The Politics of Protection:

The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the

Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth
Century 1

James Onley

Introduction
The history of Anglo­-Arab relations in the Arabian Gulf has been overshadowed
by the general assumption that the Maritime Truces (1835-1971) and the
resulting Pax Britannica were imposed by Britain. This assumption has led to the
development of two opposing interpretations of the Pax. At one extreme is the view
that the Maritime Truces were imposed as necessary acts of British benevolence
that benefited the Arabs more than the British. At the other extreme is the view
that they were acts of imperialistic domination that benefited the British far more
than the Arabs.
This article attempts to resolve the argument between these opposing points of view by
considering Britain’s presence in the nineteenth century Gulf from the perspective of
the Gulf Arab rulers. It argues that the Gulf Arab rulers, faced by the endless problem
of protection, defended their shaikhdoms in the nineteenth century by entering
into culturally sanctioned protector-protégé relationships: the Arabian custom of
protection-seeking, known as dakhalah (‘entering’ the protection of another) in the
northern Gulf and as zabana (refuge-seeking) in the lower Gulf. The rulers tried to
impose the role of protector (mujawwir) on Britain’s Political Resident in the Gulf
from the very outset of the Gulf Political Residency (1820-1971) with the result
that, in time, the Resident came to accept the role of protector and to behave, on the
whole, as the rulers expected a protector to behave. This legitimized Britain’s presence
within the regional political system in terms of Eastern Arabian culture and meant
that the Resident’s authority in the Gulf was not based solely on treaties. The norms
and obligations of the Arabian protector-protégé relationship continued to define
ruler-Resident relations for over a hundred years, until Britain’s military withdrawal
from the Gulf in 1971.

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Historical background
British India’s initial interest in Eastern Arabia grew out of a need to protect its ships
and subjects in Arabian waters. From 1797 onward, maritime toll-levying and raiding
by Arabs of the lower Gulf – similar to Bedouin practices along desert trade routes –
increasingly threatened British Indian shipping.2 To put an end to these practices, which
they considered extortion and piracy, in 1806 the British blockaded a fleet of dhows
belonging to the Qawasim (singular Qasimi), who they believed were responsible, and in
1809 and 1819 sent naval expeditions against Qasimi ports on the Persian coast and on
the “Pirate Coast”, as they called the Coast of Oman (the Gulf coast of the present-day
United Arab Emirates). After the second expedition, the British were able to impose an
anti-piracy treaty – known as the General Treaty of 1820 – on the rulers and governors
of the Pirate Coast. The Rulers of Bahrain, who wished to avoid maritime toll-paying,
were admitted to the Treaty at their request. To manage British India’s relations with
these rulers, supervise the enforcement of the General Treaty, and protect British India’s
ships and subjects in Arabian waters, the British created the post of Political Agent for
the Lower Gulf, headquartered on Qishm Island in the Strait of Hormuz. Two years
later, in 1822, the British transferred this post to Bushire on the southwest Persian
coast and amalgamated it with the much older post of Bushire Resident. The new post
of “Resident in the Persian Gulf ” – “Political Resident in the Persian Gulf ” (PRPG)
after the 1850s – was responsible for Britain’s relations with the entire Gulf region.3
To support the Resident in his role, the British assigned a naval squadron to the Gulf
to patrol its waters – a system known as “watch and cruise”. The Gulf Squadron was
under the command of the “Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf ” (SNOPG) and
was headquartered at the entrance to the Gulf, first on Qishm Island (1821-63, 1869-
79) and then on neighbouring Henjam Island (1879-1935). When Reza Shah began
to reassert Iranian sovereignty over the northern tier of the Gulf in the 1920s and ’30s,
the British moved the Squadron’s headquarters across the Gulf to Bahrain (1935-71),
where they established a naval base at Ras al-Jufair (southeast of Manamah).4 Today, the
former Royal Navy base is the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet.
After the imposition of the General Treaty, Gulf rulers consented to other treaties over
the course of the century. The most important of these were the Maritime Truces,
which established the Pax Britannica in the Gulf. The first Maritime Truce, signed
in 1835 by the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman and the Qasimi state (Hirah,
Khan, Sharjah, Hamriyah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Jazirah al-Hamra, Ras al-Khaimah,
Rams, Dibbah, Khor Fakkan, Fujairah, and Kalba along the Arab coast; Charak,
Mughu, and Lingah along the Persian coast; and a number of Gulf islands: Abu
Musa, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Kish, and Qishm), was an experimental ban on
maritime warfare during the pearling season. The Truce was a great success and a
second Truce was arranged the following year, which the newly-independent Ruler
of Umm al-Qaiwain also signed. After a series of annual twelve-month truces and
a ten-year Truce in 1843, the rulers signed a Perpetual Maritime Truce in 1853.

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 The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth Century

In recognition of the shaikhdoms’ membership in the Maritime Truce, the British

referred to them as the “Trucial States” and to the Coast of Oman as the “Trucial
Coast”.5 The British eventually invited the rulers of Bahrain and Qatar to join the
Truce in 1861 and 1916 respectively. Under the terms of the Truce, the Gulf rulers
gave up their right to wage war by sea in return for British protection against maritime
aggression. This arrangement, known as the “Trucial system”, cast Britain in the roles
of protector, mediator, arbiter, and guarantor of settlements. Later on, the rulers also
signed Exclusive Agreements (Bahrain in 1880, the Trucial States in 1892, Kuwait
in 1899, Najd and Hasa in 1915, Qatar in 1916) binding them into exclusive treaty
relations with, and ceding control of their external affairs to, the British Government.6
Although these states were still foreign territory and their rulers remained as heads
of state, their status vis-à-vis the British Government of India and (after 1947) the
British Government in London placed them informally within the British Empire.7

The rulers’ economic concerns

Eastern Arabia’s harsh environment is the key to understanding the nature of regional
politics in the pre-oil Gulf. There was fierce competition between and within ruling
families for control of the Gulf ’s few resources. Lucrative economic activity occurred
only in the coastal towns, where it was limited to the exportation of pearls and dates,
the importation of goods from abroad, shipping, and ship-building.8 Because those
who possessed scarce resources were always at risk of losing them, an atmosphere of
uncertainty and insecurity prevailed.9 This state of affairs had serious implications for
regional relations. One Gulf Resident described it as “a condition wherein every man’s
hand was ever prone to be raised against his neighbour.”10 As a result, the acute need
for protection dominated and shaped regional politics more than any other factor.
A shaikhdom’s most vulnerable source of income was its pearling fleets. Before oil, the
pearling industry was the Arabian Gulf ’s largest single income source and its biggest
employer.11 It follows that the prosperity of a Gulf shaikhdom was linked to a ruler’s
ability to safeguard his commercial ports and surrounding waters. A further problem was
the security of ships and caravans travelling between a shaikhdom and distant markets.
Rulers and tribes who controlled the maritime and overland trade routes connecting
Eastern Arabia’s towns with distant markets often levied tolls on those who used them
in the form of khuwah (a ‘brotherhood fee’ for protection) or juwaizah (a fee for free
passage). A merchant who travelled along controlled routes had to call at the principal
towns of the controllers and pay a fee to guarantee his safe passage.12 If he did not
and was subsequently intercepted by one of the controller’s patrols, his ship or caravan
would be raided. Such raids could be fatal. Before the General Treaty of 1820 banning
“piracy”, ships sailing through the Gulf had to pay khuwah or juwaizah to the Imam of
Muscat13 (who controlled the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz), the Ruler of the
Qasimi state (which controlled the lower Gulf between Lingah and Sharjah), and the
Ruler of the Ka‘ab (who controlled the sea route between Bushire and Basrah).

