This article was downloaded by: [New York University]

On: 11 April 2015, At: 16:44

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Applied Communication

Research
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjac20

Democracy in the workplace: Theory

and practice from the perspective of
communication
a
George Cheney
a
Associate Professor in the Department of Communication ,
University of Colorado , Campus Box 270, Boulder, CO, 80309
Published online: 21 May 2009.

To cite this article: George Cheney (1995) Democracy in the workplace: Theory and practice
from the perspective of communication, Journal of Applied Communication Research, 23:3,
167-200, DOI: 10.1080/00909889509365424

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00909889509365424

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever
as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any
opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the
authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the
Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary
sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,
claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities
whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in
relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms
& Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/
terms-and-conditions
 Journal of Applied Communication Research
23 (1995), 167-200

Democracy in the Workplace:

Theory and Practice
from the Perspective
of Communication
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

George Cheney

ABSTRACT This essay considers a range of issues related to workplace democracy in the
contemporary industrialized world. Although drawing from a broad multi-disciplinary
literature, the essay emphasizes topics that can be usefully explored from the perspective of
communication and sound contributions that can be made to theory and practice from such an
engagement of the field. The essay essentially argues for the widespread democratization of
work but not without considering realistic limitations to that ideal. The case of the Mondragon
worker cooperatives, in the Basque region of Spain, is offered to demonstrate both the promise
and problems of workplace democracy.

"Many visitors come here and ask us why we have such an unusual business. But, I say
to them: 'Don't you think it's strange that more organizations in the world aren't like
this one?' "
—from the author's interview with a worker-member, the Mondragón cooperatives,
the Basque Country, Spain, May 1994.

S urely one of the great ironies of the modern world is that democracy, imperfect
as it is in the political realm, seldom extends to the workplace. In fact, most
U.S. citizens do not even question the fact that they are required to "check their

George Cheney is Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Colorado
at Boulder, Campus Box 270, Boulder, CO 80309. This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the
International Communication Association, Albuquerque, May 1995. The author expresses gratitude to
these researchers knowledgeable about the Mondragón cooperatives for helpful discussions and written
correspondence: Sue Eicher, Fred Freundlich, Sally Klingel, Terry Martin, Sheila Turpin-Forster and
William Foote Whyte. Also, I thank the late W. Charles Redding, Cynthia Stohl, Hollis Glaser, and Mike
Miller, in addition to the reviewers and the editor of this journal, for offering their insightful comments
on earlier drafts of this paper; and Bill Gorden and Ann Westenholz for providing some valuable
references. In addition, I acknowledge support from the Council on Creative Work of the University of
Colorado at Boulder for a grant-in-aid to conduct research in Mondragón, Spain from February through
June, 1994. I am very grateful to Jürgen Denk for lending me his car during my stay in the Basque
Country. And, above all, I give profound thanks to everyone at the Otalora Training Center of the
Mondragón Cooperative Corporation and to numerous persons in specific coops of Mondragón and
ULMA for allowing me to experience, explore, converse and debate, all in one of the world's most
beautiful and inviting places.
 168
DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

voice at the door" of the shop or office. Fortunately, some scholars and practitioners
have responded to Carole Pateman's (1970) call to examine carefully how our
democratic ideals apply to the workplace. David Ewing (1977) has observed the
prevalence of undemocratic organizations within what we commonly consider to be
a political democracy. Marshall Sashkin (1984) has insisted that participative
management is an ethical imperative, not only because it is consistent with
democratic principles but also because it satisfies basic needs, enhances health and
increases productivity. And, Bachrach and Botwinick have (1992) asserted workers'
rights from a political perspective, arguing that employees ought to share equally
"in decision making at all levels of the enterprises in which they work" (p. 163).
Finally, Susan Whalen (in progress) shows convincingly that workers' voices have
been systematically excluded from public discourse about the present and future
American workplace, surprisingly even in many discussions about "employee
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

participation."
A searching consideration of workplace democracy—in the U.S., and for that
matter, around the world—could not be more timely. The "globalization" of
markets through the reduction of trade barriers here and elsewhere, the push for
greater productivity in all sectors, the implementation of new programs such as
Total Quality Management and Total Participative Management, rampant "downsiz-
ing" and "rightsizing" (with the sheer popularity of those euphemisms pointing to
the commonness of such cutbacks—we used to call them firings and layoffs), and
the acceleration of technological advances are some of the trends that are, for better
and for worse, changing the face of the workplace and affecting the lives of millions
if not billions of people. Pointedly, employee "empowerment" is now seen is a
double-edged sword: the employee with increased responsibility may also be the
employee with \y2 or 2 jobs to do. The brief but potent General Motors strike of
September, 1994, beginning in Detroit but spreading to other plants, represented
perhaps the first widely publicized objection by á large contingent of workers in the
U.S. to the norms of the New Workplace: greater responsibility within certain
parameters, more self-monitoring, and enlarged participation in a range of practices
and topics, but with longer hours, more stress and inevitably more frequent injuries
and illness. It is not surprising, then, that observers speak of "the end of
organizational loyalty" (Bennett, 1990) or "getting not just a job but a life"
(Edmondson, 1991). And, estimates of the percentage of U.S. workers happy or very
satisfied with their jobs often are at or below one-quarter of the workforce (see, e.g.,
Moravec, 1994). "Lean production" and "reengineering," representing a bare-bones
approach to overhead costs and staffing, are touted as the 1990s solutions to lack of
U.S. "competitiveness." But, what is often overlooked is people. Fortunately, in the
pages of our journals a number of articles have already appeared that challenge the
short-sighted dominant views on productivity, efficiency and competition (see, e.g.,
Barker & Cheney, 1994; Deetz, 1992; Fairhurst & Wendt, 1993; Mumby & Stohl,
1992). And, studies are beginning to explore the actuality of and potential for
worker resistance to new workplace systems in a U.S. environment where labor
unions no longer speak for a large segment of employees (see, e.g., Murphy, 1993;
Tompkins & Diamant, in progress).
Working from any one of a variety of humanistic perspectives (broadly speaking),
we must ask, "For whom are we designing or redesigning the workplace? For whom
is this accelerated pace? For whom are jobs and products and services and the
market, in the first place? For whom is increased competitiveness, worldwide?" In a
 169
JACR AUGUST 1995

penetrating, broad-based critique of the current form of the market economy,

Andrew Bard Schmookler (1993) shows how our economic system has lost sight of
higher goals in an endless pattern of unquestioned consumption and the refashion-
ing of the citizen as consumer. Communication scholars can and should have much
to say about some of the metaphors, images and values that dominate current
discussions of the New Workplace. Moreover, they should look inside as well as
outside the workplace itself to assess guiding discourses, structural imperatives,
and everyday patterns of talk. For example, there is much work to be done to
challenge and offer sensible, humane alternatives to the rhetoric of competition,
recognizing such problems and contradictions as: the implicit or sometimes explicit
end (or goal) of competition is in fact the end (or termination) of competition (see
also Krugman's, 1994, critique of the notion of a nation as economically competi-
tive).
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

While I am no economist and my concerns here are more focused on the internal
workings of modern organizations, big and small, I must attend to the larger
economic, political and social contexts for organizational change today (see, e.g.,
Deetz, 1994). Therefore, in examining what is possible for a political reordering of
the workplace, one consistent with the very principles that are enshrined by the
sacred documents of the U.S. and many other democracies around the world, we
must understand broad trends and forces at the same time that we look "inside" the
organization. (For a comprehensive economic treatment of the role of the demo-
cratic firm in various societies, see Ellerman, 1990.)
The simple but profound question, "How do we implement democratic practices
in work organizations?" leads us to think about the goals of organizations, the goals
of the individuals who inhabit them, and the goals of the larger society, recognizing
that those sets of aspirations can and perhaps should overlap even if not coincide
perfectly. What is democracy, speaking specifically and practically, in terms of
worklife? Other questions quickly follow: To what extent and in what situations is
workplace democracy desirable or beneficial? To what extent is it possible or
realistic as a goal? To what extent is it realizable or sustainable over the long term?
What are the effects of participative practice on employees and on the organization?
How far do particular participative systems go toward fostering a truly democratic
workplace? What, if anything, should be done when avenues of workplace
participation exist but are not pursued by individuals? And, to what extent is
democracy in the workplace connected with broader political and social practices
(that is, to activities beyond the organization)? These are the kinds of questions that
inspire this essay, in which I reflect on the questions and trace their pragmatic
versions through a case study of one large organization that is committed to
democracy. Above all, I wish to promote the ideal of a humane workplace, a
workplace not just for work but also for people, especially at a time when a
simplistic form of the market principle and a crude impulse for greater productivity
seem to preoccupy our factories, offices, schools, hospitals and universities.
Although full consideration of the issues listed above is beyond the scope of a
single article, I will in these pages consider some of the basic communication-
related issues implicated in a theoretical-practical exploration of organizational
democracy. As such, this essay is open to a variety of theoretical positions and
interpretations, in seeking to provoke further thought, discussion, empirical
research and social action.
 170
DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

THE IDEA(L) OF WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY

Workplace democracy comes in many forms, including localized efforts at
offering employees greater control such as quality circles and semi-autonomous
work teams (which themselves often are strikingly different in character) and more
thoroughgoing efforts at establishing "alternative" organizations or transforming
existing, traditional organizations. Workplace democracy has been structured and
formalized in, for example, the co-determination models of Germany, Sweden and
Denmark, where labor, management and government are legally obliged to cooper-
ate in the formulation of economic policy (see, e.g., Gorden, Holmberg & Heisey,
1994). At the other end of the continuum of institutionalization are informal
movements to alter existing authoritarian or hierarchical or patriarchal structures.
Of course, such ad hoc efforts frequently find themselves or define themselves in
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

marginal positions with respect to the established institutions of society (see, e.g.,
Sennett, 1980). Somewhere in the middle of this continuum are many worker-
owned and/or worker-managed cooperatives in the private or for-profit sector. (See
Dachler & Wilpert, 1978, for a thorough consideration of different rationales for and
concepts of workplace democracy.)
In all cases, however, the nature and authenticity of workplace democracy is at
issue. Neither democracy nor participation are unitary concepts, in that with each
we may speak of types and degrees (see, e.g., Harrison, 1994). Moreover, while sheer
participation is a necessary condition for democracy, it is certainly not sufficient.
As has often been noted with respect to U.S. politics during the last half of the
twentieth century, democratic structures may exist and yet invite only a low to
medium level of actual participation (hence, the plethora of voting-behavior
studies). Further, the nature of democracy itself is continually contested, as
political shifts on the late 1980s and early 1990s in various parts of the world have
powerfully shown (see, e.g., Barber, 1992, on "strong democracy"; and Deetz, 1992,
on "corporate colonization"). In the context of work, the active pursuit of a
democratic arrangement by, say, a majority group in a worker cooperative often
engenders paradox: To what extent can democracy be forced, pushed, or mandated,
even by a benevolent and value-motivated majority (see, e.g., Westenholz, 1993)?
Similarly, the relationship between economic control and participation in actual
decision making must be considered, especially in for-profit firms. This relationship
is complex and important; for, as Edward Greenberg (1986) concludes from his
extensive research on U.S. worker-owned firms, individual alienation and estrange-
ment from the body social can persist even in an organization where economic
ownership truly is shared. Thus, most Marxist positions on the matter are too
narrow in not giving sufficient attention to the social "logic" and dynamics of the
organization; however, such critiques do direct our attention to the self-promoting
aspects of the market, to the structures which divorce workers from control over the
products and processes of their labor, and to genuine differences in wealth and
power between groups (see, e.g., Burawoy, 1979, for a noteworthy exception).
This essay considers some of the communication-related issues of democracy in
the workplace, where workplace democracy is defined broadly as a system of
governance which truly values individual goals and feelings (e.g., equitable remunera-
tion, the pursuit of enriching work and the right to express oneself) as well as typically
organizational objectives (e.g., effectiveness and efficiency, reflectively conceived),
which actively fosters the connection between those two sets of concerns by
 171

