TH E U.S.

NAV Y A N D T H E V I ET N A M W A R
Edward J. Marolda and Sandra J. Doyle, Series Editors

Naval Air War

The Rolling Thunder Campaign
Norman Polmar and Edward J. Marolda

D E PA R T M E N T O F T H E N AV Y
WA S H I N G T O N , D C
2 015
© 2015 Naval Historical Foundation
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Polmar, Norman.
Naval air war : the Rolling Thunder campaign / Norman Polmar and Edward J. Marolda.
pages cm. -- (The U.S. Navy and the Vietnam War)
ISBN 978-0-945274-82-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-0-945274-83-4 (508-compliant pdf) -- ISBN 978-0-945274-84-1
(epub) -- ISBN 978-0-945274-85-8 (mobi) 1. Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Aerial operations, American. 2. Operation Rolling
Thunder, 1965-1968. 3. Naval aviation--United States--History--20th century. 4. Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Naval operations,
American. I. Marolda, Edward J. II. Title. III. Title: Rolling Thunder campaign.
DS558.8.P65 2015
959.704’345--dc23
2015028706

∞ The paper used in this publication meets the requirements for permanence as established by the American National Standard for
Information Sciences “Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials” (ANSI Z39.48-1984).

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 CONTENTS

Introduction 1

The Start of an Air Campaign 5

Way Down South on Dixie Station 19

Rescuing Downed Aviators 23

Countering the SAMs 29

The Bombing Campaign Heats Up 35

The POL Strikes 41

Air War at Its Deadliest 51

Tet and Rolling Thunder 55

Learning from the Rolling Thunder Experience 61

Sidebars

Attack Aircraft 10

Fighter Aircraft 14

Tragedy Aboard Ship 42

Frustrated Warrior: Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp Jr. 47

Homer Smith and the Debut of PGMs 52

Recce Aircraft 56

Acronyms 64

The Authors 65

Acknowledgments 66

Suggested Reading 66
 NHHC VN Collection
Architects of defeat. Left to right, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam Maxwell D. Taylor, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, President Lyndon B. Johnson, and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.
 INTRODUCTION

T
he U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and the People’s Republic of China. As retired
strongly influenced the conduct and Air Force officer Dennis M. Drew observed in his
outcome of the Vietnam War. Naval monograph Rolling Thunder 1965: Anatomy of a
aviation—Navy and Marine Corps— Failure, “The overriding fear was that the Chinese
figured prominently in air operations against the would intervene directly if the United States began
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) intense military operations in Vietnam, particularly
and Communist forces in Laos, and in support of if the United States assaulted North Vietnam. The
U.S. and allied troops fighting in the Republic of memories of the Korean conflict and the Chinese
Vietnam (South Vietnam). assault across the Yalu River remained fresh in the
President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the March minds of the American leadership in 1965.”
1965 bombing campaign against North Vietnam— Confident in the political science conflict theories
Operation Rolling Thunder—to discourage the of “flexible response” and “graduated escalation,” all
Hanoi regime’s direction and support of an insur- the rage in Washington during the early 1960s, U.S.
gency that threatened to destroy the Republic of leaders drew a bombing line across the southern part
Vietnam. Bombing operations during 1964 in Laos, of North Vietnam and envisioned “rolling” the line
through which passed the main enemy supply line of “thunder” very slowly northward. They believed
to South Vietnam—the Ho Chi Minh Trail—had that as the bombing moved closer to Hanoi, the Ho
failed to curtail or even slow Hanoi’s war effort. The Chi Minh government would capitulate to save the
U.S.-sponsored Operation 34 Alpha, a clandestine country from massive destruction. U.S. Navy and
maritime campaign of sabotage and naval bombard- U.S. Air Force operational planners initially focused
ment along the coast of North Vietnam, had proven on 94 targets that included bridges and railways,
even less successful. Indeed, the attack by North military installations, and industrial sites in North
Vietnamese torpedo boats on destroyer Maddox Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff selected these
(DD-731) in August 1964, and the killing of U.S. targets months prior to the start of the campaign,
servicemen by Viet Cong guerrillas at bases in and the White House approved some of them.
Bien Hoa, Saigon, Pleiku, and Qui Nhon in South Operation Rolling Thunder would become one
Vietnam in late 1964 and early 1965, demonstrated of the longest sustained aerial bombing campaigns
the enemy’s determination to stay the course. One- in history. And it would be a failure. Those respon-
time U.S. strikes against targets in North Vietnam sible for that failure included President Johnson,
in retaliation for these attacks failed to alter the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the
enemy’s long-term plan to unite all of Vietnam Washington-based national security/intelligence
under Ho Chi Minh’s Communist regime. establishment, and the senior U.S. military com-
The Johnson administration decided that a manders in Asia.
concerted bombing campaign could convince North In early 1965, few American civilian or military
Vietnam’s leaders that they would pay too high a leaders believed that North Vietnam had the will
price to achieve their goal. Washington concluded or capacity to resist the bombing campaign. When
that allied air forces operating from bases in South it became clear that the U.S. strategic analysis
Vietnam, Thailand, and aircraft carriers in the Gulf had erred on both counts, American leaders
of Tonkin could accomplish this mission without parted ways on how to proceed. Some but not all
provoking intervention into the war by North members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other
Vietnam’s nuclear-armed allies, the Soviet Union military leaders advocated an overwhelming, 1
 NHHC VN Collection
An RF-8A Crusader aerial reconnaissance plane of Light Photographic Squadron 63, involved in air operations in Laos
during December 1964, flies over carrier Ticonderoga (CVA-14).

no-holds-barred air assault on North Vietnam to Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp Jr., Commander
achieve victory. President Johnson, however, feared in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), who
that a major war in Southeast Asia would derail was the commander directing the Rolling Thunder
his Great Society and other domestic programs. campaign, initially tried to steer a middle course.
Secretary McNamara persuaded the President He pushed for powerful military strikes, but in his
that a judicious, carefully controlled application of bombing plans he accommodated Washington’s
military force would bring success as it had in the wishes to avoid provoking Hanoi’s allies or arousing
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Both men believed war fever in the United States. By the end of Rolling
they could compel Hanoi to give up the fight Thunder, however, Sharp’s often heated advocacy
through military pressure and diplomacy without of strong measures, including the mining of North
triggering Chinese or Soviet intervention. Vietnam’s ports and the destruction of all major
2
military targets, had negated his influence with and for a period in 1968 the battleship New Jersey
Johnson and McNamara. (BB-62) shelled targets along the North Vietnamese
The admiral especially loathed Washington’s coast. Other warships, with advanced radars,
micromanagement of operations. President Johnson monitored the skies over North Vietnam to warn
once boasted that the military could not “bomb U.S. aircraft of approaching enemy planes. Naval
an outhouse without my permission.” Significant replenishment ships enabled the fleet to remain off
technological improvements in military commu- Vietnam night and day, seven days a week through-
nications since the Korean War enabled President out Rolling Thunder.
Johnson, unlike his predecessors, to exercise direct Nonetheless, the Navy that entered the fight in
control of military operations thousands of miles Vietnam did so with many ships, aircraft, weapons,
from Washington. He often selected targets to be and equipment that first saw service in the Korean
struck in North Vietnam at Tuesday luncheons War, or even World War II, and with tactics
in the White House. McNamara and his civilian inadequate for aerial warfare in the 1960s. The Navy
deputies not only dictated which targets could be overcame those deficiencies with the development
struck but at times stipulated specific days and times and testing in battle of advanced aircraft, munitions,
for attacks, the number and types of aircraft to be and electronic gear. Naval officials, combat com-
employed, and the kinds of ordnance to be used. manders, and enlisted personnel learned in the hard
Vice Admiral Malcolm “Chris” Cagle, a noted naval school of combat the best tactics for overcoming
aviator, likened this unwieldy process to “targeting North Vietnam’s increasingly lethal air defenses.
by remote control.” The success with which the Navy executed the
While constrained by the tight control of Linebacker campaign against North Vietnam in
operations from afar, the Navy, Marine Corps, and 1972 revealed how much the service had learned
Air Force officers charged with executing Rolling from and exploited the Rolling Thunder experience
Thunder adapted as best they could and brought of 1965–1968.
significant airpower to bear against enemy forces
in North Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam. The
bombing campaign failed to compel Hanoi’s sur-
render or to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but Rolling
Thunder operations did force North Vietnam to pay
a heavy price in terms of lost lives; destroyed roads,
railways, bridges, and power generating plants; and
a devastated economy. The American air forces also
saved the lives of thousands of allied soldiers and
Marines fighting in South Vietnam by delaying the
start of enemy offensives and starving them of sup-
plies and reinforcements.
The U.S. Navy proved essential to the conduct of
Rolling Thunder. Exploiting the inherent flexibility
and mobility of naval forces, the Seventh Fleet oper-
ated with impunity for three years off the coast of
North Vietnam. With existing airfields under attack
and new, jet-capable airfields under construction in
South Vietnam during the early years, Task Force 77
carriers complemented the Air Force’s air support
responsibilities. Cruisers, destroyers, frigates, 3
 NHHC VN Collection
A catapult crew of carrier Ranger (CVA-61) readies an A-4 Skyhawk attack plane for a March 1965 bombing mission
over North Vietnam.
 THE START OF AN AIR CAMPAIGN

R
olling Thunder, initially involving U.S. ten Crusaders, and two Skyraiders flying combat
and South Vietnamese air forces, began air patrol were ready for them if they had appeared.
on 2 March 1965, following two weeks Lieutenant (j.g.) Charles F. Clydesdale was forced to
of delay caused by political upheaval ditch his damaged and smoking Skyraider at sea. The
in Saigon and foul weather over North Vietnam. destroyer Wiltsie (DD-716), one of two plane guards,
Indeed, throughout the war the Air Force units immediately dispatched a helicopter to the splash site,
based in Thailand and the Navy squadrons on but Clydesdale did not escape from his sinking plane.
board aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin would The other 93 planes made it back to their carri-
find the weather over Indochina almost as difficult ers, although four of the piston-engine Skyraiders
to deal with as the enemy. During the northeast suffered damage from antiaircraft fire. The mission
monsoon, which lasted from November to March, was the first of the Rolling Thunder multiplane,
huge billowy clouds, sudden rain squalls, and dense multicarrier operations called “Alpha strikes.” These
fog severely reduced visibility over North Vietnam missions employed planes of various types: attack
and the Gulf of Tonkin, making life miserable and aircraft (A-1 Skyraiders, A-4 Skyhawks and later
dangerous for aviators. The southwest monsoon A-6 Intruders and A-7 Corsair IIs), fighters (F-8
from May to September brought similar weather to Crusaders and F-4 Phantoms), special antiradar
Laos and South Vietnam. aircraft (A-4s and later A-6s), and various support
The first Navy attack of Rolling Thunder took aircraft (tankers, photoreconnaissance, and elec-
place on 15 March 1965, when aircraft from Rear tronic warfare planes).
Admiral Henry L. Miller’s Task Force 77 carriers In addition to striking targets in North
Ranger (CVA-61) and Hancock (CVA-19) bombed Vietnam, Navy and Air Force planes continued
the ammunition depot at Phu Qui between Vinh bombing operations in Laos, which had begun
and Thanh Hoa. After crossing the coastline, 64 A-4 in 1964. These strikes were focused on the Plain
Skyhawk and A-1 Skyraider attack planes arrived over of Jars in central Laos in support of CIA-armed
the target at 1300 and descended through a break in Hmong tribesmen under Lieutenant General Vang
the heavy cloud cover. Even before they reached the Pao and especially on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in
targets, eight F-8 Crusader fighters attacked North the panhandle of southern Laos. The goal of the
Vietnamese antiaircraft defenses with rockets and latter operation was to severely strain if not cut the
cannon fire. Still, the attack planes had to fly through enemy’s logistic pipeline into South Vietnam. The
intense 37mm and small arms fire before they could air forces concentrated on interdicting the trail at
drop their general purpose iron bombs and fire several chokepoints—the Ban Karai, Nape, and Mu
rockets and 20mm cannon at the depot complex. Gia mountain passes between North Vietnam and
Bombs containing jellied gasoline (napalm), first Laos. Other attack aircraft flew armed route recon-
used in World War II, made their debut in attacks on naissance missions in pairs over both Laos and
North Vietnam on this mission. When the returning North Vietnam in search of targets of opportunity
strike group radioed “feet wet” as they crossed the such as trucks, river craft, and antiaircraft sites. The
coast, the planes had destroyed or severely damaged American air forces compelled the enemy to restrict
21 buildings, which two RF-8A Crusader reconnais- most vehicle, bicycle, and even foot traffic to dark-
sance planes confirmed with post-strike photos. ness, but they could not sever the supply line. The
North Vietnamese MiG fighters did not challenge North Vietnamese and their Laotian Communist
the American planes, but eight F-4 Phantom IIs, allies developed a sophisticated logistic operation 5
 that featured multiple vehicle parks, refueling Johnson and John J. Hyland served successively as
stations, rest stops, antiaircraft defenses, and hun- Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).
dreds of miles of roadways, trails, and paths. These officers were in turn responsible to CINCPAC,
The aircraft carriers taking part in these strikes Admirals Sharp and later John S. McCain Jr.
operated from Yankee Station, a staging area in Lieutenant General Joseph H. Moore,
the Gulf of Tonkin located roughly between the Commander Seventh Air Force, had a similar chain
Demilitarized Zone and the Chinese island of of command up to CINCPAC. Moore and later
Hainan, at grid coordinates 17˚30' N and 108˚30' E. Seventh Air Force commanders sought to have
By 1966, three or four carriers along with cruisers, all air operations in the war zone placed under a
destroyers, and frigates formed Task Force 77, the centralized—Air Force—command. But the Navy
Seventh Fleet’s Attack Carrier Striking Force. The kept its carrier operations entirely under the control
Seventh Fleet commander, a vice admiral, reported of Navy flag officers up through CINCPAC.
to the four-star Pacific Fleet commander at Pearl In reality, the President and the Secretary
Harbor. During Rolling Thunder, Admirals Roy L. of Defense ran the air war from Washington.
In the effort to prevent any
action that might cause North
Vietnam’s Communist allies to
N ORTH CHINA
VIETNAM intervene directly in the conflict,
Phong Saly Washington prohibited strike
Province

Nam Tha operations closer than 25 nautical

L A O S Sam Neua
Province
Hanoi  miles to the border with China;
Plain of
30 nautical miles of the North
Luang Jars
Prabang Vietnamese capital of Hanoi; and
GULF of
TONKIN
Hainan
10 nautical miles of Haiphong,
the country’s main port. These
Vientiane
operational restrictions put North
YANKEE STATION
Udorn
Vietnam’s most vital indus-
Ho
Chi Minh
Trail

Seno
Quang Tri tries—power-generating facilities,
Tchepone Hue
ports, transportation centers, and
Danang
Attopeu airfields—beyond the reach of
THAILAND
Khorat
Pakse U.S. airpower in the early months
Ubon
Kontum of Rolling Thunder.
Voun
Air Force and Navy leaders
Bangkok CAMBODIA Khom
tried a number of approaches
to dividing the bombing
Sambor
Rapids
responsibility in North Vietnam,
but different service operating
Phnom Penh SOUTH
methods compelled Admiral
VIETNAM
Phan Thiet Sharp to establish separate

SAIGON
areas, or “route packages,” for
DIXIE STATION
GULF of each service. The Air Force flew
SIAM Soc Trang
the attacks in Route Packages
V and VIA, the areas closest to
Cape Camau SOUTH CHINA SEA
NHHC

their bases in Thailand. The U.S.

6 Carrier stations off Indochina. Military Assistance Command,
 and warfighting cultures
CHINA that precluded centralized
control. Nonetheless,
leaders and commanders
in the operational theater
routinely cooperated with
VI A one another to fashion a
powerful offensive force,
N ORTH VIETNA M and combat units from the
different services routinely
V Kep worked together. For
HANOI VI B example, Navy warships
 Gia Lam
Phuc Yen
Cat Bi
used their advanced air
Paul
Doomer
Kien An
Haiphong search radars to warn Air
Bridge
Force planes of approach-
IV ing enemy fighters; Air
Force search and rescue
(SAR) aircraft plucked
LAOS Thanh Hoa Bridge
downed naval aviators
III from the sea; and Marine
ground forces prevented
GULF of
TONKIN Viet Cong guerrillas from
Vinh
overrunning Air Force
bases in South Vietnam.
II
Vientiane
Carrier-based A-4
Skyhawks, A-1 Skyraiders,
 Capital F-8 Crusaders, and F-4
Major Airfield
I Dong Hoi Phantoms flew most of the
Prohibited Zone Navy strikes. On 29 March
Restricted Zone
1965, six aircraft from
Buffer Zone DMZ
Ranger’s Heavy Attack
Miles
Squadron (VAH) 2 became
0 25 50 75 100
SOUTH VIETNAM the first A-3B Skywarriors
NHHC

(35-ton aircraft designed

Route Packages and Prohibited Zones in North Vietnam. for the nuclear strike role)
to drop bombs in combat
Vietnam (MACV) under General William C. when they hit targets on Bach Long Vi (Nightingale
Westmoreland was responsible for Route Package I, Island) in the Gulf of Tonkin. Heavy haze prevented
just north of the Demilitarized Zone. The Navy visual sighting of the targets, so the Skywarriors
carriers focused their strike efforts on the coastal used radar to drop 12 tons of bombs on several
regions in Route Packages II, III, IV, and VIB. sites. Throughout the summer of 1965, Skywarrior
Few service leaders liked the divided command detachments demonstrated their versatility as
and control structure employed for the Vietnam air bombers, aerial tankers, and electronic warfare and
war. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps each reconnaissance aircraft. Like their companions, the
had different operational requirements, resources, A-1 Skyraiders and A-4 Skyhawks, also designed by 7
 NHHC VN Collection
The forward 8-inch turret of heavy cruiser Saint Paul (CA-73) opens up against targets on the coast of North Vietnam.

the Douglas Aircraft Company’s legendary engineer

Ed Heinemann, Skywarriors proved to be highly
versatile combat aircraft.
The aircraft on Yankee Station employed a vast
array of ordnance, from World War II and Korean
War-era iron bombs to precision-guided munitions
(PGMs). Navy attack planes initially dropped 250-,
500-, 750-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound general purpose
bombs, napalm bombs, and Shrike AGM-45 antira-
dar missiles. The planes also used 5-inch Zuni and
2.75-inch rockets against ground targets. The Navy
emphasized preparation for nuclear war in its pilot
training programs of the 1950s and early 1960s; thus
the Vietnam squadrons had to adapt their tactics to
NHHC VN Collection

the conventional strike warfare role.