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Two other forms of raiding also threatened caravans and ships. Before the first
Maritime Truce of 1835, all rulers, including those who did not control a trade route,
used privateers as well as their own military forces to engage in the wartime raiding
(ghazu) of their enemies.14 Pearling fleets were the most vulnerable to ghazu, as raiders
always knew where to find them. A successful raid on a pearling fleet could plunge
a shaikhdom into deep recession. The other form of raiding was piracy, in the usual
meaning of the term. To the British, the different kinds of maritime raiding were all
piracy. And it is apparent that they all interfered with the economic well-being of the
Gulf shaikhdoms whose ships were plundered and destroyed.
What clearly emerges from this overview of the Arabian Gulf shaikhdoms’ economy
is the high vulnerability of the main sources of income to raiding, the extent to which
raiding could seize or destroy limited resources, and the resulting importance of
protection. The next sections examine how the Arabian Gulf rulers sought to provide
the necessary protection.

The rulers’ military concerns

Without military power, a ruler could not protect and maintain the economic well-
being and political integrity of his shaikhdom. Henry Rosenfeld has observed in Arabia
“an interlocking hierarchical social structure status-scale ... based on military power
and the ability to control certain territory and groups and maintain independence
from other groups.”15 In other words, the greater a ruler’s military strength, the
more territory and economic resources he could control, and the higher his status in
regional politics. Borders naturally fluctuated according to rulers’ military abilities. If
a ruler was succeeded by one of significantly greater or lesser ability, there were often
territorial consequences. There are countless examples of village shaikhs asserting their
independence and of town rulers taking villages under their control.16 The majority
of Gulf Arab rulers lacked the resources they needed to guarantee the security of their
shaikhdoms. Their personal military forces were small, leaving the rulers vulnerable
to antagonistic regional powers, or alliances formed against them.17
Military forces in the full-time employ of Arabian Gulf rulers in the nineteenth century
ranged in size from 20 to 200 men – few rulers could afford to employ more.18 In
1905, for instance, John Lorimer notes that the Gulf rulers had the following number
of armed retainers:
Gulf rulers’ armed retainers19
STATE ARMED RETAINERS
Oman 1,050
Bahrain 200 (plus another 240 retained by his brother and three sons)
Kuwait 100
Dubai 100
Ras al-Khaimah 70
Sharjah 20

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 The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth Century

A rulers’ military forces were composed primarily of armed retainers — known as

fidawiyyah (singular fidawi) in the northern Gulf and mutarziyyah (singular mutarzi)
in the southern Gulf — employed to enforce the ruler’s will within his shaikhdom,
and secondarily of warriors from tribes in subordinate alliance with the ruler, whom
the ruler called up as needed. The extent of a ruler’s military resources depended upon
the economic prosperity of his shaikhdom. The greater a ruler’s financial resources,
the more fidawiyyah or mutarziyyah he could employ, and the more tribal shaikhs he
could reward for their loyalty and military support. Madawi al-Rasheed explains how
the rulers “maintained a tradition of subsidising these [tribal] shaikhs through the
continuous distribution of cash and gifts of rice, coffee, sugar, camels, and weapons.
These gifts acted as a bribe to maintain the allegiance of the shaikhs, who remained
to a great extent autonomous.”20 As one Assistant Resident noted in 1845: “Of
so great importance is [the Bedouin tribes’] alliance or forbearance considered by
the maritime chieftains, that these ... find it their best policy to conciliate them by
repeated and considerable presents.”21 A ruler’s payments to secure loyalty accounted
for the majority of his expenses.
The principal difference between the leading shaikh of a tribe and the ruling shaikh
of a shaikhdom was the latter’s command of fidawiyyah or mutarziyyah. While both
shaikhs had authority derived from their leadership qualities and social status, only
the latter had the coercive power to collect taxes and tribute, enforce laws, and punish
criminals.22 Both led, but only the latter ruled. Only the latter had the ability to
control enough people and territory to constitute a shaikhdom or emirate. The key to
rulership was the consistent loyalty of one’s people, but even the ablest leader could
not secure this without money.23 That no shaikh could rule his people without a
command of economic power explains why all rulerships were town-based, at the heart
of economic activity in the Gulf.24 A town fort, therefore, symbolized both control
of a town and the rulership of a shaikh. It also symbolized the difference between
a ruler of a shaikhdom and a leader of a tribe, who lived in a tent. Peter Lienhardt
explains that, “when rulers have been overthrown, the seizing of the fort has often
been the main steppingstone to power.”25 The British, too, drew upon the symbolism
of forts to great effect. If a ruler seriously breached the terms of the General Treaty
or Maritime Truce and then ignored the Resident’s instructions for reparation, the
Resident usually threatened to bombard the ruler’s fort. In the rare instances when
the Resident was forced to follow through on his threat, the ruler suffered a powerful
blow to his rulership, if not the end of it.
As their military forces were never very large, the rulers relied upon tribal alliances
either to redress the balance when faced by a stronger enemy, or to gain an advantage
over an enemy of equal strength.26 Alliances did not always work, of course, nor
did they always last. In the ever-changing political environment of the Gulf, rulers
were quick to seize advantages and abandon liabilities with the result that alliances
themselves were ever-shifting.27 The rulers’ allies were often fair weather friends.

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The rulers’ tribute relations

If a ruler faced the impending attack of a much stronger enemy, he would typically
seek the protection of a regional power to ward off the threat. These protectors gave
guarantees of defence in return for subservience or the relinquishment of some
degree of independence. The protégé’s payment of tribute symbolized this and had
a transforming effect.28 The protector regarded his tributary as a part of his own
tribe.29 Similarly, the protector regarded his tributary’s territory as his territory, but
with one important distinction. The protector considered such land, especially if it
was at some distance from his shaikhdom, to be a ‘dependency’ rather than a part
of his shaikhdom. The protector usually left the governing of his dependency to the
local ruler or tribal leader who had submitted to his authority.30 When he did, the
only noticeable difference between an independent shaikhdom and a dependency,
apart from the tribute payments, was that the dependants or protégés owed allegiance
to their protector as if they were his own subjects. Indeed, he considered them his
subjects.
Custom dictated the amount of tribute an individual protégé should pay his protector,
if he were to pay any at all.31 Custom did not dictate what a protégé ruler should pay,
however, although he was usually able to negotiate the payment. If the parties failed
to agree on the amount, they would often enlist a neutral ruler to arbitrate. Tribute
was normally paid annually and could take many forms: a fixed sum of money; a share
of the annual customs revenue; a share of the agricultural produce (mainly dates); a
certain number of horses, camels, etc.; provision of men for military service; and
even zakat (enjoined Islamic alms that, in the Sunni interpretation, Muslim officials
normally collect from Muslim subjects).32 Tribute was typically imposed as khuwah.
In its original form, khuwah was a ‘brotherhood fee’ paid voluntarily by the weak to
the strong in return for protection.33 The protector became, in effect, his protégé’s big
brother, with all the responsibilities that entailed.
A would-be attacker’s forceful imposition of khuwah as a ‘protection tax’ on an
opponent, however, symbolized not brotherly relations but political domination.34
Militarily strong rulers would often threaten to attack weaker rulers with the
intention of tribute-collection, not military conquest. The same tactic was
employed by those who controlled Arabia’s trade routes and imposed tolls (often as
khuwah) on those who used them. If the ruler of a shaikhdom, skipper of a ship, or
leader of a caravan refused to pay tribute to a would-be attacker, he risked military
conquest or raiding. Payment in this context depended largely upon the payer’s
belief in the likelihood of attack. There had to be a threat, or a perceived future
threat; no threat, no tribute. From a Western perspective this looked like extortion
– an Arabian form of protection-racketeering. But there was one important
difference: the ‘extortionist’ assumed responsibility for the complete protection
of his ‘victim’. Where actual war was involved, tribute could have the positive
effect of transforming an adversarial relationship into a protective one, and was the
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 The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth Century

