OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME? MAY THE
STATEMENTS NECESSARY FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF SUCH EQUIVOCAL ACT BE
ADMISSIBLE AS VERBAL ACTS?
The equivocal act may extend over a long period of time, and during that period, those
statements that are necessary for an understanding of the meaning of said equivocal act, are
admissible as verbal acts. If a man and a woman are cohabiting together and for a certain
period of time they have been appearing in public together, there is here an equivocal conduct
which may be interpreted either as licit or illicit. According to the present rule, any statements
made by the parties during such equivocal conduct showing it to be matrimonial, meretricious
or otherwise, are admissible as verbal acts. (Morann, Ibid., p. 636 citing Matter of Taylor, 9
Paige (N.Y.), 611)
Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to known the facts therein stated, maybe
received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in h is professional capacity
or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty (Sec. 43,
Rule 130)
1. The entries must have been made at or near the time of the transaction to which
they refer;
2. The person who made the entry must be, at the time the entry is presented as
evidence, deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to testify;
3. The person who made the entry must be in a position to know the facts there in
stated at the time he made the entries;
4. The entries must have been made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty; and
5. The entries must have been made in the ordinary or regular course of business.
(Ruperto G. Martin, Revised Rules on Evidence, vol. IV. 1989 Ed., p. 363)
They are admissible on two grounds, namely, (a) necessity, and (b trustworthiness.
Necessity, because the entrant is dead or not available as witness, and no equally satisfactory
proof of the entry can be had; and trustworthiness, because a man who makes regular entries
for purposes of business or duty usually makes them with accuracy. As these entries are relied
upon by businessmen everyday they can be relied upon the courts. (J. Nuevas, Ibid., p. 589
citing Welsh vs. Barret, 15 Mass. 380 and Tracy’s Handbook, 62 Ed., p. 276)
It refers to an entry made by a person whose business or duty it was to make the entry,
and which appears to be part of a regular system of entries kept in that establishment. (Jaime
Nuevas, Ibid., p. 590 citing O’Day vs. Spencer, 189 Pac. 394; Kibbe vs. Bancraft, 77 III. 19)
No; the entrant must be presented as witness. However, while on the stand, he can
refer to his entry as memorandum to refresh his memory. (Cang Ui vs. Gardner, 34 Phil. 376).
But, if notwithstanding the aid of his entry as a memorandum, the entrant cannot recollect the
facts stated therein, and then his entry is admissible as independent evidence, provided all the
other requisites for its admissibility are present. (Shove vs. Wiley, 18 Mass. 558)
Entries in official records made in the performance of h is duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty especially enjoined bylaw, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (Sec. 44, Rule 130)
They are admissible on two grounds, namely, (a) necessity, and (b) trustworthiness.
Necessity, because litigations are numberless in which the testimony of public officials is
required, and trustworthiness, because the law reposes a particular confidence in public
officials such that is presumes that they will discharge their duties with fidelity and accuracy.
(Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil. 148)
They are prima facie evidence of the fact therein entered. (Sec. 44, Rule 130)
They are admissible if published for use by persons engaged in that occupation, and is
generally used and relied upon by them. (Sec. 45, Rule 130)
They are admissible if the fact therein stated can be judicially noticed, or if another
expert testifies that the author is a recognized expert on the subject. (Sec. 46, Rule 130).
No, because they are not judicial in character. Besides, in legislative and
administrative investigations, the rules of evidence are not binding. (Moran, Ibid., p. 645)
As a rule, a witness must confine his testimony to matters within his actual knowledge.
He cannot be asked questions calling for his opinion or conclusions upon facts, which are for
the court to make. (J. Nuevas, Ibid., p 595 citing 20 Am. Jur. 635). Hence, the opinion of a
witness is not admissible. (Sec. 48, Rules 130)
“Qualifying the witness” means proving that the witness presented is an expert, and this
is done by asking him preliminary questions as to his education, training, experience, and the
like. (Nuevas, Ibid., p. 596 citing Tracy’s Handbook, 62 Ed., p. 207)
“Opinion evidence” as the term is used in law, means the testimony of a witness, given
or offered in the trial of an action, that the witness is of the opinion that some fact pertinent to
the case exists or does not exists, offered as proof of the existence or non-existence of the fact.
