SAINT AUGUST INE:

CHRISTIAN OR
NEO-PLATONIST?
FROM HIS RETREAT AT CASSICIACUM
UNTIL HIS ORDINATION AT HIPPO

A Differtation Accepted by the Faculty of the Graduate

School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfill
ment of the Requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy.

BY

SISTER MARY PATRICIA GARVEY, R.S.M.

of THE PROVINCE of CINCINNATI

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PRESS

MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN
1939
 ---
-

.* _
Á -> *

*
-
-
-->
A. 2*-

º
-
º,” a

COPYRIGHT, 1939
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
 To

My Brother, Patrick J. Garvey

With deep affection and gratitude

Ni37962
?'ihil ©hatat
H. B. Ries
Censor Librorum
St. Francis, Wis., July 24, 1939

łmprintatur
Milwaukiae, Die 31 iulii, 1939
+ Samuel A. Stritch
Archiepiscopus Milwaukiensis
 CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

LITERATURE ON THE PROBLEM OF THE CHRISTIAN

CONVERSION OF ST. AUGUSTINE

Origin of the Problem 1

Early History of the Problem: Con............................................. 3

i Early History of the Problem: Pro.............................................

Recent Literature on the Problem
Purpose of the Present Study......................................................
14
28

38

CHAPTER II

CRITERIA

The Meaning of Conversion........................................................ 41

The Basic Doctrines of Christianity............................................ 42

i The Basic Doctrines of Neo-Platonism

Christianity and Neo-Platonism Compared................................
St. Augustine's Statement of the Differences between Chris
tianity and Neo-Platonism..........................................................
47
52

56

CHAPTER III

AT CASSICIACUM

De Beata Vita..................... 67
Contra Academicoſ ............... 78

i De Ordine .............................
Soliloquia ........................
Epitulae …
87

100
112

CHAPTER IV

AT MILAN

De Immortalitate Animae............................................................ 118

 CHAPTER V

AT ROME

A. De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae................................................ 128

B. De Moribuſ Manichaeorum........................................................ 143
C. De Quantitate Animae .. 146
D. De Libero Arbitrio (Liber primus)............................................ 160

CHAPTER VI

AT TAGASTE

A. De Geneſi contra Manichaeof...................................................... 170

B. De Muſica.................................................. -182

C. De Magistro..................................... -- ..192
D. De Vera Religione...................................................................... 196
E. Epitulae … 209

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

A. Evidences of Christianity............................................................ 218

B. Development in Augustine's Thought........................................ 230
C. Tendency to Speak in Neo-Platonic Terms................................ 233
D. Christianity Not a Superstructure of Hellenism........................ 238

Bibliography … 241
Index ...…. 261
 PREFACE

Saint Augustine may be said to have made the framework for

innumerable writings which have passed down through the vista of
the centuries. Eminent scholars have found pleasure and profit in
explaining the doctrine and paying tribute to the name of the immortal
Bishop of Hippo. Students of philosophy in a spirit of humble
approach and uncertainty have also attempted to study and interpret
the thought of the illustrious Saint and Scholar. In this class I claim
a place.
It was my good fortune to have made the acquaintance of Augus
tine, the Philosopher, under the direction of Dr. Anton C. Pegis,
at that time Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Marquette University.
To him I am indebted for suggesting the subject of this dissertation,
and also for valuable advice in regard to the method of treating it.
To Dr. John O. Riedl, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Marquette
University, who was so generous of his time and assistance in directing
my work, I am particularly indebted. To his unflagging interest, helpful
suggestions, constructive criticism, and unfailing encouragement is due
in great measure the completion of this study. To the Superiors and
Sisters of my Community I am deeply grateful for their having afforded
me the opportunity of spending many delightful hours with the charm
ing son of the saintly Monica.
SISTER MARY PATRICIA, R.S.M.

March 7, 1939
Our Lady of Cincinnati College
 SAINT AUGUSTINE:
CHRISTIAN OR
NEO-PLATONIST?
CHAPTER I

LITERATURE ON THE PROBLEM OF THE CHRISTIAN

CONVERSION OF ST. AUGUSTINE

A. Origin of the Problem

The details of his conversion so graphically portrayed in the Con
feſsions were written by Saint Augustine about the year 400 A.D.,"
some thirteen years after the great spiritual crisis had occurred. In the
meantime the illustrious convert had become a well-informed Christian
thinker. As time elapsed the interests of the philosopher, which played
so important a rôle in the early thought of the converted rhetorician,
were gradually superseded by those of the churchman and theologian.
Augustine had been ordained a priest by Valerius, the venerable Bishop
of Hippo, had been consecrated Assistant Bishop to the aged Prelate,
and upon the death of the latter had been elected to fill the vacant See.
1 Our sources for determining the date of composition of the works of St.
Augustine are the Retractationes and internal evidence in the writings them
selves. In the Prologue of the Retractationes Augustine writes: "Inveniet
enim fortasse quomodo scribendo profecerim quisquis opuscula mea, ordine
quo scripta sunt legerit. Quod ut possit hoc opere, quantum potero, curabo
ut eundem ordinem noverit.” (Migne, Patrologia Latina, T. XXXII, col.
586). In reference to the date of the Confessions the Benedictine Editors of
the works of Augustine write as follows: "Hosce libros observamus scriptos
circiter annum Christi quadringentesimum, propterea quod ab Augustino
recensentur proxime ante illos quos episcopus adversus Faustum Manichaeum
non multo ante vel post hunc annum elaboravit . . .” (Ibid., col. 659-660)
The text which will be used throughout this study in citing references to
the works of St. Augustine is Migne, Patrologia Latina. The Corpus scrip
torum eccleſiaſticorum Latinorum was also consulted but since this text is
incomplete, it seemed advisable to use the Migne for all citations. The vol
ume and column references to the Patrologia Latina will be placed in paren
theses after the titles of the various writings of Augustine.
 -

. e -
-
-

He had ably defended Catholic doctrine against the Manichaeans” and

the Donatists,” had become a profound student of Holy Scripture, and
an ardent expounder of Christian truth. In fine, he had become per
meated with the spirit and the teachings of the Church.
In the light of this complete transformation the question arises as
to the historical value of the account of Augustine's conversion as
found in the Confeſsions. After years of intensive study and teaching
of Catholic doctrine could the Bishop of Hippo adequately portray his
religious experiences at the time of his conversion? As he passed in
retrospect the circumstances of that decisive event, did he not behold
his dispositions at the time through lenses colored by years of famili
arity with doctrines to which more than a decade before he was almost
a complete stranger?
Questions such as these are especially pertinent if comparison is
made between the early writings of Augustine and the story of his con
version as recorded in the Confeſsions. Can the enthusiastic teacher and
philosopher, the ardent admirer of Plotinus and the Platonists, repre
sented in the philosophical treatises at Cassiciacum” be consistently
identified with the humble convert of the Confeſsions, with the peni
tent rhetorician who welcomed the seclusion of the country home of
Verecundus in order to make a worthy preparation for the Sacrament
of Baptism? In other words, in 386 A.D. was Augustine converted to
Christ and Christianity, or rather to Plotinus and Neo-Platonism?
Reflections of this nature were responsible for the controversy which
has centered about the conversion of St. Augustine.

2 Augustine's anti-Manichaean writings date from about 388 to 404 A.D. In

the Retractationes the following writings are mentioned before the Confes
sions, as having been written directly or indirectly against the Manichaeans:
De moribus ecclesiae catholicae and De moribus Manichaeorum; De libero
arbitrio; De Genesi adversus Manichaeof; De vera religione; De utilitate
credendi; Contra Manichaeos, de duabus animabus; Acta contra Fortunatum
Manichaeum; De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus; Contra Adimantum Mani
chaei discipulum.
* Most of the anti-Donatist works were written between 400 and 420 A.D.
However, as early as about 393 A.D. Augustine wrote his Psalmus contra
partem Donati, also Contra epistulam Donati haeretici, which is no longer
extant.
* The site of the country villa of Verecundus, Augustine's fellow-teacher and
friend. Here Augustine retired after resigning his position at Milan. The
ancient Cassiciacum is identified with the modern Cassago of Brianza, about
thirty-three kilometers from Milan. Cf. Louis Bertrand, Autour de Saint
Augustin (Paris: A. Fayard et cie, 1922), c. III.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST 2 3

B. Early History of the Problem: Con

For fifteen centuries after the great moral crisis in the life of Aure
lius Augustine writers unquestioningly accepted at face value the testi
mony of the Confeſsions. They regarded his spiritual awakening as a
thorough conversion to Christ and His Church, as the reward of the
prayers and tears of the saintly Monica from whom Augustine had in
herited that thirst for God which was appeased only when his heart
found rest in Him. Toward the close of the nineteenth century, how
ever, we find Gaston Boissier," who may be regarded as the pioneer in
the controversy, noting and attempting to harmonize what he con
sidered a singular discrepancy between the Confessions and the works
written by Augustine at the time of and shortly after his conversion.
Boissier remarks that from a factual point of view there is no
notable difference between the Confessions and the early writings; in
both Augustine makes known his hesitations, his struggles, his progress
as he advances morally and intellectually toward the goal to which he
aspired. But it is the difference in the general tone of the earlier and
later autobiographies which causes the impression made by the one to
be wholly unlike that afforded by the other.” In the latter we behold
the penitent touched by the grace of God, weeping over his sins and
misdemeanors; in the former, the philosopher serenely confident as he
resolves to devote himself without reserve to philosophy. And since
these two personages are so radically different, Boissier asks himself,
which is authentic: the penitent or the philosopher? Perhaps the correct
answer, he observes, is that both are true pictures of Augustine. It may
be that at one and the same time Augustine was conscious of a multiple
personality within himself.”
Boissier by no means questions the sincerity of Augustine in the
Confeſsions. Every page bears evidence of the deep sincerity of their
* G. Boissier, “La conversion de saint Augustin,” Revue des deux mondes,
LXXXV (1888), 43-69. (Paris: Bureau de la revue des deux mondes).
The same thesis is embodied by Boissier in La fin du paganisme, 2 vols.
(Paris: Hachette et cie, 1909), I, 291-325.
* G. Boissier, “La conversion de Saint Augustin,” Revue des deux mondes,
LXXXV (1888), 44.
* Ibid., 65: "Et puisque les deux personnages diffèrent entre eux, pouvons
nous savoir, du pénitent ou du philosophe, leguel est le véritable? Peut-être
convient-il de répondre qu'ils sont vrais tous les deux. Saint Augustin se
trouvait a un de ces moments oil, suivant le mot du poète, on sent plusieurs
hommes en soi.”
4 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

author. Augustine wished to imitate the penitents of the early Church

by confessing his sins in public, and asking pardon for them. He was
especially motivated by the desire to teach sinners by his own example
never to lose courage and consider amendment impossible. He intended
to present a true picture of his youth, and in essentials he succeeded
in so far as was possible for one who was describing an event which
transpired more than a decade before. After all, the discrepancy be
tween the early and later writings is quite advantageous, for it enables
us to discern the true sentiments of Augustine at various epochs of his
life and to trace the steps through which he passed before attaining
a precise and definite doctrine.” With a little good will, one is able
to detect in the background of the early philosophical works some ves
tiges of Christian thought but, it must be admitted, these are rather
vague and are not easily discernible at the first reading. From the study
of the Dialogueſ, Boissier concludes, it is evident that Augustine de
sired to effect a conciliation between the old man and the new, between
the professor and the Christian.”
A group of writers, following Boissier and proceeding further,
did not hesitate openly to challenge the reliability of the account as
recorded in the Confeſsions. They admit that a moral transformation
occurred in the life of Augustine in his thirty-second year, but they
attribute this change, on the evidence of his early writings, to Neo
Platonic rather than to Christian influences. In other words, they are
convinced that it was in Neo-Platonism and not in Christianity that
Augustine at that time became completely absorbed.
Adolf Harnack in his study of the Confessions is of the opinion
that the early writings of Augustine by no means indicate so complete
a break with the past as the Confessions would have us believe. Augus
tine “unconsciously transferred to the moment of conversion” the
thoughts and sentiments of riper years.” “At that time,” Harnack says,
“he was no ecclesiastical theologian. In spite of his resolve to submit
himself to the Church, he was still living wholly in philosophical
*G. Boissier, “La conversion de saint Augustin,” Revue des deux mondes,
LXXXV (1888), 44-45.
° Ibid., 68: “La lecture des Dialogues nous montre qu'il veut concilier l'homme
nouveau, le professeur et le chrétien.”
19 Adolf Harnack, Monasticism: Its Ideals and History and the Confessions of
St. Augustine (Oxford: Williams and Norgate, 1901), p. 141.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 5

problems. The great break was limited entirely to worldly occupations

and to his renunciation of the flesh: the interests that had hitherto
occupied his mind it did not affect.” -

According to Harnack, it was Neo-Platonism which first snatched

Augustine from the night of uncertainty. By its aid he was freed,
though not completely, from Manichaeism, as well as from skepti
cism.” As a matter of fact, it was despair of reason which caused
Augustine to submit to the authority of the Church. Harnack thus
describes Augustine's state of mind before he gave himself over to an
"unreasoned authority” for guidance:
His conflict with himself had convinced him of the badness of
human nature and Manichaeism had left him in complete doubt
as to the foundations and truth of the Christian faith. His confi
dence in the rationality of Christian truth had been shaken to
the very depths, and it was never restored. In other words, as
an individual thinker he never gained the subjective certitude
that Christian truth, and as such everything contained in the
two Testaments had to be regarded, was clear, consistent, and
demonstrable. When he threw himself into the arms of the
Catholic Church, he was perfectly conscious that he needed the
authority not to sink into skepticism or nihilism.”
Friedrich Loofs likewise finds a conflict between the Confessions
and the Dialogues of St. Augustine. During the first half decade after
the great moral change had occurred in Augustine's life, his thinking
was essentially Neo-Platonic. In fact, throughout this period (386-391)
Augustine's “Christianity was simply Neo-Platonism with a Christian
tint and a Christian veneer.” It was only at the beginning of his
clerical career that we recognize a new phase in his Christianity. And
even then Neo-Platonism did not cease to exercise a potent influence
upon Augustine, for it remained the corner stone upon which he
erected the edifice of his theological thought.” The Confeſsions
11 Ibid., p. 141.
12 A. Harnack, History of Dogma, 5 vols, translated from the third German
edition (2nd ed., London; Williams and Norgate, 1897-1899), I, 361.
13 Ibid., V, 79.
** F. Loofs, “Augustinus,” Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und
Kirche, 23 vols, (Leipzig; J. C. Hinrich, 1896-1913), II, 270: “In Wirklich
keit ist in dieser Zeit (386-391 A.D.) sein Christentum Neuplatonismus mit
christlicher Färbung und christlichem Einschlag.”
15 Ibid., II, 274.
6 SAHNT AUGUSTINE:

represents Augustine's conversion under an aspect quite different

from that in which it is depicted in the early writings, and there
fore, in order to present a true picture, this celebrated autobiography
must be amended by the testimony of the early works. And yet,
when read in the light of the treatises written shortly after his
conversion, it forms a necessary complement to them. It would seem
that some great crisis must have occurred to render explicable Augus
tine's escape from the allurements of forbidden sensual pleasures and
his positive revulsion for them, as disclosed in the Soliloquia, since
he still remained a victim of concubinage even after his acceptance of
Neo-Platonism.” By apprising us of this turning point in his moral
career, the Confeſsions supplies a notable deficiency in the early writ
ings. Pontitianus's account of the cenobites of Egypt was in reality the
proximate cause of Augustine's moral crisis. He became converted when
he permitted himself to be put to shame by the ideal of monastic life.”
Louis Gourdon agrees with Boissier in admitting without qualifica
tion Augustine's sincerity in narrating, as he does in the Confeſsions,
the prayerful story of his conversion. But sincerity and truth, Gourdon
observes, are two different things, so perhaps the question had better
be asked: “Is the sincere account which Augustine gives us in regard
to his conversion a reliable one?” Such a query would have to be
answered in the negative, Gourdon believes, were one to use the early
works of Augustine in confirmation of the recital of the Confeſsions.
And if we are to consider his conversion from a historical point of
view, it appears necessary to have recourse to the writings almost con
temporaneous with his conversion in order to ratify or to invalidate the
recital of the Confeſsions. Adopting this procedure, Gourdon concludes
that in 386 A.D. “Augustine was converted, first, to Neo-Platonism,
and secondly, to good morals.” It is only in 390 A.D. that he can
with any propriety be called a Christian for in that year he wrote his
16 Soliloquia, L. I, c. X, n. 17 (XXXII, 878).
17 F. Loofs, “Augustinus,” Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und
Kirche, II, 267.
18 L. Gourdon, Essai sur la conversion de saint Augustin (Paris: A. Coueslant,
1900), p. 23: "Notre question reparait: Le Sincère récit, qu'Augustin nous
donne de sa conversion, est-il bien vrai?”
19 Ibid., p. 45: "Quelle a donc été la conversion de Saint Augustin, d'après
les écrits contemporains de cette conversion? Si l’on nous presse de répondre,
nous dirons: Augustin, en 386, s'est converti: 1. au néoplatonisme; 2. aux
bonnes moeurs.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 7

first work that is Christian in content and in spirit.” The crisis of the
year 386 A.D. can merely be regarded as one of the decisive steps in
his spiritual development. In reality, his conversion began in his nine
teenth year with the reading of Cicero's Hortensius and was effected so
gradually that it was not completed before 400 A.D.; hence Augustine
cannot with precision be called a true Christian before that time. In his
case it was not a "conversion by revolution, but a conversion by evolu
tion.”21

Gourdon's comparative study of the Confessions and the Dia

logues convinces him that there is a flagrant contradiction between the
one and the other, though involuntary on the part of Augustine. The
results of Gourdon's study are summarized as follows: 1. Augustine
abandoned his profession at Milan and retired to Cassiciacum in order
to regain his health. 2. In imitation of the illustrious masters of
antiquity, he enjoyed his leisure in the society of his disciples and his
friends. 3. He did not break with his past life; his interests in litera
ture, poetry, and philosophy remained the same. 4. He embraced a
chaste life. 5. He adopted Neo-Platonic philosophy.”
Scheel holds that the writings of the period antecedent to the priest
hood of Augustine show that his Christology was far different from
that of the Confessions. The former represent Augustine not as a per
son who had been won over through the impression made upon him by
the humble Christ, but rather as one who held the conviction that
Christianity was not irrational as he had deemed it to be, inasmuch as
it offered on the basis of authority the same truth that Neo-Platonism
offered intellectually. Augustine identified the Son of God with the
Neo-Platonic Nous. The doctrine of Creation is formally expressed in
these early works but materially it appears to be merely a logical Pan

20 Ibid., p. 82: "Nous sommes, donc maintenant, et maintenant seulement (390

A.D.), en présence d'un homme qui se convertit au christianisme sous sa
forme catholique.”
21 Ibid., p. 87. -

** Ibid., pp. 44-45: “Augustin abandonne ses fonctions publiques de professeur,

et se rend à la villa de Cassiciacum pour y rétablin sa santé. 2. Dominé par
des souvenirs classiques, il profite deses loisirs, et de la société de quelques
disciples et amis, pour imiter, en leur genre de vie, quelques illustres
maitres, de l'antiquité. 3. Il ne rompt pas avec sa vie passée; il se nourrit
encore de littérature, de poésie et de philosophie; il conserve les mêmes
goûts et les mémes besoins profanes. 4. Il vit dans le chasteté. 5. Il embrasse
la philosophie néo-platonicienne.”
8 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

theism. The Father and the Son are said to be alike and of one sub
stance, but still there are traces of subordination of the latter to the
former. There is no evidence that Christianity was exerting a direct
influence upon him. His concept of the Word at this period was
definitely Neo-Platonic.”
Hans Becker likewise rejects the traditional view of Augustine's
conversion. To Gaston Boissier he gives the credit of having first made
a psychological study of that period of Augustine's life, thereby free
ing it from the deus ex machina in which it had traditionally been
involved.” Becker holds that Augustine's development proceeded along
an almost entirely different course from that portrayed in the Con
feſtions.” In only one respect can a notable agreement be detected
between the autobiography and the early writings of the convert: they
both record Augustine's long and earnest struggle for the attainment
of truth. It was this striving after truth which led him from Chris
tianity to Manichaeism, Stoicism, Academic thought, Neo-Platonism,
and then again to Christianity. Christianity was both his point of
departure and the final goal of his development, but this Christianity
was very strongly influenced by Neo-Platonism. In his early works it
is evident that Augustine believed that his hunger for truth could be
satisfied chiefly by Neo-Platonism, Christianity playing merely a sec
ondary rôle.” Only after he had passed through the school of Neo
Platonism did he interest himself intensively in Christianity. Hence
Neo-Platonism should be regarded as the bridge over which he was
transported into the realm of Christian thought.”
Wilhelm Thimme advocates the use of great caution in accepting
the account of Augustine's conversion as given in the Confessions for
the work is characterized by definite tendencies, two of which are
especially important: Augustine desired, on the one hand, to blame his
own evil heart and his own moral helplessness and, on the other, to
28 O. Scheel, Die Anschauung Augustins iber Christi Person und Werk (Leip
zig; J. C. B. Mohr, 1901), pp. 76-77.
* H. Becker, Augustin, Studien zu seiner geistigen Entwicklung, (Leipzig; J.
C. Hinrich, 1908), p. 4.
25 Ibid., Preface, iii.
28 Ibid., p. 23.
27 Ibid., p. 53: "Erst jetzt, nachdem er durch die Schule des Neuplatonismus
hindurchgegangen ist, beginnt er sich intensiver mit dem Christentum zu
beschäftigen. Der Neuplatonismus ist ihm die Brücke hintiber ins Christen
tum geworden.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 9

praise God's goodness and His all-powerful grace; secondly, in so do

ing, he unconsciously did violence to the events of his past life by
forcing them into a mold which he himself at a much later date had
shaped. Fortunately, Augustine's early writings provide a means for
correcting the inadvertent misrepresentation of the Confesſions which
cannot be accepted as an authentic record.” It is the early works,
therefore, that are of documentary value.” According to these, philos
ophy—the books of the Platonists translated by Victorinus—dispelled
the dark clouds of doubt which covered his horizon, and illuminated
the path which led to his adoption of Christianity. Thimme believes
that it was the Platonism of Plotinus which exercised an immediate,
powerful influence on Augustine at the time of his conversion.”
Prosper Alfaric is a classic exponent of the thesis that in 386 A.D.
Augustine whole-heartedly accepted Neo-Platonism and that he did not
actually embrace Christianity until several years later. Alfaric supports
his opinion on the internal evidence of the Dialogueſ in opposition to
the story of Augustine's conversion as recorded in the Confessions.
In the Confeſsions Augustine minimizes the importance of the
influence which Neo-Platonism had exercised upon his spiritual life.
He mentions the “books of the Platonists” in order to show that their
doctrines, while agreeing somewhat with those of Holy Scripture,
present a radical difference from the teachings of the Bible.” He gives
us the impression that, before he made the acquaintance of Platonic
doctrine, he had already firmly believed not only in the existence of
God and in His Providence, but also in the divinity of Christ, the
infallibility of the Scriptures, and the teaching authority of the
Church.” In other words, according to the Confessions, Augustine was
a Christian before he became a Platonist. He adhered to Platonism
because he found it, for the most part, in agreement with Christianity;
he considered the books of Porphyry and Plotinus quite inferior to
the Scriptures.
*8 W. Thimme, Augustins geistige Entwicklung in den ersten Jahren nach
#. Bekehrung, 386-391 (Berlin: Trowitzsch und Sohn, 1908), p. 11.
* Ibid., p. 24.
* Ibid., p. 253: "Ein fast perfekter Neuplatoniker geworden, Öffnet sich Augus
tin rickhaltlos allen christlichen Einflüssen.
* Confessiones, L. VII, c. IX, n. 13-15 (XXXII, 740–742).
** Ibid., L. VII, c. VII, n. 11 (XXXII, 739).
10 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

