1G.R. No.

78742 July 14, 1989

2ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A.
3GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J.
4SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA,
5EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE &
6NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
7vs.
8HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

9G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

10ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D.
11TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
12vs.
13JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.

14G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

15INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
16vs.
17HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE
18SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO
19AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

20G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

21NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,

22vs.
23HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

24

25CRUZ, J.:

26In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his
27eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to
28resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on
29Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned,
30Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.

31Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.

32The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who,
33like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.

34"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is
35more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed
36among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

37Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the
38people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the
39acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly,
40there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the
41bondage of the soil." 3

42The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social
43Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in
44the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:

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45SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
46landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this
47end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
48limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just
49compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
50voluntary land-sharing.

51Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the
52Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27,
53which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
54among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.

55The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President
56Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
57valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by
58Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics
59for its implementation.

60Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its
61own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited
62debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino
63signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect
64insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4

65The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to the
66constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The different
67antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained hereunder.

68G.R. No. 79777

69Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

70The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-
71hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by
72E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

73The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal
74protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

75They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for
76violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not
77conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

78In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice and not by
79the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay  5 and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just
80compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.

81In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected
82by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners
83only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.

84The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228
85ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small
86farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

87In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases of  Chavez v. Zobel,  7 Gonzales v.
88Estrella,  8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council.  9 The determination of
89just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary
90only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no

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 91valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties because the
92lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.

93Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any
94event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of
95just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the
96constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of
97martial law.

98In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have
99been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from
100substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.

101A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that
102the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant
103on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above-
104mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.

105G.R. No. 79310

106The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters'
107Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
108E.O. No. 229.

109The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to
110Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she
111could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the
112President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on
113just compensation, due process, and equal protection.

114They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:

115Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION
116PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be
117sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the
118Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and
119accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount
120appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be
121appropriated at this time.

122Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money
123and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land
124Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's
125declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the
126Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part
127cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary
128and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC.

129The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation.
130There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have
131been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to
132equal protection has been violated.

133A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of
134at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by
135Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the Court.

136NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid
137because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial

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138appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed.
139Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.

140Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise
141of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own property.

142The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the
143government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly
144required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.

145In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
146229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to
147the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not
148indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.

149On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be
150differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the
151expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.

152The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money without the corresponding
153appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty
154billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word
155"initial" simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.

156On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In
157addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:

158(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;

159(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;

160(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and

161(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives.

162G.R. No. 79744

163The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just
164compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to
165the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.

166On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the
167recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his
168petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O.
169Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the
170private respondents.

171The petitioner now argues that:

172(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.

173(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just
174compensation.

175(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.

176The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides
177violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to
178emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.

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179The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of
180riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for
181his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:

182Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment for the land.

183is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small landowners in the program along
184with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic.

185In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the Minister of
186Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to
187Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

188The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.

189On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural
190land was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization
191payments.

192In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the
193Office of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public
194respondent's acts.

195G.R. No. 78742

196The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as
197long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants
198who are actually cultivating such lands.

199According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

200No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the
201respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing
202P.D. No. 27.

203The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian
204Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of
205mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

206In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who
207own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes
208from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations
209implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small
210Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines
211of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and
212Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply
213for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file
214the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.

215The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the
216President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of
217discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a
218separate department of the government.

219In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares
220of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in
221force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera.10 As for LOI 474, the same is
222ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.

223I

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224Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government, the judiciary is
225nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental
226law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily
227exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
228respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend
229of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by
230Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would not be breached.

231In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a
232majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc. 11 And as
233established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
234requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of
235legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the
236resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12

237With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners
238and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
239complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive
240the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

241In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
242issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court
243dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
244they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this exception in
245many other cases. 15

246The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.

247In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it
248will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will
249be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political
250considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.

251For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice
252Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution.

253It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —

254... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
255reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
256determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
257instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
258power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16

259The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so we shall.

260II

261We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several
262measures involved in these petitions.

263The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v.
264Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
265Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.

266The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took
267over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on
268July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that
269these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or
270repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution

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271of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the
272measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.

273Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has
274specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of
275the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been
276incorporated by reference in the CARP Law. 18

277That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as
278specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said
279fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of
280public funds from the treasury. 19 The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

281It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With
282particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives,
283which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The
284legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.

285The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention
286limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section
2876 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares:

288Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
289agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
290infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall
291retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
292qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided,
293That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them
294thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval
295of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

296The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title,
297deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters
298embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20

299The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect
300of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744,
301that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued
302by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.

