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Asian Journal of Political Science

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Ethnicity and Democratization in

Myanmar
a
Ian Holliday
a
Faculty of Social Sciences , University of Hong Kong , Pokfulam
Road, Hong Kong
Published online: 20 Aug 2010.

To cite this article: Ian Holliday (2010) Ethnicity and Democratization in Myanmar, Asian Journal of
Political Science, 18:2, 111-128, DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2010.492975

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 Asian Journal of Political Science
Vol. 18, No. 2, August 2010, pp. 111
128

Ethnicity and Democratization in

Myanmar
Ian Holliday
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Myanmar is embarking on political reforms that could prove to be the first stage of a
gradual transition to democracy. However, critical problems of ethnic discord remain to
be resolved. This article draws on the literature on multiculturalism to examine ways
forward. First it considers how other democratic states have sought to manage ethnic
relations, and constructs a matrix of four ideal types: multiculturalism; ethnic enclaves;
assimilation; and marginalization. Next it demonstrates just how difficult matters of
ethnicity and identity were in the development of modern Burma. Then it surveys
possibilities for ethnic relations in contemporary Myanmar. Finally it sketches future
pathways. A brief conclusion reinforces the core argument. Ethnic enclaves and
assimilation are the major contenders for ethnic policy in Myanmar. Their relative
merits will need to be debated as openly as possible during any future democratization
process.

Keywords: Burma; Democracy; Democratization; Ethnicity; Multiculturalism; Myanmar

Introduction
Myanmar is embarking on political reforms that could prove to be the first stage of a
gradual transition to democracy.1 Currently directed by Senior General Than Shwe
and the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), political reform is
promoted with far greater ambition and vision by democratic groups focused on
Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD), as well as by
leaders of ethnic forces based mainly in peripheral parts of the country. At the heart
of the roadmap to discipline-flourishing democracy pursued by the military junta is a
tightly managed general election scheduled for the closing months of 2010, which is
already certain to result in victory for military-backed candidates and parties. At the
same time, however, the 2010 election will recast the political landscape by instituting

Ian Holliday is Professor and Dean of Social Sciences, University of Hong Kong. Correspondence to: Ian
Holliday, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong. Email:
[email protected]

ISSN 0218-5377 (print)/ISSN 1750-7812 (online) # 2010 Asian Journal of Political Science
DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2010.492975
 112 I. Holliday

an elected president, a bicameral national parliament, and a series of provincial

legislatures. In years thereafter, politics in Myanmar could thus chart a fresh course as
elected assemblies haltingly find their feet, and power slowly flows from the hands of
military leaders who have long imposed tight control on the country into the hands
of civilians.
As Myanmar approaches its 2010 general election, the controlling military stamp
placed on existing democratization proposals makes them a source of deep division
across the country. Indeed, with elements unwelcome to many, the democracy on
offer in 2010 casts considerable doubt on the extent of the political reforms soon to
be enacted. In particular, parallel sets of guarantees of military power and constraints
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on popular control raise many questions. The guarantees are most evident in
constitutional clauses requiring the president to have a military background, allowing
military forces to appoint 25 per cent of legislative members, and enabling military
forces to declare a state of emergency and impose unfettered control should all else
fail. They are also visible in electoral laws mandating total acceptance of the junta’s
contentious roadmap to discipline-flourishing democracy. On offer in Myanmar in
the closing months of 2010 is, then, democracy for a garrison state, designed to
generate enough democracy to keep the generals’ critics at bay, but not enough to
loosen their tight grip on power. For this reason, it is forcefully challenged by leading
members of the opposition and key ethnic groups. Even as the calendar counts down
to the 2010 general election, the fate of the SPDC’s political reform process therefore
remains unclear.
There is, though, a matter of still greater uncertainty on Myanmar’s political
horizon, well understood by analysts but paid only limited attention in much
democracy talk. This is the course ethnic politics will take if and when the country
really does begin to democratize. Historically, the project of nation building in
modernizing Burma was fraught and unsuccessful. Indeed, failure to build a modern
nation to underpin the modern state was a key trigger for the collapse of democracy
nearly 50 years ago, and has been a major factor prolonging military rule down to this
day. Faced with such a difficult past, there is little reason to believe ethnic politics will
miraculously fall into place if Myanmar starts again to move down the path of
democracy after the 2010 general election. At a time when a degree of political change
may be on the horizon, it is thus necessary to revisit the country’s ethnic question.
How might ethnic issues be managed to undergird a democratization process?
This question has faced many other countries as they too have built democratic
systems. To address it, this article therefore looks to comparative experience for
guidance before focusing on the Myanmar case. The article has four main sections. The
first considers how other democratic states have sought to manage ethnic relations, and
constructs a matrix of four ideal types: multiculturalism; ethnic enclaves; assimilation;
and marginalization. The second demonstrates just how difficult matters of ethnicity
and identity were in the development of modern Burma down to the late 1980s, when a
formal military junta seized power from a disintegrating military-backed regime. The
third surveys possibilities for ethnic relations in contemporary Myanmar by showing
 Asian Journal of Political Science 113

where key political forces are arrayed on the matrix of available options. The fourth
sketches future pathways by thinking through potential areas of policy shift by leading
political forces, and evaluating the contribution external actors and experiences might
make to a process of dialogue and reform.
The exploration undertaken here is necessarily schematic and suggestive, designed
to provoke further analysis and debate rather than to provide definitive answers to
immensely complex questions. Moreover, in the current climate of vice-like military
control, an element of unreality hangs over any attempt to open up Myanmar’s
ethnic question for rational examination. Nevertheless, the article’s core argument is
in no sense diminished by this. It is that ethnic enclaves and assimilation are the
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major contenders for ethnic policy in Myanmar. Their relative merits will need to be
debated as openly as possible during any future democratization process.