It is by no means likely, Alfaric believes, that Augustine was a

Christian before becoming a Platonist. Had he believed so firmly in
Christ and in the Scriptures before reading the books of the Platonists,
why did he have such a meager knowledge of the nature of Christian
life and of the teachings of the Bible? If he noted such deficiencies in
Platonic doctrine, it seems strange that he should read the works of
the Platonists with an enthusiasm equal to that which he experienced
in perusing the Sacred Writings.” Elsewhere in the course of his nar
rative Augustine seems flagrantly to contradict the statement previ
ously made; namely, that his knowledge of Christianity was anterior
to that of Platonism, for he admits with deep regret that after hav
ing made the acquaintance of the latter he was still unfamiliar with the
Scriptures, though inflated by the new knowledge which he had
acquired.”
By citing numerous texts” from the early writings of Augustine,
Alfaric proceeds to establish his opinion that Augustine adopted Neo
Platonism before his adhesion to Christianity and that he embraced
the latter only after he had judged it to be in conformity with Neo
Platonism. Before reading the Ennead; he had admired the work
accomplished by the disciples of Christ and had been impressed by
their exemplary lives with the result that he felt an inclination to
become a Christian. But he definitely became one only because he
believed that, while doing so, he still remained a genuine Platonist.
For some time he continued to adhere to the doctrine of Plotinus rather
than to Catholic dogma.” Moreover, even after reading Plotinus and
St. Paul, Augustine did not find himself in the state of definite con
viction indicated in the Confeſsions. He continued to accept the prob
ability of the Academy as worthy of consideration. Therefore, even
33 P. Alfaric, L'évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin I Du Manichéisme
au Néoplatonisme (Paris: Emile Nourry, 1918), p. 379.
* Confessiones, L. VII, c. XX, n. 26 (XXXII, 746-747).
* P. Alfaric, L'évolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin, pp. 379-381.
* Ibid., pp. 380-381: “Augustin a donc adopté le Platonisme avant de donner
son adhésion au Christianisme et il ne s'est rallié au second que parce qu'il
l'a, après examen, jugé conforme au premier. Déjà avant de lire les
Ennéades, il admirait l'oeuvre accomplie par les disciples du Christ et leur
vie exemplaire, en d'autres termes, la catholicité de l'Église et sa sainteté.
Il inclinait, par conséquent, à se faire chrétien. Mais il ne l'est devenu
définitivement que parce qu'il a cru rester ainsi un pur Platonicien. Même
dans la suite, il a tenu quelque temps a la doctrine de Plotin bien plus qu'au
dogme catholique.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 11

his acceptance of Neo-Platonism was not immediate but was accom

plished slowly and by degrees. His first reading of the Enneady had
resulted in turning his thoughts into a spiritual channel; it had modi
fied his aspirations rather than his ideas.” -

In the opinion of Alfaric, not only the intellectual but also the
moral conversion of Augustine was due to Neo-Platonic influence.
In the Confessions the Bishop of Hippo depicts his conversion as a
simple acceptance of Christianity. Alfaric finds it impossible to accept
this view. The importance of the conversations which Augustine
held with Simplicianus and Pontitianus as related in the Confes
Jionſ is more or less exaggerated. In fact, Augustine had already
experienced a great aversion for the world. He had a strong in
clination for the life pointed out by the Gospel, but hesitated to fol
low it. However, this ideal of chastity which he did not have the
courage to practice he had learned years before from the Manichaeans.
The most that can be said is that the examples of Victorinus, of
Ambrose, and of their numerous imitators furnished him with a moral
stimulus of which he had need.* Then, too, is it not possible that
the one-time professor of rhetoric was guilty of rhetorical exaggeration
in describing the inner conflict which he experienced during the recital
of Pontitianus?” The details of the story evidently are fictitious.”
The incidents to which Augustine's final conversion is attributed in
the Confeſsions are too insignificant to have exerted the influence which
Augustine ascribes to them. The voice from the neighboring house"
seems a rather ordinary indication of Divine intervention. The words
of St. Paul” which moved him so intensely were not especially appro
priate. Augustine had never been addicted to excesses of the table;
he could not be considered a debauchee; he had never wished evil to

87 Ibid., p. 382.
38 Ibid., p. 392.
39 Confeſsiones, L. VIII, c. VI, n. 13—c. VIII, n. 20 (XXXII, 754-758).
40 P. Alfaric, L'évolution intellectuelle de faint Augustin, p. 392.
41 Confessiones, L. VIII, c. XII, n. 29: "Et ecce audio vocem de vicina domo
cum cantu dicentis et crebro repetentis, quasi pueri an puellae, nescio: Tolle,
Jege; tolle, lege.”
* Romans, XIII, 13, 14: “Non in comessationibus, et ebrietatibus, non in
cubilibus et impudicitiis, non in contentione et simulatione; sed induite
Dominum Jesum Christum, et carnis providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscen
tiis.”
12 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

anyone; finally, in becoming a Christian he aspired to ideals far more

elevated than those expressed in the Scriptural passage which he read.*
Alfaric likewise questions Augustine's motive for resigning his
position at Milan. Was it primarily to satisfy his conscience or was it
not rather to regain his health? If the former motive was the stronger,
why did he not at once abandon the profession which he deemed
morally injurious? Granted that he wished to avoid criticism, as he
admits with some embarrassment, he could have alleged ill-health as an
excuse for his resignation instead of postponing it until the vacation.
As a matter of fact, he did not tender his resignation even before
leaving Milan, but deferred it until the close of vacation.*
Moreover, Augustine's own estimate of the Dialogues, Soliloquier,
and Letterſ which he composed during his sojourn at the villa of
Verecundus gives no evidence of a sincere and humble convert. He
admits that “they breathed still of the pride of the schools,” a remark
which shows conclusively, in the opinion of Alfaric, that the state of
Augustine's soul at this time was far different from what he describes
it to be in the Confeſsionſ.”
The conversation which took place between Augustine and Monica
at Ostia was inspired by Neo-Platonism rather than by Christianity.
Augustine's description of the process by which the soul mounts up to
God in contemplation is Plotinian both in language and in thought.
Moreover, it is very doubtful whether such a highly emotional experi
ence could be described with such precision as the author of the Con
feſtions uses some thirteen years after the event had taken place. Here
and there we find Biblical expressions and allusions in it but they have
little bearing upon the context. The entire passage closely resembles
Plotinus's description” of the gradual ascension of the soul to God.”
48 P. Alfaric, L'évolution intellectuelle de faint Augustin, p. 394.
44 Ibid., p. 394.
45 Confeſsioner, L. IX, c. IV, n. 7 (XXXII, 766).
46 Ibid., L. IX, c. IV, n. 7 (XXXII, 766): “Ibi quid egerim in litteris,
jam quidem servientibus tibi, sed adhuc superbiae scholam, tamguam in
pausatione anhelantibus, testantur libri disputati cum praesentibus, et cum
ipso me solo coram te.”
47 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, V, i, 2.
48 P. Alfaric, L'évolution intellectuelle de faint Augustin, p. 395. Alfaric has
reference to the conversation which Augustine held with Monica at Ostia
a few days before her death. Cf. Confessiones, L. IX, c. X, n. 23: “Quaere
bamus inter nos apud praesentem Veritatem, quod tu es, qualis futura esset
vita aeterna sanctorum quam nec oculus vidít, nec auris audiwit, nec in cor
hominis ascendit.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 13

A study of the writings composed at Cassiciacum and shortly after

wards establishes the conclusions to which a critical examination of the
Confeſſionſ leads us. In these early writings Augustine makes no men
tion of his conversation with Simplicianus or Pontitianus. He does
not allude to the scene in the garden, even though these works abound
in other personal reminiscences. Although one is not justified for this
reason in inferring that they did not actually occur, yet it is evident
that they were not considered of much importance. The Dialogues bear
no indication of any interior conflicts but rather stress the influence
of Neo-Platonism in detaching him from the world. In all of these
writings Augustine attributes the resignation of his profession at Milan
to ill-health. Hence the ex-professor at Cassiciacum and the Bishop of
Hippo are far from agreeing on this point.”
Again, the author of the Confeſsions gives the impression that in
the solitude of Cassiciacum the time was spent in prayer, in penance,
and in the reading of the Scriptures. In the early writings, on the con
trary, Augustine pictures the villa of Verecundus as a house of repose,
inhabited by those who were eager in the pursuit of wisdom, where
mundane pleasures alternate with those of the spirit and where pro
fane sciences play a more important rôle than the study of the Bible.
During a part of the day Augustine is occupied with overseeing the
workmen and keeping accounts. He devotes the remainder of his time
to intellectual pursuits. He spends long hours in explaining to his pupils
the poetry of Virgil, and he carries on philosophical discussions with
his friends. The tone of these conversations is sometimes humorous,
at other times serious, and at times even spiritual. In fact, Augustine
and his companions at Cassiciacum are associated in much the same
fashion as Cicero and his friends at Tusculum. The conversations of
both groups are quite similar in content and in form.”
There is a notable difference, Alfaric concludes, between the ex
rhetorician whom we see in the Dialogues at Cassiciacum and the neo
phyte who is depicted for us in the Confeſsionſ. Indeed, Augustine at
Cassiciacum is far less a catechumen occupied as an ideal Christian
than a disciple of Plotinus, eager to conform his life to the doctrine
of his master. As a matter of fact, if Augustine had died after writing
* P. Alfaric, L'évolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin, p. 395.
* Ibid., pp. 396-398.
14 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

the Soliloquia or the treatise De quantitate animae, one would be

obliged to consider him a convinced Neo-Platonist tinted, more or less,
with Christianity.” But since later on he wrote so much in favor of
the Church and since there is a tendency to place insufficient stress
upon his development, Augustine's early works have been interpreted
according to his later writings, and it has been falsely believed that his
Neo-Platonism was merely a light veneering of his Catholic faith.
“Morally and intellectually,” Alfaric concludes, Augustine "was con
verted to Neo-Platonism rather than to the Gospel.”

C. Early History of the Problem: Pro

The thesis of Alfaric, as well as the attitude of those who during
the three preceding decades rejected the Christian conversion of Augus
tine in 386 A.D., did not pass uncontested by the advocates of the
traditional view of his conversion. In presenting the opinions of the
latter it seems advisable to deviate from the chronological order and
to note the reaction to the position of Alfaric as expressed in the
periodical literature which appeared shortly after the publication of his
work.
In his critical analysis of Alfaric's position Etienne Gilson, while
lauding the extraordinary profundity of the exegetical method pursued
by Alfaric, refused to accept all the conclusions at which this pains
taking and scholarly exegete arrived. Among these unacceptable deduc
tions is the inference that Augustine embraced Neo-Platonism before
adopting Christianity and that he accepted the latter because he con
sidered it in harmony with the former. According to Gilson, Alfaric
does not seem to have noted or, at least, accurately to have weighed the
essential nature of the modifications imposed upon Augustine's Neo
Platonism by his Catholicism.” “The mere fact that Augustine from
the beginning admitted the doctrine of creation and the equality of the

51 Ibid., p. 527: "En lui le Chrétien disparait derrière le disciple de Plotin. S'il
était mort après avoir rédigé les Soliloques ou le traité De la quantité de
l'ame on neºle considêrerait que comme un Néoplatonicien convaincu, plus
ou moins teinté de Christianisme.”
52 Ibid., p. 399: “Moralement comme intellectuellement c'est au Néoplatonisme
qu'il s'est converti, plutót qu'à l'Évangile.”
53 E. Gilson, “Revue critique,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Etran
ger, LXXXVIII (1919), 501-503.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 15

Divine Persons is sufficient to prove that he was directly a Catholic and

not a Neo-Platonist.” He does not agree with Plotinus on the nature
of God, on the origin of the world, on the nature of man and his
destiny. These all-important points are quite sufficient to distinguish
the Catholic from the follower of Plotinus. If we follow up these
diverse trends of thought to the Middle Ages, we find that they are
precisely what effected the separation of the Averroists from the Catho
lics. The Catholics were those who thought with Augustine; the here
tics, those who thought with Plotinus. On the other hand, there is
nothing which Augustine retained from Plotinus that the Church did
not preserve under one form or another."
From its very beginning the thought of Augustine unhesitatingly
imposed on that of Plotinus whatever Catholicism essentially required
and it did this with so little reservation that the doctrine of Plotinus,
thus baptized, became difficult to recognize. On the other hand, Augus
tine chose so well the Plotinian elements by which he desired to enrich
Christianity that they became definitely assimilated with it. In the
Soliloquia, then, we do not find “a Neo-Platonism tinted with Chris
tianity but, on the contrary, a Christianity tinted with Neo-Platonism.”
For some time, in the opinion of Gilson, Augustine believed that he
found one and the same truth in Plotinus and in Christianity, but this
error was possibly due to the fact that from the beginning he read the
Enneads as a Christian. That at first he was better acquainted with
Neo-Platonism and the Enneads than with Christianity and the Scrip
tures did not prevent him from whole-heartedly embracing the Catholic
faith.57

* Ibid., 503: “Le seul fait qu'Augustine ait admis dés le début la creation et
l'égalité des personnes divines suffirait à établir qu'il fut immédiatement
catholique et non plotinien.”
55 Ibid., LXXXVIII (1919), 505.
* Ibid., 505: "On ne se trompe donc pas lorsqu'on voit dans les Soliloques non
point un néo-platonisme teinté de christianisme, mais au contraire un chris
tianisme teinté de néo-platonisme.”
Dean Inge says that all Christianity is Neo-Platonism, perhaps chiefly be
cause of the influence of Augustine. Cf. W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of
Plotinus, 2 vols. (2nd ed., New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1923),
I, 12: “From the time of Augustine to the present day Neoplatonism has
always been at home in the Christian Church.”
* E. Gilson, “Revue critique,” Revue philosophique de la France et de
l'Etranger, LXXXVIII (1919), 505.
16 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Monceaux likewise takes exception to the results of Alfaric's pro

found analysis. He believes that the conclusions of this erudite critic
seem to go beyond the evidence of his premises.* That Augustine
accepted the philosophy of Plotinus and endeavored to adapt it to
Catholicism is incontestable, but it cannot be admitted that even after
his baptism he subordinated Christianity to Neo-Platonism. In his early
writings Augustine does not mention his baptism but there was no
occasion for doing so; he was seeking in philosophy the rational justi
fication for his conversion. But that by no means required the subordi
nation of his faith. The fact is that, in order to establish an intellectual
foundation for his Catholic faith, he gave a Catholic interpretation to
Neo-Platonism.59
Alfaric's method, so rigorously and exclusively logical, is, in the
opinion of Monceaux, somewhat dangerous for a study of so delicate
a nature as the intellectual and moral conversion of a man. It is not
simply a question of marking the various steps of the process or of
analyzing successive beliefs, as Alfaric so admirably does; the difficulty
lies in understanding how he passed from one to another. In the case
of Augustine this is made possible by reading the Confeſſions. In this
work Augustine who was gifted with a splendid memory and a deep
knowledge of himself gives us a simple narrative of his search for
truth. He tells us how he was deluded by the Manichaeans without
having been completely informed in regard to their system, how he
lingered temporarily in scepticism while waiting to see his way clearly,
how he was captivated by Neo-Platonism and the metaphysics of
Plotinus, but little by little returned to Christianity. Recognizing him
self as a Catholic, he received baptism and then sought in philosophy
the rational justification of his faith.” -

While acknowledging Alfaric's meticulous analysis and clear ex

position of the thought of Augustine in his search for truth, Alfred
Loisy regrets that in the treatment of Augustine's conversion this emi
nent critic has pushed too far his textual criticism and his arguments
of pure reason. Nothing is easier, Loisy remarks, than to place in

** P. Monceaux, "L'évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin,” Journal der

Javants, (1920), 250.
59 Ibid., 251.
60 Ibid., 252-253.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 17

opposition texts from the early writings and the Confessions of Augus
tine, but it is important to weigh their meaning before affirming a
contradiction between them. If one takes into consideration the differ
ent character of these works, texts which appear contradictory to
Alfaric corroborate rather than conflict with one another. The Dia
logues do not wholly represent the interior life of Augustine; they bear
witness to the growing influence of Neo-Platonism on his thought but
only incidentally treat of his conversion. There is no doubt that at
Cassiciacum Augustine's intellect was permeated with Neo-Platonism,
but he found the means of adapting it to Christian dogma. And it is
no less certain that in heart and in mode of life he became definitely
a Christian. Augustine's moral conversion was as real as was the Neo
Platonic development of his thought.”
M. Jacquin without hesitation labels the general thesis of Prosper
Alfaric as false. The conclusion that Augustine both morally and
intellectually was converted to Neo-Platonic philosophy rather than to
the Gospel, based on the apparent contradiction between the Confes
Jions and the early philosophical works of Augustine, raises a psycho
logical problem which Alfaric has failed to solve. If Augustine were
a genuine Neo-Platonist who regarded Catholicism as an inferior form
of wisdom suitable only for inferior minds, why should he decide to
receive baptism? Why should he take so decisive a step if not impelled
to do so by his Christian convictions? That Neo-Platonism had paved
the way for embracing Christianity by eliminating rational objections
is undeniable. From the beginning, however, the new convert submitted
to the authority of Christ. In him we already behold the Saint Augus
tine whom the later works reveal: the believer and the theologian who
wished to understand what he believed.”
Among the first to uphold the compatibility of the Confeſsions
with the early writings of Augustine was F. Wörter. In opposition to
Boissier and Harnack whom we have mentioned as pioneers in the
controversy regarding the conversion of Augustine, Wörter proposes
several arguments. In the Dialogues the convert reveals nothing of his
interior life or of his ascetic preparation for baptism for the simple
** A. Loisy, Revue d’histoire et de littérature religieuses, (1920), 568-569. Cf.
Revue critique, II (1923), 324.
* M. Jacquin, Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, X (1921),
277–278.
18 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

reason that there was no occasion for it. But this silence does not imply
a contradiction between the Confessions and the Dialogues. In the
early works a few citations from the Bible can be found. That they
are so few is due to the entirely philosophic purpose of these writings,
which did not permit a more frequent usage. In the Confessions Augus
tine expressly declares that at Cassiciacum he was employed in reading
Holy Scripture. In fine, it is evident that the author of the Dialogues
had a knowledge of Christ because he speaks of Him at times and
makes mention of His Incarnation accomplished in order to wrest the
human race from the darkness of error.”
After discussing the influence exercised by Neo-Platonism upon
St. Augustine and after specifying the reasons why Christianity tri
umphed over it in his regard, Grandgeorge concludes that for Augus
tine Neo-Platonism was a transitory doctrine; it was neither the point
of departure nor the final goal.” Its influence was both negative and
positive: negative, in that it helped him to abandon a Manichaean
point of view; positive, in that it played a rôle of no little importance
in his conversion. It contributed to the formation of his intellect,
thereby directing him toward Christianity to which his natural inclina
tion was bound to lead him.**
Augustine never forgot the service rendered by Plotinus in extri
cating him from Manichaean dualism. He made use of Plotinian doc
trines in defense of his faith, but he always subordinated them to the
great truths of Christianity and at the same time gave them a form
entirely new. So long, therefore, as Neo-Platonism agreed with his
religious convictions, Augustine was frankly a Neo-Platonist but, when
ever a contradiction arose, he never hesitated to subject philosophy to
religion, reason to faith. He was, first of all, a Christian; the philo
sophical questions that engaged his attention constantly found them
selves more and more relegated to the background.”
63 F. Wörter, Die Geistesentwicklung des heiligen Augustinus bis zu feiner
Taufe (Paderborn, 1892), pp. 62-66.
84 L. Grandgeorge, Saint Augustin et le Néo-Platonisme (Paris: Ernest Leroux,
1896), p. 152: "Ainsi le rôle du néo-platonisme est bien déterminé. Ce fut
pour saint Augustin une doctrine transitoire. Cene fut ni le point de départ,
ni le point d'arrivée.”
65 Ibid., p. 152.
66 Ibid., pp. 157-158.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 19

The Abbé Jules Martin believes that the inspiration of the Dia
logues is just as Christian as that of the Confeſsions. In the works
composed at Cassiciacum St. Augustine always and definitely employs
the word philosophy in the sense of Christian perfection and asceticism,
a meaning quite in conformity with ancient usage.” Augustine read
Plotinus but he never became a Platonist. Even in his early writings
reference can be found to the celebrated scene of Augustine's conver
sion.* The Confessions gives a more detailed account; it pictures
more graphically his final struggle, but fundamentally it adds nothing
essential to the early account in the Dialogues.”
Martin finds in the early works of Augustine a doctrine of grace,”
as well as a doctrine of predestination.” “It is indeed remarkable,” he
observes, “that speaking of grace for the first time and without any
dogmatic purpose, Saint Augustine has almost expressed the two cele
brated formulas: Non deterit nisi deteratur and Da quod jubes et jube
quod vis.” Except for the fact that Augustine does not expressly men
tion original sin, a complete doctrine of grace can be found in the
Soliloquia.”
George Baron Von Hertling, Reinhold Seeberg, E. Portalié, Wil
liam Montgomery, and Jens Nørregaard also defend the reliability of
the Confeſsions in presenting an account of Augustine's conversion.
Von Hertling finds no special difficulty in Augustine's early writ
ings in which he speaks of philosophy as the harbor wherein he sought
refuge after breaking with his former life. In the philosophical Dia

* J. Martin, “Saint Augustin a Cassiciacum veille et lendemain de sa conver

sion,” Annales de philosophie Chrétienne, XXXIX (1898), 308. Martin
cites Meleton of Sardis, Clement of Alexandria, and Denys of Alexandria as
identifying philosophy with Christian perfection.
* Contra Academicos, L. II, c. II, n. 5-6 (XXXII, 921-922).
* J. Martin, “Saint Augustin a Cassiciacum veille et lendemain de sa conver
sion,” Annales de philosophie Chrétienne, XXXIX (1898), 311.
* Soliloquia, L. I, c. I, n. 1-6 (XXXII, 869-872); L. II, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII,
885; L. II, c. XV, n. 27 (XXXII, 898); L. II, c. VI, n. 9 (XXXII, 889).
** Ibid., L. I, c. I, n. 4 (XXXII, 871): “Exaudi, exaudi, exaudi me more
illo tuo paucis notissimo.”
** J. Martin, “Saint Augustin a Cassiciacum veille et lendemain de sa conver
sion,” Annales de philosophie Chrétienne, XXXIX (1898), 312: "C'est,
en effet, chose remarquable que, parlant pour la première fois de la grâce,
et sans aucun dessein dogmatique, saint Augustin ait presque rencontré les
deux formules célèbres: non deserit nisi deseratur, et da quod jubes et jube
quod vis.”
78 Ibid., 313.
| | Pº Lº

