PP Vs Oliva GR 106826 January 18, 2001 Facts
PP Vs Oliva GR 106826 January 18, 2001 Facts
Facts:
Accused Edgar Manlapaz, Bogoy Seachon, Metchel Ibaya, Joel Cinco, Amy Inopia,
Oscar Oliva, Noli Salcedo, John Doe and Peter Doe were charged of murder committed against
Jacinto Magbojos alias Dagoy.
Appellants Oliva and Salcedo claimed that they had no participation in the commission of
the crime. Oliva stated that he was in Metro Manila when the crime was committed. He said that
he went there sometime in 1985 and returned to Masbate after the EDSA revolution. Likewise,
Salcedo claimed his innocence because from 1985 to 1987 he was in Metro Manila, working as a
furniture polisher. He declared that he had no knowledge of the incident until he was
apprehended.
Concededly, there were no eyewitnesses who testified regarding the actual killing of the victim
making the appellants claim that their identities were not positively established are belied by the
testimonies of witnesses.
The court a quo erred in finding accused-appellants Oliva and Salcedo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution evidence and
convicting appellants for the crime of murder.
Ruling.
Yes. While it is true that there is no direct evidence as to who actually killed the victim,
direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix whereby the trial court may
draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. It is settled that conviction may be based on
circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites must concur: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is of a nature identically the same with direct evidence. It is equally
direct evidence of minor facts of such a nature that the mind is led intuitively or by a conscious
process of reasoning to the conviction that from them some other fact may be inferred. No
greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is
direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime.
As regard to appellants alibi. Oliva would like the court to believe that he was in Metro
Manila when the crime was committed. In order that alibi will prevail, the defense must establish
by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the accused
were somewhere else. This, appellants failed to show. As regards to Oliva, his admission that he
went back to Masbate after the EDSA revolution would not rule out his presence in the scene of
the crime during its commission. EDSA revolution took place in the last week of February 1986.
Hence, it was not impossible for him to be in the crime scene on May 26, 1986. With regard to
Salcedo, aside from his own declaration that he was in Metro Manila at the time of the incident,
no other evidence was presented to support his alibi. Besides, Oliva and Salcedo were positively
identified as among the perpetrators of the crime. Accordingly, their alibis must fail.
However, we cannot agree with the finding of the trial court that the killing was qualified
by treachery. To appreciate treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1) the
employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
The settled rule is that treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. In the case at bar, although the fact of death and
the identity of the victim and the identity of the perpetrators were established, there is no proof at
all on how the killing was done. Thus, absent any particulars as to the manner in which the
aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim unfolded,
treachery cannot be appreciated.
To conclude, since no qualifying circumstance was proved in this case, the crime
committed is only homicide, not murder.