303But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this Court
304held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have
305any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official
306Gazette dated November 29,1976.)

307Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of
308a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important
309qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not
310to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.

311Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear
312duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely
313ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For
314example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great
315detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus
316will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22

317And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available from the
318administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23

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319III

320There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both
321powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all
322municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised
323was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power
324is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or
325obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the
326taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

327In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism: "The general
328rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The
329regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on
330the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights
331thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained without
332compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:

333Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and
334is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public
335health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The
336property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents
337the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it
338may because of further changes in local or social conditions — the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy
339his property as heretofore.

340Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter
341being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long
342been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier
343case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant
344remarks:

345Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain powers on different planets. Generally speaking,
346they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that would be available for public use,"
347literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point
348reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately
349authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation
350whatever. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land use, the distance between the two powers has contracted
351considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend
352expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test
353to match that of the police power's standard of "public purpose." 27

354The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of
355the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:

356If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth
357Amendment that stands in the way.

358Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.

359For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28

360In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,  29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court sustained the respondent's
361Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office
362building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the
363police power. The problem, however, was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although
364other landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the Court nonetheless
365recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the
366regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:

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367In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the
368authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights which would have been
369exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were
370proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right
371to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30

372The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures
373under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
374accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they
375may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
376compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title
377to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is
378definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

379Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the
380due process and equal protection clauses.

381The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and
382dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention
383limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will
384come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under
385the power of expropriation.

386The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become
387academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that
388they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a
389particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
390classification have been violated.

391Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in
392these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must
393be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of
394the class. 32 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

395Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
396imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
397landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
398substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate
399on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition
400and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

401It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject
402and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the
403interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be
404achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution
405itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve
406the constitutional goal.

407One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means.
408It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution.
409Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent
410public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a,
411person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would
412deny him that right.

413That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the
414owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without
415just compensation.

416This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.

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417IV

418Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
419compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the
420purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot
421accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount
422authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on
423the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

424But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found
425in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant
426jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1)
427public use and (2) just compensation.

428Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in
429the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically,
430it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all
431agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the
432legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear
433showing that it has been abused.

434A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as the political
435question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36

436The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those questions which,
437under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
438delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
439particular measure.

440It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which now includes the authority
441of the courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
442any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments
443simply because their views may not coincide with ours.

444The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings (even as
445the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws).
446The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but
447illegal. We do not find it to be so.

448In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,38 it was held:

449Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river between the American bank and the
450international line, as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of
451navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith," that determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the
452United States under that Act, and there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .

453As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls
454for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum
455retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction
456that the State adopt the necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are
457landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.

458The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.

459Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.  39 It has been repeatedly
460stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
461"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41

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462It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the
463police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived
464them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.

465As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator
466must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal
467authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of
468the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these
469requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

470Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as
471"the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed
472in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:

473Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with
474an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
475immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the
476Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

477Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative authorities in
478violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the
479owner of the offer of the government to buy his land-

480... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP
481and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice.
482After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days
483after it is submitted for decision.

484To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or
485official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just
486compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof
487by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:

488The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It
489tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.

490Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the
491property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the
492owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of
493Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a
494judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing
495short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is
496always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade
497school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

498x x x

499In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the
500same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent
501of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.

502This time, we answer in the affirmative.

503x x x

504It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is
505repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the
506judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con
507have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.

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508A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees
509constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless
510allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation
511by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:

512Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

513The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have
514the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

515The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.

516This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:

517SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the
518landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof,
519or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.

520The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:

521(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:

522(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned — Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
523government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

524(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government
525financial instruments negotiable at any time.

526(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
527negotiable at any time.

528(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in
529accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;

530(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

531(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:

532(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from
533the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part,
534he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;

535(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount
536of their face value, for any of the following:

537(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets
538foreclosed by government financial institutions in the same province or region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;

539(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private
540corporations;

541(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or for performance bonds;

542(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise,
543preferably in a small and medium- scale industry, in the same province or region as the land for which the bonds are paid;

544(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain
545percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned
546above;

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547(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
548institutions;

549(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government hospitals; and

550(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.

551The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the
552expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support of
553this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:

554The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be
555neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always
556been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
557expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)

558In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:

559It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is
560more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of
561the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which
562the owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and
563an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)

564In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is also to the effect that just
565compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus —

566The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor
567can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the time and in the
568manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of
569payment, binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)

570Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48

571"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable time
572after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable
573advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)

574It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so,
575conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of
576the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken
577by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.