customary method of settling a conflict. Paul Harrison observed in 1924 that “the
amount of tribute extorted is simply the measure of the balance reached between
[the] two contending forces.”35
Henry Rosenfeld tells us how a group’s increased power typically resulted in “increased
tribute payments, tributary groups, and honour”, while decreased power meant “less
ability to receive tribute, less recognition and, as the group itself becomes tributary,
[a] gradual reduction on the status scale of honour.”36 Madawi al-Rasheed elaborates
on this analysis:
The inter-connection between military power and economic power was a
cyclical process. The two factors, power and tribute, were interdependent;
the alteration of one factor automatically affected the other. The more power
the amirs had, the more they were able to collect tribute. Equally, more
tribute meant more power. The reverse of the cycle was also possible. Less
military power meant no effective control over trade, pilgrims, and subjects,
consequently, less tribute. Any decrease in tribute meant less subsidies, less
loyalty, and a diminished ability to invest in the means of coercion. As a result,
the amirs’ power would inevitably be affected and would tend to decrease.37
Tribute payment created what Rosenfeld calls the “web of overlordship and the
recognition of a hierarchy of dominance” in Arabia.38 Personal honour and status
relations were at the centre of Arabian politics in the nineteenth century, as they are
today. Just as one speaks of ‘status relations’ and not ‘class relations’ at the personal
level in Arabia,39 so are regional relations a reflection of status relations between rulers
vis-à-vis their military power. Saddam Husain’s financial demands on the Amir of
Kuwait in the months preceding the August 1990 invasion, for example, resemble the
familiar pattern of tribute-collection followed by Gulf Arab rulers in the nineteenth
century.

The rulers, protection-seeking, and the protector-protégé relationship

Hitherto, historians have explained the relations between Gulf Arab rulers and the
rulers’ ever-changing alliances solely in terms of self-interest and shrewd pragmatism.
As yet, no historical explanation has viewed intraregional relations through the lens
of Arabian political culture. Yet the tribute system upon which these relations were
based was in fact regulated by the Arabian custom of protection-seeking. The norms
and obligations of the protector-protégé relationship provided the rulers with an
effective survival strategy in the face of Arabia’s ever-shifting power dynamics. The
rulers used these norms and obligations in a variety of ways to legitimate and regulate
their political relations with others – including their relations with the British
Government.
As political relations between the shaikhdoms were really relations between individual
shaikhs, anthropological studies of protection-seeking customs at the individual level
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 James Onley

are relevant to the study of regional political relations in the Gulf. Paul Dresch, Harold
Dickson, Peter Lienhardt, and Sulayman Khalaf have examined these customs in
Arabia.40 What follows is a synthesis of their findings.
Just as personal honour was central to regional political relations, so too was it
central to the politics of protection. If someone requests protection, honour demands
that protection be given.41 The granting of protection is considered an honourable
deed, which enhances the reputation of the protector, while refusing protection has
the opposite effect.42 Once protection is granted, the protégé (al-dakhil, al-zabin,
or al-jar) is ‘on the honour’ (fi wajhhu) of his protector (mujawwir).43 The protégé
is henceforth in his charge and the protector is obligated to defend him.44 If the
protector is weaker than his protégé’s enemy, he may only be able to hide his protégé
and smuggle him to safety.45 Protégés of the same protector are forbidden to offend or
attack each other, just as all others – including the protector himself – are forbidden
to violate the protection placed over them.46 For a protector to offend his own protégé
is the greatest disgrace of all.47 Although respect for the honour of the protector and
fear of disgrace restrains the protector’s own people from harming his protégé, it does
not inhibit outsiders. There is no question of outsiders ‘respecting’ the honour of the
protector. They are not restrained by piety, shame, or fear of God because protection
is not the same as sanctuary. What restrains outsiders is fear of the protector and his
people and the vengeance they will seek.48
This law of entering another’s protection, known as dakhalah (entering the protection
of another) in the upper Gulf and zabana (refuge-seeking) in the lower Gulf, is a
sacred and honoured custom throughout Arabia.49 One claims dakhalah by saying
ana dakhilak or ana dakhil ‘ala Allah wa ‘alaik (I am your protégé, I enter upon God’s
pardon and yours).50 Dresch describes this as entering the ‘personal peace’ of another.
Every tribesman has a ‘peace’ by virtue of his personal honour.51 If a protégé offends
someone else, especially a fellow protégé, or otherwise behaves badly, he violates this
‘peace’ and insults the honour or ‘face’ (wajh) of his protector. When this happens,
the protector may justifiably take action against his protégé or revoke his protection.
If someone violates dakhalah, the consequences for the protector and his people are
severe.52 Honour demands that the protector exact compensation or take revenge
on behalf of the victim. If he cannot, he is obligated to personally compensate the
victim out of his own pocket. Only revenge or compensation will restore the honour
of the victim and wipe out the disgrace to himself. In this system of protection, a
protégé is answerable to his protector who, in turn, is answerable to the public for the
actions of his protégé. If one has a claim against a protégé, he is supposed to go to the
protector, not the protégé.53 This effectively casts the protector in the secondary roles
of mediator, arbiter, and guarantor of settlements. If one side breaks a settlement,
the settlement’s guarantor is supposed to intervene on the side of the victim.54 These
norms and expectations influenced the conduct of the Gulf rulers toward the British,
and eventually became a shaping force in Anglo-Arab relations.55

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 The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth Century