20 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

logues there is sufficient evidence that Augustine attributed this change

to the mercy of God. They are not lacking in expressions of Christian
piety, in isolated citations from the Old and New Testaments, in the
ad-nowledgment of salvation through the merits of Christ. That these
early works differ somewhat in content and in tone from the later writ
tings of Augustine is not at all strange. It is not to be expected that
he should confide to his young pupils and to the circle of friends gath
ered at Cassiciacum thoughts which were uppermost in his mind: his
relation to God, and grief over his past life. These were pondered
over in the sanctuary of his heart.”
Seeberg maintains that Augustine's external submission to the
Church was accompanied by a deep interior process of conversion.
The faith of his childhood had never been completely effaced from
the soul of Augustine but, enveloped as he was for years in the
darkness of Manichaean materialism, he could not understand the
teachings of the Church. Neo-Platonism extricated him from this diffi
culty; it became for him the bridge to Christianity by enabling him to
conceive of spiritual reality and by offering an explanation of the
nature of evil. But Augustine was not a Christian Neo-Platonist. Neo
Platonism merely gave form to the content of his thought which was
basically Christian.”
Portalié remarks that undoubtedly there is considerable difference
between the Confessions and the philosophical Dialogues of Augustine,
but it can readily be accounted for if one considers the purpose and
the nature of these respective works. The Dialogues are a work of pure
philosophy, a product of Augustine's youth, and, as he himself frankly
admits,” somewhat pretentious in style. Is it possible, then, for such
writings to recount the victories of grace? It is only incidentally, Por
talié observes, that they reveal the spirit of the solitary, but they tell
us enough to identify him with the convert of the Confessions. These
early works manifest on the part of Augustine an excessive confidence
in Platonism. However, it evidently is not a Platonist who speaks in
74 G. Freiherr von Hertling, Augustin, Weltgeschichte in Karakterbildern
(Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1902), p. 37.
75 R. Seeberg, “Augustin und der Neuplatonismus” in W. Laible, Moderne
Irrtämer im Spiegel der Geschichte (Leipzig. Dorffling and Franke, 1912),
pp. 97-105. Cf. R. Seeberg, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte (Leipzig;
Deichert, 1923), II, 409 f.
76 Confessiones, L. IX, c. IV, n. 7 (XXXII, 766).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 21

them, but a Christian; or more exactly, it is both the one and the
other. For Augustine there were not two truths; there was only one
which he found in the Gospel and the reason for which he was seek
ing in philosophy.”
Montgomery, who firmly believes in the inherent credibility of the
Confeſsions in depicting the spiritual state of Augustine at the time of
his conversion, attempts to answer the principal objections of those
who deny the compatibility of the Dialogues and the Confessions. In
the first place, it was not a philosophical party that was gathered at
Cassiciacum. Augustine devoted a considerable part of his time to
teaching for the simple reason that he was obliged to do so in order
to support his mother and son, and possibly other members of his
household. “After all,” Montgomery adds, “most men have to go on
with some daily work, whether they be passing through a spiritual
crisis or no.”8
To the objection that in the Dialogue; there is little evidence of any
such crisis in Augustine's immediate past as the narrative of the Con
fessions would lead us to expect, Montgomery replies that, considering
the nature of these early works, it would be absurd to expect from them
so complete and intimate a self-revelation as the Confessions affords.
However, we can find in the Dialogues some allusion to this crisis.”
The cheerful tone of the early works in contrast to the penitential
atmosphere of Augustine's autobiography is not to be wondered at.
It would be unnatural for a man who possessed any sense of humor
to live in unmitigated gloom for months together. Besides, it is to be
expected that Augustine's momentous decision to break with his old
life should be accompanied by a sense of relief and with it a lightening
of the whole mood. Neither is it strange that Augustine's knowledge of
Christian doctrine should be somewhat defective even after his con
version. In the Confeſsions he himself admits that such was the case.”
What appears to be a more serious difficulty is the fact that in the
Dialogueſ very little is said about religion while philosophy is praised
77 E. Portalié, “Saint Augustin,” Dictionnaire de théologie Catholique (Paris:
Letouzey et Ané, 1903), I, 2273.
78 W. Montgomery, St. Augustine—Aspects of His Life and Thought (New
York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1914), p. 37
7° Contra Academicos, L. II, c. II, n. 5 (XXXII, 921).
* W. Montgomery, St. Augustine—Aspects of His Life and Thought, pp. 40
46.
 Yºº tº

22 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

in extravagant terms. Montgomery's explanation of this is that in

Augustine's early writings he views Christianity as interpreted through
Neo-Platonism. For the most part, he does not distinguish philosophy
from Christianity, but whenever he makes such a distinction, it is not
to philosophy that he awards the primacy.” Thus Montgomery answers
the negative objections raised against the compatibility of the Con
feſsionſ and the Dialogues.
From a positive point of view it seems a matter of surprise that,
on the evidence of the Dialogues, Augustine was not a more, but
rather a less complete Neo-Platonist at Cassiciacum than the Confes
Jions represent him to have been at that period. Montgomery's expla
nation is that, although at that time Augustine had read the Neo
Platonic books, he had not as yet worked out a solution for the intel
lectual difficulties which troubled him. This he was attempting to do
in the Dialogues. The existence of these difficulties, Montgomery
observes, does not conflict with the religious experience of the Con
feſsions. Augustine had already decided to believe on the grounds of
authority, but "his restless intellect ceaselessly endeavored to reach the
same conclusions along its own lines.”
Jens Nørregaard, the Danish scholar, is of the opinion that the
Confessions in almost every respect gives but new expression to the
details of the picture which the youthful writings of Augustine sketch
in regard to his spiritual development. The conclusion at which Nørre
gaard arrives as a result of his investigation is that the difference
between the portrayal of the decisive change in the religious life of
Augustine as given in the Confessions and the impression afforded by
his first writings is not so great as it usually is represented to be. If
one rightly understands the Confeſsions, Augustine even after his con
version was strongly inclined to Neo-Platonism, while his early works
disclose a greater influence of Christian thought than their marked
Neo-Platonic atmosphere might lead us to suspect. They likewise
reveal a conscious adoption of Christianity as the truth.
In reality, Neo-Platonism was of primary importance in the life
of Augustine for only a short time. Before his acquaintance with it,
Augustine had been so greatly attracted to Christianity that the new
81 Ibid., pp. 46-50.
82 Ibid., p. 65.
 s
T
-

CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 23

philosophy became for him only a means of adapting himself to Chris

tianity. Neo-Platonism, therefore, played only a secondary rôle, though
one of considerable importance, in the development of Augustine. At
the time of his baptism he was truly a Christian.*
Charles Boyer, the French Jesuit, is the classic defender of the his
toricity of the Confessions. From a detailed study of the relationship
of Christianity and Neo-Platonism in the spiritual development of
Augustine, Boyer concludes that according to both the Confessions and
the Dialogues Augustine was assuredly a Christian before he became
acquainted with Neo-Platonism and that the influence of the latter was
by no means a determining factor in his moral transformation.*
The influence of Christianity on the soul of Augustine can be traced
back to his earliest years. In his infancy he was enrolled by his pious
mother among the catechumens. With them he received the imposition
of salt in the church at Tagaste and was signed with the sign of the
cross. These rites were frequently renewed, as Augustine himself tells
us.” Throughout his childhood he was imbued by the saintly Monica
with Christian impressions which never completely vanished from his
soul. She taught him to pronounce the name of Christ with a venera
tion which should be accorded to no other name. He learned that salva
tion is found only in Christ, that the Master has promised eternal life
to the imitators of His humility. Even when pagan teaching drove
Christianity from his mind and sensual love banished it from his heart,
the name of Jesus continued to have a peculiar charm for Augustine.
83 J. Nørregaard, Augustins Religiose Gennembrud, En Kirkehistorick Under
Gogelse. (København: P. Branner, 1920), p. 337. This work was translated
into German by A. Spelmeyer under the title Augustin's Bekehrung (Tübing
en: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923).
Cf. A. Loisy's critical review of Augustin's Bekehrung in Revue critique
d'histoire et de littérature, XC (1923), 304.
84 C. Boyer, S.J., Christianisme et Néo-Platonisme dans la formation de saint
Augustin (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1920), pp. 130-131: ". . . d'après les Con
fessions, son esprit s'était soumis à la foi chrétienne avant de souvir au
néo-platonisme. . . . Avec plus d'insistence encore, Augustin proteste que ce
n’est pas l'influence néo-platonicienne qui a determiné sa transformation
morale;” p. 141: “En réalité, le fait qui a aiguillé, d'après les Confessions, le
progrès moral d'Augustin dans un sens specifiquement chrétien, nous parait
clairement confirmé par les Dialogues.”
* Cf. Confessiones, L. I, c. XI, n. 17 (XXXII, 668-669): ". . . et signabar
jam signo crucis ejus, et condiebar ejus sale, jam ab utero matris meae.”
Boyer adds, p. 24: “Noter les imparfaits de répétition.”
24 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Nothing completely obliterated this deeply-rooted impression of his

childhood. It was the dominant factor in his evolution.*
After reading Cicero's exhortation to the study of philosophy,
which made so profound an impression on the youthful Augustine, he
hastened to the Scriptures in search of that wisdom which the Horten
Jiu, urged him to pursue, for wisdom, he believed, must be associated
with the name of Christ.” Disappointed, however, with the simplicity
of their style, Augustine attached himself to the Manichaeans, at
tracted by their promise to provide the knowledge for which he longed.
But he never submitted entirely to Manichaeism and after nine years
he rejected it. Disappointed again in his hopes, he fell into a state
of doubt and despair of ever finding the truth. Perhaps, after all, the
doctrine of the New Academy was the best that could be found. Men
of high intellectual attainments had assured themselves that certitude
is unattainable; even Cicero, the author of the Hortensius, considered
it a satisfactory tenet.*
At this juncture the young professor of rhetoric fortunately changed
his residence from Rome to Milan, where he came under the influence
of St. Ambrose. The eloquence of the holy Bishop drew Augustine
once more into the atmosphere of Christian thought. Ambrose ex
plained the Old Testament allegorically and by his exegetic method
gave a very reasonable interpretation to the apparent anthropomor
phisms in the Sacred Books. The inconsistencies which the Manichaeans
had pointed out in the Holy Scriptures were soon cleared away and
Augustine found all his difficulties in accepting them eliminated. This
was indeed an important step, though not the final one, toward his
acceptance of Christianity. Gradually his doubts subsided and he be
came convinced of the authority of the Church, of its mission as a
divine teacher of Christian truth. To believe in the Scriptures as
explained by Ambrose and to believe in the Church were for Augus
tine one and the same thing. In his eyes the authority given by God to
the Sacred Writings became identified with that of the Church. From
86 C. Boyer, S.J., Christianisme et Néo-Platonisme dans la formation de saint
Augustin, p. 25.
87 Ibid., p. 34. Cf. C. Boyer, S.J., “La conversion de saint Augustin,” La scuola
Cattolica, IX (1927), 403.
88 C. Boyer, S.J., Christianisme et Néo-Platonisme dans la formation de saint
Augustin, pp. 38-50.
 s
–

|
CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 25

that time, by his assent to faith, Augustine in thought became a Catho

lic.” Under the sole influence of Ambrose before his acquaintance with
Plotinus and the books of the Platonists, the young rhetorician of
Milan, moved by the grace of God, found again the faith of his
infancy.”
However, between his return to the faith and his acquaintance with
Neo-Platonism, the mind of Augustine was not completely satisfied.
The materialistic philosophy in which he had so long been involved
prevented him from having as deep and true an understanding of the
faith as he desired. In this respect the writings of Plotinus, which fell
into his hands, proved of considerable advantage. They aided him in
understanding the principal dogmas of the Catholic faith. They were
of special assistance in affording him a clearer conception of spiritual
reality and in offering a solution for the problem of evil. From that
moment Augustine interpreted his faith, in so far as the sacred for
mulas permitted, according to this philosophy of the intelligible world.
He read these writings as a Christian and through them attained a
better understanding of Christian truths. But Augustine by no means
became a Christian because he had been a Neo-Platonist. Neo-Platonism
could not provide the necessary aids for his moral conversion which
had not yet taken place. The reading of St. Paul, prayer, the example
of Victorinus and of St. Anthony and his monks, the well-known crisis
in the garden when the mysterious voice bade him read the Scriptural
text which proved the final step—these were the factors which won
over to Christian perfection the noble soul of Augustine. These were
the influences which effected his conversion.”
Boyer holds that the Dialogues written at Cassiciacum are entirely
in harmony with the Confeſsions. These early writings disclose an inti
mate penetration of the Christian faith into the soul of St. Augustine;
in order to see this, however, one must understand that in the Dia

89 Ibid., p. 65: “Croire à l'Écriture que lui expliquait Ambroise et croire

à l'Église, c'était pour lui une seule et même chose. A ses yeux, l'autorité
donnée par Dieu ä l'Écriture s'identifiait avec celle de l'Eglise; il nomme
l'une ou l'autre indifféremment. Dès lors, dans sa pensée, il est devenu catho
lique par un assentiment de foi.”
90 C. Boyer, S.J., “La conversion de saint Augustin,” La scuola Cattolica, IX
(1927), 404.
91 C. Boyer, S.J., Christianisme et Néo-Platonisme dans la formation de faint
Augustin, pp. 191-192. -
26 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

logues he is speaking as a philosopher and rhetorician. But in the

Augustine of Cassiciacum we find an entirely different person from
the rhetorician and philosopher of former days. He has renounced
glory, ambition, and all superfluous desires. He has resolved to preserve
perfect chastity by embracing celibacy; he leads a mortified life; he is
searching for God. Whatever enthusiasm the reading of the Neo
Platonists may have aroused in him, it never led him to take these
steps. In the Confeſsions is found a satisfactory and authentic explana
tion; namely, Christian influence directing and completing the Neo
Platonic influence. This should be sufficient testimony of the Chris
tianity of St. Augustine at Cassiciacum.” It is evident that Augustine
himself saw no lack of harmony between his autobiography and his
early works. In his Retractationes he did not find it necessary to point
out the agreement of the Dialogue; and the Confessions because no
discrepancy was apparent to him.”
Bardenhewer, De Labriolle, and Cayré likewise contest the position
of those who reject the historicity of the Confeſsions. Bardenhewer
holds that the actual events related in the Confeſsions, when taken in
their full significance, are incontestable. According to the Retractationes
Augustine regarded his Confeſſions as a religious treatise and upon
reviewing the work, he found only one sentence which needed correc
tion.* The philosophical writings present several new points of infor
mation which fit in very well with Augustine's autobiography. They
cannot be regarded as specific testimony of their author's spiritual
progress, since they are products of the school of eloquence, and, as
such, are somewhat affected and impersonal in manner.”
Pierre De Labriolle repudiates the hypercritical attitude of those
who are scandalized at the content and the tone of the early works of
Augustine. They are astonished, he says, to find in them no traces of
the moral anguish which is so obvious in the Confessions. The peaceful
calm of these metaphysical discourses is not at all to be wondered at.
On the morrow of his dearly bought victory it was but natural that
some degree of relaxation and tranquillity should be experienced by

92 Ibid., pp. 152-153.

93 Ibid., pp. 187-188.
94 Cf. Retractationes, L. II; c. VI, n. 2 (XXXII, 632).
95 O. Bardenhewer, Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur, (2nd ed., Freiburg,
1924), IV, 452.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 27

the soul of Augustine. In the works whose unruffled tone amazes these
critics one is able “here and there to mark the track left by his [Augus
tine's] inner life, his devotion and tears in secret to which his com
panions were in no way privy.”
Augustine had lost all his prejudices against the Bible before he
came upon the books of the Platonists. Upon reading the latter, he was
greatly impressed by the points of resemblance between the teaching
contained therein and certain articles of Catholic doctrine, but he was
likewise struck by what was lacking in them.” His acquaintance with
Platonic literature was the point of departure for new reflections on
God, himself, and the true nature of evil. The Platonists settled many
of his metaphysical difficulties but did not enable him to conquer his
passions. It was only in the garden after the poignant struggle between
the two wills, when Augustine obeyed the mysterious command “tolle,
lege,” that “all shadows were dissipated and a sense of security came
to inundate his soul.”
Fulbert Cayré believes that the thesis of those who maintain that
the recluse of Cassiciacum was merely a convert to Neo-Platonism,
which he abandoned only several years after his baptism, is manifestly
exaggerated but is not entirely to be rejected. There is a difference
between the state of soul of Augustine as revealed in the Confeſsions
and that of the solitary at the country home of Verecundus; however,
it is not a distinction between the Philosopher and the Christian, but
between the imperfect and the perfect Christian. Without doubt Augus
tine found in his Christian faith peace both of mind and of heart but
it was a relative peace which, far from excluding all disquietude,
excited within him an ardent longing for true spiritual happiness
which he looked for here below in the possession of God. Philosophy
gave him this hope, but Christianity animated it by furnishing him
with the means of attaining the happiness he so desired. In these early
years, however, Augustine exaggerated the beatitude possible of attain
ment on earth and, in order to obtain it, he joined to an austere asceti
* P. De Labriolle, History and Literature of Christianity from Tertullian to
Boethius, translated by Herbert Wilson, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1925), p. 402.
97 Cf. Confessiones, L. VII, c. XXI, n. 27 (XXXII, 747-748).
* P. De Labriolle, History and Literature of Christianity from Tertullian to
Boethius, p. 399.
 28 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

cism an effort in the philosophic order, which was useful but immod
erate. The result was an unnaturalness and inquietude in his religious
life, which was eliminated only by degrees as his experience with the
interior life became more enriched and especially as grace enabled him
more definitely to understand and to find the Supreme Good. This
gradual evolution had been achieved when he wrote the Confeſsions,
and it was the enjoyment of this profound peace which dictated the
celebrated text of the first page of Augustine's autobiography: "Thou
hast made us for Thyself and our heart is restless till it repose in
Thee.”99

D. Recent Literature on the Problem

The literature commemorative of the fifteenth centenary of the

death of St. Augustine did not fail to mention the controversy relative
to his conversion. More recent studies also have made reference to that
important event in the life of the eminent convert.
Joseph Mausbach, adopting unreservedly the traditional view,
denies that it was Neo-Platonism which converted the doubter Augus
tine to faith in God and to a spiritual ideal of life and that Augustine's
reformation dated not from the crisis in the garden at Milan, but from
the entrance of Neo-Platonism into his life. While Augustine in his
Confeſſionſ and in his early writings speaks enthusiastically of the
books of the Platonists, in both he emphasizes the superiority of the
Pauline wisdom and the deeper effect it had upon him. Not only his
carnal desires but also his perverse will had to be overcome. This was
accomplished by Augustine for the first time at the memorable strug
gle in the garden at Milan. Neo-Platonic monotheism undoubtedly
made a powerful impression on Augustine. His conversion, however,
was not to theology but to faith in Christ and in His Church and to
moral purity.” And for a man so conscientious as Augustine, this con
version which had its climax in the Sacrament of Baptism could be
nothing else than a decisive moment of his life.”
99 F. Cayré, La contemplation Augustinienne—principes de la spiritualité de
saint Augustin (Paris: A. Blot, 1927), pp. 87-88.
100 J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus, (2nd ed., Freiburg: Herder
and Co., 1929), I, 13: “Erinnern wir uns noch einmal, dass seine Bekehrung
nicht eine Bekehrung zur Theologie, sondern zum Glauben an Christus und
die Kirche und zur sittlichen Reinheit war.”
101 Ibid., I, 13.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 29

Martin Grabmann is of the opinion that Neo-Platonism occupied a

very important place in the structure of Augustine's mental world, but
this does not mean that he borrowed all his philosophical principles
from Plotinus. By freeing Augustine from the bonds of sensual Mani
chaeism, Neo-Platonism prepared the soil of his mind for the spiritual
ity and purity of Christian doctrine. The more Augustine, after his
baptism, steeped himself in the mental world of Holy Scripture, the
more he assimilated with Christian teaching the elements which he had
received from Neo-Platonism. Toward the close of his life the Bishop
of Hippo disapproved of the excessive praise which in his early days
he had accorded to pagan philosophy. Augustine's christianizing of
Neo-Platonic philosophy, which in many respects involved the mis
shaping of Platonic thought, was an achievement comparable to that
performed in the Middle Ages by St. Albert the Great and especially
by St. Thomas Aquinas in their structure of a Christian Aristotelian
ism.” St. Thomas thus explicitly states the use which St. Augustine
made of Neo-Platonic philosophy in his theological speculation:
“Augustine who had been imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists
adopted whatever he found in their teaching compatible with faith,
but whatever he found in opposition to our faith he changed for the
better.”103
Monsignor Ubaldo Mannucci holds that the complete parallelism
of the Confessions with the Dialogues is sufficient to establish the tra
ditional view of the conversion of St. Augustine. The opposition raised
against this view has been advantageous in that it furnished an occa
sion for proving beyond doubt the historicity of the Confeſſions, and
also for obtaining a clearer knowledge of Augustine's intellectual and
moral progress before his conversion and of his interior life from that
important event until the writing of his celebrated autobiography.
The study of the Dialogues, Mannucci observes, reveals how Augus
tine overcame his despair of finding the truth by submitting to the
Church, the divinely appointed guardian of the revelation contained
19° M. Grabmann, “Augustins Lehre von Glauben und Wissen und ihr Einfluss
auf das mittelalterliche Denken” in Grabmann-Mausbach: Aurelius Augus
tinus (Cologne: J. P. Bachem, 1930), p. 94.
* St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 84, a. 5, resp. “Augustinus
qui doctrinis Platonicorum imbutus fuerat, si qua invenit fidei accomoda in
eorum dictis, assumpsit; quae vero invenit fidei nostrae adversa in melius
commutavit.”
30 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

in Holy Scripture. The primary influence in effecting this result was

Ambrose, the Bishop of Milan. In the second place, Augustine's
acquaintance with Neo-Platonism, which he interpreted according to
the Christian principles already fixed in his mind, disclosed to him the
harmony between faith and reason, especially in regard to the nature
of God, the eternity of the only-begotten Word, and the origin of evil.
Finally, his careful study of St. Paul assisted Augustine in understand
ing the humility of the Incarnation and the antinomy between sin and
grace, whence arose the mystery of the Redemption. Augustine him
self had intimate experience of the efficacy of grace.”
In the Confessions we have a record not only of the personal
experience of Augustine before his conversion and of his interior life
from the time of this great crisis until the writing of his autobiography,
but also of all the Christian experience of past centuries with all the
elements extracted from the contact of Christianity with the Greek and
Roman world, and of centuries to come, since the work of justification
and the efficacy of Divine grace will continue until the end of time.
Hence there is no conflict between the Dialogues and the Confeſsions.
The latter complements the narrative of the former and presents a
more impressive picture of the personality of their author.”
Warfield, Tolley, and Sparrow Simpson also believe that Augus
tine's early writings represent him as a convert to Christianity. Com
menting on the Dialogues, Warfield says: “Plainly it is not the philos
opher, only slightly touched by Christianity, that is speaking in them,
but the Christian theologian who finds all his joy in the treasures he
has discovered in his newly gained faith.” Tolley's opinion is that
there is no serious contradiction between the Confessions and the Dia
logues: “The Neo-Platonic character of the Dialogues is conceded, but
their Christian character is also defended. . . . On the other hand, to
believe in the essential agreement between the Confessions and the
Dialogues one need not deny that there are minor modifications of

104 U. Mannucci, “La conversion di S. Agostino e la critica recente,” in Miscel

lanea Agostiniana, 2 vols. (Rome: Poliglott Vatican Printing Office, 1931),
II, 46.
105 Ibid., II, 47. -

106 B. B. Warfield, “Augustine and His Confessions,” in Studies in Tertullian

and Augustine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 275-276.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 31

doctrine and thought.” Sparrow Simpson, after referring to the

critics who have defended or denied the historical value of the record
of the Confessions, maintains that a study of Augustine's works leads
us to conclude that he was converted to the authority of Christ and of
the Church. However, while giving implicit assent to the doctrines of
faith, Augustine needed time and reflection in order fully to realize
the implications of the doctrines to which he had assented.”
Jolivet holds that Augustine's conversion to Christianity, or rather
his return to the faith of his infancy, occurred some time previous to
his conversation with Simplicianus and to the scene in the garden. On
the evidence of the Confeſsions”—and Jolivet accepts unconditionally
its account of the conversion of Augustine—nothing can be clearer than
that he submitted to the Church before his intellectual difficulties had
been solved. Busy as he was with his professional and social duties,
and loath to intrude upon the scanty leisure of the Bishop of Milan,
the only means of instruction afforded to Augustine were the Sunday
sermons of Ambrose. These were intended for the faithful and not
for explaining problems of a speculative nature, such as troubled the
professor of rhetoric.” When he came in contact with Neo-Platonism,
he found his mind illumined and his thought transformed in regard
to doctrines which he had heard from the lips of Ambrose but which
he had not clearly understood. The impression made upon Augustine
by Neo-Platonism was so powerful that throughout his long career
some of its theories remained a pivot about which revolved his own
system of thought.” Augustine without hesitation attributed to Neo
Platonism the work of his deliverance on points which troubled him
after his return to the faith of his infancy.