One of the Navy’s primary weapons for destroy-
ing rail and highway bridges—key components of
Commander Charles H. DeLorenzi, the commanding North Vietnam’s transportation system—was the
officer of Heavy Attack Squadron 2, pilots his A-3B AGM-12 Bullpup air-to-ground missile. The bullet-
Skywarrior during a bombing mission over Vietnam in shaped, 1,785-pound Bullpup-A had a 990-pound
8 October 1965.
warhead and was propelled by a rocket
engine that could accelerate it to Mach
2 speeds with a range of more than ten
miles. The launching aircraft, however,
had to descend toward the target straight
on, at relatively slow speed, and with
wings level as the pilot used a joystick to
visually guide the weapon into the target.
This approach was an antiaircraft gunner’s
dream! Few naval aviators were fond of the
Bullpup.
Surface warships were an active part
of Task Force 77. Beginning in October
1966, 8-inch- and 6-inch-gun cruisers and
5-inch-gun destroyers and frigates (DLGs)
moved along the coast of southern North
Vietnam in Operation Sea Dragon to sink
waterborne logistic craft (referred to as
WBLCs, or “Wiblics”), bombard coastal
roads and rail lines, and destroy enemy
coastal guns and radar sites.
The carrier-based S-2 Tracker antisub-
marine warfare aircraft and A-1 Skyraiders
helped the surface ships by spotting enemy

NHHC VN Collection
targets. At one time or another, the Royal
Australian Navy destroyers Hobart, Perth,
Brisbane, and Vendetta served with the
Sea Dragon force, as did the battleship General purpose, or iron, bombs crowd the deck before ordnancemen
New Jersey (BB-62). By early 1967, pairs of load them onto Task Force 77 attack planes.
surface warships—including at least one
guided missile ship—operated as far north
as the 20th parallel. The North Vietnamese tried
repeatedly but failed to sink these ships with air
attacks. And, when the ships were close to the shore
for bombardment they came under fire from North
Vietnamese coastal guns. Those guns damaged
19 U.S. ships and killed and wounded scores of
American sailors.
Enemy aircraft also took a toll on naval aircraft
and aircrews. On 3 April 1965, strikes by Carrier
NHHC VN Collection

Air Wing (CVW) 21 led by Commander Warren

Sell from Hancock and CVW-15 led by Commander
H. P. Glickman from Coral Sea (CVA-43) destroyed
the Dong Phoung Thong highway bridge 65 miles An AGM-12 Bullpup air-to-ground missile affixed to the
south of Hanoi. Antiaircraft fire struck an A-4C wing of an A-7 Corsair. 9
 Attack Aircraft

THE DOUGLAS A-1 SKYRAIDER (originally AD, pylons; this capability outpaced that of even the
redesignated in 1962), designed during World War II celebrated prop-driven Skyraider series.
and a mainstay of strike operations in the Korean War, A key feature of the early Intruders was the digital
served the Navy, the Air Force, and the Vietnam Air integrated attack system (DIANE) that combined search
Force during the conflict in Southeast Asia. The propel- and track radars; navigation, communications, and
ler-driven Skyraider, called a “Spad,” was known for its identification equipment; a cockpit display system; and
ability to carry a heavy load of ordnance and stay aloft a high-speed digital computer. DIANE enabled the pilot
for many hours. A-1s took part in strike operations to preselect a target, guide the aircraft, release the
during the early years of Rolling Thunder. Naval leaders weapons, and leave the target area automatically. From
eventually considered the planes too vulnerable to the the time an Intruder catapulted from a carrier’s flight
enemy’s sophisticated air defenses in the heart of
North Vietnam and subsequently employed them for
close air support missions in South Vietnam and as
armed escorts for search and rescue missions in the
less heavily defended regions of Indochina.
The workhorse of Task Force 77’s attack arm
during Rolling Thunder was the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk.
The A-4s, fondly called “Scooters” by pilots who con-
sidered them easy to handle and a joy to fly, formed
the core of the Alpha strikes against targets in North
Vietnam. The A-4s carried bombs and rockets on
attack missions and Shrike antiradar missiles to
suppress enemy air defenses. Skyhawks flew more
attack sorties than any other Navy plane and per-

NHHC VN Collection
formed well in that role, but they also suffered heavy
losses. Enemy air defenses shot down 195 A-4s, and
operational accidents claimed another 77, represent-
ing almost one-third of all Navy aircraft lost in the The pilot of a propeller-driven A-1H Skyraider taxies
war. A-4 pilots who fell victim to enemy fire early in his attack plane, loaded with bombs for a mission
the war included Lieutenant (j.g.) Everett Alvarez along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, into position for a cata-
pult launch from Ticonderoga (CVA-14).
Jr., Commander James B. Stockdale, and
Lieutenant Commander John S. McCain III.
These men figured prominently in the
prisoner-of-war (POW) experience. By the
end of Rolling Thunder, the fleet had begun
limiting the use of Skyhawks over the high-
risk areas of North Vietnam.
As the air war over Vietnam escalated,
new aircraft and weapons entered the
fight. On 4 July 1965, carrier Independence
(CVA-62) launched the first A-6A Intruders
on a combat mission. The Grumman
NHHC VN Collection

Intruder (originally A2F) was the first aircraft

designed specifically to strike targets
obscured by bad weather or darkness.
It was a two-seat, twin-turbojet aircraft A catapult officer (with yellow headgear and vest) and other
capable of carrying up to 15,000 pounds flight deck crewmembers ready an A-7 Corsair for launch from
10 of conventional or nuclear weapons on five Ranger (CVA-61) in December 1967.
 NHHC VN Collection
An A-4C Skyhawk of VA-172 is prepared for a mission in On Board USS Shangri-La by Verceill Tossey. Oil on canvas.

deck to its return from a mission over Vietnam the pilot

had no need for visual references.
The debut of the first Intruder squadron—Attack
Squadron (VA) 75—was marred by several losses. On
the night of 17 September 1965, the squadron’s com-
manding officer, Michael C. Vogt, and his bombardier-
navigator were killed when their aircraft, apparently hit
by antiaircraft fire, came down at sea.
The Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV, formerly Chance

NHHC VN Collection
Vought) A-7 Corsair II, which bore a resemblance
to the F-8 Crusader, first saw combat in December
1967, when Ranger entered the Gulf of Tonkin for her
third Western Pacific deployment of the war. The Navy
Two A-6A Intruders from Constellation (CVA-64)’s
intended the Corsair to replace the A-4 Skyhawk as a Attack Squadron 196 en route to North Vietnam. With
light attack aircraft for daytime operations. Its design- their advanced navigation and targeting systems,
ers anticipated the plane conducting deep interdiction the day-night, all-weather attack planes significantly
strikes, with nuclear or conventional weapons, and improved bombing accuracy.
providing close air support to ground forces.
When Ranger arrived in the South China Sea with
of weapons and drop tanks (or refueling equipment)
VA-147, the first operational Corsair attack squadron,
on six wing pylons; two cheek pylons held Sidewinder
included in its ranks were 24 Air Force personnel—
air-to-air missiles. Initially the attack plane boasted a
three of them carrier-qualified pilots—to evaluate the
pair of 20mm M12 cannon, and the later A-7C and A-7E
aircraft for their service, which later procured the A-7D
versions had a single 20mm multi-barrel Gatling gun.
variant. The Corsair could carry up to 15,000 pounds 11
 Skyhawk from Hancock, forcing the pilot, Lieutenant survive, the MiGs dove away before U.S. fighters
Commander Raymond Vohden, to eject. He soon could react. But three of the four MiG-17s did not
occupied a POW cell in North Vietnam’s infamous return to base. North Vietnamese antiaircraft
Hoa Lo Prison, nicknamed the Hanoi Hilton. gunners, apparently mistaking the MiGs for
During this mission, for the first time in the war, American planes in the heat of battle, shot down
North Vietnamese MiG-17 Fresco turbojet fighters the trio as well as another F-105D.
attacked an F-8 Crusader flying combat air patrol The success of the MiG-17s surprised Navy and
for the strike group. Damage to the plane forced the Air Force commanders, who had considered the
Crusader pilot to divert to Danang Airfield in South Soviet-built, Korean War–era planes and their green
Vietnam, where he landed safely. Believing that the pilots no match for the mainline F-4 Phantoms and
Crusader had been destroyed, and to celebrate the F-8 Crusaders with highly trained naval aviators.
event, the North Vietnamese government estab- The first North Vietnamese fighter unit—the 921st
lished 3 April as Air Force Day. Red Star Fighter Regiment—had only been estab-
The first loss of American aircraft to MiG fight- lished in February 1964.
ers occurred the following day, 4 April, when four Soon after the start of the air combat over
MiG-17s engaged Air Force F-105D Thunderchiefs North Vietnam, U.S. commanders realized that
attacking the soon-to-be-infamous “Dragon’s their top fighter, the Phantom, had sacrificed
Jaw” bridge at Thanh Hoa.* After intercepting and maneuverability for high-performance and
shooting down two F-105s, whose pilots did not multimission capability. While long-range missiles
designed for stand-off action against Soviet missile-
* Throughout Rolling Thunder, Navy and Air Force squadrons carrying bombers were intended to reduce the
attacked the strategic bridge but failed to bring it down, suffer-
ing the loss of many planes and crews. In April 1972, Air Force likelihood of a dogfight, the tight rules of engage-
planes dropped portions of the bridge, but did not permanently ment set by U.S. political leaders for the skies over
disable it. That October, Attack Squadron 82 flying A-7
Corsairs from America (CVA-66) employed a combination of
Vietnam required visual identification before a
precision-guided munitions and general purpose bombs to missile could be fired. When missile-armed aircraft
finally knock out the bridge. failed to achieve the
expected high kill ratios,
U.S. pilots and military
leaders recognized that
close-in dogfighting was
not a relic of the past.
The long-range missile’s
design philosophy that
had created the Navy’s
gunless F-4 degraded the
plane’s close-in fighting
ability. Aviation historian
Lon Nordeen aptly
observed that “anyone
who thought the ten-
NHHC VN Collection

year-old MiG-17 was an

obsolete aircraft with no
capability against modern
Carriers Ranger (CVA-61) (foreground) and Coral Sea (CVA-43) launched heavy strikes U.S. fighting machines
12 against targets below the 20th parallel of North Vietnam during the spring of 1965. was sadly mistaken.”
 NHHC VN Collection
HMAS Hobart and three other Royal Australian Navy destroyers fought alongside their American counterparts in
Operation Sea Dragon.

Soon after the MiG-17’s entry into the

Vietnam conflict, the North Vietnamese
government responded to an American
call for diplomatic talks. On 8 April 1965,
Premier Pham Van Dong stated that
negotiations could begin when the United
States halted the bombing of North
Vietnam and removed all of its troops
from the South; the South Vietnamese
government recognized the demands of
NHHC VN Collection
the National Liberation Front (political
arm of the Viet Cong); and all parties
agreed that only the Vietnamese would
decide on how to unify the country. From A Soviet-made MiG-17 Fresco in flight.

Washington’s standpoint these were

unacceptable demands. It also revealed Phantoms of Fighter Squadron (VF) 96 for a combat
to American leaders that as yet Rolling Thunder air patrol over the northern Gulf of Tonkin. The first
had failed to induce North Vietnamese leaders to aircraft suffered an engine failure as it was being
negotiate an end to the conflict. catapulted—an ominous beginning to the mission.
On 9 April 1965, Navy aircraft once again The two crewmen, however, ejected safely, and a SAR
engaged MiGs. That day Ranger launched two F-4 helicopter quickly retrieved them from the sea. A 13
 Fighter Aircraft

TWO OUTSTANDING FIGHTERS FLEW from U.S. (F-4 after 1962). The Phantom was the Navy’s first
carrier decks during Operation Rolling Thunder—the fighter not armed with guns, but had an all-missile
McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II (formerly F4H) armament. A radar operator sat behind the pilot to
and the Ling-Temco-Vought F-8 Crusader (formerly operate the complex electronics systems. The first
F8U). Both aircraft were designed specifically for Phantom flew in 1958, and it soon became known as
shipboard operation. The Phantom also flew from a winner.
British carriers and was flown by the Royal Air Force The F8U-3 Crusader III competed with the
ashore. The French Navy launched Crusaders from Phantom as the Navy's advanced fighter. It was a
their carriers. The U.S. Air Force and several foreign single-engine, single-pilot, specialized interceptor
air arms employed Phantoms from land bases. compared with the two-engine, two-man F4H-1
The Phantom and the Crusader proved to be lethal multimission aircraft. Both planes could reach level
adversaries of the Soviet-built MiG fighters during speeds in excess of Mach 2. In 1958 the Navy
the Vietnam conflict. selected the Phantom, with its speed of Mach 2.2,
More Phantoms were produced than any other over the advanced Crusader as its standard carrier-
U.S. post–World War II military aircraft except for based fighter. And in 1962 Secretary of Defense
the F-86 Sabre/FJ Fury, and the P-80/T-33 Shooting Robert McNamara directed the Air Force to procure
Star. During the 1960s and 1970s, Phantoms were Phantoms instead of additional F-105 Thunderchiefs,
the mainstay fighter aircraft of the U.S. Navy, Marine a specialized attack aircraft.
Corps, and Air Force and were operated by the air The Phantom relied on armament of six Sparrow
forces of ten foreign nations, some well into the radar-homing missiles or four Sparrows and four
21st century. Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles for intercepts.
The McDonnell Aircraft Company initially designed In the attack role a Phantom could carry a payload
the Phantom as a single-seat, fighter-attack aircraft, of almost eight tons—nearly double the maximum
at one point designated AH-1. During the plane’s load of a World War II B-17 Flying Fortress. The
development the Navy changed its requirements to a weapons load could include eleven 1,000-pound
long-range, high-altitude interceptor designated F4H bombs or eighteen 750-pounders or four Bullpup
air-to-surface missiles.
The Phantom could carry
four Sparrows with any of
these attack loads.
Entering U.S.
Navy service in 1962,
Phantoms first saw
combat in August
1964, when F-4s from
Constellation (CVA-64)
escorted attack aircraft
that bombed targets in
North Vietnam follow-
ing the Gulf of Tonkin
incident. The first air-to-air
NHHC VN Collection

encounter came on 17
June 1965, when two
Phantoms from Midway
A Kitty Hawk (CVA-63) F-4B Phantom of Fighter Squadron 114 high above the (CVA-41) tangled with four
clouds of North Vietnam during Rolling Thunder. While the Phantom lacked guns, North Vietnamese MiG-17
its Sparrow radar-guided and Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles claimed many fighters. The Phantoms
14 enemy fighters.
 The Crusader
had four 20mm
cannon, a
Sidewinder missile
rail on each side of
the fuselage, and
a rocket pack that
opened from the
bottom of the fuse-
lage to fire thirty-two
2.75-inch, unguided,
air-to-ground rockets.
The Navy deleted
the rocket pack from
later models and

NHHC VN Collection
modified the missile
rails so that each
could launch two
Sidewinder air-to-air
An F-8 Crusader fires an AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile. missiles.
The first F8Us
entered Navy and
used Sparrow missiles to down two of the MiGs and Marine fighter squadrons in 1957. In June of that
suffered no losses. After that, Navy and Air Force year, a pair of Crusaders launched from Bon Homme
Phantoms regularly engaged and defeated MiG-17s. Richard (CVA-31) off the California coast and with in-
All five U.S. fighter aces of the Vietnam War (two flight refueling, recovered on board Saratoga (CVA-60)
Navy and three Air Force) scored their aerial victories off the Florida coast; the flight spanned the continent
with the aircraft. F-4s were responsible for 36 of the in three and a half hours. A month later, Marine Major
Navy’s Vietnam aircraft kills. Overall, the Phantom John H. Glenn Jr. piloted an F8U-1P photo variant
demonstrated a marked superiority over the MiG-21 from California to New York in 3 hours, 28 minutes,
and lesser aircraft encountered in Vietnam. Air Force 50 seconds for an average speed of 723.5 mph, a
and Marine squadrons also flew the RF-4, a photo cross-continent record.
reconnaissance variant of the versatile jet. The F-4 By 1960, more than half of the Navy’s 30 carrier-
Phantom merited the numerous accolades heaped based fighter squadrons and most of the Marine
upon the plane during its 35-year career with the U.S. Corps fighter squadrons flew the Crusader, as did
armed forces. the French Navy. At that time unarmed F8U-1P Photo
The F-8 Crusader, first flown in 1955 and Crusaders served in two- and three-plane detach-
designated F8U prior to 1962, served as the Navy’s ments on all Navy attack carriers and in the three
single-seat, high-performance, day fighter. Faced Marine reconnaissance squadrons.
with the problem of developing a Mach 1.8 fighter Like the Phantom, the Crusader first saw combat
with good carrier-landing characteristics, Vought during the Gulf of Tonkin incident of August 1964,
designers created a plane whose wing raised up when they flew from Ticonderoga (CVA-14) as part
seven degrees during launches and recoveries, of the Pierce Arrow retaliatory strike operation.
thus providing the angle-of-attack necessary for a Crusaders flew throughout the Vietnam conflict
130-mph landing speed and still have the fuselage and shot down 18 MiGs. The F-8 claimed one of its
in a near-horizontal attitude for maximum pilot victims with 20mm cannon fire and all the others with
visibility. Sidewinders or a combination of guns and missiles.
15
 standby Phantom took the place of the lost plane, and
the two aircraft streaked northward. Four Chinese
navy MiG-17s engaged these Phantoms as well as
another pair already in the area. The aerial battle took
place at high altitude near China’s Hainan Island.
The Phantom of Lieutenant (j.g.) Terence
Murphy and his radar intercept officer (RIO), Ensign
Ronald Fegan, destroyed a MiG-17, as later reported
by Chinese media. Murphy then radioed that his
plane was out of missiles; the pair was never heard
from again. The Navy did not give them official
credit for the MiG kill because of the sensitivity over
American and Chinese forces engaging in combat.
This would not be the last instance of such contact,
however. During the Vietnam War, Chinese MiGs
downed five Navy aircraft (two A-6A Intruders, one
NHHC VN Collection
F-4B Phantom, one A-1H Skyraider, and one KA-3B
Skywarrior) and two Air Force planes (one F-4C
and one F-104C). Navy Lieutenant Robert Flynn of
Attack Squadron 196 was the only survivor of the
Their pre-mission briefing completed, naval aviators at
two Intruders downed over China, whose govern-
Yankee Station head for their A-4 Skyhawks in April 1965.
The pilots and their planes will soon carry out an Alpha ment released him from captivity in 1973.
strike in North Vietnam.

