DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY SABBAVARAM,

VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE

CASE ANALYSIS – OLGA TELLIS VS BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

SUBJECT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1

NAME OF THE FACULTY

MR. A. NAGESHWARA RAO

NAME OF THE STUDENT

UMA SHANKAR MISHRA

ROLL NO.
18LLB091

SEMESTER

Page 1 of 26
ACKN0WLEDGEMENT

I w0uld like t0 express my special thanks 0f gratitude t0 0ur lecturer Mr. A. Nageswara Ra0 Sir
wh0 has given me the g0lden 0pp0rtunity t0 d0 this w0nderful pr0ject 0n the t0pic “CASE
STUDY: OLGA TELLIS VS BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION which als0 helped me in
d0ing a l0t 0f research and thr0ugh which I came t0 kn0w s0 many new things. I am really
thankful t0 him.

Page 2 of 26
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 4

DETAILED ANALYSIS – OLGA TELLIS VS BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 5-11

CASES REFERRED IN THE JUDGEMENT 11

RELATED CASES 12-19

CONCLUSION 20

Page 3 of 26
INTRODUCTION

The case of Olga Tellis Vs BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION has been one of the
Landmark cases under Article 21 where Hon’ble Supreme Court has expanded the meaning
of Right to life in Context of Right to livelihood. In the History of Constitution various cases
have Come to Supreme Court of India where Article 21 has been interpreted in a wide
manner to Include Right to live with Dignity (Maneka Gandhi Vs Union of India) Right to
privacy (KS puttaswamy Vs Union of India) and many others. One of those Interpretations is
Right to livelihood.as given in this case. In a United Nations Report on Human Rights
prepared by MR. EL HADJI GUISSE, it has been said: “Individual economic, social and
cultural rights are essentially the right to work and the right to adequate food, health, housing
and education. There is no doubt that those rights rest on the most significant right of all,
namely, the right to life. They all revolve around and center on this right, if by “life” is
everything that contributes to the continued existence and improvement of the humans’
condition. In the view of some people, these rights constitute an idea to be achieved i.e., they
are not immediately claimable. This view is incorrect since these rights have a strong legal
foundation and can be claimed at any moment and their violation punished”1 The Supreme
Court Originally In Re Sant ram2 held that the question of livelihood is included only in the
freedoms enumerated in Article 19 particularly Cl. (g) or even in Article 16 in a limited sense;
but the word “life” in Article 21 does not include livelihood. But this view has been changed
by subsequent decisions. It has now been held in a series of cases that right to livelihood is
included in the right to life “because no person can live without the means of living, i.e., the
means of livelihood”. Right to livelihood is an integral part of right to life under Article 21
although it has not been incorporated by specific language in Pt III by the framers of the
Constitution. The framers of the Constitution, in the Preamble to the Constitution, guaranteed
to secure to its citizens justice, social, economic and political as well as equality of status and
opportunity. While interpreting the scope of National Rural Employment Guarantee Act,
2005, the court said that the Act has clearly placed the “right to livelihood” at a higher
pedestal than a mere legal right3. While considering the scope of Building and other
Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996, the

1
See Justice Fazal Karim (Retd. Judge of Pakistan Supreme Court), Judicial Review of Public Actions, p 587
(notes).
2
AIR 1960 SC 932
3
Centre for Environment & Food Security v UOI, (2011) 5 SCC 676

Page 4 of 26
court said that the enabling provision which empowers the Central & State Governments to
constitute Welfare Boards to provide and monitor social security schemes and welfare
measures for the benefit of building and other construction workers recognises the right to
live with basic human dignity enshrined in the Indian Constitution. The Act regulates the
employment and conditions of service. While reiterating the right to livelihood as an integral
facet of right to life, the court said that when an employee is afflicted with an unfortunate
disease due to which he is unable to perform the duties of the post he is holding, the employer
must make every endeavor to adjust him in a post in which the employee would be suitable to
discharge the duties. The right to wages of seamen, as right to wages of any employee is an
integral part of the right to livelihood and is entitled to protection of Article214.. In M. Paul
Anthony v Bihar Gold Mines Ltd.5, the court insisted that when a government servant or one
in public undertaking is suspended pending the holding of a departmental inquiry against
him, subsistence allowance must be paid to him. Court emphasized that a government servant
does not surrender his right to life under Article 21 or other basic human rights. Non-payment
of subsistence allowance is an inhuman act which has an unpropitious effect on the life of an
employee. If the right to livelihood is not treated as part and parcel of the constitutional right
to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his
means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Any person who is deprived of his right to
livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the
deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21.

OLGA TELLIS VS BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (AIR 1986

SC 180)

Case No: W.Ps. Nos. 4610-4612 and 5068-5079 of 1981 (Under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India)
Bench: Y.V. Chandrachud, A. Varadarajan, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, V.D. Tulzapurkar, O.
Chinnappa Reddy

FACTS OF THE CASE

In this case the Bombay Municipal Corporation decided to evict the pavement dwellers and
those who were residing in slums in Bombay. These Writ Petitions portray the plight of lakhs

