THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 130974. August 16, 2006.]

MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC , petitioner, vs . HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of
ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO , respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR ., J : p

The court's jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service of summons.

Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the
defendant voluntarily submits to it. The defendant must be properly apprised of a pending
action against him and assured of the opportunity to present his defenses to the suit.
Proper service of summons is used to protect one's right to due process.
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 presents the core issue
whether there was a valid substituted service of summons on petitioner for the trial court
to acquire jurisdiction. Petitioner Manotoc claims the court a quoshould have annulled the
proceedings in the trial court for want of jurisdiction due to irregular and ineffective service
of summons.
The Facts
Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 63337 entitled Agapita Trajano, pro se,
and on behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda 'Imee' R. Marcos-Manotoc 2
for Filing, Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgment. Respondent Trajano
seeks the enforcement of a foreign court's judgment rendered on May 1, 1991 by the
United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America, in a case
entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos , Civil Case No.
86-0207 for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military
intelligence o cials of the Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority,
supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or in uence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court.
Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons 3 on
July 6, 1993 addressed to petitioner at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or Alexandra
Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.
On July 15, 1993, the Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served
upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit
mentioned earlier. 4 When petitioner failed to le her Answer, the trial court declared her in
default through an Order 5 dated October 13, 1993. AICTcE

On October 19, 1993, petitioner, by special appearance of counsel, led a Motion to

Dismiss 6 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an
invalid substituted service of summons. The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the
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 address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling,
residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative,
employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on
personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident
of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and
futile.
During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Manotoc presented Carlos
Gonzales, who testi ed that he saw defendant Manotoc as a visitor in Alexandra Homes
only two times. He also identi ed the Certi cation of Renato A. de Leon, which stated that
Unit E-2104 was owned by Queens Park Realty, Inc.; and at the time the Certi cation was
issued, the unit was not being leased by anyone. Petitioner also presented her Philippine
passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card 7 issued by the Immigration Service
of Singapore to show that she was a resident of Singapore. She claimed that the person
referred to in plaintiff's Exhibits "A" to "EEEE" as "Mrs. Manotoc" may not even be her, but
the mother of Tommy Manotoc, and granting that she was the one referred to in said
exhibits, only 27 out of 109 entries referred to Mrs. Manotoc. Hence, the infrequent
number of times she allegedly entered Alexandra Homes did not at all establish plaintiff's
position that she was a resident of said place.
On the other hand, Agapita Trajano, for plaintiffs' estate, presented Robert Swift,
lead counsel for plaintiffs in the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, who
testi ed that he participated in the deposition taking of Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.; and he
con rmed that Mr. Marcos, Jr. testi ed that petitioner's residence was at the Alexandra
Apartment, Greenhills. 8 In addition, the entries 9 in the logbook of Alexandra Homes from
August 4, 1992 to August 2, 1993, listing the name of petitioner Manotoc and the Sheriff's
Return, 1 0 were adduced in evidence.
On October 11, 1994, the trial court rejected Manotoc's Motion to Dismiss on the
strength of its ndings that her residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was Alexandra
Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the
documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court relied on the presumption
that the sheriff's substituted service was made in the regular performance of o cial duty,
and such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary. 1 1
On December 21, 1994, the trial court discarded Manotoc's plea for reconsideration
for lack of merit. 1 2
Undaunted, Manotoc led a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 3 before the
Court of Appeals (CA) on January 20, 1995, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36214 seeking
the annulment of the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of Judge Aurelio C.
Trampe.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 17, 1997, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, 1 4 dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. The court a quo adopted the ndings of the trial
court that petitioner's residence was at Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, which was also the residence of her husband, as shown by
the testimony of Atty. Robert Swift and the Returns of the registered mails sent to
petitioner. It ruled that the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card and the Certi cation dated
September 17, 1993 issued by Renato A. De Leon, Assistant Property Administrator of
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 Alexandra Homes, were hearsay, and that said Certi cation did not refer to July 1993 — the
month when the substituted service was effected.
In the same Decision, the CA also rejected petitioner's Philippine passport as proof
of her residency in Singapore as it merely showed the dates of her departure from and
arrival in the Philippines without presenting the boilerplate's last two (2) inside pages
where petitioner's residence was indicated. The CA considered the withholding of those
pages as suppression of evidence. Thus, according to the CA, the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner as there was a valid substituted service pursuant to Section 8,
Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court. IaEACT