NHHC VN Collection

This dramatic aerial reconnaissance photo shows enemy soldiers who have just disembarked from a troop train near Thanh
16 Hoa, North Vietnam, heading south for combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
 By the spring of 1965, carrier
aircraft were executing more than
100 strike sorties every day. In one
instance, 110 aircraft from Hancock
and Coral Sea struck radar sites
and antiaircraft positions in North
Vietnam. The increasing sorties
brought with them increasing losses
of men and planes. On the first day of
June, the enemy shot down a pair of
RF-8 reconnaissance planes and the

NHHC VN Collection
next day destroyed two A-4 Skyhawks
and an EA-1F Skyraider sent to the
crash site on a SAR mission. The
two-day loss of five aircraft and The bridge at Xom Ca Trang 60 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone
shows the effects of a carrier strike. Attack planes from Coral Sea took out
eight aircrew (six killed, two made one of the structure’s center spans with Bullpup missiles on 16 April 1965.
prisoner, one rescued) was the heavi-
est of the war—so far.
The men flying from
the Yankee Station
carriers recognized
that their tactic of
approaching targets at
low level—a holdover
from training for
nuclear war—put them
in great danger from
antiaircraft artillery,
and even small arms.
The enemy’s small
arms and antiaircraft
artillery accounted for
three times the number
of Navy and Marine
aircraft lost to MiGs
and surface-to-air mis-
siles (SAMs) during the
war. Despite the danger
from MiGs and SAMs
at the higher altitudes,
the attack squadrons
Navy Art Collection

operated there as much

as possible to lessen the
antiaircraft artillery
threat. Plane Handlers by John Steel. Acrylic drawing. 17
 NHHC VN Collection
Midway (CVA-41), with a complement of A-4 Skyhawks, A-1H Skyraiders, and A-3B Skywarriors on deck, steams in the
South China Sea in early 1965.

18
 WAY DOWN SOUTH ON DIXIE STATION

W
hile the air action over North permanent carrier station off South Vietnam to
Vietnam accelerated, Navy and support his ground forces. The lack of sufficient
Marine aircraft joined Army, land bases in South Vietnam for Air Force aircraft
Air Force, and Vietnam Air prompted his request. As in the Korean War, during
Force planes on 15 April 1965 to strike Viet Cong the initial stages of the conflict the Navy’s carriers
positions in the South for the first time. Navy provided allied forces with a movable airfield that
attack aircraft from Midway (CVA-41) and Coral could steam off the coast of Vietnam with little fear
Sea (CVA-43) participated, as did Marine F-8E of enemy attack.
Crusaders from Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF) The vulnerability of land bases in South Vietnam
212 flying from Yorktown (CVS-10). The combined to mortar, rocket, and ground attack was another
forces bombed Viet Cong positions on Nui Ba Den factor that prompted Westmoreland’s request. For
(Black Virgin), a mountain that dominated the oth- example, on 27 October 1965, Viet Cong sappers
erwise flat terrain northwest of Saigon. All carrier destroyed or damaged more than 40 U.S. aircraft
aircraft returned safely to their ships. on the Marine airfields at Danang and Chu Lai.
The Navy’s participation in the operation was so The killing of 32 Viet Cong saboteurs during these
successful that General Westmoreland, the MACV attacks did not compensate for the loss of much-
commander, requested that the Navy establish a needed and costly aircraft. During the course of
the war, the enemy
destroyed or heavily
damaged almost
3,000 fixed-wing air-
craft and helicopters
on airfields in South
Vietnam.
Pacific Fleet
commander
Admiral Roy L.
Johnson, following a
request by General
Westmoreland,
directed the estab-
lishment of Dixie
Station, a carrier
staging area about
100 miles southeast
NHHC VN Collection

of Cam Ranh Bay

at 11˚ N and 110˚
E. The setup of
General William C. Westmoreland, Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Dixie Station meant
Vietnam, returns the salute of Rear Admiral Henry L. Miller, Commander Task Force 77 and
side boys of carrier Ranger (CVA-61) in March 1965. The general’s advocacy led the Navy to
that of the four
establish the carrier staging area southeast of Cam Ranh Bay known as Dixie Station. carriers then being 19
 deployed to the combat theater, one
would operate from Dixie Station and
two from Yankee Station, with the fourth
carrier at the Subic Bay Naval Base in
the Philippines for the rest and recupera-
tion of her sailors and Marines and for
maintenance. Mid-year 1965 the Navy
authorized the deployment of another
carrier to the operational area, bringing a
total of five to Southeast Asian waters.
The carrier squadrons on Dixie
Station destroyed numerous enemy
ammunition dumps, fortified posi-
tions, and storage huts in the jungle of
Vietnam. At critical times, carrier units
frustrated enemy ground attacks and
chased surviving attackers back into
their forest lairs. By the end of the year,
the Dixie Station aircraft had flown
26,000 attack, reconnaissance, search

NHHC VN Collection
and rescue, and combat air patrol sorties,
totaling one-third of all allied air sorties
over South Vietnam.
In the early morning of 26 August 1966, Marines move across the flight
One memorable operation occurred in deck of amphibious assault ship Princeton (LPH-5) to board helicopters
early June 1965, when two Viet Cong regi- that will transport them to South Vietnam’s Rung Sat Swamp south of
Saigon. The troops, supported by Seventh Fleet carriers at Dixie Station,
ments fired a 200-round mortar barrage took part in amphibious Operation Jackstay.
and stormed into the Army Special
Forces camp at Dong Xoai, northeast of
The air war in the South continued apace during
Saigon. Through the night of 9 June and
1966. Mostly land-based Army, Air Force, and
the next day, Army Green Berets, South Vietnamese
Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters
paramilitary troops, and nine Seabees of Naval
flying from Thailand and South Vietnam carried
Mobile Construction Battalion Team 1104 fought for
out close air support and interdiction missions.
survival. Construction Mechanic 3rd Class Marvin
The air wing aviators from the Dixie Station carrier
Shields, even though he was mortally wounded,
familiarized themselves with combat operations in
pulled fellow defenders to safety and silenced an
the less lethal skies of South Vietnam before their
enemy machine gun position. Shields became the
deployment to Yankee Station off North Vietnam.
only Seabee awarded the Medal of Honor.
Dixie Station carriers also provided air support
Carrier-based and other allied air support pre-
for amphibious and coastal operations. Carriers
vented the enemy from killing or capturing the sur-
Hancock (CVA-19) and Kitty Hawk (CVA-63) and
vivors and permanently occupying the camp. From
amphibious assault ship Princeton (LPH-5) took
10 to 14 June, Oriskany (CVA-34)’s Carrier Air Wing
part in the war’s first and largest combined arms,
16, along with other U.S. and South Vietnamese
multiservice amphibious action. Operation Jackstay,
air units, strafed enemy troops, flattened overrun
which began on 26 March 1966 in South Vietnam’s
buildings, and helped friendly ground forces break
Rung Sat Special Zone 35 miles southeast of Saigon,
20 the siege.
also involved Air Force B-52 bombers flying from 24 hours a day, seven days a week was the Navy’s
Guam, as well as U.S. Army helicopter and fixed- at-sea replenishment system that had been proven in
wing aircraft, Navy and Coast Guard patrol boats, combat during World War II and the Korean War,
and one U.S. and two South Vietnamese Marine bat- and strengthened in the Vietnam War. The Seventh
talions. Despite this enormous outlay of resources Fleet’s Mobile Logistics Support Force (Task Force
and 38 casualties, at the end of the 12-day operation 73) operated ammunition, stores, repair, and salvage
the allies had killed or captured just 69 Viet Cong ships; tugs; and oilers. In a typical underway replen-
guerrillas and only temporarily disrupted enemy ishment (UNREP), logistic ships moved alongside
operations in the area. combatants to provide them, via high-lines and
With Air Force and Marine airfields in South hoses strung between the ships, “beans, bullets,
Vietnam largely completed and operating combat and black oil.” The war saw a significant innovation
aircraft by August 1966, the Navy disestablished to the UNREP method with the use of helicopter
Dixie Station. For the rest of the war, the Navy transfers—vertical replenishments—of parts and
deployed all incoming carriers to Yankee Station, munitions. During the war, the Navy introduced
where they operated for the most part against fast combat support ship Sacramento (AOE-1) and
targets in North Vietnam but continued launching combat stores ship Mars (AFS-1) to the logistic
strikes into South Vietnam and Laos when required. fleet. Both types combined the functions of many
Enabling the carriers at both Dixie and Yankee auxiliaries, carrying vast quantities of ammunition,
stations and their escort ships to remain in the fight fuel, and other supplies.

NHHC VN Collection

While underway in the South China Sea, fast combat support ship Camden (AOE-2) refuels carrier America (CVA-66) to
port and destroyer Harry E. Hubbard (DD-748) to starboard as destroyer Walker (DD-517) waits her turn astern. A CH-46
helicopter, key to the vertical replenishment of warships with supplies, prepares to land on the carrier. 21
 NHHC VN Collection
A Seasprite of Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 1 lifts off Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31) for a SAR mission in the
Gulf of Tonkin.

22
 RESCUING DOWNED AVIATORS

T
he Navy and the Air Force invested
enormous resources in the effort to
recover aircrews downed at sea or
in North Vietnam, Laos, and South
Vietnam. As soon as an allied plane went down,
the rescue combat air patrol moved into action. A-1
Skyraiders and other fixed-wing aircraft immediately
tried to make contact with the downed airmen and, if
need be, attack enemy forces near the crash or splash
area. Simultaneously, airborne early warning aircraft
coordinated the dispatch of Navy SH-3 Sea King
and UH-2 Seasprite helicopters based on carriers or
surface combatants, and Air Force HU-16 Albatross
amphibians and HH-3E “Jolly Green Giant” helicop-
ters based in Thailand and South Vietnam.

Courtesy National Naval Aviation Museum

The first rescue of a Navy pilot shot down in
North Vietnam occurred on 20 September 1965.
An A-4E Skyhawk from Independence (CVA-62), an
Atlantic Fleet carrier operating off Vietnam, went
down 20 miles east of Hanoi. A SAR helicopter
rescued the pilot, Lieutenant (j.g.) John R. Harris of
VA-72, and delivered him safely to missile cruiser
Squadronmates share a moment of joy with Lieutenant
Galveston (CLG-3) in the Gulf of Tonkin. Commander John Holtzclaw after his rescue from the
While a number of downed fliers were rescued, shoot-down site in North Vietnam by Lieutenant (j.g.)
Clyde Lassen and the crew of his SAR helicopter.
many more were not, especially those who went
down inland. Often injured during their violent
ejection from badly damaged and burning planes, One of the most remarkable episodes of the
aircrews landed amid crowds of angry villagers war began on 1 February 1966, when German-born
who frequently beat them before the local militia Lieutenant (j.g.) Dieter Dengler launched from
or troops intervened and dispatched them to the Ranger (CVA-61) in an A-1J Skyraider as part of an
prison camps around Hanoi. On many occasions, interdiction mission near Mu Gia Pass between Laos
North Vietnamese forces set traps for the helicop- and North Vietnam. Ground fire severely damaged
ters and other aircraft attempting to rescue pilots. Dengler’s plane, forcing him to crash-land in Laos.
One ruse was to use captured survival radios and The naval aviator evaded discovery through the
to spread parachutes to lure the SAR planes in close night, but the following day Laotian Communist
for attack by hidden antiaircraft guns. Navy and Pathet Lao guerrillas captured him. The guards bru-
Air Force SAR units retrieved only a small number talized Dengler as they force-marched him through
of men who went down in North Vietnam or Laos, the jungle.
but the SAR crews willingly took great risks to Once they arrived at a rudimentary camp, the
rescue downed aviators, who were clearly grateful Pathet Lao guards shoved Dengler into a rough hut
for that dedication. with six Thai, Chinese, and American prisoners, 23
 and berries gathered
in the bush. The
escapees floated
down a river on a
makeshift raft.
When villagers
attacked and killed
Martin, Dengler
pressed on with
declining strength.
Weakened by
hunger and disease,
frightened, and on
the edge of despair
23 days after his
escape, the naval
officer lay down on a
large rock in a jungle
clearing. He was
almost out of hope.
An Air Force A-1E
Skyraider appeared
above and then
made a return pass.
Dengler ripped up a
parachute remnant
Navy Art Collection
and waved it franti-
cally over his head.
The “Spad” radioed
Crewman in Rescue Chopper after Mission by John Steel. Acrylic drawing. for help and soon
after an Air Force
HH-3E helicopter
some of whom had been held for more than two arrived and rescued him. The story of his escape,
years. From March through late June, the prisoners jungle ordeal, and dramatic rescue electrified
suffered from the elements, inadequate food and America. Dengler eventually returned to duty, and
medical care, and mistreatment by their captors. he provided the Navy’s training establishment with
Seizing an opportunity, on 29 June Dengler and his a wealth of information and insight on the POW and
fellow prisoners captured their guards’ weapons escapee experience.
and either killed or drove them off and made their An important responsibility for U.S. warships
escape. The former prisoners split up and headed operating along the coast was to rescue downed
into the jungle; Dengler and one other captive were aircrews. At times these combatants traded fire with
the only men ever seen again. Wandering in the North Vietnamese shore batteries. In July 1966,
dense jungle, fellow American Duane Martin and frigate King (DLG-10) saved five aviators, one of
Dengler, severely ill with jaundice, lived on some rice whom was plucked from deep inside North Vietnam
24 Dengler had managed to save during his captivity by the ship’s helicopter. During two months in 1967,
destroyer Wiltsie (DD-716) rescued nine airmen.
These ships also refueled the large, carrier-based
rescue helicopters, which touched down temporarily
on their small flight decks or hovered above the ship
to connect to a refueling hose.
In July 1967, Lieutenant Neil R. Sparks navigated
his SH-3 Sea King helicopter through heavy North
Vietnamese air defenses and hovered for 20 minutes
over the site of a downed naval aviator 30 miles
south of Hanoi. During that time, enemy ground fire
damaged his radios and other equipment and threat-
ened to bring down the helicopter. Sparks retrieved
the aviator, Lieutenant Commander Demetrio A.
Verich, piloted the Sea King back over hostile territory,
and delivered the grateful pilot to his carrier home.