One may become the protégé of another without demeaning himself. The
protégé has a ‘peace’ of his own and one day the protector may be in need of
it.56 A ruler who seeks protection, however, loses some of his personal honour
and prestige, as Rosenfeld’s comments in the previous section suggest. Protégés
of rulers – be they individuals, tribes, or other rulers – normally paid tribute to
their protector.57 In this sense, protégés become like a ruler’s own subjects, from
whom he collects taxes such as zakat. In both cases the payer is entitled to the
payee’s protection.
If a ruler was unable to secure, or unwilling to accept, the protection of a regional
power, or an alliance with a less powerful ruler, and faced certain defeat in battle
against his enemy, he had one last resort. It was acceptable for him to place himself
under his enemy’s protection as a form of reluctant nominal subservience. This was
a political compromise preferable to outright military defeat. A skilful ruler might
even use such a temporary submission to his advantage. This practice originates from
the tactic Bedouin warriors resorted to in the face of certain death in battle, whereby
the supplicant says to his enemy, Ya fulan ana fi wajhak (O so-and-so, I place myself
under your protection / on your honour). If he gets the reply, Inta fi wajh hi, sallim
salahak (You are under my protection / on my honour, hand over your arms), the
supplicant is safe. The protector is then obligated to defend the supplicant with his
life until the battle, and possibly the war, is over. The supplicant becomes, effectively,
a prisoner of war and is not free to go on his way.58
For a ruler, there was little advantage in surrendering after the commencement of
hostilities; only his life would be spared. It was far better for him to offer submission
before battle, then his rulership would be spared as well. If he did this, he became
a protégé and was required to pay tribute as a sign of submission and political
subordination. Henceforth, the ruler’s shaikhdom was considered a dependency of
his protector, as discussed above. The ruler became, in effect, a governor who ruled on
behalf of his protector.59 Unlike a military conquest, a submission was not normally
followed by military occupation, although the protector might send a political agent
(wakil or muctamad) to reside at the ruler’s court, making the ruler’s submission
largely symbolic and the incorporation often nominal.60 With his rulership intact, a
submissive ruler or tribal leader would pay tribute and bide his time until he was able
to reassert his independence, often by securing the protection of another regional
power or an alliance with a less powerful ruler or tribal leader. For powerful rulers and
tribes, these submissions were often nominal and always temporary, lasting no more
than a few years. For weak rulers and tribes, submission involved a greater loss of
autonomy and tended to be more permanent, lasting for decades or even generations,
as did the tribute payments.
Frauke Heard-Bey explains how the greater the geographical distance between the
governor of a dependency and his ruler, the greater the governor’s independence, and
the less his ruler’s personal influence in the town, district, or dependency under the
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governor’s supervision.61 Another factor was a ruler’s choice of governor. The stronger
the bonds of trust between governor and ruler, the more a ruler could delegate
authority without the risk of secession. “This is the reason”, says Heard-Bey, “why
most Rulers put a brother or a son in charge of an important dependency, but this
was not always a sure safeguard against secessionist movements, either led by the wali
[governor] or perpetrated by the inhabitants themselves.”62
The rulers also had governors to contend with at home because a shaikhdom was
typically divided into areas controlled by governors on behalf of the ruler. The
governing of a ruler’s shaikhdom and dependencies by a number of semi-autonomous
governors, some of whom might be rivals for the rulership, meant that a ruler’s
authority rested, not only on a general acceptance of his rule and his command
of economic resources and armed retainers, but ultimately on his superior ability
to protect his subjects and dependants. A ruler’s presumed or actual skill at both
forging military alliances and devising effective protection-seeking tactics when his
shaikhdom and dependencies were threatened was what kept him in power over his
governors. The internal structure of his shaikhdom and dependencies thus motivated
him to obtain the most powerful protector he could – hence the frequent appeals of
the Gulf rulers for British protection.
The protection of their shaikhdoms and dependencies from antagonistic regional
powers was an on-going problem for the smaller Gulf rulers. Often they lacked
sufficient military resources and were forced to seek or accept outside support, as
these tables of facts from the history of the ruling family of Bahrain, the Al Khalifah,
illustrate:

Occasions when the Al Khalifah of Bahrain sought military alliances: 63

ALLIES DATES
1. Ruler of Kuwait (al-Sabah) 1770, 1782-3, 1811, 184364
2. Shaikh of Ruwais and Qais Island (al-Jalahimah) 1782-3, 184265
3. Shaikh of Qais Island and Bida‘ (al-Bin-‘Ali) 1842, 1847
4. Shaikhs of western Qatar (al-Na‘im) c.1766-1937
5. Rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah (al-Qasimi) 1816-19, 1843, 1867
6. Ruler of Dubai (al-Maktum) 1843
7. Bani Hajir tribe of Hasa 1843, 1869
8. Ruler of Abu Dhabi (Al Nahyan) 1829, 1867

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 The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth Century

Occasions when the Al Khalifah of Bahrain sought or accepted protection: 66

PROTECTORS DATES
1. Ruler of Hasa (Bani Khalid) 1716-95
2. Persian Prince-Governor of Fars c.1784-9, 1839, 1843, 1859-60
3. Persian Governor of Bushire 1799
4. Amir of Najd and Hasa (Al Sa‘ud) 1801-5, 1810-11, 1816-17,
1830-3, 1836, 1843, 1847-50,
1851-5, 1856-9 1861-5, 1867-71
5. Imam of Muscat (Al Bu-Sa‘id) 1800, 1801, 1805-6, 1811-16,
1820-1, 1829
6. Commander of the Egyptian army in Hasa 1839-40
7. Ottoman Governor of Egypt 1853
8. Ottoman Sharif of Mecca 1853
9. Ottoman Governor of Baghdad 1859-60
10. British Resident in the Gulf 1805, 1823, 1828, 1830, 1838,
1839, 1842, 1843, 1844, 1846,
1847, 1848, 1849, 1851, 1854,
1859, 1861, 1869, 1872, 1873,
1874, 1875, 1878, 1879, 1880,
1881, 1887, 1888, 1892, 1895

The Al Khalifah may have had an unusually high number of protectors, but they
were by no means unusual in having been protégés. All the ruling families of the Gulf
today have been the protégés of regional and extra-regional powers in the past. In the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, most of them sought British protection. The reason
was simple: the Resident had the greatest coercive power in the Gulf at his command:
the Gulf Squadron of the Indian Navy and later of the Royal Navy. The Resident had a
better chance than any other regional protector of punishing and exacting compensation
from offenders. As a result, British protection was the least likely to be violated.
By allying with a powerful protector like the British Government, a ruler also reinforced
his own position. If a ruler could create the impression amongst his family and governors
that he alone had access to the Resident and that the beneficial connection would be
lost without him, he gained security for his rulership against internal rivals.67 In the
act of protecting a shaikhdom, either militarily or politically, Britain also enhanced the
political status of the ruler and his shaikhdom within the regional political system. British
protection “bestowed a legal status on the concept of ‘shaykhdom’,” as J. E. Peterson
puts it.68 It also served as recognition of shaikhly families as sovereign governments, thus
reinforcing their independence within the regional political system. Peter Lienhardt
explains that British protection and recognition accorded the rulers “a status higher than
the traditional way of life had allowed them”, reinforcing their authority within their
35
 James Onley

shaikhdoms and dependencies.69 The withdrawal of British protection and recognition

from a shaikhdom or its dependencies, therefore, made a ruler vulnerable to a family
coup d’état or a tribal secession respectively. In the case of the Trucial Coast, British
protection and recognition of the coastal rulers also helped to empower most of them
to dominate the independent rulers and tribal leaders of the interior, whom the British
had not recognized. The result was the conversion of the interior shaikhdoms and tribal
areas (dirahs) into dependencies of the coastal shaikhdoms. In the 1950s and ’60s, the
British helped the coastal rulers to achieve complete control over these dependencies,
in effect to annex them, enabling a British-run oil company, Petroleum Development
(Trucial Coast), to explore and drill wells there.
Despite the advantages British protection brought, it proved to be a double-edged
sword for the rulers. It came at a high price: accountability to the Resident for any
action he disapproved of. Accountability was common to both British and Arabian
understandings of the protégé-protector relationship, of course, but the problem
for the rulers was that the Resident was able to hold them thoroughly accountable.
Once a Gulf Arab ruler obtained a promise of British protection, he disregarded the
resulting obligations at his peril. Furthermore, while British protection had enabled
many rulers to acquire new inland dependencies, it had the opposite effect on rulers
with overseas dependencies. The Maritime Truces forbad the use of maritime force,
and the protection and control of tributary domain was no exception. By 1872, the
Al Khalifah of Bahrain had lost the majority of their dependencies in Qatar and,
by 1887, the Qawasim (singular: Qasimi) of the Trucial Coast had lost their last
dependency on the Persian coast: Lingah.

