Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44251 May 31, 1977
FELIX MONTEMAYOR, petitioner,
vs.
ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, JUAN SALCEDO, JR., TOMAS DAVID,
MARTIN CELINO, MARCELO AMIANA, as Members of the Panel of Investigators,
Members of the Board of Trustees, FR. ROMEO PELAYO and the HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents.
E. B. Garcia & Associates for petitioner.
Marcelo C. Amiana for private respondents.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor
Jesus V. Diaz respondent Secretary of Labor.
FERNANDO, J.:
The protection to labor mandate is more of a reality with the present Constitution expressly
providing for security, of tenure. 1 Moreover, for a university professor, aptly referred to as a
tiller in the vineyard of the mind, there is the guarantee of academic freedom. 2 Nonetheless, for
cause duly shown there may be a forced termination of his services. It is essential though that
prior to his removal, procedural due process be observed. The grievance alleged by petitioner in
this case, a university professor, was that there was a failure to comply with such a requisite.
When therefore respondent Secretary of Labor granted a clearance to the private respondent, the
Araneta University Foundation,3 for his dismissal for immorality he instituted this certiorari
proceeding. A thorough and exhaustive comment, considered as the answer, filed by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza 4 with full support from the record, negates such a contention.
There is no basis for a reversal. certiorari does not lie.
It is undisputed that petitioner Felix Montemayor was a fulltime professor of respondent Araneta
University Foundation, serving as head of its Humanities and Psychology Department,
Previously, he was on the faculty of other educational institutions. There was, on April 17, 1974,
a complaint for immorality lodged against him by the Chaplain of the Araneta University
Foundation for alleged immorality. Its then President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a committee
to investigate such charge. The first hearing, which took place on April 24, 1974, was attended
by petitioner as well as complainant with his two witnesses. One of them. Leonardo de Lara,
submitted an affidavit. Petitioner sought the postponement of the investigation to May 3, 1974. It
was granted. On that occasion, he was furnished a copy of the affidavit of the other witness,
Macario Lacanilao. The accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral advances
committed against the person of Leonardo de Lara. There was cross-examination by petitioner of
the witnesses against him. With the assistance of counsel, he filed on May 28, 1974 a motion to
dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance. He likewise filed an affidavit to sustain his defense
on June 17, 1974. The report and recommendation of the investigating committee came on July
8, 1974. It was adverse to petitioner, who was found morally responsible for the act complained
of. The recommendation was for his demotion in rank by one degree. The then President Juan
Salcedo, Jr., on August 5, 1974, adopted such recommendation and thereafter referred the same
to the Board of Trustees of private respondent for appropriate action. Subsequently, on
November 8, 1974, with new charges being filed by Professor Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime
Castaneda, and Jesus Martinez against petitioner for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member,
another committee was appointed. Then came his preventive suspension, ordered to last until the
administrative investigation was concluded. There was a motion by petitioner for the
postponement of the hearing set for November 18 and 19, 1974, but the same was denied. The
hearing proceeded in his absence. There was testimony by Professor Luis Almazan and Jaime
Castaneda. Thereafter, on December 5, 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding the
charges against petitioner to have been sufficiently established and recommending to the
President and the Board of Trustees of the Araneta University Foundation his separation from the
University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of Policies of the University.
The Committee found as established: "1. That immoral advances on several occasions have been
made by respondent [herein petitioner] on Prof. Luis Almazan 2. That immoral advances have
also been made by respondent on Jaime Castaneda, a student- employee of the university on
several occasions; 3. That said immoral advances were frustrated because both Professor
Almazan and Mr. Castaneda had refused to accept them; 4. That both witnesses and victims of
said immoral advances have declared that the behavior of respondent was detrimental [and]
prejudicial to the moral and educational standards of the Araneta University Foundation; 5. That
because of said behavior, respondent should not continue as Professor in the University; and 6.