4
O. Konavalov v Commander, Coast Guard Region, (2006) 4 SCC 620
5
AIR 1999 SC 1416

Page 5 of 26
of persons who live on pavements and in slums in the city of Bombay. They constitute nearly
half the population of the city. The first group of petitions relates to pavement dwellers while
the second group relates to both pavement and Basti or Slum dwellers.
 The three petitioners in the group of Writ Petitions 4610 4612 of 1981 are a journalist
and two pavement dwellers. One of these two pavement dwellers, P. Nagamuthu,
migrated from Salem, Tamil Nadu, to Bombay in the year 1961 in search of
employment. He was a landless labourer in his home town but he was rendered
Jobless because of drought. He found a Job in a Chemical Company at Dahisar,
Bombay, on a daily wage of Rs-23 per day. A slum-lord extorted a sum of Rs.2,50
from him in exchange of a shelter of plastic sheets and canvas on a pavement on the
Western Express Highway, Bombay. He lives in it with his wife and three daughters
who are 16, 13 and 5 years of age. The second of the two pavement dwellers came to
Bombay in 1969 from Sangamner, District Ahmednagar, Maharashtra. He was a
cobbler earning 7 to 8 rupees a day, but his so-called house in the village fell down.
He got employment in Bombay as a Badli Kamgar for Rs. 350 per month. He was
lucky in being able to obtain a "dwelling house" on a pavement at Tulsiwadi by
paying Rs. 300 to a goonda of the locality. The bamboos and the plastic sheets cost
him Rs. 700.
 On July 13, 1981 the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Shri A.R. Antulay, made an
announcement which was given wide publicity by the newspapers that all pavement
dwellers in the city of Bombay will be evicted forcibly and deported to their
respective places of origin or removed to places outside the city of Bombay. The
Chief Minister directed the Commissioner of Police to provide the necessary
assistance to respondent 1, the Bombay Municipal Corporation, to demolish the
pavement dwellings and deport the pavement dwellers. The apparent justification
which the Chief Minister gave to his announcement was: "It is a very inhuman
existence. These structures are flimsy and open to the elements. During the monsoon
there is no way these people can live comfortably.
 On July 23, 1981 the pavement dwelling of P. Angamuthu was demolished by the
officers of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. He and the members of his family
were put in a bus for Salem. His wife and daughters stayed back in Salem but he
returned to Bombay in search of a job and got into a pavement house once again. The
dwelling of the other petitioner was demolished even earlier, in January 1980 but he

Page 6 of 26
 rebuilt it. It is like a game of hide and seek. The Corporation removes the ramshackle
shelters on the pavements with the aid of police, the pavement dwellers flee to less
conspicuous pavements in by-lanes and, when the officials are gone, they return to
their old habitats. Their main attachment to those places is that they are near to their
place of work.
 In the other batch of writ petitions Nos. 5068-79 of 1981, which was heard along with
the petitions relating to pavement dwellers, there are 12 petitioners. The first five of
these are residents of Kamraj Nagar, a habitation which is alleged to have come into
existence in about 1960-61, near the Western Express Highway, Bombay. The next
four petitioners were residing in structures constructed off the Tulsi Pipe Road,
Mahim, Bombay. Petitioner No. 10 is the Peoples' Union of Civil Liberties, petitioner
No. 11 is the Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights while petitioner No.
12 is a journalist.
 The case of the petitioners in the Kamraj Nagar group of cases is that there are over
500 hutments in this particular basti which was built in about 1960 by persons who
were employed by a Construction company engaged in laying water pipes along the
Western Express Highway. The residents of Kamraj Nagar are municipal employees,
factory or hotel workers, construction supervisors and so on. The residents of the
TulsiPipe Road hutments claim that they have been living there for 10 to 15 years and
that, they are engaged in various small trades. On hearing about the Chief Minister's
announcement, they filed a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay for an order of
injunction restraining the officers of the State Government and the Bombay Municipal
Corporation from implementing the directive of the Chief Minister. The High Court
granted an ad-interim injunction to be in force until July 21, 1981. On that date,
respondents agreed that the huts will not be demolished until October 15, 1981.
However, it is alleged, on July 23, 1981, the petitioners were huddled into State
Transport buses for being deported out of Bombay. Two infants were born during the
deportation but that was set off by the death of two others The petitioners file this case
stating that the actions of State Government as well as Bombay Municipal
Corporation are violative Of Indian Constitution and Bombay Municipal Corporation
Act,1888.

Page 7 of 26
 The Pavement dwellers filed a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay for an order
of injunction restraining the officers of the State Government and the Bombay
Municipal Corporations from implementing the directive of the Chief Minister.

1. The High Court of Bombay granted an ad interim injunction to be in force until July
21, 1981. Contrary to agreement, on July 23, 1981, petitioners were huddled into State
Transport buses for being deported out of Bombay.
2. The respondent’s action was challenged by the petitioner on the grounds that it is
violative of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. They also asked for a declaration
that Section 312, 313 and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 is
violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

Issues involved and Question of law

The issues which were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme court, in this case, were as
follows:

 Whether the Actions of respondents of demolishing Huts are Violative of Articles 19

and 21 of Indian Constitution,1950 and what is the Scope of right to life under Article
21 of the Constitution?
 Whether section 312, 313 and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 is
violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.?

Arguments of Petitioners -
Advocates for Plaintiffs- Ms. Indira Jaising, Mr. V.M. Tar Kunde and Mr. Ram
Jethmalani
Petitioner’s plea is that the right to life is illusory without a right to the protection of the
means by which alone life can be lived. And, the right to life can only be taken away or
abridged by a procedure established by law, which has to be fair and reasonable, not fanciful
or arbitrary such- as is prescribed by the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act or the Bombay
Police Act. They also rely upon their right to reside and settle in any part of the country
which is guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(e).