JACR AUGUST 1995

encouraging individual contributions to important organizational choices, and

which allows for the ongoing modification of the organization's activities and policies
by the group. Thus, I work from the perspective that sees merit in preserving some of
the Enlightenment celebration of individual rights and responsibilities but within
the context of collective pursuits. Moreover, I recognize that some organizational
goals—for example, pursuit of the common good or social betterment—may indeed
incorporate what I am here referring to as individual goals. Ultimately, of course,
there ought to be substantial, though not complete, overlap between individual and
collective pursuits.1 Along the way in this discussion, I treat some relevant
economic issues. Crucial to my conception of workplace democracy is a strong
notion of process: specifically, the celebration of self-reflection, collective develop-
ment and individual opportunity.
To keep this essay both manageable and focused, I mention but do not emphasize
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

the promotion of workplace democracy within the structurally adversarial labor-

management model, while recognizing the important contributions of many unions
and labor-management arrangements toward fostering true worker participation
and the continuing role of labor in seeking and protecting a variety of benefits for
workers (see Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Further, I must for now exclude state-
sponsored and highly institutionalized systems such as codetermination models
that exist on a society-wide basis, whether they be in capitalist, plan-based or mixed
economies. Too, I am not exploring here the possibilities that exist for workplace
democratization through the revolution in communications technologies, although
I acknowledge that technical advances do offer avenues toward new forms of
organization and community even as they allow for new forms of control and
represent a loosening of some traditional social bonds. Also, I do not deal explicitly
with issues of multi-cultural or multi-ethnic diversity, although many of my points
are relevant to "diversity" in those and in other senses (see Allen, in press, for a
detailed treatment of racial and ethnic diversity in organizations). My stress here is
on so-called "alternative" organizations—particularly, employing organizations
that define themselves at least somewhat in opposition to the "mainstream" and are
established and maintained with the principle of worker control as primary.
Specifically, I describe and explore briefly the case of Mondragón, the largest system
of worker-owned and worker-governed cooperatives in the world, located in the
Basque region of Spain. However, many of the points I treat are relevant as well to
other coops, to volunteer groups, to traditional corporations, and even to other more
hierarchical organizations.
In fact, as Hollis Glaser (1994) observes, much can be learned about the strengths,
limits and possibilities of mainstream organizations from a close and critical
examination of organizations that consciously construct and style themselves as
"different." After all, even in some of the most tradition-bound multinational
corporations, there are emerging trends toward the decentralization of operations
and the empowerment of employees (although specific instances may vary consid-
erably in kind and degree of democracy). Levering and Moskowitz (1993), in their
survey of the "best companies to work for" in the U.S., find them characterized to
varying degrees by some form of participation and/or democracy. Take, for
example, the case of W. L. Gore and Associates, with its flexible structure, emphases
on responsibility and participation, and an Employee Stock Ownership Program (or
ESOP); it aims for a comparatively high level of employee satisfaction and sense of
empowerment (see Pacanowsky, 1988).
 172

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY

I have not the space to detail a history, even a selective and interpretive one, for
the appearance of workplace democracy in various parts of the world over the
millennia. In fact, as Malcom Warner (1984) observes, the history of the idea of
workplace democracy is difficult to chronicle precisely because most of its "history"
predates the professionalization of knowledge. Besides, the objective of developing
a reasonably comprehensive history of the concept and practice has been achieved
elsewhere, especially by historians of labor, but also by economists, political
scientists and sociologists (see, e.g., reviews by Blumberg, 1968; Deane, 1978;
Horvat, 1972; Kendall, 1975; Vanek, 1972; and Warner, 1984). A detailed and
relatively comprehensive review of the current scholarly and popular literatures on
workplace democracy, with special attention to its implications for communication
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

research, will appear elsewhere (Cheney & Hirsch, in progress). However, I must
observe that neither the philosophy nor the practice of democracy at work are new.
The ideal of a democratic workplace, however formerly restricted to white male
elites, can certainly be traced at least as far back as ancient Athens. Specific
concerns about how to democratize factories, for example, were addressed by
German, French and British philosophers in the mid- to late-nineteenth century
(see, e.g., Warner, 1984). And sometimes radical experiments, such as the French
worker-priest movement of the middle of this century, where priests entered the
workplace to work shoulder-to-shoulder with laborers, have attracted interest far
beyond their locales. And, of course, many representatives of the Human Relations
Movement, which heavily influenced the U.S. workplace between 1930 and 1965,
were genuinely committed to at least some measures of workplace democracy—
albeit often in conjunction with interests in productivity (see, e.g., the review by
Redding, 1972; see also Trist & Murray, 1993, on socio-technical systems).
Perhaps the examples best known in the popular consciousness of workplace
democracy are the so-called Utopian communities of Great Britain and the United
States during the early to mid-1800s. British industrialist Robert Owen, for
instance, responded to the alienation of factory workers in England by creating
worker-owned and worker-managed enterprises in the 1830s. While Owen by no
means eliminated alienating practices from his factories—he, for example, main-
tained a strict, over-the-shoulder monitoring system—he did make shared owner-
ship and structural control by workers to be pillars of the enterprise (see, e.g.,
Weisbord, 1991). Eventually, these experiments disappeared or were coopted, in
part because of outside influence in the form of absentee stock ownership. Once
Owen and others sought to expand the capital base of the organizations by selling
shares to persons other than employees, the companies were pressured by their new
"absentee landlords" toward becoming just like the traditional corporations of the
time: both autonomy and distinctiveness were lost.

Interaction with External Systems

Thus, an important principle for the maintenance of an alternative organization is
the need to buffer the organization significantly from outside pressures to alter its core
values and practices. This is a substantial challenge for profit-making organizations
that also must engage and to some extent succeed in the market, especially a market
that is fast becoming global. One way to handle this problem is through the creation
 173

JACR AUGUST 1995

or inclusion of support organizations. Tierra Wools (or "Ganados del Valle") of

north-central New Mexico heeds this lesson through the establishment of a network
of organizations, groups and individuals that all belong to the cooperative.
Shepherds, landowners, weavers, shopkeepers and salespersons all support one
another in an elaborately cooperative enterprise.
In terms of communication, the principle means that the organization must try to
sustain a special identity while also doing business with other types of organizations.
Considered as a social system, the organization must not be so open as to lose its
cohesiveness and distinctiveness (see Luhmann's, 1990, insightful philosophical
formulation of this problem). "Openness" and "closedness" with respect to an
organization are two conditions or orientations that are dialectically interdepen-
dent: each depends upon the other for its meaning, and neither can be overempha-
sized in practice. In the terms of religious organizations, this means that the
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

organization must maintain something of a "sectarian" posture, engaging but not

becoming completely absorbed in the larger society. The "alternative" organization
cannot be a predominantly open system that simply absorbs outside influences (see
the five diverse case examples in Rothschild & Whitt, 1986). It should establish and
maintain as "sacred" certain values, principles and practices (perhaps even some
rituals) that help to remind members of where their organization "stands" with
respect to the rest of the organizational world.
However, we must remember that the relationship between an alternative, highly
democratic organization and its environment can be partially or wholly supportive.
For example, some coops are fostered and encouraged by external groups. In the
Farmworker Power Project (FPP) of Colorado (1989-1992), a support structure was
established to assist migrant and non-migrant farmworkers in developing worker-
owned-and-managed cooperatives, in an effort to replace the corrupt and authoritar-
ian crew-leader system which dominates and oppresses many farm laborers in
various parts of the U.S. The FPP encouraged workers in each coop to rotate through
the position of manager; offered training in English, negotiation skills and decision
making; and provided valuable financial assistance. In this case, the support of an
outside organization made possible an extraordinary experiment in workplace
democracy in one of the most unlikely contexts. Unfortunately, grave problems
developed within the supporting organization itself which required some of us on
the board to shut it down. Fortunately, this happened after one farmworker coop
had become established and relatively self-sufficient.

Size, Structure and Patterns of Interaction

Size is another important issue and, I maintain, an underrated factor in
communication research. Students of small-group communication or group dynam-
ics in psychology understand well that when a group's membership exceeds a
certain number, say 15, it becomes very difficult for the group to work consistently
as a whole. The temptation and indeed the necessity with growth is to form
committees or subgroups to do at least some of the business of the organization. The
simple constraints on talk time in a large group mean that it is impossible for every
member to participate fully. The simple formula n(n - l)/2, where "n" indicates
the number of persons in the social system, reveals the number of possible dyadic or
two-person linkages. Thus, with a group of five persons, the number of possible
 174

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

linkages is 10; but for a group of 10, the number jumps to 45. In addition, limitations
of human cognitive-processing capacity make it difficult for an individual to keep
track of a great number of relationships simultaneously. This general finding about
human information processing supports conventional wisdom about span of
control (e.g., Fayol, 1949) in that one supervisor cannot function well with more
than ten or so employees. So we find several areas of social science research
converging on a single principle: that the intense, face-to-face interaction required
by real, direct democratic participation cannot be maintained in something larger
than what tve call a small group. Larger groups must therefore create subunits or
spin off new organizations. This reality is understood deeply by all who have
observed the growth of an organization beyond its few initial members: whether in a
student club, a faculty, a high-tech firm, a congress, or a religious congregation. In
this way, the practical reality of growth confronts us with the distinction between
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

direct and representative democracy and with the need to create subunits where, in
many instances, the spirit of direct democracy may be preserved within the larger
context of representative decision making.
For example, size is an important concern in the University of Colorado's INVST
(International and National Voluntary Service Training) program. The program
involves special courses in the analysis of social problems, leadership-oriented
internships in Denver metro agencies, innovative summer experiences locally and
internationally, and intense student participation in the policy-making functions of
the organization. To further secure the place of the organization within the
university, more students than the current number of 30 need to participate. But,
growth can threaten the intimate, communal and democratic aspects of the
organization. Thus, the group is contemplating the creation of subunits that would
sometimes join together in larger meetings while creating mechanisms of represen-
tation. But, such a change in structure and size must be handled with care lest the
organization lose not only a measure of intimacy in relations but also something of
its essentially innovative character.
Jane Mansbridge (1983), from her extensive political-anthropological investiga-
tions of organizations as diverse as town meetings and crisis-line support groups,
argues that a vision of unitary democracy in which value consensus is constitutive
of the organization is best pursued by smallish organizations (cf. Hansmann's,
1990, argument that workplace democracy is only feasible in small homogeneous
organizations). Even in those cases, though, tensions can arise over, say, how to
define an appropriate political stance. The value consensus of the majority can
sometimes become a source of oppression for the minority of persons who adopt
dissenting views: in the interest of building consensus, the organization can
intentionally or unwittingly obstruct the development of diversity. At a larger level
an adversarial model of democracy in which competing interests are institutional-
ized and have proportional representation and influence is most fitting for an
organization or political unit. Mansbridge's overarching point is that the pursuit of
genuine democracy, at work or elsewhere, must take into account the reality of size
and its implications for social structure and communication practice.
In a well-known article, Mansbridge (1973) explains that there are three
significant challenges to any participative group: these are managing time, handling
the frequent and intense expression of emotion, and coping with the reality of certain
inequalities. Inequality, for instance, is likely to be perceived because of different
types and levels of expertise on the part of group members. These real differences
 175
JACR AUGUST 1995

should be celebrated in such a way as to draw upon the full range of members'
resources while maintaining the personal equality of members. All of Mansbridge's
challenges are manifested in and must be handled through communication. And, as
observed in a recent dissertation that reframes Mansbridge's factors in explicitly
communicative terms, time, emotion and inequality are in fact interdependent sets
of issues (Glaser, 1994). Further, Mulder and Wilke (1970) report experimental
findings that inequality will always appear in a decision-making group because of
differences in the skills of communication and persuasion. Each of Mansbridge's
challenges is intensified with the increased size of the organization, even when the
organization maintains the small-group decision-making unit.2
Based on the observation of participatory groups, one can add to Mansbridge's list
of challenges the threat of mutual monitoring. That is, in comparatively leaderless
groups, where the role of an outside "boss," administrator, supervisor, or overseer,
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

is eliminated or reduced in importance, group members can develop an internal

system of discipline that involves a great deal of monitoring of one another and a
corresponding loss of individual autonomy. This is precisely what Barker and his
colleagues (Barker, 1993; Barker & Cheney, 1994; Barker & Tompkins, 1994) found
in a recent study of the limits of participation in the semi-autonomous work teams
of a high-tech firm. In an intensely participative environment that developed as a
planned organizational change, most teams took on control functions previously
held and performed at higher levels of the organization: their talk gradually became
laced with references to "looking over each other's shoulders" and social control.
Similarly, Mumby and Stohl (1991) report that team members themselves some-
times develop systematic and rigid interpretations of such things as worker
absences and lateness.
Robert Michels (e.g., 1962), the early-twentieth-century political theorist, took a
very dim view of the prospects for any meaningful democratic participation being
maintained in a large organization. From his thorough examinations of European
political parties across the political spectrum (even some that were avowedly
committed to equal access and participation), Michels articulated his famous Iron
Rule of Oligarchy: that all large organizations (at or beyond the 3,000-5,000
member range) inevitably move toward control by a few. No matter how strong the
initial commitment to democracy and participation, said Michels, any large
organization inclines toward the increased concentration of power.
Although Michels' "law" has been heavily criticized in some circles, little
empirical evidence has been mounted to dispute it. One of the most well-known and
articulate rebuttals, however, is Victor Thompson's Modern Organization (1961), in
which he argues that hierarchy as we know it is a relative and not an absolute or
universal cultural phenomenon. We are so biased in this regard, says Thompson,
that we usually view any non-hierarchical organization as "disorganized" and
sometimes even unworthy of the title "organization" (cf. Iannello, 1992). In her
studies of numerous and diverse egalitarian organizations, including some for-
profit business collectives, Katherine Newman (1980) is sympathetic with Thomp-
son but finds that the temptation to bureaucratize and to restructure hierarchically
is almost irresistible for some organizations, especially when they must position
themselves to obtain outside funding or recognition or clients. In discussions over if
and when to bureaucratize, those who advocate the preservation of "flat hierar-
chies" are frequently portrayed as naive and unrealistic.
 176