That the acts of respondent complained of are offensive to good morals [and] inimical to the
welfare of students and greatly prejudicial to [the] interest and educational objectives of
University, hence the same are highly reprehensible." 5 His dismissal was then ordered on
December 10, 1974, effective November 15, 1974, the date of his preventive suspension. The
University, on December 12, 1974, filed with the National Labor Relations Commission a report
of his suspension and application for clearance to terminate his employment. Meanwhile, on
November 21, 1974, petitioner in turn lodged a complaint with the National Labor Relations
Commission against private respondents for reinstatement and payment of back wages and
salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and increments attendant thereto. There was a motion to
dismiss on the part of the latter. Both the labor arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission found in favor of petitioner. He was ordered reinstated to his former position with
back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges. Petitioner's complaint for unfair
labor practice was, however, dismissed. Private respondents appealed to respondent Secretary of
Labor who, on July 14, 1976, set aside the Commission's order for his reinstatement. He found
petitioner's dismissal justified, Nor was he persuaded by the plea that there was denial of due
process. He was satisfied with the procedure followed by private respondent. Moreover, he could
not have ignored the fact that the controversy between the parties was passed upon and the
parties heard on their respective contentions in the proceedings before the labor agencies.
Respondent University was, however, required to pay complainant the amount of P14,480.00
representing the latter's accrued back wages which the former voluntarily offered to extend him.
Dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision, petitioner filed this instant petition for certiorari.
1. The present Constitution, as noted, expanded the scope of the protection to labor mandate by
specifying that the State shall assure the right of workers to security of tenure. This Court, as
stressed in Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Air Lines Employees Associations 6 is called
upon to manifest realty to a constitutional command." 7Subsequently, in Almira v. B. F.
Goodrich Philippines, 8 it was the ruling of this Tribunal that even where disciplinary action
against an employee is warranted, "where a penalty less punitive [than dismissal] would suffice,
whatever missteps may be committed ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe." 9 An
instructor or member of a teaching staff of a university was held, in the leading case of Feati
University v. Bautista, 10 to be an employee. As such, he is entitled to that security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution. The explicit pronouncement in Feati University v. Bautista was
foreshadowed by Far Eastern University v. Court of Industrial Relations, 11 a 1962 decision.
While a faculty member such as petitioner may be dismissed, it must be for cause. What is more,
there must be clearance from the Secretary of Labor. So it is provided in the Labor Code.12
2. The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to security of tenure is reinforced by the
provision on academic freedom which, as noted, is found in the Constitution. While reference
therein is to institutions of higher learning, it was pointed out in Garcia v. The Faculty
Admission, Committee 13 that academic freedom "is more often Identified with the right of a
faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or
publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the
event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in
the political, economic, or academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert Maclver, it is 'a
right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings
and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or
penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or
beyond the institution.'" 14 Tenure, according to him, is of the essence of such freedom. For him,
without tenure that assures a faculty member "against dismissal or professional penalization on
grounds other than professional incompetence or conduct that in the judgment of his colleagues
renders him unfit" for membership in the faculty, the academic right becomes non-
existent, 15 Security of tenure, for another scholar, Love joy, is "the chief practical requisite for
academic freedom" of a university professor. 16 As with Maclver, he did not rule out removal but
only "for some grave cause," Identified by him as "proved incompetence or moral
delinquency." 17
3. The charge leveled against petitioner, that of making homosexual advances to certain
individuals, if proved, did amount to a sufficient cause for removal. The crucial question
therefore is whether it was shown that he was guilty of such immoral conduct. He is thus entitled
to the protection of procedural due process. To paraphrase Webster, there must be a hearing
before condemnation, with the investigation to proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be
rendered only after such inquiry. As far back as 1915, the American Association of University
Professors adopted the principle that "every university or college teacher should be entitled
before dismissal or demotion, to have the charges against him stated in writing, in specific terms
and to have a fair trial on these charges before a special or permanent judicial committee of the
faculty or by the faculty at large. At such trial the teacher accused should have full opportunity to
present evidence."18 Thus the phrase, academic due process, hagsgained currency, Joughin
referred to it as a system of procedure designed to yield the beat possible judgment when an
adverse decision against a professor may be the consequence with stress on the clear, orderly,
and fair way of reaching a conclusion. 19
4. The procedure followed in the first investigation of petitioner, conducted in June of 1974, did
satisfy the procedural due process requisite. The same cannot be said of the November, 1974
inquiry when the petitioner had to face anew a similar charge of making homosexual advances.