1st Contention

Page 8 of 26
  Whether the Actions of respondents of demolishing Huts are Violative of Articles
19 and 21 of Indian Constitution,1950 and what is the Scope of right to life under
Article 21 of the Constitution?
Petitioners have stressed on the argument that the right to life which is guaranteed by Art. 21
includes the right to livelihood and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are
evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to deprivation
of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the
factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they
will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which we have to
consider is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer
to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Art. 21 is
wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away
as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to
procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. The petitioners
refereed to the US Supreme Court case of Bekesy v. Board of Regents,6 in which it
was held that the right to work I have assumed was the most precious liberty that man
possesses. Man has indeed, as much right to work as he has to live, to be free and to own
property. To work means to eat and it also means to live." The right to live and the right to
work are integrated and interdependent and, therefore, if a person is deprived of his job as a
result of his eviction from a slum or a pavement, his very right to life is put in jeopardy. It is
urged that the economic compulsions under which these persons are forced to live in slums or
on pavements impart to their occupation the character of a fundamental right.
2nd Contention
The object of Ss. 312 to 314 is to keep the pavements and foot-paths free from encroachment
so that the pedestrians do not have to make use of the streets on which there is heavy
vehicular traffic. The pavement dwellers answer the nature's call, bathe, cook and wash their
clothes and utensils on the foot-paths and on parts of public streets adjoining the foot- paths.
Their encroachment creates serious impediments in repairing the roads, foot-paths and drains.
The refusal to allow the petitioners and other persons similarly situated to use foot-paths as
their abodes is, therefore, not unreasonable, unfair, or unlawful. The basic civic amenities,
such as drainage, water and sanitation, cannot possibly be provided to the pavement dwellers.
Since the pavements are encroached upon, pedestrians are compelled to walk on the streets,
thereby increasing the risk of traffic accidents and impeding the free flow of vehicular
6
347 M.D. 442 (1954)

Page 9 of 26
movement. petitioner no. 12. Prafulla Chandra Bidwaiwho is a journalist, has filed a
rejoinder asserting that Kamraj Nagar is not located on a foot-path or a pavement. According
to him, Kamraj Nagar is a basti off the Highway, in which the huts are numbered, the record
in relation to which is maintained by the Road Development Department and the Bombay
Municipal Corporation. Contending that petitioners 1 to 5 have been residing in the said basti
for over 20 years, he reiterates that the public has no right of way in or over the Kamraj
Nagar. He also disputes that the huts on the foot-paths cause any obstruction to the
pedestrians or to the vehicular traffic or that those huts are a source of nuisance or danger to
public health and safety. His case in paragraph 21 of his reply-affidavit seems to be that
since, the foot-paths are in the occupation of pavement dwellers for a long time, foot-paths
have ceased to be foot-paths. He says that the pavement dwellers and the slum or basti
dwellers, who number about 47.7 lakhs, constitute about 50 per cent of the total population of
Greater Bombay, that they supply the major work force for Bombay from menial Jobs to the
most highly skilled jobs, that they have been living in the hutments for generations, that they
have been making a significant contribution to the economic life of the city and that,
therefore, it is unfair and unreasonable on the part of the State Government and the Municipal
Corporation to destroy their homes and deport them A home is a home wherever it is. The
main theme of the reply-affidavit is that" The slum dwellers are the sine qua non of the city.
They are entitled to a quid pro quo. "It is conceded expressly that the petitioners do not
claim any fundamental right to live on the pavements. The right claimed by them is the right
to live, at least to exist. The only other pleading which deserves to be noticed is the affidavit
of the journalist petitioner,
Ms. Olga Telis has stated that one of the important reasons of the emergence and growth of
squatter-settlements in the Metropolitan cities in India is, that the Development and Master
Plans of most of the cities have not been adhered to. The density of population in the Bombay
Metropolitan Region is not high according to the Town Planning standards. Difficulties are
caused by the fact that the population is not evenly distributed over the region, in a planned
manner. Unless economic and leisure activity is decentralised, it would be possible to find a
solution to the problems arising out of the growth of squatter colonies. Even if squatters are
evicted, they come back to the city because, it is there that Job opportunities are available.
Arguments of Respondent
Advocates - Mr. KK Singhvi and Mr. Shankarnarayan

Page 10 of 26
 The advocates submit to Hon’ble supreme court counter- affidavit filed by V.S. Munje,
Secretary in the Department of. K. Singhvi and Mr. Shankaranarayanan who appear for
the respondents, no one has a fundamental right, whatever, Government of Maharashtra and it
states that no person has any legal right to encroach upon or to construct any structure on a
footpath, public street or on any place over which the public has a right of way. Numerous
hazards of health and safety arise if action is not taken to remove such encroachments. Since,
no civic amenities can be provided on the pavements, the pavement dwellers use pavements
or adjoining streets for easing themselves. Apart from this, some of the pavement dwellers
indulge in anti-social acts like chain-snatching, illicit distillation of liquor and prostitution.
The lack of proper environment leads to increased criminal tendencies, resulting in more
crime in the cities. It is, therefore, in public interest that public places like pavements and
paths are not encroached upon. The problem of poverty and rural to Urban migration is a
major problem in the Country and Maharashtra government has launched many schemes for
poverty alleviation

Contention 1 Whether section 312, 313 and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act
1888 is violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.?
It is denied in the counter-affidavit that the provisions of sections 312, 313 and 314 of the
Bombay Municipal Corporation Act violate the Constitution. Those provisions are conceived
in public interest and great care is taken by the authorities to ensure that no harassment is
caused to any pavement dweller while enforcing the provisions of those sections. The
decision to remove such encroachments was taken by the Government with specific
instructions that every reasonable precaution ought to be taken to cause the least possible
inconvenience to the pavement dwellers. What is more important, so the counter- affidavit
says, the Government of Maharashtra had decided that, on the basis of the census carried out
in 1976, pavement dwellers who would be uprooted should be offered alternate developed
pitches at Malvani where they could construct their own hutments. According to that census,
about 2,500 pavement hutments only were then in existence.
The object of Ss. 312 to 314 is to keep the pavements and foot-paths free from encroachment
so that the pedestrians do not have to make use of the streets on which there is heavy
vehicular traffic. The pavement dwellers answer the nature's call, bathe, cook and wash their
clothes and utensils on the foot-paths and on parts of public streets adjoining the foot- paths.
Their encroachment creates serious impediments in repairing the roads, foot-paths and drains.
The refusal to allow the petitioners and other persons similarly situated to use foot-paths as

Page 11 of 26
their abodes is, therefore, not unreasonable, unfair, or unlawful. The basic civic amenities,
such as drainage, water and sanitation, cannot possibly be provided to the pavement dwellers.
Since the pavements are encroached upon, pedestrians are compelled to walk on the streets,
thereby increasing the risk of traffic accidents and impeding the free flow of vehicular
movement.
The Municipal Commissioner disputes in his counter-affidavit that any fundamental right of
the petitioners is infringed by removal of the encroachment committed by them on public
property, especially the pavements.
Defense counsel stated that the pavement residents had admitted to the High Court that they
did not claim any basic right to install cabins on sidewalks or public roads and that they
would not prevent their demolition after the scheduled date.