NHHC VN Collection
For displaying extraordinary courage and professional
skill during this successful two-and-a-half-hour
mission, Sparks was awarded the Navy Cross.
A Seasprite dispatched from carrier Constellation (CVA-64)
The workload of the Navy and Air Force lifts Aviation Jet Mechanic 3rd Class Joseph J. Keola from the
SAR forces—and the cost in lives and destroyed sea. SAR helicopters rescued not only pilots shot down but
also sailors knocked overboard by jet blasts and other causes.
aircraft—increased dramatically as the North
Vietnamese deployed more antiaircraft guns,
that helped save two naval aviators shot down in
surface-to-air missile batteries, and advanced
southern North Vietnam. Launching from the
MiG fighters. An especially black day for the
deck of guided missile frigate Preble (DLG-15) on
Navy’s SAR forces was 19 July 1967. Soon after
the night of 19 June 1968, Lieutenant (j.g.) Clyde E.
an Oriskany (CVA-34) A-4 Skyhawk, piloted by
Lassen’s UH-2 Seasprite helicopter sped to the scene
Lieutenant Commander Richard D. Hartman,
of the shoot-down and located the American airmen
went down near Hanoi, enemy gunfire killed one
on the ground. Dense foliage that damaged his
crewmember of a Hornet (CVS-12) SH-3A and
low-flying helicopter and flares that fizzled out foiled
put bullet holes in the helicopter, which escaped.
Lassen’s attempts to land close to the men. Despite
Antiaircraft fire then damaged the rotors of a SAR
being under enemy fire and low on fuel, Lassen
helicopter dispatched from guided missile frigate
decided to go for broke. He turned on his landing
Worden (DLG-18), which also survived. The enemy
lights to guide the downed aviators to a clearing,
next shot down another Sea King to arrive on the
landed, and hustled them on board. Dodging
scene, killing its four-man crew. North Vietnamese
antiaircraft fire, and with only five minutes of fuel
gunners then downed a Skyhawk of the escorting
left in his tank, Lassen flew the helicopter out to a
force, compelling the pilot to parachute into the
welcoming reception on board a Seventh Fleet ship.
gulf for an at-sea rescue. Completing the tragedy of
The Navy recognized the crew’s successful accom-
this event, the North Vietnamese eventually found
plishment of the mission and the nation awarded
Hartman, the naval aviator the SAR force had tried
Lassen the Medal of Honor.
so hard and at so high a cost to rescue; he died in
Air-to-air combat between North Vietnamese
captivity. Hanoi returned his remains in 1974.
MiGs and U.S. fighters often provided high drama.
Other SAR missions had better endings. On one
On 17 June 1965, Commander Louis C. Page and
memorable occasion, an officer and his crew dem-
his back-seat radar intercept officer Lieutenant
onstrated exemplary courage and professionalism 25
 Commander John C. Smith picked
up on radar four potentially
hostile aircraft 60 miles south of
Hanoi and 30 miles ahead of their
F-4 Phantom II. Page alerted his
wingman Lieutenant Jack E.D.
Batson. Soon, four MiG-17 Fresco
fighters came into sight and headed
straight for the two Phantoms.
Two of the North Vietnamese
pilots made the fatal mistake of
banking away from the Americans.
Page maneuvered behind one
enemy, squeezed off a missile, and
climbed into the clouds overhead.
Batson and his RIO, Lieutenant
Commander Robert B. Doremus,
fired one missile and followed
Page’s jet upward. The Sidewinders
destroyed both MiG-17s. The other
two enemy planes immediately
reversed course and headed for the
sanctuary of the Hanoi airspace.
On hand to greet the four Phantom
NHHC VN Collection

crewmen when they recovered

on board Midway (CVA-41) was
Secretary of the Navy Paul H.
Lieutenant (j.g.) Edgar L. Murphy armed and equipped to survive at sea or Nitze. He took time from his visit
ashore walks away from his SAR helicopter on the flight deck of carrier Bon to the Seventh Fleet to broadcast
Homme Richard after a day’s work.
to the carrier’s crew the news
that the Page/Smith and Batson/
Doremus team had achieved the
first American aerial victories of the war.
On two occasions during the conflict, propeller-
driven Navy aircraft were able to destroy turbojet
Courtesy National Naval Aviation Museum

MiG-17s. On 20 June 1965, four A-1s from Midway’s

VA-25 (the fleet’s last operational Skyraider squad-
ron) were engaged in a mission to rescue downed
pilots when two MiG-17s pounced on them. Flight
leader Lieutenant Commander Edwin A. Greathouse
directed his pilots to fly close to the ground to
prevent the faster enemy jets attacking from below.
The wing of an F-4J Phantom from Fighter Squadron 84 He also put his planes into a tight, circular forma-
shows the effects of North Vietnamese antiaircraft fire. The
enemy’s air defense artillery claimed hundreds more U.S.
tion that prevented the enemy aircraft from getting
26 planes than did MiG fighters and surface-to-air missiles. behind them. When a MiG tried to break into the
 Navy Art Collection
F-4 Airstrike by John Steel. Gouache drawing.

circle, the Americans shot it out of the sky with

20mm cannon fire. All the naval aircraft on the
mission returned safely to the carrier.
While the enemy’s MiG and SAM victories
captured headlines worldwide throughout Rolling
Thunder, antiaircraft guns brought down the
majority of the U.S. aircraft lost in Southeast Asia.
As one example, Vietnamese antiaircraft gunfire
shot down and captured one of the most senior U.S.
naval officers taken during the war—Commander
James B. Stockdale. On 8 September 1965, Stockdale
led six planes from Carrier Air Wing 16 operating
from Oriskany on a strike that destroyed an 18-truck
convoy northeast of Thanh Hoa. On the negative
side, enemy 37mm fire shot down an RF-8A recon-

NHHC VN Collection
naissance plane, killing the pilot.
The following day, a North Vietnamese 57mm
round badly damaged Stockdale’s A-4E Skyhawk
as he led a strike against a rail line. He bailed out Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale shows how he and fellow
POWs communicated during their captivity in Hanoi. They
of the stricken plane and parachuted into a heavily placed aluminum drinking cups next to the walls of their
populated area. Quickly captured, severely beaten, cells and either listened through them or spoke into them.
and trucked off to Hanoi, Stockdale spent the next
seven and a half years in captivity. To paraphrase earned him the Medal of Honor and the respect
John Paul Jones, however, he had only begun to of a grateful nation and his fellow prisoners. After
fight. During his incarceration Stockdale continually release from prison in 1973, he rose to the rank of
defied his captors, helped keep up the morale of vice admiral, served as president of the Naval War
fellow prisoners, and established a clandestine com- College, and ran as a vice presidential candidate
munications system among the American prisoners. in the national election of 1992. His writings and
Stockdale’s courage, dedication to duty, and speeches about the value of honor, integrity, and
leadership under great duress while in captivity perseverance inspired many.
27
 NHHC VN Collection

Reconnaissance photo of a North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile

battery. Navy photo interpreters have circled individual Soviet-made
SA-2 Guideline missiles and their launchers.

28
 COUNTERING THE SAMS

O
ne of the most feared weapons in Anderson Jr., over Cuba on 27 October 1962. SA-2s
North Vietnam’s air defense arsenal also destroyed four Central Intelligence Agency
was the Soviet-provided SA-2 (CIA) U-2s and an RB-57 Canberra flown on recon-
Guideline surface-to-air missile. naissance missions over China by Republic of China
Designated V-75 Dvina by the Soviets, the 35-foot- (Taiwan) air force pilots.
long, two-stage missile carried a 349-pound, high- The Soviet Union provided thousands of
explosive warhead. The SA-2 entered service in the missiles, launchers, and fire-control radar sets
late 1950s in batteries located around the cities of to North Vietnam during the war. Moscow also
Moscow, Leningrad, and Baku. They shot down the trained North Vietnamese air defense personnel
U-2 high-altitude intelligence spy plane piloted by in the operation of these plane killers who became
Francis Gary Powers over the Soviet Union on 1 May especially adept at coordinating SAM and antiair-
1960 and the U-2 flown by Air Force Major Rudolph craft artillery defenses and overcoming American

NHHC VN Collection

An SA-2 missile explodes below a carrier plane sending thousands of pieces of deadly shrapnel in all directions. 29
 Courtesy National Naval Aviation Museum
A pair of Attack Squadron 25 A-7 Corsairs, armed with AGM-45 Shrike antiradiation missiles and Mark 82 bombs carry out an
Iron Hand mission in North Vietnam during 1969.

countermeasures in a never-ending game of

cat-and-mouse.
It did not take long for these weapons to show
up in North Vietnam. On 5 April 1965, an RF-8A
Crusader photoreconnaissance plane from Coral
NHHC VN Collection

Sea (CVA-43) brought back photos that positively

identified North Vietnam’s first SAM battery
under construction. Discovery of the site 15 miles
A Shrike air-to-surface, antiradiation missile is mounted southeast of Hanoi was considered important
on the wing of an A-4 Skyhawk during a 1963 evaluation of
the weapon at the Navy’s China Lake Naval Ordnance Test enough for Rear Admiral Henry L. Miller, the Task
30 Station in California. Force 77 commander, to fly to Saigon to discuss the
intelligence with Air Force leaders. The conferees pilots would alter course to another preplanned point,
agreed that they needed to take immediate action pull the planes into a climb, and then dive toward
to counter this new and dangerous threat. They the target for the release of weapons. This pop-up
forwarded a plan for a joint Navy–Air Force strike procedure, however, brought the planes down to the
on the SAM site. range of small arms fire. In addition, the enormous
Washington rejected the proposal. The Johnson pressure on the pilot to quickly identify landmarks
administration feared that strikes on the SAM sites and the target to be attacked affected the accuracy of
would kill Soviet advisors and technicians installing the strike. Pilots learned to go no lower than 4,500
the weapons and perhaps cause the Soviet Union feet on their attacks lest they run afoul of gunfire
to intervene in the war. In July naval intelligence from the ground.
reported a SAM site operational, and Washington Naval aviator Lieutenant Commander Paul T.
finally took notice and ordered its destruction, Gilchrist related how flying at either a high or a low
but it was already too late. By the end of the year, altitude offered no refuge from enemy air defense
56 SAM batteries dotted the countryside around weapons. On his first mission over North Vietnam,
Hanoi and Haiphong. on 19 April 1966, Gilchrist’s fellow F-8 Crusader
On 24 July 1965, the North Vietnamese regis- pilots immediately dove from 8,000 feet to avoid SA-2
tered the first kill of an American plane with an SA-2 missiles, often characterized by the Americans as
surface-to-air missile when a battery commanded by flying telephone poles. The pilot found himself feeling
Soviet Lieutenant Colonel F. Ilinykh shot down an “naked as a jaybird up there all by myself.” He soon
Air Force F-4C Phantom II some 40 miles northwest followed suit and headed down but then realized
of Hanoi. The Navy’s first aircraft loss to a North the enemy’s “trap had been neatly sprung. All 11
Vietnamese SAM occurred on 11 August 1965, when strike aircraft had been driven down into the killing
an SA-2 destroyed a Midway (CVA-41) A-4 Skyhawk. grounds of the fiercest barrage of 37mm and 57mm
At this stage of the war, the North Vietnamese artillery fire I could have imagined.” Gilchrist escaped
launched an average of 15 SAMs at every U.S. plane unharmed, but the squadron’s commanding officer,
that flew within range, testimony to the growing Commander Robair F. Mohrhardt, was not as lucky.
amount of Soviet support to North Vietnam. Antiaircraft fire heavily damaged Mohrhardt’s F-8E,
Another noteworthy loss occurred on 5 October forcing him to eject over the gulf for an at-sea rescue.
1965, when F-8E Crusaders from Oriskany (CVA-34)’s The Navy soon operated planes and equipment
VF-162 flying combat air patrol for a strike against over North Vietnam to detect, jam, and confuse
bridges north of Hanoi came under attack by SA-2s. the enemy’s missile guidance radars. Air Force
One of the missiles exploded close behind the planes based in Thailand, Marine aircraft launching
Crusader flown by Lieutenant (j.g.) Robert F. Adams. from Chu Lai in South Vietnam, and Navy aircraft
With his plane on fire, Adams made it over the gulf on board carriers at Yankee Station made up the
and ejected. Within minutes, a helicopter from cruiser electronic warfare anti-SAM force. The Navy planes
Galveston (CLG-3) rescued the pilot. This was the included EA-1E and EA-1F Skyraiders, EA-3B and
first instance of a pilot surviving a SAM shoot-down. EKA-3B Skywarriors, and later in the war EA-6B
Adams’ luck held the following July when antiaircraft Prowlers. The Marines operated EA-6A Intruders
fire downed his F-8E Crusader, and an SH-3 Sea King and EF-10B Skyknights, the latter of which first saw
helicopter plucked him safely from the jungle. service as night fighters in the Korean War.
One of the early approaches the U.S. air forces These planes employed sophisticated electronic
took to avoid SAMs called for the strike formations to gear, referred to as black boxes, in attempts to blind
fly toward the target at low level and high speed until enemy guidance systems and radars. The electronic
they reached a preplanned point of identification such countermeasures (ECM) crewmen focused their
as a prominent landmark or bend in a river. Then the equipment on the S-band (air search), C-band 31
 NHHC VN Collection
Commander Harry B. Southworth (left), executive officer of Attack Squadron 72, receives a Silver Star medal from Rear Admiral
James R. Reedy, Commander Task Force 77, for the destruction of an enemy SAM site on 26 October 1965.

(height-finding), and X-band (fire control) radar fre- The Navy had not devoted major resources to
quencies used by the North Vietnamese. The planes electronic warfare prior to the war. With combat
also dropped chaff (strips of aluminum released in joined in 1965, however, the Navy’s scientific
the thousands) to help make it difficult for the North and procurement agencies went into high gear to
Vietnamese radars to detect attacking planes. develop and rush new and improved electronic
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, a combat veteran countermeasures equipment to the fleet. In
of the air war, later recalled that “all that was well Project Shoehorn, the Navy equipped attack and
and good until the North Vietnamese began to fighter aircraft with a set that produced a “heart-
launch missiles like [fireworks] over the Lincoln pounding audio warning of a low-warble/high-
Memorial on the Fourth of July!” He added, “Often warble tone which distinguished scanning radar
the sky would be full and they’d be coming from so from tracking [radar].” John B. Nichols, a veteran
many different directions that all one could do was of Rolling Thunder, later observed, “For at least
ensure a constant jink and keep a constant lookout.” the first three years [of the war] the large major-
In short, a barrage of missiles could overcome the ity of carrier planes flying over the beach were
32 best defenses. electronically naked.” While other naval aviators
and ECM equipment operators had a more positive U.S. weapons and tactics. They routinely turned
appraisal of the countermeasures effort, by the their radar on for only a few minutes or seconds to
end of Rolling Thunder the Navy determined that zero in on a plane and then turned it off to negate
additional measures were needed to defend its the missile’s homing guidance. Still, by the end of
pilots and planes. the war improved antiradiation missiles, tactics,
The Navy and Air Force also took the offensive and U.S. electronic countermeasures significantly
against the SAM batteries. U.S. forces designated reduced aircraft losses to SAMs.
the anti-SAM operations “Iron Hand.” The Navy The North Vietnamese worked just as hard to
carried out its first Iron Hand strike on 17 October improve the effectiveness of their surface-to-air
1966, when four A-4E Skyhawks from Independence missiles. The North Vietnamese positioned SAM
(CVA-62) accompanied by an A-6A Intruder batteries close to nonmilitary sites, such as irriga-
destroyed a SAM site near Kep Airfield northeast of tion dikes and villages, in an effort to deter air
Hanoi with antiradar missiles. attacks. If the Americans targeted the sites and
Some of the Navy’s most skilled and fearless caused collateral damage, Hanoi’s propaganda
pilots carried out Iron Hand missions. On 20 April machine could highlight the destruction as evi-
1967, Lieutenant Commander Michael J. Estocin, dence of “indiscriminate” bombing. Robert Dunn,
a member of Ticonderoga (CVA-14)’s VA-192, led then a commander and the commanding officer
a three-plane group that destroyed three SAM of the VA-146 “Blue Diamonds,” remembered a
sites near Haiphong. Six days later, while his particular mission. The photo interpreters on board
Skyhawk and an escorting F-8 Crusader piloted by Constellation (CVA-64) steaming in the Gulf of
Lieutenant John Nichols headed for the ship after a Tonkin in July 1967 had identified a SAM battery
successful strike mission, a North Vietnamese SA-2 in the middle of a soccer stadium in Phu Ly, a city
exploded close to Estocin’s plane. As witnessed about ten miles south of Hanoi. Shortly afterward,
by Nichols, the wounded naval aviator managed an Alpha strike consisting of 12 A-4 Skyhawks, 4
to keep his heavily damaged plane in the air for a A-6E Intruders, and 4 F-4J Phantoms struck the
time, but eventually he lost consciousness and the target. Despite heavy opposition from enemy SAM
Skyhawk plummeted to the ground. Nichols, as and antiaircraft guns, the strike group unleashed
related in his book On Yankee Station: The Naval 750-pound bombs against the target. Dunn and
Air War Over Vietnam, co-authored with Barrett the other attack pilots watched with satisfaction
Tillman, considered Estocin “perhaps the bravest as their bombs fell precisely within the confines
man I ever knew, and one of the finest aviators.” of the stadium and obliterated the SAM battery. A
The intrepid pilot was posthumously awarded the follow-up photoreconnaissance mission confirmed
Medal of Honor. the accuracy of their initial observations.
The weapon of choice for the Iron Hand attacks Several days later Dunn learned about the lead
was the AGM-45 Shrike antiradar missile, which story, complete with pictures, in a Hanoi newspa-
reached Task Force 77 carriers in early 1966. The per: “Yankee air pirates destroy school children’s
weapon was specifically designed to track a radar football stadium!” The images showed several
emission beam back to the emanating equipment. wrecked seats and torn up turf in the stadium.
The Shrike’s warhead fragmented into thousands of Unsurprisingly, they did not show destroyed mis-
metal shards that shredded radar antennas, nearby siles or their launchers. This was just one more
support vans, and operating personnel. Shrikes chapter in North Vietnam’s concerted effort to
destroyed many SAM radars, as did the AGM-78 influence antiwar sentiment in the United States
Standard ARM (antiradiation missile) that came and on the international stage by painting the U.S.
into use at the end of Rolling Thunder. Enemy radar air campaign as a criminal enterprise.
operators, however, quickly learned to adapt to the 33
 NHHC VN Collection

Enterprise (CVAN-65), the Navy’s first nuclear-powered carrier, shapes a course in the South China Sea.

