FRANCISCO A. PERFECTO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. FELICIANO S.

GONZALES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of

Catanduanes, and JULIANA C. VISTA and VICENTE VISTA, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-35157 April 17, 1984 RELOVA, J.
FACTS:
Private respondent Juliana C. Vista, a public school teacher of San Andres, Catanduanes was appointed POU clerk by
the Commission on Elections in Precinct No. 25 of San Andres in the general elections of November 9, 1965. Petitioner
Francisco A. Perfecto, a retired public service commissioner, was a candidate for congressman of the lone district of
Catanduanes. He lost in that election. In August 1967, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections an administrative
complaint against the members of the board of election inspectors of Precinct No. 25 of San Andres including herein private
respondent Juliana C. Vista, poll clerk of said precinct. The complaint charged that the said members of the board of election
inspectors were guilty of nonfeasance, malfeasance and misfeasance for wilfull failure to comply with the instructions, orders,
decisions and rulings of the Commission in connection with the performance of their duties relative to the conduct of the
elections of 1965.
As a consequence, private respondent Juliana Vista, assisted by her husband Vicente Vista, filed an action for damages
alleging that the above charges were false and without basis and had been instituted maliciously in order to harass, annoy
demean degrade and expose her to public ridicule and because of which she suffered "mental torture, anguish, sleepless
nights, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, mental shock and social humiliation which may be assessed as moral
damages in the amount of P20,000.00." Further, she "claims the further sum of P15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P10,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses in the prosecution of the suit.
Answering the complaint for damages, herein petitioner Francisco A. Perfecto avers that the filing of the
administrative complaint against private respondent Vista and the members of the board of election inspectors of Precinct No.
25 was done in good faith with the highest motive of bringing to justice persons who have violated the laws of the land.
Evidence shows that private respondent Vista was the poll clerk of Precinct No. 25 of San Andres during the elections
of 1965. However, it had been shown successfully that she did not act as poll clerk on election day, November 9, 1965 because
she was ill and had been running with fever for several days prior to the election. In fact, she was substituted by Nazaria B.
Reyes, another public school teacher as poll clerk on that day.
The lower court found that in the minutes of voting and the election return, it appears that Mrs. Nazaria B. Reyes, the
substitute poll clerk, acted as poll clerk on election day in place of the regular POU clerk, the plaintiff, who was absent and did
not report for duty. However, the lower court "failed to find sufficient proof to sustain the charge that in filing the
administrative complaint with the Commission on Elections the defendant was acting with malice and for the sole purpose of
degrading or besmirching the reputation of the plaintiff and exposing her to public ridicule. Notwithstanding, the lower court
rendered judgment ordering herein petitioner to indemnify private respondent the sum of P12,000.00 as compensatory
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the P12,000 compensatory damages awarded by the lower court?
RULING:
NO.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business, trade, property,
profession, job, or occupation, and the same must be proved; otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and non-substantial, no damages
win be given.
In the case of Malonzo vs. Galang,, the Court, speaking through Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that with respect to
compensatory damages assuming that they are recoverable under the theory that petitioner had filed a clearly unfounded suit
against respondent, the same constitutes a tort against the latter that makes the former liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omissions complained of. These damages, cannot, however, be Presumed and
must be duly proved (Article 2199, New Civil Code). Well settled is the rule that even if the complaint filed by one against the
other is clearly unfounded this does not necessarily mean, in the absence of specific facts proving damages, that defendant
really suffered actual damage over and above attorney fees and costs' The Court cannot rely on its suggestions as to the fact
and amount of damages. It must depend on actual proof of the damages alleged to have been suffered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the order of respondent judge condemning petitioner Francisco A.
Perfecto to pay compensatory damages of P2,000.00 is hereby SET ASIDE.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FEDERICO ABRAZALDO @ "PEDING," accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 124392             February 7, 2003 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
FACTS:
On July 15, 1995, accused-appellant, then intoxicated, attempted to hack his uncle, Bernabe Quinto, but instead, hit the
post of the latter’s house. The incident was reported to the barangay authorities, prompting Delfin Guban, Rosendo Fajardo,
Sr., Alejandro Loceste (all are members of the barangay tanod), and Cesar Manaois to rush to the scene. Upon reaching the
place, Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at his uncle, "I will kill you!" Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant coming out
of Quinto’s house with blood oozing from his forehead. At that time, the place was well lighted by a flourescent lamp. Guban
tried to assist accused-appellant. However, for unknown reason, accused-apellant and Guban shouted at each other and
grappled "face to face." Accused-appellant pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban at the abdomen and ran away. When Fajardo got
hold of Guban, the latter said, "I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo."   Fajardo, together with the other barangay tanod, rushed
Guban to the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital where he was operated by Dr. Alberto Gonzales, a Medical Officer III. But
after a few hours, Guban died. Dr. Gonzales issued a Medico-Legal Certificate stating that the cause of death was "stab wound,
epigastrium, massive hemothorax right."
Gregorio Guban, the victim’s father, testified that he was the one who spent for his son’s funeral expenses. For the
burial, he spent ₱10,000.00;  for the 10-day funeral wake, ₱10,000.00;  for the 9th day novena, ₱3,000.00; and for the
hospitalization, ₱4,000.00, or a total of ₱27,000.00.
  Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant presented a different version. On July 15, 1995 at about 10:00 in the evening,
he was making fans inside his house at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. His wife Lydia and children Mary Jane, Melvin
and Christelle were with him. Suddenly, Delfin Guban, who was then drunk, went to his house and shouted at him, saying, "Get
out Feding I will kill you!"  When accused-appellant went out, Guban hit him with an iron pipe. Accused-appellant ran towards
his house and got his two children. Guban, now armed with a knife, followed him and they grappled for its possession. In the
course thereof, both fell down. It was then that the knife held by Guban accidentally hit him. Accused-appellant did not know
which part of Guban’s body was hit. Thereafter, he got the knife in order to surrender it to the police.
Marites Abrazaldo testified that accused-appellant is his brother. On July 15, 1992, at about 6:00 in the evening,
accused-appellant, Guban and Juan Quinto were engaged in a "drinking spree. At about 10:00 o’clock in that evening, accused-
appellant caused trouble at the house of his uncle, Bernabe Quinto. He attempted to hack his uncle, but instead hit the post of
the latter’s house.  While running away from his uncle’s place, he bumped an artesian well, causing a wound on his forehead.
Afterwards, accused-appellant killed Guban.
On November 15, 1995, the trial court rendered a Decision, finding accused Federico Abrazaldo Peding guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Accused Federico Abrazaldo is ordered to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 to the
heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban. Accused is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban the total sum of
₱27,000.00 as actual expenses, plus costs. In appreciating treachery and the aggravating circumstances under paragraphs (5)
and (6) of Article 14,25 Revised Penal Code, the trial court held: "We now come to the issue of whether or not evident
premeditation was present. The prosecution’s evidence is wanting on this point. However, there is no question that there
was treachery as the accused embraced Delfin Guban and suddenly stabbed him with a knife. The victim was not in a
position to defend himself at the time of the attack. The deceased was stabbed without any warning. He was given no
chance to defend himself. Treachery, therefore, qualifies the killing of the victim and raises it to the category of
murder.
"The prosecution has established thru the testimony of Gregorio Guban that at the time of the incident on July 15,
1995, the members of the barangay tanod, namely: Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Delfin Guban and Alfredo Laceste were performing
their duties as members of the barangay tanod. This is an aggravating circumstance under paragraph 5, Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code. The members of the barangay tanod who are public authorities were engaged in the discharge of
their duties at the time of the stabbing incident. Besides, the incident was committed during nighttime, that was 10:00 in
the evening. Accused took advantage of the darkness of the night for the successful consummation of his plan to kill Delfin
Guban."
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not accused Abrazaldo acted in self-defense?
2. Whether or not there was treachery in the killing of Delfin Guban?
3. Whether or not there was an aggravating circumstance of nighttime?
4. Whether or not the trial court correctly awarded the damages? (TORTS & DAMAGES ISSUE)
RULING:
1. NO. Consistent is the jurisprudence that where self-defense is invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on
his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel an aggression. On appeal, the burden becomes
 even more difficult as the accused must show that the court below committed reversible error in appreciating the
evidence.
Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge the burden. To show that he was not the unlawful aggressor, he
testified that it was Guban who went to his house, threatened to kill him, 27 hit him with an iron pipe, 28 and attacked him with a
knife. It is uncorroborated and even opposed by Marites, accused-appellant’s own sister and lone witness. Contrary to his
testimony that Guban hit him on his forehead with a pipe, Marites declared that accused-appellant sustained the wound on his
forehead when he accidentally bumped an artesian well. Instead of fortifying her brother’s defense, she virtually affirmed the
prosecution’s story by testifying that he created trouble in their compound, attempted to kill his uncle Bernabe Quinto and
killed Guban.
Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is
not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but in itself is extremely doubtful. In the present case, accused-
appellant’s tendency to invoke a melange of defenses renders his testimony dubious. While he admitted the commission of the
crime in order to preserve his own life, he maintained that Guban accidentally stabbed himself. This shows ambivalence.
Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes voluntariness, induced only by
necessity. Indeed, if there is truth to either of his claim, his natural course of action was to assist the victim, or at the very least,
report the incident to the authorities. Certainly, the justifying circumstance of self-defense  or the exempting circumstance of
accident cannot be appreciated considering accused-appellant’s flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the
authorities of the incident. Furthermore, that he did not surrender the knife to the authorities is inconsistent with a clean
conscience and, instead, indicates his culpability of the crime charged.

2. NO. We find that the trial court erred in concluding that treachery attended the commission of the crime. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
defense which the offended party might make. Treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. Fajardo testified that accused-appellant and Guban were
"grappling with each other" and that prior to the stabbing, they were shouting at each other. In this scenario, it cannot
be said that Guban was unprepared to put up a defense, such as hitting accused-appellant, or that the latter’s assault
was sudden.

3. NO. The trial court likewise erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity or nighttime. For
nocturnity to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the commission of the crime and that it was
purposely sought for by the offender. By and itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. 41 In the instant case,
no sufficient evidence was offered to prove that accused-appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness to
accomplish his criminal design. In fact, Fajardo testified that there was a fluorescent lamp sufficiently illuminating the
scene of the crime. Neither can we sustain the trial court’s finding that the aggravating circumstance under paragraph
(5) of Article 14, Revised Penal Code, i.e., that the crime was committed in a place where public authorities were
engaged in the discharge of their duties, is present. It must be pointed out that this aggravating circumstance is based
on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the place of the commission of the crime, which must be
respected.43 In this case, the crime was committed at the compound of the accused-appellant where no public function
was being held. The arrival of the barangay authorities was precisely due to the trouble that had commenced prior to
the stabbing incident. Clearly, the said aggravating circumstance cannot be considered. Moreover, under the present
Rules,  aggravating circumstances must be alleged, otherwise, they cannot be appreciated. Being favorable to the
accused, this new procedure may be given retroactive effect. Except treachery, the other aggravating circumstances
mentioned have not been alleged in the Information. Accused-appellant can only be held liable for homicide defined
and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

4. On the trial court’s award of actual damages in the amount of ₱27,000.00, we find the same to be unsubstantiated. To
be entitled to such damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party.  In the case at bar, the
prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the claim for expenses incurred. Gregorio Guban, the father of the
victim, who shouldered the expenses for the wake and burial failed to submit receipts to show the amount of such
expenses. However, as the heirs of Guban did actually incur funeral expenses, we are justified in awarding ₱25,000.00,
not for purposes of indemnification, but by way of temperate damages.
Thus, we now hold that where the amount of the actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts
to prove the same, but it is shown that the heirs are entitled thereto, temperate damages may be awarded. Such temperate
damages, taking into account the current jurisprudence fixing the indemnity for death at ₱ 50,000.00, should be one-half
thereof, or ₱25,000.00. This makes temperate damages equal to the award of exemplary damages, which is likewise fixed at
₱25,000.00 in cases where its award is justified

PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, ARQUE MAMING and JORBIN TOLENTINO, petitioners,

vs.
JOAQUIN TONDA, respondent.
G.R. No. 138478             November 26, 2002 CORONA, J.
FACTS:
On January 11, 1991, plaintiff [Respondent], Joaquin Tonda, purchased from defendant Pacific Airways Corporation
through its travel agent Valderama Travel and Tours, Inc. a package tour for a party of nine consisting of round trip airfares to,
transfers to and from defendant corporation’s airstrip at Caticlan, Malay, Aklan and accommodation and breakfast at Boracay,
Malay, Aklan. Two receipts were issued which the travel agency advised would entitle the members of the tour package to
avail of the above stated services/accommodation. On January 18, 1991, with the receipts, plaintiff, his wife, 3 kids, a nanny,
two brothers-in-law, and a sister-in-law flew to Boracay via defendant-corporation’s aircraft. Plaintiff and party stayed in
Boracay up to January 21, 1991. In the morning of January 21, 1991, plaintiff and party, along with other guests, left Boracay
on board bancas provided by defendant corporation and on reaching a certain point, they alighted and boarded tricycles that
look them to defendant corporation’s airstrip at nearby Caticlan. They arrived at the airstrip at around 9:30 a.m. during which
the incident that gave rise to the present complaint took place.
After plaintiff and his party arrived at the airstrip and while their luggages were being unloaded from the tricycles,
passengers informed them that they should weigh themselves. Heeding the advice, plaintiff’s wife Mrs. Tina Marie Tonda
repaired to a nipa structure-office where the weighing scale was located. While she was weighing herself, defendant
corporation’s employee, Archimedes ‘Arque’, naming one of the defendants herein, shouted at Mrs. Tonda, telling her
something which was not clearly heard by plaintiff as he was unloading luggages from the tricycles. Plaintiff later asked his
wife what transpired inside the hut and she related that Maming shouted at her to hurry up as there were many passengers
who would also take their weight, and that she replied by saying ‘please, when you talk to me, talk to me in a nicer manner.’
Plaintiff and the other members of his party also went inside the hut to get their weight. Later, as plaintiff and his party were
about to board the 19-seater aircraft that would carry 16 passengers, defendant Maming approached Mrs. Tonda and asked for
their tickers. Mrs. Tonda obliged by giving him the receipts issued by the travel agency, but defendant Maming shouted at her,
telling her that those were not tickets. Mrs. Tonda answered back, saying that those were the receipts that served as their
tickets when they left Manila. Plaintiff then butted in and told Maming ‘You don’t have to talk to my wife like that.’ Maming,
who seemed to be very nervous, pushed plaintiff, telling him ‘You don’t have bulls (sic), do you?’, prompting plaintiff to push
back Maming. Suddenly, Jorvin Tolentino, defendant corporation’s employee and also one of the defendants herein, who was
behind plaintiff, appeared at plaintiff’s right side and punched him at the right eye causing it to bleed. Maming who was in
front of plaintiff then slashed plaintiff’s left shoulder with a sharp pointed instrument which could have been a ballpen causing
it to bleed and leave a scar measuring 4 inches by 12 centimeters and plaintiff to fall down. The other passengers who then
intervened took Maming and Tolentino away. Plaintiff immediately aired a verbal complaint at defendant corporation’s office,
which, however, gave him no medical treatment. On arrival in Manila, plaintiff related the incident to, and sought medical
treatment at defendant corporation’s office but he was not extended any although he was advised to file a formal complaint so
it could be investigated. Plaintiff thus sought medical attendance at the Ayala Alabang Village Association Clinic.
On 23 December 1993, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Tonda and awarded him actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees to wit: 1. P1,000.00 as and for actual damages; 2. P100,000.00 as and for
moral damages; 3. P50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; 4. P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S APPEAL
AND DENYING THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
RULING:
The petition is unmeritorious.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that our jurisdiction in a petition for review on  certiorari under Rule 45 is
limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the findings of fact complained of are devoid of support by the
evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. The trial court, having heard the
witnesses and observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is in a better position to decide the question of their
credibility. Hence, the findings of the trial court must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court.  
 In the case at bar, there is no reason to deviate from this rule inasmuch as the findings of fact by the courts  a quo are
supported by the evidence and records of the case. The errors imputed by the petitioners require an inquiry into the
appreciation of evidence by the trial court which this Court cannot do on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Besides, this Court has already ruled that the finding of negligence is a question of fact  which it cannot look
into anew, without any showing that the case falls under the exceptions to the well-established rule that this Court is not a
trier of facts.