578What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

579The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the
580maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a
581small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted
582owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to
583secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program
584as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our
585thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the
586farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the
587key at least to their deliverance.

588Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation
589under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially
590appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.

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591We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the
592government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
593compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they
594were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
595the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment
596as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of
597the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of
598payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they
599presumably agreed in principle.

600The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning
601to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the
602suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to
603determine how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as
604"progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just
605compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50

606On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and
607intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure
608and the limitations of the expropriator.

609With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore- quoted
610Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced
611our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to
612the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
613frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section
614will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of
615discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree
616today.

617Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion
618of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is
619not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small
620landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less
621importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which
622are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other
623properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

624Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As already
625remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need
626for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform.
627Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.

628The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it appears that
629Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the
630earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that
631given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on
632the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.

633The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just
634compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.

635The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the
636just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:

637Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is
638entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's
639report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51

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640... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the
641owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)

642In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just
643compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it
644was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in
645the State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the
646construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter
647upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that
648the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public
649use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."

650Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes,  56 that:

651If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of
652expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from
653an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.)

654It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the
655owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him
656unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment
657of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.

658When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

659All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree
660No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)

661it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers'
662cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the
663"lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just
664compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."

665The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of
666the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
667remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

668Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be
669rejected.

670It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained
671by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners
672whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further,
673That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
674retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."

675In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the
676President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude
677immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the
678petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.

679Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any,
680under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the
681whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.

682V

683The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from those who point to the
684shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be
685continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start

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686somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected
687difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an
688experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect
689perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that
690have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.

691By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the
692true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of
693the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils
694will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once
695it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his
696small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."

697WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

6981. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the
699herein petitions.

7002. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.

7013. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.

7024. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657
703under the conditions therein prescribed.

7045. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

705SO ORDERED.

706Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
707Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

708 

709Footnotes

7101 Art. 11, Sec. 5.

7112 1973 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 6.

7123 Ibid., Art. XIV, Sec. 12.

7134 R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 15.

7145 149 SCRA 305.

7156 150 SCRA 89.

7167 55 SCRA 26.

7178 91 SCRA 294.

7189 113 SCRA 798.

71910 136 SCRA 271; 146 SCRA 446.

72011 Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2).

72112 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392.

72213 Ex Parte Levitt, 303 US 633.

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72314 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.

72415 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331; PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479; Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333.

72516 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.

72617 R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 75.

72718 Ibid., Sec. 63.

72819 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 US 410.

72920 Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172; Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208.

73021 Supra.

73122 Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456.

73223 Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359; Espanol v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314.

73324 106 Phil. 144.

73425 260 US 393.

73526 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 US 678: Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148; Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, supra.

73627 John J. Costonis "The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 91:40,1977, p. 404.

73728 348 US 1954.

73829 438 US 104.

73930 See note 27.

74031 International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 US 199.

74132 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.

74233 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.

74334 US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85; Fable v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486; Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256.

74435 Noble v. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1.

74536 100 Phil. 1101.

74637 1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.

74738 57 L ed. 1063.

74839 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286.

74940 Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467; J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413; Municipality of Daet v.
750Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89.

75141 City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208.

75242 58 SCRA 336.

75343 Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, pp. 1166- 1167.

75444 149 SCRA 305.

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75545 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286; Province of Tayabas v. Perez, supra, at note 40.

75646 31 SCRA 413.

75747 Mandl v. City of Phoenix, 18 p 2d 273.

75848 Sacramento Southern R. Co. v. Heilbron 156 Cal. 408,104 pp. 979, 980.

75949 City of Waterbury v. Platt Bros. & Co., 56 A 856, 76 Conn, 435 citing Butler v. Ravine Road Sewer Com'rs, 39 N.J.L. 665; Bloodgood v.
760Mohawk v. H.R.R. Co., N.Y. 18 Wend. 9 35, 31 Am. Dec. 313; Sanborn v. Helden, 51 Cal 266; Burlington & C.R. Co. v. Schweikart, 14 p. 329,
76110 Colo, 178; 23 Words and Phrases, pl. 460.

76250 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 647, 704; Vol. 3, pp. 16-20, 243-247.

76351 Chicago Park Dist. v. Downey Coal Co., 1 Ill. 2d 54.

76452 Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 US 599, 26 L ed 550.

76553 Ibid.

76654 4 Blkf., 508.

76755 11 NY 314.

76856 40 Phil. 550.

76957 Sec. 16(d).

770

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