34
 THE BOMBING CAMPAIGN HEATS UP

I
n late 1965 the Navy deployed two of its most 128,500 rockets in the effort to interdict the enemy’s
advanced warships to the combat theater. On supply lines into South Vietnam. As an example
26 November, the nuclear-propelled carrier of the intensity of carrier operations during this
Enterprise (CVAN-65) and the nuclear-pow- period, when the small-deck, Hancock (CVA-19)-class
ered frigate Bainbridge (DLGN-25) joined Seventh carrier Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31)—the Bonnie
Fleet units operating in the South China Sea. On Dick—and her Carrier Air Wing 19 returned to the
2 December Enterprise, commanded by James L. United States in January 1966, both were awarded the
Holloway III, a future Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Unit Commendation for their accomplishment
made her combat debut when Carrier Air Wing 9 of 12,328 combat missions; no carrier or air wing had
aircraft struck Viet Cong positions near Bien Hoa, exceeded that number on a single deployment.
South Vietnam. On 11 December, Enterprise set To determine if Ho Chi Minh’s government
a record with 165 combat sorties in a single day. was feeling the pain after ten months of Rolling
And just before Christmas, planes from Enterprise, Thunder, President Johnson halted bombing opera-
Kitty Hawk (CVA-63), and Ticonderoga (CVA-14) tions in North Vietnam from Christmas Eve 1965
destroyed a North Vietnamese power plant at Uong to 30 January 1966. Rather than asking for terms,
Bi north of Haiphong. This 100-plane Alpha strike North Vietnam exploited the lull to strengthen
was the first raid on an industrial target in North air defenses; push additional troops and supplies
Vietnam. southward; and disperse fuel, ammunition, and
During the last ten months of 1965, Navy and equipment stocks throughout the countryside.
Marine Corps aircraft flew more than 61,000 sorties Task Force 77 faced increasing challenges in the
over North and South Vietnam; and Air Force aircraft air war when the bombing resumed in February.
flew almost 50,000 sorties. By the end of 1965 Seventh Advanced, Soviet-built MiG-21 jets had already
Fleet squadrons had dropped 64,000 bombs and fired made their first appearance in the skies over North
Vietnam. The MiG-21—given the
U.S.-NATO codename Fishbed—was
a delta-wing aircraft, which, like its
predecessors from the Mikoyan-
Gurevich design bureau, was
noted for its simplicity and high
performance. The MiG-21 was a
specialized, Mach 2+ air-superiority
fighter; it was highly maneuverable
and relatively easy to fly. Early
variants had two 30mm cannon
and two Atoll air-to-air missiles,
heat-seeking weapons similar to the
American Sidewinder. Later MiG-21s
NHHC VN Collection

deleted the guns in favor of four

Atoll missiles with a more advanced
radar. Subsequent variants carried
An F-4 Phantom of Enterprise (CVAN-65)’s Fighter Squadron 96 fires Zuni
rockets at Viet Cong targets in the jungle of South Vietnam. both a 37mm cannon and radar as 35
 April 1966, several MiGs
attacked an Air Force F-4C
Phantom II escorting a
pair of RB-66 Destroyer
reconnaissance aircraft.
The Phantom pilot fired
two Sidewinder missiles at
one of the MiGs, with at
least one striking its target
and the pilot seen ejecting
from his stricken plane.
This victory over the more
advanced MiG-21 by the
larger, supposedly less agile
Phantom demonstrated that
it was capable of destroying

NHHC VN Collection
the best fighter in the Soviet
arsenal. This was the first
time in history that one
An exultant Commander Harold L. Marr gives the thumbs-up sign after his shoot-down of
a North Vietnamese MiG-17 on 12 June 1966 as Captain J. C. Donaldson, the commanding supersonic aircraft had shot
officer of Hancock (CVA-19) (seated left), looks on. down another.
Not until June 1966,
more than one year after the start of Rolling
Thunder, did the Navy’s other carrier-based fighter,
the F-8 Crusader, register its first kill. On 12
June, Commander Harold “Hal” Marr of carrier
Hancock (CVA-19)’s VF-211, escorting a flight of
Skyhawks with three other F-8Es, sighted four
MiG-17s closing for an attack. Turning toward
the oncoming MiGs, Marr fired a Sidewinder that
missed, but a second missile blew the MiG apart
at an altitude of only 50 feet. Marr then turned his
fighter toward another MiG, earning a probable kill
with his 20mm cannon.
NHHC VN Collection

Nine days later, on 21 June, Lieutenant (j.g.)

Philip V. Vampatella, Marr’s wingman on the 12th,
shot down another MiG-17 in one of the most dra-
matic aerial encounters of the war. The naval aviator
The railroad bridge near Ninh Binh on the Day River
under attack by aircraft from Constellation (CVA-64) in was in a flight of four Crusaders covering the rescue
September 1966. attempt of an RF-8 recon pilot shot down earlier.
Orbiting the area in low clouds, and well within the
well as Atoll missiles, providing the plane with an envelope of North Vietnamese air defenses, the jets
all-weather capability. waited for the arrival of a rescue helicopter.
The North Vietnamese MiG-21s initially kept Vampatella felt his plane shudder as he took a
36 their distance from U.S. aircraft. However, on 26 hit from antiaircraft fire but continued the mission.
Shortly thereafter he and his section
leader, both low on fuel, prepared to
break off and find a tanker orbiting over
the Gulf of Tonkin. The two F-8E pilots
had barely set course for the tanker
when they heard a “Tallyho, MiGs!”
over the radio. The remaining two Navy

NHHC VN Collection
fighters had sighted MiG-17s approach-
ing and were maneuvering to meet
the enemy planes. Vampatella and his
section leader immediately turned back A Soviet-made, delta-wing MiG-21 Fishbed fighter.

to rejoin their comrades. Vampatella,

however, discovered that the damage to
his plane from antiaircraft fire had slowed his speed.
Arriving at the scene some 30 seconds behind
his faster wingman, Vampatella found the other
Crusaders and MiGs already joined in battle, and
one enemy plane trailing and then shooting down an
F-8. Angry and frustrated, the naval aviator realized
that another MiG-17 was closing on his tail. Pulling
his plane into a tight, diving turn, the lieutenant
headed for the ground, his damaged aircraft bucking

NHHC VN Collection
and yawing. Skimming the trees at almost 700
mph, he evaded his pursuer and then turned on
the would-be attacker, who had evidently given up
The thermal power plant at Uong Bi, North Vietnam, struck
the chase and was heading for home. Even though several times by Task Force 77 carrier planes.
his fuel supply was critical, Vampatella pressed a
Sidewinder attack and watched the enemy plane
disappear in a large cloud of smoke. a pair of Intruders from VA-85 led by Commander
With only about eight minutes of fuel remaining, Ronald J. Hays crossed the enemy coast in the dark
he found an aerial tanker, refueled, and headed for and destroyed the Uong Bi power plant before North
Hancock, steaming 60 miles farther out to sea. After Vietnamese air defenses could react. In the words of
landing safely on board the carrier, Vampatella was one account, “The power plant lit up like a Fourth of
amazed to find 80 holes in his plane from antiair- July display as electrical cables sent showers of sparks
craft fire. The young fighter pilot earned the Navy flying and fuel erupted in multiple explosions.”
Cross for staying in the fight with a plane severely On 15 May 1966, antisubmarine carrier Intrepid
damaged and low on fuel. (CVS-11) arrived off South Vietnam to serve in a
The air war intensified in 1966 as Task Force 77 limited attack role at Dixie Station. Prior to departure
attacks edged ever closer to Hanoi and the port city from the United States, the ship had beached her
of Haiphong. On 13 April, under the leadership of antisubmarine aircraft and taken on board Carrier
Commander David B. Miller, commanding officer of Air Wing 10 with two A-1H Skyraider squadrons and
Ticonderoga’s VA-144, 11 Skyhawks and 4 Crusaders two A-4 Skyhawk squadrons. After three months of
dodged heavy SAM and antiaircraft fire to drop five strike operations against Viet Cong targets in South
spans of the Haiphong highway bridge between the Vietnam, Intrepid deployed north to Yankee Station.
Chinese border and the city. Less than a week later, Naval leaders beefed up her aircraft complement 37
 on later deployments with detachments of Navy F-8 (by May 1968, the guided missile cruiser Long Beach
Crusaders and Marine A-4 Skyhawk “fighters” to [CGN -9] had identified and tracked more than
protect the wing’s attack planes from enemy MiGs. 500 MiG flights with her massive AN/SPS-32/33
Task Force 77’s readiness to counter the threat fixed-array radars); warned American pilots who
from North Vietnam’s small but capable surface navy were flying too close to the Chinese border; vectored
paid off on 1 July 1966, when three North Vietnamese search and rescue aircraft; and with shipboard
torpedo boats emerged from a port and moved to missiles, defended friendly air and naval forces.
attack guided missile frigate Coontz (DLG-9) and Routinely, a modern missile cruiser shared PIRAZ
destroyer Rogers (DD-876), at the time steaming some duties with an older, gun-armed destroyer that rode
55 miles offshore on search and rescue operations. shotgun, prepared to protect the cruiser from an
Aircraft from carriers Hancock and Constellation enemy torpedo boat attack.
(CVA-64) responded to the threat before the torpedo One of the U.S. Navy’s most potent weapons off
boats got within range of the American ships. The Vietnam was the RIM-8 Talos ship-launched, sur-
carrier planes sank all of the torpedo boats with face-to-air missile. A 4,400-pound, solid-propellant
bombs, rockets, and cannon fire. Coontz picked up 19 rocket booster launched the 3,400-pound missile
North Vietnamese sailors who were later exchanged that could destroy aircraft some 100 miles away at
for American POWs captured in South Vietnam. On altitudes up to 80,000 feet.
7 July, aircraft from the same carriers sank two and On 11 May 1966, Long Beach, operating in the
heavily damaged two North Vietnamese torpedo northern Gulf of Tonkin, launched Talos missiles
boats found near the port of Hon Gai, 35 miles north- against North Vietnamese MiG fighters in the first—
east of Haiphong. On 6 August, A-4 Skyhawks and albeit unsuccessful—U.S. attempt to down hostile
A-6 Intruders from Constellation sank four North aircraft with surface-to-air missiles. On five separate
Vietnamese torpedo boats and damaged a fifth some occasions that month, North Vietnamese aircraft
50 miles northeast of Haiphong. tried but failed to strike U.S. surface ships along the
Following these attacks the Soviet government coast and lost two MiGs in the process. In contrast,
charged that “large caliber bullets” from the attack- on 23 May 1968, Long Beach fired two Talos missiles
ing American planes had struck a Soviet merchant
ship in Haiphong. A U.S. spokesman denied the
charge. Moscow regularly accused U.S. aircraft
of inflicting damage on Soviet or neutral (usually
Soviet Bloc) merchant ships. Most of these charges
were false, but some were valid; dodging SAMs and
antiaircraft fire in the heat of battle sometimes made
it difficult for pilots to keep their weapons trained
on intended targets.
To help in the air war over the North during
Rolling Thunder, the Navy positioned guided missile
ships on positive identification radar advisory zone
(PIRAZ) stations in the northern Gulf of Tonkin.
These ships—called Red Crown for their radio call
NHHC VN Collection

sign—provided a stable and exact reference point

for allied aircraft; checked out and identified the
hundreds of aircraft flying daily over North Vietnam
and the gulf to confirm friendly aircraft and warn of A Talos missile blasts skyward from a Navy cruiser during a
38 enemy planes; guided U.S. fighters to intercept MiGs test of the weapon’s guidance system in early 1968.
two minutes apart at a pair of MiG fighters
at a distance of some 65 miles. The first
missile destroyed an aircraft and the
second missile detonated on the falling
wreckage. Long Beach repeated the feat
against a MiG at a range of 61 miles in
September 1968.
Visiting Long Beach during the war,
Gerald E. “Jerry” Miller, who rose to the
rank of vice admiral and fleet commander,
remarked, “I’ve always said that if we could
get it [a MiG] with Talos, why the hell are
we going to put a guy [in a plane] over the
beach up there and jeopardize him getting
shot down?” He envisioned a future, now
come to pass in the 21st century, in which
pilotless aircraft would execute thousands
of strike missions in heavily defended
enemy airspace.
Historian Malcolm Muir also described
another role for the Talos missile in

NHHC VN Collection
support of U.S. air operations over North
Vietnam. Beginning in the fall of 1967,
the Navy modified the Talos to perform a
Nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser Long Beach (CGN-9) armed
radar-hunting mission. The Talos cruisers with Talos and Terrier surface-to-air missiles steams through the
launched several antiradar missiles on Western Pacific during the war.
a high-altitude trajectory out to their
maximum range of some 120 miles to
target North Vietnamese radars threatening U.S. air
operations. “Once in action,” Muir wrote, Talos mis-
siles “reportedly shut down North Vietnamese radar
installations for an entire week.”
The Vietnam War saw the first combat use of
another surface-to-air missile, the RIM-2 Terrier,
an antiaircraft weapon that could engage targets 20
NHHC VN Collection

miles or more from the ship and at altitudes up to

80,000 feet. A 1,820-pound, solid-propellant rocket
booster launched the 1,180-pound Terrier. The
weapon was a beam-riding missile with semi-active The mid-air destruction of a North Vietnamese MiG-17 by
terminal homing. Introduced to the fleet in 1955, a Terrier missile fired from guided missile frigate Sterett
RIM-2s armed 40 U.S. aircraft carriers, cruisers, (DLG-31).

frigates, and destroyers (as well as a number of

foreign warships). Despite teething problems, the weapon off North Vietnam shot down at least three
Terrier proved to be a reliable weapon. Later in MiGs, Biddle (DLG-34) destroyed two planes, and
the war, U.S. guided missile frigates employing the Sterett (DLG-31) claimed another. 39
 NHHC VN Collection

A North Vietnamese fuel vessel caught at sea off Haiphong erupts in smoke after
a strike by Constellation (CVA-64) aircraft in August 1966.

40
 THE POL STRIKES

I
n early 1966, Pentagon and CINCPAC coastal waters vessels were presumed to be North
staffs developed a plan that targeted North Vietnamese, and U.S. planes attacked them only
Vietnam’s infrastructure for storing and after being fired on.
transporting petroleum, oil, and lubricants As part of the POL campaign, U.S. planes staged
(POL) near Hanoi and Haiphong. After weeks their heaviest raids over North Vietnam on 25
of vacillation, President Johnson and Defense August, flying 146 sorties—71 Air Force, 68 Navy,
Secretary McNamara approved attacks on 7 of and 7 Marine. Enemy fire claimed no U.S. planes
11 potential targets. They directed the Navy to that day. In following months, the American air
use only the most experienced pilots who were to forces logged as many as 173 bombing missions over
take special care not to cause collateral damage North Vietnam in a single day. By September the
to civilians and to Soviet, Chinese, or Communist Navy and Air Force had destroyed most of the major
Bloc shipping in the port of Haiphong. They also above-ground POL storage facilities.
dictated that the strikes could only be executed in Despite this concerted effort by U.S. air forces,
clear weather when aircrews could make positive the POL campaign failed to starve the enemy war
visual identification of their targets. machine of fuel. The North Vietnamese responded
The bombing campaign against North Vietnam’s to it with a different, but no less effective, approach
POL system began on 29 June 1966. A 28-plane to POL storage and distribution. They simply
formation from Ranger (CVA-61) executed an Alpha switched from storing fuel in large, vulnerable tank
strike, dropping their bombs on the Haiphong POL farms to small caches of 55-gallon steel drums
complex, which erupted in fire and smoke that rose located throughout the countryside. Soviet tankers
to 20,000 feet. At the same time, Constellation began delivering POL to Haiphong in drums rather
(CVA-64) sent an attack against the smaller POL than in bulk. Hence, the POL campaign proved to be
facilities on the Don Son Peninsula southeast of only a temporary setback to Hanoi’s war effort.
Haiphong. On 1 July, Constellation and Hancock In early fall 1966, with no significant POL targets
(CVA-19) launched devastating strikes against left to strike, Rear Admiral David C. Richardson, the
fuel storage sites at Dong Nham about 13 miles Task Force 77 commander, refocused Navy strikes
northwest of Haiphong, and at Bac Giang 30 on rail yards, rail and highway bridges, and rolling
miles north of Hanoi. Aircraft from Hancock also stock. The attack squadrons from Constellation,
attacked the only two pumping stations in North Oriskany (CVA-34), Intrepid (CVS-11), and
Vietnam capable of transferring petroleum from Coral Sea (CVA-43) took a heavy toll of enemy
ships to storage tanks ashore. When aircraft from locomotives, tank cars, and boxcars.
Constellation again bombed oil installations near The 9th of October proved to be an especially
Haiphong in early August 1966, they encountered stellar day for the carrier force. An E-2C Hawkeye
one of the heaviest antiaircraft barrages of the warned Commander Richard M. Bellinger, the com-
Vietnam War. manding officer of VF-162, and three other pilots of
The fleet also attacked and sank hundreds of his F-8E squadron that MiGs were headed their way.
North Vietnam’s barges, junks, and other coastal Bellinger, who had piloted Army bombers in World
craft employed to transport POL. The Chinese War II and Navy planes in Korea, led his forma-
government complained on one occasion that U.S. tion toward the approaching enemy aircraft. The
planes sank a Chinese merchant vessel and damaged commander and his flight came face-to-face with
another. The U.S. State Department replied that in the enemy at only 3,000 feet and a dogfight ensued. 41
 Tragedy Aboard Ship

For America’s carrier warriors, one of

the greatest fears during the Vietnam
War was embodied in a single word—fire.
In most cases, fast firefighting actions
snuffed out fires and limited the damage
on these ships laden with bombs,
rockets, ammunition, and aviation fuel. On
7 December 1965, a fire in a machinery
room on board carrier Kitty Hawk (CVA-63)
off Vietnam killed two sailors and injured
another 28. Damage control parties
limited the fire’s spread.
A much more serious event occurred
on 26 October 1966, when a sailor