Modeling Multi-ethnic States

It is now widely accepted that nations are a product of the modern age. Anderson
notes that the two most important pre-modern cultural systems were the religious
community and the dynastic realm. As capitalism developed, however, and print
technology revolutionized human communication in a world fractured into multiple
language groups, the stage was set for the modern nation to emerge as an ‘imagined
political community’ (Anderson, 1991: 6). Furthermore, following the American and
French Revolutions the nation became a template for and marker of modernity. ‘In
effect, by the second decade of the nineteenth century, if not earlier, a ‘‘model’’ of
‘‘the’’ independent national state was available for pirating’ (Anderson, 1991: 81). So
widespread was the subsequent spread of nationalism that ‘nation-ness is the most
universally legitimate value in the political life of our time’ (Anderson, 1991: 3).
Against Hobsbawm and others, Anderson contends that its dominance is far from
drawing to a close, and global events in the two decades since he wrote bear him out
on that.
One key problem that the near-universal spread of modern nationalism has
generated is well known. In much of the world, the frontiers of nation and state are
not coterminous, and many political leaders face difficult issues of building a nation
to underpin the state they govern. Nation-building projects have thus been taken
seriously by just about every major modern state. Nearly 20 years ago, Walzer (1992:
100
101) sketched the outlines of a neutral liberal state that stands above ethnic
groups, ‘refusing to endorse or support their ways of life or to take an active interest
in their social reproduction’, and thereby making itself ‘neutral with reference to
[their] language, history, literature, calendar’. He held the clearest example to be
the United States, which mandates no official language or religion in its constitution.
However, as Kymlicka (2002: 346) notes, actual policies in the US have done an
enormous amount to promote English, which today must be learned by children
in schools and by immigrants under the age of 50, and is a de facto requirement
 114 I. Holliday

for government jobs or contracts. Similarly, the Christian religion is immensely

privileged.
Nation building is, then, a project undertaken by states throughout the world. In
Asia, it was pursued with particular intensity in the early post-colonial years as
governments sought to project an image of unity and control. The result was that a
region characterized by extreme cultural and linguistic diversity witnessed often
heavy-handed attempts to straightjacket multiple ethnic groups into single national
frameworks, most of which were in fact inherited from imperial masters (Brown,
1994). Only after long periods of violent struggle and widespread recourse to ‘the art
of not being governed’ (Scott, 2009), much of which continues to this day, did
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alternative approaches start to emerge. Complicating the contemporary situation is

the gradual spread of democracy which, though formally committed to numerical
majorities through the principle of one person one vote, in practice creates space for
minority groups to advance their cause (Kymlicka, 2005: 33). Today, in consequence,
several Asian states are starting to pay more attention to ethnic issues.
In a typical situation where a majority ethnic group is confronted by one or more
minority ethnic groups, minority attempts are often made to open up the public
sphere. There are, though, various ways for minority groups to gain political
traction. Kymlicka (2002: 348) sketches four options: mass emigration; integration
into the majority culture; self-government to defend the minority culture; and
permanent marginalization. However, it is possible to address the issue more
systematically. In essence, multi-ethnic states face two overwhelmingly important
matters relating to the map and the law of the land.
With regard to the map of the land, the key issue is whether ethnic groups are to
be given demarcated spaces where their identity is accorded special value and
recognition. Will the territory of the state be mapped on to one national identity
using the established formula of one language, one nation, one state? Or within the
country’s borders will there be a series of ethnic markers and divisions?
With regard to the law of the land, the central issue is whether ethnic groups are to
be accorded legal protection in part or all of the country’s territory. Is this to be a
single nation, blind to ethnicity in the public sphere? Or is it to be a conglomeration
of two or more identities and cultures, each afforded due recognition and protection
by the body of law that defines a state?
Taking these two issues*map of the land and law of the land*as the axes of a
two-by-two matrix generates the four options for structuring a multi-ethnic state
shown in Figure 1.
In the top left-hand quadrant, a map of the land treated as a single national space
partnered by a law of the land providing full legal protection for ethnic groups
generates multiculturalism. This is one variant of the liberal democratic ideal, in
which a state guarantees equal rights for ethnic groups throughout the length and
breadth of its territory. While this ideal has not yet been fully realized in any real-
world state, it is an increasingly visible strand of political debate and is starting to
inform policy choices in some democracies.
 Asian Journal of Political Science 115
Law of Legal
the land protection

Multiculturalism Ethnic enclaves

Map of the land

Single national space Ethnic markers

Assimilation Marginalization
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No legal
protection

Figure 1 Structuring a Multi-ethnic State.