(R. Martin, Ibid., p. 396 citing 20 Am. Jur. 634)
Expert evidence is necessary when there are certain matters which do not come within
the knowledge of ordinary witnesses. (Moran, Ibid., p. 650)
Mental insanity may be proven by the opinion of ordinary witnesses, but when the
mental disease is to be inferred from an examination and observation of its symptoms, the
opinion of an expert is necessary. (Torres vs. Lopex, 48 Phil. 772)
Yes, because it is a science requiring close study. (People vs. Medina, 59 Phil. 330)
The following:
a) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral
involved in the offense charged.
b) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
c) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged. (Sec. 51, Rule 130).
DEFINE CHARACTER
MAY THE PROSECUTION PROVE THE BAD MORAL CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED?
The prosecution is not permitted to impeach the character of an accused, if the latter
does not put it in issue by giving evidence in his support. (People vs. Hodges, 48 Phil. 592).
The reason for the rule is that evidence of bad character may create an unfair prejudice against
the acused who may be convicted not because he is guilty of the crime charged, but because
of his being a crooked man. (Moran, Ibid., p. 657 citing People vs. Shen, 147 N. Y. 78, 41 N.E.
508)
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (Sec.
1, Rule 131)
“Burden of Evidence” is defined as “that logical necessity which rests on a party at any
particular time during a trial to create a prima facie case in his own favor, or to overthrow one
when created against him. The burden of evidence is determined by the progress of the trial,
and shifts to one party when the other party has produced sufficient evidence to be entitled as
a matter of law to a ruling in his favor. (R. Martin, Ibid, p. 431 citing 2 Jones on Evidence. 2 nd
Ed., 355)
In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution
(People vs. De Reyes, 82 Phil. 130), because the accused has in his favor the presumption of
innocence.
When it has been proven that the accused committed the unlawful acts alleged, it is
properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with criminal intent, and it
is incumbent upon them to rebut such presumption. (R. Martin, Ibid., p. 441 citing State vs.
Sullivan, 34 Idaho 68, 199 p. 647, 17 A.L.R. 902)
WHAT IS A PRESUMPTION?
IS PRESUMPTION EVIDENCE?
No. The effect of a presumption is to do away with evidence. It is not evidence, even
though it takes the place of it in the trial of causes. (R. Martin, Ibid., p. 448 citing The
Chamberlayne Trial Evidence, p. 732)
Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
(Sec. 2, par. (a)Rule 131)
The general rule is that, if it is proved that the accused committed an unlawful act
charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with a criminal intention, and it is for the
accused to rebut this presumption. The act in itself is evidence of the intent. (Vicente J.
Francisco, Ibid., p. 82 citing 16 C.J. 81)
Though it is maxim of law, as well as the dictate of charity, that every person is to be
presumed innocent until he is proved to be guilty, yet it is a rule equally sound that every sane
person must be supposed to intended that which is the ordinary and natural consequences of
his own purposed act. (V.J. Francisco, Ibid., p. 84 citing 3 Green Evidence, 15 th ed., 13)
Men of sound mind are presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequences of
acts which they intentionally perform. (Ruperto G. Martin, Revised Rules on Evidence, Vol. IV
1989 ed., p. 465 citing 1 Jones on Evidence, 2 nd Ed., 210). It is said that man intends that
consequence which he contemplates and which he expects to result from his act, and he,
therefore, must be taken to intend every consequence which is the natural and immediate
result of any act which he voluntarily does. (Ibid).
Non-production of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and,
therefore,, fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party’s
cause. (Marvel Corp. vs. David, 94 Phil. 376)
The presumption arises that the case is groundless and affects the whole mass of
evidence presented by the party. (De Leon vs. Layco, 73 Phil. 588)
None, the exact date of death is a matter of proof. (J. Nuevas, Ibid., p 607 citing Davis
vs. Briggs, 97 U.S. 628)
They are admissible when the facts from which they may be deduced are fully proven;
a presumption cannot be made to rest on another presumption. (Cuaycong vs. Rius, 86 Phil.