NHHC VN Collection
mishandled a parachute flare that
ignited a blaze on the hangar deck of
Oriskany (CVA-34) operating in the Gulf
of Tonkin. Firefighters battled the flames
while other crewmembers jettisoned Amid the wreckage of combat aircraft, firefighting teams battle
the blaze that wracked carrier Forrestal (CVA-59) in July 1967. The
343 bombs over the side, some of them tragedy provided lessons learned for the Navy’s damage control
as large as 2,000 pounds. The damage training for years afterward.
control parties saved the ship, but she
suffered serious damage, and 44 officers
and enlisted men perished, many from the lieutenant found the strength to heave a 250-pound
ship’s air wing. Oriskany made port in the Philippines bomb overboard. A chief petty officer equipped with
for minor repairs before steaming to the San Francisco only a fire extinguisher courageously ran toward a
Naval Shipyard for major repairs. The carrier returned plane on fire to rescue the pilot. A sudden, massive
to battle off Vietnam the following June. explosion killed both of them. Many of the ship’s
Forrestal (CVA-59), on loan from the Atlantic firefighters died in the blaze. Berthing spaces immedi-
Fleet, fell victim to fire on the morning of 29 July ately below the flight deck became death traps for 50
1967 after only four days of combat operations. sailors as burning aviation fuel poured down.
As the flight deck crew readied the second launch Firefighting parties fought the flames with great
of the day, faulty equipment ignited a 5-inch Zuni courage and dedication, but their lack of sufficient
rocket. The rocket struck the 400-gallon drop-tank training impeded and even complicated the effort.
of Lieutenant Commander Frederick White’s A-4E In one instance, just after a team had smothered a
Skyhawk, killing the pilot and engulfing his plane in fire with foam, another arrived and sprayed the site
a ball of flame. Exploding bombs knocked some men with water, washing away the foam and immediately
overboard. Lieutenant Commander John S. McCain III reigniting the blaze. The Forrestal fire became a
and other naval aviators had to leap from their learning experience for the Navy, and for many years
burning planes to escape exploding ordnance and afterward sailors watched the training film Learn or
fuel fires on the flight deck. Burn, which incorporated the actual flight deck film of
The fire spread rapidly through the after end of the catastrophe.
the stricken ship as flames reached and exploded Nearby ships hastened to Forrestal’s aid. Oriskany,
other aircraft fuel tanks and ordnance. Despite the herself a victim of a tragic fire less than a year earlier,
obvious danger, the flight deck crew rushed forward provided firefighting and medical assistance to the
to man water hoses and foam dispensers and to toss larger carrier via helicopters. Destroyers moved in
bombs and rockets over the side. One 130-pound close to spray water onto the burning carrier. Within
42
an hour combined
firefighting efforts
had contained the
fire on the flight deck,
but fires below deck
raged for another 12
hours.
Personnel
casualties and the
damage to the ship
and her aircraft were
catastrophic. The
fire claimed the lives
of 134 air wing and
ship’s personnel
and seriously injured
another 161 men. The
blaze destroyed 21
aircraft and damaged

Courtesy National Naval Aviation Museum

others. On her own
power, Forrestal
made her way home
to Norfolk, Virginia,
to undergo seven
months of repairs and
the replacement of
aircraft at a total cost
Fire ravages the carrier Enterprise (CVAN-65) preparing off Hawaii in January 1969 to
of $72 million. The
join Task Force 77 at Yankee Station.
ship rejoined the fleet
to serve for another
26 years.
Nuclear-propelled Enterprise (CVAN-65)
was the third carrier to be stricken by
a major fire. On 14 January 1969, she
was steaming off Hawaii on an exercise
before deploying to the South China Sea.
The accidental triggering of a Zuni rocket
quickly transformed the flight deck into an
inferno of burning planes and exploding
ordnance. Damage control parties battled
the flames for three hours before they
NHHC VN Collection

brought the fire under control. This con-

flagration killed 28 men, seriously injured
62, and destroyed 15 aircraft. Repairs to
the carrier and replacement of aircraft cost Somber and still shaken Forrestal (CVA-59) crewmembers watch in
$56 million. Enterprise returned to Yankee silence as shipmates transport ashore at the Subic Bay naval base
Station in October 1969. the remains of one of the ship’s 134 sailors and aircrewmembers
killed in the blaze. 43
 NHHC VN Collection
Commander Richard M. Bellinger of Oriskany (CVA-34)’s Fighter Squadron 162 relates how he destroyed a North
Vietnamese MiG-21 on 9 October 1966.

Attempting to escape Bellinger’s Crusader, one MiG

turned sharply, dove for the ground, and headed
for the safety of an airfield off-limits to American
forces. He did not make it. Bellinger slowly gained
on the jinking North Vietnamese plane and
launched a heat-seeking Sidewinder missile. In a
flash, the North Vietnamese fighter exploded in
what appeared to be a thousand pieces. This event
marked the Navy’s first victory over the primary
fighter of the North Vietnamese air force—the
Soviet-built MiG-21 Fishbed.
The air campaign against ground targets in
North Vietnam continued apace in the last months
of 1966. On 2 December, for instance, attack
squadrons from Ticonderoga (CVA-14) and Franklin
NHHC VN Collection

D. Roosevelt (CVA-42) joined with Air Force aircraft

in a 200-plane assault on the Van Dien truck depot
south of Hanoi. This operation, and a repeat strike 12
President Lyndon B. Johnson (center), Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara (bottom right), and Admiral Thomas days later, destroyed 75 percent of the buildings and
H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations (upper left), observe other facilities at the site. By the end of the year, the
44 flight operations on board carrier Enterprise (CVAN-65).
Yankee Station carrier force had executed
33,000 attack sorties in North Vietnam.
The year, however, was also marked
by the loss of 120 naval aircraft and 89
aircrewmen in Indochina air operations.
The politically based decisions made
in Washington on the conduct of the air
war over the North had, in the opinion
of many Navy commanders at all levels,
permitted the North Vietnamese regime
to undertake countermeasures in time
to mitigate the effects of the bombing.
This was especially true of the long-

NHHC VN Collection
debated aerial mining of Haiphong and
North Vietnam’s other harbors, which
did not occur until 1972. Moreover,
Washington added more targets to the Commander David Ellison, executive officer of Fighter Squadron 24,
discusses an upcoming mission in North Vietnam with fellow aviators in
approved bombing list but never gave the squadron’s ready room on board carrier Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31)
approval for attacks on the coal mining
facilities of North Vietnam that supplied
In a subsequent breakdown, McNamara gave
the country’s electric power plants.
these statistics for air losses in Southeast Asia for all
President Johnson’s unilateral, month-long
services: fighter and attack, 1,044; reconnaissance,
bombing halt in January 1967 again failed to
104; cargo/transport, 56; other fixed-wing, 207; and
prompt the North Vietnamese to talk rather than
helicopters, 672. Interestingly, this breakdown gave
fight. The enemy used the opportunity to shore up
an even greater total—2,083—than the number
air defenses around Hanoi and Haiphong and to
given in McNamara’s statement to the press. Thus
push combat troops and supplies south along the
obfuscation and confusion in the “numbers game”
Ho Chi Minh Trail.
occurred at the top levels of the national security
While the air campaign had produced only
establishment. The bottom line U.S. air losses in the
limited gains by early 1967, it had cost the United
Vietnam conflict were both greater than reported
States greatly in the number of aircraft lost. A
and greater than expected.
Defense Department report released to the press
Secretary McNamara also stated that U.S.
on 9 January 1967 claimed the loss of 599 fixed-
aircraft dropped approximately 65,000 tons
wing aircraft and 255 helicopters—a total of 854
of ordnance on targets in North and South
aircraft. But in his Pentagon press conference on
Vietnam every month. This, he told the press,
15 February, Secretary McNamara revealed much
was sustainable as U.S. factories were producing
higher numbers, reporting the loss in the war up to
about 600,000 tons per month and 650,000 tons
31 January 1967 of 1,172 fixed-wing aircraft and 682
were in the inventory. Not said was that much of
helicopters—more than double the number cited
the inventory consisted of iron bombs left over
by his department the previous month. McNamara
from World War II and the Korean War that were
explained that the earlier numbers included only
outdated, in poor material condition, and often
those aircraft lost in the “battle area” of Vietnam.
dangerous to handle. For a time in 1966, the lack
The new totals counted losses in Laos and Thailand,
of some critical bomb parts and sufficient numbers
planes lost while returning from missions, and from
of specialized bomb types resulted in aircraft
Viet Cong attacks on U.S. bases in the south. 45
 Courtesy National Naval Aviation Museum
Members of Fighter Squadron 162, including Lieutenant Richard E. Wyman (top row, fourth from the left) who downed a
MiG-17 in December 1967, pose for a photo in front of one of their F-8 Crusaders.

launching for missions over North Vietnam with

less than full loads of required ordnance.
In early 1967, Washington finally authorized
attacks on North Vietnam’s heavy industries and
power-generation facilities, including cement
factories, iron and steel plants, power plants, ship
and rail repair shops, and rail marshaling yards.
And the MiG bases at Kep, Hoa Lac, and elsewhere
were now fair game for attack—if preceded by
presidential approval. Johnson even allowed Navy
and Air Force attacks, albeit under strict rules of
engagement, on targets within the prohibited zones
around Hanoi, Haiphong, and along the China
border. In May, for instance, a small number of
Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31) aircraft penetrated
Hanoi’s heavy air defenses to carry out a bold strike
on the capital’s electrical power plant, knocking it
out of action, if only for a short time.
NHHC VN Collection

The Johnson administration never approved a

measure strongly recommended by naval leaders
throughout Rolling Thunder—the mining of North
Vietnam’s major ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Commander Ernest Moore registered great success in
Iron Hand strikes against enemy air defenses. While
Cam Pha, through which passed war materials pro- evading eight SA-2 missiles aimed at his aircraft, Moore
vided by the country’s allies. On 23 February 1967, neutralized two SAM sites near Van Dinh, North
however, Washington allowed the aerial mining of Vietnam. The Navy awarded the intrepid aviator a Silver
46 Star for this achievement.
 Frustrated Warrior: Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp Jr.

NO AMERICAN MILITARY LEADER was more associ- developed compromise solutions that met with
ated with the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign than Johnson’s and McNamara’s approval.
Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp Jr., commander in While a naval officer in background and inclina-
chief of the Pacific Command from 1964 to 1968. His tion, Sharp worked in his joint service billet to
post-retirement book Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in accommodate the views of his Navy, Army, Air Force,
Retrospect, published only three years after the fall of and Marine subordinates. He asserted total control
Saigon, detailed the military’s intense dissatisfaction of the bombing operations in most of North Vietnam
with President Johnson’s and Defense Secretary and Laos but gave great latitude to his Army and Air
McNamara’s direction of the Vietnam War. Force subordinates in their direction of air operations
Sharp earned two Silver Star medals for valor in South Vietnam and southern North Vietnam. Sharp
while commanding destroyer Boyd (DD-544) in the concurred with General Westmoreland’s desire during
Pacific theater during World War II. Command in the the enemy’s Tet Offensive of 1968 to assign “single
Korean War and service in various oceangoing and management” of airpower in South Vietnam to an Air
staff positions in the 1950s and early 1960s earned Force officer despite howls of protest from Marine
the strong approval of his superiors. commanders who opposed this loss of control over
Despite later criticism of the Johnson administra- Marine aviation.
tion’s “flexible response” and “graduated escalation” He began to part ways with Johnson and
approaches to the air war over North Vietnam, as McNamara as it became clear from 1966 to 1968
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet from September that the administration’s handling of the war was
1963 to June 1964, and then in his first year as head inept, costly in terms of American lives, and would
of the Pacific Command, Sharp accommodated his not defeat the enemy. The admiral dispatched
civilian superiors’ desires to keep the war “limited,” hundreds of classified messages and spoke often on
avoiding direct Chinese or Soviet intervention. When secure phones to the Secretary of Defense to voice
the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended massive his criticism over contradictory political objectives,
bombing of North Vietnam, the mining of the diplomatic bombing halts that never succeeded, and
country’s ports, and other strong steps, the admiral overly restrictive rules of engagement. The Pacific
commander’s opposition to adminis-
tration policies regarding the air war
first became public in a major way
when he testified before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services,
headed by John C. Stennis (D-MS),
in August 1967. Even before then,
Sharp had become persona non grata
to Johnson and McNamara. Their
disagreements became moot when
Johnson announced the end of most
bombing operations in North Vietnam
in March 1968, and Sharp retired on
31 July of that year.
Sharp, however, was not about
to remain silent. Until his death in
NHHC VN Collection

2001 at age 95, Sharp, in speaking

engagements, books, and articles,
continued to detail how the Johnson
administration had bungled the Rolling
Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp Jr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Thunder bombing campaign. •
Command, in his Camp Smith headquarters near Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 47
 NHHC VN Collection
Task Force 77 at Yankee Station in 1967, as seen from the flagship Constellation (CVA-64). Visible are carrier Oriskany (CVA-34)
(center), destroyer George K. MacKenzie (DD-836) (left), destroyer Rogers (DD-876) (forward of Oriskany), and ammunition ship
Mt. Katmai (AE-16) (right).

the major rivers in North Vietnam’s south-

ern panhandle. Barges and other coastal
craft carrying munitions southward often
ducked into these rivers to avoid attack by
the cruisers and destroyers of Task Force 77
conducting Sea Dragon operations off the
coast of Vietnam.
The first aerial mining took place on 26
February when seven A-6A Intruders from
Enterprise (CVAN-65), led by Commander
A. H. Barie, commanding officer of VA-35,
planted minefields in the mouths of the Song
Ca and Song Giang. The carrier planes laid
five additional minefields through mid-April,
NHHC VN Collection

employing Mark 50 and Mark 52 magnetic

sea mines and Mark 36 Destructors (mag-
netic/seismic mines based on 500-pound
Coral Sea (CVA-43) ordnancemen load 250-pound bombs onto A-4
Skyhawk attack planes that are slated to take part in a strike on bombs). During Rolling Thunder, the Navy
48 North Vietnam in March 1967.
 NHHC VN Collection
Smoke enshrouds the rail and highway bridge at Cam Pha between Haiphong and the Chinese border after an August 1967
Alpha strike by attack aircraft from Oriskany (CVA-34).

and the Air Force also dropped 35,000 Destructors

along roads, inland rivers, and around bridges and
fords where enemy logistic traffic had to concentrate
to cross a waterway. Passing boats and trucks trig-

NHHC VN Collection
gered the mines. While both the river mouth and
river crossing mining operations initially succeeded
in disrupting traffic, the enemy eventually found ways
An artist’s drawing of a Navy air-dropped Mark 36
to locate and either destroy or avoid the mines. Naval Destructor mine.
commanders recognized that the Destructor would
not be a war-winning weapon. A-4F Skyhawk of VA-212 from Bon Homme Richard
Moreover, on a psychological level naval aviators employed an AGM-62A Walleye, an especially
had little love for the weapons. After dodging anti- accurate, television-guided, glide bomb that the pilot
aircraft fire, SAMs, and MiGs to reach target areas, could launch and then immediately bank the plane
the attack pilots dropped their Destructors, which out of danger. As Vice Admiral Malcolm Cagle
quickly and soundlessly plopped into a river or mud observed, “The first launch went against a large
bank; there were no satisfying explosions, fire, or military barracks complex at Sam Son. . . . The pilots
smoke to mark a successful strike. watched the TV bomb fly straight and true into a
A new weapon was brought to bear against window of the barracks, exploding within—exactly
targets in North Vietnam in March 1967, when an like the brochure said it would.”
49
 NHHC VN Collection
Strike by John Steel. Acrylic drawing.