On April 2, 1997, petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration 1 5 which was denied
by the CA in its Resolution 1 6 dated October 8, 1997.
Hence, petitioner has come before the Court for review on certiorari.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors for the Court's consideration:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS ERROR IN
RENDERING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN QUESTION (ANNEXES A AND
B) IN DEFIANCE OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER
THROUGH A SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SECTION 8, RULE 14 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.

II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS ERROR

WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS A VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON AN
ALLEGED CARETAKER OF PETITIONER'S RESIDENCE IN COMPLETE DEFIANCE
OF THE RULING IN CASTILLO VS. CFI OF BULACAN, BR. IV, G.R. NO. L-55869,
FEBRUARY 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 632 WHICH DEFINES THE PROPRIETY OF SUCH
SERVICE UPON MERE OVERSEERS OF PREMISES WHERE A PARTY
SUPPOSEDLY RESIDES.
III. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS ERROR IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE RESIDENCE OF THE HUSBAND IS ALSO THE
RESIDENCE OF HIS WIFE CONTRARY TO THE RULING IN THE BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. DE COSTER, G.R. NO. 23181, MARCH 16, 1925, 47 PHIL.
594.
IV. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS ERROR IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE ON EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS
UNDER SECTIONS 17 AND 18, RULE 14 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. 1 7

The assigned errors bring to the fore the crux of the disagreement — the validity of
the substituted service of summons for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
petitioner.
The Court's Ruling
We GRANT the petition.
Acquisition of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons
or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily
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 submit to the court's jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, "any
judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and
void." 1 8 In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in
person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a
reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service
of summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual
method of service." 1 9 Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed
requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, "compliance with the
rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process
as of jurisdiction." 2 0

Requirements for Substituted Service

Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to this case
provides:
SEC. 8. 2 1 Substituted service . — If the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's o ce or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof. IDAESH

We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid
substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant
cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. 2 2 Section 8, Rule
14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the
summons to the defendant in person, but no speci c time frame is mentioned.
"Reasonable time" is de ned as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances
for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty
requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,]
to the other party." 2 3 Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However,
when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the
summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons
lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has
failed. 2 4 What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order
to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means
no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a
plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end
of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a
return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff's Return provides
data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be
submitted to the O ce of the Court Administrator within the rst ten (10) days of the
succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered
"reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due
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 care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the
expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to
accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is
expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For substituted
service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to
personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually
resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at
least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must
cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be
confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. 2 5 The efforts made to find the defendant and
the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and
time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the
name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts
done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be speci ed in the Return to
justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff's Return of Summons on Substituted
Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial
Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to nd the defendant personally and the
fact of failure. 2 6 Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989
requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made
to nd the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in
the proof of service. TIEHSA

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it
should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." 2 7 A
person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity
(18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the
importance of a summons. "Discretion" is de ned as "the ability to make decisions which
represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or
wise may be presupposed". 2 8 Thus, to be of su cient discretion, such person must know
how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully
realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest
possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the
"relation of con dence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least
be noti ed of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the
person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the
recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
signi cance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters
must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendant's o ce or regular place of
business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the
person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office
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 or business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have
su cient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its
importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these
details must be contained in the Return.
Invalid Substituted Service in the Case at Bar
Let us examine the full text of the Sheriff's Return, which reads:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several attempts were made
to serve the summons with complaint and annexes issued by this Honorable
Court in the above entitled case, personally upon the defendant IMELDA 'IMEE'
MARCOS-MANOTOC located at Alexandra Condominium Corporation [sic]
or Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104 No. 29 Meralco [sic] Ave., Pasig,
Metro-Manila at reasonable hours of the day but to no avail for the
reason that said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or
premises. That on the 15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of summons
was resorted to in accordance with the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving
copy of said summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la
Cruz , caretaker of the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto, Receptionist
and Telephone Operator of the said building, a person of suitable age and
discretion, living with the said defendant at the given address who acknowledged
the receipt thereof of said processes but he refused to sign (emphases supplied).
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this Honorable Court of
origin, duly served for its record and information.
Pasig, Metro-Manila July 15, 1993. 2 9