107 W. P. Tolley, The Idea of God in the Philosophy of St. Augustine (New
York: R. B. Smith, 1930), p. 24.
108 W. J. Sparrow Simpson, St. Augustine's Conversion (New York: The Mac
millan Co., 1930), Introduction, p. VII.
109 Cf. Confessiones, L. VI, c. V, n. 7 (XXXII, 722-723); L. VII, c. VII, n. 11
(XXXII, 739).
110 R. Jolivet, Saint Augustin et le Néo-Platonisme Chrétien (Paris: Denoël et
Steele, 1932), pp. 92-93.
111 Ibid., p. 105: "Quoi qu'il en sort, le choc qu'Augustin ressentit de son con
tact avec le néoplatonisme fut si puissant que non seulement son esprit en
fut illuminé et sa pensée transformée, mais encore que dans la suite, et
tout de long de sa carrière, les théories plotiniennes restèrent l'un des pivots
de sa propre doctrine.”
32 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

In attempting to account for the profound influence of Neo-Plato

nism on Augustine, Jolivet offers as a solution for the problem the fact
that the texts of Plotinus which Augustine read were made by the
Christian convert, Marius Victorinus. As these were paraphrases rather
than exact translations, it may be that the Latin texts expressed the
Neo-Platonic thought in a more or less Christian sense with the result
that Augustine found them ready for adaptation to Christian doc
trine.” On the other hand, one need not suppose that this adaptation
of Neo-Platonic doctrine was voluntary on the part of Augustine. Both
the Confeſsions and the early writings imply an unconscious transposi
tion of Plotinian thought to a Christian meaning. Augustine was not
seeking a philosophical system in Neo-Platonism. He was looking for
a clearer conception of the faith he had embraced. Plotinus put him
on the way of finding what he desired and, above all, snatched him
from the abyss of materialism in which he was engulfed. Augustine
with his marvelous genius utilized what he had received, without being
particularly concerned with the Neo-Platonic text. Reading Neo-Plato
nism in this way, he failed to notice the incompatibility between Chris
tian doctrine and Plotinian thought. At that time we perceive in
Augustine not a theorist, but a soul restless and feverish in its search
for the light of God and not of men.” But whatever service the
works of Plotinus rendered to Augustine from an intellectual point
of view, they furnished no assistance for putting his moral conduct
in harmony with his faith. The way of salvation had to be sought not
in Neo-Platonism but in Christianity. The Christian way is opened by
112 Ibid., pp. 123-124.
Reinhold Schmid finds in Marius Victorinus a more definite Neo-Platonic
influence than in Augustine, especially in his doctrine on the Trinity. Even
in his earliest writings, Schmid observes, Augustine has passed far beyond
Victorinus in his conception of this Christian tenet. Cf. De ordine, L. I,
c. X, n. 29 (XXXII, 991). It was rather on the Ambrosian doctrine that
Augustine formed his theory of the Godhead. Cf. R. Schmid, Marius Vic
torinus Rhetor und seine Beziehungen zu Augustin, Inaugural Dissertation
(Kiel; Ernst Uebermuth, 1895), pp. 76-77: “Ein ungleich ausgebildetere und
klarere Trinitätslehre als bei Victorinus findet sich bei Ambrosius unbeirrt
von spekulativen Erwāgungen und Deduktionen. An ihm hat sich Augustin
gebildet, so dass er schon von Anfang an über den Standpunkt des Victori
nus hinausgestritten war.”
118 R. Jolivet, Saint Augustin et le Néo-Platonisme Chrétien, p. 125: “Plotin ne
représentait qu'un moyen à ses yeux, mais nullement une fin.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 33

the door of humility which Augustine found in reading the Epistler of

St. Paul. 114
The Dialogues, in the opinion of Jolivet, do not contradict the evi
dence of the Confessions. In his retreat at Cassiciacum Augustine con
tinued his search for truth as he had recently done at Milan. In doing
so, he had access to two sources: the Sacred Writings and the teachings
of the Church, on which were laid the foundations of his faith, and the
Neo-Platonic writings which aided him in gaining a better under
standing of what he believed. However, his Christian faith always
remained the unalterable rule upon which he based his judgments.”
Karl Adam considers it very significant that Augustine, when de
livered from the trammels of materialism, immediately recognized
Catholic Christianity as the true Christianity. That fact, in the opinion
of Adam, “is a further justification of our supposition that the Church
and her authority had from the very start some sort of vitality in his
subconsciousness. And so as soon as all the walls had fallen which he
had built up against her in years of passion and conflict, the Church
stood out for him at once as the one true Church.” But, although
Augustine gave complete assent to all the dogmas of the Church and
became and remained a thorough and sincere Catholic, it is equally
certain, Adam remarks, that “he saw the Church with Neoplatonic
eyes.” In other words, the mental atmosphere in which Augustine's
conversion had been effected was decidedly Neo-Platonic and continued
to be so until 391 A.D. As his study of Holy Scripture became more
intensive, he began to have an increasingly deeper realization of what
Christianity had in common with Neo-Platonism and also of the points

114 Ibid., pp. 131-132.

115 Ibid., pp. 148-149: "En fait, les Dialogues reviennent sans cesse au point
de vue chrétien, et Augustin, dans sa retraite, continue simplement de
chercher la vérité comme il l'a fait naguère à Milan; il puise à deux sources,
qui sont, d'une part, les livres révélés et l'enseignement de l'Église, qui
fondent sa croyance, et, d'autre part, les ouvrages néo-platoniciens, qui l'aident
à se hausser a 1'intelligence de la foi, mais de telle sorte que la croyance
chrétienne reste toujours la régle inébranlable de ses jugements.”
118 K. Adam, St. Augustine, the Odyssey of His Soul, translated by Dom Justin
McCann (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932), pp. 20-21. This is a
translation of the centenary address entitled Die geiſtige Entwicklung des
heiligen Augustinus, delivered at Tübingen, at a celebration held by the
Catholic Theological Faculty in honor of St. Augustine, on May 4, 1930.
117 Ibid., p. 21.
34 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

in which it was essentially different. In order correctly to understand

Augustine's mental development as a Christian, one must take note
of this confusion of Christian and Neo-Platonic elements which char
acterized the thought of Augustine during these early years of his
conversion. His whole subsequent evolution, according to Adam, was
“a progressive deliverance from Neo-Platonism and a growth into
essential Christianity: Augustine would scarcely have become the great
saint that he did, and certainly not the great theologian, had not his
own development forced him into a continual argument with Neo
Platonism.” However, he never completely broke with it; "as long
as he lived he extolled it for its special achievement, that it had recog
nized and proclaimed the immutability of eternal truth.”
It is the opinion of Hofmann that in many respects the Confeſsions
seems to harmonize with the early writings of Augustine. However,
a careful analysis of both forces one to conclude that the Confeſsionſ
presents an erroneous picture of the catechumen, and that it was the
Catholic Bishop who sketched the autobiography.”
Hofmann thus summarizes the results of his comparative study:
1. At Cassiciacum Augustine devotes himself with great enthusiasm to
the study of wisdom. In general, he identifies wisdom with Neo
Platonic philosophy which, he believes, is in perfect harmony with
Christianity. He arrived at this conclusion by transporting, at one time,
Christian notions into Neo-Platonism and, at another, Neo-Platonic
ideas into Christianity. 2. According to the testimony of the Confer
Jion'ſ Augustine in those early days was penetrated with the spirit of
Christianity, a characteristic notably lacking in the Dialogueſ. In the
latter there appears no notion of the forgiveness of sin, so strongly
emphasized in the Confeſsions; rather they are permeated by an ethical
complacency which accompanied his pursuit of higher knowledge.
Fundamentally the early works bear the stamp of a powerful Neo
Platonic influence. 3. At that time religion and philosophy are blended
into an inseparable unity in which philosophy takes the lead. Christ
and the Church are but minor elements in the amalgam.”
118 Ibid., p. 29.
119 Ibid., p. 38.
120 F. Hofmann, Der Kirchenbegriff des heiligen Augustinus in seinen Grund
lagen und in seiner Entwicklung (Munich: Max Hueber, 1933), p. 20.
121 Ibid., p. 35.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 35

F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A., is of the opinion that the importance of

Neo-Platonism as a factor in the conversion of St. Augustine has been
greatly exaggerated. Augustine's thought was drawn from facts re
corded in the fourth Gospel and from thoughts expressed in the first
Epistle of St. John rather than from Platonic or Neo-Platonic sources.
When Augustine came into the Church, Father Tourscher observes,
"he brought with him no one of the pre-Christian systems of philos
ophy. He professed to follow none. In the Catholic Church he found
the right way of thinking and a complete philosophy of the meaning
of life.”122
After “literally groping in the confusion of pre-Christian sys
tems” Augustine allowed himself temporarily to rest in a state of
theoretic doubt. In this frame of mind he came to Milan, where he
found himself once more under the influence of Catholic thought.
From Ambrose he learned “new ways of thinking about spirit sub
stance . . . . The facts of the Bible and the meaning of facts in the
mind of the living Church opened a new way of thinking where Pla
tonic ideas had failed.”
Tourscher maintains that the works of Augustine from the time
of his conversion until his ordination to the priesthood were planned
and written for a fixed purpose; namely, “to build up a definite system
of thought for Christian Philosophy.” The arguments in these early
treatises, for example, in his studies on the soul, “rest not on the author
ity of other thinkers, Plato or Plotinus, but on the force of facts and
the logic which facts reveal. Facts are the starting point, they are the
premises.”
Paul Henry, S.J., while stressing the importance of Neo-Platonic
influence on the intellectual development of Augustine, is of the
opinion that a great distance separates the Bishop of Hippo from the
122 F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A., “Saint Augustine's Philosophy, Right Thinking and
Right Living,” The American Ecclesiastical Review, (1933), 114.
123 Ibid., 114.
124 Ibid., 115.
125 F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A., “Augustine's First Studies in Philosophy, His In
fluence on Catholic Culture,” The American Ecclesiastical Reviews (1930),
120.
** F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A., “St. Augustine's Philosophy, Right Thinking and
Right Living,” The American Ecclesiastical Review, (1933), 121.
36 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Philosopher of Alexandria.” Augustine did not copy Plotinus even

though he allowed himself to be influenced by the illustrious pagan.
He made use of the vocabulary of Plotinus, and his mentality, to a
certain extent, was Neo-Platonic. His spirit, however, was entirely
different; it was the spirit of the Gospel and of the Church.” In ref
erence to the enthusiasm which Augustine manifested upon reading the
works of Plotinus, Father Henry remarks: “If he [Augustine] was so
dazzled by the doctrines of Plotinus, when he first came upon them, it
is because he read them with Christian eyes and with a Christian
mind.” By listening to the sermons of Ambrose for whom he had
deep regard, Augustine progressed little by little in the knowledge of
Christianity with the result that he already knew its principal doctrines
before he made a profound study of the Scriptures. Hence, when he
opened the books of the Platonists, he was able to compare them with
the Sacred Writings. The instructions of the Bishop of Milan, it is of
particular importance to note, made him understand the special and
unique authority which the Catholic faith attaches to the Scriptures
as such.130
As far as the essential facts of Augustine's conversion are con
cerned, the Confessions, Henry observes, is quite in harmony with the
Dialogues written at Cassiciacum. There is more literary embellishment
in the former than the latter, a quality not to be expected in a philo
sophical treatise.” Hence, “it is in vain that critics have opposed
Augustine the bishop to Augustine the convert.” The Confeſsions
is not less Plotinian than are the Dialogues.” Augustine always re
mained true to Plotinus; however, he knew full well the difference
between the Gospel; and the Enneads, between the spirit of St. Paul and
127 P. Henry, S.J., Plotin et l'Occident (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovani
ense, 1934), p. 64.
128 Ibid., p. 142: "Son esprit est un esprit tout nouveau, c'est l'esprit de
1’Evangile et de l'Église du Christ.”
129 P. Henry, S.J., “Augustine and Plotinus,” The Journal of Theological Studies,
XXXVIII (1937), 11.
130 P. Henry, S.J., La vision d'Ostie (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938), pp. 65-66.
131 P. Henry, S.J., Plotin et l'Occident, pp. 93-94.
132 P. Henry, S.J., “Augustine and Plotinus,” The Journal of Theological Studies,
XXXVIII (1937), 11.
138 P. Henry, S.J., La vision d'Ostie, p. 33.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 37

that of Plotinus.” Morally and intellectually, then, it is to the Gospel

that Augustine was converted.”
Romano Guardini believes that what Augustine read in the Enneads
of Plotinus was actually a religious philosophy, but what he was look
ing for was Christianity. The feeling enkindled by Plotinus in the
heart of Augustine was not of philosophic origin but was derived from
another source. For awhile there was danger that Augustine would
mistakenly regard it as philosophy and that he would allow himself to
become absorbed therein. But his Christian instinct was stronger than
this philosophic impulse. Involuntarily he repeated what he had done
in his nineteenth year after reading the Hortensius: he hastened to
Holy Scripture, to the Epistles of St. Paul. But now Augustine was able
to grasp their meaning—a proof of the advancement he had made
since his first experience with the Sacred Books. He realized that
some of the sentiments expressed in the Enneads of Plotinus are like
wise to be found in the writings of St. Paul, also that the Christian
revelation is in no way a spiritually inferior doctrine, but the truth in
its entirety. More important still, he realized that the Pauline doctrine
is not merely a source of enlightenment, but is also a channel of grace.
Besides conveying to man the knowledge of a spiritual God, of crea
tion, of good and evil, it points out the means of arranging one's moral
life in conformity with the teaching it imparts. In other words, it ac
quaints him with the need of a thorough conversion.”
Referring to the discussion that has centered about the conversion
of St. Augustine, Étienne Gilson in The Spirit of Mediaeval Philoſophy
explicitly affirms his agreement with the view that Augustine's con
version was genuinely Christian. The Confessionſ clearly shows that
Augustine found fault with Neo-Platonism for its ignorance of the
twofold doctrine of sin and its deliverance through grace. “One
might show,” Gilson remarks, “that the purely intellectual evolution
of St. Augustine was completed by his adhesion to Neo-Platonism and
nevertheless, with St. Augustine himself, we should have to add a good
184 P. Henry, S.J., “Augustine and Plotinus,” The Journal of Theological Studies,
XXXVIII (1937), 11.
135 P. Henry, S.J., Plotin et l'Occident, p. 103: “Moralement comme intellectu
ellement, c'est à l'Évangile qu'il s'est converti.”
* R. Guardini, Die Bekehrung des heiligen Aurelius Augustinus (Leipzig; J.
Hegner, 1935), pp. 264-265.
38 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

many restrictions; but his whole doctrine makes it impossible to confuse

that adhesion with his conversion.” Plotinus, it is true, urged man
to curb his passions and to aspire after God, but he could render him
no assistance for following this excellent advice. The conversion of
Augustine was effected not by the reading of Plotinus, but by the
perusal of St. Paul and his doctrine of grace. Gilson concludes: “It was
not an intellect that agonized in the night in the garden of Cassiciacum:
it was a man.”188

E. Purpose of the Present Study

Such are the lines of argument proposed by those who deny and
by those who uphold the Christian conversion of St. Augustine in
386 A.D. The battle ground of the controversy, as has been pointed
out, is the early writings of Augustine. The first group believe that the
evidence in these early treatises offers a conclusive proof that their
author became a Neo-Platonist; the second find in the same produc
tions unquestionable verification of Augustine's Christianity at that
period, in that they discover in them no essential disagreement with
the account of his conversion as recorded in the Confeſsions. Hence
they adhere to the traditional view of Augustine's conversion.
The former group are wholly in agreement with one another in
alleging that on the basis of Augustine's early writings one is forced
to conclude that at first he was fundamentally a Neo-Platonist, although
eventually he became a Christian. They differ, however, as to when
precisely he could be said to have embraced Christianity. Becker holds
that the change to a Christian view can be noted in the treatise De
moribus ecclesiae catholicae which was written about 388 A.D.”
Loofs is of the opinion that from 386 to 391 A.D. Augustine's think
ing was basically Neo-Platonic tinged somewhat with a Christian hue,
and that Neo-Platonism remained the foundation upon which he
erected his theological thought.” Gourdon asserts that only in 390
A.D. can Augustine with propriety be called a Christian since in that
year he wrote the first treatise that is Christian in content and in spirit;
however, his conversion to Christianity was not completed before 400
137 E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (New York: Charles Scrib
ner's Sons, 1936), p. 31.
138 Ibid., p. 31.
18° H. Becker, Augustin, Studien zu seiner geistigen Entwicklung, pp. 56-57.
** F. Loofs, “Augustinus,” Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und
Kirche, II, 270, 274.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 39

A.D.” Alfaric, as we have seen, maintains that the Dialogues indicate

that both from a moral and an intellectual point of view Augustine
was converted to Neo-Platonism, and he specifies that the Soliloquia
and the De quantitate animae prove him to be a convinced Neo
Platonist tinted more or less with Christianity.” Thimme believes that
Augustine became amenable to Christian influences after having be
come an almost complete Neo-Platonist.” While accepting the three
crises in Augustine's life, which are mentioned in the Confessions,
Max Wundt argues that a fourth turning point should be designated in
the spiritual development of Augustine, namely, the complete break
with Neo-Platonism and, in general, with a philosophic mode of
thought and diction, which occurred at the beginning of the year
391 A.D., about the time of his ordination to the priesthood. The
doctrine supported in the last work of the preceding period can be
regarded less as Christianity than as philosophy of a decidedly Neo
Platonic coloring.”
The diversity of opinions expressed by these critics would lead us
to believe that each used his own individual norm for determining
what specifically constitutes a Christian content and spirit. Otherwise,
why should Becker, for example, find sufficient evidence in the treatise
De moribus eccleſiae catholicae to entitle its author to be designated
a Christian, and Gourdon believe that the first manifestation of defi
nitely Christian thought appears in a work composed some two years
later? Why should Wundt require a fourth crisis in order adequately
to explain the development of Augustine? Since Loofs regards Neo
Platonism as the foundation on which Augustine reared the structure
of his theological thought, it seems apparent that he finds such close
affinities between Neo-Platonism and Christianity, as to make the latter
merely the completion of the former, since, after all, the foundation
determines to a great extent the stability of the superstructure.
In view of the variance between the conclusions arrived at by the
critics whom we have mentioned, it would seem that the early writings
141 L. Gourdon, Essai sur la conversion de faint Augustin, pp. 82-87.
*** P. Alfaric, L'évolution intellectuelle de faint Augustin, pp. 399, 527.
148 W. Thimme, Augusting geistige Entwicklung in den ersten jahren nach
seiner Bekehrung, p. 253.
** M. Wundt, “Ein Wendepunkt in Augustins Bekehrung,” Zeitschrift für die
neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche, XXI
(1922), 54-56.
40 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

of Augustine, that is, the works composed from the time of his retreat
at Cassiciacum in 386 A.D. until his ordination to the priesthood in
391 A.D., taken by themselves and independently of the Confessions,
offer a field for further study in respect to the Neo-Platonic or Chris
tian conversion of their author and the content of his mind during the
five years which followed this important event, a study based upon
standards of a different nature from those used by the critics whose
opinions have been cited. The fact itself of Augustine's conversion is
not pertinent to the problem with which we are concerned. All admit
that approximately in 386 A.D. a reformation occurred in the conduct
of the Milanese Professor of Rhetoric, that he began at that time to
embrace a new moral life. The point of importance, it would seem,
is to determine, if possible, the intellectual content of Augustine's new
mode of life. At the time of his conversion was he possessed of suffi
cient Christian dogma to justify us in styling him a Christian or, on
the other hand, was his mental content so fundamentally Neo-Platonic
as to warrant our calling him a Neo-Platonist? This is the question we
propose to answer by an analysis of the treatises and letters written by
Augustine from the time of his sojourn at Cassiciacum until the office
of the priesthood was urged upon him at Hippo.
However, in order to determine what precisely is Christian and
what is definitely Neo-Platonic in these early writings, it seems neces
sary to provide a suitable criterion for distinguishing the one from the
other—a measuring-rod, so to speak, which is not of our own making.
The objective norm which for our purpose appears to be indisputably
sound and entirely adequate is twofold: first, a standard derived from
the basic doctrines of Christianity and of Neo-Platonism, as estab
lished by their respective Founders; secondly, a standard obtained from
the writings of Augustine himself at a time when by universal agree
ment he was definitely a Christian and was consequently in a position
to distinguish between Neo-Platonism and Christianity. The works
from which it seems advisable to set up this second criterion for
distinguishing Christianity from Neo-Platonism, as they appeared to
Augustine, are his most celebrated writings, the Confeſsions and the
City of God. By applying this twofold norm to the products of the
first half decade of Augustine's literary career, we should be able to
determine the precise nature of the content of their author's mind and
the name which rightly can be given it.
 CHAPTER II

CRITERIA

The first standard for determining the Christian and the Neo
Platonic elements in the early writings of Augustine is a norm objec
tively established on the distinction between the fundamental princi
ples of Christianity and of Neo-Platonism. This criterion can adequately .
be drawn up, it would seem, by considering, first, the meaning of
conversion; secondly, what constitutes a Christian view; thirdly, the
basic ideas of Neo-Platonism; and finally, the characteristics which
differentiate the former from the latter.

A. The Meaning of Conversion

Conversion, from the Latin verb convertere (to turn round, to
change one's direction), signifies a change in conformity with the views
of another. In its widest application it includes every change of opin
ion, without respect to subject. In a more limited and, we may add,
in the usual sense of the term, it includes a complete change of atti
tude toward God, involving a deep conviction of ultimate religious
and moral truths. It is, of course, in the latter sense that we apply the
word to the subject of our discussion. Moreover, we are referring to
the ordinary and not to the instantaneous type of conversion, of
which, for example, St. Paul the Apostle furnishes a classical illustra
tion. Now, what can be said as to the nature of the causes of con
version? What part is taken by man in that activity which effects
within him so radical a change?
Since man by nature is a contingent being, a being who is depend
ent in the order of existence and therefore in respect to everything
which flows from that existence, he cannot ascribe conversion wholly
to himself. In the case of every man, then, conversion begins with
some grace received from the Author of his being. The acceptance of
this grace, for man being a free agent has it within his power to accept
or to reject it, rests with man himself. In this sense, conversion, even
in its initial stage, may be considered as a product of man's own
activity, that is to say, it proceeds from an act of the will which moves
the intellect accidentally, as it were, to begin its inquiry, to start out
on its tour of investigation in order that it may arrive at truth. How
42 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

ever, the intellectual conviction which follows upon the search for
truth does not mark the completion of the process of conversion. For
even though the intellect may move the will to accept what has been
discovered, man is still the master of his own consent. In other words,
he is free to act or not to act in accordance with what his intellect pro
poses to him as desirable. St. Thomas explicitly teaches that there is such
a radical freedom in man in the present state in which he finds himself,
that he can refuse to think about any object whatsoever, and therefore
he has it in his power to reject even the highest good." It is only in
the presence of the necessary good, that is, in the presence of God
Himself, that the will can be compelled in a necessary way. Hence
the will is the decisive factor in effecting this change in man.
Conversion, then, implies the submission of man's intellect and
will to God, and consequently his readiness to accept whatever God
has made known to him and to arrange his life in conformity with that
doctrine. In other words, in the process of conversion an act of faith
is the final step as regards the free submission of the intellect to God's
revelation. But although man's highest powers, his intellect and will,
are involved in this activity, conversion does not concern any one or
two particular faculties. Man is a unity; he is one being, a single whole;
hence it is not merely his intellect that is affected, nor is it solely his
will. Conversion is something which concerns the entire man, his mind
and heart and soul.