50
 AIR WAR AT ITS DEADLIEST

T
he heavier U.S. air operations over information to confirm that Chinese or Russian
North Vietnam paralleled an increase pilots flew MiGs in combat over Indochina.
in the enemy’s air defense effort. Earlier that summer, F-8E Crusaders from Bon
In March 1967, Commander Task Homme Richard had shot down three MiG-17
Force 77 declared that “the quantities of flak our fighters during a raid on the oil storage area at Ta
pilots are getting are heavier than ever—about Xa 30 miles north of Haiphong. By then, pilots
one-third heavier than last summer.” By that time from the carrier had downed nine MiGs. And
U.S. intelligence officers estimated that the North on 25 October, U.S. carrier pilots destroyed or
Vietnamese operated some 6,000 antiaircraft guns damaged at least ten MiG fighters on the ground in
and missile launchers provided by China and the a strike on Phuc Yen Airfield.
Soviet Union. At least 560 antiaircraft guns and 15 On 21 August, Commander Bryan W. Compton
multiple-launcher SAM sites defended Hanoi alone. Jr., the commanding officer of VA-163 flying from
In August 1967, the enemy set new records by Oriskany (CVA-34), led a strike that severely
launching 249 SAMs against U.S. aircraft—80 mis- damaged Hanoi’s thermal power plant. In the face
siles on 21 August alone—and shooting down 16 of heavy antiaircraft and surface-to-air missile fire,
Navy aircraft with SA-2s and antiaircraft fire. The the squadron leader remained in the target area
enemy’s sophisticated early warning and command until his charges had safely withdrawn and with a
and control network significantly enhanced the air hand-held camera took photos of the smoking plant
defenses of North Vietnam. that verified the success of the mission. Compton
Aircraft from Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31) received the Navy Cross for his combat leadership
and Kitty Hawk (CVA-63) reached a milestone in and bravery under fire. His willingness to lead from
the war on 24 April 1967 when they carried out the front typified the bravery and dedication of the
the first airstrikes against MiG bases in North Navy’s combat commanders, but they paid a price;
Vietnam. The Navy planes attacked Kep Airfield, 67 wing and squadron commanders and squadron
less than 40 miles northeast of Hanoi, while Air executive officers lost their lives in the Vietnam War.
Force units hit Hoa Lac, southwest of Kep. Navy The next step in the effort to bring pressure
F-4B Phantom IIs flying cover for the strike aircraft against Ho Chi Minh’s government occurred on
were credited with two probable MiG-17 kills. A 30 August 1967, when Oriskany planes dropped
few days later, on 1 May, A-4 Skyhawks
from the carriers shot down two MiG-17
fighters in aerial combat and destroyed
four more on the ground at Kep. Some
of the MiGs shot down may have been
among the 14 flown by North Korean
pilots that U.S. forces destroyed during
a two-month period in 1967. Unhappy
with this performance, the North
Vietnamese sent their surviving Korean
NARA

Communist comrades back home. China

Surface-to-air missiles such as this Soviet-made, 35-foot-long
and the Soviet Union trained North Guideline carried a powerful warhead and significantly strengthened
Vietnamese pilots, but there is scant the North Vietnamese air defense system. 51
 Homer Smith And The Debut Of PGMs

COMMANDER HOMER SMITH, the commanding be in the North Vietnamese capital, Washington
officer of Bon Homme Richard’s VA-212, brought demanded that the Navy employ the accurate
the Navy into the era of precision-guided munitions Walleyes. Commander Task Force 77 picked the
(PGMs) with his combat introduction of the AGM-62A unflappable Homer Smith to lead the strike on Hanoi.
Walleye, a 1,000-pound, free-fall glide bomb On 19 May, Smith and his wingman, Lieutenant
equipped with a TV camera in its nose. The pilot Michael Cater, launched in their A-4 Skyhawks from
used a cockpit-mounted monitor and crosshairs to the flight deck of Bon Homme Richard with Walleyes
guide the bomb to its target. hanging from wing pylons. A flight of six F-8E
On 11 March 1967, Smith’s A-4 Skyhawk and Crusaders accompanied them to deal with any MiG
other attack and fighter aircraft moved against the opposition and to knock out SAM missile batteries
enemy barracks at Sam Son. Smith released his and antiaircraft guns near the target. Meanwhile, to
Walleye, then stood off to observe the weapon’s divert enemy attention from the main mission, Kitty
descent to the target. The bomb went right through Hawk squadrons attacked a truck depot south of
a barracks window and exploded inside, leveling Hanoi. With this essential support, Smith’s attack
the building. For the next two days, Smith and his aircraft made it unscathed through the air defenses
squadronmates dropped more Walleyes on other encircling the capital.
barracks and the Thanh Hoa Bridge. The weapons hit Screaming low over the rooftops of Hanoi, Smith
the bridge accurately but without enough explosive and his squadronmates spotted their target. They
force to inflict permanent damage. released their bombs, banked hard, and headed for
After a series of Walleye attacks, Rear Admiral their carrier home. The Walleyes hit pay dirt; John
Thomas J. Walker, Commander Carrier Division 3, Colvin, a resident British diplomat, observed that no
declared that “for the first time in the history of naval sooner had the U.S. attack jets raced from the scene
warfare a combat commander could launch one than fire and smoke rose over the power plant and
aircraft carrying one weapon with a high degree of the ceiling fan in his office stopped dead. The next
confidence that significant damage could be inflicted day, Colvin found the facility’s main building a hollow
on a selected target.” shell and its two distinctive smokestacks piles of
The following month, Task Force 77 squadrons rubble. The North Vietnamese restored power to the
received President Johnson’s order to destroy capital with backup generators the following day, but
previously off-limits power plants, including a 32,000- Homer Smith’s daring strike provided a foretaste of
kilowat power generating station in Hanoi. Ever-fearful the tactical successes such PGMs would bring to
of killing civilians, Russians, or Chinese who might carrier operations later in the war. •

the Haiphong highway bridge southeast of the city. North Vietnamese engineers, construction troops,
The plan was to isolate Hanoi and Haiphong from and peasants worked around the clock repairing
the rest of the country by severing their road and and replacing destroyed bridge spans, rail lines, and
rail connections. Carrier aircraft destroyed one roadways. To reduce the strain on the logistic support
bridge and railroad yard after another, and sank of Hanoi and Haiphong, in August 1967 the North
dredges working to keep the water approaches to Vietnamese evacuated to the countryside all civilians
Haiphong open. not considered vital to the functioning of the govern-
An army of tens of thousands of Chinese (among ment, civil defense, or war industries.
the 320,000 members of the People’s Liberation Army The air war over the North continued unabated
who served in North Vietnam during the war) and with hundreds of carrier strikes, fighter forays,
52
 NHHC VN Collection
A Navy technician at the China Lake Naval Ordnance Test Station affixes a Walleye TV-guided glide bomb to an A-4
Skyhawk during the weapon’s prewar development.

and reconnaissance missions. Despite the loss in Hawk, and Intrepid (CVS-11) fighter and attack
August 1967 of 16 Navy aircraft—six of them to squadrons struck ship and boat yards, dock facilities,
SAMs—a monthly record—carrier planes kept and barges and lighters in previously off-limits areas
working to isolate Haiphong from the interior. in the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha.
These aircraft put the four main bridges into and By the end of 1967, Task Force 77 had carried out
out of Haiphong out of commission. They also 77,000 combat and support sorties, far surpassing
knocked out the center span of the Lang Son rail and the previous year’s record. This tally included over
highway bridge, only eight miles from the Chinese 1,000 bridges dropped or severely damaged and 700
border. From September to December, Oriskany, trucks, 400 locomotives and rail cars, and 3,200
Constellation (CVA-64), Coral Sea (CVA-43), Kitty coastal and river craft destroyed.
53
 NHHC VN Collection
As part of Operation Niagara, an F-4 Phantom from Fighter Squadron 154 drops a load of general-purpose bombs on
North Vietnamese troops besieging the Marine-held base at Khe Sanh.

54
 TET AND ROLLING THUNDER

T
he massive Rolling Thunder air cam- A-6 Intruders executed most of the strike operations
paign against North Vietnam did not during this period. Nonetheless, carrier aircraft
prevent the Communist Tet Offensive concentrated their strikes on North Vietnam’s pan-
that struck South Vietnam like a thun- handle and the enemy lines of communication into
derbolt on 31 January 1968. Viet Cong and North South Vietnam. On one occasion, the heavy rain
Vietnamese forces seized the old imperial capital clouds parted to reveal a 100-truck supply convoy in
of Hue and attacked four other South Vietnamese Laos, which Navy squadrons completely destroyed.
cities as well as 36 of the 44 provincial capitals. Supported by U.S. air and naval power, American
Enemy saboteurs even penetrated the U.S. embassy and South Vietnamese soldiers and Marines quickly
compound in Saigon. recovered from the Tet Offensive, retook all of
President Johnson especially feared that South Vietnam’s population centers, and inflicted
the North Vietnamese troops surrounding the enormous casualties on the attackers. By mid-1968,
combat outpost of Khe Sanh, just south of the Hanoi was compelled to supplement the ranks of the
Demilitarized Zone might overrun the Marine Viet Cong with North Vietnamese soldiers because
base as they had done at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 in of the large number of Viet Cong troops that had
the battle against the French army. In Operation been killed during the heavy fighting.
Niagara, Task Force 77 and other U.S. and South But Tet was a strategic victory for the enemy.
Vietnamese air forces deluged the enemy forces Having heard only positive reports on the war from
around Khe Sanh with a rain of bombs and rockets General Westmoreland and other government
that decimated their ranks and eliminated any officials during preceding months, many Americans,
prospect of a successful ground assault on the base. including President Johnson, now considered the
Flying more than 3,000 attack sorties in support war unwinnable. The President and others were
of the Khe Sanh defenders during February and distressed over the high number of American
March 1968, Yankee Station carrier aircraft strafed, casualties, the continuing malfunction of the South
rocketed, and bombed enemy positions, some as Vietnamese government, and Hanoi’s obvious
close as 100 yards to the U.S. base. determination to fight on to ultimate victory. On 31
The weather in North Vietnam during the first March 1968, a somber President Johnson delivered
months of 1968 was dismal, so the all-weather a televised address to the American people in which
he announced a halt to bombing operations
north of the 19th parallel, another offer to
negotiate a cease-fire agreement with Hanoi,
and his decision not to seek a second term
in office. The North Vietnamese government
agreed to talk and later that year met with
American diplomatic officials in Paris.
After the bombing halt, the Navy and the
Air Force continued to fly reconnaissance
NHHC VN Collection

missions north of the 19th parallel to ensure

that the enemy was not building up forces for
another offensive. Hanoi, however, character-
Napalm Along the Buffer Strip by Larry Zabel. Oil on metal. ized the flights by unarmed Air Force RF-4 55
 Recce Aircraft

INTELLIGENCE ACQUIRED BY Navy, Marine, and Air

Force reconnaissance planes on North Vietnam’s
air defenses, transportation system, and military-
related infrastructure was essential to the conduct of
Operation Rolling Thunder. Analysis of prestrike pho-

NHHC VN Collection
tography enabled planners to identify enemy SAM and
antiaircraft gun batteries, where MiGs were based,
and the military value of potential targets. Post-
mission photo interpretation helped U.S. commanders
determine the effectiveness of strike operations and An RA-5C Vigilante reconnaissance plane ready for
decide if the target should be struck again. Moreover, launch from carrier Independence (CVA-62).
aerial intelligence of enemy movements along the
Ho Chi Minh Trail, of Soviet ships entering Haiphong
Harbor, and of trains entering North Vietnam from
China helped leaders evaluate the scope of enemy
material stocks and foreign assistance.
The Navy’s primary reconnaissance plane was
the LTV RF-8, a variant of the Crusader fighter
usually referred to as the Photo Crusader. One of the
RF-8’s most significant accomplishments early in the
war was to confirm the existence in North Vietnam

NHHC VN Collection
of advanced Soviet air defense weapons. RF-8A
and RF-8G Crusaders served the carrier forces well
during the war, despite the loss of 20 planes to
enemy air defenses. The aviators who flew these
planes used the apt motto, “Recce pilots go alone, A U.S. photoreconnaissance plane flies so low and
fast over this North Vietnamese antiaircraft site that
unarmed, and unafraid.” gunners, some seen in the upper right of this image,
Fleet operations benefited from another, even more have no time to react. Other American air units were
sophisticated photo and electronic reconnaissance not so successful evading enemy air defenses.

Phantom II and Navy RA-5C Vigilante reconnais- that they collected was of limited use.
sance planes as strike operations, so Washington Following President Johnson’s curtailment of
called them off after a few weeks. Afterward, bombing operations north of the 19th parallel,
Mach 3, high-altitude SR-71 Blackbird aircraft U.S. Navy, Air Force, Marine, and at times North
carried out the reconnaissance missions usually at Vietnamese aircraft crowded the skies in the few
altitudes up to 100,000 feet, far above the effective miles above and below the Demilitarized Zone and
range of the SA-2 missile. On a standard mission, over the southern waters of the Gulf of Tonkin; it
a Blackbird took off from Kadena Air Base on was a prescription for trouble. In mid-June 1968,
Okinawa and landed at Takhli Royal Thai Air numerous allied units ashore and afloat reported
Force Base in Thailand after photographic runs spotting or contacting on radar at night unidenti-
over North Vietnam. Reconnaissance satellites and fied helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in the area.
a few unmanned drones also flew missions over In the early morning hours of 16 June, air-launched
North Vietnam, but the poor-quality intelligence rockets and automatic weapons fire narrowly
56
aircraft, the North American RA-5C
Vigilante, which operated from the large-
deck carriers. When Ranger (CVA-61)
arrived off Vietnam in August 1964, on
her deck was the Navy’s first reconnais-
sance heavy attack squadron—RVAH-5
and its six Vigilantes. Originally designed
as a nuclear attack aircraft—it could
reach Mach 2.1 speeds—the Navy
changed the mission of the plane from
nuclear strike to reconnaissance when
the Polaris ballistic-missile firing sub-
marines replaced carriers as the Navy’s
primary nuclear attack platforms in the

NHHC VN Collection
early 1960s.
For its new mission, the Navy
fitted the RA-5C with a sensor canoe
under the fuselage that contained five
A catapult officer prepares to give the launch signal that will propel
cameras, side-looking airborne radar, the RF-8A Crusader photographic reconnaissance plane skyward for
infrared mapping, and electronic coun- its mission over Laos in mid-May 1965.
termeasures gear. The plane could also
carry an electronic countermeasures
recorded on the plane’s magnetic tape equipment,
package in its bomb bay in place of
along with its exposed photographic film, to rapidly
one of three auxiliary fuel tanks. The aircraft also
produce an integrated analysis for commanders and
boasted two wing-mounted, high-intensity strobe
their intelligence staffs. While North Vietnamese
flashes to illuminate ground targets during night
air defenses downed 17 RA-5Cs during the war, the
missions. Integrated operational intelligence centers
Vigi squadrons collected some of the highest quality
introduced to the large-deck carriers just before the
images of the enemy throughout the conflict.
war downloaded an RA-5C’s mission information

missed cruiser Boston (CA-69) and Coast Guard Vice Admiral William F. Bringle, Commander
cutter Point Dume (WPB-82325), but hit and sank a Seventh Fleet, immediately launched an investiga-
Swift boat, PCF-19, killing four crewmen and injur- tion that concluded Air Force F-4 Phantoms, whose
ing others. At 0118 on 17 June, missiles exploded pilots believed that they were attacking enemy
close aboard Boston, splattering the ship with helicopters, had launched the Sparrow air-to-air
shrapnel. Shortly afterward, missiles fired by air- missiles that struck Boston and Hobart on the 17th.
craft on two separate occasions struck Australian While other Air Force planes in all likelihood carried
destroyer Hobart operating as part of Operation out the 16 June strikes on Boston and PCF-19, there
Sea Dragon near Tiger Island north of the DMZ. is some suggestion that enemy helicopters might
The attacks killed two crewmen, wounded several have been involved. Regardless, the multiple attacks
others, and severely damaged the warship. Minutes demonstrated that even though Air Force and
later, destroyer Edson (DD-946) withstood another Navy commands had taken preventative measures
aerial attack but escaped damage or casualties. after a similar air assault on Coast Guard cutter
57
 Point Welcome (WPB-82329) in August
1966, interservice coordination remained
a problem. Both services took immediate
action to correct command and control
problems. The events of 16 and 17 June
1968 proved to be an aberration in the
generally positive conduct of operations
involving U.S. ships and aircraft for the
remainder of the war.
The air war south of the 19th parallel
witnessed no let-up in combat. On 19
September 1968, northwest of Vinh,
Lieutenant Anthony J. Nargi piloting an
F-8C from Intrepid (CVS-11)’s VF-111

NHHC VN Collection
shot down a MiG-21, the Navy’s last aerial
victory in Rolling Thunder and the war’s
last victory for a Crusader.
Naval leaders of Rolling Thunder, left to right, Vice Admiral William Navy fighter and attack aircraft had
F. Bringle, Commander Seventh Fleet; Admiral John J. Hyland,
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; and Captain H. E. Greer, command-
accounted for 32 MiGs and two AN-2
ing officer of Hancock (CVA-19), observe flight operations from the biplane transports during the campaign.
carrier’s bridge. Air Force planes had downed 81 MiGs
from 1965 to 1968. Sidewinder and
Sparrow air-to-air missiles accounted for
all but a few of the Navy kills. Crusaders scored only
one of their victories by gunfire alone; the gunless
Phantoms accomplished all 13 of their kills by
missile. A-1H Skyraiders and an A-4C Skyhawk—
attack aircraft—scored improbable MiG kills with
gunfire and unguided Zuni rockets.
Washington prohibited the Navy and the
Air Force from striking targets in most of North
Vietnam after 31 March 1968. Nonetheless, until
the end of Rolling Thunder on 31 October of that
year, Task Force 77 carriers and surface warships
and Air Force units concentrated their firepower
on the region between the 18th and 19th parallels
and southern Laos. The reason for that mission
was clear: Communist forces in South Vietnam
launched so-called mini-Tets in the spring and
NHHC VN Collection

fall of 1968 that needed to be starved of troop

reinforcements, weapons, and ammunition. In this
campaign, naval units mined rivers and ports and
On 1 November 1968, Captain W. R. Flanagan, command- bombarded railway and highway bridges, truck
ing officer of Constellation (CVA-64), informs his crew
that Washington has ended the three-year-long Rolling parks, fuel dumps, roads, ferry crossing points, and
58 Thunder bombing campaign. barges shuttling down the coast.
 Vice Admiral Bringle zeroed in on three critical
logistic chokepoints in the south around Vinh, Phu
Dien Chau, and Ha Tinh. In August, he concen-
trated the attacks of his carrier air wings and Sea
Dragon surface ships against Ha Tinh alone. In
around-the-clock operations, the naval forces thor-
oughly jammed the enemy’s truck traffic heading
south and destroyed or damaged more than 600 of
the stranded vehicles. At the same time, the fleet
knocked out almost 1,000 coastal vessels. By the

NHHC VN Collection
end of Rolling Thunder, this Navy and Air Force
interdiction campaign, along with hard fighting by
U.S. and South Vietnamese troops, had frustrated
A sailor from carrier America (CVA-66) scrawls a message
the enemy’s yearlong effort to win the war in the
to the enemy in South Vietnam, often referred to as
“Charlie” from the phonetic alphabet for Viet Cong (VC or South.
Victor Charlie).