Hence, we affirm the decision of the courts a quo that petitioner PACO is liable for the negligence of its employees, co-
petitioners Maming and Tolentino, pursuant to Article 2180, in connection to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In fact, the finding
of mere negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees is too kind to accurately describe what really happened on January
21, 1999 to respondent and his family. The treatment accorded respondent and his wife by petitioner PACO’s employees was
characterized by a certain viciousness and meanness which the businessman did not deserve. This kind of bad conduct, not to
mention petitioner PACO’s utter lack of interest in or concern for what happened, respondent’s medical condition and
extrajudicial demand for reimbursement and damages, reflects the terrible kind of service philosophy or orientation
subscribed to by petitioners. Any liability arising from such substandard service orientation must therefore be borne by them.
Respondent proved that he incurred actual damages of P1,000 for the treatment of the wounds inflicted by petitioners
Maming and Tolentino. The fact that he suffered injuries which required him to seek medical attention at the Ayala Alabang
Village Clinic and at the Makati Medical Center remains uncontroverted 16 and is thus deemed admitted. He is also entitled to
moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 (2) 17 of the Civil Code inasmuch as the petitioner’s tortious acts certainly caused
physical injuries and undue embarrassment. Exemplary damages are also recoverable as it is imposed by way of example or
correcting for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, and for acting in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive and malevolent manner. 18 Petitioner Maming’s acts of uttering vulgar words, and
pushing and scratching respondent with a ballpen, and petitioner Tolentino’s act of punching respondent (a paying customer)
in the eye and injuring it, were shameless and reprehensible and therefore "wanton, reckless and oppressive acts" which
justify the award of such damages. Respondent is also entitled to attorney’s fees as he was forced to litigate to protect his
rights19 when his extrajudicial demand for damages from petitioner PACO was ignored.
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the award by the courts a quo of P100,000 as moral damages, in the light of the
injuries, humiliation and harrowing experience of respondent. No customer, especially a businessman like respondent,
deserves to be screamed at, pushed and slashed with a ballpen by the company’s employees, especially those of service-
oriented companies like petitioner PACO which offers its services precisely to ensure a hassle-free vacation for its customers.
Because of the particular obnoxiousness of petitioners’ behavior, exemplary damages are increased to P100,000.
 ROMEL P. ALMEDA, in substitution of the late PONCIANO L. ALMEDA and/or ALMEDA, INC., petitioners,
vs.
LEONOR A. CARIÑO, the surviving spouse, and his children, namely: ROSARIO C. SANTOS, REMEDIOS C. GALSIM,
RAMON A. CARIÑO, REGINALDO A. CARIÑO, RANIEELA C. DIONELA and RACHELLE C. SAMANIEGO, in substitution of the
late AVELINO G. CARIÑO, respondents.
G.R. No. 152143            January 13, 2003 MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
On April 30, 1980, Ponciano L. Almeda and Avelino G. Cariñ o, predecessors-in-interest of petitioners and respondents,
entered into two agreements to sell, one covering eight titled properties and another three untitled properties, all of which are
located in Biñ an, Laguna. The agreed price of the eight titled properties was P1,743,800.00, 20% of which was to be paid upon
the signing and execution of the agreement and the balance to be paid in four equal semi-annual installments, beginning six
months from the signing thereof, with the balance earning 12% interest per annum. On the other hand, the purchase price of
the three untitled properties was P1,208,580.00, 15% of which was to be paid upon the signing and execution of the
agreement, and the balance, bearing a 12% annual interest from the signing thereof, to be paid as follows: 15% of the purchase
price plus interest to be paid upon the issuance of titles to the lots, and the balance plus interests to be paid in semi-annual
installments starting from the date of issuance of the respective certificates of title to the lots involved, which must be not later
than March 30, 1982.
On April 3, 1982, Cariñ o and Almeda executed an amendment to their agreements to sell (a) extending the deadline
for the production of the titles to the untitled properties from March 31, 1982 to June 30, 1982, (b) providing for a partial
payment of P300,000.00 for the titled properties, (c) requiring Cariñ o to render an accounting of the proceeds of the sugar
cane crop on the properties subject of the sale up to the 1982 harvest season and (d) obliging the vendor (Cariñ o) to pay the
vendee (Almeda) the sum of P10,000.00 a month in case of the failure of the former to produce the certificates of title to the
untitled properties by June 30, 1982.
Before the end of April 1982, Almeda asked Cariñ o for the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale over the eight titled
properties although they had not been fully paid. Cariñ o granted the request and executed on May 3, 1982 the deed of sale
over the eight titled lots in favor of Almeda, Inc. On April 30, 1982, Almeda executed an undertaking 7 to pay Cariñ o the balance
of the purchase price. Deeds of sale for two of the three untitled lots were also executed on July 2, 1982 and October 9, 1982. 8
Subsequently, Cariñ o made demands for the full and final payment of the balance due him in the amount of
P477,589.47 and the interests thereon. Despite demand letters sent to Almeda on March 9, 1983 and on July 20, 1983,
however, the balance was not paid. Hence, Cariñ o filed before the RTC of Biñ an a complaint against Almeda and Almeda, Inc.,
in whose name the titles to the properties had been transferred. Cariñ o prayed that Almeda and/or Almeda, Inc. be ordered to
pay to him the balance of P477,589.47, the legal interests thereon from demand until full payment, 15% of all the amounts
due, including interests as attorney’s fees, P10,000.00 as litigation expenses, P100,000.00 as moral, exemplary and nominal
damages and the costs of suit.
Almeda and Almeda, Inc. contended that the purchase price, including interest charges, of the eight titled properties
had been fully paid as of April 3, 1982. With respect to the three untitled lots, they contended that the purchase price of Lot
Nos. 2272 and 2268-B had likewise been fully paid, while that of Lot No. 3109 had only a remaining balance of P167,522.70.
The RTC of Biñ an, Laguna found the claim of Cariñ o to be well founded and gave judgment in his favor . Without questioning
the amount of judgment debt for which they were held liable, Ponciano Almeda and Almeda, Inc. appealed to the Court of
Appeals for a modification of judgment, contending that the lower court erred in awarding nominal damages and attorney’s
fees in favor of Cariñ o and imposing a 12% annual interest on the judgment debt from the time of demand on March 9, 1983
until it was fully paid.
During the pendency of the case, Almeda died. He was substituted by his heirs, namely, his wife Eufemia P. Almeda
and their children, Elenita A. Cervantes, Susan A. Alcazar, Florecita A. Datoc, Laurence P. Almeda, Edwin P. Almeda, Marlon P.
Almeda, Wenilda A. Diaz, Carolyn A. Santos, Alan P. Almeda and Romel P. Almeda, the last having been designated to act as
their representative.9
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that the award of nominal damages was justified
by the unjust refusal of Almeda and Almeda, Inc. to settle and pay the balance of the purchase price in violation of the rights of
Cariñ o. The award of attorney’s fees was also affirmed, it being shown that Cariñ o was forced to litigate to protect his interests.
Finally, the appeals court also affirmed the 12% interest rate per annum, as agreed upon by the parties in their contracts,
following Art. 2209 of the Civil Code. The appeals court also ruled that the amount of the unpaid purchase price, P477,589.47,
should be awarded to Cariñ o, considering the failure of Almeda and/or Almeda, Inc. to respond to the two demand letters and
the computation sheet sent to them by Cariñ o, as well as their failure to rebut the correctness of the outstanding balance
before the lower court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING NOMINAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P150,000.00.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P15,000.00 IN FAVOR
OF THE RESPONDENT.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY THE
AMOUNT OF P477,589.47 WITH A 12% RATE OF INTEREST PER ANNUM FROM THE DATE OF DEMAND ON
MARCH 9, 1983 UNTIL FULLY PAID
RULING:
In this appeal, petitioners do not dispute the amount of the outstanding balance on the purchase price of the lots.
Petitioners only seek a modification of the decision of the appeals court insofar as it upheld the trial court’s award of nominal
damages, attorney’s fees, and 12% interest. We find their appeal to be without merit and, accordingly, affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
First. Petitioners contend that the trial court erred in awarding nominal damages in favor of respondents since there
was no showing that they acted in an unfair, reckless or malevolent manner so as to justify such an award.
Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the
purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.  Its award is
thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right.  Indeed, nominal
damages are damages in name only and not in fact. When granted by the courts, they are not treated as an equivalent of a
wrong inflicted but simply a recognition of the existence of a technical injury. A violation of the plaintiff’s right, even if only
technical, is sufficient to support an award of nominal damages. Conversely, so long as there is a showing of a violation of
the right of the plaintiff, an award of nominal damages is proper.
Applying such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact that petitioners have an unpaid balance on the
purchase price of lots sold to them by respondents. Their refusal to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price despite
repeated demands, even after they had sold the properties to third parties, undoubtedly constitutes a violation of respondents’
right to the said amount under their agreements. The facts show that the right of the vendor to receive the unpaid balance to
the lots sold was violated by petitioners, and this entitles respondents at the very least to nominal damages.