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

Maintaining Integrity
The Iron Rule of Oligarchy, however seriously it is taken, throws down a gauntlet
to those who wish to maintain widespread and intense participation in decision
making in organizations that grow beyond the small-group level. In fact, Michels'
hypothesis calls into question the possibility of longevity for a truly democratic
organization. The issue is taken up by Rothschild and Whitt (1988) in their five case
studies of alternative organizations, including a newspaper, a food coop, a free
clinic, a law collective and an innovative high school. The authors observe that
some alternative enterprises are founded so as to be short-lived. That is, some
organizations actually decide on going out of existence after a certain time, rather
than find themselves coopted by outside forces (e.g., competitors or monitoring
agencies) or falling back on traditional, hierarchical practice. Extraordinarily, some
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

organizations plan for their own demise rather than becoming rigidly permanent or
finding themselves drifting away from their basic goals. In this sense, institutional-
ization and growth can pose direct threats to organizational integrity. Sheer
longevity is thus an issue in efforts to establish and maintain organizational
democracy. It may be, for example, that the spontaneous and spirited elements in
the life of a newly-formed organization cannot be enjoyed over the long haul.
Certainly, Max Weber (1978) raised this precise question with respect to
charismatic authority in the form of organizations (such as religious sects) that are
born and grow up around the passion and character of a powerful leader. The
"routinization of charisma," as Weber called it, represents an organization's attempt
to preserve its singular aspects beyond the involvement of its founding member(s).
This is why the problem of succession is so vexing for relatively new organizations
(e.g., "What do we do now that our leader is gone?"). All organizations are founded
through special instances of informal communication because formal structure
cannot spontaneously come into existence (see Barnard, 1938/1968). Further, many
organizations develop through the inspirational guidance of a person or a small
group. Preserving or institutionalizing inspiration is an enormous and paradoxical
challenge, particularly for organizations that define themselves in contrast to the
"mainstream." The problem of succession can be exceptionally trying when the
founders are those perceived to be the embodiment of special values or the holders
of particular knowledge.
More generally, of course, Weber (1978) feared what he saw as the inevitable
"march of rationalization": that society as a whole as well as particular organiza-
tions would move toward bureaucratic order. In one sense, the bureaucratic impulse
is deeply democratic: in the widespread development of civil-service systems in
North America and Europe of the late nineteenth century, a serious effort was made
to grant equal—or relatively equal—opportunity through merit. In this way,
bureaucracy embodies the ideal of equality. But, as Weber (1978) rightly feared,
bureaucracy also tends to overconcentrate power, depersonalize participation, and
remove people from the consideration of transcendent goals. The tendency of many
initially creative and flexible social-movement organizations and high-tech compa-
nies to experience creeping bureaucratization is living testimony to Weber's
prophecy about the sweep of bureaucracy. But, a question remains about the
possibilities for bureaucracy being overtaken by other models of organization,
especially as prompted by the appearance of hierarchically flat and operationally
flexible small firms. Tompkins and Cheney (1985), for example, observe the
 177

JACR AUGUST 1995

persistence of bureaucratic pressures on and within organizations that rely on

control of a "concertive" type: contemporary organizations that are structured
around interdependence, horizontal monitoring, flexible roles, strong expertise and
a common mission (such as some energetic high-tech firms and team-based
organizations). And a question persists about what if anything a specific organiza-
tion can do over time to resist the temptation to formalize, centralize, standardize
and otherwise reduce the spontaneous and dynamic aspects of life within it (see,
e.g., Hummel, 1993). From a feminist standpoint, of course, the rationalistic-
bureaucratic model can be seen to rule out essential dimensions of our humanness
(see, e.g., Ferguson, 1984; Mumby & Putnam, 1992). Ironically, a self-conscious
organization might occasionally restructure itself so as to preserve spontaneous
aspects: for example, by creating new types of groups within the larger organization.
What this would mean for meetings is that the status quo could be granted only a
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

moderate amount of presumption in deliberations. In any event, collective and

careful reflection on the goals and practices of non-traditional, democratic organiza-
tion must be a regular part of an organization's decision-making process.
While I was a new assistant professor at the University of Illinois in 1984-86, I
was asked to assist a student-run social-change group called SMART: Students for
Mutual Arms Reduction Talks. This organization, dedicated to mounting political
pressure on the U.S. government to negotiate with the Soviet Union to reduce
sharply their nuclear arsenals, consisted of 12 core members and about 20 other
loosely connected students. From the informal talk that preceded the formal
meeting, it was clear to me that the students perceived themselves as being outside
the range of prevailing political opinions on the campus and as being "different
from the system." In the two-hour meeting I attended, the self-appointed leader of
this small, supposedly "alternative" group explained in the form of a strict
monologue the structure of the organization. Incredibly, he diagrammed on the
blackboard three "levels" of hierarchy, six "departments," and a number of highly
specialized roles (including a "Xeroxer" who would do all of the photocopying for
the group!).
At the time, I was stunned by the extent to which the familiar bureaucratic model
was being adopted wholesale for use in an organization for which it was clearly
inappropriate; I understood at that moment just how easily a presumably "different"
and participative organization can slide into centralization, formalization and
regularization of its activities. After all, the bureaucratic model does present
significant advantages in minimizing arbitrariness and in making possible the
organization of giant, far-flung enterprises. And, bureaucracy is indeed more
"rational" than the charismatic and traditional structures of authority that Weber
charted. Bureaucracy also happens to be the most visible model around in business,
government, education and nearly every other sector or organized activity—even in
an age where we are supposedly transcending bureaucracy (e.g., Drucker, 1988,
1992). As mentioned above, bureaucracy is not inherently undemocratic, but its
rigid implementation and stultifying effects in many settings effectively minimize
the potential for both individual expression (in something beyond Barnard's, 1968,
notion of "partial inclusion") and collective pursuit (in something beyond frag-
mented and narrow concerns of the moment). Moreover, bureaucracy is too often
experienced as isolating and alienating (cf. Denhardt, 1989, and Hummel, 1993, on
this point).
As already suggested, organizations can drift away from their original goals: a
 178

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

quality product, or good service, or safety, or positive social transformation. Even

the conservative organizational theorist Herbert A. Simon (e.g., 1976) cautions that
sheer survival and growth can come to overshadow any other collective goals, such
as being of benefit to society and maintaining a humane work environment. This is
why cases of "organizational suicide" are relatively rare. Some organizations lose
their market niche or competitive edge; some collapse out of ineffectiveness,
inefficiency or attrition; and still others are eliminated by outside controllers of their
fate (e.g., by a legislative body or a regulatory agency or a court). But few vote to
eliminate themselves, even when they are seen to depart significantly from their
original and announced goals. Facing potential demise, some organizations alter
their declared goals so as to maintain themselves. For instance, the March of Dimes
responded to the development of the polio vaccine in 1956-5 7 by widening its focus
to include a whole range of birth defects and congenital disorders; in this case,
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

remarkably, the organization actually witnessed the achievement of its initial goal.

Self-reflection and Self-regeneration

In some cases, to see the organization itself as an end rather than as means to the
accomplishment of lofty objectives is very seductive. Radical critics, such as Petro
Georgiou (1981), go so far as to suggest that organizations do not even have goals;
rather, they muddle through as loose collections of various individual pursuits and
are preoccupied with self-maintenance and power. Such a position militates against
any effort to create and cultivate an organization grounded in a deep value
consensus. In any case, the prospect for goal displacement in an organization that
privileges certain values such as democratic participation and equality is an
ever-present threat. The fact of this tendency is often used to criticize labor unions
today, especially in the U.S., although the complaint tends to be rather indiscrimi-
nate. Some big unions, like some big corporations, some big universities, etc., can
devolve so that they serve only their masters, but this danger is no more inherent in
labor organizations than in other institutions. In any case, collective self-reflection
and engagement in discussion about the value consensus becomes extremely
important for sustaining workplace democracy. In other words, the values of the
organization and their pursuit must be available to both members and outside
observers for critique and debate. In particular, sacred notions of democracy and
participation must themselves be open to criticism.
Such a commitment is evident in the regular practices of the Rocky Mountain
Peace Center of Boulder, on whose board I served for four years. The Peace Center
pursues a wide away of projects, locally and nationally, while periodically
reexamining what peace, non-violence and sustainable development mean for
different people and at different moments. The organization consists of eight paid
staff members and a larger "Spokescouncil" that is comprised of liaisons to various
community organizations (dealing with, e.g., the concerns of Native Americans,
reform of the U.S. penal system, and conversion of nuclear weapons plants to
peaceful uses). Even the formal symbols and principles of the organization come
under periodic reflection and questioning. And, the range of meanings for a term
such as "non-violent social change" becomes part of the group's self-examination.
An ongoing process of reflection and discussion not only makes individual
members aware of real differences within the organization but also helps to make
the value consensus more profound and less simply presumed. As a result, both the
 179

JACR AUGUST 1995

structure and some of the practices of the organization are distinctly different now
from what they were ten years ago: today, for instance, the organization has a radial
design with working groups that involve numerous citizens and that elect
representatives to a core group.