B. The Basic Doctrines of Christianity

Let us next consider what is implied in conversion to Christianity.
Christianity is the name assigned to a religion established in Palestine
during the reign of the Roman Emperor, Tiberius Caesar. Its founder
was the great historical Personage, Jesus Christ,” Who during the
greater part of His life was regarded as the son of Joseph and Mary,
poor and obscure residents of the village of Nazareth,” although they
1 St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae: De malo, q. 6, a. 1, resp. (Paris:
Consociatio Sancti Pauli, 1883).
* The sources upon which we depend for our knowledge of the life of Christ
are chiefly the four Gospels according to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.
These together with the Acts of the Apostler constitute the historical books
of the New Testament.
* Luke III, 23; II, 4-16; Matthew I, 18.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 43

were descendants of the royal house of David.” At about the age of

thirty Christ left His humble home in Galilee and entered upon a
public life of great activity, journeying throughout the various towns
and cities of Palestine, instructing a band of disciples whom He
selected to carry on His work,” teaching the people, and substantiating
by miracles" His claim of being the long-expected Messiah, the Son
of God.” On account of His Messianic pretensions He was condemned
to death by Pontius Pilate, the Governor of Judea, at the instigation
of the Jewish Sanhedrim,” but on the third day after His crucifixion
and death” He crowned His former miracles by the most stupendous
of them all, that of His resurrection from the tomb.” For forty days
after this marvelous event He remained on earth, instructing the disci
ples whom He had chosen to disseminate His doctrine throughout the
world.” At the expiration of that time He ascended into Heaven,
after promising His disciples that He would send the Holy Spirit to
remain with them and their successors as a Guide to insure for all
time the purity of His doctrine.”
After the coming of the Holy Ghost the disciples dispersed among
the various nations to begin their mission. The fundamental doctrines
of the religion which their Master had commanded them to preach
have passed down through the centuries in the creeds formulated by
the Church as embodying the principal articles of faith, the most im
portant of which are the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian
Creeds.” Since the briefest digest of the teachings of Christ, com
* Matthew I, 1-17.
5 Matthew X, 1; Mark III, 14-15; Luke VI, 13; IX, 1.
6 Matthew V-XXV; Mark I, 21—XIII; Luke IV-XXI; John II-XVII.
7 Luke XXII, 70; John III, 16; IV, 26; VIII, 27, 49, 54; X, 29, 30, 38;
XI, 41; XVI, 28, 32.
8 Matthew XXVII, 26; Mark XV, 15; John XIX, 16.
9 Matthew XXVII, 35, 50; Mark XV, 24, 37; Luke XXIII, 33, 46; John
XIX, 18, 30.
10 Matthew XXVIII, 6; Mark XVI, 6; Luke XXIV, 1-6; John XX, 15-17.
11 Act; I, 3; Matthew XXVIII, 19-20.
12 John XIV, 16, 17, 26; Acts I, 8.
18 The Nicene Creed is the Symbol formulated at the First Council of Nice in
325 A.D. It stresses the consubstantiality of Jesus Christ with the Father in
opposition to Arius who attacked the divinity of Christ. The Athanasian
Creed treats almost exclusively of the doctrines of the Trinity and the In
carnation, only a passing reference being made to other dogmas. This Creed,
if not the composition of St. Athanasius, Archbishop of Alexandria—until the
seventeenth century it was thought to be so—at least, owes its existence to
Athanasian influences. Cf. P. Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, 2 vols. (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1878), I, 24-29; 34-42.
44 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

prising truths of the natural and the supernatural order, is found in

the Apostles' Creed or the Symbol of the Apostles, as it is sometimes
called, it seems advisable to make use of this compendium of Christian
faith from which to outline the fundamental doctrines of Christianity.
Although, according to Schaff, the Apostles' Creed in precisely the
form and language in which we have it today can hardly be found
beyond the latter part of the fifth century,” in substance it can be
traced back to the earliest years of the Christian era. As Schaff remarks:
“If we look at the several articles of the Creed separately, they are all
of Nicene or ante-Nicene origin while its kernel goes back to the
Apostolic Age.”
That a definite form of belief should have been drawn up, em
bracing at least the basic doctrines of Christ, in other words, that some
kind of a creed should have been formulated by the Apostles would
seem to have been necessary for the preservation of unity of belief.
Evidence that there was such a form may be gathered from the Acts
of the Apostles and from the Epistles of St. John and of St. Paul.”
Moreover, the various forms of the “Rule of Faith” which was found
in the writings of the Fathers of the Church during the second and
third centuries contain in great measure the substance of the Apostles'
Creed as we have it today. Whether or not the term “Rule of Faith”
can be regarded as synonymous with “Creed” is not to our present
purpose to investigate.” The point which concerns us is the evidence
that many of the articles embodied in the Apostles' Creed were ac
cepted as a summary of Christian doctrine from the early part of the

14 P. Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, I, 19.

15 Ibid., I, 20.
16 The sermons preached by St. Peter and St.Paul as recorded in the Acts of the
Apostles are very similar in content. Cf. Acts II, III, IV, X, XVII. St. John
in his second Epistle, 10, remarks: “If any man come to you, and bring not
this doctrine, receive him not into the house, nor say to him God speed you.”
St. Paul speaks to the Romans of “that form of doctrine into which you have
been delivered” (Romans VI, 17), to the Hebrews “of the doctrine of bap
tisms, and imposition of hands, and eternal judgment” (Hebrews, VI, 2), to
Timothy of that doctrine which is according to godliness” (1 Timothy VI,
3) Cf. 2 Timothy I, 13, 14; Hebrews V, 12.
"Cf. J. R. Gasquet, Studies Contributed to the "Dublin Review” (Westminster:
Art and Book Co., 1904), pp. 86-90.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 45

second century” by Christians of the Eastern and Western Churches.

It is of special interest to note that the Church of Africa in the third
century possessed a Creed or Rule of Faith embracing in substance all
the articles of the Apostles' Creed, as may be gathered from the com
bined writings of St. Cyprian and Tertullian.” The latter tells us that
the Church of Rome” had a Symbol in common with the Church of
Africa.” St. Ambrose remarks that in his day Rome kept ever intact
the Symbol of the Apostles,” and Rufinus observes that the Creed was
faithfully transmitted in the Church of the city of Rome, though other
Churches made some additions to it.”

The text of the Apostles' Creed which was in general use in Africa
toward the close of the fourth century may be gathered from the dis
course delivered by St. Augustine at the Council of Hippo-Regius

18 St. Ignatius of Antioch (107 A.D.) in his Epistola ad Trallianos, c. 9, warns

the Trallians to preserve intact against the heretics a series of doctrines;
namely, that Christ is the Son of God, that He was born of the Virgin Mary,
that He was crucified, died, arose from the dead, and ascended into Heaven.
Irenaeus (180 A.D.) incorporates most of the twelve articles of the Apostles'
Creed in Contra haereses L. I, c. 10, n. 1; also in Adversus haereses L. III,
c. 4, n. 1-2; L. IV, c. 33, n. 7.
19 A somewhat different form of Creed is found in each of the following works
of Tertullian: De virginibus velandis, c. I, Adversus Praxeam, c. 2, De prae
scriptione haereticorum, c. 13. Articles lacking in Tertullian's forms are con
tained in a fragmentary creed in St. Cyprian's Epistle to Januarius (Ep. 70).
Origen of Alexandria also gives some fragments of the Creed which was used
in Africa in his day, in the preface of the first book of his De principiis.
20 In the early Church, the principal churches throughout the world had each
its own Symbol; namely the Church of Rome, the Church of Aquileia, the
Church of Antioch, and the Church of Alexandria. "In spite of variations in
the form and wording,” Alexander MacDonald observes, “the Symbol is one
—one in its scope, one in its meaning, one in its structure, one in type, one
in all its essential elements.” Cf. A. MacDonald, The Apostles Creed. (2nd
ed., London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1925), p. 7.
21 Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, c. 36.
22 St. Ambrose, Epistola ad Siricium: “Credatur Symbolo Apostolorum, quod
Ecclesia Romana intemeratum semper custodit et servat.”
* Rufinus, Expositio Symboli Apostolici, c. III.
The following is the Latin text of the Old Roman Creed as found in the
Expositio Symboli Apostolici, which was used before 341 A.D.: “Credo in
Deum Patrem omnipotentem. Et in Jesum Christum, Filium ejus unicum,
Dominum nostrum; qui natus est de Spiritu Sancto et Maria Virgine; sub
Pontio Pilato crucifixus, et sepultus; tertia die resurrexit a mortuis; ascendit
in coelum, sedet ad dexteram Patris; inde venturus est judicare vivos et mor
tuos. Et in Spiritum Sanctum; Sanctam Ecclesiam; remissionem peccatorum;
jºinem."
om, II, 47.
This text is found in P. Schaff, Creeds of Christen
 46 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

which convened in 393 A.D. Augustine tells us” that he was ordered
by the Bishops at the general assembly of the North African Church
to give a discussion on Faith and the Creed. The following articles
may be collected from Augustine's discourse, comprising almost the
entire Creed as we have it today:
As we believe therefore in God the Father Almighty. . . . We
believe also in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only Begotten
of the Father, that is to say, His only Son our Lord. . . . Believ
ing in that Son of God who was born of the Holy Ghost
through the Virgin Mary. . . . Therefore do we believe in Him
who under Pontius Pilate was crucified and buried. . . . We
believe that He ascended into Heaven. . . . We believe also
that He sitteth at the right hand of the Father. . . . We believe
also that at the most seasonable time He will come from thence
and will judge both the quick and the dead. . . . There is added
to our confession . . . the Holy Spirit. . . . We believe also
in the Holy Church . . . assuredly the Catholic. . . . We believe
also in the remission of sins. . . . We believe also in the resur
rection of the flesh. . . . And when this resurrection of the body
has taken place . . . we shall fully enjoy eternal life.”
From the historical evidence furnished by the Apostles' Creed,”
then, we can readily determine the basic dogmas taught by the Apostles
and Disciples of Christ, as well as by their successors, in executing the
Divine commission to teach all nations.” All things owe their existence
to God, a Spiritual Being of infinite perfection in Whom there is a
unity of essence and a trinity of Persons, distinct from One Another
and in every respect equal. This one, personal, omnipotent Being not
only created, but continually preserves all things. From the beginning
of the world He made laws to govern the conduct of man. When the
human race in the person of Adam, its first parent, disobeyed His law,
His love for man prompted Him to send upon earth His Divine Son,
24 Retractationes, L. I, c. XVII, (XXXII, 612): “Per idem tempus (presbyterii
mei) coram episcopis hoc mihi jubentibus, qui plenarium totius Africae con

cilium Hippone-regio habebant de Fide et Symbolo presbyter disputari."

25 De fide et symbolo, c. II, n. 3—c. XXIV, n. 24 (XL, 183-196).
28 For a detailed study of the Apostles' Creed see the following: A. MacDonald,
The Apostles' Creed, H. B. Swete, The Apostles' Creed: Its Relation to Primi
tive Christianity (3rd ed., Cambridge: The University Press, 1899); J. R.
Gasquet, Studies, Contributed to the “Dublin Review,” c. IV-V; P. Schaff,
The Creeds of Christendom, I, 3-24; II, 1-55.
27 Matthew, XXVIII, 19-20.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 47

the Second Person of the Trinity, Who assumed human nature and
suffered the death of a criminal in order to redeem and save His fallen
creatures, and to teach them by word and example how to attain their
ultimate end, for man's existence does not terminate with the present
life. His destiny, if he observes the Divine Law, is to love and enjoy
God forever, while preserving his own identity, in the life to come.
If he refuses to obey God's Law, he will be condemned, both soul and
body—for by nature he is a composite of a spiritual soul and a material
* body—to eternal punishment. The Founder of this body of doctrine
established a Church to which under the guidance of the Holy Spirit,
the Third Person of the Trinity, was entrusted a threefold mission:
to teach, to govern, and to sanctify all men. These are the basic doc
trines of the Christian religion, and it is the acceptance of these funda
mental teachings and the regulation of one's life in accordance with
them which constitutes conversion to Christianity.

C. The Basic Doctrines of Neo-Platonism

We shall next examine the basic principles of what is known as
Neo-Platonism. Neo-Platonism is a term applied to a philosophical
system, eclectic in content and decidedly spiritual in tone, founded by
Plotinus, the first great thinker of the West. Plotinus, whose birthplace
was Lycopolis in Egypt, pursued his philosophical studies for eleven
years under a self-made teacher, Ammonius Saccas,” of whose philo
sophical tenets little, if anything, is known. That he exercised a re
markable influence on his disciple is evident from the simple but
beautiful tribute which Plotinus paid his master when, after wandering
dissatisfied from one teacher to another, in his twenty-eighth year he
had the good fortune, he believed, of meeting Ammonius Saccas. “This
is the man I was looking for,” Plotinus remarked after the first lecture
of his new master whose ardent disciple he remained until the death
of Ammonius some eleven years later. In 244 A.D., Plotinus went to
28 Ammonius Saccas, as teacher of Plotinus, is sometimes regarded as the founder
of Neo-Platonism. Dean Inge says in reference to Saccas: ". . . the scanty
and untrustworthy notices that we have of his oral teaching (he committed
nothing to writing) do not enable us to say with certainty whether he de
serves to be called the founder of Neoplatonism.” Cf. W. R. Inge, The Philos
ophy of Plotinus, 2 vols. (2nd ed., New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1923), I, 95.
 48 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Rome where he began his philosophical career which ended near the
same city about 270 A.D.”
Neo-Platonic philosophy shows definite traces of the influence of
Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. But Plotinus seems to have
regarded himself particularly as an interpreter of the Platonic tradition.
As Inge observes, “He [Plotinus] wished to be a Platonist and indeed
a conservative Platonist . . . to Plato alone he attributes plenary inspira
tion. He will not admit that he ever differs from his master's teach
ing.” This accounts for the extreme spiritualism” which is the out
standing characteristic of the philosophical system of Plotinus.
The fundamental tenet of Neo-Platonism is concerned with the
problem which proved the stumbling-block to all pagan systems of
philosophy; namely, how to derive the many from the one, how to
arrive at multiplicity from unity. Plotinus's answer to the question was
his doctrine of emanation in which the Neo-Platonic Trinity plays an
important rôle. All things have their origin in perfect Unity. The One
is the Source of all reality; It is infinite perfection, unlimited goodness.
It is absolutely simple; It is the archetype from which all things draw
their existence and on which they depend for their nature.” This One,
the Absolute, is free and independent—free, in the sense that It is
unproduced; independent, in the sense that, being first, its existence
does not have to be explained. However, this God of Plotinus is free
and independent of everything but Himself. He must be what He is;
He must do what He does.** It is not in accordance with the nature of
this Absolute Unity, Perfection, and Goodness to be alone. To beget
something else is the mark, the requirement of Perfection.” From It,
29 Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 1-23. Porphyry's biography of Plotinus and an
outline of his works is found in the Enneads, translated by Stephen Mackenna
(London: Medici Society, 1921-30) I, 1-28.
30 W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, I, 109.
81 For Plato the intelligible world is that of true reality. Since sense realities
are constantly changing, they can not be the basis of true knowledge and
therefore the sensible world can not be the realm of true being. But stability
is a fact in the order of knowledge; hence, there must be an order of reality
that contains the permanence that is in knowledge; namely, the intelligible
world. Cf. Phaedo, 65a-68b; also Parmenides, 126a-135c.
** Plotinus, Enneads, translated by Stephen Mackenna (London: Medici Society,
1921-30), V, i, 6; I, vii, 1. This translation will be used for citations from
the Enneads.
* Ibid., II, ix, 1; V, i, 6.
* Ibid., V, iv, 1; II, ix, 3; V, iii, 10.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 49

therefore, emerged the Nous or Intellect which is the image of the

One and at the same time is the source of multiplicity, since it con
tains within itself all that will come after it. It has two faces, so to
speak, one turned toward the One, and the other, toward the uni
verse.” The World-Soul, which is directly responsible for the being
and the preservation of the material universe, emanated from the Nous.
Thus we have the Neo-Platonic Trinity: the One, the perfect Principle
of reality; the Nous, the intelligent Principle of reality; the World
Soul, the conserving Principle of reality. As the Nous is the image of
the One, so the World-Soul is the image of the Nous but, being
inferior to it, the World-Soul is the source of greater multiplicity and
gives birth, so to speak, to the actual multiplicity that is evident in the
universe. It gives rise to individual souls which, in turn, are responsible
for the production of the material world since they combine with matter
to constitute material phenomena.” Matter is farthest removed from
perfect Unity. It is lowest in the scale of being; it is the principle of
formlessness, dissipation of spirit, the antithesis of the One.” As such,
it is the source of all evil; in fact, it is evil itself.” These, in brief,
are the elements which comprise the universe of Neo-Platonism.
Man, according to Plotinus, is a composite of soul and body. The
union between them, however, is by no means an intimate one, for the
body of man is composed of matter which Plotinus characterizes as
"ugliness, utter disgracefulness, unredeemed evil.” The union of the
spiritual soul with this principle of dispersion is the result of a fall.
The soul receives nothing but harm from its union with the body.”
It lives, as it were, a dream life while united with the body, from
which it awakens only when it extricates itself from its gross, material
vesture at the moment of death. There is an ethical warfare constantly
taking place between soul and body, in which the soul must do every
thing possible to eliminate sense life. By the practice of asceticism it
must remove everything derived from generation, everything acquired
by its fall.” It must completely emerge from matter and strive to live
85 Ibid., V, iv, 2; V, iii, 16; III, viii, 9.
86 Ibid., V, 1, 7.
87 Ibid., I, viii, 7; III, vi, 7; II, iv, 15; II, iv, 12.
38 Ibid., III, vi, 2; I, viii, 7; I, viii, 10; II, iv, 13.
39 Ibid., II, iv, 16.
40 Ibid., I, viii, 12; I, vi, 5.
41 Ibid., III, vi, 5.
50 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

only for that unity from which it originally came and into which it is
destined to become completely absorbed. In this will consist the per
fect happiness of the soul. By union with the body, it has, so to speak,
lost itself and it can recover itself only through a continual process
of purification until eventually it leaves its prison, the body, and is
united to the One.
Such are the fundamental tenets of Neo-Platonism as contained
in the system of its chief representative, Plotinus. And it is the accept
ance of these doctrines and the ordering of one's life in harmony with
them which is implied in conversion to Neo-Platonism.
That Augustine was acquainted with the writings of the Neo
Platonists, especially with those of Plotinus, is quite evident since he
refers to them in several of his works. It likewise seems probable that
he regarded Neo-Platonism and Platonism as one and the same school
of philosophy, and Plotinus as a follower of Plato. In the Contra
Academico'ſ he remarks: “The countenance of Plato . . . shone forth
especially in the person of Plotinus, a Platonic philosopher.” Accord
ing to the Benedictines of St. Maur, five manuscripts of the De beata
vita substitute the name of Plotinus for that of Plato in the statement
made by Augustine to the effect that he had read a few books of
Plato.” Nebridius, an intimate friend and frequent correspondent of
Augustine, writes to him, expressing his appreciation for the letters
which Augustine had written to him, and adds: “They will bring to
my ear . . . [the teachings of] Plato and Plotinus.” In the Confer
fions Augustine tells us that he had read “certain books of the Plato
nists which Victorinus, formerly a professor of Rhetoric at Rome . . .
42 Contra Academicos, L. III, c. XVIII, n. 41 (XXXII, 956).
48 De beata vita, c. I, n. 4 (XXXII, 961, n. 1).
From a palaeographical investigation of the more important manuscripts of
Augustine, P. Henry, S.J., concludes that the authentic reading of the text
in question is “lectis autem, Plotini paucissimis libris.” In “Augustine and
Plotinus,” The Journal of Theological Studies, XXXVIII (1937), 9, Henry
remarks: “The oldest manuscripts have Plotini; only one of the ninth cen
tury, and a very bad one at that, has Platonis. Of the seventeen copies I have
examined, eleven attest Plotini and six Platonis or similar readings.” H. A.
Naville, Saint Augustine, étude sur le développement de Ja penſée jusqu'à
l'époque de son ordination (Geneva: Ramboz et Schuchardt, 1872), p. 27,
proposes several reasons for concluding that the texts referred to in this
passage were the Enneads of Plotinus.
** Epistulae, VI, 1 (XXXIII, 67).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 51

had translated into Latin.” These were probably the Enneads of

Plotinus and other Neo-Platonic translations made by Gaius Marius
Victorinus Afer, a famous rhetorician and a convert to Christianity.
None of these Neo-Platonic writings of Victorinus have survived, but
various theological and exegetical treatises are still extant.” In the
City of God Augustine mentions the renowned Plotinus as a follower
of Plato” and he speaks of him elsewhere as “that great Platonist.”
Augustine was also, at least, slightly acquainted with later Neo
Platonists. Among the later disciples of Plato he lists Iamblichus and
Porphyry.” In the City of God he mentions the names of some treatises
of Porphyry, and discusses and criticizes several of the doctrines con
tained in them.” That he knew to some extent the works of Platoºi

would seem evident from the fact that in his later writings especially
he frequently refers to him. In the eighth book of the City of God,
for example, he gives a detailed account of Platonic philosophy. It
would seem probable that he was familiar with the Timaeus” through
the translation of Cicero whom Augustine greatly admired and who
had exercised a profound influence on him in his early years. Isolated
allusions in the Confessions” would lead us to believe that he had
some acquaintance, at least, with other dialogues of Plato, such as the
Phaedrus, Theaetetus, Republic, Meno, and Cratylus. Knowledge of
Plato's philosophy may also have been derived from the Platonic writ
* Confessiones, L. VIII, c. II, n. 3 (XXXII, 750). Cp. Ibid., L. VII, c. IX, n.
13 (XXXII, 740); L. VII, c. XX, n. 26 (XXXII, 746).
* An account of the Neo-Platonic elements in the writings of Victorinus and of
his relation to Augustine is found in R. Schmid, Marius Victorinus Rhetor und
feine Beziehungen zu Augustin, Inaugural Dissertation (Kiel: E. Uebermuth,
1895).
* De civitate Dei, L. VIII, c. XII, (XLI, 237).
* Ibid., L. X, c. II (XLI, 279). Cf. L. IX, c. X (XLI, 265); L. X, c. XIV
(XLI, 292).
* Ibid., L. VIII, c. XII (XLI, 237).
*Ibid., L. X, c. XI (XLI, 288-291); L. X, c. XXXII (XLI, 312-316); L.
XIX, c. XXIII (XLI, 650-655).
* The subject of the erudition of Augustine, of the sources from which he
derived his knowledge of Platonism, and of the Greek, Oriental, and Latin
Sources of his philosophy is treated at length in Nourrisson, La philosophie
de faint Augustin (Paris: Didier et cie, 1865), II, 89-146.
* Cp. Confessioner, L. XIII, c. IV, n. 5 (XXXII, 846) and Timaeus, 29 D.
* Confessiones, L. VIII, c. VII, n. 18 (XXXII, 757); L. VIII, c. V, n. 11
(XXXII, 754); L. I., c. XVI, n. 25 (XXXII, 672); L. X, c. X, n. 17
(XXXII, 786); L. I, c. XIII, n. 22 (XXXII, 671).
52 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

ings of Apuleius, the fellow-countryman of Augustine, who is called

in the City of God a disciple of Plato.”