Second. Petitioners claim that the imposition of a 12% annual interest rate is erroneous because it is contrary to law
and jurisprudence. According to them, the applicable rate is 6% since the case does not involve a loan or forbearance of
money.
This contention is without merit. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code provides:
If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which
is six per cent per annum.
The contracts to sell of the parties stipulated that the balance of the purchase price shall earn an interest rate of 12%
per annum upon signing of the contract. Such stipulations have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with by them in good faith. The interest in this case should be allowed to run from March 9, 1993, respondents’
extrajudicial demand for payment of the remaining balance plus interest having begun on said date.
In addition, in accordance with our decision in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, when the judgment of
the court awarding the sum of money becomes final and executory, a 12% legal interest per annum shall also be imposed from
such finality until satisfaction thereof, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Third. Nor is there any basis for petitioners’ claim that the appellate court erred in awarding attorney’s fees in favor of
respondents. Under the Civil Code, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses can be recovered in cases where the court deems it
just and equitable.18 We see no reason therefore to set aside the order of the trial court, as affirmed by the appeals court,
granting to respondents attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000.00.
Fourth. We observe that this case has dragged on for more than a decade. While the records reveal that respondents
engaged the services of two lawyers, petitioners had a total of sixteen counsels starting from January 24, 1984 up to December
22, 1997. Of the sixteen, one lawyer served for more than 2 years, another for 8 days only, and still another entered his
appearance and withdrew it only to re-enter his appearance after some time. The records show that most of the lawyers who
entered their appearances either filed only motions to cancel hearings or motions for postponements, claiming to have
misplaced the calendar of court hearings or to be staying abroad. These unduly delayed the disposition of the case in violation
of the right of respondents to claim what is rightfully due them. This fact further justifies the award of nominal damages and
supports the grant of attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Interest at
the rate of twelve percent (12%) shall be imposed on the amount due upon finality of this decision until payment thereof.

JOSE MENCHAVEZ, JUAN MENCHAVEZ JR., SIMEON MENCHAVEZ, RODOLFO MENCHAVEZ, CESAR MENCHAVEZ,
REYNALDO, MENCHAVEZ, ALMA MENCHAVEZ, ELMA MENCHAVEZ, CHARITO M. MAGA, FE M. POTOT, THELMA M.
REROMA, MYRNA M. YBAÑEZ, and SARAH M. VILLABER, petitioners,
vs.
FLORENTINO TEVES JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 153201             January 26, 2005 PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
On February 28, 1986, a "Contract of Lease" over a fishpond located at Cebu City with an area of 10 hectares was
executed by Jose S. Menchavez, Juan S. Menchavez Sr., Juan S. Menchavez Jr., Rodolfo Menchavez, Simeon Menchavez, Reynaldo
Menchavez, Cesar Menchavez, Charito M. Maga, Fe M. Potot, Thelma R. Reroma, Myrna Ybañ ez, Sonia S. Menchavez, Sarah
Villaver, Alma S. Menchavez, and Elma S. Menchavez, as lessors; and Florentino Teves Jr. as lessee. The pertinent portions of
the Contract are herein reproduced as follows:
On June 2, 1988, Cebu RTC Sheriffs Gumersindo Gimenez and Arturo Cabigon demolished the fishpond dikes
constructed by respondent and delivered possession of the subject property to other parties. As a result, he filed a Complaint
for damages with application for preliminary attachment against petitioners. In his Complaint, he alleged that the lessors had
violated their Contract of Lease, specifically the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property for the entire duration of the
Contract. He claimed ₱157,184.40 as consequential damages for the demolition of the fishpond dikes, ₱395,390.00 as
unearned income, and an amount not less than ₱100,000.00 for rentals paid.
Respondent further asserted that the lessors had withheld from him the findings of the trial court in Civil Case No.
510-T, entitled "Eufracia Colongan and Paulino Pamplona v. Juan Menchavez Sr. and Sevillana S. Menchavez." In that case
involving the same property, subject of the lease, the Menchavez spouses were ordered to remove the dikes illegally
constructed and to pay damages and attorney’s fees.
Petitioners filed a Third Party Complaint against Benny and Elizabeth Allego, Albino Laput, Adrinico Che and
Charlemagne Arendain Jr., as agents of Eufracia Colongan and Paulino Pamplona. The third-party defendants maintained that
the Complaint filed against them was unfounded. As agents of their elderly parents, they could not be sued in their personal
capacity. Thus, they asserted their own counterclaims.
The trial court ruled that under the Regalian Doctrine, the lease contract between Florentino Teves, Jr. and Juan
Menchavez Sr. and his family is a patent nullity. Being a patent nullity, [petitioners] could not give any rights to Florentino
Teves, Jr. under the principle: ‘NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET’ - meaning ONE CANNOT GIVE WHAT HE DOES NOT HAVE,
considering that this property in litigation belongs to the State and not to [petitioners]. Therefore, the first issue is resolved in
the negative, as the court declares the contract of lease as invalid and void ab-initio. "On the issue of whether [respondent] and
[petitioners] are guilty of mutual fraud, the court rules that the [respondent] and [petitioners] are in pari-delicto. As a
consequence of this, the court must leave them where they are found. On the third issue of whether the third party defendants
are liable for demolishing the dikes pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the lower court[, t]his must be resolved in the
negative, that the third party defendants are not liable. First, because the third party defendants are mere agents of Eufracia
Colongan and Eufenio Pamplona, who are the ones who should be made liable if at all, and considering that the demolition was
pursuant to an order of the court to restore the prevailing party in that Civil Case 510-T, entitled: Eufracia Colongan v.
Menchavez.
The CA disagreed with the RTC’s finding that petitioners and respondent were in pari delicto. It contended that while
there was negligence on the part of respondent for failing to verify the ownership of the subject property, there was no
evidence that he had knowledge of petitioners’ lack of ownership. The CA ruled that respondent could recover actual damages
in the amount of ₱128,074.40. Citing Article 1356 of the Civil Code, it further awarded liquidated damages in the amount of
₱50,000, notwithstanding the nullity of the Contract.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the parties are in pari delicto?
2. Whether or not the award of liquidated damages is proper?
RULING:
The Petition has merit
In Pari Delicto Rule on Void Contracts
The parties do not dispute the finding of the trial and the appellate courts that the Contract of Lease was void.  Indeed,
the RTC correctly held that it was the State, not petitioners, that owned the fishpond. The 1987 Constitution specifically
declares that all lands of the public domain, waters, fisheries and other natural resources belong to the State. Included here are
fishponds, which may not be alienated but only leased. Possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership.
Being merely applicants for the lease of the fishponds, petitioners had no transferable right over them. And even if the
State were to grant their application, the law expressly disallowed sublease of the fishponds to respondent. Void are all
contracts in which the cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, public order or public policy.
Parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the law; the courts leave them as they are, because they are
deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault." To this rule, however, there are exceptions that permit the return of that which may
have been given under a void contract. One of the exceptions is found in Article 1412 of the Civil Code, which states:
"Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules
shall be observed:
"(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the
contract, or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking;
"(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract,
or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what
he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise."
On this premise, respondent contends that he can recover from petitioners, because he is an innocent party to the Contract of
Lease. Petitioners allegedly induced him to enter into it through serious misrepresentation.
Finding of In Pari Delicto:
A Question of Fact
The evidence of respondent himself shows that he negotiated the lease of the fishpond with both Juan Menchavez Sr.
and Juan Menchavez Jr. in the office of his lawyer, Atty. Jorge Esparagoza. His counsel’s presence during the negotiations, prior
to the parties’ meeting of minds, further debunks his claim of lack of knowledge. Lawyers are expected to know that fishponds
belong to the State and are inalienable. It was reasonably expected of the counsel herein to advise his client regarding the
matter of ownership.
Indeed, the evidence presented by respondent demonstrates the contradictory claims of petitioners regarding their
alleged ownership of the fishpond. On the one hand, they claimed ownership and, on the other, they assured him that their
fishpond lease application would be approved. This circumstance should have been sufficient to place him on notice. It should
have compelled him to determine their right over the fishpond, including their right to lease it.