170)
Presumptions do not constitute evidence and have no weight as such, but only
determined the party who has the duty of presenting evidence, and when that duty is met,
presumptions recede. (Nuevas, Ibd., p. 608 citing Anno. 15 A.L.R. 881) In other words,
presumptions merely aid in establishing a prima facie case and have no probative effect when
countervailing proof is offered. (J. Nuevas, Ibid., p. 608 citing 20 Am. Jur. 171)
Yes, a witness must answer questions, although his answer may tend to establish a
claim against him (Sec. 3)
Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated
in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue. (Sec. 6)
Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. – After the cross-examination pf the
witness has been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or
supplement his answers given during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in its
discretion. (Sec. 7)
After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness
cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its
discretion, as the interest of justice may require.
A leading question is one which suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires. (Sec. 10)
As a general rule, they are not allowed, except in the following cases
a) On cross examination;
b) On preliminary matters;
c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind or a deaf-mute;
d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
e) Of a witness who is an adverse party, or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse
party. (Sec. 10)
A misleading question is one which assumed as true a fact not yet testified to by the
witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed (Sec. 10)
As a rule, no, except, if the witness is an unwilling or hostile witness or if the witness is
an adverse party of an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or
a partnership or association which is an adverse party. (Sec. 12)
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with
the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked
whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in
writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
(Sec. 13)
On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the court any witness not at the
time under examination sot that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses. The judge
any also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing with one
another until all shall have been examined. (Sec. 15)
A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written
or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the
same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examined
the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a
writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear
that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must
be received with caution. (Sec. 16)
Whenever writing is shown to witness, it may be inspected by the adverse party. (Sec.
18)
a) The written official acts, or records of official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country.
b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
and
c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
It must be authenticated, which means that its due execution and authenticity must first
be proved. (Sec. 20)
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he ahs seen the person write or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also
be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated
as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. (Sec. 22)
The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose may be evidenced by an official publication thereof of by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record or by his deputy and accompanied
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office (Sec. 24)
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court. (Sec. 25)
It means that any public record an official copy of which is admissible in evidence must
not be removed from the office in which it is kept except upon order of a court where the
inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a pending case. (Sec. 26)
The party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to
have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account
for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another without his
concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it or was otherwise
properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of
the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence. (Sec.
31)
There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed private documents insofar
as their admissibility as evidence is concerned. (Sec. 32).
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purposes for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (Sec. 34)
As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the witness is
called to testify. Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a
party’s testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be
done in writing. (Sec. 35)
Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of
the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (Sec. 36)
An objection is general when the grounds thereof are not stated, or are generally
stated. An objection that the evidence offered is irrelevant, incompetent, or inadmissible is a
general one. (Moran, Remedial Law Reviewer, p. 690 citing Rush vs. French, 1 Ariz., 99, 25
Pac. 819) An objection is specific where it states wherein or how or why the evidence is
irrelevant or incompetent. (Moran, Ibid., Rush vs. French, supra) The general rule is that an
objection must be specified. (Sec. 36)
A general objection is sufficient, if on the face of the evidence objected to units relation
to the rest of the case, there appears no purpose whatever for which it would have been
admissible. Thus, it has been held that where there is a general objection to evidence and it is
overruled, and the evidence is received, the ruling will not be held erroneous unless the
evidence, in its essential nature, is inadmissible. Where the general objection is sustained, and
the evidence excluded, the ruling will not be upheld, unless any ground in fact existed for the
exclusion (6 Moran, Comments, p. 128, 1963 ed.)
WHEN SHALL THE COURT RULE ON THE OBJECTIONS TO THE OFFER OF EVIDENCE?
The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the objection is made, unless
the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented by the
ruling (Sec. 38)
SHOULD THE COURT STATE THE REASON FOR ITS RULING IN CASE OF OBJECTION
TO EVIDENCE?