Consistency between Goals and Process

Range. This brings us to the interrelated matters of the thoroughness and the
authenticity of democratic efforts in organizations. Bernstein (1976), Strauss
(1982), and Monge and Miller (1988), in their relatively comprehensive reviews of
certain dimensions of workplace democracy, explain that at least three major
factors must be considered: (1) the range of issues treated in a particular program,
(2) the extent of actual influence by employees, and (3) the highest levels at which
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

influence is exercised. The range of issues within the domain of democratic

decision making is important because in some systems of participation certain
topics (e.g., salary and wages) are excluded from consideration. And, in some
avowedly democratic systems, participants justifiably fear that their speaking out
on certain issues will lead to punishment or attack. Imagine the effect on trust and
confidence in a system when a group is told that it can discuss and make
recommendations about "any matter except. . .". Likewise, many a new member of a
supposedly egalitarian group has been dismayed to find patriarchy, traditional
hierarchy and centralized control. On the other hand, some organizations go so far
in the democratic direction as to allow employees to decide on the type of
ownership structure. And in some circumstances—say, in the drastic economic
transition of Eastern Europe today—such a level of participation may be seen as
essential to productivity as well as to worker commitment (Mygind, 1992).
In my own experience I have encountered student groups and social-movement
organizations that have startled me in their degree of reliance on direct orders,
non-participative meetings, and the centralized control of information—organiza-
tions which have permitted democratic activity only within a narrowly circum-
scribed domain of activity. One large and highly visible peace-movement organiza-
tion dedicated to ending the nuclear-arms race during the 1980s conducted its
meetings as virtual monologues, with the director barking orders, dictating entirely
the flow and specific nature of work, unilaterally assigning all roles and tasks, and
pressuring members (both paid staff and volunteers) to work unreasonably long
hours. This I interpreted as a kind of "organizational violence." But, the director
was impervious to critique and refused to recognize the painful contradiction
between the organization's external pursuits and internal practices. On those few
occasions when the director did offer a defense of his actions, he would simply
argue that the worthy ends of the organization justified a non-democratic internal
process. When he was rebutted with demands that "we collectively should decide
the nature of governance within the organization," the director and founder simply
shrugged, asserted the supremacy of his own expertise and judgment, and declared
the matter of decision-making procedures to be non-negotiable. "Besides," he said,
pointing to the rising membership of the organization and to the latest tally of
contributions but ignoring the very high turnover among volunteers, "we're very
effective this way."
This argument, of course, is frequently advanced in favor of authoritarian
structures in all sectors of society. And, it has great force, considering the successes
 180

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

of many different types of organizations that implicitly or explicitly adhere to a

military model of top-down decision making and communication. What such a
point of view overlooks, besides obvious differences between the battlefield and the
boardroom, is that effectiveness, or the achievement of the organizational goals,
cannot be divorced from efficiency, or the sum of all other effects, both intended and
accidental. Preeminent among those effects, as the theorist and executive Chester
Barnard (1968) explained, is the satisfaction of individual motives. Barnard thus
offers us a novel interpretation of efficiency, one quite different from the usual
U.S.-style calculation of "the biggest bang for the buck" (see Cheney & Brancato,
1992). With the partial exception of total institutions such as prisons, steep declines
in the satisfaction of individual members may not only make for unhappy workers
but also jeopardize the effectiveness of the organization. (This is not to say, of
course, that the relationship between job satisfaction and other factors—notably,
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

productivity—is straightforward or uncomplicated by other matters, such as

reward structure.) As Kurt Lewin (e.g., 1947) illustrated so well in his extensive
research in small-group contexts, participation and investment in the decisions of
the group influence profoundly individual members' commitments to executing
those decisions and to the group as a whole.

Actuality. The extent of actual influence by employees is a second criterion for

assessing the nature and authenticity of participation. That is, questions should be
put to any avowedly democratic or egalitarian organization about the true extent of
influence on the part of employees who own and/or contribute voice to the
organization. "Participation" can indeed mean many different things and in some
cases may actually be a misleading term. ESOPs (or Employee Stock Ownership
Programs) are now common in the U.S. But very few of these programs allow
employees at all levels of the organization to have a shaping influence on policy
and, as a result, often lose the enthusiasm of employees after being in place for just a
few years (Rooney, 1992; Turpin-Forster, 1992). Also, we know that many
organizations use widespread and frequent voting in fact to cover up deeply
ingrained patterns of authoritarian leadership. Likewise, Guillermo Grenier (1988)
found through his initially supportive assessment of quality circles and similar
programs that they are often used to pacify employees and defuse potential
resistance to harsh employment practices (e.g., in the form of unionization). At
times, leaders are externally imposed on presumably self-directed or semi-
autonomous teams, reinforcing the teams' sense that leadership cannot emerge from
within their groups (see, e.g., Manz & Sims, 1984). Some presumably efficient and
democratic systems of workplace reorganization—for example, Total Quality
Management—in fact, lead to greater surveillance of the employee (Sewell &
Wilkinson, 1992). Some leaders of presumably and apparently collégial academic
departments will stage votes only to make the "real" decision behind closed doors,
thereby keeping up only an illusion of democracy. Some anarchical social-
movement organizations confidently proclaim that they are "beyond power," even
though certain members assume dominant positions in discussions and in decision
making (Hickey, 1990). Some members become de facto leaders if not always
effective persuaders.
Thus, with any practices of majority rule or consensus decision making arises a
question of how those practices are used to guide the organization. The assertion of
democracy is by no means proof of it; in fact, in many cases, it represents a way of
 181

JACR AUGUST 1995

silencing or suppressing potential opposition. In other cases, we find organizations

with deeply embedded values that guide them in inspiring, maintaining and
revising a democratic order.
The Religious Society of Friends, or the Quakers, for example, is strongly
committed to reflective and thoroughgoing consensus decision making (see, e.g.,
Sheeran, 1983). Friends' meetings often provide remarkable instances of mutual
sensitivity, respect for group process, and the emergence of something approaching
real consensus. Still, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), a partially
affiliated but non-denominational service and social-change association, tends to
practice consensus on the local office level while maintaining a relatively tradi-
tional reporting structure at the regional and national levels. This tension is an
almost constant concern in the organization. In my consultation with a local and a
regional office of AFSC in 1992-93,1 found that this conflict surfaced in a number of
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

ways, especially during a hiring process. Because of differences in presumptions

about the extent of reliance on consensus, the negotiation of conflicting opinions
was difficult. Members' different definitions of appropriate decision-making prac-
tice were at issue.
In such a case, at the very least, the organization must establish clearly the
domains of decision making within which consensus is paramount (e.g., in basic
policy matters), allowing then for the practices of majority rule, committee control,
or unilateral direction in other types of decisions.
Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1982), for instance, identifies a number of situations in
which highly participative decision making is appropriate and other circumstances
in which it is not. For example, where complex decisions are to be made and the
expertise of particular organizational members is relevant, those members should
be granted strong voices in the discussion. However, even in cases like these, the
matter is not as simple as it first appears because "expertise" is sometimes used as a
way of deliberately mystifying policy-making procedures and excluding the
opinions of the so-called "non-experts," such was frequently the case during
Cold-War debates over U.S. nuclear-deterrence policy (see, e.g., Russett, 1983).

Level. The third criterion is tied to the highest level(s) of the organization in
which democracy is practiced. This has two interrelated senses: the first pertains to
the locus of participative activity, and the second relates to the extent to which
regular employees are empowered to deal with higher-level issues. Here again,
things are not always as they may appear: presumably democratic change can yield
some surprisingly and disturbingly undemocratic results. Many organizations that
have reorganized themselves around semi-autonomous work teams and that allow
for a great deal of participation at the production levels of the hierarchy in fact
maintain traditional relationships at the upper-management levels (see, e.g., Barker,
1993). Such a division can undermine the confidence and trust of lower-level
employees in the participative program. This message is implicit: "We're going to
implement a new program; be committed to it; it'll be good for you as well as for the
company; but, by the way, don't expect all of us to participate." Moreover, when
workplace democracy is imposed but not practiced by top managers or administra-
tors, the entire system can be called into question. There is thus a dual problem in
the establishment of many quality-circle and other participation programs: the
avowedly democratic programs are mandated and implemented from "the top" even
as they exclude policy makers from the regular practices (see, e.g., Grenier, 1988). In
 182

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

such instances the privilege to make policy and structural decisions also is retained
at the top.
As Daniele Linhart (1992) observes with respect to the evolution of French firms,
even in cases of announced "organizational revolutions," where participative
management is employed throughout corporations, the persistence of reactionary
and somewhat dehumanizing Tayloristic principles at the level of the work can
undermine the larger democratic goals. Thus, any announced claim of "industrial
or workplace democracy" needs to be examined very carefully in terms of the
day-to-day practices and the whole set of experiences that constitute life in the
organization.
However, there are other cases—for example, those described by Kathy Iannello
(1992) in her accounts of feminist groups—where the entire organization is
committed to and practices a form of egalitarianism. In Iannello's view, the source
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

and strength of the organization's commitment to democratic participation and

related practices are crucial in determining how "upward-reaching" non-traditional
efforts are. In her case studies of non-profit women's groups, she found that
organizations which are grounded in democratic and egalitarian principles and
which consistently and rather uncompromisingly evaluate their performance
against those standards can be successful in preserving their highly democratic
arrangements, particularly if their pursuit of consensus is tempered by realism.
Iannello thus speaks of "modified consensus" in egalitarian-type organizations,
where the group agrees on the domains where consensus decision making is in fact
the most vital and arenas where other forms of decision (e.g., simple voting or
committee empowerment) are generally considered acceptable. In terms of commu-
nication practice, modified consensus means that the group must reach or
approximate a consensus about its central and constitutive concerns (i.e., those
features that are seen to "make the organization what it is") versus those that are
peripheral, secondary, or non-essential.
In my own experience as a board member of the Rocky Mountain Peace Center, I
found a remarkable, sustained commitment to shared leadership. Consensus
decision making was celebrated and pursued; the role of group facilitator was
rotated; techniques such as "go-arounds" were used to insure full participation; and
expertise and equality were kept remarkably in balance. An attitude of mutual
respect existed side-by-side with a recognition of the special abilities and contribu-
tions of each member. Even "organizational" divorce" emerged, where dissenting
groups were allowed to leave the organization (see Westenholz's, 1991, "postmod-
ernist" conception of organizational democracy, 1993; see also Billig, Condor,
Edwards, Gane, Middleton, & Radley, 1987 on the importance of managing
effectively the tension between expertise and equality).

Democracy as Process
These three criteria—the range of issues, the extent of influence, and the highest
levels involved in participation—remind us that democracy, participation and
equality are continually contested terms. That is, one person's vision of a democratic
order in the workplace may be another person's idea of an oppressive or limited
arrangement. (In this light, consider Habermas's, 1981, "ideal speech situation" in
terms not only of its approachability in practice but also in its capacity for
self-adjustment.) For example, more radical observers of presumably democratic
 183

JACR AUGUST 1995

organizations can often point to the persistence of hierarchy and domination in

subtle and concealed forms: in the forcefulness of speech, in the monopolization of
talk time, and in "the tactical uses of passion" (e.g., emotional threats and outbursts;
see Bailey, 1983). On the other hand, other observers of the same organizations may
see the heavy reliance on consensus and democratic process as a form of constraint
on their own autonomy and desire to control their work time. As one of my
colleagues sometimes reminds me, democracy can be both exhausting and impos-
ing. Thus, the interpretation of "true democracy" or "authentic participation" or the
"ethical equality" of organizational members is persistently problematic.
For this reason, Michel Foucault (e.g., 1984) was loathe to align himself with any
particular political party or any particular organized vision of a just society. He
argued vigorously that any presumably "just" system would necessarily suppress or
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

exclude the interests of some persons and some groups. (Of course, some critics
reject this posture as a cop-out and a de facto endorsement of the status quo.) Those
in the minorities would then be faced with the options of silence, covert opposition
from "the margins," revolution or flight (cf. Hirschman's, 1976, economic-political
options of "exit," "voice," or "loyalty"). This viewpoints us toward an understanding
of democracy as a self-critical, self-regenerating and self-correcting process, as
opposed to a conception that emphasizes a specific type of structural arrangement.
For example, Yohanan Stryjan (1989) uses Anthony Giddens' (1984) Theory of
Structuration to show how delicate are the cyclical processes of interaction in the
"self-managed" organization. Still, he argues that such organizations are potentially
equipped to modify their own ways of doing things and thereby adapt to their
changing environments.