The Contract itself stated that the area was still covered by a fishpond application. Nonetheless, although petitioners
declared in the Contract that they co-owned the property, their erroneous declaration should not be used against them. A
cursory examination of the Contract suggests that it was drafted to favor the lessee. It can readily be presumed that it was he
or his counsel who prepared it -- a matter supported by petitioners’ evidence. The ambiguity should therefore be resolved
against him, being the one who primarily caused it.
The CA erred in finding that petitioners had failed to prove actual knowledge of respondent of the ownership status of
the property that had been leased to him. On the contrary, as the party alleging the fact, it was he who had the burden of
proving – through a preponderance of evidence -- that they misled him regarding the ownership of the fishpond. His evidence
fails to support this contention. Instead, it reveals his fault in entering into a void Contract. As both parties are equally at fault,
neither may recover against the other.
Liquidated Damages Not Proper
The CA erred in awarding liquidated damages, notwithstanding its finding that the Contract of Lease was void. Even if
it was assumed that respondent was entitled to reimbursement as provided under paragraph 1 of Article 1412 of the Civil
Code, the award of liquidated damages was contrary to established legal principles.
Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of a breach thereof.
Liquidated damages are identical to penalty insofar as legal results are concerned. Intended to ensure the performance of the
principal obligation, such damages are accessory and subsidiary obligations. In the present case, it was stipulated that the
party responsible for the violation of the terms, conditions and warranties of the Contract would pay not less than ₱50,000 as
liquidated damages. Since the principal obligation was void, there was no contract that could have been breached by
petitioners; thus, the stipulation on liquidated damages was inexistent. The nullity of the principal obligation carried with it
the nullity of the accessory obligation of liquidated damages.
As explained earlier, the applicable law in the present factual milieu is Article 1412 of the Civil Code. This law merely
allows innocent parties to recover what they have given without any obligation to comply with their prestation. No damages
may be recovered on the basis of a void contract; being nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie between the
parties involved. Since there is no contract, the injured party may only recover through other sources of obligations such as a
law or a quasi-contract. A party recovering through these other sources of obligations may not claim liquidated damages,
which is an obligation arising from a contract.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution SET ASIDE. The Decision of the trial court is
hereby REINSTATED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. EDDIE LACHICA (at-large), ARIEL ROLLON, and ERROL ROLLON, Accused.
G.R. No. 131915 September 3, 2003. CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
In the evening of September 24, 1995, some residents of Sitio Sapang Palay, Barangay Pili, San Fernando, Romblon,
attended the wake of Palmeta Rollon. Among those paying their last respects were Ariel Rollon, Edgar Perez, Alejandro Rogero
and his older brother Melchor Rogero. Ariel and Edgar were already tipsy, having had a drinking spree in celebration of the
birthday of Ariel’s son. After a while, Ariel and Edgar decided to go home. On their way, they saw Kagawad Jose Rafol, who was
then fixing a rundown water pipe. For no apparent reason, Edgar boxed Jose. When the latter tried to retaliate, Ariel, who was
close behind, moved in to aid his friend. At that juncture, Kagawad Thomas Rios who was on his way to the wake, intervened
and pacified the protagonists. However, Jose’s son, Dixon, arrived and punched Edgar who fell to the ground. Ariel fled to call
for reinforcements. After an hour and a half, Ariel, on board a tricycle driven by his brother Errol Rollon, and armed with a
bolo, returned to the wake. With them were Eddie Lachica and Salvador Romano, who were each armed with guns. They were
followed closely on foot by Ariel and Errol’s father Felipe Rollon, their youngest brother, Filjun Rollon, and Francisco Rabino.
After the tricycle pulled over the roadside, Errol immediately alighted and boxed Jose. A fisticuffs ensued. Jose’s other
son, Dicky, arrived, pacified Errol and his father and brought the latter home.
Errol broke a bottle of gin on the pavement. Eddie followed suit, firing his gun into the air. Errol and his companions
pursued Jose and Dicky to their house and pelted it. When an occupant of the house screamed for help, Errol and his group
retreated and went back to where the wake was being held. When Ariel saw Kapitan Tito Royo, he attempted to hack the latter
with his bolo, but the bolo hit the wooden pole which Filjun used to strike Tito. Tito managed to evade the blow, and dove
under the table. He then fled to his house, which was about 50 meters away. A commotion ensued.
In the meantime, Felipe and his sons Errol and Ariel, with Eddie Lachica, Salvador Romano, Danilo Perez and
Francisco Rabino, all boarded the tricycle and went after Tito. As they reached the gate of Tito’s house, they chanced upon
Alejandro and Melchor. The two were on their way home from the wake and were just waiting for their younger brother Isidro
who got separated from them during the commotion. Errol alighted from the tricycle and greeted Alejandro and Melchor,
waving his left hand. Alejandro likewise waved his hand saying, "Pre, waya kita (Friend, there is nothing between us)." Errol
curtly retorted, "Waya ka diyan (You have nothing here)." Errol blocked Alejandro and Melchor’s way. Ariel vented his ire on
Alejandro and hacked the latter on his left arm. Alejandro retaliated and boxed Ariel, who fell to the ground. Errol then joined
the fray, but was held at bay by Alejandro. Eddie suddenly shot Alejandro, who fell prostrate to the ground. In the meantime,
Melchor could not help his brother because Francisco had his gun aimed at the latter. Errol then shot Alejandro two more
times on the head and on his body. Ariel, for his part, then hacked the hapless Alejandro with his bolo. Melchor somehow
managed to sneak out without being noticed and ran for dear life to the house of Thomas Rios. When Melchor was already
inside the house, he heard someone shout, "Patay na ina! (Kill him!)." Melchor heard another gunshot. He peeped through a
hole and saw the dead body of his brother, Alejandro, being run over by the tricycle driven by Errol. Melchor could only watch
in horror and grief. He could not do anything more for his brother.
The malefactors then left the crime scene. Melchor stepped outside and rushed towards his brother, who was soaked
in his own blood. He cried out for help and a handful of people came. Melchor proceeded to the police station to report the
incident but was waylaid by an unidentified person who chased him. He doubled back and took a shortcut home.
Police authorities arrived at the scene of the crime and investigated the incident. They learned that Errol and Ariel
were among the malefactors. The next morning, SPO4 Ramon Rutor, Chief of Police, PNP San Fernando, Romblon, arrived at
the Sibuyan District Hospital in Cajidiocan, Romblon, where Errol and Ariel were treated for their injures. Ariel surrendered to
SPO4 Rutor a bolo which was allegedly used by Alejandro to attack him and his brother. Dr. Leticia V. Chan, the Municipal
Health Officer of San Fernando, Romblon, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. She prepared and signed a
Postmortem Examination Report which states that the cause of death was Internal hemorrhage sec. to gunshot wounds of the
head, chest and abdomen.
Melchor and Thomas executed their respective sworn statements on the incident. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, an Information was filed, against Ariel and Errol Rollon, and Eddie Lachica. When arraigned, Errol and Ariel
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Eddie Lachica remained at large. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Ariel denied the charge.
 After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment finding Ariel and Errol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. The trial court disbelieved the appellants’ denials and assertion that Eddie Lachica alone killed the victim.
Both accused interposed their appeal from the decision of the trial court.
On September 2, 1998, Ariel Rollon died due to cardio-respiratory arrest while detained at the Romblon Provincial
Jail. On January 27, 1999, we resolved to dismiss the case. Hence, only the appeal of appellant Errol Rollon is left for our
determination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence and probative weight to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses while disbelieving that of the Appellant.
RULING:
The appeal is barren of merit.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the
trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’
deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe
the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization
of an oath — all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity. The trial court’s
findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact for circumstance of weight which the lower court
may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case.
The denial of the appellant of the crime charged cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution
witnesses that he and his cohorts killed the victim. Like the defense of alibi, a denial is inherently weak and crumbles in the
light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that the appellant was at the scene of
the incident and was one of the victim’s assailants. Moreover, denial, being a negative defense, must be substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence. Otherwise, it would merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. The denial offered by the appellant is not only inherently
weak, it lacked a strong corroboration. Indeed, even if the defense of denial is supported by the testimony of friends of the
appellant, it deserves the barest consideration.
More importantly, the autopsy conducted by Dr. Leticia V. Chan on September 25, 1995, corroborated the testimony of
the witnesses, that the appellant and his group shot and hacked the victim. The physical evidence shows that the victim
sustained a total of no less than 20 wounds — 5 gunshot wounds and 11 incised wounds on different parts of his body, a
partially amputated thumb and several abrasions. In contrast, the appellant did not suffer any major injuries, except for the
minor cut on his left arm which was inflicted by his late brother Ariel when the appellant’s group ganged up on the victim to
finish him off. It is difficult to believe that Alejandro could, all by his lonesome, initiate the attack on the appellant and his six
cohorts who were each armed with bolos and handguns. Even if Alejandro was, as claimed by the appellant, armed with a bolo,
he was at the mercy of the appellant and his six cohorts. The claim, therefore, of the appellant that Alejandro single-handedly
attacked them is weak and flimsy.
Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses. 24 In the case
at bar, the physical evidence, consistent with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, established the appellant’s
culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
We agree with the trial court that the appellant is guilty of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by abuse of superior strength as alleged in the Information. To take advantage of
superior strength is to purposely use excessive force, out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. 36 In the case at bar, there was a clear and gross disparity of strength between the unarmed victim and the four
armed assailants — three of whom were armed with firearms. The victim gave no provocation and was in fact already backing
off when he was attacked.
Civil Liabilities of the Appellant
Conformably to recent jurisprudence, we sustain the amount of P50,000 for civil indemnity. Article 2206 of the Civil
Code provides that when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to be indemnified without
need of any proof thereof.
We cannot award moral damages in the absence of proof of mental or physical suffering on the part of the heirs of the
victim. As to actual damages, while Melchor Rogero testified that they incurred burial and other expenses resulting from the
death of Alejandro, no competent evidence was presented to prove his claim. Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, a party is
entitled to compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Only substantiated and proven
expenses, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will
be recognized in court. 42 However, under Article 2224 of the same Code, temperate damages may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty. In the present case, the heirs of Alejandro clearly incurred funeral and burial expenses. Hence, we find that the
amount of P7,500 by way of temperate damages is justified.
 In the same vein, loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded to the victim’s heirs in the absence of competent proof
thereof. While Melchor testified on the victim’s income, the same could not serve as a basis for lost earnings. Indemnification
for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven; and a self-serving statement,
being unreliable, is not enough. For lost income to be recovered, there must be an unbiased proof of the deceased’s average,
not just gross, income.
Additionally, given the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 to the heirs of the victim in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, is in
order. 46
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81, finding appellant Errol Rollon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is hereby AFFIRMED. The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The
appellant is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Alejandro Rogero the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity;
P7,500 as temperate damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages. Costs against the Appellant.

WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, on behalf of the Residents of West Tower Condominium and in
representation of Barangay Bangkal, and others, including minors and generations yet unborn, Petitioners,
vs.
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, FIRST GEN CORPORATION and their RESPECTIVE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS, JOHN DOES, and RICHARD DOES, Respondents.
GR. No. 194239               June 16, 2015 VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS:
Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, which covers a
117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene;
and (b) the Black Oil
Pipeline (BOPL) System, which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel from Batangas to a depot in Sucat,
Parañ aque. These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of
Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower
Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within the
condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from... the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its inability to control the
flow, WestTower’s management reported the matter to the Police Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city’s
Bureau of Fire Protection.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the
condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage
system of Barangay Bangkal.
Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of West Tower to abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010 and
the condo’s power was shut down. On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.)
interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in
representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is
joined by the civil society and several people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups who
have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the environmental issues involved.
On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan[2] with a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members o... f their Boards of Directors to file their respective verified
returns. The TEPO... enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check
the structural integrity of the whole span of the 117-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and
avert any untoward incident that may result from any leak of the pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon within 60 days from
receipt thereof.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 2011, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors and Officers filed a Joint CompliancE
submitting the report required by the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that they neither own nor operate the
pipelines,... adding that it is impossible for them to report on the structural integrity of the pipelines, much less to cease and
desist from operating them as they have no capability, power, control or responsibility over the pipelines. They, thus, prayed
that the directives of the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently performed, as to them.
On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page “Report on Pipeline Integrity Check and
Preventive Maintenance Program.” Since after the Court’s issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on November 19,
2010, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and the BOPL. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a query of
the DOE, clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC;
thus, FPIC can resume operation of its BOPL System.
To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). By this
Court’s Resolution dated November 22, 2011, the appellate court was required to conduct hearings and, thereafter, submit a
report and... recommendation within 30 days after the receipt of the parties’ memoranda.
On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration[19] of the CA’s Report praying that (a)
instead of the DOE, the required certification should be issued by the DOST-Metal Industry Research and Development Center;
(b) a trust... fund be created to answer for future contingencies; and (c) the directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be held
accountable.
On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the CA in its Report and
Recommendation that FPIC be ordered to secure a certification from the DOE Secretary before the WOPL may resume its
operations.
Having received the October 25, 2013 Certification and the August 5, 2014 Letter from the DOE on the state of the
WOPL, as well as the parties’ comments thereon, the following issues defined by the parties during the March 21, 2012
preliminary conference are now ripe for adjudication
Issues:
1. Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners and whether the other
petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
2. Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the respondents to perform or to
desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment;
3. Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies; and
4. Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the environmental
protection order. (TORTS and DAMAGES ISSUE)
Ruling:
Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[39] Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real...
parties-in-interest.[40] In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right
sought to be enforced.[41] Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the... jurisdiction of the
court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest.
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit owners
and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when
the condominium’s electrical power... was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not
return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit owners and residents,
and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium corporation has limited powers under
RA 4726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the instant
case, the condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or
all of the condominium unit owners or users.
Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical personality
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang
Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. – San Juan
Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in
the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7[45] of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental...
disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court, including the
periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
 Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in the pending motions. Suffice it to
state in the outset that as regards the substantive issues presented, the Court, likewise, concurs with the other
recommendations of the CA, with a few... modifications.
II.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE Certification of the WOPL’s Commercial Viability
To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent
Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,[46] Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. For
its part, respondent
FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place, will sufficiently address any concern of oil
leaks from the WOPL.
With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following systems: (a) regular cleaning scraper runs,
which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG, now known as in-line inspections (ILI),
which is done every five years; (c) pressure monitoring valves; and (d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted that it also
undertook the following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known as
segment pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d)... inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection and
reinforcement of dents; and (f) Pandacan segment replacement. Furthermore, in August 2010, with the oil leak hogging the
headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI... inspections through magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and
ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall thinning of the pipeline and check it for cracks.
The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and insufficient for purposes of leak
detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the necessary caution and level of assurance required to
ensure that the WOPL system is free... from leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the CA recommended that FPIC obtain
from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already safe for commercial operation. This certification, according to the CA,
was to be issued with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC of... the appropriate leak detection systems to monitor
sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace portions of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. Sans the required
certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.
The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We required FPIC to obtain the adverted
DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said certification from the DOE considering
that the core issue of this case... requires the specialized knowledge and special expertise of the DOE and various other
administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of
the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos
Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the timetable for the resumption of the WOPL
operations after conducting a dialogue between the concerned government agencies and FPIC. After a perusal of the
recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in
the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as conditions for the resumption of the commercial
operations of... the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests proposed in the said
August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall
issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the... operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe result in a finding
that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition is irremediable, or that it already exceeded its
serviceable life, among others, the closure of the WOPL may be ordered.
It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL’s compliance with pipeline structure
standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the evidence presented
by the parties on the WOPL’s... actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the numerous findings and recommendations of the
CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL’s present structure, and not the cited pipeline incidents as the dissent
propounds.
Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC for the resumption of the
operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its proposed activities and timetable, is a clear and
unequivocal message coming from the
DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of and continued commercial operations is not yet fully determined.
And it is only after an extensive determination by the DOE of the pipeline’s actual physical state through its proposed
activities, and not merely through a... short-form integrity audit,[56] that the factual issue on the WOPL’s viability can be
settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline’s structural integrity has not yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to
this Court’s resolution.
 Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the certification adverted to equates to the writ of kalikasan
being functus officio at this point.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
Anent petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the
environment.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation
of a trust fund for similar future contingencies.This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already
suffered. Hence,the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for
damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view
that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced.
The present ruling on petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse, however, is
without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising from
the same incident if the payment... of damages is found warranted.
IV.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and officers, the CA found FGC not liable
under the TEPO and, without prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-256, RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City)
and criminal complaint (Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Makati City) filed
against them, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable in their individual capacities.
The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors and officers of FPIC
and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a
writ of kalikasan,the Court cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed by
petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual liability of respondents,
if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the
dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.
Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC officials which can, however, be properly
resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending against them.
 PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
DE DIOS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and DE DIOS MARIKINA TRANSIT CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 147010             July 18, 2003 CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
Herein respondents De Dios Transportation Co. (DDTC) and De Dios Marikina Transport Corporation (DMTC) were
the franchise holders and owners of fifty-eight buses plying the Buendia-Ayala-UP and Monumento Ayala routes. On February
23, 1995, the respondents, as vendors, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale covering the said buses and their franchise in favor
of Willy Choa Coyukiat (Coyukiat) and/or Goldfinger Transport Corporation (Goldfinger) as vendees. In the said contract, the
respondents bound and obliged themselves to sell to Coyukiat and Goldfinger the fifty eight buses and their corresponding
franchise, and to deliver and turn over possession of the said buses to the vendees for the price of P12,000,000.
The parties further agreed that in case of default by the vendors, it is agreed and understood that the representations
and warranties made by the VENDORS in this Contract are the primary motivations/reasons that induced, convinced and
moved the VENDEE to enter into this contract and the Deed of Sale. In the event of default by the VENDORS, the VENDEE shall
at its option either consider the obligations of the VENDORS under the Contract immediately due and demandable and the
VENDORS shall immediately execute the Deed of Sale of the buses and their corresponding lines/franchises without need of
any further payments or reimburse all the amounts paid by the VENDEE to the VENDORS. In either case, the VENDORS shall,
likewise, be liable to the VENDEE for liquidated damages in the amount of Twelve Million (P12,000,000.00) pesos. In the event
of default by the VENDEE, the VENDORS shall at their option, declare the entire obligation due and demandable, and demand
for the payment of the entire balance of the purchase price or declare the contract as without any further force and effect and
that all payments previously paid are forfeited. In either case, the VENDEE shall, likewise, be liable for liquidated damages in
the amount of Twelve Million (P12,000,000.00) Pesos in favor of the VENDORS.
The respondents, as vendors, guaranteed that the franchise and routes to Buendia-Ayala-UP and vice versa and
Monumento-Ayala via EDSA were valid, fully and completely utilizable, and merely required registration with the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) for the vendees to be able to operate the same. The vendees delivered the downpayment and
postdated checks drawn upon the account of Goldfinger with the Philbanking Corporation for the balance of the purchase
price.
On March 23, 1995, the respondents delivered the buses to the vendees. The respondents were able to encash the
check for the downpayment of the purchase price. However, before the respondents could deposit the first check for the
remaining balance, the vendees stopped all payments, on their claim that, contrary to the representations of the respondents,
some of the buses were not in good running condition. The color of the buses had been changed without the proper permits
or clearances from the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB), the LTO and the Philippine National
Police (PNP). Consequently, the vendees failed to operate the buses. The vendees were, likewise, unable to operate the buses
along the Buendia-Ayala-UP route, notwithstanding the representation of the respondents that only registration with the LTO
was required.
On July 20, 1995, the vendees, through its counsel, the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office, filed a complaint against
the respondents and Philbanking Corporation as defendants with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for rescission
of contract with a plea for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Therein plaintiffs Coyukiat
and Goldfinger alleged that defendants (the respondents herein) reneged on their obligation to deliver the buses in good
running condition.
The vendees furthermore prayed as follows: Ordering the defendant De Dios Transportation Co. Inc. and the De Dios Marikina
Transit Corporation to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral
damages. Ordering the defendants De Dios Transportation Co. Inc. and the De Dios Marikina Transit Corporation to pay jointly
and severally the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages. Ordering the defendants De Dios
Transportation Co. Inc. and the De Dios Marikina Transit Corporation to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amounts
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as attorney's fees and at least One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as
litigation expenses.
On July 21, 1995, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants and their agents from
encashing, accepting, clearing, or transacting twelve postdated checks issued by therein plaintiff Coyukiat. On August 11, 1995,
the RTC granted the plaintiffs' plea for a writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of P11,000,000.
On August 17, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint dropping Philbanking Corporation as party-defendant.
The defendants, in their answer with counterclaim, denied the material allegations of the complaint and prayed for
the dismissal thereof. The defendants interposed counterclaims for damages and attorney's fees, thus: (a) P11,000,000
representing the plaintiffs' unpaid balance; (b) P12,000,000 representing liquidating damages; (c) P1,000,000 for moral
damages; (d) P1,000,000 for exemplary damages; and (e) twenty percent of the claim representing attorneys fees and P1,000
for each court appearance.
On December 14, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and granting the counterclaims of the
defendants. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs Coyukiat and Goldfinger interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On September 15, 1999, the respondents filed with the CA a Motion to Execute Against the Injunction Bond posted by
herein petitioner Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation, serving a copy thereof on Atty. Ronaldo Reyes. The respondents
alleged inter alia in their motion that the appellants Coyukiat and Goldfinger were not entitled to a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction. They contend that were it not for the said temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction, the appellants would not have been able to hide and dispose of their assets and sell the buses, thus
frustrating the collection of the amount of P11,000,000 representing the respondents' counterclaim.
On November 4, 1999, the petitioner filed with the CA its comment on the opposition to the motion to execute filed by
the respondents with the CA on the following grounds: I There is no basis for defendants-appellees to execute against the
injunction bond; II The Decision of the lower court has become final and, therefore, defendants-appellees' Motion can no longer
be entertained; and III Even assuming, for the sake of argument that an application for damages can still be made, defendants-
appellees suffered no damage by reason of the issuance of the injunction.
In accordance with the directive of the Court of Appeals, the respondents filed on December 9, 1999 with the RTC a
Motion to Resolve their Motion to Execute Against the Injunction Bond. On February 2, 2000, the court a quo issued an order
denying the motion of the respondents on the following grounds: (a) its Decision dated December 4, 1998 had already attained
finality in view of the withdrawal of the appeal by the plaintiffs; and (b) the resolution of the respondents' motion to execute
against the injunction bond would necessitate the reception of evidence which could no longer be done as its decision had
become final and executory. The respondents' motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by the court on March 13,
2000.
On April 21, 2000, the respondents, consequently, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA seeking
the annulment of the February 2, 2000 and March 13, 2000 Orders of the court a quo. The respondents in this case
alleged inter alia that the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied their motion to resolve (the motion to execute against the injunction bond) on the ground that the judgment in the
main case had become final and executory, and that the case could no longer be re-opened for the parties to adduce evidence
in support of the motion.
On June 23, 2000, herein petitioner filed its comment. The petitioner averred that the decision of the trial court had
become final and executory on September 14, 1999, upon the withdrawal of the appeal. Further, when the CA issued its
October 8, 1999 Resolution directing the respondents in this case to address their motion to the trial court, it had already lost
its jurisdiction over the appeal. Even assuming that the motion of the respondents was timely filed, nevertheless, they
did not suffer any damages arising from the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The injunction bond
answers only for the damages caused to the adverse party by reason of the wrongful issuance of the injunction and
not for the damages awarded by the trial court on the respondents' counterclaims.
On October 31, 2000, the CA rendered a decision annulling the assailed orders of the trial court and granting the
motion to execute on the injunction bond issued by the petitioner therein. The Court of Appeals cited the ruling of this Court
in International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,24 which declared that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court regarding the application against the surety bond in support of the writ of preliminary attachment shall apply by
analogy to a preliminary injunction. The CA likewise cited the ruling of this Court in  Rivera v. Talavera,25 and Ponce Enrile v.
Capulong,26 that the application or claim for damages against the injunction bond must be filed before the trial court either
during the trial with due notice to the surety or sureties, or even after trial when judgment is rendered, but before entry
thereof.
ISSUES:
1. WON The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that it still had jurisdiction over the case even after Coyukiat and
Goldfinger had filed their Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal as a matter of right.
2. WON the respondents are not entitled to execute on the injunction bond for failing to file an application for damages against
the injunction bond at the trial of the main case, Civil Case No. Q-95-24462, and for filing the same only after the decision in
said case had become final and executory.
3. WON The judgment of the Quezon City RTC-Branch 223 in the main case, Civil Case No. Q-95-24462, did not include any
award for damages in favor of respondents by reason of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and the fact that the
decision therein was in favor of respondents did not automatically entitle them to such award for damages.
4. WON The damages allegedly sustained by respondents were not by reason of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court of Appeals still had jurisdiction over the case when the
Motion to Execute Against the Injunction Bond was filed.
Petitioner argues in its Petition that Coyukiat filed a Withdrawal of Appeal on September 14, 1999 or one day before
respondents filed their Motion to Execute Against Injunction Bond on September 15, 1999. Since no appellee's brief had been
filed at that time, petitioner argues that the withdrawal of the appeal was a matter of right. Thus, Pioneer triumphantly
concludes, on September 14, 1999 the appeal was already effectively withdrawn and the Decision of the trial court had already
become final and executory.