In the top right-hand quadrant, a map of the land with ethnic markers partnered
by a law of the land that provides full legal protection for ethnic groups within clearly
demarcated spaces generates ethnic enclaves. Taking ethnicity to be a key dividing line
within society, this policy adheres to a notion of separate but equal. More negative
ways of describing it are ghettoization and ethnic cleansing. However, it is more fair
to employ a neutral terminology, for a policy of ethnic enclaves can derive from
positive expressions of ethnic identity and need not embrace the many negatives
associated with, say, ghettoization of the Jews in World War II or ethnic cleansing in
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Indeed, a policy of ethnic enclaves is another variant of the
liberal democratic ideal, providing special protections for ethnic groups in designated
parts of the land.
In the bottom left-hand quadrant, a map of the land treated as a single national
space partnered by a law of the land that provides no legal protection for ethnic
groups generates assimilation. This is the polar opposite of ethnic enclaves, for it takes
no account whatsoever of ethnicity in framing law and policy and thus has no
concept of separate spheres. All are held to be equal before the law, and minority
ethnic groups are expected over time to adopt the majority culture. For many years,
this was the dominant policy in new world states such as Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and the US, with English language and culture in the ascendancy and
minorities required to fall in line with it. More recently, however, all of these states
have made important, though still incomplete, moves away from assimilation to
either multiculturalism or ethnic enclaves by introducing legal protections for
minority cultures (Kymlicka, 2005).
In the bottom right-hand quadrant, a map of the land with ethnic markers part-
nered by a law of the land giving no legal protection to ethnic groups generates
marginalization. This is the polar opposite of multiculturalism, for it not only denies
equal rights to all ethnic groups, but also restricts the movement of designated
groups to particular parts of the national territory. In many ways, this is the policy
 116 I. Holliday

historically adopted by new world states in their dealings with indigenous peoples.
Again, however, moves have been made out of this quadrant in recent decades
(Kymlicka, 2005).
The model presented in Figure 1 identifies four ideal types. None will necessarily be
found in pure form anywhere in the world, and hybrid forms are conceivable
especially in the top and bottom halves of the matrix. It is quite possible for a state to
adopt a dual policy of multiculturalism and ethnic enclaves by introducing legal
protections for ethnic groups throughout its territory, and enhanced protections for
specified groups in designated zones. Similarly, it is possible for a state to adopt a
dual policy of assimilation and marginalization by promoting one-nation policies
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throughout the country, and persecuting selected minorities in particular parts. The
chief value of the matrix comes not in describing the contemporary world of multi-
ethnic states, but rather in serving as an analytical tool for examining the challenges
that face them. Furthermore, determining a state’s orientation with regard to this
matrix is logically antecedent to debating detailed constitutional questions to do with
federalism, consociationalism, voting systems, and so on.

Ethnic Politics in Burma

The people of the country now known as Myanmar have inherited a legacy of mainly
failed nation building from their ancestors who inhabited a country known as Burma.
Indeed, in analyzing ethnic relations in this land, a useful dividing line is the late
1980s, when a military junta took power from a collapsing military-backed quasi-
socialist regime and soon issued a decree mandating the set of name changes linked to
the major switch from Burma to Myanmar. The failure of nation building in Burma
weighs heavily on leaders and citizens in Myanmar (Smith, 2006).
Tracing back into history, a convenient starting point is British engagement with
Burma during the central decades of the nineteenth century. Prior to the first British
intervention in the mid-1820s, the territory had neither modern frontiers nor a
modern state. Indeed, in terms of both the map and the law of the land, everything
was archaic. Moreover, while the British gradually brought modern maps and laws to
Burma, they did so in ways that were mainly imposed, and thereby entirely divorced
from a project of organic nation building (Thant Myint-U, 2001; 2006). The reason is
clear and simple: the British were involved in a colonial project of imperial control,
not an indigenous project of national development. Their concerns were first to
secure their Indian Raj, the jewel in the crown of their Empire, second to exploit the
natural and human resources of their colonial possession, and only third to promote
the development of a functioning social and political system.
The British were thus cavalier about governance and the ethnic relations that
underpinned them. They incorporated Burma into the Raj for most of the colonial
period, paid little heed to traditional ruling structures in some parts and worked
closely with and through them in others, and consequently established divergent
modes of direct rule in central Burma and indirect rule in the surrounding hill
 Asian Journal of Political Science 117

country. By and large, the impact of this patchwork of governance arrangements on