Observations of the Court

There can be no depreciation of the Constitution or renunciation of fundamental rights.
Court held
The Constitution does not provide for an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or
personal liberty. Under Article 21, such deprivation must be in accordance with the procedure
established by law. Section 314 has the character of an enabling provision and not of a
compulsive nature. It gives the Commissioner the discretion to remove an encroachment with
or without notice. It is designed to exclude the principles of natural justice by exception and
not as a general rule. Sections 312(1), 313(1)(a), and 314 empower the Commissioner of
Municipalities to stop encroachment on trails where the public has the right to pass, cannot be
considered unreasonable, unjust or unjust. The right to life conferred by section 21 is vast and
far-reaching Depriving a person of his right to life as means of subsistence and you will have
deprived him of his life. In light of Article 39(a) and 41, it would be pedantry to exclude the
right to livelihood from the content of the right to life
Chinnappa Reddy, J. Said:
In our view, the principles of natural justice do not have a rule of exclusion depending on
whether it would have made a difference if natural justice had been respected. Failure to
respect natural justice is in itself prejudice to any man and proof of harm, regardless of the
evidence of a denial of natural justice, is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has
denied justice that the person denied justice is not harmed.

Cases Referred by the Bench for Adjudicating the case

Page 12 of 26
Justice Chinappa Reddy while deciding the matter referred the case of S.L. Kapoor v.
Jagmohan,7. In that case, the suppression of the New Delhi Municipal Committee was
challenged on the ground that it was in violation of the principles of natural justice since, no
show because notice was issued before the order of suppression was passed. Linked with that
question was the question whether the failure to observe the principles of natural justice
matters at all, if such observance would have made no difference, the admitted or
indisputable facts speaking for themselves. He also referred to the case of Chintepalli
Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Secretary (Food & Agriculture)
Government of Andhra Pradesh8 in which it was said that Section 77(2) of the Andhra
Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act 1964 is a mandatory provision and It is true that a
personal hearing is not obligatory but the minimal requirement of the principles of
natural justice which are ingrained in s. 77(2) is that the party whose rights are going to be
affected and against whom some allegations are made and some prejudicial order are
claimed. This minimal requirement can on no account be dispensed with. by relying upon
the principle of absence of prejudice or imputation of certain knowledge to the party against
whom action is sought for.

In Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi 9 a Constitution Bench of

this Court considered the question whether the fundamental rights conferred by the
Constitution can be wa

7
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 746
8
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 563
9
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 563

Page 13 of 26
ived. Two members of the Bench (Das C.J. and Kapoor J.) held that there can be no waiver of
the fundamental right founded on Article 14 of the Constitution. Two others (N.H. Bhagwati
and Subba Rao, JJ.) held that not only could there be no waiver of the right conferred by
Article 14, but there could be no waiver of any other fundamental right guaranteed by Part III
of the Constitution. The Constitution makes no distinction, according to the learned Judges,
between fundamental rights enacted for the benefit of an individual and those enacted in
public interest or on grounds of public policy

In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra 10,, a Special Bench of nine learned
Judges of this Court held that, where the action taken against a citizen is procedurally ultra
vires, the aggrieved party can move this Court under Article 32. The contention of the
petitioners is that the procedure prescribed by section 314 of the B.M.C. Act being arbitrary
and unfair, it is not "procedure established by law" within the meaning of Article 21 and,
therefore, they cannot be deprived of their fundamental right to life by resorting to that
procedure. The petitions are clearly maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution.

In the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan11 In that case, the suppression of the New Delhi
Municipal Committee was challenged on the ground that it was in violation of the principles
of natural justice since, no show because notice was issued before the order of suppression
was passed. Linked with that question was the question whether the failure to observe the
principles of natural justice matters at all, if such observance would have made no difference,
the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves.

The Court also refereed to the case of Francis Coralie Mullin Vs UT of Delhi 12 where it
was held that “It is for this Court (Supreme Court) to decide in Exercise of its Constitutional
Power Under Judicial review whether the Deprivation of personal life and Liberty in a given
case is by procedure , just , fair reasonable or not.

Y. V. Chandrachud, J.

. These Writ Petitions portray the plight of lakhs of persons who live on pavements and in
slums in the city of Bombay. They constitute nearly half the population of the city. The first
group of petitions relates to pavement dwellers while the second group relates to both
10
[1978] 3 S.C.R. 744-770
11
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 746,766
12
AIR 1981 SC 746

Page 14 of 26
pavement and Basti or Slum dwellers. Those who have made pavements their homes exist in
the midst of filth and squalor, which has to be seen to believed. Rabid dogs in search of
stinking meat and cats in search of hungry rats keep them company. They cook and sleep
where they ease, for no conveniences are available to them. Their daughters, come of age,
bathe under the nosy gaze of passers-by, unmindful of the feminine sense of bashfulness. The
cooking and washing over, women pick lice from each other's hair. The boys beg. Menfolk,
without occupation, snatch chains with the connivance of the defenders of law and order;
when caught, if at all, they say:

To summarise, we hold that no person has the right to encroach, by erecting a structure or
otherwise, on footpaths, pavements or any other place reserved or ear- marked for a public
purpose like, for example, a garden or a playground; that the provision contained in section
314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is not unreasonable in the circumstances of
the case;; The slum dwellers who were given identity cards and whose dwellings were
numbered in the 1976 census must be given alternate sites for their resettlement On the
question of natural justice, was it argued that this possibility of hearing should be given to whom? To
the intruder who has encroached on public property? Or to people who commit a crime?