D. Christianity and Neo-Platonism Compared

A cursory glance at the basic principles of Christianity and of Neo
Platonism, as outlined, would suffice to indicate that apparently there are
close affinities between the fundamental doctrines which the Christian
accepts and those to which the Neo-Platonist subscribes. The spiritual
element in the religion established by Christ and in the philosophy
founded by Plotinus is decidedly pronounced. Both of them admit
that the universe and all things contained therein, from inanimate mat
ter through sentient life to man, the masterpiece of the visible world,
have their origin from a Being that is absolute Unity, Goodness, and
Perfection. Both recognize in God a Trinity. The Christian Trinity
comprises the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit; the Neo-Platonic, the
One, the Nous, the World-Soul. Both attribute to God a providence
which governs the whole and is the source of harmony and order in
the universe. Man, the noblest of God's creatures, reflects in a special
manner the greatness of that Being by Whom the universe was pro
duced. In his soul especially is mirrored the goodness and beauty of
Him Whose image is stamped upon man's spiritual nature. To both
the Christian and the Neo-Platonist the life of man on earth is a war
fare in which he is constantly engaged in order to repair, in so far as
he is able, his vitiated nature and thereby attain that union with God
in which his happiness will consist in the life to come. Undoubtedly,
the language in which the basic notions of the Christian are expressed
bears a decided resemblance to that used by the Neo-Platonist.
However, when an analysis is made of the fundamental ideas veiled
beneath the diction in which the two bodies of doctrine are portrayed,
a chasm yawns between them which it is impossible to bridge. In other
words, although Neo-Platonism contains some ideas which Christianity
also accepts, it differs so essentially from Christianity that basically
there can be no common ground between them. The God to Whom
the Christian adheres is a personal God, a Creator, a Being supreme in
the order of existence. The universe exists because He freely made it;
it is a universe of multiplicity which proceeds from Unity through His
54 De civitate Dei, L. VIII, c. XII (XLI, 237).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 53

creative act. A Divine decision stands between Him and it. The Neo
Platonic God is perfect Unity and Goodness; He is, as Plotinus says,
"all-transcending and self-sufficing.” All things proceed from Him
but not as a result of free choice; their procession from the One is a
dramatization of necessity.” He is the source of the essence of things
but not the creator of their being. In Him there is a primacy of the
Good, not a primacy of Being; the highest characteristic of the Neo
Platonic One is goodness.
Consider further the relation between the Christian and the Neo
Platonic Trinity. The Nicene Creed thus beautifully and explicitly
describes the origin of the Son of God, the Christian Logos, and also
that of the Holy Ghost:
I believe in one God, the Father almighty. . . . And in one
Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God. And born of
the Father before all ages. God of God, light of light, true God
of true God. Begotten, not made, consubstantial with the
Father: by Whom all things were made. . . . And in the Holy
Ghost, the Lord and giver of life; Who proceedeth from the
Father and the Son. Who together with the Father and the Son
is adored and glorified.
To the Christian, then, the Father is God and the Son also is God,
begotten of the Father and equal to Him in all things. In other words,
in the Christian God there is generation with equality. All things were
created by the Word because He is truly God, one in nature, though
not in person, with the Father. This is by no means the case with the
Plotinian Trinity. There can be no consubstantiality between the Logos
and the One. The Nous proceeds from the One and hence partakes of
Its nature but, since it implies multiplicity, since it contains an image
of the many, it is bound to be inferior to that perfect Unity in which
there are no distinctions whatsoever. The Logos of Plotinus knows
itself as the image of the One and the source of multiplicity." Just
as we find generation with equality in the Second Person of the Chris
tian Trinity, so, too, do we have procession with equality in the case
of the Third Person of the Godhead. From the mutual love of the
Begetter and the Begotten is produced the Spirit of Truth Who with
55 Plotinus, Enneads, VI, ix, 6.
56 Ibid., II, ix, 3; V, iv, 1; V, i, 6.
57 Ibid., V, i, 7; V, iv, 2.
54 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

the Father and the Word comprises that sublime Trinity which the
Christian venerates and loves. On the contrary, the third member of
the Neo-Platonic Trinity, the World-Soul, has no direct relation to the
One. It is, so to speak, two degrees removed from perfect Unity. It is
replete with the ideas contained within the Nous and yet it is inferior
to it, for, as the Begetter of material things, the World-Soul is the
source of actual multiplicity. It is not only, so to speak, the creator of
the world, but is likewise the universal providence that watches over
it. This universal providence consists, as Inge remarks, in the fact that
the material world is framed in the image of the spiritual world.*
To both the Christian and the Neo-Platonist man is a composite
of soul and of body, of spirit and of matter. The Christian considers
it of the nature of man to be composed of soul and body. Man is a
unit, although he possesses a higher and a lower nature. Plotinus at
times likewise speaks as if he believed the combination of soul and
body to be natural to man.” Yet he never fails to depreciate and vilify
the body, and to assert that man is primarily a soul.” The body is not
a part of the real man; it is something extraneous to him. To the
Christian the intimate companionship of soul and body is eventually to
last forever. Their union is temporarily severed, it is true, at the
moment of death, but is to be resumed again when time shall be no
more. It is man in his human nature, that is, a creature composed of
body and soul, whose destiny is to be forever happy with God, while
he preserves his own individuality. Man is a reality distinct from God
and from every other being in the universe. His existence, which is to
endure forever, was freely willed by God. On the contrary, the attain
ment of happiness to the Neo-Platonist means the loss of his own indi
viduality, the complete absorption of himself within the Soul-of-the-All
from which his soul, the “true” man, was necessarily derived. This is
evident from the last words addressed by Plotinus to his physician,
words which Bréhier" calls the résumé and summary of the entire reli
gious and philosophic ideal of Plotinus: “I am striving to give back
the Divine in myself to the Divine within the All.”
58 W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, I, 208.
59 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, IV, vii, 13; IV, viii, 2.
60 Ibid., I, i, 10; IV, iii, 9; IV, iii, 20; IV, viii, 5; I, i, 9; VI, iv, 16; V, iii, 9.
61 E. Bréhier, La philosophie de Plotin (Paris: Boivin et Cie, 1928), p. 188.
62 Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 2.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 55

Both Christianity and Neo-Platonism explicitly teach a doctrine of

asceticism. The Christian believes that human nature was corrupted by
the sin of Adam, and that, as a result, an inner war is constantly being
waged between man's higher and his lower nature, between his rational
soul and the passions of his body. And yet the Christian does
not consider the union existing between soul and body a detriment to
the soul.” Since the body is a creation of God, it is good. It is the
evils in the body, the effects of original sin, which man must make
every effort to undo. This is accomplished by Christian asceticism,
which means not the suppression of the body, but its reorganization
until it can live in peace and harmony with the soul. This is effected
by the training of the human will. To the Neo-Platonist, however, the
body is a product of the dispersion of the soul and, as such, is essen
tially an evil and a detriment to the soul. In order to rectify this evil,
the soul must do everything possible to immaterialize itself. The only
way in which the soul can really be present to itself is by achieving a
total separation from the body.” The function of asceticism, therefore,
is completely to eliminate all sense life, to get rid of everything that
is the cause of dispersion within the soul, to remove everything
which it unfortunately acquired in its fall. In this way the human soul
will return to its original state, that in which it was united to the
One. 65

From this brief analysis and comparison of the fundamental doc

trines of Christianity and Neo-Platonism, it is obvious that basically
there is no common ground between them. That they have many points
of contact is to be expected. Christianity includes many doctrines acces
sible to unaided human reason and advocates many practices which are
the natural outcome of human nature. Although, strictly speaking,
it cannot be regarded as a philosophy, it professes to solve many
* J. F. McCormick, S.J., “The Burden of the Body,” The New Scholasticism,
XII, 4 (1938), 392–400, explains in what sense, according to St. Thomas, the
body may be regarded as a burden to the soul. St. Thomas insists, Father
McCormick observes, that the union of the human soul with the body is not
a disadvantage to the soul, since soul and body are the constituent parts of
human nature. However, “looked at from the side of its aspiration to higher
things the soul may well appear to be weighed down by the burden of its
earth-bound body.” p. 400.
* Cf. K. Adam, St. Augustine, The Odyssey of His Soul, p. 23: “The aim of
Neo-Platonic ethics was not the transformation of sense, but its destruction.”
* Plotinus, Enneads, VI, iv, 16; III, vi, 5; III, vi, 6; V, iii, 9.
56 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

problems which Greek philosophy, representing, as it did, the highest

efforts of the human intellect, attempted to explain.” Yet the basic doc
trines of Christianity and of Neo-Platonism which was the loftiest as
well as the final utterance of Greek thought, doctrines pertaining to
the nature of God and His relation to the universe, to the origin,
nature, and destiny of man, are so radically different that an impas
sable gulf separates the one from the other. Hence it seems justifiable
to conclude that it is impossible at the same time to profess without
reservation the religion of Christianity and the philosophy of Neo
Platonism. The Christian theory of creation raises, in itself, an insur
mountable barrier between them.” The Weltanschauung of Christian
ity and that of Neo-Platonism are fundamentally disparate.” Hence
the essential distinctions which have been pointed out between them
can serve as an adequate norm to apply to the early writings of Augus
tine in order to discern the Neo-Platonic and the Christian elements
contained in them.

E. St. Augustine's Statement of the Differences Between Christianity

- and Neo-Platonism

The question now arises: Was Augustine ever aware of any basic
differences between Neo-Platonic doctrine and Christian teaching? May
66 The Christian Apologists of the second and third centuries expressed this idea
in their defense of Christianity. The Christian religion, they observed, fur
nishes a solution for problems which Greek philosophy was at a loss to ex
plain. Cf. St. Justin Martyr, Dialogue with the Jew Tryphon; also Minucius
Felix, Octavius.
67 The doctrine of Creation renders untenable the position of those who hold
that Christianity was erected on the foundation of Greek thought, for example,
Dean Inge who regards Christianity as the last creative product of Greek
civilization and who alleges “the utter impossibility of excising Platonism
from Christianity without tearing Christianity to pieces.” Cf. W. R. Inge,
The Philosophy of Plotinus, I, 14. Nor can one agree with A. O. Lovejoy,
The Great Chain of Being, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936),
p. 67, when he says: “From Neoplatonism the principle of plenitude, with
the group of ideas presupposed by it or derivative from it, passed over into
that complex of preconceptions which shaped the theology and the cosmology
of medieval Christendom.”
68 The dogma of Creation effects so great a chasm between Neo-Platonism and
Christianity, that one can hardly agree with P. Henry, La vision d'ortie, p. 83,
who, commenting on the words of congratulation uttered by Simplicianus to
Augustine, when informed that the latter had read the books of the Platonists
(Confessiones, L. VIII, c. II, n. 3), observes: "Qu'est-ce à dire, sinon qu'il
est parfaitement possible d'être en même temps un disciple du Christ et de
º *:
e celui-lä.”
à une condition. De remplacer l'orgueil de celui-ci par l'humilité
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 57

he not have been so strongly impressed with points of likeness between

them as to be wholly unconscious of their being at variance on im
portant issues? In a word, is it possible to derive from Augustine a
standard for differentiating Christianity from Neo-Platonism? In order
to provide a satisfactory answer to this query it seems advisable to refer
to what he himself tells us at a time when, in the opinion of everyone,
he was thoroughly a Christian. Although isolated references could be
cited from other writings of Augustine, our research will be limited
to his two masterpieces: the Confeſsions and the City of God, since in
them is to be found a detailed estimate of Neo-Platonic doctrines.
In the seventh book of his Confeſsions Augustine is very enthusias
tic in acknowledging the service which the Neo-Platonists had rendered
to him, but at the same time he severely reproaches them for their
pride and their idolatry, and he points out serious errors which marred
the sublimity of their doctrine.
Augustine was especially grateful to the Platonists for helping him
to form a clearer conception of the spirituality of God. He firmly
believed, he tells us, in the immateriality of the Supreme Being but
experienced no little difficulty in comprehending what this meant:
/ I did in my inmost soul believe that Thou wert incorruptible,
and uninjurable, and unchangeable because, without knowing
whence or how, I still saw plainly and was sure that what can
be corrupted is inferior to that which cannot be, and I unhesi
tatingly preferred that which is uninjurable to that which can
be injured, and what is unchangeable appeared to me to be
better than that which suffers change.”
But he writes later on:

Having read the books of the Platonists, after being reminded

to search for incorporeal truth, I saw Thy invisible things,
understood by those things that are made and, though foiled
in my attempt, I perceived what that was which I could not
6° Confessiones, L. VII, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 733): “Et te incorruptibilem et
inviolabilem, et incommutabilem, totis medullis credebam, qua, nesciens unde
et quomodo, plane tamen videbam et certus eram, id quod corrumpi potest,
deterius esse quam id quod non potest; et quod violari non potest, incunctanter
praepomebam violabili; et quod nullam patitur mutationem, melius esse quam
id quod mutari potest.”
As has been noted (Chapter II, C), Augustine seems to have regarded Neo
Platonism and Platonism as one and the same school of philosophy.
58 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

clearly behold on account of the darkness of my mind, that

Thou art infinite and yet art not diffused through finite or
infinite space.”
Neo-Platonism likewise offered Augustine a satisfactory solution
for the problem of evil which had given him considerable trouble.
Since God created all things and since evil is a reality, is not God
responsible for the evil which is so obvious in the world? Šuch was
the thought which for some time had harassed the mind of Augus
tine. This difficulty was cleared for him when he learned that evil is
nothing positive, but is merely a privation of good, that things in so
far as they exist are good, and that the order of the universe requires
various degrees of perfection.”
Augustine also believed that he discovered in Plotinus a doctrine of
the Logos, as mentioned by St. John,” but a doctrine which was seri
ously defective in that it contained no reference to the Incarnation.
He read in Plotinus that the Word is one with God, that all things
were made by the Word, that it is the Source of life and light which
enlightens every man that cometh into the world but, he adds, “that
the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, that I did not read.”
Notwithstanding the marked spirituality of his doctrine, Plotinus did
70 Confessiones, L. VII, c. XX, n. 26 (XXXII, 746): “Sed tunc lectis Platoni
corum illis libris, posteaguam inde admonitus quaerere incorpoream veritatem,
invisibilia tua, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspexi; et repulsus sensi
uid per tenebras animae meae contemplari non sinerer, certus esse te, et in
#. esse, nec tamen per locos finitos infinitosve diffundi.” Augustine's
former materialistic conception of God had been that of a vast cloud of vapor,
penetrating the entire mass of the universe and extending beyond through
infinite space. Cf. Confessiones, L. VII, c. 1, n. 2 (XXXII, 733-734): “Ita
etiam te, vita vitae meae, grandem per infinita spatia undique cogitabam pene
trare totam mundi molem, et extra eam quaquaversum per immensa sine
termino; ut haberet te terra, haberet coelum, haberent omnia, et illa finirentur
in te, tu autem nusquam.”
71 Ibid., L. VII, c. XII, n. 18 (XXXII, 743): “Ergo si omni bono privabuntur,
omnino nulla erunt: ergo quamdiu sunt, bona sunt. Ergo quaecumque sunt,
bona sunt. Malumque illud, quod quaerebam unde esset, non est substantia;
quia, si substantia esset, bonum esset. Aut enim esset incorruptibilis substan
tia, magnum utique bonum: aut substantia corruptibilis esset, quae nisi bona
esset, corrumpi non posset. Itaque vidi et manifestatum est mihi, quia omnia
bona tu fecisti et prorsus nullae substantiae sunt, quas tu non fecisti. Et
quoniam non aequalia omnia fecisti, ideo sunt omnia; quia singula bona sunt,
et simul omnia valde bona: quoniam fecit Deus noster omnia bona valde.”
72 John, I, 1-14.
* Confessiones, L. VII, c. IX, n. 14 (XXXII, 741): “Sed quia Verbum caro
factum est, et habitavit in nobis; non ibi legi.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 59

not know that the Son of God "emptied Himself, taking the form of a
servant, being made in the likeness of man . . . and humbled Him
self by becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the
cross.”74

The mystery of the Cross was nowhere to be found in the doctrine

of the Platonists. They had no conception whatever of the depths of
humility to which the Word of the Father descended in accomplishing
the work of man's redemption, for God has concealed such profound
knowledge from the proud and self-sufficient and has revealed it to the
humble and the lowly. Exalted in their conceit and absorbed in their
seemingly great learning, the Platonists could not hear the words of the
Master: “Learn of me for I am meek and humble of heart and you
shall find rest for your souls.” And “even though they know God,”
Augustine says, “they do not glorify Him as God or render Him
thanks; but they are vain in their thoughts and their foolish heart is
darkened; though they claim to be wise, they are steeped in folly.”
Humility, then, is a virtue which has no place in the calendar of
Plotinian thought.
Not only does Augustine blame the Platonists for neglecting in
their darkness of mind to render to God the glory which is due Him,
but he even charges them with falling into the depths of idolatry.
"I read there also,” he remarks, “that they had changed the glory of
Thy incorruptible nature into idols and images of various kinds, into
the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and birds, and four
footed beasts and serpents, in other words, into the Egyptian food for
which Esau lost his birthright.” Hence they vitiated their spiritual
concept of God by the worship of idols and inferior gods.”
74 Ibid., L. VII, c. IX, n. 14 (XXXII, 741): "Sed quia semetipsum exinanivit
formam servi accipiens, in similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus
ut homo; humiliavit se factus obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis
. . . non habent illi libri.”
75 Matthew, XI, 25, 28, 29.
78 Confessiones, L. VII, c. IX, n. 14 (XXXII, 741): "Etsi cognoscunt Deum,
non sicut Deum glorificant aut gratias agunt; sed evanescunt in cogitationibus
suis, et obscuratur insipiens cor eorum; dicentes se esse sapientes, stulti fiunt.”
77 Ibid., L. VII, c. IX, n. 15 (XXXII, 741): "Et ideo legebam ibi etiam im
mutatam gloriam incorruptionis tuae in idola et varia simulacra, in similitudi
nem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum, et quadrupedum, et ser
pentum; videlicet Aegyptium cibum quo Esau perdidit primogenita sua.”
78 This charge applies to Porphyry and later Neo-Platonists rather than to
Plotinus. However, even Plotinus recognizes a series of gods comprising the
60 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

It was only when Augustine entered into himself and turned to the
Holy Scriptures, to the Epistles of St. Paul, that a light was shed about
him, revealing two important truths altogether unknown to the Pla
tonists: that Christ, the God-Man, is Mediator between God and man,
and that it is through His redeeming grace that man can hope for
Salvation.

What shall wretched man do? Who will deliver him from the
body of this death but only Thy grace through Jesus Christ our
Lord; Whom Thou hast begotten, coeternal, and hast formed
in the beginning of Thy ways, in Whom the prince of this
world found nothing worthy of death, and yet killed Him;
and the handwriting which was against us was blotted out?
This these writings do not contain.”
Notwithstanding the fact that the Platonists assisted him in attain
ing a clearer insight into the meaning of spiritual reality, Augustine
expresses the opinion that they would have effected his ruin, had he
not taken refuge in the Holy Scriptures. Completely lacking in humil
ity, as they were, they provided no foundation upon which to erect
the structure of salvation. Instead of arousing within him sentiments
of remorse and sorrow for his past sinful life, they inflated him with
pride and a sense of superiority. It was providential, he believed, that
he came upon their writings before he had made an intensive study
of the Scriptures, for he was thus enabled “to discern and distinguish
between presumption and confession; between those who saw whither
they were to go, yet saw not the way, and the way that leads not only
to behold, but to dwell in that blessed country.”
spiritual world. Cf. Enneads II, ix, 9. The multiplicity of gods, however, does
not destroy the unity of the spiritual world. Cf. Enneads, V, viii, 9: “Call on
God, maker of the sphere whose image you now hold, and pray Him to enter.
And may He come bringing His own Universe with all the Gods that dwell
in it—He who is the one God and all the gods, where each is all, blending
into a unity, distinct in powers but all one god in virtue of that one divine
power of many facets.”
79 Confessiones, L. VII, c. XXI, n. 27 (XXXII, 748): “Quid faciet miser
homo? Quis eum liberabit de corpore mortis hujus nisi gratia tua per Jesum
Christum Dominum nostrum quem genuisti coaeternum, et creasti in prin
cipio viarum tuarum, in quo princeps hujus mundi non invenit quidquam
morte dignum, et occidit eum; et evacuatum est chirographum quod erat con
trarium nobis. Hoc illae litterae non habent.”
80 Ibid., L. VII, c. XX, n. 26 (XXXII, 747): “In quos me propterea,
priusquam Scripturas tuas considerarem, credo voluisti incurrere, ut imprime
retur memoriae meae quomodo ex eis affectus essem: et cum postea in libris
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 61

In the City of God Augustine likewise bestows extravagant praise

upon the Platonists. “It is evident,” he says, “that none came nearer to
us than the Platonists”;” and again, “We prefer these to all other
philosophers, and confess that they approach nearest to us.” They
excelled other philosophers in their physical theory. From a study of
changeable and material things they arrived at a notion of the un
changeableness and simplicity of God and they understood “from this
unchangeableness and this simplicity that all things must have been
made by Him, and that He could Himself have been made by none.”
They were also superior to other philosophers in their rational psychol
ogy: “Those, however, whom we justly rank before all others, have
distinguished those things which are conceived by the mind from those
which are perceived by the senses, neither taking away from the senses
anything to which they are competent, nor attributing to them anything
beyond their competency.” In moral philosophy, too, they held first
rank: “They have not affirmed that a man is blessed by the enjoyment
of the body, or by the enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoy
ment of God—enjoying Him, however, not as the mind does the body
or itself, or as one friend enjoys another, but as the eye enjoys light,
if, indeed, we may draw any comparison between these things.”
In a word, the Platonists came nearest to Christian faith because
of the triple rôle which they assigned to the supreme God: “That He
is both the maker of all things, the light by which things are known,
and the good in reference to which things are to be done; that we have
tuis mansuefactus essem, et curantibus digitis tuis contrectarentur vulnera mea;
discernerem atque distinguerem quid interesset inter praesumptionem et con
fessionem; inter videntes quo eundum sit nec videntes qua, et viam ducentem
ad beatificam, non tantum cernendam, sed et habitandam.”
*1 De civitate Dei, L. VIII, c. V (XLI, 229): “Nulli nobis, quam isti, propius
accesserunt.”
82 Ibid., L. VIII, c. IX, (XLI, 234): “Eos [Platonicos] omnes caeteris ante
ponimus, eosque nobis propinquiores fatemur.”
** Ibid., L. VIII, c. VI (XLI, 231): “Propter hanc incommutabilitatem et
simplicitatem intellexerunt eum et omnia ista fecisse et ipsum a nullo fieri
potuisse.”
**Ibid., L. VIII, c. VII (XLI, 232): "Hi vero, quos merito caeteris anteponi
mus, discreverunt ea quae mente conspiciuntur, ab iis quae sensibus attingun
tur; nec sensibus adimentes quod possunt, neceis dantes ultra quam possunt.”
* Ibid., L. VIII, c. VIII (XLI, 233): “Cedant igitur hi omnes illis philosophis
[Platonicis], qui non dixerunt beatum esse hominem fruentem corpore, vel
fruentem animo; sed fruentem Deo: non sicut corpore vel se ipso animus, aut
sicut amico amicus, sed sicut luce oculus; si aliquid ab his ad illa similitudinis
afferendum est.”