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated. However, if
the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or
some of them must specify the ground or grounds relied upon. (Sec. 38)
WHEN MAY THE COURT STRIKE OUT AN ANSWER OF A WITNESS DURING THE TRIAL?
Should a witness answer the question before the adverse party had the opportunity to
voice fully its objection to the same, and such objection is found to be meritorious, the court
shall sustain the objection and order the answer given to be striken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are
incompetent, irrelevant or otherwise improper. (Sec. 39)
If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may
have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the
offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
the substance of the proposed testimony. (Sec. 40)
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. (Sec. 2, Rule 133)
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in uprejudiced mind. (Sec. 2)
In determining where the superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies the
court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case including the following:
It is the fact of specific loss or injury. In homicide, the fact of death, whether or not
feloniously caused is the corpus delicti (Cortez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-32246, June
2, 1988)
WHAT MANNER OF PROOF IS REQUIRED IN SELF-DEFENSE?
Accused who claims self-defense has the burden to prove its elements by clear and
convincing evidence. That evidence must be clear, satisfactory and convincing. (People vs.
Macariola, 120 SCRA 92)
The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when
the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be
reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with
caution. (Sec. 6)
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter
on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that
the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (Sec. 7)
A person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or that of another person
regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of the Philippines, may file a verified
petition in the court of the province of the residence of any expected adverse party. (Sec. 1)
The petition shall be entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall show (a) that the
petitioner expects to be a party to an action in a court of the Philippines but is presently unable
to bring it or cause it to be brought; (b) the subject matter of the expected action and his
interest therein; (c) the facts which is he desires to establish by the proposed testimony and his
reasons for desiring to perpetuate it; (d) the names or a description of the persons he expects
will be adverse parties and their addresses so far as known; and (e) the names and addresses
of the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which he expects to elicit
from each, and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the
persons to be examined named in the petition for the purpose of perpetuating their testimony.
(Sec. 2)
WHAT SHALL THE NOTICE OF PETITION CONTAIN, AND UPON WHOM, WHEN AND HOW
SHALL IT BE SERVED?
The petitioner shall thereafter serve a notice upon each person named in the petition
as an expected adverse party, together with a copy of the petition, stating that the petitioner will
apply to the court, at a time and place named therein, for the order described in the petition. At
least twenty (20) days before the date of hearing the notice shall be served in the manner
provided for service of summons. (Sec. 3)
If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or
delay of justice, it shall make an order designating or describing the persons whose deposition
may be taken and specifying the subject matter of the examination, and whether the deposition
shall be taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The depositions may then be
taken in accordance with Rule 24 before the hearing (Sec. 4)
For the purpose of applying Rule 24 to depositions for perpetuating testimony, each
reference therein to the court in which the action is pending shall be deemed to refer to the
court in which the petition for such deposition was filed. (Sec. 5)
If a deposition to perpetuate testimony is taken under this rule, or if, although not so
taken, it would be admissible in evidence, it may be used in any action involving the same
subject matter subsequently brought in accordance with the provision of Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 24. (Sec. 6)
If an appeal has been taken from a judgment of the Regional Trial Court or before the
taking of an appeal if the time therefore has not expired, the Regional Trial Court in which the
judgment was rendered may allow the taking of depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their
testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court. In such case the party
who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make a motion in the said Regional Trial Court for
leave to take the depositions, upon the same notice and service thereof as if the action was
pending therein. (Sec. 7)
WHAT SHALL THE MOTION SHOW?
The motion shall show (a) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined
and the substance of the testimony which he expects to elicit from each; and (b) the reason for
perpetuating their testimony. (Sec. 7)
If the court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to avoid a failure or
delay of justice, it may make an order allowing is proper to avoid a failure or delay of justice, it
may make an order allowing the depositions to be taken, and thereupon the depositions may
be taken and used in the same manner and under the same conditions as are prescribed in
these rules for depositions taken in actions pending in the Regional Trial Court. (Sec. 7)
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