Decision

Although the Court refused to conclude that the expelled inhabitants were entitled to an
alternative site, it ordered that:

1. No one has the right to encroach on trails, sidewalks or any other place reserved for
public purposes. The provision of section 314 of the Bombay Municipality Act is not
unreasonable in the circumstances of this case. Sites must be provided to censored
residents in 1976.
2. Slums existing for 20 years or more should not be removed unless the land is required
for public purposes and, in this case, alternate sites must be provided.
3. High priority should be given to resettlement.

Outcomes
The inhabitants of the causeway were expelled without relocation. Since 1985, the principles,
in this case, have been affirmed in many subsequent decisions, often leading to large-scale
evictions without resettlement. For example, in considering the extent to which their

Page 15 of 26
judgment was executed. Similarly, there have been many cases where these principles have
been applied.
RELATED CASES

D.K. Yadav Vs J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259

Facts - In this case respondent, by its letter dated December 12, 1980 which was received by
the appellant on December 19, 1980, intimated that the appellant wilfully absented from duty
continuously for more than 8 days from December 3, 1980 without leave or prior information
or intimation or previous permission from the management and, therefore, "deemed to have
left the service of the company on your own account and lost your lien and the appointment
with effect from December 3, 1980." In support thereof reliance was placed on clause 13 (2)
(iv) of its Certified Standing Order. The appellant averred that despite his reporting to duty on
December 3, 1980 and everyday continuously thereafter he was prevented entry at the gate
and he was not allowed to sign the attendance register. He pleaded that he was not permitted
to join duty without assigning any reasons. His letter of December 3, 1980 was marked herein
as Annexure 'A' wherein he explained the circumstances in which he was prevented to join
duty. The Tribunal found that the appellant had failed to prove his case. the Action of the
respondent is in accordance with the standing Orders and it is not a termination nor
retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for short 'the Act'. The appellant in
terms of standing orders lost his lien on his appointment and so is not entitled to
reinstatement. Clause 13 (2) (iv) standing order reads thus:

If a workman remains absent without sanctioned leave or beyond the period of leave
originally granted or subsequently extended, he shall lose his lien on his appointment unless.
(a) he returns within 3 calendar days of the commencement of the absence of the expiry of
leave originally granted or subsequently extended as the case may be; and
(b) explains to the satisfaction of the manager/management the reason of his absence or his
inability to return on the expiry of the leave, as the case may. The workman not reporting for
duty within 8 calendar days as mentioned above, shall be deemed to have automatically
abandoned the services and lost his lien on his appointment. His name shall be struck off
from the Muster Rolls in such an eventuality."

This action of the management was based on clause 13 (2) (iv) of the Certified Standing
Orders of the Industrial Concern which stipulates that if a workman remains absent without

Page 16 of 26
sanction of leave or beyond the period of leave originally granted or subsequently extended,
the employee loses his lien
on employment unless he returns to duty within eight calendar days of the commencement of
the absence or the expiry of leave. At this stage it would be pertinent to examine the legal
status of these
Certificate Standing Orders. A statutory mandate has been imposed on the owners of
industrial establishments employing 100 or more workmen to formulate standing orders in
compliance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. This law was
enacted with the objective of Introducing Certainty in service Conditions
ISSUE
Whether the Impugned decision of the management i.e. removal of the employee from the job
under Clause 13 (2) (iv) of the standing order is violative of principal of Natural justice?

JUDGEMENT - It was held that the right to life enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution
would include the right to livelihood. The order of termination visits with civil consequence
of jeopardising not only the worker's livelihood but also the career and livelihood of the
dependants. Therefore, before taking any action of putting an end to the tenure of an
employee, fair play requires that a reasonable opportunity to put forth his case is given and
domestic enquiry conducted complying with the principles of natural justice. The procedure
prescribed for depriving person Right to livelihood must meet the requirement of Article 14
and follow its requirements

REASONING - The Court, speaking through K. Ramaswamy J. then proceeded to examine

all the leading cases on the issue and stated that the basic principles of natural justice are that
in every case the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his
case and the authority should act in a fair, just and impartial manner. The Court stated that
principles of natural justice apply unless a particular statute or statutory rules or orders having
statutory flavour exclude the application of natural justice expressly necessary implication.
The Court then proceeded to examine the validity of the impugned action in the light of Art.
21 and observed that the right to life guaranteed by Art. 21 includes, the right to livelihood.
The order of termination of service of an employee or workman visits with civil
consequences of jeopardising not only his livelihood but also that of his dependants. Thus,
the Court categorically held that before taking any action putting an end to the tenure of an
employee. fair-play requires that a reasonable opportunity to put forth his case be given and a

Page 17 of 26
domestic enquiry conducted in compliance with the principles of natural justice. In this
manner the Court stipulated that principles of natural justice would have to be read Into
Clause 13(2) (iv) of the Standing Orders in order to fulfil the requirement of just and fair
procedure prescribed by Arts. 14 and 21.

