Exercise Bank For Chapter Four: Modal Logic
Exercise Bank For Chapter Four: Modal Logic
Exercises for The Little Logic Book may be downloaded by the instructor as Word documents
and then modified for distribution to students; or students may be instructed to download the
exercises and then told which ones to answer. This is an exercise bank; it is not assumed that
students will do all the exercises for any one chapter. Comments, questions or suggestions for
Chapter Four of The Little Logic Book can be sent to [email protected]
3.0 Symbols
Identify the symbols for
3.1 P is necessary
3.2 P is possible
(You may find it helpful to translate that into possible world terms.)
6.2 The following argument is a very well known modal fallacy. Can you explain why it is
fallacious? (Note: “No, I can’t explain it.” is not really an adequate answer.)
□(P → Q)
P
Therefore,
□Q
(Again, thinking about this argument in terms of possible worlds may be very helpful.)
6.3 Why do the concepts and principles of modal logic play such an important role in some parts
of philosophy?
6.4 On a scale of 1 – 10, exactly how weird is your philosophy instructor? Do not hand in your
answer to this question.
6.5 Thinking in terms of possible worlds, explain why the following formulas work in the reverse
direction:
6.5.1 □P → ~ ◊ ~ P
6.5.2 ◊P → ~ □ ~ P
6.5.3 ~ ◊ ~ P → □P
6.5.4 ~ □ ~ P → ◊P
6.6 Again thinking in terms of possible worlds, explain why the following formulas do not work
in the reverse direction:
(1) □P → P
(2) P → ◊P
(1a) P → □P
(2a) ◊P → P
6.7 Explain in terms of possible worlds why the following formula is true:
◊ ~P → ~ □ P
“When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains—no matter how
improbable—must be the truth.”
Despite his use of modal terms—e.g., “impossible”—it is unlikely that he meant to be making a
precise modal statement. But suppose someone did intend it that way. Explain why as a modal
statement the above would be false. (Hint: think about the category of contingent statements.)
7.0 A Stretch
Boethius was a Roman Christian philosopher of the late 5th and early 6th centuries. He wrote a
number of important books on logic, and produced a number of translations and commentaries on
Greek philosophers. But he was also a statesman. Adopted by a well-placed Roman family, he
rose to power in the western Roman world and soon become the right-hand man of the Emperor
Theodoric. But his good fortune soon turned. Theodoric, feeling threatened by the powers of the
eastern empire and his own senate, accused Boethius of treason and had him sentenced to death.
In prison, awaiting execution, Boethius wrote The Consolation of Philosophy, one of the most
influential books in western Europe during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. In this work, he
imagines he is visited by Philosophy, personified as a woman, who seeks to raise him above his
troubles by reminding him of the rule of God and the nature of his soul.
In the last book of the work, Book V, the conversation turns to God’s foreknowledge of our
actions. It seems that there is a conflict between God’s foreknowledge of all things and human
freedom. If God knows what I will do tomorrow, then I must do exactly what God knows I will
do. Otherwise God would not know it. (Remember that you can’t know what is false. You can
believe it. You can believe it very strongly. But you can’t know it. If you know something, then
it’s true.) If I must do what God knows I will do in the future, then I cannot do otherwise. Do I
really have a free choice in the matter if I cannot choose otherwise? If God knows that I will snap
at my roommate tomorrow, then I must snap at my roommate tomorrow. It seems, then, I am
fated to do so. I must do so. It is, to use a modal term, necessary that I do so.
Philosophy helps Boethius out of this problem by making a distinction between two different
kinds of necessity: simple necessity and conditional necessity. Using symbols, we can represent
the difference this way: □Q is simple necessity; □(P → Q) is conditional necessity. When we use
the concept of simple necessity we say: necessarily Q is the case. When we use the concept of
conditional necessity we say: Necessarily, if P is the case, then Q is the case. To illustrate, there is
a big difference in saying:
Necessarily, paying tuition next semester will be easy.
and
Necessarily, if you are a billionaire, then paying tuition next semester will be easy.
In our example, then, we can make a distinction between these two claims:
Philosophy claims that the necessity of my doing what God knows I will do is a conditional
necessity, not a simple necessity. How does this help her reconcile the apparent tension between
God’s foreknowledge and human freedom?