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Hazard Identification Hazard Identification

The document discusses methods for hazard identification and risk assessment. It describes qualitative hazard identification which identifies hazards and quantitative risk assessment which determines the probability and consequences of events to express risk numerically. The key steps are system description, hazard identification, scenario identification, and determining accident probability and consequences. Hazard Identification Methodologies include Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) which examines deviations from design parameters, and Fault Tree Analysis which works backward from accidents to identify causal scenarios. Risk can be reduced through inherently safer design principles like minimization, substitution, moderation and simplification of hazardous materials and conditions.

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Towfiq Ahmed
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98 views32 pages

Hazard Identification Hazard Identification

The document discusses methods for hazard identification and risk assessment. It describes qualitative hazard identification which identifies hazards and quantitative risk assessment which determines the probability and consequences of events to express risk numerically. The key steps are system description, hazard identification, scenario identification, and determining accident probability and consequences. Hazard Identification Methodologies include Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) which examines deviations from design parameters, and Fault Tree Analysis which works backward from accidents to identify causal scenarios. Risk can be reduced through inherently safer design principles like minimization, substitution, moderation and simplification of hazardous materials and conditions.

Uploaded by

Towfiq Ahmed
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Hazard Identification

 What are the hazards?


 What can go wrong?
 What are the chances?
 What are the consequences?
Process Safety Assessment
 Qualitative
◦ Hazard identification: identification of Hazards and
taking measures to minimize the negative
consequences of hazards.
 Quantitative
◦ Risk assessment: determination of the events that
can produce an accident, the probability of those
events and the consequences-known as quantitative
risk analysis (QRA).
◦ QRA expresses the risk in numbers and asks for
modifications in
process/plants/operations/emergency responses that
reduces the risk to a lower acceptable number.
Hazard identification and Risk assessment can
be performed independently or carried out together
Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment Procedure
System description

Hazard identification

Scenario identification

Accident probability Accident consequences

Risk determination

Modify
no 1. process or plant
Risk and/or hazard 2. process operation
acceptance 3 emergency response
4 other
yes

Build and/or operate


system
Hazard Identification Methodologies
Factors Affecting Selection of Methods
Classical Limitations of Hazard
Evaluation Studies
Hazards and Operability (HAZOP)
Studies
Documents: PFD, P&ID, Plant Layout
 Begin with a detailed flow sheet and break the flow
sheet in to a number of process units
 Choose a study node (Vessel, line etc.)
 Pick a process parameter: flow, level, T, P, concentration,
pH, viscosity , reaction etc
 Apply a guide word to suggest possible deviation
 If the deviation is applicable determine possible causes
and note any protective system
 Evaluate the consequences
 Recommend action
 Record all information
HAZOP Table

Study node:
Para Guide Possible Possible Existing Required actions/
meter word causes consequences safeguards recommendations
(deviation)
Example of HAZOP Matrix
Guide
word
No Low High Part of Also Other than Reverse

Process-
variable
No Low High Missing Wrong Reverse
Flow flow flow flow ingredients Impurities material flow

Low High Low High - -


Level Empty interface interface
level level

Open to Low High - - -


Pressure atmosphere pressure pressure Vacuum

Temperature Low High - - - Auto


Freezing temp. temp. refrigeration

No Poor Excessive Irregular- Foaming - Phase


Agitation mixing mixing
agitation mixing separation

No Slow "Runaway Partial Side Wrong Decom-


Reaction reaction
reaction reaction reaction" reaction reaction position

Utility External External - - Start-up -


Other Shutdown
failure leak rupture
Maintenance
Example: DAP Process
HAZOP Analysis Worksheet-
Worksheet-I
HAZOP Analysis Worksheet-
Worksheet-II
DAP Plant

Phosphoric acid tank Ammonia tank

Granulator DAP reactor


Example: Cooling
 Consider the reactor system shown in Figure 10-8. The
reaction is exothermic, so a cooling system is provided to
remove the excess energy of reaction. In the event that the
cooling function is lost, the temperature of the reactor would
increase. This would lead to an increase in reaction rate, leading
to additional energy release. The result would be a runaway
reaction with pressures exceeding the bursting pressure of the
reactor vessel. The temperature within the reactor is measured
and is used to control the cooling water flowrate by a valve.
 Perform a HAZOP study on this unit to improve the safety of
the process. Use as study nodes the cooling coil (process
parameters: flow and temperature) and the stirrer (process
parameter: agitation).
Example: Cooling
HAZOP Analysis Worksheet-
Worksheet-I
Examples
 Storage Tanks
◦ Parameters: Level ,Temperature, Pressure
◦ Action: Relief valve (to flare)
 Distillation column
◦ Parameters: Level ,Temperature, Pressure
◦ Action: Relief valve (to flare)
Volatile solvent heating system
 A heat exchanger is used to heat
flammable, volatile solvents, as
shown in Figure 10-15. The
temperature of the outlet stream
is measured by a thermocouple,
and a controller valve manipulates
the amount of steam to the heat
exchanger to achieve the desired
set point temperature.
◦ Identify the study nodes of the
process
◦ Perform a HAZOP study on the
intention "hot solvent from heat
exchanger." Recommend possible
modifications to improve the safety
of the process.
HAZOP
 Study nodes: volatile solvent outlet from
heat exchanger
 Recommendations
◦ Relief valve connected to flare
Risk Assessment
 Risk assessment includes
◦ Incident identification: describes how an
accident occurs and analyses probabilities
◦ Consequence analysis: describes the expected
damage, including loss of life, damage to
environment or capital euipment and days
outage
Fault Trees Method
 Fault trees are a deductive method for
identifying ways in which hazards can lead
to accidents.
 It started with a well-defined accident, or
top event, and works backward toward
the various scenario that can cause the
accident
Example: Chemical Reactor with an
Alarm
Fault Trees
 Inherently safer system
Inherent Safety Technique
 Depends on chemistry or physics to prevent accidents
rather than on control system, interlocks, redundancy, special
operating procedures
 It specially directed to process design features , for example:
◦ Minimize:
 reduce storage, hold-up, inventory of hazardous material
◦ Substitute:
 use chemicals with higher flash points, use water as heat transfer
fluid instead of oil
◦ Moderate:
 reduce process temperature & pressure, control room away
from operations
◦ Simplify:
 keep piping system neat and visible

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