Britain and the role of protector

The British Government had been extremely reluctant to assume the role of protector
in the Gulf. Although the Gulf Residency had been created in 1820 with the aim
of stabilizing the region, the British Government rejected the idea of a Maritime
Truce until 1835. Even then, the early Truces were temporary, giving the Resident a
measure of flexibility in their annual renewal. Not until 1853 did the Government
accept responsibility for the permanent maritime protection of the Trucial Coast. The
reasons for the Government’s hesitation were, first, that adopting the role of protector
might draw Britain into the unstable and unpredictable affairs of the mainland,
forcing it to commit military forces there. Shortly after the establishment of the Gulf
Residency, the Government realized that the Pax Britannica would be more effectively
maintained without land forces. The high death rate of the first Gulf garrison – 444
soldiers and 10 officers killed in battles against just one interior Omani tribe during
1820-21 and the decimation of the garrison by disease during 1821-22 – prompted
Britain to withdraw its land forces from the Arabian Gulf in early 1823.70 Thereafter,
Britain limited its military activity to the range of its naval guns. It re-constituted its
Gulf garrison only in wartime or when war threatened (1856-58, 1914-18, 1939-45,

36
 The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth Century

and 1961-71). Added to this was the problem that the Imam of Muscat, the Amir
of Najd and Hasa, the Persian Prince-Governor of Fars, and the Ottoman Governor
of Baghdad all claimed Bahrain as a dependency and had attempted to subjugate it
at one time or another. Successive Residents feared, rightly, that the protection of
Bahrain would bring them into conflict with these regional powers. For this reason,
the Ruler of Bahrain was not invited to join the Maritime Truce until 1861, twenty-
six years after the Trucial Rulers.
The second reason for the Government’s hesitation to offer permanent protection
before 1853 was that the British feared it might encourage despotism, as it had
in some Indian states. The third reason was that the Resident would lose political
leverage with the Gulf rulers if he switched from a conditional to an unconditional
protection policy. The fourth reason was that permanent protection would shoulder
the Government with the role of guarantor of the state. Successive Residents feared
that such a role might considerably add to their burden by placing upon them “the
onus and responsibility of being the arbiter in every dispute, and [the] settlement of
endless claims”, to use the words of Major James Morrison (Resident 1835-37).71
Possible misunderstandings about what the Gulf rulers were asking of the Resident
might have also contributed to the Government’s reluctance to assume a protective
role in the Gulf. The British concept of protection relied on the protector’s ability
to defend his protégé physically and bring an attacker to justice. As a deterrent
to attack, it relied solely on a would-be attacker’s respect for the firepower of the
protector. The Arabian concept relied additionally on a protégé’s respect for the
honour of his protector, thus inhibiting enemies who shared the same protector from
attacking each other. It also relied on the protector’s secondary roles of mediator,
arbiter, and guarantor of settlements to provide a peaceful channel for would-be
attackers to settle their differences with the protégé, as discussed above. It seems that
early Residents either misunderstood or rejected the duties of this role, in which
Gulf rulers were trying to cast them. Many rulers were frustrated by the failure of
successive Residents to live up to these expectations. For instance, early Residents
were usually willing to mediate between rulers, but they refused to play the role of
guarantor for the settlements reached. Settlement negotiations usually broke down as
a result, as Lieutenant Arnold Kemball (Assistant Resident 1841-52, Resident 1852-
55) observed in 1844: “Experience has shown that the most solemn engagements
between these chieftains ..., formed without the guarantee of the Government, are
no security whatever for the maintenance of peace”. “[They] deem the guarantee of
the British to any sort of arrangement a sine qua non.” “Attempts have been made
to induce the several chiefs to enter into a mutual agreement among themselves,
without British guarantee ...; but these have ever been rendered nugatory by Arab
pride and sense of honour”.72 The greatest frustration, of course, came from the
early Residents’ routine rejection of the rulers’ requests for protection in the first
place.

37
 James Onley

Before the first Maritime Truce in 1835 – the experimental ban on maritime warfare
during the pearling season – Residents feared that a larger naval presence and
corresponding expenditure would be necessary if Britain were to assume responsibility
for the maritime protection of the Gulf shaikhdoms. The acting Resident who
proposed the Truce to the Rulers of the Coast of Oman (later the Trucial Coast),
Lieutenant Samuel Hennell (1834-35), only did so because of the Rulers’ enthusiastic
support for the idea.73 So desirable was British protection in Eastern Arabia that,
shortly after the signing of the General Treaty of 1820 banning “piracy”, the principal
pearl merchants of Sharjah offered to pay khuwah to the British Government of India
at the rate of MT$20 (Rs.40) per boat if the Gulf Squadron would permanently
station a gunboat at the pearl banks to protect their pearling fleets.74 British reports
on the first Maritime Truces clearly indicate that its annual renewal was a product of
the initiative and insistence of the majority of the rulers, and was not imposed upon
them by the Resident. When the time came for the Truce’s first renewal in April 1836,
Lieutenant Kemball, observed that it was renewed “with the undisguised satisfaction
of the respective chiefs”.75
The idea to extend the Truce’s coverage beyond the summer pearling season into a
perpetual ban on all maritime warfare was first proposed by Shaikh Sultan bin Saqr
al-Qasimi of Sharjah in September 1836, just sixteen months after the introduction
of the first Maritime Truce. The Resident, Major James Morrison, rejected the
Shaikh’s proposal. The British Government, Morrison explained, lacked the resources
to enforce a perpetual truce. Or so he believed.76 The British were also convinced
that, so long as the ban on maritime warfare permitted rulers to pursue feuds outside
of the pearling season, they would be content “to allow their feuds and animosities
to remain in abeyance, under the idea that after a specified date it would always be
in their power to indulge their deeply rooted feelings of animosity, should they feel
disposed to do so.”77 Were the ban to become perpetual, it could not provide for this.
Samuel Hennell (Assistant Resident 1826-38, Resident 1838-41, 1843-52) believed
that precluding the rulers “from avenging insults, or taking satisfaction for wrongs,
whether real or imaginary, would so embitter the sentiments of hatred entertained
[by the rulers] towards each other, that a series of aggressions and retaliations would
speedily arise, which would only tend to defeat the very object for which the peace
had been negotiated.”78
In 1838, when Captain Hennell toured the Coast of Oman to renew the Maritime
Truce for a third time, Shaikh Sultan bin al-Qasimi “not only expressed his earnest
desire for a renewal of the Truce, but added that it would afford him sincere pleasure
if it could be changed into the establishment of a permanent peace upon the seas.”79
Hennell rejected the Shaikh’s proposal, for the reasons just mentioned. Undeterred,
the Shaikh urged the Resident to agree to an annual twelve-month truce instead. As
the other rulers consented to the Shaikh’s proposal, Hennell drew up a new truce
accordingly, which the rulers readily signed.80