ethnic relations was catastrophic. Clearly, distinct groups had not subsisted in total
peace and harmony prior to the colonial period. Nevertheless, by destroying social
structures and fundamentally reshaping the pattern of rule in the heartland, where
most of the Burmans lived, and leaving social relations and traditional modes of
control only minimally changed in the periphery, where most other ethnic groups
were to be found, the British substantially recast ethnicity and identity in Burma
(Thant Myint-U, 2001).
Registering this shift most keenly were Burmans in the heartland, who saw senior
levels of government occupied by Europeans, middle levels occupied by Indians, and
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much of the army staffed by minority peoples from the margins of the historic Burman
dominion (Smith, 2005: 264
266). Moreover, differential governance practices were
reinforced by the events of World War II, when distinct ethnic groups fought on both
sides of the overarching conflict between Britain and Japan (Allen, 1984). The result
was the plural society identified by Furnivall (1948: 304), in which a ‘medley of
peoples . . . mix but do not combine’. For him, the four main racial groups in British
Burma*European, Chinese, Indian and native*were held together solely by an
economic nexus, and had no social or cultural ties.
Burma by the time of the assassination of independence hero General Aung San in
July 1947 and of formal independence from Britain in January 1948 was, then, deeply
divided (Thant Myint-U, 2001; Taylor, 2008). Furthermore, its constituent ethnic
groups were much more varied and nuanced than the four categories listed by
Furnivall, and political systems across the territory were divergent (Leach, 1965).
Additionally, a rushed decolonization, conducted in the shadow of Indian independ-
ence, ensured that little attention was paid to ethnic relations. Indeed, the iconic
document from the period, the Panglong Agreement of February 1947, is both brief
and enigmatic, and spawned diverse interpretations that did little to promote
ethnic accord (Smith, 2005; Walton, 2008). Similarly, the subsequent 1947
constitution enshrined complex quasi-federal arrangements that satisfied neither
the Burman majority nor any of the country’s minority ethnic groups. The result was
that soon after a Communist revolt was launched in April 1948, ethnic tensions
exploded in Karen country and other uprisings occurred.
Ethnic violence was then intensified and prolonged by the historical accident that
saw part of the Chinese Revolution migrate to eastern Burma in shape of a contingent
of Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist) troops and US technical advisers employed by
the Central Intelligence Agency. In response, as Callahan (2003: 5) puts it, ‘military
and civilian leaders had few choices but to reinvigorate and redeploy the colonial
security apparatus to hold together a disintegrating country during the formative
period of postcolonial state transformation’. Thus came about the rise of a nationalist
Burman army, founded in wartime struggles against first the British and then the
Japanese, as the critical institution within the state (Selth, 2002; Callahan, 2003). At
the same time, ethnic claims made above all by Karens in the late 1940s also surfaced
 118 I. Holliday

in Arakan State, Shan State and elsewhere in the 1950s. Hostility to the government’s
Burmanization policies contributed to this (Tinker, 1956; Fairbairn, 1957).
By the late 1950s, Burmese ethnic divisions were deep and vibrant. In 1958,
constitutional clauses enabling some ethnic states to trigger autonomy provisions
provoked an upswing in revolt. At much the same time, the army*by now an
overwhelmingly Burman force*had its first taste of power through an 18-month
caretaker government headed by Chief of Staff General Ne Win. In the early 1960s,
when a return to civilian rule generated not only renewed elite bickering and
incompetence, but also federation talks, Ne Win’s army seized power in a March 1962
coup. While Burma’s experience of functioning democracy ceased, ethnic divisions
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intensified further as army leaders sought a military solution to the ethnic conflict
that now plagued the country (Smith, 1999). A new constitution promulgated in
1974 established a structure of seven Burman divisions and seven ethnic states that
persists to this day, and a 1982 nationality law identified 135 ethnic groups located
within eight major national races (the Burman majority plus seven minorities).
Nevertheless, ethnic tension remained a key motif of the entire 26 years that elapsed
from the 1962 coup to the political convulsion of the 8-8-88 uprising, which in
September 1988 prompted a formal military directorate to seize power from Ne Win’s
failed military-backed regime (Lintner, 1989).

Ethnic Politics in Myanmar

Ethnic politics in the two decades since Burma ceded place to Myanmar in June 1989
have been handled fitfully and crudely. A constitution-making process launched in
the wake of the country’s abortive 1990 general election, won in a landslide by the
NLD but ignored by Myanmar’s ‘perpetual junta’ (Callahan, 2009), quite properly
became the key forum for articulation of ethnic claims. However, constitutional
debate was just as flawed in this domain as in all others, and although many hitherto
insurgent ethnic groups concluded ceasefire deals with the SPDC in the 1990s and
‘returned to the legal fold’, their cooptation into the junta’s constitutional process
generated several proposals but scant progress. Indeed, discord over ethnic provisions
was in many respects a greater impediment to constitution-making than well-
publicized tension between the SPDC and the NLD.
Moreover, deadlock in the ethnic sphere meant that the constitution eventually put
to the people in a stage-managed May 2008 referendum made no clear advance on
the existing situation. Chapter I on basic principles and Chapter II on state structure
identify seven Bamar regions (in place of divisions) plus seven ethnic states, all of
which are formally given equal status. Chapter II spells out standard procedures for
redrawing territorial boundaries. Indeed, far more significant than any territorial
provisions is Chapter VII on the defence services, which holds in its second clause
that ‘All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence
Services’ (Government of Myanmar, 2008: 338). This opens up a major rift between
the SPDC, determined to exercise to the full Weber’s monopoly on violence
 Asian Journal of Political Science 119