Communicative Dimensions of Organizational Democracy

Democracy and Participation as Special Forms of Communication. Clearly,
participation and democracy must be defined largely in terms of communication in
that the pattern of communication in an organization, however formally or
informally structured, tells the observer a great deal about the true extent of
democracy in the workplace. For example, as researchers we would look for
communicative evidence of these aspects of W. Charles Redding's (1972) Ideal
Managerial Climate: participative decision making, openness, trust and supportive-
ness. (The fifth element of Redding's model is an emphasis on high-performance
goals, a factor which should not be overlooked in attempts to sustain member
involvement in and commitment to a organization, democratic or other.) Here we
must consider both how intentionally structured patterns of communication
contribute to a climate of real participation and how a pre-existing climate can
foster particular kinds of communication.
At the same time, we should take note of the absence of communication,
recognizing that many "texts"—for example, voices of dissent—may not be readily
accessible in public meetings or even during interviews or normal observation (see
Scott, 1990). As is dramatically the case for many subordinated groups throughout
history (from slaves to secretaries), the disempowered often develop a parallel but
largely invisible system of symbols and communication practices. Such "alternative
discourses" can be functional, expressive, ironic, and sometimes subversive or
rebellious; they are always instructive (see, e.g., Murphy, 1993).
 184
DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

Power, Persuasion and Socialization. And, even more difficult is the assess-
ment of what Steven Lukes (1974) calls the "third dimension" of power: the extent
to which the true interests of minorities have been so suppressed through
socialization that their interests do not even come to the minds of those for whom
structural or policy changes would be beneficial. John Gaventa's (1980) critical-
historical study of power and powerless in an Appalachian area of eastern
Tennessee is poignant, showing that various socio-political factors can lead people
to non-participation and even to non-awareness. This critical perspective on power
implies that the observer-researcher must endeavor to prove "the counterfactual" in
the effort to support democracy: he or she must try to show that "things would be
different in this system if only the suppressed or oppressed members had come to
realize and express what was in their own best interests." In other words, can we
prove or strongly support the idea that if certain groups were in a different situation
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

they would in fact be able to act upon their interests in a way that they cannot or
will not do with the status quo in place? Such a challenge entails an enormous
burden of proof; nevertheless, it reminds us to be vigilant and circumspect in
labeling any organization or social system "democratic." This is precisely why
assertions that "We have a consensus here!?!" should be advanced and received
with great care. Also, Lukes' critical perspective points the researcher toward the
careful examination of communication patterns. Lukes' "third dimension" of power
can be explained in more concrete terms with attention to the rhetorical aspects
organizational life: for example, with respect to how dominant, organizationally-
approved value premises (e.g., "Don't rock the boat") are inculcated in the minds of
organizational members through ongoing and perhaps unnoticed socialization
processes (see Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). However, the internalization of certain
values—say, when members take seriously the idea of "responsibility" in their own
positions—can actually limit the extent of organizational control in that the
employees become more loyal to the values than to the organization (see Bullis',
1991, case study of the U.S. Forest Service).

Structuring Participation. Assessing communication patterns within demo-

cratic or participative organizations, regardless of where they lie on a continuum of
governance types, means considering an array of factors. In her extensive research
on quality circles, for example, Cynthia Stohl (in press) has found that the creation
of level-spanning groups within the organization can open up communication
channels more generally in the organization while enhancing employees' awareness
of the "big picture" of the organization and its various activities. Thus, restructuring
may not only afford new opportunities for participation; sometimes, it can also
change in a positive way the employees' consciousness or perception of what an
organization is. Likewise, more radical structural innovations, such as role-
switching, can bring about fuller involvement of employees in the organization and
increase the appreciation of others' points of view (see Sennett, 1980). On the other
hand, as a some observers have noted (e.g., Cheney & Stohl, in progress; Stohl, 1994;
and Westenholz, 1993), organizational transformations in presumably democratic
directions can lead to troubling and paradoxical communication patterns, such as
elaborate attempts to mandate participation, quasi-coercive efforts to bring waver-
ing or minority groups into the majority or the "consensus" of opinion, and
self-conscious anticipation of "leaders who will come to make us democratic."
Obviously, many "alternative" organizations are born out of a deep commitment
 185

JACR AUGUST 1995

to doing things differently: to avoiding mundane bureaucratic practice and familiar

authoritarian rule and replacing them with flexibility, deep cooperation, and full
participation—even in some cases when the organization is a money-making
enterprise (see Rothschild & Whitt, 1986). The Burley Design Cooperative of
Eugene, Oregon is one example. Even with a workforce of about 100 persons, this
producer of now-familiar red-and-yellow and red-and-blue bicycle carts (to pull
small children or to carry groceries] uses a fluid system of mostly lateral job
transfers such that a manager may be seen working next year on a sewing machine.
The same organization pays all member-owners the same good salary and maintains
a dynamic team and committee structure for decision making.

Efficiency Reexamined. But, one of the central issues in for-profit firms is

competitiveness. Thus, a firm that is strongly committed to cooperation inside finds
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

itself behaving rather aggressively and non-cooperatively toward "outsiders." And,

this challenge is heightened in an increasingly globalized economy, where market
pressures are continuously shifting and intensifying. Today, "globalization" is the
call by many large companies to open up markets so they can extend their domains.
For smaller firms, such pushes toward "market liberalization" are understandably
unsettling and in some cases frightening. Scholars of communication and organiza-
tions must therefore deal with these pressing economic concerns when they are
investigating both traditional and non-traditional organizations (see the review of
economic aspects of cooperative management in Bonin & Putterman, 1987; see also
the treatment of economic factors' relevance to communication in Harrison, 1994).
From the standpoint of communication, perhaps the most interesting facets of
economic competition are (1) the relationships between economic and non-
economic aspects of organizational functioning and (2) the ways in which people
talk about economic concerns such as competition. Allow me to take up the first
matter here, saving the second for a bit later in this discussion.
From her extensive investigations of worked-owned and worker-managed compa-
nies in various parts of Europe, comparative economist Laura Tyson (e.g., 1979)
suggests that the development and progress of a cooperative can be summarized in
terms of one basic disadvantage and one basic advantage with respect to traditional
corporations: A cooperative suffers some inefficiency because of heavy reliance on
democratic process, but a cooperative enjoys the collective energy and commitment
that derive from substantial value consensus and the activity of participation itself.
This complicated circle of relationships can help to explain why the research
results on the linkage of participation to productivity have been mixed (see, e.g.,
Locke & Schweiger, 1979). Thus, Tyson's and parallel research by others under-
scores the importance of maintaining core values (such as equality) and high levels
of involvement in the participative processes of the organization. The maintenance
of core values in an alternative organization (such as a worker-owned coop) thus
emerges as a crucial question for both practitioners and scholars, especially in light
of the other issues addressed in this discussion: autonomy, size, longevity, goal
displacement, bureaucratization, authenticity and communication patterns.
Arnold Tannenbaum (1983) echoes this point from a somewhat different
analytical angle. Rather than treating such things as organizational identification
and commitment to core values as preceding or necessary factors, Tannenbaum
considers them as valuable outcome variables. In other words, he argues that
worker-owned-and-managed organizations are beneficial in part because they tend
 186
DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

to yield greater job satisfaction, identification with the organization, and commit-
ment to core values (such as the general philosophy of "cooperativism"). Putting
together Tyson's (e.g., 1979) and Tannenbaum's (1983) arguments we can describe
a circular pattern of reinforcement of basic values in the case of a successful
cooperative system: Active participation in and deep commitment to a coop can
allow the organization to overcome a tendency toward economic inefficiency; this
vitality in turn encourages the organization to maintain its democratic order; and
that in turn strengthens individual members' commitments to core values. The fact
that this cycle of influence can easily be broken or reversed—say, in times of
cutbacks in personnel or in financial resources—means that a great deal of
vigilance is needed.
In fact, it is common in many different types of organizations (large public
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

universities, for example) to view democracy and other socio-political goals as mere
luxuries to be enjoyed or indulged only in "fat" times. The scholarly literature and
my personal experience point me to a drastically different conclusion, however: that
the social life of the organization deserves perhaps extra attention during tough
economic times—when individual financial rewards may be few, when organiza-
tional cohesion may be threatened, and when the "social side" of the organization
may in fact be the key to continuance and future success. In my view, then,
organizational democracy is both an ethical and a pragmatic imperative.

Adaptation: Organization to Environment, Environment to Organization

A final issue to mention here is the nature and strength of the relationship
between democratic values within an organization and those held in the larger,
"host" society. To be sure, U.S. experience attests to the fact that a societal
commitment to democracy does not necessarily translate into democratic ideals in
the workplace, just as it does not necessarily translate into democratic political
practices in the broader public sphere. The consistent support of the U.S. Supreme
Court for the "at-will" employment doctrine assures that the rights of employers are
elevated far above those of their employees (see, e.g., Ewing, 1983). Practically
speaking, this doctrine preserves the rights of employers to fire employees for a host
of reasons and to dictate virtually the conditions of employment. And, there are
many other ways in which employee rights are typically limited, including
especially restrictions on the expression of dissenting views (see Gorden, Infante,
Wilson, & Clarke, 1984; Graham, 1986). The expression of voice, in the form of
criticism that seeks to improve the organization, is central to a principled vision of
true organizational democracy and is seen by employees in many different
organizations in just that way (see Gorden, 1988). So too is protection for
"whistle-blowers" and others who speak out in challenge of organizational
practices.
Can influence flow in the other direction? That is, do democratic organizations
"spread the word" to the larger society by fostering a wide-ranging participative
consciousness? On this matter, the evidence, at least in the U.S., is limited and
disappointing. Successful cases of workplace democracy, such as the long-standing
instance of employee ownership and significant control at Weirton Steel of West
Virginia, still cause many observers in the U.S. to skeptically ask: "Why are the
monkeys running the zoo?" (Boselovic, 1994). And, in the case of United Airlines'
partial employee buy-out in the summer of 1994, the managerial expertise of even
 187

JACR AUGUST 1995

the elite pilots has been widely questioned by those outside the firm. In his
longitudinal studies of worker-owned plywood coops in the Pacific Northwest,
Greenberg (1986) has found little to suggest that the democratic structure of the
organizations has a "ripple effect" or even that workers become intensely commit-
ted to the principles of participation on which their organizations are based.
Huspek and Kendall (1991) offer further support for this conclusion in the study of
similar firms. They find that the political consciousness of the workers is often
circumscribed by their own language and that they experience a definition of
political life that is quite different and separate from that of the larger society.
Clearly, though, there is great need for further research on the relationship between
participation inside and outside the workplace, especially in light of how electronic
and computer-mediated communications are transforming both domains and their
boundaries.
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

A CASE STUDY WITH BOTH PECULIARITIES AND GENERALIZABILITY

With the array of questions raised in this essay in mind, I am investigating
perhaps the largest and certainly one of the now-oldest systems of worker
cooperatives in the world: Mondragón in the Basque region of Spain. There, I
participated in a ten-day intensive tour in March of 1992. In 1994 I spent five
months interviewing, observing, participating in meetings, conducting archival
work and developing a questionnaire instrument.
Together with a few other instances of extensive workplace democracy today—
notably, Israeli Kibbutzim and various agricultural cooperatives throughout the
world—Mondragón is one of the most famous examples of an intentionally and
largely democratic firm. Yet, as William Foote Whyte (see, e.g., Whyte & Whyte,
1991) explained to me, the day-to-day internal dynamics of the cooperative system
have been little researched. Especially, there has been almost no attention to the
patterns and character of communication throughout the organization, given the
emphases of extant studies on financial performance, leadership and structure.

Background on Mondragón
The Mondragón system in fact grew out of fifteen years of small-group discussion
and analysis (1941-1956), with the guidance of a Basque priest, José María
Arizmendiarrieta, and the active involvement of five young engineers. "Arizmendi"
envisioned the coops as a "third way" between the options of unbridled capitalism
and centralized socialism that preserved individual economic incentive while
emphasizing collective commitment and goals. A small technical school, that
treated not only engineering and science but also principles of cooperativism, was
created in 1943. The first coop, ULGOR, now part of FAGOR and the largest
refrigerator manufacturer in Spain, was opened in 1956. Today the system includes
more than 150 cooperative organizations and employs over 23,000 people. To-
gether, in the form of the Mondragón Cooperative Corporation, the coops make up
the 15th largest private firm in Spain.
Each socio-trabajador (or worker-owner-associate-member) is an economic owner
of his/her coop through a complex system of investment and return. A substantial
portion of profits, often up to 70 percent, go to owner-members in the form of
individual capital accounts and direct benefits; approximately 20% of the profits is
 188
DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

socialized as reinvestment in the coops; and 10% is contributed to community

projects (especially to Basque-language schools but also to drug-education and
AIDS-related programs).
Besides industrial coops (which comprise the core and the historic strength of the
system), there are coops in agriculture, education, research and development, and
consumer services. The central bank, with both organizational and individual
members, is crucial to the vitality and autonomy of the system; today the bank is
expanding its capital base beyond the cooperatives by investing in some traditional
capitalist ventures. The bank is the most important "superstructural" coop in which
both individuals and entire cooperatives are members; other coops of this type are
schools (representing all educational levels through the baccalaureate degree), an
elaborate social-security and health-care system, and a research-and-development
laboratory (which takes on projects from both within and beyond the coops).
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

