Social Justice Society v.

Atienza (MR of 2007 decision) - SC ruling in 2007 case:

February 13, 2008 o Respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government
J. Corona Code to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
Ortiz the city, including Ordinance No. 8027.
o SC also held that the Court need not resolve the issue of whether the
Facts: MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the
subsequent resolutions passed by the city council could amend or
- SJS, Vladamir Cabigao, and Bonifacio Tumbokon in an original petition
repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the
for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel
MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full
respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce
force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
Ordinance No. 80271
o There was nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing
o Enacted by the City Council of Manila on November 20, 2001
Ordinance No. 8027
o Approved by Mayor Atienza on November 28, 2001
- Oil companies and Department of Energy sought to intervene and filed motions
o Effective on December 28, 2001
for reconsideration in intervention
o Reclassification of area from Industrial II to Commercial I o Caltex (Chevron), Shell, Petron filed petitions to annul the validity of
o Violators are given 6 months from the effectivity of the ordinance to Ordinance No. 8027
cease and desist operations o RTC granted preliminary mandatory injunction in favour of the oil
- On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) companies
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. - In 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as
o They agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006. This
most viable and practicable option. was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006
o The city council ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same o Oil companies filed a case for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8119
resolution, the city council declared that the MOU was effective only o RTC granted TRO
for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.
o On January 30, 2003, the city council adopted Resolution No. 13 Issues:
extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and
authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to (1) WON the Court should consider Ordinance No. 8119 even if it was not
the oil companies. presented in evidence (WON court should take mandatory judicial notice of the
Ordinance) [NO]
1 (2) WON respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and
ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan Ordinance No. 8119 in one of the civil cases filed with the RTC [NO]
and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of
land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Ratio:
Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pandacan
in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the JUDICIAL NOTICE
[n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the
southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino
Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from The original 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No.
Industrial II to Commercial I. 8119 which was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that
  the Court was never informed about this ordinance.
xxx xxx xxx
   
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule
of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the
period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within
enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under Section 1,
which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in
consequence, disallowed. Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Although, Section 50 of RA 409 provides that “all courts sitting in the city shall take
judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the Sangguniang Panglungsod”. This cannot
be taken to mean that the Supreme Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should
have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any
duty to inform the Court about it.

Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal
ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not
before it and to which it does not have access. The party asking the court to take judicial
notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the party desires it to
have notice of. Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take
judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial
notice of local ordinances.

JUDICIAL ADMISSION

Argument of the oil companies: Respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027
was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in one of the civil cases when the parties in their
joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that the issue has been
rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of Ordinance No. 8119.They
contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the respondent.

Rule 129.4 is NOT applicable in this case. Respondent made the statements regarding the
ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not the same as this
case before us. To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in
the same case in which it is offered. Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming
that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the
oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the argument that
Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn
its (8119s) validity.