throughout the country, and leading ethnic groups, both legal and illegal, that have
long maintained militias in defiance of the national army.
Looking beyond the charade of constitution-making to the real world of Myanmar
politics over the past 20 years, one significant development is the junta’s attempt to
entrench a form of harmonious nationalism built on a foundation of Bamar
Buddhism (Skidmore, 2005). Echoing one-nation strategies found in China and
other parts of Asia, the military elite has sought to rally the people around a single
Myanmar language, religion and identity held in harmony by all major ethnic groups
(Holliday, 2007). As this initiative has met with limited success, however, the junta
has also concluded the series of ceasefire agreements that has returned many ethnic
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groups to the sphere of legality and effectively seen the dominant military machine
cede control of some peripheral parts of the national territory to ethnic armies and
militias (Silverstein, 1997; Callahan, 2007; Zaw Oo and Win Min, 2007; South, 2008).
In consequence, contemporary Myanmar is a patchwork of contending ethnic
groups, and even mapping its composition is contentious. The SPDC holds firm to
the formula established by Ne Win in 1974 and 1982, which asserts that the country
has eight major national ethnic races, and 135 ethnic groups within them.2 It lists the
national races, with numbers of subsidiary ethnic groups in brackets, as: Bamar (9);
Chin (53); Kachin (12); Kayah (9); Kayin (11); Mon (1); Rakhine (7); and Shan (33)
(Government of Myanmar, 2010). While from one perspective there is much to
applaud in this nuanced presentation of Myanmar’s ethnic make-up, from another
there is here a conspicuous junta attempt to divide and rule, or at least to indicate
that the extent of ethnic division across the land justifies its disciplining control
(South, 2008). The 8/135 formula was a major bone of contention, never satisfactorily
addressed, in Myanmar’s drawn-out constitutional process.
Determining the populations of distinct ethnic groups with any degree of accuracy
is also problematic. The US Central Intelligence Agency (2010) gives this breakdown:
Bamar 68 per cent, Shan 9 per cent, Kayin 7 per cent, Rakhine 4 per cent, Chinese
3 per cent, Indian 2 per cent, Mon 2 per cent, other 5 per cent. For the seven states in
which the leading ethnic groups are concentrated, the Myanmar government gives
these populations (in millions): Shan State 4.75; Rakhine State 2.71; Mon State 2.43;
Kayin State 1.45; Kachin State 1.25; Chin State 0.47; Kayah State 0.26. However, no
state has an ethnically homogenous population, and representation of the group for
which states are named ranges from 94 per cent in Chin State to 38 per cent in Kachin
and Mon States. By the same token, many individuals from non-Bamar ethnicities
live in the seven divisions dominated by the Bamar majority with, at the extreme,
Ayeyarwaddy Division being 20 per cent Kayin (Government of Myanmar, 2010).
More generally, marriage across ethnic lines has generated a series of hyphenated
identities. Exactly how any individual chooses to express his or her identity is little
analyzed in a country marked by a dearth of scientific social research. The map of
ethnic composition therefore remains one of the great unknowns about Myanmar.
In the foreseeable future, there is little prospect of change in this regard.
 120 I. Holliday

Equally difficult to capture are the political commitments of leading forces. Always
many and varied, those forces have been thrown into considerable flux by recent
constitutional and electoral provisions. Among ethnic groups, the major challenge
has come from the constitutional requirement to fold ethnic militias into the
national army, which generated armed skirmishes notably in the Kokang region of
eastern Myanmar in August 2009 and may provoke further flare-ups in the near
future (Haacke, 2010). Among the democratic opposition, the major provocation was
found in electoral laws released in March 2010, which require political parties wishing
to contest the 2010 election to accept all of the junta’s major political moves over
the past 20 years, including writing the 1990 general election out of the country’s
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political history and entrenching a discipline-flourishing democracy through the

2008 constitution. Within weeks, the NLD voted formally to boycott the 2010
election, provoking an open split within the democratic camp over electoral strategy.
Today, key political forces throughout the country are thus fragmented and
divided. Neither among ethnic groups nor within the democratic opposition is it
possible to detect an entirely unified identity or stance. Placement of major
political forces on the matrix of multi-ethnic state forms is therefore hazardous,
and cannot be undertaken with any degree of precision. Nevertheless, the broad
outlines of where key political groups have staked out a position over the past
20 years are reasonably clear. Drawing on the flow of debate over those years,
Figure 2 grafts on to the matrix presented in Figure 1 the location of major political
forces that have sustained themselves over the two decades that Myanmar itself
has been in existence. It is at once apparent that all four quadrants contain significant
proponents.
Multiculturalism has long been the stated policy of Myanmar’s leading opposition
force, the NLD (National League for Democracy, 1996). More accurately, in Walton’s

Law of Legal
the land protection

Multiculturalism Ethnic enclaves

NLD ENC

Map of the land

Single national space Ethnic markers

Assimilation Marginalization

SPDC SPDC (Rohingya)

No legal
protection

Figure 2 Perspectives on Myanmar’s Multi-ethnic State.