Important, too, is the consulting organization, formerly the entrepreneurial division

of the bank, which investigates and assesses brand new cooperative ventures as
well as conversions of traditional capitalist firms in other parts of Spain. There is no
question that this group of "second-order" coops has been instrumental to the
success of the system as a whole, granting the coops capital, stability, security, and
some measures of autonomy and independence from the fluctuations of the larger
market.
The coops range in size from Eroski (meaning essentially "group buying" in the
Basque language, Euskera), a large supermarket chain, with more than 7,500
worker-members, to an association of translators with eight members. Among the
other diverse coops are machine tool manufacturers, an electronics firm, and a
catering service.
The cooperative system is governed at the highest level by a Cooperative
Congress, which now meets once a year, with proportional representation from
each coop. Each individual coop has its own general assembly which must approve
general policy decisions and changes in policies (one person, one vote), an elected
governing or guiding council (typically the most powerful group in determining the
strategic decisions of the coop), an elected social council (that deals with issues of
personnel and human resources), an elected watchdog council (that safeguards
accounting procedures), and an operating management with a top manager
(appointed by the governing council). In larger coops, there is also a management
council, with membership determined in part through election and in part through
appointment. Thus, each coop practices a complex system of both direct and
representative democracy, in addition to pursuing traditional managerial functions.
In practice, as I have learned, the exact functioning of these various organs varies
somewhat across coops: for example, in some coops I visited, the social council
lacked a clear charge, definition and direction. In some coops, the governing
council was dominated by top-level managers (or directors); in others, rank-and-file
workers were largely in control. (See Whyte & Whyte, 1991, for a detailed historical
and social-structural analysis of the Mondragón coops through the 1980s.)
Before moving to a brief discussion of specific challenges facing the Mondragón
system now, particularly in relation to the themes of this essay, I must mention one
more important set of characteristics: the multiple levels of "solidarity" within the
coops. The term itself is important in Basque culture for denoting camaraderie and
interdependence, seen as complementary to self-sufficiency, another important
cultural value. Within the coops, solidarity is institutionalized in several ways.
 189

JACR AUGUST 1995

First, is wage solidarity: the index of highest to lowest salaries has always been kept
narrow (more on this a bit later). Second, there is tremendous job security, with
extensive use of lateral transfers between coops and very few layoffs or early
retirements. Third, intercooperative solidarity means that both benefits (or profits)
and losses are socialized within a group of coops that comprise one industrial sector
(say, automotive parts). A bad year by one of the coops in the group is compensated
for directly by contributions from others that are doing better. Finally, solidarity
with the environment means both the protection of jobs in a locale and assistance to
the wider community and to the world.

Challenges Facing Mondragón

Cultural Transformation. Today, there are important external pressures and
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

internal changes that challenge the traditions of the Mondragón system; some of
these are related to the larger cultural changes evident within Basque and Spanish
societies, and others are not. For example, as women have made their presence
known in the Spanish and Basque workforces during the past two decades, so they
have come to comprise about 35% of all employee-members in the coops. However,
the fact that many men at Mondragón still point to the existence of a special
women's coop as a sign of progress and are somewhat defensive about the
comparatively small numbers of women in top-level managerial positions suggests
a need for further efforts in this area. Also, the noticeable decline in religiosity in
predominantly Catholic Spain in the period since Francisco Franco's death in 1975
characterizes life in the Basque Country. But, while the founding principles of the
coops do parallel liberal 20th-century Catholic social teaching (as well as being
derived to some extent from the cooperatives of Robert Owen and some of his
disciples in mid-19th-century Britain, the "Rochdale Pioneers"), the principles are
now comfortably but forcefully seen in a secular context. However, the much-
discussed increase in the pace of life—felt keenly by everyone on the street—seems
tightly connected with pressures to be more productive and competitive and with
temptations to be more materialistic and individualistic. In fact, so prevalent were
such comments to me in both formal interviews and informal conversations that it
became clear that this entire set of issues was an important part of the popular
consciousness and the sense of "what's happening to us."

Competition and Expansion. The challenges mentioned above and those

mentioned below form the backdrop for my study there. Increased competition due
to (European Community) EC unification in 1992 leads some coop members I have
interviewed to say, "We must grow or die." Noteworthy, too, are frequent
("reifying") references to "The Market" as if it were a wholly external, determinant
force, well beyond human hands. Clearly, there is a powerfully felt need to expand
the cooperatives and to broaden their capital base, although a number of my
interviewees see the pressure as an exaggerated excuse for greater centralization of
control. Worker-members talk regularly and openly about "the realities of competi-
tion"; that "we are just not competitive enough"; and that "like it or not—we need to
be more like the Japanese, the Germans and the Americans." This pressure has
recently led, for example, to the expansion of the supermarket chain beyond the
Basque Country, with the assistance of a group of public corporations (especially
banks). In this case, however, no effort is being made to configure the new
 190
DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

supermarkets as cooperatives; thus, their employees are neither owners nor voting
members. In a sense, the organization is departing from its "evangelical" stance, a
position embodied in one of its ten cooperative principles. Thus, the matter of how
the cooperatives communicate their identities and values to both "insiders" and
"outsiders" becomes extremely important. Interesting in this regard is that the
cooperatives are doing more to develop their public-relations and internal commu-
nications functions, areas that were in the past largely ignored because in many
ways they were not needed.

Wage Solidarity. Another debate is even more intense in its capacity to

produce division within the coops: it centers on the meaning and practice of
another one of Mondragón's ten basic principles, wage solidarity. This refers to the
commitment of the coops to maintaining a comparatively narrow range between the
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

highest and lowest paid worker-members. When the first coop was founded in 1956,
the ratio between "top" and "bottom" was set constitutionally at 3:1, meaning that
the highest paid employees could make no more than three times that of the lowest
paid ones. (This is in marked contrast to the ratio in most large U.S. corporations,
where it ranges between 200:1 and 300:1. Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream of Vermont is
considered radical in the American context because its ratio has been set at 7:1.)
Gradually, Mondragón's pay-solidarity ratio was widened to 4.5:1 and then to 6:1
(although when taxes are taken into account, the last index becomes more like 4:1 in
actuality). In 1991 the Cooperative Congress permitted individual coops as well as
the corporate superstructure to peg salaries to a level of up to 70% of the market rate.
Even though the real salaries of the top managers implicated by this new policy
actually make today only about 50% of their outside market counterparts, the fact of
the change and the new mystery surrounding salaries of 25 or so persons in the
"cúpula" (as some worker-members call top corporate management), is very
divisive. The symbolic aspects of the policy change were disheartening for many
persons and seemed to overshadow the question of real salaries. The reality of the
change in salary structure, as well as the speculation about it, has divided the
members of the coops between those who seek change and point to the realities of
the larger economic environment (e.g., "We have to be realistic") and those who
seek to preserve tradition and point to the distinctive commitments and practices of
the coops (e.g., "Our confidence in each other has been broken"). The ways in
which coop members interpret and discuss this transformation reveal much about
their conceptions of what is essential to or constitutive of the coops and indicate also
what wage solidarity will mean in the future.

Centralization and Reorganization. Still another area of change at Mondragón

is the current restructuring toward greater centralization and the formation of new
industrial sectors. Until 1984, there was no Cooperative Congress; before that year,
the bank did most of the coordinating activity. Until 1991, there was no corporate
head; there was only a cooperative "group." But, recent changes in the complex
Basque and Spanish laws which govern cooperatives allowed the Mondragón
system to centralize itself more, speak to the market with one voice, and consolidate
its strategic functions. Part ofthat change, internally, was a move away from the 15
traditional regional sectors—usually organized in valleys of the mountainous
Basque Country in which generations had lived and with which people still
strongly identify—toward industrial sectors. At the same time, more and more
 191

JACR AUGUST 1995

guiding functions are being assumed by the central offices of the Mondragon
Corporación Cooperativa, formerly Grupo Cooperativa Mondragon (and some
observers consider this name change in itself to be important in that it suggests to
some a further departure from the heritage of the coops). This transformation is seen
as necessary for efficiency by some but as a threat to "local control" within each
coop by others. At issue is the degree to which the advantages of creating
centralized functions—for example, ease of coordination—truly outweigh the
losses in terms of the sense of "groupness" that characterizes many of the individual
coops. Some of the coops are thus fearful of losing both autonomy and identity.
And, a social movement—formal unions are not allowed in principle—has arisen
within the 9,000 member FAGOR regional group to oppose strongly the "breaking of
the traditional bonds of people to people and people to the land." It is important to
recognize that intercooperative solidarity was originally defined within regional
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

sectors; now it is being "transferred" to industrial sectors, where a specific sector

may have member coops in cities both inside and outside the Basque Country.
Thus, it is not surprising that some coops, notably a group called ULMA, in a valley
next to that of Mondragon, have separated themselves from the corporation chiefly
in order to preserve their "regional integrity." And in that same Valley of Oñati
unemployment in early 1994 was a mere 2% in contrast with 16% for the Basque
Country or 23% for Spain as a whole. My interviews there revealed a powerful sense
of identity rooted in local distinctiveness and self-determination.

Programs to Increase Productivity and Participation. A final development

within the coops is pertinent to this discussion. At the corporate as well as at the
cooperative level, new programs for increased productivity and participation are
being implemented, mostly under the general heading of "Total Participative
Management." Among these programs are Self-directed Work Teams, Constant or
Continual Improvement (focused on quality) and Auto-responsibility (referring to
each work position). While it is too early to evaluate these efforts, the majority of
which were initiated in 1993 or 1994, it is clear that their implementation will have
a shaping effect on the future of the coops, not only with respect to their standing in
the European and world markets but also in terms of their social integrity and
vitality. For example, in one successful coop which manufactures plastic car
components, the program of Constant Improvement (in part at my urging) is
currently being broadened to include hygienic and social aspects of the workplace.
Thus, in a variety of areas employee-members are encouraged to make improve-
ments directly in their places of work as well as to make suggestions to their teams
and managers. All of the programs mentioned here involve substantial restructuring
in terms of patterns of relations and lines of authority.
With all of these controversial issues, commitments to core values at Mondragon—
notably, democracy, equality and solidarity—are implicated. Some observers, for
example, have argued that a decreased commitment to equality can threaten
commitment to participation. This is why the analysis of how members at a variety
of levels of the coops talk about and practice core values is so important. Greenwood
and González (1989), in their organizational-cultural study of part of one coop in
the FAGOR group in the mid-1980s, found both passion for the humanistic goals of
the organization and concerns about the deleterious effects of growth, bureaucrati-
zation and centralization.
 192
DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

MAKING SENSE OF MONDRAGÓN

In the Mondragón case we find a convergence of nearly all of the issues discussed
in this essay. We must ask, for example, in reformulating Weber's (1978) enduring
question in a market-conscious way: How can a large, partially bureaucratic and
economically successful worker-cooperative system sustain its humanistic value
commitments over time? (cf., Satow, 1975). (In one sense, this question represents
the obverse of the one being posed by economists currently investigating Mon-
dragón: that is, "Can a cooperative system survive in the current market economy?";
Martin, 1994.) To address this big question, I am operating with more specific ones:
for example, how are the basic values of the cooperatives being "negotiated" and
"renegotiated" today? I am considering the multiple meanings for the same value
(e.g., "solidarity"), tensions between those different meanings, tensions between
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

different values (e.g., between "efficiency" and "participation"), and commitments

to values (as demonstrated in a variety of ways). I am also examining the role of
value-centered discourse in the life of the coops.