As admitted in the exhaustive comment of the Solicitor General: "On November 16, 1974,
Montemayor, through counsel, moved for the postponement of the hearing set for November 18
and 19, 1974 but the same was rejected by the committee. The hearing proceeded as scheduled in
the absence of Professor Montemayor and his counsel. In said hearing, Prof. Luis Almazan and
Jaime Castaneda testified. On December 5, 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding the
charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and recommending to the
President and the Board of Trustees of the Araneta University Foundation his separation from the
University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of Policies of the
University." 20 It does appear therefore that the members of such investigating committee failed
to show full awareness of the demands of procedural due process. A motion by petitioner for
postponement of the hearing, apparently the first one made, was denied. What is worse, in his
absence the matter was heard with the committee losing no time in submitting its report finding
the charges against petitioner to have been sufficiently established and recommending his
removal. If that were all, respondent Secretary of Labor cannot be sustained. certiorari would lie.
But such deficiency was remedied, as pointed out in the same comment of the Solicitor General,
by the fact "that petitioner was able to present his case before the Labor Commission ." 21 Then
he continued: "Thus, the record discloses that at a mediation conference held on December 9,
1974, the parties appeared and, after all efforts at conciliation had failed, they agreed to submit
their dispute for compulsory arbitration. Several hearings were conducted by Labor Arbiter Atty.
Daniel Lucas, Jr., wherein petitioner submitted his evidence supported by his affidavit
impugning the regularity of the proceedings before the investigating committees and assailing
the legality of his removal. The entire record of the administrative proceedings, including the
transcript of the stenographic notes taken therein, was elevated to the Labor Commission for
review. Petitioner herein, thru counsel, moved for reinstatement during the pendency of the case.
In another motion, he prayed for the consolidation and joint hearing of his complaint for unfair
labor practice against herein private respondents (NLRC Case No. R-IV-1060-74) with that of
the application for clearance filed by the University to terminate Montemayor's employment. On
the other hand, the University moved to dismiss the complaint for unfair labor practice against its
officials on the ground that they were not complainant's employers and that their participation in
the administrative case against the latter was official in nature. Respondent University also
presented the affidavit of Thomas P. G. Neill Dean of the Institute of Agricultural Business
Administration and Chairman of the Committee created to investigate the charges of immorality
against petitioner attesting to the regularity of the proceedings and the validity of the
dismissal." 22 The legal aspect as to the procedural due process having been satisfied was then
summarized by the Solicitor General thus: "All the foregoing clearly shows that petitioner was
afforded his day in court. Finally, and more significant, is the fact that petitioner claims denial of
due process in the proceeding had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings
before the NLRC wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest opportunity to present
his case." 23
5. The comment of the Solicitor General was submitted on January 4, 1977. The memorandum
for petitioner was submitted on April 25. What immediately calls attention is that no attempt was
made to refute specifically such recital of the Solicitor General, of decisive significance as far as
the due process issue is concerned. Instead, the emphasis was on the alleged commission of an
unfair labor practice by private respondent. Inasmuch as the Arbiter as well as the National
Labor Relations Commission absolved private respondent from the charge of unfair labor
practice, it would appear that the emphasis of counsel for petitioner was misplaced. Accordingly,
there is nothing in the record that would militate against the contention of the Solicitor General
that there was an observance of procedural due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed No. costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J, is on leave.