 Asian Journal of Political Science 121

terminology this is the myth of Panglong to which the party subscribes in its insistence
that Myanmar already is multicultural, or rather would be if only the extreme Bamar
nationalist control imposed by the SPDC were replaced by a democratic order. Both
Aung San Suu Kyi in her writings and the NLD in its rare policy documents promote
this largely unsubstantiated belief, and with it the desire to build a polity in which ethnic
groups have full legal protection throughout the land (Aung San Suu Kyi, 1995: 223;
Walton, 2008: 904
905). Another way of putting this is that the NLD focuses on
democracy as the critical issue in Myanmar, and places ethnic relations on a secondary
footing (Smith, 2005: 274
275).
A policy of ethnic enclaves has generally been the aspiration of Myanmar’s ethnic
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nationalities inside the country, as well as of exile forces grouped in the Ethnic
Nationalities Council (ENC) (South, 2008). It corresponds to another of Walton’s
myths of Panglong, and one of the clearest statements of this position was appropriately
issued by the ENC on the 60th anniversary of the Panglong Agreement (Ethnic
Nationalities Council (Union of Burma), 2007). The sheer extent and diversity of ethnic
nationality groups makes it is hard to define their position on any given issue.
Nevertheless, it is clear that whether operating legally or illegally inside the country, or
maintaining an oppositional stance from outside, the ethnic nationalities are
overwhelmingly concentrated inside this quadrant, articulating a defiant ethnic
nationalism and seeking to secure special rights for specified ethnic groups within
demarcated areas of the country’s territory (Smith, 2005: 278
279; Smith, 2006;
Walton, 2008: 905
907).
Assimilation has always been SPDC policy, and was also the policy of the military-
backed governments that preceded it. It has thus been state policy for some 50 years. It
corresponds to still another of the myths of Panglong identified by Walton (2008: 904).
It gains expression not only in routine official pronouncements such as the three main
national causes and set-piece speeches by military leaders, but also in consistent
government attempts to consolidate national identity around the dominant Bamar
identity (South, 2003). The many approaches adopted range from military conquest in
Myanmar’s ongoing low-grade civil wars, through suppression of key ethnic markers
such as non-Buddhist religions, to education campaigns mandating Bamar language as
the medium of instruction in schools across the land. Although assimilation has
evidently been a policy failure in many peripheral parts, defeated by overt resistance,
covert non-compliance, resource constraints and state incapacity, it remains a central
plank of government policy (Holliday, 2007). No challenge to it is made by the SPDC’s
2008 constitution (Government of Myanmar, 2008).
With respect to one of Myanmar’s small ethnic groups, however, the SPDC has
consistently departed from its overarching assimilation policy and pursued instead a
policy of marginalization. The Rohingya, concentrated in Rakhine State and accounting
for 68 per cent of that state’s population according to government statistics, are in key
respects the most distinctive of Myanmar’s many ethnic groups, with religious beliefs,
social customs and physical features that set them apart from other groups and attract
hostility not only from the government, but also from many ordinary citizens. For
 122 I. Holliday

decades, government policy has been to marginalize them. The Rohingya are not
included in the list of 135 ethnic groups enshrined in the 1982 nationality law, and their
rights to property, marriage, travel, education, employment and so on are largely non-
existent. This is one of the clearest cases of ethnic persecution in the world today
(Refugees International, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2009).
Feeding the matrix of options facing multi-ethnic states into the real world of
contemporary Myanmar reveals the magnitude of the task facing political leaders
committed to sponsoring some measure of political reform. Moreover, that task is just
as great whether thin (SPDC) or thick (NLD) versions of democracy are implemented,
for while a government prepared to follow the SPDC in seeking a military solution to
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ethnic challenges may taste short-run success, in the long run a political settlement will
be needed. Either way, then, attention must turn to political solutions that can provide a
foundation for lasting stability as part of a future democratization process (Steinberg,
2001; South, 2008).

Ethnic Futures in Myanmar

When key political forces are distributed all over a two-by-two matrix, the critical
task is to find ways to bring them together across the axes that structure the matrix.
To do this, it is necessary to examine two aspects of group placement that have not
yet been considered: strength and depth. By strength is meant the intensity with
which a political force is committed to its ethnic relations policy. Is it high or low? By
depth is meant the location of a political force on the matrix. Is it near to or far from
the central point? Once issues of strength and depth are examined, the nature of
Myanmar’s ethnic challenge becomes somewhat clearer.
In the multiculturalism quadrant, NLD policy on ethnic relations is difficult to
gauge. Statements issued by party leaders are infrequent and enigmatic, typically
mandating little more than big-tent dialogue with military forces and leading ethnic
groups during a transition to democracy. Does this indicate that the strength of the
party’s commitment to a multicultural future for Myanmar is low? Does it reveal that
the NLD is not deeply embedded in this quadrant, but rather can easily be brought
near to the core of the matrix? In the absence of detailed position papers, both
questions are difficult to answer. The conclusion many draw is that the NLD believes
ethnic stains will simply come out in the democratic wash. For ethnic nationality
leaders, this generates broad frustration (South, 2008). As Smith (2005: 275) notes,
they ‘would prefer to have clear minority guarantees included as part and parcel of
the democracy process*alongside human rights and rule of law*rather than
something to be left to the vagaries and uncertainties of political decision-making
once democracy is established’.
In the ethnic enclaves quadrant, multiple diverse actors drive policy formulation
and no umbrella organization inside or outside Myanmar is fully representative of
ethnic nationality positions. Despite this, there is comparative clarity here. In terms
of strength, the ethnic nationalities are forcefully committed to a policy of ethnic
 Asian Journal of Political Science 123