LIC Of India Vs Consumer Education and Research Centre (1995) 5 SCC 482
Facts - On August 25, 1980 one Prof. Manubhai Shah Executive Trustee of Respondent No.1
and Mr.D.N. Dalal sought policies under Table 58. Similarly, in December, 1978
RespondentNos.2, to 4 sought similar policies for convertible term insurance plans for
different amounts. In September, 1980 Respondent Nos.6 and 7 agents of the appellants when
presented proposals to the LIC under Table 58 on behalf of individual respondents and
promised to cover under Table 58 other 9 crores uninsured households, the LIC turned them
down. Consequently, after issuance of a notice through counsel on September 14, 1980, the
respondents filed the above writ petition. The conditions imposed and denial to accept
policies sought under Table 58 were assailed as arbitrary, discriminatory violating Articles
14, 19(1)(g) and right to life in Article 21 of the Constitution. The High Court while
upholding that prescription of conditions for 1st class lives as eligibility and other criteria laid
down in the policy under Table 58 are neither unjust nor arbitrary, declared a part of the
conditions, namely, “Further, proposals for assurance under the plan will be entertained only
from persons in Government or Quasi-Government organisation or a reputed commercial
firm which can furnish details of leave taken during the preceding year under Table 58" as
subversive of equality and, therefore, constitutionally invalid. Accordingly, it was struck
down. The Corporation filed the appeal against the portion that was struck down and the
respondents filed the cross appeal against the findings that went against them.

ISSUE –
Whether the appellant is justified in law in restricting the term policy only to the specified
class, namely, salaried persons in Government, quasi-Government or reputed commercial
firms?
Whether the policies Of LIC are Within the Ambit of Right to Life Under Article 21?

Judgement- It was held that Right To livelihood as interpreted In Olga tellis Vs Union of
India includes Right to Life Insurance Policies of LIC and the policy Premium must be
Within the Paying capacity and means Of Insured.

Page 18 of 26
Reasoning- It was held that right to health, medical aid and to protect the health and the
vigour of a worker while in service or post retirement is a fundamental right under Article 21
read with Articles 39(e), 41, 43, 48-A of the Constitution of India and fundamental human
right to make the life of workmen meaningful and purposeful with dignity of persons". In
Regional Director, ESI Corporation v. Francis De Costa,1992 Indlaw SC 458, the same view
was stated. Security against sickness and disablement is fundamental right under Article 25 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7(b) of international Convention of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and under Articles 39(e), 38 and 21 of the Constitution
of India. Employees State Insurance Act seeks to provide succour to maintain health of an
injured workman and the interpretation should be so given as to give effect to right to medical
benefit which is a fundamental right to the workman. In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v.
Vishwanath Pandu Barde13 on February 22, 1995 this Court held that right to economic
empowerment to the poor, disadvantaged tribes and depressed and oppressed Dalits, is a
fundamental right to make their right to life and dignity of person meaningful and worth
living. It was also held that socio-economic democracy is sine qua non to make political
democracy, a truly participatory democracy and a truism for unity and integrity of Bharat. It
would thus be well settled law that the Preamble Chapter of Fundamental Rights and
Directive Principles accord right to livelihood as a meaningful life, social security and
disablement benefits are integral schemes of socio-economic justice to the people in
particular to the middle class and lower middle class and all offendable people. Life
insurance coverage is against disablement or in the event of death of the insured economic
support for the dependents, social security to livelihood to the insured or the dependents. The
appropriate life insurance policy within the paying capacity and means of the insured to pay
premia is one of the social security measures envisaged under the Constitution to make right
to life meaningful, worth living and right to livelihood a means for sustenance.

Case 3) Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union Vs Delhi Administration,

Delhi (AIR 1992 SC 789)
Facts- The petitioner-workmen who were employed on daily wages have filed these petitions
for their absorption as regular employees in the Development Department of the Delhi
Administration and for injunction prohibiting the termination of their services and also for the
difference in wages paid to them and those paid to the regular employees. The petitions are
13
1995 Indlaw SC 596,

Page 19 of 26
resisted on behalf of the respondents contending that there is no scope for the absorption of
the petitioners as they were employed on daily wages with a clear understanding that the
schemes under which they were employed had no provision for regularisation of any
workman. During the 5th Five Year Plan, the Central Government had formulated various
schemes to provide wage- employment to agricultural and landless labourers during lean
periods. One such scheme was "Food for work". Under this scheme, employment was given
to the poorer sections of the population in the rural areas partly for food and partly for cash
payment. During the 6th Five Year Plan, the objective of the programme was enlarged to
include alleviation of rural poverty by distribution of income in favour of the poor and the
needy population in the rural areas by providing employment opportunities to them. With this
view, a new programme called the National Rural Employment Programme was started in
October 1980 replacing the "Food for work" programme. During the period of the same Plan,
another scheme called "Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme" was launched on
August 15, 1983with the same objective of generating additional employment in the rural
areas particularly for the land less workers. Under these programmes, works in rural area
resulting in durable community assets, social forestry, village roads etc. were taken up.
Pursuant to them, a scheme for plantation of trees was taken up at various sites in the rural
areas of Delhi. The entire said work was done by providing daily wage employment to rural
workers including the present petitioners. The labour was employed at these sites depending
upon their availability in rural areas and without reference to any Employment Exchange
either in the Union Territory of Delhi or anywhere else.

ISSUE- Whether employees of Horticulture department Under Delhi Government could be

regularised?