Focus on Communication
These and related questions point us to the analysis of messages (such as
individual and corporate accounts of decisions), levels and objects of identification
by employee-members (such as commitments to transcendent goals), and formal
and informal practices in the organization (such as training programs and employee
communications). The range of meanings for a particular value term, say, "partici-
pation," becomes very important in that some terms are likely to allow more
"symbolic maneuvering room" than others with a more restrictive range of
meanings (cf. Cheney, 1991; Eisenberg, 1984; Stohl, 1993). Of course, we also must
attend to the structural aspects of such an organization: that is, the ways in which
day-to-day communication is "architecturally" shaped through the prescription of
relationships, messages and decision-making procedures (seeMcPhee, 1985).
Values such as democracy, solidarity and equality are realized to a great extent
through talk. How, for example, can a commitment to participation be effectively
demonstrated except through access to, by the structure of, and with respect to the
content of discussions? And the reinforcement or erosion of such values similarly
takes place in and through communication practice: that is, democracy itself must
be discussed, assessed and modified in an ongoing manner if it is to be effectively
maintained. However, the expressed meanings for communication-related values
such as participation and equality can be rigid or flexible, changing or relatively
constant, broadly encompassing or narrowly circumscribed. In other words, one
person's vision of democracy, in the workplace or elsewhere, is by no means the
next person's; universality cannot be simply presumed; consensus cannot be
merely assumed. And, the pursuit of such values can and often does engender
conflict, contradiction and paradox. If, for example, a democratic work system
opens itself to new members and new ideas that involve strong challenges to the
existing democratic order, what then? ("Should we admit people who may try to
change radically our organization?")
We should therefore study both the activities of participation themselves as well
the ways in which coop members interpret and reflect upon participation and
related values. In the middle phase of my project, I am conducting an examination
of the "texts" of over 100 interviews (conducted entirely in Spanish and audio-
 193

JACR AUGUST 1995

taped): one quarter are from a wide sampling of coops and levels; the rest come from
three distinct and diverse coops of 140-250 worker-members. All interviewees were
selected by me; in the case of the three select coops (one, a recent a struggling
conversion of a traditional capitalist firm; another, a recent "regionalist" departure
from the corporation; and another, a highly profitable coop that is also fairly central
to the corporate structure), I used stratified random sampling to interview between
10 and 20% of the worker-members in each case. These interviews were conducted
between late February and late June, 1994. Also, I attended several general assembly
meetings and related preparatory "chats" (for groups of 20-40 worker-members) in
May of 1994 and participated in several training workshops (focused on principles
of cooperativism and human relations) in May of 1994. In addition, I was party to
hundreds of informal conversations, both inside and outside the coops, often
having the opportunity to observe work-in-process. And, I have conducted a
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

preliminary, but broad content analysis of the corporate house organ, Trabajo y
Unión (or "Work and Union"), distributed monthly to all worker-members.

Themes of the Research

I do not have the space here to report in depth my findings or to offer extended
quotations from the discourse of formal or informal communications. (These will be
presented in Cheney, in progress.) However, I can highlight seven themes that have
clearly emerged in my analysis and which point directly to the issues advanced in
the earlier parts of this essay.

1. Support Systems. As mentioned above, the creation of an extensive support

system is essential to the success, coherence and autonomy of the cooperatives.
Economists have documented the central financial role of the bank, the Caja Laboral
(or Labor Bank), in allowing the coops to flourish—by, for example, offering
preferential interest rates for the creation and development of individual coops (see,
e.g., Thomas & Logan, 1982). But, I wish to emphasize, beyond that point, that many
interviewees pointed with pride to the superstructure of the health-care and
social-security systems. Some said, for example: "That's what makes us strong and
special." The superstructure is therefore important to social cohesion as well as for
financial autonomy. And, there are many other coops in Spain (as elsewhere) that
do not enjoy such security. I should note, however, that the idea of support systems
can be broadened to include participation in strategic alliances and network
organizations so as to strengthen the position of Mondragón and similar cooperative
enterprises (see, e.g., Powell, 1990).

2. Growth. The issue of growth continues to pose both opportunities and

threats. While the coops have succeeded economically in part because of their
expansion, the very same expansion is seen by many as a threat to the democratic
vitality of the group and to the autonomy of individual coops. With growth come
some measures of depersonalization, hierarchy, bureaucratization, and centraliza-
tion, as already observed. Thus, many worker-members speak openly of growth as a
"two-sided coin." The reality of the transformations mentioned here points to the
crucial importance of reviving democracy at the small-group level (more on this
below).
 194
DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

3. Identity. Related to the second point above is the struggle over the identity of
the coops: sustaining distinctiveness while striving toward broader appeal. Al-
though the Mondragón coops are to some extent grounded in Basque culture, recent
observers of them have insisted that the "cultural factor17' should not be allowed to
overshadow the internal structures and dynamics of the cooperatives in explaining
their successes to date (see, e.g., Morrison, 1991). Still, until very recently, the coops
themselves have been styled as Basque coops. (This is the case even though many
worker-members, as immigrants from other parts of Spain to the Basque Country in
the economically booming 1960s and early 1970s, do not really think of themselves
as Basques and do not speak the incredibly challenging and wholly unique
language, Euskera.) In the 1990s, the coops are spreading well beyond the Basque
Country, to the neighboring provinces of Navarra and Cantabria, for example. And
the Corporation now maintains satellite offices in France, Germany and the U.S.
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

The question "Who are we?" thus surfaces frequently. And the questioning is
focused on and most manifest in the current search for a new name for the entire
system, now called the Mondragón Cooperative Corporation. Many seek a title and
an identity that is sufficiently inclusive to symbolize the coops' expanse, yet
comparatively local to stress distinctiveness.

4. Revitalization. Many worker-members see some of the practices of the coops

as ritualistic, calcified and stale and point to the need to recreate the spontaneous
and dynamic dimension of cooperative worklife. For instance, interviewees spoke
freely of their passion for cooperativism, but at the same time criticized general
assemblies and other formally specified meetings as being "as predictable as
Catholic masses." Thus, as I witnessed, unplanned moments in general-assembly
meetings (such as an objection to a report voiced from the floor) almost necessarily
appear to be disruptive. So, the more spontaneous elements of discussion—highly
valued by the Basques in their strongly oral and debate-loving culture—are to be
found more commonly in small, informal meetings that are preparatory to general
assemblies. Many coop members thus call for an internal revitalization of gover-
nance and daily practices, an issue which is being considered at this moment on a
variety of levels. There seems to be a strong sense among worker-members that
democracy itself is a process rather than a specific structural arrangement upon
which a group or organization comes to rest or rely.

5. Managing Competitiveness. Competitiveness has internal as well as external

relevance. Many worker-members are self-conscious about the contradictory
aspects of striving to be cooperative internally but competitive externally, with
respect to the larger market. Some, in fact, see the 1991 change in the salary index to
be bringing about a degree of competitiveness within the coops that did not exist
previously. "People are talking much more about the differences between their
salaries and especially about the salaries of top managers than they did before," a
number of worker-members told me. Further, the prospect looms for actual
competition between and within the coops as the drive toward higher quality,
greater production, and customer-driven work processes continues.

6. Implementing Participation. There is the complex matter of how to imple-

ment new systems of participation and productivity within individual coops and
throughout the system as a whole. Many people at Mondragón in fact recognize the
 195

JACR AUGUST 1995

paradox inherent in imposing systems such as self-directed work teams completely

from the top. The corporate communications director related to me a story of the
president of the corporation becoming very excited at a meeting and declaring,
"From this day, we shall have Total Participative Management throughout the
cooperatives!" (Fortunately, the President, himself an elected official, later realized
the contradiction that he had unwittingly and benevolently embraced.) Clearly,
these new programs have the potential to revitalize democratic process within the
coops, though by enhancing decision-making power at the level of work positions
and in small-group teams rather than at the broader strategic level of the system as a
whole. However, some worker-owners expressed to me concerns about overwork in
the future. What is essential to the success and to the humanistic integrity of these
plans is that worker-members at all levels be able to join in their formulation and
implementation. Managers can foster a participative environment, but they cannot
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

and should not force it.

Noteworthy in this regard is the related paradox, expressed by some worker-
interviewees, that "we are waiting for a new charismatic leader (like one of the
founders) to lead us to be more democratic." Thus, at both the managerial and
rank-and-file levels are obstacles to authentic democratic revival.

7. Dynamic Communication. There is an acute need to maintain a dynamic,

self-reflective and comprehensive communication system. The coops, like the larger
societies in which they are situated, still have relatively low regard for formal
written communications (such as memos and reports). Yet, they feel that they
should use such means, often in a top-down fashion, to "be a modern business."
What is needed is a more complex, group-based and highly interactive system that
will energize all levels of the cooperative system: the individual coops, the
newly-created sectors (whose identity for many employee-members is not solid or
vivid), and the unifying corporate structure. Vertical written communications, such
as the (not-so-widely read) corporate house organ, can play an important role, but
they should not be relied upon as the backbone of communication in a system that
has a tradition of making use of a variety of groups and bodies to give advice and to
make decisions. A variety of types of ad hoc groups, with diverse memberships, can
be used effectively to keep the organization together, increase participation,
broaden involvement in decisions about specific programs and their implementa-
tion, and decrease both the felt and the actual "distance" between worker-members
and the "cúpula."

EPILOGUE
We thus have in Mondragón a giant and complex laboratory for the study of
workplace democracy within the context of the increasingly globalized market
economy. This case, with nearly four decades of rich experience behind it, affords
important opportunities for theoretically-informed and practically-oriented commu-
nication research. And, this and other similar organizations have striking implica-
tions not only for the study of so-called "alternative" organizations but also for other
efforts to put some of our most treasured political and social commitments to work.
A humane and democratic workplace is not just a good idea, but it does take a
special kind of collective commitment to make it happen. As an ideal, the
democratic and humane workplace can certainly be a point of reference in making
 196

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

policy, even if it remains unattainable in all its features. Whether exceptional cases,
such as Mondragón, can ever become the rule remains an arguable issue for both
practitioners and theorists. The answer depends in part on how one sees possibili-
ties for doing something "different" within an economic and political landscape
that, despite announced claims to the contrary, seems to insist on conformity.
Alternatively, one might look forward to broader societal transformations, working
within certain local contexts toward that vision. But it is hard to argue that many of
our workplaces today are not terribly people-friendly. So, why not ask simply:
"What would organizations be like if we really created and maintained them for
persons?"

ENDNOTES
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

1. This formulation is inspired in part by the humanistic critique of contemporary organizational life
and theory in Robert B. Denhardt (1989). I must note that the underscored definition cannot do justice to
the complexities surrounding the matters of individual and organization and the possible relationships
between the two. For example, from a more collectivist as opposed to a more individualistic perspective,
it is not reasonable to dichotomize the two sets of goals as implied here: individual goals and
organizational ones would be overlapping to such a great extent in the regular operation of the social
system. Further, it can be argued that a higher goal, such as pursuit of the common good, necessarily
brings together concerns for the individual person as well as for the social body. Nevertheless, there is a
danger in subsuming individual rights and responsibilities within even the most noble and progressive
collectivist vision. In fact, there is need for perpetual vigilance with respect to the individual's right to
distance her/himself (and the parallel right of a sub-group to distance itself) in one way or another from a
seemingly restrictive or oppressive majority. (Compare Foucault, 1984, and Westenholz, 1993, on this
point.)
2. See also Schwartzman's (1989) detailed and fascinating interpretive account of what meetings
mean to participants in largely democratic service organizations. Her case analysis reminds us of the
importance of attending to many different types of messages and levels of analysis with respect to
communication in organizations. Moreover, Schwartzman alerts us to how presumably mundane
communication phenomena, such as meetings, may in fact be considered as constitutive of the
organization by its members, especially within a democratic order.