enclaves. In terms of depth, they are located quite far from the central point of
the matrix. There is, then, a solid commitment to ethnic enclaves among key political
forces in Myanmar.
In the assimilation quadrant, the strength and depth of the SPDC’s commitment to
one nation look considerable. Smith notes that the SPDC has accepted the reality of
seven main non-Bamar ethnic groups, each with its own state, as promulgated in the
1974 constitution (Smith, 2005: 275
277). Its 2008 constitution makes no change in
this regard. Nevertheless, the blatant Bamar nationalism of most of the junta’s words
and deeds suggest that the military machine is solidly bound to an assimilation
policy.
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In the marginalization quadrant, systematic SPDC persecution of the Rohingya

concentrated in Rakhine State is something much external opinion feels cannot be
allowed to continue, and it may be that this is not the most substantial of the SPDC’s
policy commitments. However, there is another difficulty. When the junta recently
responded to global outrage by stating through its mouthpiece English-language
newspaper that ‘The Rohinja is not included in over 100 national races of the Union
of Myanmar’, it may well have expressed an opinion shared by many citizens (New
Light of Myanmar, 2009). Indeed, while some local voices were raised in protest, to
many observers there appears to be a social consensus behind the stigmatization of
what Kymlicka (2005: 53) calls a ‘metic group’. If so, then the situation of the
Rohingya in Myanmar is parallel to that faced, at different times, by Koreans in Japan,
Tamils in Sri Lanka, Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia, and so on.
When issues of strength and depth are examined, the extent of Myanmar’s ethnic
challenge is confirmed. Very few of the divisions that structure this multi-ethnic society
look readily amenable to negotiation and compromise. Furthermore, comparative
experience suggests that unless the people of Myanmar can engineer a political
settlement in the realm of ethnic relations, the danger of voting leading to violence
will be considerable (Holliday, 2008). Building a secure foundation here is, then, the
central issue facing the country when one day it embarks on a genuine process of
democratization, and not something that can be left for later. While conflict resolution
strategies are an essential starting point (Smith, 2007), there is a need in the longer run
to focus on principles that can underpin a durable political settlement. In Myanmar’s
difficult circumstances, how might a future path be sketched out?
One helpful development would be for the NLD to abandon the rather bland
multiculturalism that in any case it promotes with little vigour, and move to another
quadrant. Historical factors relating to Aung San’s ambivalence on ethnic questions
combined with contemporary issues regarding Aung San Suu Kyi’s unswerving focus
on democracy suggest that this will be difficult. For those who are in a position to
offer advice to the NLD, however, an important task is to advocate for this switch.
Within another quadrant, marginalization of the Rohingya cannot be expected to
resolve itself even if the SPDC passes power to a civilian regime and democracy
establishes a footing. Rather, it is necessary for those who advise groups across the
country to speak for the Rohingya and the rights they can properly claim in
 124 I. Holliday

Myanmar. To some extent that has happened in recent months, but there is clearly
much more to be done.
If, then, the NLD can be talked into moving on from the lip service it currently
pays to multiculturalism, and the country can be persuaded to review its margin-
alization of the Rohingya, the task of fashioning a multi-ethnic polity in Myanmar
will home in on two quadrants: ethnic enclaves and assimilation. It is immedi-
ately clear that between these two a choice needs to be made. Ethnic enclaves and
assimilation are utterly distinct ways of confronting a single issue. It is also clear that
the broad trend of global experience, and therefore of external influence on Myanmar,
is divided between these two perspectives. In much of the wider world, ethnic
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enclaves are increasingly seen as the way forward, and policies that would have been
unthinkable no more than two or three decades ago have been introduced in many
states (Kymlicka, 2005). In key parts of Asia, by contrast, assimilation remains
dominant. In this regard, no state is more important than China (He, 2005).
In charting ethnic futures for Myanmar, as in charting ways forward in many other
domains, one key issue will therefore be how the balance of global experience and
opinion is registered inside the country. Under SPDC control, whether direct as now
or indirect as may be the case after the 2010 general election, China’s complex and by
no means decisive influence will nevertheless remain more substantial than any other
(Holliday, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2009). Despite cross-border problems
recently witnessed in Kokang and elsewhere, and not yet fully resolved (Haacke,
2010), this influence can be expected strongly to reinforce existing SPDC assimilation
policy. Indeed, so firm is Beijing’s commitment to one China that splittist moves and
tendencies on any of its borders are certain to be regarded with deep hostility.
However, should the political sphere start to open up to more diverse internal forces
under a process of real and sustainable democratization, other global experiences will
become more relevant to the Myanmar case.
At that point it will be important to demonstrate that a policy of ethnic enclaves is
by no means the unique preserve of Western states. Indeed, in many respects the
global pioneer emerged in Asia. ‘At a time when Western liberalism advocated
neutrality and [a] difference-blind approach, India acknowledged the rights of
minorities and valued cultural diversity’, writes Mahajan (2005: 288). During its
difficult and violent independence in 1947, which generated an immediate split with
Pakistan and many subsequent fractures on both sides of the absolute divide
established then, India was endowed with a system of differentiated rights within a
federal system. In years thereafter, additional minority claims were accommodated
within this framework through constitutional revisions. Today, many minority
groups, defined by religion, language and tribe, have guaranteed rights within the
overarching framework of Indian democracy. While the resultant governance
arrangements are far from flawless, and have by no means consigned ethnic and
religious intolerance to history, many scholars maintain that they have helped to
stabilize, not undermine, Indian democracy (Dasgupta, 1998). As Mahajan (2005:
310) puts it, ‘the ability to accommodate and recognize collective community
 Asian Journal of Political Science 125