*
62 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

in Him the principle of nature, the truth of doctrine, and the happiness
of life.”86
However, the Platonists fell into serious errors which marred the
beauty of their doctrine. They "erred in speaking in the plural of
Principles,” whereas, “when we speak of God, we do not affirm two or
three principles, no more than we are at liberty to affirm two or three
gods; although, speaking of each, of the Father, or of the Son, or
of the Holy Ghost, we confess that each is God.” They did not
know the Holy Spirit: “Plotinus places the soul of nature after the
intellect of the Father, while Porphyry, making it the mean, does not
place it after, but between the others. . . . but we assert that the Holy
Spirit is the Spirit not of the Father only, not of the Son only, but of
both.”88
In their pride and impiety the Platonists were ashamed to acknowl
edge the Incarnation of the Son of God. Augustine says in addressing
Porphyry:
You proclaim the Father and the Son, whom you call the
Father's intellect or mind, and between these a third, by whom
we suppose you mean three Gods. In this, though your expres
sions are inaccurate, you do in some sort, and as through a veil,
see what we should strive towards; but the Incarnation of the
unchangeable Son of God, whereby we are saved, and are
enabled to reach the things we believe, or in part understand,
this is what you refuse to recognize. You see in a fashion,
although at a distance, although with filmy eye, the country in
which we should abide; but the way to it you know not.”
86 Ibid., L. VIII, c. IX (XLI, 233): “Quicumque igitur philosophi de Deo
summo et vero ista senserunt, quod et rerum creatarum sit effector, et lumen
cognoscendarum, et bonum agendarum; quod ab illo nobis sit et principium
naturae, et veritas doctrinae, et felicitas vitae.”
87 Ibid., L. X, c. XXIV (XLI, 300-301): “Nos itaque ita non dicinus
duo vel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur, sicut hoc duos deos vel tres
nobis licitum est dicere: quamvis de unoquoque loquentes, vel de Patre, vel de
Filio, vel de Spiritu Sancto, etiam singulum, quemque Deum esse fateamur.”
88 Ibid., L. X, c. XXIII (XLI, 300): “Postponit quippe Plotinus animae
naturam paterno intellectui: iste [Porphyrius] autem cum dicit medium, non
postponit, sed interponit. Et nimirum hoc dixit ut potuit sive ut voluit, quod
nos Spiritum sanctum, nec Patris tantum, nec Filii tantum, sed utriusque
Spiritum dicinus.”
8° Ibid., L. X, c. XXIX (XLI, 307): "Praedicas Patrem et ejus Filium,
quem vocas paternum intellectum seu mentem; et horum medium, quem
putamus te dicere Spiritum sanctum, et more vestro appellas tres deos. Ubi, et
si verbis indisciplinatis utimini, videtis tamen qualitercumque et quasi per
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 63

Augustine also upbraids the Platonists for their idolatry. Although

they knew something of the Creator of the universe, they misunder
stood the true worship of the Most High God and offered adoration to
lesser deities:

Even these philosophers [the Platonists], whether accommodat

ing to the folly and ignorance of the people, or, as the Apostle
says, 'becoming vain in their imaginations,’ supposed or allowed
others to suppose that many gods should be worshipped, so
that some of them considered that divine honor by worship and
sacrifice should be rendered even to the demons.”

Even the most renowned among them desired sacred rites to be per
formed in honour of the gods: “Among these [Platonists] were the
renowned Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry . . . and the African
Apuleius. . . . All these . . . and also Plato himself thought that sacred
rites ought to be performed in honour of many gods.”
They erred, too, in their belief that creation is eternal. They held
that the human soul is coeternal with God, because they believed that
nothing could be everlasting which had not always existed.
Why [Augustine says] do we not rather believe the divinity
in those matters which human talent cannot fathom? Why do
we not credit the assertion of divinity, that the soul is not co
eternal with God, but is created, and once was not? . . . There
fore, let the incapacity of man give place to the authority of
God; and let us take our belief regarding the true religion

quaedam tenuis imaginationis umbracula, quo nitendum sit: sed incarnationem

incommutabilis Filii Dei, qua salvamur, ut ad illa quae credimus vel ex quan
tulacumque parte intelligimus, venire possimus, non vultis agnoscere. Itaque
videtis utcumque, etsi de longinquo, etsi acie caligante, patriam in qua
manendum est; sed viam qua eundum est, non tenetis.”
* Ibid., L. X, c. I (XLI, 277): “Sed quia ipsi [Platonicil quoque sive cedentes
vanitati errorique populorum, sive, ut ait Apostolus, evanescentes in cogita
tionibus suis, multos deos colendos ita putaverunt, vel putari voluerunt, ut
uidam eorum etiam daemonibus divinos honores sacrorum et sacrificiorum
eferendos esse censerent, quibus jam non parva ex parte respondimus.” Cp.
Confessiones, L. VII, c. IX, n. 15 (XXXII, 742).
* De civitate Dei, L. VIII, c. XII (XLI, 237): “Ex quibus sunt valde nobili
tati Graeci, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyrius: in utraque autem lingua, id est
et graeca et latina, Afer Apuleius exstitit Platonicus nobilis. Sed hi omnes,
et caeteri ejusmodi, et ipse Plato, diis plurimis esse sacra facienda putaverunt.”
64 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

from the ever-blessed spirits, who do not seek for themselves

that honour which they know to be due to their God and
OurS.92

The doctrine of happiness, as proposed by the Platonists, is also

essentially defective. They taught, it is true, that God alone can confer
happiness and that the happiness which all men desire can be attained
only by those who lead a pure life, but they failed to realize that
happiness to be worthy of the name must be eternal. “It is very cer
tain that Plato wrote that the souls of men return after death to the
bodies of beasts. . . . Plotinus also held this opinion.” It is absurd,
Augustine remarks, to believe that souls would have any desire to
abandon a life of permanent happiness and once more to take up their
abode in corruptible bodies. If the complete purification which is nec
essary for admittance into the abode of the blessed causes souls to for
get all evils and it is this oblivion of evil which creates a desire for the
body, then we meet with this incongruity: “The supreme felicity will
be the cause of foolishness, and the purest cleansing the cause of
defilement.” However long the blessedness of the soul last, it cannot
be founded on truth, if, in order to be blessed, the soul must be
deceived. As a matter of fact, any doctrine which does not affirm the
eternity of happiness destroys all hope and annihilates beatitude.
Their notion of matter as essentially evil must likewise be rejected.
In reference to Porphyry's belief that God put the soul into the world
in order that it might recognize the evil of matter and hasten to eman
cipate itself from all contact with it, Augustine remarks: “Here is some
inappropriate thinking, for the soul is given to the body that it may do
good, for it would not learn evil unless it did it.” Again, he says in
92 Ibid., L. X, c. XXXI (XLI, 311-312): “Cur ergo non potius divinitati
credimus de his rebus, quas humano ingenio pervestigare non possumus, quae
animam quoque ipsam non Deo coaeternam, sed creatam dicit esse, quae non
erat? . . . Quapropter divinae auctoritati humana cedat infirmitas, eisque
beatis et immortalibus de vera religione credamus, qui sibi honorem non ex
petunt, quem Deo suo, qui etiam noster est, deberi sciunt.”
93 Ibid., L. X, c. XXX (XLI, 310): “Nam Platonem animas hominum post
mortem revolvi usque ad corpora bestiarum scripsisse certissimum est. Hanc
sententiam Porphyrii doctor tenuit et Plotinus.”
94 Ibid., L. X, c. XXX (XLI, 311): “Profecto erit infelicitatis causa, summa
felicitas: et stultitiae causa, perfectio sapientiae; et immunditiae causa, summa
mundatio.”
* Ibid., L. X, c. XXX (XLI, 310): ". . . aliquid inconvenienter sapit (magis
enim data est [anima] corpori, ut bona faceret; non enim mala disceret, si
non faceret.)”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 65

opposition to the Platonists' doctrine of purification: "Thus the good

and true Mediator showed that it is sin which is evil, and not the
substance or nature of the flesh; for this, together with the human
soul, could without sin be both assumed and retained, and laid down
in death, and changed into something better by resurrection.”
Lastly, the Platonists denied the resurrection of the body, for they
argued that the weight of the material elements of which the body is
composed renders it impossible for an earthly body to enter heaven.
After pointing out at length the fallacy of their reasoning, Augustine
concludes: "They, therefore, adduce from their weights and order of
the elements nothing from which they can prove that it is impossible
for Almighty God to make our bodies such that they can dwell in the

It is evident, therefore, from the Confessions and the City of God

that Augustine, at the time he wrote these treatises, was aware of
notable differences between Neo-Platonic doctrine and Christian
thought—differences which are essential since they are grounded on
the fundamental principles of Christianity and of Neo-Platonism.
Hence there is no difficulty in obtaining from Augustine himself a
criterion for distinguishing the religion of Christ from the philosophy
of Plotinus.
It is our intention to apply this twofold norm which we have
established to the treatises and letters” written by Augustine from the
time of his sojourn at Cassiciacum until his entrance upon the duties
of the priesthood at Hippo. This procedure should enable us to detect
96 Ibid., L. X, c. XXIV (XLI, 301): "Bonus itaque verusque mediator ostendit
peccatum esse malum, non carnis substantiam vel naturam; quae cum anima
hominis et suscipi sine peccato potuit, et haberi, et morte deponi, et in melius
resurrectione mutari.”
97 Ibid., L. XXII, c. XI (XLI, 775): "Nihil igitur afferunt ex ponderibus atque
ordine elementorum, unde omnipotenti Deo, quominus faciat corpora nostra
talia, ut etiam in coelo possint habitare praescribant.”
98 In general, the treatises and letters will be studied in the order of their com
position. According to the Retractationes the following works were written at
Cassiciacum in 386 A.D.; Contra Academicos, De beata vita, De ordine, Solilo
quia. Four letters have been assigned to this period. De immortalitate animae
was composed at Milan about 387 A.D. De moribus eccleſiae catholicae, De
moribus Manichaeorum, De quantitate animae and De libero arbitrio (Book
I) were produced at Rome in 387-388 A.D. De musica, De Generi contra
Manichaeos, De magistro, De vera religione were written at Tagaste in 388
391 A.D. Fourteen letters represent the extant correspondence from 388 until
Augustine's ordination.
66 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

the Christian and the Neo-Platonic elements in these works and to

note their relative importance in the structure of his thought during
the half decade preceding his ordination. In this way we should be able
to determine whether Neo-Platonism or Christianity exercised the domi
nant influence upon Augustine during this epoch, impelling him in the
eventful thirty-second year of his life to become a follower of Christ or
a disciple of Plotinus. That he could not simultaneously be both the one
and the other is quite obvious, for, although Christianity and Neo
Platonism have many doctrines in common, their basic principles are
mutually exclusive.
 CHAPTER III

AT CASSICIACUM

A. De Beata Vita

The first treatise completed by Augustine during the days of his

sojourn at Cassiciacum was De beata vita.” On the thirteenth of Novem
ber he treated the little group” who had accompanied him to the villa
of Verecundus to an intellectual feast appropriate for the occasion, the
celebration of his thirty-third birthday. The subject of the discussion
was: What constitutes a happy life. Augustine dedicated this dialogue
to his "eminent and most cultured” friend, Mallius Theodorus, for
whose learning and virtue he evidently had deep regard.”
The first impression afforded us of Augustine in the De beata vita
is that of an ardent lover of philosophy which he lauds in most
extravagant terms. Philosophy is the goal of wisdom, the harbor which
leads at once into the realm of a happy life,” the haven of peace for the
storm-tossed mariner." In his nineteenth year, Augustine tells us, he
had made the acquaintance of philosophy through the burning words
1 Retractationes, L. I, c. II (XXXII, 588): “Librum de Beata Vita, non post
libros de Academicis, sed inter illos ut scriberem, contigit. Ex occasione quippe
ortus est diei natalis mei, et tridui disputatione completus, sicut satis ipse
indicat.” Internal evidence in the Contra Academicos points to the fact that
the De beata vita was written between the first and second books of the
Contra Academicos. Cf. Contra Academicos, L. I, c. II, n. 5; L. I, c. III, n. 8:
L. II, c. IV, n. 10; L. II, c. VIII, n. 20; L. III, c. I, n. 1. It seems advisable,
therefore, to study the De beata vita before the Contra Academicos, although
the latter is mentioned first in the Retractationer. D. Ohlman, De ſancti
Augustini dialogis in Cassiciaco scriptis (Argentorati, 1897), p. 27, has pre
pared a chart showing the precise date of composition of each of the
Dialogues.
2 De beata vita, c. I, n. 6 (XXXII, 962): “Erant autem. . . . in primis nostra
mater, cujus meriti credo esse omne quod vivo; Navigius frater meus, Tryge
tius et Licentius, cives et discipuli mei. Nec Lastidianum et Rusticum conso
brinos meos . . . deesse volui. . . . Erat etiam nobiscum aetate minimus om
nium, sed cujus ingenium, si amore non fallor, magnum quiddam pollicetur,
Adeodatus filius meus.” Alypius likewise belonged to the group, but was not
present at the discussion of which this dialogue treats.
3 Ibid., c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 959); c. I, n. 5 (XXXII, 962). This is probably
the same Theodorus who is mentioned in De ordine, L. I, c. XI, n. 31
(XXXII, 992); also in De civitate Dei, L. XVIII, c. LIV (XLI, 620). He
was consul in the year 399 A.D., and held other important offices under
various emperors, which he fulfilled with honor.
* De beata vita, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 959).
* Ibid., c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 959).
68 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

of Cicero. From that moment he became enamoured of its beauty and

forthwith set out on his persistent quest for truth." Truth, wisdom, hap
piness are words inseparably associated in the mind of Augustine.
The pursuit of truth leads to wisdom, and wisdom is synonymous with
happiness.”
The question now arises: What is the meaning of philosophy as
Augustine here uses the term, of that wisdom for which one must
be ready to sacrifice both pleasures and honors? Let us follow the
explanation which he himself appears to give.” After reading Cicero's
Hortensius which excited within him so great an interest in philosophy,
he resolved to devote himself to it immediately. But obstacles forthwith
began to present themselves. At first childish superstition prevented
him from even beginning his search for wisdom. Then he decided to
look for teachers who would point out to him the way to truth. He
met a group of men who lured him by deceptive promises to do so,
but soon he realized their inability to lead him to true wisdom.” After
abandoning their doctrine for which he had lost all regard, he met
with further delay from the Academic philosophers,” until at length,
to use his own words, "I came into these lands; here I have discovered
the constellation to which I should entrust myself.”
What were the lands (terrar) to which Augustine here refers? “I
have often noted,” he continues, “in the sermons of our priest and
sometimes in your [Theodorus's] conversations, that, when God was
being considered, nothing corporeal should be thought of, neither
should it be in the case of the soul, for this is the one thing most like
to God.” But still he was kept from the goal which he had set out
to reach, by the allurement of a wife and by the desire of recognition,
persuading himself that, after attaining these desires, he would hasten
at full sail to the harbor of wisdom. Then he came upon a “very few
Tºia, ci, n. 4 (xxxii, 961).
7 Ibid., c. IV, n. 33-34 (XXXII, 975-976).
8 Ibid., c. I, n. 4-5 (XXXII, 961-962).
9 The Manichaeans. Cf. Confessiones, L. III, c. VI, n. 10 (XXXII, 686-687).
10 The philosophers of the New Academy. Cf. Confessiones, L. III, c. VI, n. 10
(XXXII, 686-687).
11 De beata vita, c. I, n. 4 (XXXII, 961): "Deinde veni in has terras; hic
septentrionem cui me crederem didici.”
12 Ibid., c. I, n. 4 (XXXII, 961): “Animadverti enim et saepe in sacerdotis
nostri, et aliquando in sermonibus tuis, cum de Deo cogitaretur, nihil omnino
corporis esse cogitandum, neque cum de anima: nam id est unum in rebus
proximum Deo.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 69

books” of Plotinus” and compared with them the authority of those

who taught the Divine Mysteries. As a result, Augustine says, “I was
so inflamed that I wished to tear asunder all those anchors, if the
judgment of men had not influenced me.” The apparent misfortune
of ill-health proved for him a blessing in disguise in that it forced
him to abandon the profession which he did not have the courage to
resign, so at last he brought his shattered boat into the long desired
haven of peace. “You see,” he adds, “in what philosophy I am now
sailing as in a harbor.”
Apparently, then, Augustine identifies “these lands” with the har
bor of philosophy. And the philosophy to which he here makes refer
ence does not seem to be limited to the doctrine which he discovered in
the books of Plotinus, for he tells us that it was only after reading
these treatises and comparing with them the authority of those who
explained the Divine Mysteries that he experienced such a strong in
clination to conquer his desire for pleasure and renown, which formerly
had enthralled him. It would seem, therefore, that authority and
reason were the lands where Augustine discovered the “constellation”
to which he could safely entrust himself, that is to say, the guide
which would lead him to truth. The sermons of Ambrose, Bishop of
Milan (ſacerdotis noſtri), which had often attracted his attention
were concerned, he tells us, with the spiritual nature of God and of
the soul.” Evidently Augustine had already found special interest in
pondering over the themes which later on were to form the central
ideas, the core of his philosophical system. It seems reasonable to infer
that the comparison of which he speaks was made chiefly in reference
to these subjects on which the Bishop frequently had taken occasion
to preach. If they were the topics which so attracted the attention of
Augustine, it would be natural for him to check the views of Plotinus
against the Bishop's explanation of the Scriptures relative to the nature
of God and of the human soul. Hence, philosophy as used by Augus
tine in the prologue of his treatise De beata vita seems not to have
13 Cf. Chapter II, note 43.
14 De beata vita, c. I, n. 4 (XXXII, 961): ". . . sic exarsi, ut omnes illas vel
lem anchoras rumpere, nisi me nonnullorum hominum existimatio commo
veret.”
* Ibid., c. I, n. 5 (XXXII, 961): “Ergo vides in qua philosophia quasi in portu
navigem.”
* Ibid., c. I, n. 4 (XXXII, 961).
70 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

been confined to the notion of reason alone as a guide to truth, but

rather to the amalgam of reason as expressed in the writings of Plotinus,
and of authority as embraced in the teachings of the Church, of which
Ambrose was the official expounder at Milan.
In his eulogy of the pursuit of philosophy as the goal of wisdom
Augustine issues a note of warning not only to those who are aiming
at the attainment of wisdom, but also to those who have advanced
somewhat along its path. Situated before the harbor of philosophy is
an enormous mountain, the mountain of pride (ſuperbum ſtudium
inanissimae gloriae), which offers great difficulties to those who are
eager for the acquisition of wisdom:
For it gleams in such a way and is clothed with such a mis
leading light that it not only presents itself as inhabitable to
those who are arriving and have not yet entered the harbor and
promises to satisfy their desires for a happy land, but it often
allures to itself even men who have reached the harbor, and it
sometimes keeps them delighted with its height whence it
pleases them to disregard others.”
While it is difficult to arrive at what precisely Augustine means by this
highly figurative description, it seems evident that he considers pride
an obstacle to the acquisition of wisdom and therefore, by implication,
that he regards humility as requisite for its attainment. If pride is
synonymous with error and falsity, then its opposite, humility, is
identified with truth and since truth leads to wisdom, humility is nec
essary for the attainment of it and consequently for the acquisition of
happiness. Toward the conclusion of the dialogue Augustine stresses
the same idea, that pride is an impediment to union with God. After
explaining what it means for souls to possess and enjoy God, he adds:
“But a certain warning flows out to us from the very Source of truth,
which urges us to think of God, to seek after Him, and to thirst for
Him after rooting out all pride.”
17 Ibid., c. I, n. 3 (XXXII, 960): “Nam ita fulget, ita mentiente illa
luce vestitur, ut non solum pervenientibus, nondumque ingressis incolendum
se offerat, at eorum voluntatibus pro ipsa beata terra satisfacturum polliceatur;
sed plerumque de ipso portu ad sese homines invitat, eosque nonnunquam
detinet ipsa altitudine delectatos, unde caeteros despicere libeat.”
18 Ibid., c. IV, n. 35 (XXXII, 976): “Admonitio autem quaedam, quae nobis
cum agit, ut Deum recordemur, ut eum quaeramus, ut eum pulso omni fas
tidio sitiamus, de ipso ad nos fonte veritatis emanat.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 71

In Neo-Platonic thought there is no place for the virtue of humility.

God is above man and man must aspire to be united to Him, but,
after all, man in his true nature is, so to speak, part and parcel of the
One; therefore there is no occasion for a sense of lowliness and
abasement when he thinks of himself in relation to God. All that the
soul, the real man, need do is to turn away and completely to emerge
from the world of sense and it will become conscious of its union
with God even in the present life. In a Christian universe, however,
in which man is related to God as creature to Creator, humility is
indeed a fundamental virtue. Augustine is wholly in accord with
Plotinus when he affirms that bodily pleasure is an impediment to
the attainment of wisdom,” but he passes beyond when, in warning
against the vice of pride, he stresses by implication the importance
of humility as the foundation upon which the edifice of wisdom and
consequently of happiness is to be erected.”
Augustine seems confident that he has embraced a philosophy
which can guide him to truth. But he realizes that he is only a novice
setting out in quest of that treasure. “The harbor,” he says, “is of
great extent; it does not entirely exclude error even though the error
is of a less dangerous nature.” Although he now seems to feel that
he has a guide to serve as a regulative norm for his intellect in its
pursuit of truth, he still is fearful for that reason which for more than
a decade of years had been unable to lead him out of the maze of
error in which he had been involved. He has a long distance to travel
before he can consider himself an enlightened philosopher and there
fore he will have many problems to solve. Already he anticipates the
one to which he was to devote the most profound consideration and
whose solution would be fraught with greatest difficulty—the problem
of the soul. It is a subject to which he seems already to have given no
19 Ibid., c. I, n. 4 (XXXII, 961).
20 Cp. Augustine's criticism of the Platonists' pride in Confessiones, L. VII, c.
XX, n. 26 (XXXII, 747). The effect produced upon him by reading the
books of the Platonists he describes as follows: “Garriebam plane quasi peri
tus, et nisi in Christo Salvatore nostro viam tuam quaererem, non peritus, sed
periturus essem. Jam enim coeperam velle videri sapiens, plenus poena mea
. . et inflabar scientia. Ubi enim erat illa aedificans charitas a fundamento
humilitatis, quod est Christus Jesus?”
* De beata vita, c. I, n. 5 (XXXII, 961): “Sed etiam ipse [portus] late patet
ejusque magnitudo quamvis jam minus pericolosum, non tamen pentitus ex
cludit errorem.”
72 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

little attention: “For what substantial argument have I found up to

the present time which has the force of weakening my persistent in
quiry concerning the nature of the soul?” Augustine does not dis
close what his special difficulties were, but the problem about which
they were centered is precisely that which harassed the mind of Ploti
nus and gave rise to perplexities which never entirely vanished.”
In subject matter and in treatment the dialogue De beata vita bears
a striking resemblance to treatises both of Cicero and of Plotinus. In
the Tusculan Disputations” Cicero, in agreement with the Stoic philos
ophers, holds that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Virtue is not the
slave, but is the master of fortune. Since the wise man possesses virtue,
he finds himself in need of nothing and therefore is supremely happy.
In his De finibus” Cicero develops the same thesis with the conclusion
that all wise men are happy but, since there are degrees of happiness,
it is possible for one man to be happier than another. Cicero's doctrine,
in brief, is that happiness is identical with virtue.
Augustine approaches more closely to Plotinus in his doctrine of
happiness. In the fourth tractate of the first Ennead, which Plotinus
devotes to this subject, he definitely asserts that material possessions
and freedom from physical misfortune are not the constituents of hap
piness. The loss of his children, imprisonment, disgrace, death have no
effect upon the happy man. Virtue is requisite as a means of attaining
happiness, but happiness itself consists in the possession of the Good.
The happy man does not cease to enjoy his felicity no matter what may
happen: “A thousand mischances and disappointments may befall him
and leave him still in tranquil possession of the Term.” Augustine
likewise holds that whatever is transitory and perishable cannot render
man happy. Only he who possesses God, then, can be happy since He
alone is eternal and imperishable.”
22 Ibid., c. I, n. 5 (XXXII, 962): "Quid enim solidum tenui, cui adhuc de
anima questio nutat et fluctuat?”
28 In his attempt at solving problems connected with the soul, especially that of
its union with the body, Plotinus offers suggestions which are quite incon
sistent with one another. Cf. Enneads, IV, viii, 1-8; IV, iii, 13; II, ix, 8.
24 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes, V, 9-16.
25 Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, V, 29-32.
26 Plotinus, Enneads, I, iv, 7.
27 De beata vita, c. II, n. 11 (XXXII, 965); "Deum, igitur, inquam, qui habet
beatus est.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 73