What Pioneer conveniently does not disclose is that the Withdrawal of Appeal was not filed by counsel of record for
Coyukiat but a different counsel purporting to be the newly substituted counsel for Coyukiat. This different counsel from the
counsel of record had entered her appearance as such only for the purpose of withdrawing the appeal.
More importantly, Pioneer also conveniently fails to disclose that neither the Entry of Appearance of new counsel for
Coyukiat nor the Withdrawal of the Appeal bore the conformity of Willy Choa Coyukiat and Goldfinger Transport Corporation
— the appellants. It is well-established that substitution of counsel is not effective without the conformity of client. Moreover,
well-entrenched is the rule that pleadings which have the effect of withdrawing the appeal should bear the conformity of the
appellant.
Clearly therefore, the Withdrawal of Appeal filed on September 14, 1999 was not effectual because it did not bear the
conformity of Coyukiat. The new counsel of Coyukiat (who entered her appearance without Coyukiat's conformity in
substitution of the counsel of record) cannot reasonably expect that she will be allowed by the Court of Appeals to withdraw
the appeal on her own. This is especially so when even her substitution of the counsel of record does not bear the conformity
of the appellants.
For a substitution of attorneys to be effectual, the procedure to be followed strictly is as follows:
"In order that there may be substitution of attorneys in a given case, there must be (1) a written application
for substitution; (2) the written consent of the client; (3) the written consent of the attorney substituted; and
(4) in case such written consent cannot be secured, there must be filed with the application proof of service of
notice of such motion upon the attorney to be substituted, in the manner prescribed by the rules. Unless the
foregoing formalities are complied with, substitution will not be permitted, and the attorney who properly
appeared last in the case, before such application for substitution, will be regarded as the attorney of record
and will be held responsible for the proper conduct of the case." ( Adarne vs. Aldaba, A.C. No. 801, June 27,
1978; Cortez, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-32547, May 9, 1978; Ramos vs. Potenciano, 118 Phil. 1435; and U.S. vs.
Borromeo, 20 Phil. 189).
In this case, therefore, the Withdrawal of Appeal filed by a new counsel who substituted the counsel of record — Atty.
Ronaldo Reyes, without bearing the conformity of Coyukiat was a mere scrap of paper.
As mentioned above, the appellants only manifested their desire to withdraw the appeal, by way of the signature of
Coyukiat in his behalf and in behalf of Goldfinger Transport Corporation, on September 29, 1999. This conformity was taken
note of by the Court of Appeals on October 8, 1999 when it dismissed the appeal.
Clearly, therefore, even if we were to follow petitioner's argument that a withdrawal of appeal is a matter of right and
needs no further action from the court, in this case the intention of withdrawing the appeal was only properly made known to
the court by Coyukiat and Goldfinger Transport Corp. on September 29, 1999.
By that time, respondents had already filed their Motion to Execute Against the Injunction Bond. It is, therefore, not
factually and legally accurate for petitioner Pioneer to claim that the Court of Appeals had already lost jurisdiction
over the case when the Motion to Execute Against the Injunction Bond was filed. 28
In its reply to the comment of the respondents, the petitioner avers that the compliance to the CA Resolution of
September 16, 1999, to submit the appellants' conformity to the substitution of new counsel and the withdrawal of the appeal
was a ratification of the withdrawal of the appeal by the new counsel which should be deemed effective as of the date of the
filing of the notice of withdrawal of appeal, or on September 14, 1999.
For its part, the CA ruled that it still retained jurisdiction over the appeal when the respondents filed their motion for
execution of the bond with the said court, the supervening finality of the RTC decision notwithstanding
The contention of the petitioner does not persuade.
First. The notice of withdrawal of appeal filed by the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates on September 14, 1999 with the
CA was a mere scrap of paper, absent a valid substitution of counsel. The counsel of record as of September 14, 1999 was the
Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office. On the said date, the law office filed a motion with the CA to withdraw as counsel for
the appellants, while the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates filed the notice of withdrawal of appeal for the appellants. In the
case of Santana-Cruz v. Court of Appeals,30 this Court enumerated the essential requisites of a valid substitution of counsel:
. . . No substitution of counsel of record is allowed unless the following essential requisites of a valid substitution of
counsel concur: (1) there must be a written request for substitution; (2) it must be filed with the written consent of
the client; (3) it must be with the written consent of the attorney to be substituted; and (4) in case the consent of the
attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there must be at least a proof of notice that the motion for substitution
was served on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. . . .31
There was clearly no compliance to these essential requisites. It was only on September 16, 1999 when the CA granted
the motion of the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office to withdraw as counsel for the appellants that the withdrawal of the
said counsel and its substitution by the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates became effective.
Second. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Section 3. Withdrawal of appeal. — An appeal may be withdrawn as a matter of right at any time before the filing of
the appellee's brief. Thereafter, the withdrawal may be allowed in the discretion of the court.
We agree with the respondents that the notice of withdrawal of appeal of the appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 61310 filed
on September 14, 1999 was not self-executory, and did not render the trial court's December 4, 1998 Decision final and
executory. While we agree with the petitioner that under Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal maybe withdrawn
by the appellants as a matter of right at any time before the filing of the appellees' brief; however, the rule does not apply in
this case because the notice of withdrawal of appeal filed in CA-G.R. CV No. 61310 by the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates did
not bear the appellants' conformity thereto. It bears stressing that the counsel of the appellants was a mere agent holding a
special power of attorney to act for and in behalf of the principal respecting the ordinary course of the appealed case. There
was a need for the appellants, as the principals, to execute a special power of attorney specifically authorizing the withdrawal
of a perfected appeal. Absent a special power of attorney expressly authorizing their counsel to withdraw their appeal, or in
lieu thereof, the written conformity of the appellants to the withdrawal of their appeal, the notice of withdrawal of appeal by
the new counsel of the appellants was a mere scrap of paper.
Third. The submission by the appellants on September 28, 1999 of the requisite conformity to the withdrawal of their
appeal should not be given retroactive effect so as to foreclose the right of the respondents to file with the CA their motion to
execute against the injunction bond, thus enabling the petitioner to escape liability on the same.
The notice of withdrawal of appeal was deemed filed only on September 28, 1999 upon compliance with the
September 16, 1999 Resolution of the CA. The appeal of the appellants was effectively withdrawn and dismissed before
October 8, 1999 when the CA issued its resolution therein. The petitioner should not be benefited by the deleterious
manipulation of the rules of procedure.
On the second ground, the petitioner avers that the respondents failed to serve a copy of their (respondents') motion
to execute on the bond as mandated by Section 20, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which reads:
1. The application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued;
2. Such application for damages must be filed before the entry of judgment; and
3. After hearing with notice to the surety.34
In International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court ruled that due notice to the adverse
party and its surety setting forth the facts supporting the applicant's right to damages and the amount thereof under the bond
is indispensable. The surety should be given an opportunity to be heard as to the reality or reasonableness of the damages
resulting from the wrongful issuance of the writ. 36 In the absence of due notice to the surety, therefore, no judgment for
damages may be entered and executed against it.
In this case, the petitioner was not served with a copy of the motion to execute on the bond filed by the respondents
with the CA in CA-G.R. CV 61310. But the records show that the CA directed the petitioner to file its comment on the said
motion.37 On November 4, 1999, the petitioner filed its comment on the respondents' motion, and on December 9, 1999, the
respondents filed their motion to resolve with the trial court, serving a copy . thereof to the petitioner. It cannot, thus, be
gainsaid that the petitioner was deprived of its right to be heard on the respondents' motion to execute on the bond.
We also agree that the Court of Appeals had the authority to remand to the court of origin the resolution of the motion
to execute against the injunction bond after the parties adduced their respective evidence on the motion. To repeat, the
respondents' motion to execute was filed earlier than the motion to withdraw the appeal, and more importantly, before the
December 4, 1998 Decision of the court of origin became final and executory. 38
On the third and fourth grounds, the same should be addressed to and resolved by the trial court after due hearing
and presentation of evidence. As it was, the trial court denied the motion of the respondents on its finding that it had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the motion, without affording the parties the right to adduce evidence thereon.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. The RTC Quezon City, Branch 223, is directed to resolve on the merits the Motion to Execute Against Injunction
Bond filed by the respondents after the parties shall have adduced their respective evidence in Civil Case No. Q-95-24462 with
dispatch.