A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of

material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in
person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved
inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or
unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of "on many occasions several
attempts were made to serve the summons . . . personally," "at reasonable hours during the
day," and "to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place
and/or residence or premises." Wanting in detailed information, the Return deviates from
the ruling — in Domagas v. Jensen 3 0 and other related cases 3 1 — that the pertinent facts
and circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be
narrated in the Return. It cannot be determined how many times, on what speci c dates,
and at what hours of the day the attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted
service of summons may be assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is
imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the service of
summons be described with more particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service. ESTCDA

Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioner's address in the Complaint, it has not
been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Cañelas, who served such summons,
exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the
Complaint only states that respondents were "informed, and so [they] allege" about the
address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff
must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct
means. 3 2 More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioner's residence or house is
doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service
to have been pursued persistently.
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 In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 3 3 it may be true that the Court held that a Sheriff's
Return, which states that "despite efforts exerted to serve said process personally upon
the defendant on several occasions the same proved futile," conforms to the requirements
of valid substituted service. However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in
substituted service which have spawned the ling of a great number of unnecessary
special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged
litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the narration
of the efforts made to nd the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and
imprecise words will not su ce. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more
particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service, dates and
times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the alleged
residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the Return to satisfactorily
show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts were made to personally serve summons
on defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal
service.
Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms
would encourage routine performance of their precise duties relating to substituted
service — for it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such
broad terms. Lastly, considering that monies and properties worth millions may be lost by
a defendant because of an irregular or void substituted service, it is but only fair that the
Sheriff's Return should clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness
of personal service.
Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a
serious nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left with a "person
of suitable age and discretion" residing in defendant's house or residence. Thus, there are
two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and
discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. Both
requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriff's Return lacks information as to
residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriff's general
assertion that de la Cruz is the "resident caretaker" of petitioner as pointed out by a certain
Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is
doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit
considering that a married woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a male
caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioner's allegation that Macky de la Cruz is
not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have additional information
in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruz's refusal to sign the Receipt for
the summons is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary "relation of
con dence" with petitioner. To protect petitioner's right to due process by being accorded
proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to
clearly comply with the rules.
It has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons must faithfully
and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the circumstances authorized
by the rules. 3 4
Even American case law likewise stresses the principle of strict compliance with
statute or rule on substituted service, thus:
The procedure prescribed by a statute or rule for substituted or constructive
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 service must be strictly pursued. 3 5 There must be strict compliance with the
requirements of statutes authorizing substituted or constructive service. 3 6
Where, by the local law, substituted or constructive service is in certain
situations authorized in the place of personal service when the latter is
inconvenient or impossible, a strict and literal compliance with the provisions of
the law must be shown in order to support the judgment based on such
substituted or constructive service. 3 7 Jurisdiction is not to be assumed and
exercised on the general ground that the subject matter of the suit is within the
power of the court. The inquiry must be as to whether the requisites of the statute
have been complied with, and such compliance must appear on the record. 3 8
The fact that the defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service does not
render the service effectual if in fact the process was not served in accordance
with the requirements of the statute. 3 9

Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that there
was strict compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). cSCTEH

Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the
proceedings held before the trial court perforce must be annulled .
The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
o cial duty. It reasons out that "[t]he certi cate of service by the proper o cer is prima
facie evidence of the facts set out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from
said certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing." 4 0
The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However, for the
presumption to apply, the Sheriff's Return must show that serious efforts or attempts
were exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts
must be speci cally narrated in the Return. To reiterate, it must clearly show that the
substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age and discretion living in the
dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is awed and the presumption
cannot be availed of. As previously explained, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas did not comply
with the stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service.
In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals , 4 1 it was held that ". . . the
presumption of regularity in the performance of o cial functions by the sheriff
is not applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriff's return is
defective (emphasis supplied)." While the Sheriff's Return in the Venturanza case had no
statement on the effort or attempt to personally serve the summons, the Return of Sheriff
Cañelas in the case at bar merely described the efforts or attempts in general terms
lacking in details as required by the ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other
cases. It is as if Cañelas' Return did not mention any effort to accomplish personal service.
Thus, the substituted service is void.
On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of Alexandra Homes, Unit E-
2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, our ndings that the substituted service is
void has rendered the matter moot and academic. Even assuming that Alexandra Homes
Room 104 is her actual residence, such fact would not make an irregular and void
substituted service valid and effective.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed March 17, 1997 Decision and October 8, 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
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 and the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 163 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs. EHSITc

SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Carpio Morales and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Dated October 24, 1997, rollo, pp. 3-18.

2. Complaint, dated June 25, 1993, Annex "C" of Petition, rollo, pp. 32-36.
3. Dated July 6, 1993, Annex "D" of Petition, rollo, p. 37, records, p. 28.
4. Sheriff's Return, dated July 15, 1993, Annex "E" of Petition, rollo, p. 38, records, p. 29.
5. Annex "G" of Petition, rollo, p. 41, records, p. 33.

6. Dated October 18, 1993, Annex "H" of Petition, rollo, pp. 42-44, records, pp. 35-37.
7. Exhibit "3", records, pp. 95-96.
8. Rollo, p. 25-26.
9. Exhibits "A" to "EEEEE," records, pp. 152-258.
10. Supra note 4.
11. Records, p. 275, par. 3.
12. RTC Pasig Branch 163 Order, records, p. 309.
13. Rollo, p. 58.
14. CA rollo, pp. 77-86. (penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz, with Associate
Justices Pedro A. Ramirez and Ricardo P. Galvez concurring).
15. Rollo, p. 72.
16. Rollo, p. 31.
17. Rollo, pp. 7-8.
18. Domagas v. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 663, 677, citing
Lam v. Rosillosa, G.R. No. L-3595, May 22, 1950, 86 Phil. 447.
19. Id. at 678, citing Hamilton v. Levy, G.R. No. 139283, November 15, 2000, 344 SCRA 821.
20. Id. at 679, citing Ang Ping v. CA, G.R. No. 126947, July 15, 1999, 369 Phil. 607, 310
SCRA 343.
21. Now 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 14, Sec. 7 .
22. Arevalo v. Quitalan, G.R. No. 57892, September 21, 1982, 116 SCRA 700, 707.
23. Far Eastern Realty Investment, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. L-36549, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA
256, 262.

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 24. Supra note 21, Sec. 5.
25. Domagas v. Jensen, supra note 14, at 678.
26. A HANDBOOK FOR SHERIFFS (October 2003), p. 116.
27. REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, Sec. 8.

28. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993), p. 647.

29. Supra note 4.
30. Supra note 13.
31. See Samartino v. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 664, 669; Hamilton v.
Levy, G.R. No. 139283, November 15, 2000, 344 SCRA 821, 829; and Madrigal v. CA, G.R.
No. 129955, November 26, 1999, 319 SCRA 331, 336.
32. 62B Am Jur 2d, Process § 147, citing Romeo v. Looks, 369 Pa Super 608, 535 A2d
1101, app den 518 Pa 641, 542 A2d 1370 and app den 518 Pa 642, 542 A2d 1370.
33. G.R. No. 140244, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 243, 249.
34. Domagas v. Jensen, supra note 15, at 679.
35. 62B Am Jur 2d, Process § 150, p. 857, citing Guaranty Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v.
Green Cove S. & M.R. Co., 139 US 137, 35 L Ed 116, 11 S Ct 512.

36. Id. at 857-858, citing Miller v. Corning Glass Works, 102 Ariz 326, 429 P2d 438.
37. Id. at 858, citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 US 385, 53 L Ed 1363, 34 S Ct 779.
38. Id., citing Galpin v. Page, 85 US 350, 21 L Ed 959.
39. Id., citing Napoleon B. Broward Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, etc., 160 Fla 120, 33 So
2d 716.
40. Rollo, p. 28.
41. G.R. No. L-77760, December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 305, 313.

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