REFERENCES
Allen, B. I. (in press). "Diversity" organizational communication. Journal of Applied Communication
Research.
Bachrach, P., & Botwinick, A. (1992). Power and empowerment: A radical theory of participatory
democracy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Bailey, F. G. (1983). The tactical uses of passion. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Barker, J. (1993). Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in the self-managing organization.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 408-37.
Barker, J., & Cheney, G. (1994). The concept and practices of discipline in contemporary organizational
life. Communication Monographs, 61, 19-43.
Barker, J., & Tompkins, P. (1994). Identification in the self-managing organization: Characteristics of
target and tenure. Human Communication Research, 21, 223-240.
Barnard, C. I. (1968). The functions of the executive (30th anniv. ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press. (Originally published, 1938).
Bennett, A. (1990). The death of the organization man. New York: Morrow.
Bernstein, P. (1976). Necessary elements for effective worker participation in decision making. Journal of
Economic Issues, 10, 490-522.
Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D., & Radley, A. (1987). Ideological dilemmas: A
social psychology of everyday thinking. London: Sage.
Blumberg, P. (1968). Industrial democracy: The sociology of participation. London: Constable.
Bonin, J. P., Putterman, L. (1987). Economics of cooperation and the labor-managed economy. London:
Harwood Publishers.
 197

JACR AUGUST 1995

Boselovic, L. (1994,18 September). Steeled for the future: Weirton Steel enters its second decade with
CEO Elish at the helm and employees at the rudder. Pittsburgh Post Gazette, Business Section, p. C-1.
Bullis, C. (1991). Communication practices as unobtrusive control: An observational study. Communica-
tion Studies, 42, 254-271.
Burawoy, M. (1979). Manufacturing consent: Changes in the labor process under monopoly capitalism.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cheney, G. (in progress). Passion, pressure and paradox: The maintenance of humanistic values in a
competitive worker-cooperative complex. Unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado at Boul-
der.
Cheney, G. (1991). Rhetoric in an organizational society: Managing multiple identities. Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press.
Cheney, G., & Brancato, J. (1992). Scientific Management's rhetorical force and enduring impact.
Unpublished paper, University of Colorado at Boulder.
Cheney, G., & Hirsch, C. (in progress). A critical-analytic review of the literature on workplace
democracy from the standpoint of communication. Unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

at Boulder.
Cheney, G., & Stohl, C. (in progress). Managing consensus and dissent in organizational life: Paradoxes of
participation and workplace democracy. Unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado at Boulder
and Purdue University.
Dachler, H. P., & Wilpert, B. (1978). Conceptual dimensions and boundaries of participation in
organizations: A critical evaluation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23, 1-38.
Deane, P. (1978). The evolution of economic ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Deetz, S. (1994, November). Economic and political contexts for organizational democracy. Annual
meeting of the Speech Communication Association, New Orleans.
Deetz, S. (1992). Democracy in an age of corporate colonization. Albany: State University of New York
Press.
Denhardt, R. B. (1989). In the shadow of organization. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Drucker, P. (1992). The new society of organizations. Harvard Business Review, Sept.-Oct., pp. 95-104.
Drucker, P. (1988). The coming of the new organization. Harvard Business Review, Jan.-Feb., pp. 45-53.
Edmondson, B. (1991, July-August). Remaking a living. Utne Reader, pp. 66-75.
Eisenberg, E. (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. Communication Mono-
graphs, 51, 227-242.
Ellerman, D. (1990). The democratic worker-owned firm: A new model for East and West. Boston: Unwin
Hyman.
Ewing, D. (1983). "Do it my way or you're fired!" New York: John Wiley.
Ewing, D. (1977). Freedom inside the organization. New York: Dutton.
Fairhurst, G., & Wendt, R. (1993). The gap in total quality. Management Communication Quarterly, 6,
441-451.
Fayol, H. (1949). General and industrial management. New York and London: Pitman. (Originally
published, 1925.)
Ferguson, K. (1984). The feminist case against bureaucracy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Foucault, M. (1984). The Foucalt reader (P. Rabinow, ed.). New York: Pantheon.
Freeman, R. B., & Medoff, J. L. (1984). What do unions do? New York: Basic Books.
Gaventa, J. (1980). Power and powerlessness. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Georgiou, P. (1981). The goal paradigm and notes toward a counter-paradigm. In M. Zey-Ferrell & M.
Aiken (Eds.), Complex organizations: Critical perspectives (pp. 69-88). Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Glaser, H. (1994). Structure and struggle in egalitarian groups: Reframing the problems of time, emotion
and inequality as defining characteristics. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign.
Gorden, W. I., Holmberg, K-A., & Heisey, D. R. (1994). Equality and the Swedish work environment.
Employee Rights and Responsibilities Journal, 7, 1-20.
Gorden, W. I. (1988). Range of employee voice. Employee Rights and Responsibilities Journal, 1, 283-299.
Gorden, W. I., Infante, D. A., Wilsin, L., & Clarke, C. (1984). Rationale and development of an
employee-rights scale. In H. L. Ewbank (Ed.), Free Speech Yearbook 1984 (pp. 66-79). Falls Church,
VA: Speech Communication Association.
Graham, J. W. (1956). Principled organizational dissent: A theoretical essay. In B. M. Staw & L. L.
Cummings (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior, 8, 1-52. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
 198

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

Greenberg, E. (1986). Workplace democracy: The political effects of participation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Greenwood, D., & Gonzalez, J. L. (1989). Culturas de FAGOR. San Sebastian, Spain: Editorial Txertoa.
Grenier, G. J. (1988). Inhuman relations: Quality circles and anti-unionism in American Industry.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Habermas, J. (1981). The theory of communicative action, Vol. I: Reason and the rationalization of society
(T. McCarthy, trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.
Hansmann, H. (1990). When does worker ownership work? ESOPS, Law firms, codetermination, and
economic democracy. Yale Law Journal, 99, 1749-1816.
Harrison, T. (1994). Communication and interdependence in democratic organizations. In S. Deetz (Ed.),
Communication Yearbook 17. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Hickey, J. (1990). Paradoxes of power in a lesbian-feminist peace-activist group. Unpublished notes,
University of Colorado at Boulder.
Hirschman, A. 0. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

Horvat, B. (1972). An institutional model of a self-managed economy. In J. Vanek (ed.), Self-management:

The economic liberation of man (pp. 127-144). Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.
Hummel, R. P. (1994). The bureaucratic experience (4th ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press.
Huspek, M., & Kendall, L. (1991). On withholding political voice: An analysis of the political vocabulary
of a "non-political" speech community, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 77, 1-19.
Iannello, K. P. (1992). Decisions without hierarchy: Feminist interventions in organization theory and
practice. New York: Routledge.
Kanter, R. M. (1982). Dilemmas of managing participation. Organizational Dynamics, 11: 1, 5-27.
Kendall, W. (1975). The labour movement in Europe. London: Allen Lane.
Krugman, P. (1994, June). The myth of competitiveness. Harper's Magazine, pp. 24-28.
Levering, R., & Moskowitz, M. (1993). The 100 best companies to workfor in America (rev. ed.). New York:
Doubleday-Bantam-Dell.
Lewin, K. (1947). Frontiers in group dynamics. Human Relations, 1, 5-41.
Linhart, D. (1992). The shortcomings of an organizational revolution that is out of step. Economic and
Industrial Democracy, 13, 49-64.
Locke, E. A., & Schweiger, D. M. (1979). Participation in decision-making: One more look. In B. M. Staw
& L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior, 1, 265-339. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Luhmann, N. (1990). Essays on self-reference. New York: Columbia University Press.
Lukes, S. (1974). Power: A radical view. London: Macmillan.
Mansbridge, J. (1973). Time, emotion, and inequality: Three problems of participatory groups. The
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 9, 351-68.
Mansbridge, J. (1983). Beyond adversary democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Manz, C. C, & Sims, H. P., Jr. (1984). Searching for the "unleader": Organizational member views on
leading self-managed groups. Human Relations, 37, 409-24.
Martin, T. (1994, March). Personal communication.
McPhee, R. D. (1985). Formal structure and organizational communication. In R. D. McPhee & P. K.
Tompkins (Eds.), Organizational communication: Traditional themes and new directions (pp. 149-
178). Beverly Hills: Sage.
Michels, R. (1962). Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern
democracy. New York: The Free Press.
Monge, P. R., & Miller, K. I. (1988). Participative processes in organizations. In Goldhaber, G. M., &
Barnett, G. A., eds., Handbook of Organizational Communication (pp. 213-29). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Moravec, M. (1994, January). The 21st century employer-employee partnership: Professionally speaking.
HR Magazine, pp. 128-132.
Morrison, R. (1991). We build the road as we travel. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers.
Mulder, M., & Wilke, H. (1970). Participation and power equalization. Organizational Behavior and
Human Performance, 5, 430-438.
Mumby, D., & Putnam, L. (1992). The politics of emotion: A feminist reading of bounded rationality.
Academy of Management Review, 17, 465-486.
Mumby, D., & Stohl, C. (1991). Power and discourse in organization studies: Absence and the dialectic of
control. Discourse and Society, 2, 313-332.
Murphy, A. G. (1993, March). Examining hidden transcripts: A critical approach to organizational
socialization. Unpublished M. A. thesis, The University of Utah.
 199

JACR AUGUST 1995

Mygind, N. (1992). The choice of ownership structure. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 13, 359-99.
Newman, K. (1980). Incipient bureaucracy: The development of hierarchies in egalitarian organizations.
In G. M. Britan & R. Cohen (Eds.), Hierarchy and society: Anthropological perspectives on bureaucracy
(pp. 143-163). Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Values.
Pacanowsky, M. (1988). Communication in the empowering organization. In J. A. Anderson (Ed.),
Communication Yearbook 11 (pp. 356-379). Beverly Hills: Sage.
Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and democratic theory. London: Cambridge University Press.
Powell, W. W. (1990). Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of organization. Research in
Organizational Behavior, 12, 295-336.
Redding, W. C. (1972). Communication within the organization: An interpretive view of theory and
research. New York: Industrial Communication Council.
Rooney, P. M. (1992). ESOPs, producer coops and traditional firms: Are they different? Journal of
Economic Issues, 26, 593-603.
Rothschild, J., & Whitt, J. A. (1986). The cooperative workplace: Potentials and dilemmas of organiza-
tional democracy and participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015

Russett, B. (1983, 15 April). Telephone interview with the author.

Sashkin, M. (1984, Spring). Participative management is an ethical imperative. Organizational Dynam-
ics, pp. 5-22.
Satow, R. L. (1975). Value-rational authority and professional organizations: Weber's missing type.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 20, 526-31.
Schmookler, A. B. (1993). The illusion of choice: How the market economy shapes our destiny. Albany:
State University of New York Press.
Scott, J. C. (1990). Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Schwartzman, H. B. (1989). The meeting. New York: Plenum Press.
Sennett, R. (1980). Authority. New York: Random House.
Sewell, G., & Wilkinson, B. (1992). "Someone to watch over me": Surveillance, discipline and the
Just-in-Time labor process. Sociology, 26, 271-289.
Sheeran, M. J. (1983). Beyond majority rule: Voteless decisions in the Religious Society of Friends.
Philadelphia: The Religious Society of Friends.
Simon, H. A. (1976). Administrative behavior (3rd ed.). New York: Free Press.
Stohl, C. (in press). Organizational communication: Connectedness in action. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Stohl, C. (1994, June). Facilitating bona fide groups: Practice and paradox. Paper presented at the
International Organizational Communication Conference, Rome.
Stohl, C. (1993). European managers' interpretations of participation. Human Communication Research,
20, 108-131.
Strauss, G. (1982). Workers participation in management: An international perspective. Research in
Organizational Behavior, 4, 173-265.
Stryjan, Y. (1989). Impossible organizations: Self-management and organizational reproduction. New
York: Greenwood Press.
Tannenbaum, A. S. (1983). Employee-owned companies. Research in Organizational Behavior, 5,
235-68.
Thomas, H., & Logan, C. (1982). Mondragón: An economic analysis. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Thompson, V. (1961). Modem organization. New York: Knopf.
Tompkins, P. K., & Cheney, G. (1985). Communication and unobtrusive control in contemporary
organizations. In R. D. McPhee & P. K. Tompkins, Eds., Organizational communication: Traditional
themes and new directions (pp. 179-210). Beverly Hills: Sage.
Tompkins, P. K., & Diamant, D. (in progress). Forms of resistance to concertive organizational control.
Unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado at Boulder.
Trist, E., & Murray, H. (1993). The social engagement of social science; Vol. II: The socio-technical
perspective. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Turpin-Forster, S. (1992, May). Personal communication.
Tyson, L. D. (1979). Incentives, income sharing, and institutional innovation in the Yugoslav
self-managed firm. Journal of Comparative Economics, 3, 285-301.
Vanek, J. (1975). Introduction. In J. Vanek (Ed.), Self-management: The economic liberation of man.
Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.
Warner, M. (1984). Organizational democracy: The history of an idea. In B. Wilpert & A. Sorge (Eds.),
International perspectives on organizational democracy (pp. 5-21). New York: John Wiley.
 200

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORKPLACE CHENEY

Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society, 2 vols. (G. Roth & C. Wittich, trans.). Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Weisbord, M. (1991). Productive workplaces: Organizing and managing for dignity, meaning and
community. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Westenholz, A. (1993). Paradoxical thinking and change in the frames of reference. Organization Studies,
14, 37-58.
Westenholz, A. (1991). Democracy as "organizational divorce" and how postmodern democracy is stifled
by unity and majority. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 12, 173-186.
Whalen, S. (in progress). Working for words: Rhetoric, interests and the eclipse of the contemporary
American worker. Unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado at Boulder.
Whyte, W. F., & Whyte, K. K. (1991). Making Mondragón: The growth and dynamics of the worker
cooperative complex (2nd ed., rev.). Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, Cornell University.
Downloaded by [New York University] at 16:44 11 April 2015