38
 The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth Century

So successful were the annually renewed Truces, that the Resident agreed to guarantee
a ten-year Maritime Truce in 1843. The following year, Lieutenant Kemball observed
that the rulers “are now quite as much interested in its maintenance as ourselves; and
of this they exhibited ample proof in their united readiness to renew it for so long
a period as ten years, or even more, had such been desired or deemed expedient.”81
J. B. Kelly explains that,
so changed had the shaikhs’ outlook become by the time of the conclusion
of the Ten Years’ Truce that they often acted on their own initiative to
punish infractions of the truce by their subjects, even before these had been
brought to the notice of the Resident. Sometimes they even went further
and acted to prevent the commission of piracy. The Shaikh of ‘Ajman, for
example, when a Qasimi vessel from Lingah ran aground in a storm off
Ajman in 1845, hastened to the scene with his brothers, sword in hand,
and swore to cut down the first man who tried to plunder the vessel.82
After the successful completion of the ten-year Truce in 1853, it was evident to the
British that their reasons for not granting permanent protection were unfounded.
That year, the Resident finally invited the Rulers of the Coast of Oman to sign a
Perpetual Maritime Truce, seventeen years after the Ruler of Sharjah first proposed
the idea. All the Rulers signed without hesitation.
The slow realisation that earlier British fears were unwarranted is also reflected in the
British Government’s gradual change in attitude towards the protection of Bahrain.
Until 1838, the Government maintained a straightforward ‘no protection’ policy for
the reasons outlined above.83 In 1838, however, it adopted a cautious ‘emergency
protection only’ policy dependent upon British approval of the Ruler. In 1851, it
adopted an ‘unofficial protection only’ policy irrespective of British approval of the
Ruler.84 In 1861, after the Ruler became increasingly warlike, it adopted a ‘permanent
protection’ policy and admitted Bahrain to the Perpetual Maritime Truce, making it
Bahrain’s Protecting Power.85 Finally, in 1880, it assumed responsibility for Bahrain’s
foreign affairs.86 After 1861, it was able to maintain political leverage with the Ruler
and avoid encouraging despotism, as experienced in the Indian states, by limiting its
protection to the shaikhdom. It would not guarantee the Ruler’s position within the
shaikhdom. Time and time again, the Resident informed the Ruler that,
it was highly desirable that the Chief of Bahrein should learn to rely on his
own resources for the maintenance of his position, for as long as he could
count on the constant presence of foreign support he would surely remain
careless and pathetic and disinclined to exert himself in strengthening his
position by good administration and a conciliatory policy towards his
people.87
The only way the Ruler could secure British support for his rulership in moments
of crisis was if the Resident wished it to continue. All the Trucial Rulers were in the
39
 James Onley

same position. This motivated most of the rulers most of the time to maintain good
relations with the Resident.
The strength of the British position in the Arabian Gulf in the nineteenth century was
that the British alone had the power to stop the cyclical pattern of protection-seeking,
raiding, and invasion amongst the rulers. Residents could use this position to their
advantage as an indirect method of keeping in power those rulers who co-operated
with them to maintain the Pax Britannica, and keeping out of power those who did
not. Occasionally Residents employed more direct methods, intervening personally
to remove rulers unwilling to co-operate with them and installing shaikhs who would
uphold the Pax Britannica. One must view this in context, however. Other regional
protectors, such as the Al Sa‘ud of Najd and the Al Bu-Sa‘id of Muscat, regarded
such interventions as a right and behaved accordingly. The fact that protégés were
occasionally deposed by their protectors did nothing to diminish the general demand
for protection and the willingness of the rulers to accept it.

Conclusion: the rulers and the Pax Britannica

This study has argued that the Gulf Arab rulers, faced by the endless problem of
protection, defended their shaikhdoms during the nineteenth century by entering
into culturally sanctioned protector-protégé relationships. It has shown how the rulers
tried to impose the role of protector on the Resident and the British Government
from the very outset of the Gulf Residency and that, in time, the Resident came to
accept the role of protector and to behave, on the whole, as the rulers expected a
protector to behave. This legitimized Britain’s presence within the regional political
system in terms of Eastern Arabian culture and meant that the Resident’s authority in
the Gulf was not based solely on treaties. From the rulers’ perspective, the Resident
was a Gulf ruler himself, except that he was the most powerful and influential ruler
they had ever known. The Gulf rulers gave him the respectful titles of Ra’is al-Khalij
(Chief of the Gulf ) and Fakhamat al-Ra’is (His High Presence the Chief ).88
Although the ban on maritime warfare deprived the Al Khalifah and the Qawasim
of their dependencies in Qatar and on the Persian coast, the Pax Britannica benefited
the Gulf shaikhdoms – including Bahrain, Sharjah, and Ras al-Khaimah – as much
as it did the British. This explains why the Pax was so successful: it was largely self-
enforcing. To assume, as many now do, that Britain imposed its protection on the Gulf
shaikhdoms against the will of their rulers, is not only to ignore the Eastern Arabian
tradition of protection-seeking and the successful use the rulers made of it, but also
to completely disregard the historical record, set forth in this article, which shows that
the protection treaties were initiated as much by the Gulf rulers as by the British, and
that it was mainly the rulers who worked towards the establishment of the Perpetual
Maritime Truce. British protection was not imposed on the Gulf shaikhdoms, but
sought after and welcomed by the Gulf rulers, despite the restrictions it placed on
their rulerships.89
40
 The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth Century

The view of British protection as unsolicited and unwanted only arose when memories
of the turbulent years before the Maritime Truce became distant, when the benefits
of British protection became less apparent, and when the British became increasingly
involved in domestic affairs.90 Even so, the need for British protection remained. In
1968, when the British Government declared it could no longer afford the £12,000,000
per annum to keep its forces in the Gulf and would be withdrawing its military in
1971, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahyan, offered to pay for
the military presence himself. The Ruler of Dubai made a similar offer, adding that he
believed all four oil-producing states under British protection – Abu Dhabi, Bahrain,
Dubai, and Qatar – would be willing to cover the cost. The British Government
declined these unprecedented offers, however, and withdrew its forces in December
1971.91 One need only compare this with Britain’s withdrawal from Egypt, Palestine,
or Aden to appreciate the difference between Britain’s involvement in the Arabian
Gulf and its involvement in the rest of the Arab world.

Abbreviations
Asst. Assistant
For. Foreign
IOR India Office Records, British Library, London
MT$ Maria Theresa dollars
n. footnote
PRPG Political Resident in the Persian Gulf
Rs. Rupees
Sec. Secretary
SNOPG Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf (the Commander of the Gulf
Squadron)
Notes
1. This is a revised version of a substantially longer article, entitled “The Politics of Protection in
the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century”, published in
New Arabian Studies, vol. 6 (2004), pp. 30-92. It is based on research conducted in Bahrain,
funded by the Bahrain-British Foundation; in London at the India Office Records (IOR) of
the British Library, funded partly by the Society for Arabian Studies; and in Oxford at the
Middle East Centre of St. Antony’s College. For reading drafts of this article and offering
helpful comments, I am indebted to Gloria Onley, James Piscatori, Frauke Heard-Bey, Ahmad
al-Shahi, and Andrew Gardner. For helpful discussions on the article’s subject, I would also
like to thank Paul Dresch, Sulayman Khalaf, Jill Crystal, Ali Akbar Bushiri, Nelida Fuccaro,
Yoav Alon, and Samer El-Karanshawy.
2. For more details of this episode in Gulf history, see L.E., Sweet, “Pirates or Polities? Arab
Societies of the Persian or Arabian Gulf, 18th Century”, Ethnohistory, vol. 11, no. 3 (summer
1964), pp. 262-80; C. Belgrave, The Pirate Coast (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1966); H. Moyse-
Bartlett, The Pirates of Trucial Oman (London: Macdonald, 1966); P. R[isso] Dubuisson,
“Qasimi Piracy and the General Treaty of Peace (1820)”, Arabian Studies, vol. 4 (1978), pp.
47-57; S.M. al-Qasimi, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf (London: Croom Helm, 1986);
C.E. Davies, The Blood-Red Arab Flag: An Investigation into Qasimi Piracy, 1797-1820 (Exeter:
University of Exeter Press, 1997); P. Risso, “Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime

41
 James Onley

Violence in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region during a Long Eighteenth
Century”, Journal of World History, vol. 12 (fall 2001), pp. 293-319.
3. For a history of the Gulf Residency, see D. Wright, The English Amongst the Persians during the
Qajar Period, 1787-1921 (London: Heinemann, 1977), pp. 62-93; P. Tuson, The Records of the
British Residency and Agencies in the Persian Gulf. IOR R/15 (London: India Office Records, 1979),
pp. 1-9; G. Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Relinquishment of Power in
Her Last Three Arab Dependencies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 96-136.
4. The title SNOPG was only used after 1869. Earlier variants were the “Senior Indian Marine
Officer in the Persian Gulf ” (1822-30), the “Senior Indian Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf ”
(1830-63) and the “Commodore at Bassadore” (1822-63). For the sake of simplicity, SNOPG
is used for all four.
5. Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah became separate Trucial States in 1869, although the British
Government did not recognise this until 1921. Fujairah did not follow suit until 1901 and
1952 respectively.
6. For analysis of the treaties, see J.B. Kelly, “The Legal and Historical Basis of the British Position
in the Persian Gulf ”, St. Antony’s Papers, no. 4: Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 1 (London: Chatto
& Windus, 1958), pp. 119-40; D. Roberts, “The Consequences of the Exclusive Treaties: A
British View”, The Arab Gulf and the West, edited by B.R. Pridham (London: Croom Helm,
1985), pp. 1-14; H.M. al-Baharna, “The Consequences of Britain’s Exclusive Treaties: A Gulf
View”, The Arab Gulf and the West, pp. 15-37; al-Baharna, The Legal Status of the Arabian
Gulf States: A Study of Their Treaty Relations and Their International Problems (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1968).
7. For details, see J. Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the
British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
8. For more details, see H. Fattah, The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf,
1745-1900 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), pp. 63-90; F. Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to
United Arab Emirates, 2nd edn. (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 164-97; Heard-Bey, “The
Tribal Society of the UAE and its Traditional Economy”, in E. Ghareeb and I. al-Abed
(eds.), Perspectives on the United Arab Emirates (London: Trident Press, 1997), pp. 254-72; P.
Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, ed. A. al-Shahi (London: Palgrave, 2001), pp.
24-32, 114-64.
9. R.G. Landen, “The Arab Gulf in the Arab World 1800-1918”, Arab Affairs, 1 (summer 1986),
pp. 59, 64.
10. Pelly (PRPG) to Gonne (Sec., Bombay For. Dept.), 19 June 1869, L/P&S/9/15 (IOR). Also
see Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, p. 97.
11. See, for example, Maj. D. Wilson, “Memorandum Respecting the Pearl Fisheries in the
Persian Gulf ”, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 3 (1833), pp. 283-6; Capt. E. L.
Durand, “Notes on the Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf ”, Government of India, Report
on the Administration of the Persian Gulf Political Agency for the Year 1877-78 (Calcutta: For.
Dept. Press, 1878), appendix a, pp. 27-41; J. B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-
1880 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 29-30.
12. S. B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf (London: Harrison & Sons, 1919),
p. 291; Fattah, The Politics of Regional Trade, pp. 5-6, 31, 36-8, 47-9, 60, 126; F. I. Khuri,
Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab
State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 19-20; M. al-Rasheed, Politics in
an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidis of Saudi Arabia (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 111-17; K.
H. al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf Arab Peninsula: A Different Perspective (London:
Routledge, 1990), pp. 11, 13-16; C. E. Davies, The Blood-Red Arab Flag: An Investigation
into Qasimi Piracy, 1797-1820 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), p. 263; A. M. Abu

42
 The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth Century

Hakima, History of Eastern Arabia, 1750-1800: The Rise and Development of Bahrain and
Kuwait (Beirut: Khayats, 1965), p. 170 (n. 1).
13. The British referred to the Ruler of Muscat as the “Imam of Muscat” (often spelt “Imaum”)
until the mid-nineteenth century and as the “Sultan of Muscat” thereafter. The British
Government first referred to the Ruler as the “Sultan of Muscat” in the Anglo-Muscati Treaty
of 1839. The Ruler himself used the title of Imam until 1786, after which time he used the
title of Sayyid. For more details, see Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 11-12.
14. Davies, The Blood-Red Arab Flag, pp. 263-4; Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab
Emirates, pp. 228-9. Patricia Risso prefers to describe ghazu as “piracy”. P. Risso Dubuisson,
“Qasimi Piracy and the General Treaty of Peace (1820)”, Arabian Studies, 4 (1978), p. 47.
15. H. Rosenfeld, “The Social Composition of the Military in the Process of State Formation in
the Arabian Desert”, part 1, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain
and Ireland, 95 (1965), p. 79.
16. Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, p. 15.
17. For a discussion of the military in nineteenth century Arabia, see Rosenfeld, “The Social
Composition of the Military”, parts 1 and 2, pp. 75-86, 174-94; T. Asad, “The Beduin as a
Military Force: Notes on Some Aspects of Power Relations between Nomads and Sedentaries
in Historical Perspective”, in C. Nelson (ed.), The Desert and the Sown: Nomads in the Wilder
Society (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973), pp. 61-73;
al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis, pp. 133-58; J. Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers
and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 60.
18. Rosenfeld, “Social Composition of the Military”, part 2, p. 178
19. J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, ’Oman, and Central Arabia, 2: Geographical and
Statistical (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1908), pp. 252, 454, 1009,
1076, 1422–3, 1761.
20. Al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis, pp. 81-82; al-Rasheed, “The Rashidi Dynasty:
Political Centralization among the Shammar of North Arabia”, New Arabian Studies, 2
(1994), p. 146.
21. Lt. A. B. Kemball, “Memoranda on the Resources, Localities, and Relations of the Tribes
Inhabiting the Arabian Shores of the Persian Gulf ” (1845), in R. H. Thomas (ed.), Selections
from the Records of the Bombay Government, new ser., 24 (Bombay: Bombay Education Society
Press, 1856; reprinted by Oleander Press, 1985), p. 94.
22. Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, pp. 209-10; Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain,
pp. 51-2; Khuri, “From Tribe to State in Bahrain”, in , S. E. Ibrahim and N. S. Hopkins
(eds.), Arab Society: Social Science Perspectives (Cairo: AUC Press, 1985), p. 435.
23. Khuri, “From Tribe to State in Bahrain”, p. 435.
24. P. Lienhardt, “The Authority of Shaykhs in the Gulf: An Essay in Nineteenth Century History”,
Arabian Studies, 2 (1975), p. 69; Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain, p. 435. For an explanation of
about how leaders of bedouin tribes became rulers of towns and shaikhdoms, see J. E. Peterson,
“Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia”, Middle East Journal, 31 (1977), pp. 299-300.
25. Lienhardt, “The Authority of Shaykhs in the Gulf ”, p. 69.
26. There has been extensive work on alliance-seeking in Arabia. See, for example, al-Rasheed,
Politics in an Arabian Oasis; F. F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, and Qatar (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); S. Alghanim, The Reign of
Mubarak Al-Sabah: Shaikh of Kuwait, 1896-1915 (London: I.B. Taurus, 1998); F. I. Khuri,
Tents and Pyramids: Games and Ideology in Arab Culture from Backgammon to Autocratic Rule
(London: Saqi Books, 1990), pp. 114-17.