NHHC VN Collection

Attack Squadron 85 ordnancemen prepare to lift and attach a 500-pound bomb to a wing station of an A-6A Intruder
during the spring of 1968. 59
 Navy Art Collection
USS America by Orlando S. Lagman. Oil on canvas.

60
 LEARNING FROM THE ROLLING THUNDER EXPERIENCE

P
resident Johnson halted all combat wars and to project naval power ashore. The carriers
operations against North Vietnam on and surface warships of Task Force 77 had become
31 October 1968 in a last desperate potent instruments of national power. The Navy that
hope that this would energize cease-fire executed the Linebacker operations against North
negotiations in Paris, up to that point unproduc- Vietnam only three and a half years after the close
tive, and salvage the legacy of his presidency. It was of Rolling Thunder, demonstrated that the service
not to be. The Rolling Thunder campaign under had learned well from the experience. The service
his direction failed to end Hanoi’s support of the benefited from the actions of military leaders in
insurgency in the South, failed to destroy the Washington and Pearl Harbor, including Admiral
enemy’s war-making capacity, and failed to prevent Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
the North Vietnamese Army from deploying in Staff, and Admiral John S. McCain Jr., CINCPAC, who
strength to fight American and allied troops to a worked with the White House to set clear objectives
standstill in South Vietnam. Distracted by domes- for the Linebacker campaign. In 1972, the National
tic priorities, unprepared for his responsibilities as Command Authority directed the U.S. military to
commander in chief, misled by poor advice from help the South Vietnamese armed forces defeat the
Defense Secretary McNamara and other civilian Communist Easter Offensive, to continue the defense
and military advisors, and inclined toward the of the Republic of Vietnam, and to compel North
micromanagement of military operations, Johnson Vietnam to seriously negotiate an end to the war.
oversaw a doomed bombing effort. In contrast to earlier operations, in Linebacker
The Rolling Thunder campaign did not fail for naval commanders had much greater freedom to
lack of effort or resources. During the three and a select targets and to use the tactics, planes, and
half year aerial assault, Navy and Marine aircraft ordnance that they believed would be the most effec-
flew 152,399 attack sorties against North Vietnam, tive. President Richard M. Nixon, who took office in
just short of the Air Force total of 153,784 attack January 1969, finally authorized an action that naval
sorties. These U.S. strikes dropped 864,000 tons of leaders had unsuccessfully advocated throughout
bombs and missiles on North Vietnam. This total Rolling Thunder—the isolation of North Vietnam
compared with 653,000 tons of conventional bombs from seaborne supply. On the morning of 8 May
unleashed during the three years of the Korean War, 1972, carrier-based aircraft mined North Vietnam’s
and the 503,000 tons dropped in the Pacific theater primary port, Haiphong, and in the weeks afterward
during more than three years of World War II. the other ports through which the North Vietnamese
In the Vietnam War, enemy action and accidents imported 85 percent of the munitions they needed
claimed 1,125 Navy and Marine fixed-wing aircraft to fight the war. For the duration of the conflict, no
and helicopters, the greatest number during Rolling merchant ships steamed into or out of the country.
Thunder. Six hundred Navy and 271 Marine aviators For Linebacker, the Navy concentrated an
were lost during the war, most of them in the three unprecedented number of aircraft carriers—six—in
and a half years of the air campaign. The North the Gulf of Tonkin. Aircraft from these ships
Vietnamese and Chinese captured 170 naval aviators mounted around-the-clock strikes against the
and aircrew, 160 of whom Hanoi released in 1973. enemy’s supply lines in the panhandle of North
The Navy emerged from the Vietnam conflict, Vietnam. Commander Task Force 77 put more
and in particular from Rolling Thunder, as a combat- emphasis on surgical strikes by state-of-the-art A-6
hardened force prepared to fight limited, nonnuclear Intruder attack planes using laser-guided bombs, 61
 electro-optical glide bombs, and other smart
weapons, rather than the previous, large-scale
Alpha strikes. In the campaign, Navy and Air Force
planes smashed bridges that the services had failed
for years to destroy with earlier PGMs and iron
bombs. New, upgraded air-to-surface missiles with
electronic and optical guidance devastated enemy
radar and surface-to-air missile sites.
Veteran Navy pilot John Nichols in his book

NHHC VN Collection
On Yankee Station related how the new operational
management of air operations influenced the morale
of his fellow naval aviators:
F-4 Phantom fighters and A-7 Corsair attack aircraft (right
Spirits took an immediate upturn. We felt as background) of America (CVA-66)’s Carrier Air Wing 6
form up for an Alpha strike against targets in North
though we were finally at war. More lucrative
Vietnam during the waning days of the Rolling Thunder
targets were opening up almost daily after bombing campaign.
four dreary years. . . . In under eight months
the war Up North [in North Vietnam] had
The bombardment of North Vietnam’s coastal
turned around. Fleet aviators saw the dra-
installations, highways, and waterways by the
matic change on every trip over the beach.
Seventh Fleet’s cruisers and destroyers added to
SAMs became almost nonexistent, and AAA
the enemy’s woes. By 1972, these warships and
[antiaircraft artillery] dribbled off from
their sailors on the gun line had become skilled
85mm barrages to a token squirt here and
at putting timely, accurate, and coordinated fire
there of 23- or maybe 37mm. Few supplies
on targets along the coast of North Vietnam.
were getting in. Little was moving on the
These ships badly hurt North Vietnamese armor
ground, for bridges and rail lines were shat-
and infantry units moving south along the coast
tered. When Air Force F-4s finally toppled
to attack Hue during the Easter Offensive. The
Thanh Hoa Bridge [the “Dragon’s Jaw”] with
same day the carrier force mined Haiphong
smart bombs, we knew we had it knocked.
harbor, three destroyers neutralized the enemy’s
The operational experience of Rolling Thunder coastal batteries on the Do Son Peninsula while
spurred the Navy to reinforce its carrier air wings with guided missile cruisers Oklahoma City (CLG-5)
more advanced fighter, attack, and reconnaissance and Providence (CLG-6) defended them against
aircraft, and to redirect the older aircraft to missions air attack. Heavy cruiser Newport News (CA-148)
in the less heavily defended skies over South Vietnam. then moved close inshore and her 8-inch guns
F-4 Phantom IIs, A-6 Intruders, A-7 Corsair IIs, and bombarded military sites 17 miles away on the
RA-5C Vigilantes became the primary aircraft for transportation routes to Hanoi. Seventh Fleet ships
operations over the Red River Delta of North Vietnam, firing Talos surface-to-air missiles shot down MiGs
while the Navy assigned bombing and SAR support far inland, and with Terrier missiles, brought down
missions in the South and in Laos to the older A-4 MiGs that ventured out to sea.
Skyhawks and propeller-driven A-1 Skyraiders. The Throughout the Cold War, the Navy was
EA-6B Prowler electronic countermeasures aircraft concerned about the threat posed by the Sino-Soviet
helped reduce Navy air losses. By the start of Rolling bloc’s large fleet of missile- and torpedo-armed fast
Thunder, the Navy had deployed improved air-to-air attack craft similar to those that attacked destroyer
missiles, including upgraded Sidewinders and so- Maddox (DD-731) in August 1964. The destruction,
62 called dogfight Sparrow radar-guided weapons. by naval aircraft, of such enemy combatants at sea,
along the coast, and at shore bases in August 1964, afterward. No similar conflagrations have occurred
July 1966, and later during Rolling Thunder put many in the Navy since the end of the Vietnam War.
of those fears to rest. Hence, despite the Johnson administration’s
The Linebacker campaign also marked the first mismanagement of the Rolling Thunder campaign
test of the Navy’s “Top Gun” school. Displeased by that ended in failure—at great cost in American lives
the at-times 2-to-1 ratio of Navy aerial victories-to- and resources—the Navy professionally executed
losses during Rolling Thunder, the Navy directed its mission to project naval power ashore. Task
Captain Frank Ault, a veteran naval aviator, to Force 77’s attack squadrons supported by fighters,
investigate the situation. His study made clear that reconnaissance aircraft, electronic warfare planes,
the prewar focus of F-4 Phantom crews—unlike F-8 and the ships of the fleet almost always got through
Crusader pilots—on preparing for air combat at long to hit their targets with devastating effect. Entering
ranges and with radar-guided missiles had dramati- the war with in some cases inadequate aircraft,
cally reduced their skills for close-in dogfighting. weapons, equipment, and tactics, the Navy expe-
Armed with Ault’s report, the Navy established dited the dispatch to Task Force 77 of new, advanced
the Fighter Weapons School at Naval Air Station equipment and better trained aviators. Naval
Miramar in California. The school spent the next leaders, combat commanders, and sailors of all
three years training pilots who honed their abilities ranks learned from their mistakes to hone a superior
in air combat at close quarters. The air-to-air tally instrument of war that helped compel the enemy to
by the end of Linebacker operations confirmed the negotiate an end to the long, costly Vietnam War.
wisdom of the Navy’s foresight; Task Force 77’s fight-
ers registered a 12-to-1 ratio of victories to losses.
By 1972 the Navy had posted in
the northern Gulf of Tonkin positive
identification radar advisory zone ships
crewed by highly trained personnel and
fitted with the most advanced radar and
communications equipment available.
Linebacker reaffirmed the value of the
PIRAZ concept. For example, Senior
Chief Radarman Larry Nowell, in cruiser
Chicago (CG-11) earned the Navy
Distinguished Service Medal for enabling
the air-to-air destruction by U.S. planes
of 12 MiGs over North Vietnam.
The Oriskany (CVA-34), Forrestal
(CVA-59), and Enterprise (CVAN-65)
fires during and in the year after Rolling
Thunder reaffirmed the knowledge of the
importance of damage control on board
these warships loaded with volatile fuel
NHHC VN Collection

and munitions. Without the bravery and

professional skill of the damage control
parties in these ships, the carriers might
Combat veteran Hancock (CVA-19), one of several Task Force 77 carriers
have been lost. The fires also served that pummeled Communist forces in Indochina during the allied post-Tet
as learning tools in the Navy for years counteroffensive, steams through the Western Pacific. 63
 Acronyms

AAA antiaircraft artillery DMZ demilitarized zone

AFS combat stores ship ECM electronic countermeasures
AGM air-to-ground missile MACV Military Assistance Command,
AN/SPS shipboard air-search radar Vietnam
AOE fast combat support ship MiG fighter aircraft designed by
ARM antiradiation missile Mikoyan-Gurevich bureau
BB battleship PCF fast patrol craft
CA heavy cruiser PGM precision-guided munition
CAG guided missile heavy cruiser PIRAZ positive identification radar
CG guided missile cruiser advisory zone
CGN guided missile cruiser (nuclear) POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants
CIA Central Intelligence Agency POW prisoner of war
CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific RIO radar intercept officer
CINCPACFLT Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet RVAH reconnaissance heavy attack
CLG guided missile light cruiser squadron
CVA attack aircraft carrier SAR search and rescue
CVAN attack aircraft carrier (nuclear) SAM surface-to-air missile
CVS antisubmarine warfare support UNREP underway replenishment
aircraft carrier VA attack squadron
CVW carrier air wing VAH heavy attack squadron
DD destroyer VF fighter squadron
DIANE digital integrated attack system VMF Marine fighter squadron
DLG guided missile frigate WBLC waterborne logistic craft
DLGN guided missile frigate (nuclear) WPB Coast Guard cutter

64
The Authors

Norman Polmar is an analyst, consultant, and author specializing in naval, avia-

tion, and intelligence issues. Since June 2008 he has been the senior analyst for
national security programs at Gryphon Technologies where he has supported Navy
ballistic missile defense, shipbuilding programs, and cyber operations. Until May
2008 he served as the senior policy advisor in the Center for Security Strategies
and Operations within General Dynamics/Information Technology; he previously
held that position with the Anteon and Techmatics firms prior to corporate
buyouts. While in these positions he conducted studies and analyses of naval as
well as intelligence issues, and was a principal author and editor of several major
Navy and Marine Corps strategy and position papers and reports. From 1982 to
1986 and from 2002 to 2008, he served as a member of the Secretary of the Navy’s
Research Advisory Committee. In early 2007, he was appointed to reestablish and to chair the Science and
Technology Advisory Committee of the Department of Homeland Security. He served as chair of the commit-
tee until 1 August 2009; he remained a member of the committee until its charter expired in 2012. Mr. Polmar
has consulted on naval-related issues to three U.S. senators, the Speaker of the House, and the deputy councilor
to the President, as well as to the director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is the author or coauthor
of more than 50 published books, including the two-volume Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation
and Its Influence on World Events (2006, 2008), several other books on aircraft and aviation subjects, and scores
of articles for U.S. and foreign naval and aviation publications; currently he is a columnist for the U.S. Naval
Institute’s magazines Proceedings and Naval History. In 1998–1999, he held the Ramsey Chair of Naval Aviation
History at the National Air and Space Museum.

Edward J. Marolda has served as the Director of Naval History (Acting) and the
Senior Historian of the Navy at the Naval Historical Center, now Naval History
and Heritage Command (NHHC). He has written or edited a number of books on
the U.S. Navy’s experience in Southeast Asia, including From Military Assistance
to Combat, 1959–1965, vol. 2 (with Oscar P. Fitzgerald) in the official series
The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict; By Sea, Air, and Land: An
Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia; and Aircraft
Carriers, no. 4 in the Bantam series The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War.
Dr. Marolda serves as coeditor with Sandra J. Doyle of the commemorative series
The U.S. Navy and the Vietnam War, and has authored or coauthored a number
of its titles: The Approaching Storm: Conflict in Asia, 1945–1965; Combat at Close
Quarters: Warfare on the Rivers and Canals of Vietnam (with R. Blake Dunnavent), Knowing the Enemy: Naval
Intelligence in Southeast Asia (with Richard A. Mobley), and this booklet. In 2012, NHHC published Marolda’s
Ready Seapower: A History of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which covers the fleet’s extensive Vietnam War experience.
As an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, Dr. Marolda has taught courses on the Cold War in the Far
East. He holds degrees in history from Pennsylvania Military College (BA), Georgetown University (MA), and
George Washington University (Ph.D).

65
 Acknowledgments
We are especially grateful to Captain Henry J. Hendrix, USN, director of the Naval History and Heritage
Command from 2012 to 2014, for his unstinting support of this project. Equally deserving of our thanks are
Admiral Bruce Demars, USN (Ret.), Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, USN (Ret.), Captain Todd Creekman, USN
(Ret.), and Dr. David Winkler, distinguished leaders of the Naval Historical Foundation who enthusiastically
endorsed this effort to recognize the service and sacrifice in Operation Rolling Thunder of our naval personnel
and the Navy’s vital contribution to the Vietnam War effort. Captain John Paulson, USN (Ret.), a member of
the foundation’s staff, was especially helpful with regard to casualty, POW, and MIA statistics. NHHC staff
members who helped bring this booklet to fruition include editors Wendy Sauvageot, Debra Barker, and James
M. Caiella; photo archivists Lisa Crunk, David Colamaria, and Rob Hanshew; and art curators Gale Munro,
Pamela Overmann, and Karen Haubold. We thank Hill Goodspeed of the National Museum of Naval Aviation
for providing images from the museum’s fine collection. We also wish to thank Vice Admiral Dunn and Dr.
John Sherwood for their incisive reviews of the manuscript. Special thanks go to Sharlyn Marsh, who graciously
approved our use of paintings by her father, renowned naval artist R. G. Smith.

Suggested Reading
Cagle, Malcolm W. “Task Force 77 in Action Off Vietnam,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1972).
Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989.
Drew, Dennis M. Rolling Thunder 1965: Anatomy of a Failure. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Airpower Research
Institute, October 1986.
Francillon, Rene. Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club: Carrier Operations Off North Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1988.
Gillcrist, Paul T. Feet Wet: Reflections of a Carrier Pilot. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990.
Grossnick, Roy A. United States Naval Aviation: 1910–1995. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1997.
Hobson, Chris. Vietnam Air Losses: United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Losses in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973. Hinckley, UK: Midland Publishing, 2001.
Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast
Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1994.
———. Carrier Operations in The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War. Bantam, 1987.
_______ and Oscar P. Fitzgerald. From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959–1965. Vol. 2 in The United States
Navy and the Vietnam Conflict. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1986.
Mersky, Peter B., and Norman Polmar. The Naval Air War in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Nautical and Aviation
Publishing, 1981.
Michel, Marshal. Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965–1972. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.
Nichols, John B., and Barrett Tillman. On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War Over Vietnam. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2001.
Nordeen, Lon O., Jr. Air Warfare in the Missile Age (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002.
Polmar, Norman. Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, Vol. II,
1946–2006. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008.
Sharp, U. S. Grant. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1978.
Sherwood, John Darrell. Afterburner: Naval Aviation and the Vietnam War. New York: New York University
Press, 2004.
Toperczer, Istvan. MiG-17 and MiG-19 Units of the Vietnam War. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2001.
———. MiG-21 Units of the Vietnam War. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2001.
66
See also documents related to the Vietnam War in the Operational Archives of the Naval History and Heritage
Command, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, at www.history.navy.mil/research/
archives.html and www.history.navy.mil/research/library.html.

Publisher's Note
The Naval History and Heritage Command sincerely thanks the Naval Historical Foundation for its continued
support and dedication to telling the story of this important era in the Navy's history. The foundation funded the
initial edit of the manuscript and gifted those services to NHHC, facilitating timely publication of Naval Air War:
The Rolling Thunder Campaign.

67