JUDGEMENT- It was held that Right to life would include the right to livelihood and
therefore right to work. The right to livelihood has not been included as a Fundamental Right
in the Constitution because it was not found feasible as the country has so far not attained the
capacity to guarantee right to livelihood. Therefore, it has been placed in the Chapter on
Directive Principles. Thus, even while giving the direction to the State to ensure the right to
work, Constitution makers thought it prudent not to do so without qualifying it. Art. 41 in the
Chapter on Directive Principles enjoins upon the State to make effective provision for
securing the right to livelihood within the limits of its economic capacity and development.
Even then We cannot regularize the employees

Page 20 of 26
REASONING - This country has so far not found it feasible to incorporate the right to
livelihood as a fundamental right in the Constitution. This is because the country has so far
not attained the capacity to guarantee it, and not because it considers it any the less
fundamental to life. Advisedly, therefore, it has been placed in the Chapter on Directive
Principles Article 41 of which enjoins upon the State to make effective provision for securing
the same "within the limits of its economic capacity and development". Thus even while
giving the direction to the State to ensure the right to work, the Constitution-makers thought
it prudent not to do so without qualifying it viewed in the context of the facts of the present
case it is apparent that the schemes under which the petitioners were given employment have
been evolved to provide income for those who are below the poverty line and particularly
during the periods when they are without any source of livelihood and, therefore, without any
income whatsoever. The schemes were further meant for the rural poor, for the object of the
schemes was to start tackling the problem of poverty from that end. The object was not to
provide the right to work as such even to the rural poor- much less to the unemployed in
general. As has been pointed out by the Union of India in their additional affidavit, in 1987-
88, 33 per cent of the total rural population was below the poverty line. This meant about 35
million families. To eliminate poverty and to generate full employment 2500-3000 million
man-days of work in a year, was necessary. As against that, the Jawahar Rozgar Yojna could
provide only 870 million-man days of employment on intermittent basis in neighbourhood
projects. Within the available resources of Rs. 2600 crores, in all 3.10 million people alone
could be provided with permanent employment, if they were to be provided work for 273
days in a year on minimum wages. However, under the scheme meant for providing work for
only 80-90 days’ work could be provided to 9.30 million people. The problems of those
employed under such schemes with a view to providing them with full employment and
guaranteeing equal pay for equal work. These concepts, in the context of such schemes are
both unwarranted and misplaced. They will do more harm than good by depriving the many
of the little income that they may get to keep them from starvation. They would benefit a few
at the cost of the many starving poor for whom the schemes are meant The other equally
injurious effect of indiscriminate regularization has been that many of the agencies have
stopped undertaking casual or temporary works though they are urgent and essential for fear
that if those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 or more
days have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works are time-bound and there
is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public

Page 21 of 26
interests are thus jeopardised on both counts. In the circumstances, it is not possible to accede
to the request of the petitioners that the respondents be directed to regularise

Case 4) O.P. Gupta Vs Union of India and Others (AIR 1987 SC 2257)
Facts - The appellant who was as Assistant Engineer in the Central Public Works Department
was placed under suspension pending a departmental enquiry under r.12(2) of the Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 on September 3, 1959. He
remained on suspension till May 25, 1970 when on repeated representations the Chief
Engineer, Central Public Works Department revoked the order of suspension and he was
reinstated in service. During the aforesaid period of suspension, adverse remarks in his
confidential reports for the period between April 1, 1957 and August 31, 1957 and between
April 1, 1958 and March 31, 1959 were communicated to him on December 16, 1959. After a
period of nearly five years, the departmental proceedings culminated in an order of dismissal
from service dated March 12, 1964 but the same on appeal by him, was set aside by the
President of India by order dated October 4, 1966 with a direction for the holding of a fresh
departmental inquiry under r. 29(1)(c) of the Rules, with a further direction that he shall
continue to remain under suspension. The order of suspension was revoked by the Chief F
Engineer on May 8, 1970 but the departmental proceedings were kept alive. As a result of
this, the appellant was reinstated in service on May 25, 1970. Immediately thereafter, he
made representation to the Department to pass an order under FR 54 for payment of full pay
and allowances for the period of suspension i.e. the period between September 3, 1959 and
May 25, 1970 but the same was rejected on the G ground that departmental inquiry was still
pending. There was little or no progress in the departmental inquiry. on April 25, 1972 the
Chief Engineer passed an order of compulsory retirement of the appellant under FR 56(j).
The appellant made representations to various authorities, including the President of India, H
against his compulsory retirement but the same was rejected Eventually, on July 20, 1972 the
appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court challenging the
validity of the order of compulsory retirement and prayed for a direction in terms of FR 54
for payment of full pay and allowances for the period of suspension and also for payment of
all increments to which he was entitled. He also prayed for quashing of the departmental
proceedings.

Issues –

Page 22 of 26
1) Was the Union of India justified in passing an order dated September 17, 1982 in terms of
FR 25 declaring the appellant to be unfit to cross the efficiency bar as Assistant Engineer,
Central Public Works Department at the stage of Rs.590 in the pre revised scale of pay of
Rs.350-590-EB-900 as from October 5, 1966?

(2) Is the appellant entitled to interest on the delayed payment of his pension?

Judgement -It was held that HELD that suspension of Govt. servant pending departmental
enquiry is not by way of punishment, as also the withholding of the increments at the
efficiency bar pending such enquiry. When the High Court quashed the departmental
proceedings, which were pending for more than 20 years as being wholly invalid and unfair,
there was no occasion for the department to have passed an order under F.R. 25 for
withholding increments unless it was with a view to penalize the servant financially. Once a
direction is given by the High Court in terms of F.R. 54(2), the servant is entitled to full pay
and allowances as also to his increments etc., but this would be the normal increments prior
to the crossing the efficiency bar for the purposes of F.R. 54(2). In terms of F.R. 25 there
should be a specific order before a Govt. servant can be allowed to draw his increments
above the efficiency bar. Pending departmental enquiry, the Govt. is justified in withholding
increments under F.R. 25.