43
 James Onley

27. Landen, “The Arab Gulf in the Arab World 1800-1918”, p. 59; al-Rasheed, “The Rashidi
Dynasty”, p. 152 (n. 20).
28. Rosenfeld, “Social Composition of the Military”, part 1, pp. 78-9; Landen, “The Arab Gulf in
the Arab World 1800-1918”, p. 59.
29. Rosenfeld, “Social Composition of the Military”, part 1, p. 76.
30. P. W. Harrison, The Arab at Home (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell & Co., 1924), p. 125.
31. For examples of customary tribute payments, see H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert:
A Glimpse into Badawin Life in Kuwait and Sa’udi Arabia (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1949), pp. 443-4; al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis, pp. 113-14.
32. For more information on zakat, see Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, pp. 440-1; Heard-Bey,
From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 161.
33. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain, p. 20.
34. Al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis, p. 115. Al-Rasheed discusses khuwah at length on
pp. 111-17.
35. Harrison, The Arab at Home, p. 156.
36. Rosenfeld, “Social Composition of the Military”, part 1, p. 79.
37. Al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis, pp. 116-17.
38. Rosenfeld, “Social Composition of the Military”, part 1, p. 85 (n. 3).
39. Ibid., p. 79.
40. P. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989),
pp. 59-64, 93-5, 109, 121, 258; Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, pp. 125, 133-9, 349-50,
440-1, 443-4, 610; Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, pp. 105, 112-13; S. N.
Khalaf, “Settlement of Violence in Bedouin Society”, Ethnolog, 29 (1990), pp. 225-42.
41. Dresch, Tribes, p. 258.
42. Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, p. 112.
43. A protégé is called al-jar in South Arabia, al-dakhil in the upper Gulf, and al-zabin in the
lower Gulf. See Dresch, Tribes, pp. 59-61; Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, p. 133-9, 610;
Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, p. 105.
44. Dresch, Tribes, p. 59. Wajh literally means ‘face’ and fi wajhhu means ‘in his face’.
45. Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, p. 112.
46. Dresch, Tribes, pp. 59-60.
47. Ibid., pp. 60-1.
48. Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, p. 112.
49. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, p. 133-4; H. Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic,
3rd edn. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Spoken Language Services, 1976), p. 273; Khalaf, “Settlement of
Violence in Bedouin Society”, p. 227.
50. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, p. 133-4.
51. Dresch, Tribes, pp. 59, 62, 64.
52. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, pp. 135, 139; Khalaf, “Settlement of Violence in Bedouin
Society”, p. 237.
53. Dresch, Tribes, pp. 60-1.
54. Lienhardt, “The Authority of Shaykhs in the Gulf ”, p. 73.
55. Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, pp. 5-8.
56. Dresch, Tribes, p. 64.

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 The Arabian Gulf Rulers and the Pax Britannica in the Nineteenth Century

57. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert, pp. 440-1, 443-4.

58. Ibid., p. 125.
59. Harrison, The Arab at Home, p. 126.
60. A. Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi Books, 1998), p. 188.
61. Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 81.
62. Ibid., pp. 81-2.
63. J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, ’Oman, and Central Arabia, 1: Historical (Calcutta:
Superintendent of Government Printing, 1915), pp. 842-946.
64. The al-Sabah were ancient allies of the Al Khalifah. These dates indicate those times when the
al-Sabah came, or were asked to come, to the military assistance of the Al Khalifah.
65. The al-Jalahimah were also ancient allies, but fell out with the Al Khalifah in 1783. These
dates indicate those times when the al-Jalahimah came to the military assistance of the Al
Khalifah.
66. Lorimer, Gazetteer, 1: Historical, pp. 842-946.
67. My thanks to Yoav Alon for this insight.
68. Peterson, “Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia”, p. 302.
69. Lienhardt, The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, p. 15. Also see Peterson, “Tribes and Politics in
Eastern Arabia”, pp. 297-8.
70. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp. 167-192.
71. Paraphrase of Morrison (PRPG) to Sultan al-Qasimi, Sept. 1836, qtd. in Kemball,
“Observations on the Past Policy of the British Government towards the Arab Tribes of
the Persian Gulf ” (1844), in R. H. Thomas (ed.), Selections from the Records of the Bombay
Government, new ser., 24 (Bombay: Bombay Education Society Press, 1856; reprinted by
Oleander Press, 1985), p. 69.
72. Kemball, “Observations on the Past Policy” (1844), in Thomas (ed.), Selections, pp. 62-3, 68,
73.
73. Ibid., p. 68.
74. Ibid., p. 68 (n. *).
75. Ibid., p. 69.
76. Ibid.
77. Hennell (Asst. PRPG) to Sec., Bombay Pol. Dept., 19 Apr. 1838, qtd. in ibid., p. 70 (n. *).
This report is incorrectly dated 19 Apr. 1830.
78. Ibid.
79. Kemball, “Observations on the Past Policy” (1844), in Thomas (ed.), Selections, pp. 69-70.
80. Ibid., p. 70.
81. Ibid., p. 74.
82. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 369.
83. For details of this policy and the motives behind it, see Kemball, “Observations on the Past
Policy” (1844), in Thomas (ed.), Selections, p. 69 (n. *).
84. Lt. A. B. Kemball, “Historical Sketch of the Uttoobbee Tribe of Arabs (Bahrein), 1832-1844”
(1844), Thomas (ed.), Selections, pp. 288-89; Lt. H. F. Disbrowe, “Historical Sketch of the
Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs (Bahrein), 1844-1853” (1853), ibid., pp. 417, 420.
85. J. A. Saldanha, Précis of Bahrein Affairs, 1854-1904 (Calcutta: Superintendent of Governmant
Printing, 1904), pp. 10-11.

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 James Onley

86. Ibid., pp. 67-8.

87. Saldanha’s paraphrase of a report by Ross (PRPG), July 1874, in Saldanha, Précis of Bahrein
Affairs, p. 41.
88. D. Hawley, Desert Wind and Tropic Storm: An Autobiography (Wilby: Michael Russell, 2000),
p. 44.
89. Many more illustrations of this can be found in J. Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the
Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century”, New Arabian
Studies, vol. 6 (2004), pp. 30-92.
90. My thanks to Frauke Heard-Bey for this insight.
91.  The Times, 22 Jan. 1968, p. 1; The Times, 26 Jan. 1968, p. 5; L. Y. Saffoury, “Britain’s
Withdrawal from the Persian Gulf: Decision and Background”, MA thesis (American
University of Beirut, 1970), pp. 104-5; J. B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf and the West (London:
George Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980), pp. 49-50.

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