aspirations play a critical role in holding the nation-state together and minimizing
moments of internal dissent’. India’s rich experience is not always viewed positively
in Myanmar, and relations across this border remain fraught (Egreteau, 2008).
Nevertheless, there is much in Indian ethnic politics that is relevant to Myanmar as it
grapples with parallel issues.

Conclusion
At a time when politics in Myanmar is consumed by prospects for democracy,
artificial or real, it is critical that serious attention be paid to the multi-ethnic context
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in which any genuine transition will inevitably take place. Indeed, this has long been
the most important issue facing the country. The analysis of ethnicity and
democratization presented here is clearly sketchy and partial. In the case of a
country where political debate has been heavily constrained for decades, and where
major political forces are often unable to undertake even basic functions, this is
unavoidable. Nevertheless, that is no reason not to engage in thinking through the
deep challenges that exist in this domain, and that will undoubtedly have to be faced
sooner or later. The strategy adopted here is simple: to systematize the options by
focusing on issues generated by the map and the law of the land, and then to examine
how they might play out in a democratizing Myanmar.
The first requirement that emerges from this analysis can be readily stated: ethnic
relations must be accorded a full place alongside democratization. Here, an important
responsibility lies with the NLD and the massed ranks of external observers who focus
above all on the fate of Aung San Suu Kyi. Myanmar’s ethnic question is just as
important as its disfiguring democratic deficit, and must be addressed with equal
energy and vigour.
The second requirement is that some key players be encouraged to think again
about where they stand on the matrix of options facing multi-ethnic states. Here too
the NLD has a significant responsibility. The commitment to multiculturalism that
emerges from the writings of Aung San Suu Kyi and some NLD policy documents,
always suggestive rather than definitive, cannot be squared with the demands of the
ethnic nationalities. In all probability it will have to be abandoned. By the same token,
the SPDC must stop marginalizing the Rohingya, and all sides need to acknowledge an
urgent need for public education about their historic home inside the country. On
each count, in dealing with both the NLD and the SPDC, outsiders with links into the
relevant hierarchies have an important discursive role to play.
The third requirement once genuine democratization finds a place on Myanmar’s
political agenda is that open public debate of the two main contenders for ethnic
relations*ethnic enclaves and assimilation*take place and be informed by real-
world practice in its neighbourhood.
In this latter regard, proponents of assimilation can certainly advance arguments
that would play well across much of Asia, and particularly within China, the
key external power in this case. In fact, Myanmar’s geopolitical location makes
 126 I. Holliday

neo-Chinese perspectives strategically essential, and may mean that assimilation is

the most viable future for its ethnic relations. Nevertheless, it is also possible for
proponents of ethnic enclaves to point to India for evidence that Asians can
successfully balance ethnic aspirations and democracy. Indeed, while both
historical and contemporary factors clearly inhibit sympathetic understanding
across the India
Myanmar border, there is a compelling need to bridge the divide
so that debate in a democratizing Myanmar can profit fully from regional
experience.
Key insiders in the democratic movement long focused on the NLD and in the
major ethnic nationalities are well placed to make this happen. Equally, key
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outsiders can play an important role by supplementing their focus on the fate of
democracy in Myanmar with informed analysis of options for ethnic relations.
Although nothing will ever undermine the role of China in shaping Myanmar’s
future, lessons from India are also critically important in addressing challenges
now at the top of the country’s political agenda.

Acknowledgements
A draft of this article was presented at the symposium on ‘Political Development and
New Challenges for International Relations in Southeast Asia’, hosted by Yunnan
University, China, on 20
21 July 2009. The author is grateful for constructive
comments received at the symposium, and from two anonymous referees appointed
by the journal. Work on the article was supported by an award from the Research
Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No.
HKU 744407H).

Notes
[1] Myanmar is the country formerly known as Burma. The name change was introduced by the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in June 1989, when many states,
divisions, towns, streets, mountains and rivers were also given new English names. Rangoon,
for instance, became Yangon. Burman, denoting the dominant ethnic group, became
Bamar. This article falls in line with the SLORC changes. Up to 1989 it uses Burma and
associated names. Thereafter it uses Myanmar and associated names.
[2] While the SPDC talks of eight major national ethnic races containing 135 different ethnic
groups, the major non-Bamar peoples speak of ethnic nationalities.

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