Reasoning-. The appellant would be entitled to interest at 12% per annum on the difference in
salary as well as in pension. We further direct that the Government of India will make the
payment to the appellant within four months from today. there is no presumption that the
Government always acts in a manner which is just and fair. There was no occasion whatever
to protract the departmental inquiry for a period of 20 years and keeping the appellant under
suspension for a period of nearly 11 years unless it was actuated with the mala fide intention
of subjecting him to harassment. The charge framed against the appellant was serious enough
to merit his dismissal from service. Apparently, the departmental authorities were not in a
position to substantiate the charge. But that was no reason for keeping the departmental
proceedings alive for a period of 20 years and not to have revoked the order of suspension for
over 11 years. An order of suspension of a government servant does not put an end to his
service under the Government. He continues to be a member of the service in spite of the
order of suspension. It is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will
affect the rights of any person without first giving him an opportunity of putting forward his

Page 23 of 26
case. Both the Privy Council as well as this Court have in a series of cases required strict
adherence to the rules of natural justice where a public authority or body has to deal with
rights. It is extremely doubtful whether in a case like the present the Director General of
Works, Central Public Works Department, as the competent authority, could at all have taken
a decision to enforce the bar under FR 25 against the appellant after his retirement. That
apart, the competent authority acted in flagrant breach of the instructions contained in the
Note beneath Government of India, Ministry of Finance Memorandum dated April 23, 1962,
as amended from time to time. It enjoins that the cases of government servants for crossing of
the efficiency bar in the time- scale of pay should be considered at the appropriate time and in
case the decision is to enforce the bar against the government servant, he should be informed
of the decision which should be in consonance with natural justice.

. The Government must view with concern that a departmental inquiry against the civil
servant should have been kept alive for so long as 20 years or more and that he should have
been placed under suspension without any lawful justification for as many as 11 years,
without any progress being made in the departmental inquiry. It should also view with
concern that a decision should have been taken by the competent authority to enforce the bar
under FR 25 against the civil servant long after his retirement with a view to cause him
financial loss. Such a course not only demoralises the services but virtually ruins the career of
the delinquent officer as a government servant apart from subjecting him to untold hardship
and humiliation

Other Landmark cases Involving Article 21 and Right to Livelihood

In the case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Vs Nawab Khan Gulab Khan 14 the
Supreme Court has held that Municipality can remove huts by following a reasonable
Procedure. Under Article 21 a person can be deprived of his life or personal Liberty
following a reasonable Procedure “. It stated “It is for Court to decide in exercise of its
Constitutional Powers of Judicial review that whether the deprivation Of Life or Personal
Liberty in a given case is by a Procedure which is just, fair and reasonable or otherwise”

Similarly, in the case of Sodhan Singh vs Delhi administration15 the court held that while
hawkers have a fundamental Right under Article 19 (1) (g) to carry out trade and business of
their choice but they have no right to do so in a Particular Place. They cannot be permitted to
carry out trade o a road. the situation in present case cannot be equated to as in Olga Tellis vs
14
AIR 1997 SC 152
15
AIR 1979 SC 152

Page 24 of 26
Bombay Municipal Corporation. Footpaths, streets and roads are public property for the use
of public and not meant for Private use. Hawkers may be permitted to carry on their trade in
Sundays at specified places for them.

Similarly in Jolly George Varghese Vs Bank Of Cochin 16 the Court held that the procedure
of putting a Poor person in failure to pay its debt is violation of Article 21 of the Constitution
unless there is a proof of Minimal Fairness of his Wilful failure to Pay his Debts unless there
is a proof that debtor is having means but even then is not paying

In the case of DTC vs DTC mazdoor Sangh17 A regulation conferring power on the authority
to terminate the services of a permanent and confirmed employee by issuing a notice without
assigning any reasons and without giving him a hearing has been held to be wholly arbitrary
and violative of Articles 21 in. Sawant J, has explained the position thus:

The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to livelihood therefore cannot hang on
to the fancies of individuals in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can
its survival beat their mercy. Income is the foundation of many Fundamental Rights and
when work is the sole source of income, the right to work becomes as much fundamental.
Fundamental Rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined premises and
uncertain applications. That will be a mockery of them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

 MP Jain , Indian Constitutional Law ( 8th Edition) , 2018

 JN Pandey , Constitution Of India ( 35th Edition) , 2016
 Basu Durga Das : Commentary On Indian Constitution

LEGISLATION

Constitution Of India , 1950

CASES REFERED

16
AIR 1980 SC 470
17
AIR 1997 SC 101

Page 25 of 26
1. Sant ram Vs Unknown AIR 1960 SC 932
2. Centre for Environment & Food Security v UOI, (2011) 5 SCC 676
3. O. Konavalov v Commander, Coast Guard Region, (2006) 4 SCC 620
4. M. Paul Anthony v Bihar Gold Mines Ltd AIR 1999 SC 1416
5. Bekesy v. Board of Regents 347 M.D. 442 (1954)
6. Chintepalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Secretary (Food
& Agriculture) Government of Andhra Pradesh 1978 1 S.C.R. 563
7. S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746
8. Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi [1978] 1 S.C.R. 563
9. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra [1978] 3 S.C.R. 744-770
10. Francis Coralie Mullin Vs UT of Delhi AIR 1981 SC 746
11. D.K. Yadav Vs J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259
12. LIC Of India Vs Consumer Education and Research Centre (1995) 5 SCC 482
13. In Regional Director, ESI Corporation v. Francis De Costa,1992 In-law SC 458
14. Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu Bard 1995 Ind law SC 596
15. Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union Vs Delhi Administration, Delhi
(AIR 1992 SC 789)
16. O.P. Gupta Vs Union of India and Others (AIR 1987 SC 2257)
17. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Vs Nawab Khan Gulab Khan AIR 1997 SC 152
18. Sodhan Singh vs Delhi administration AIR 1979 SC 152
19. Jolly George Varghese Vs Bank of Cochin AIR 1980 SC 470
20. DTC vs DTC mazdoor Sangh AIR 1997 SC

Page 26 of 26