Augustine also reminds us of Plotinus in the emphasis which he

seems to place on virtue as a factor in the acquisition of knowledge.
When Monica remarks that not everyone who has what he wishes can
be considered happy, since he who desires what is evil, even though he
may possess it, is unhappy, her son is indeed pleased. “You have
reached the very summit of philosophy,” he tells his mother. And
when, to his surprise and delight, she continues to expatiate on Cicero's
doctrine in regard to the evil caused by perversity of the will, Augus
tine says: “I knew, in so far as I could, from whom and from how
divine a fountain her words were flowing.” Later on in the discus
sion when Monica further arouses the admiration of her son and his
guests by astutely remarking that Sergius Orata of whom Cicero speaks,
although abounding in wealth and desiring nothing more, was lacking
in wisdom because he was afraid of losing his possessions, and that
consequently he was unhappy, Augustine observes: “Do you see that it
is one thing to have a variety of teachings and another thing to have a
mind fixed on God? For whence come those words which we so admire
if not from Him?” It would seem, then, that he attributes the excep
tional ability displayed by his mother in discussing subtle philosophical
problems in which she had received no definite training, to her holiness
of life and her intimate union with God Who enlightened her mind to
understand what ordinarily is comprehended only by intensive study.
The doctrine of knowledge acquired through purification is likewise
found in Plotinus.31
Augustine tells us that he had intended in the discussion to make
use of arguments which had been adopted by philosophers. After
Monica had explained why, in her opinion, Orata did not possess wis
dom, Augustine observes: “Even I myself was greatly excited and
happy because she had so ably said what I had prepared as a final argu
ment and one considered of great importance in the books of philos
*Ibid., c. II, n. 10 (XXXII, 964): “Ipsam, inquam, prorsus, mater, arcem
philosophiae tenuisti.”
* Ibid., c. II, n. 10 (XXXII, 965): “In quibus verbis illa, sic exclamabat, ut
obliti penitus sexus, magnum aliquem virum considere nobiscum crederemus,
me interim, quantum poteram, intelligente ex quo illa, et quam divino fonte
manarent.”
* Ibid., c. IV, n. 27 (XXXII, 972): “Videtisne, inquam, aliud esse multas
variasque doctrinas, aliud animum attentissimum in Deum? Nam unde ista
quae miramur, nisi inde procedunt?”
* Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, IV, vii, 10.
 74 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

ophers.” The “books of philosophers” to which he here refers are

probably the writings of Plotinus. In the first Ennead the Greek phi
losopher identifies the wise man with the happy man. Such a man is so
disengaged from his possessions that he is absolutely immune to fear
of losing them. “He would be neither wise nor in a state of happi
ness,” Plotinus says, “if he had not quitted all trifling with such things
and become as it were another being, having confidence in his own
nature, faith that evil can never touch him.”
The abstruse philosophical terms which Augustine uses in arriving
at his conclusion; namely, that happiness consists in union with God,
since he who possesses God at the same time possesses wisdom and
consequently happiness, resemble closely the terminology both of Cicero
and of Plotinus. Wisdom presupposes the observance of due measure,
falling neither into excess nor into defect. The standard that deter
mines the measure which constitutes wisdom is itself not measured by
any other rule or norm.” In other words, it is the highest measure, for
only the highest measure can be a true one. Truth has never existed
without measure, nor measure without truth. Whoever, then, attains
the Highest Measure through Truth is happy. He it is who possesses
and enjoys God, that hidden Sun which sheds a beaming light upon
the inner eyes of our souls. When no unworthiness obstructs our vision,
this Being appears to be nothing else than God, the all-perfect One, the
absolute Totality and Perfection.” Undoubtedly, such diction reminds
us of Plotinus.
Let us analyze, however, the doctrine which is veiled beneath this
Neo-Platonic garb. In agreement with the philosophers Augustine holds
that in order to be happy one must possess wisdom. But what is this
wisdom which is the condition fine qua non of happiness? What else
is it but the Wisdom of God? For we have heard from Divine author
ity,” he says, that the Son of God, Who is truly God, is the Wisdom
32 De beata vita, c. IV, n. 27, (XXXII, 972): “Ubi cum omnes mirando ex
clamassent, me ipso etiam non mediocriter alacri atque laeto, quod ab ea potis
simum dictum esset quod pro magno de philosophorum libris, atque ultimum
proferre paraveram . . .”
33 Plotinus, Enneads, I, iv, 15.
84 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes, III, 8, 16; IV, 16; IV, 36-37.
35 De beata vita, c. IV, n. 34-35 (XXXII, 975-976). The terminology is strik
ingly like that used by Plotinus. Cf. Enneads, I, viii, 2; I, iv, 16.
36 1 Corinthians, I, 24.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 75

of God. Holy Scripture likewise tells us that He is Truth itself.” This

Truth is derived from the Highest Measure from which it proceeds
and to which it turns.” In other words, the Son of God Who is Truth
itself is the Divine Mediator Who leads man to his final end, the
possession and enjoyment of God. Divine Wisdom urges us to labor
earnestly for the attainment of this happiness by avoiding sin and by
keeping our minds fixed upon God. But happiness in the strict sense of
the term is unattainable in this life: “However long we seek,”
Augustine observes, “since we have not yet been satiated with the
very fountain, we must confess that we have not yet atttained our full
measure, and although God is helping us, we are not yet wise and
happy.” Complete satisfaction, true happiness consists in the perfect
knowledge, enjoyment, and possession of God, to use the words of
Augustine, “of That by which you may be conducted to Truth, of the
Truth which you may enjoy, of That through which you may be united
to the Highest Measure. These three reveal one God and one Substance
to those who know Him.”40
The question now arises: What is the nature of “these three” that
"reveal one God and one substance,” which Augustine has here in
mind? Is it Neo-Platonic or Christian in character? The language in
which he expresses the doctrine undoubtedly is Neo-Platonic but, if we
except the diction, the general tone of the passage, without any forc
ing of the thought, is in harmony with the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity and, in fact, seems unquestionably to require such an interpre
tation. It is Divine authority, Augustine says, which teaches us that the
37 John, XIV, 8.
88 De beata vita, c. IV, n. 34 (XXXII, 975).
39 Ibid., c. IV, n. 35 (XXXII, 976): "Sed tamen quamdiu quaerimus,
nondum ipso fonte, atque ut illo verbo utar, plenitudine saturati, nondum ad
nostrum modum nos pervenisse fateamur: et ideo, quamvis jam Deo adjuvante,
nondum tamen sapientes ac beati sumus.” From this statement it appears that
Augustine is rather severe in the criticism which he passes in the Retracta
tiones in which he blames himself for stating in the treatise De beata vita that
the soul of the wise man may possess happiness in this life. Cf. Retractationes,
L. I, c. II, (XXXII, 588): “Displicet . . . quod tempore vitae hujus in solo
animo sapientis dixi habitare vitam beatam.” The passage just quoted from the
De beata vita leads us to believe that it was a relative happiness of which he
was thinking, a happiness such as is attainable by man on earth.
* De beata vita, c. IV, n. 35 (XXXII, 976): “Illa est igitur plena satietas ani
morum, haec est beata vita, pie perfectegue cognoscere a quo inducaris in veri
tatem, qua veritate perfruaris, per quid connectaris summo modo. Haec tria
unum Deum intelligentibus unamque substantiam Ostendunt.”
 76 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Son of God is the Wisdom of God and the Truth which leads to
Him.” Apparently, then, the source of Augustine's information about
the Trinity was Christian. It is true that he uses abstract terms for
designating the Divine Persons, but he stresses the unity of essence and
the consubstantiality of the Highest Measure, of the Truth which pro
ceeds from It and of the Principle which conducts to Truth.* This
idea is quite incompatible with Neo-Platonic thought. According to
Plotinus's doctrine of emanation, as has been pointed out,” there can
be no consubstantiality between the One and that which It begets and
the Soul which, in turn, is produced by the latter. The Begotten is the
image of the One, but is inferior to Its Begetter in that It implies
multiplicity. It looks, so to speak, in the direction of the many as well
as in the direction of the One and therefore knows Itself as the Source
of multiplicity.” The third Principle, the World-Soul, is inferior to
the Second and consequently is still further removed from the First.”
Although the second and third Hypostases partake of the nature of the
One, they are not equal to It or consubstantial with It. In Augustine's
delineation of the Godhead there seems to be no difficulty in recogniz
ing the definition of the Church as expressed in the Athanasian Creed:
“We worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, neither con
founding the Persons nor dividing the Substance.”
That Monica at once recognizes the Christian Godhead in the
abstract explanation of her son is evident from the words of the latter:
At this point my mother, upon examining my words which
were deeply fixed in her memory, joyfully uttered from the
watch-tower of her faith, as it were, a verse from the hymn
composed by our priest, O blessed Trinity, support those
who entreat Thee,” and she added: This is beyond doubt
the happy life, which is the perfect life to which we who are
hastening can be brought and which we ought to enjoy
41 Ibid., c. IV, n. 34 (XXXII, 975).
42 Ibid., c. IV, n. 35 (XXXII, 976).
43 Cf. Chapter II, C.
44 Plotinus, Enneads, V, i, 5; V, i, 6; V, iv, 1; V, i, 7.
45 Ibid., V, i, 3; V, i, 7.
* Probably a verse of the Ambrosian hymn Deus, Creator omnium. Cf. Con
fessioner, L. IX, c. VII, n. 15 (XXXII, 770) for Augustine's account of the
practice of congregational singing, which St. Ambrose introduced into the
church at Milan.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 77

through anticipation by means of a lively faith, a confident

hope, and an ardent love.”
Hence it is reasonable to believe that the doctrine of the Trinity,
as Augustine here expresses it, is quite in accord with that pro
claimed by “Divine authority.”
Morever, God is aiding us, Augustine affirms, while we are
striving for the attainment of that perfect beatitude. This seems
to imply a positive help that would be incompatible with any
assistance which the introverted Deity of Neo-Platonism could
render to man. The One of Plotinus is above and beyond all
thought. Interest in the affairs of men would require a knowledge
of these matters and an act of knowledge, implying, as it does, a
sort of dualism, would mean the dispersion of the perfect unity and
simplicity which chiefly characterize the Neo-Platonic God. The aid
of which Augustine speaks is rather in harmony with that sug
gested by Monica, the help implied in the theological virtues: "a
lively faith, a confident hope, an ardent love.”
Augustine closes the disputation on happiness with an act of
thanksgiving to “the Father, the supreme and true God, to the
Lord, the Redeemer of souls” and then to those who took part
in the discussion. It is to be noted that the language which he uses
here is definitely the same as that which the Christian ordinarily
employs in speaking of the First and Second Persons of the Blessed
Trinity. From the omission of the Holy Ghost in this passage, as
well as from the brief mention which is given to the Holy Spirit
in his exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity, it seems evident
that Augustine at this time had a very inadequate notion of the
mission of the Third Person of the Godhead. There is no doubt
that he included the Holy Spirit as one of the Three Who “reveal
47 De beata vita, c. IV, n. 35 (XXXII, 976): "Hic mater recognitis verbis quae
suae memoriae penitus inhaerebant, et quasi evigilans in fidem suam, versum
illum sacerdotis nostri: 'Fove precantes, Trinitas, laeta effudit, atque sub
jecit: Haec est nullo ambigente beata vita, quae vita perfecta est, ad quam
nos festinantes posse perduci, solida fide, alacri spe, flagrante charitate praesu
mendum est.”
* Ibid., c. IV, n. 35 (XXXII, 976).
* Ibid., c. IV, n. 36 (XXXII, 976): “Ergo inquam, quoniam modus ipse nos
admonet, convivium aliquo intervallo dierum distinguere, quantas pro viribus
possum gratias ago summo et vero Deo Patri, Domino liberatori animarum:
deinde vobis qui concorditer invitati, multis etiam me cumulastis muneribus.”
 78 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

one God and one Substance,” but his knowledge of the Third
Person seems to have been limited to the fact that through this
Spirit, Who is truly God, we know the Son Who, in turn, unites
us with the Father.”

B. Contra Academico;
After Augustine had retired to Cassiciacum to enjoy a period
of relaxation at the beautiful country home of Verecundus, the first
literary work that engaged his attention was the refutation of
Academic philosophy.” This dialogue consisting of three books
represents a disputation in which Augustine, his pupils, Licentius
and Trygetius, and his friend Alypius take part. After invalidating
the arguments proposed by the Academics to establish the impossi
bility of attaining certitude, the disputants arrive at the conclusion
that it is indeed evident that man can know the truth. Augustine
dedicated this treatise to Romanianus, the generous friend and bene
factor who had made possible the continuation of his studies and
who had consoled and assisted him upon the death of his father.”
Throughout the Contra Academico; we are again” impressed
with the excessive praise which Augustine lavishes upon philosophy
50 Ibid., c. IV, n. 35 (XXXII, 976).
51 Ibid., c. IV, n. 35 (XXXII, 976).
J. Lebreton, Histoire du dogma de la Trinité, 2 vols. (Paris: G. Beauchesne,
1910, 1928), II, 560-563, explains that, while there is no question of the
place occupied by the Holy Ghost in the Trinity in the early Church, the
theology of the Holy Spirit was notably less developed and less precise than
that of the other Divine Persons, especially that of the Son. This is due to
the nature of the questions relating to the Trinity, which were raised at this
time. These were chiefly concerned with the Divine unity and the divinity
of Christ.
52 The Contra Academicos is the first work mentioned in the Retractationes.
Augustine speaks with subtle approval of this as the first occupation in which
he engaged after his conversion: “Cum ergo reliquissem, vel quae adeptus
fueram in cupiditatibus hujus mundi, vel quae adipisci volebam, et me ad
christianae vitae otium contulissem; nondum baptizatus, contra Academicos
vel de Academicis primum scripsi, ut argumenta eorum, quae multis ingerunt
veri inveniendi desperationem, et prohibent cuiquam rei assentiri, et omnino
aliquid, tanquam manifestum certumque sit, approbare sapientem, cum eis
omnia videantur obscura et incerta, ab animo meo, quia et me movebant,
quantis possem rationibus amoverem.” Cf. Retractationes, L. I, c. I, n. 1
(XXXII, 585).
58 Contra Academicos, L. II, c. II, n. 3 (XXXII, 920): "Tu me adolescentulum
pauperem ad peregrina studia pergentem, et domo et sumptu, et, quod pius
es, animo excepisti. Tu patre orbatum amicitia consolatus es, hortatione ani
masti, ope adjuvisti.”
54 Cf. De beata vita, c. I, n. 1-2 (XXXII, 959).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 79

and the philosophic life. Philosophy is “a very safe and delightful

harbor,” a “most secure and peaceful country.” In his earnest
and lengthy solicitation to Romanianus, Augustine enthusiastically
cites his own case as an illustration of the benefits derived from a
life devoted to the study of wisdom. From the time that he resigned
his empty profession and fled to the bosom of philosophy he has
enjoyed the peace for which he was longing. The reason for this
peace he describes in a somewhat Neo-Platonic strain:
She [philosophy] teaches—and teaches rightly—that noth
ing at all should be cherished and that everything should be
despised which mortal eye can see, or any sense can appro
priate. She promises that she will clearly make known the
true and invisible God, and now and again she deigns to
show Him to us, as it were, through the bright clouds.”
No age is barred from the study of philosophy. The young as
well as those of riper years can find profit and enjoyment in it.*
Hence, Augustine assures his friend that philosophy will have a
marvelous effect in dispelling his doubts and worries. In fact, such
benefits will accrue to Romanianus from the pursuit of wisdom that
Augustine feels justified in considering as greatly diminished the
almost insoluble debt which he owes his patron, if he can only suc
ceed in influencing him to devote himself to philosophy.”
Augustine then recounts the progress which he himself has
made in the pursuit of truth. “Hitherto,” he says, “I grasped more
by faith than I comprehended by reason whose minister you
[Romanianus] have been.” The necessity of earning a living, he
goes on to say, and the performance of social duties rendered im
possible the leisure requisite for the cultivation of his intellect.
But the generosity of Romanianus provided for him what was
55 Contra Academicos, L. II, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 919).
56 Ibid., L. III, c. II, n. 3 (XXXII, 935).
57 Ibid., L. I, c. I, n. 3 (XXXII, 907): “Ipsa enim docet, et vere docet nihil
omnino colendum esse, totumque contemni oportere, quidquid mortalibus
oculis cernitur, quidquid ullus sensus attingit. Ipsa verissimum et secretissi
mum Deum perspicue se demonstraturum promittit, et jam jamgue quasi per
lucidas nubes ostentare dignatur.”
58 Ibid., L. I, c. I, n. 4 (XXXII, 908).
59 Ibid., L. II, c. II, n. 3-4 (XXXII, 920–921).
60 Ibid., L. II, c. II, n. 4 (XXXII, 921): “Cujus autem minister fueris, plus
adhuc fide concepi, quam ratione comprehendi.”
 80 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

necessary and he eagerly entered upon his new life. Then certain
books were furnished by his kind benefactor, books packed with
thought (libri quidem pleni), which produced upon him a sudden
and marvelous effect. “They enkindled within me,” Augustine tells
his friend, "an intense fire, a conflagration which surpassed any
thing you believed possible in me. . . . What title of honor, what
retinue of men, what empty desire for renown, finally, what en
ticement binding one to this mortal life then had any effect on
me?”61

What was Augustine's reaction to this powerful influence? He

thus graphically describes it:
Indeed, I completely and hastily returned to myself. I looked
back, I confess, as from a long journey upon that religion
which had been instilled into me in my childhood and which
had been implanted within my very marrow, and yet which
continued to draw me to itself without my being aware
of it. And so, while wavering and hastening and hesitating,
I seized the writings of Paul the Apostle. For surely they
never would have had such power, they never would have
lived on, as it is clear they have, if their words and doc
trines were opposed to so great a good. I read the entire
book most attentively and carefully.”
This experience which Augustine has so vividly portrayed and
which closely resembles that recorded in the De beata vita” seems
to indicate that reason and faith, at this period, were closely asso
ciated in his mind. Whatever these books were—Augustine does
not mention their names—they directed his thoughts to the religion
of his childhood, which all along was exerting an influence upon
61 Ibid., L. II, c. II, n. 5 (XXXII, 921): “Incredibile, Romaniane, incredibile,
et ultra quam de me fortasse et tu credis; . . . etiam mihi ipsi de meipso
incredibile incendium concitarunt. Quis me tunc honor, quae hominum pompa,
quae inanis famae cupiditas, quod denique hujus mortalis vitae fomentum
atque retinaculum commovebat?”
62 Ibid., L. II, c. II, n. 5 (XXXII, 921-922): “Respexi tantum, confiteor, quasi
de itinere in illam religionem, quae pueris nobis insita est, et medullitus
implicata: verum autem ipsa mead se nescientem rapiebat. Itaque titubans,
properans, haesitans arripio apostolum Paulum. Neque enim vere isti, inquam,
tanta potuissent, vixissentque ita, , ut eos, vixisse manifestum est, si eorum
Litterae atque rationes huic tanto bono adversarentur. Perlegi totum intentis
sime atque cautissime.”
63 De beata vita, c. I, n. 4 (XXXII, 961).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 81

him without his being aware of it. He hastened, though falteringly,

to compare what he had read in these books with the words and
doctrines of St. Paul. Then, he adds, the beauty of philosophy ap
peared to him in a most realistic manner. It seems, therefore, that
philosophy as here used by Augustine was something more than the
mere exercise of reason in the pursuit of truth. Were he completely
satisfied with what he had found in the books to which he refers,
there would seem to be no special reason for resorting at once to
the writings of St. Paul, in other words, for hastening to Holy
Scripture, evidently, in order to compare the doctrines contained in
both sources. Augustine explicitly declares that the religion of his
childhood was so deeply incorporated, so to speak, within his very
substance that at no time did it cease to exercise an influence upon
him, though he himself was not aware of it.” It would seem, then,
that the books “filled with thought” assisted him in understanding
more clearly what hitherto he had accepted on evidence guaranteed
by faith.
This interpretation is supported by a remark which Augustine
makes toward the close of the dialogue. After refuting the perni
cious tenet of the Academics, that truth is unattainable and that the
wise man should never consent to anything, and after clearly stating
his own conviction of the possibility of arriving at truth, he tells
us that there is a twofold entrance into the realm of truth; namely,
authority and reason. And he adds:
Therefore I am sure that I shall never depart from the
authority of Christ for I find no other more reliable. But
what ought to be attained by the most subtle reasoning—for
at the present time I am so influenced as impatiently to
desire to apprehend truth not only by believing, but also by
knowing—I trust I shall find meanwhile in the works of
the Platonists, whatever is not in contradiction with our
Sacred Writings.”
* Contra Academicos, L. II, c. II, n. 5 (XXXII, 921): "Verum autem ipsa
[illa religio] me ad se nescientem rapiebat.”
65 Ibid., L. III, c. XX, n. 43 (XXXII, 957): "Mihi autem certum est nusquam
prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere: non enim reperio valentiorem. Quod
autem subtilissima ratione persequendum est; ita enim jam sum affectus, ut
quid sit verum, non credendo solum, sed etiam intelligendo apprehendere
impatienter desiderem; apud Platonicos me interim quod sacris nostris non
repugnet reperturum esse confido.”
82 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

That Augustine somehow associates truth with the authority of

Holy Scripture and with the name of Christ is again expressed in
the Contra Academicos. Addressing Romanianus and their mutual
friend, Lucilianus, he says:
Take care lest you think you know anything except what
you have learned in such a way as that one, two, three, and
four added together make the sum of ten; but beware also
lest you think that you will either not learn truth by means
of philosophy, or that truth can by no means be learned in
this way. For believe me or rather believe Him Who said:
Seek and you shall find', that this knowledge should not be
despaired of and that it will be clearer than those very
numbers.66

Since, then, “truth in the highest measure” is the end which

Augustine hopes to attain by the study of philosophy and since, as
he holds, there is a double path leading to this goal, the path of
reason and that of faith, while distinguishing the one from the
other, he does not separate them; therefore, philosophy, or the pur
suit of wisdom, seems to include for him the notion both of author
ity and reason. In fact, Augustine considers reason alone as an
unreliable and insufficient guide for man. In expressing his sym
pathy to Romanianus for the mishaps which have recently befallen
him, Augustine says:
While you, a person endowed with such great talents that
I often marvel at them, from the beginning of your youth
up to the present time have been entering a life filled with
all kinds of error along the weak and unaided path of rea
son, an abundance of riches which seemed attractive have
followed you, and they would have engulfed you into their
alluring whirlpool, if those blasts of fortune which are con
sidered unfavorable had not snatched you when you were
almost being submerged.”
* Ibid., L. II, c. III, n. 9 (XXXII, 923): “Sed nunc ambobus dico, cavete ne
quid vos nosse arbitremini, nisi quod ita didiceritis, saltem ut nostis, unum,
duo, tria, quatuor simul collecta in summam fieri decem. Sed item cavete ne
vos in philosophia veritatem aut non cognituros, aut nullo modo ita posse cog
nosci arbitremini. Nam mihi vel potius illi credite qui ait, Quaerite et inveni
etis, nec cognitionem desperandam esse, et manifestiorem futuram, quam sunt
illi numeri.”
* Ibid., L. II, c. II, n. 4 (XXXII, 921).
* Ibid., L. I, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 906): “Nam cum tanta, quantam semper
admiror, indole tua, ab ineunte adolescentia adhuc infirmo rationis, atque
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 83

Augustine assures Romanianus that he will pray daily for him

that God may grant him the strength and wisdom of which he now
stands in need; and he urges his friend not only to join with him
in prayer, but also to direct his mind and will to the obtaining of
the favor which he desires for him.” This prayer of petition to
which Augustine here refers is a notion quite incompatible with
Neo-Platonic thought. The prayer of adoration and contemplation,
that is, the elevation of the mind to God, is natural to the Neo
Platonist, for God is above man, and the divine nature which, strict
ly speaking, he shares with God tends to make man aspire to Him
with all the power of his soul. But what place can there be for
the prayer of supplication in a universe which is controlled by
necessity, such as was the universe of Plotinus? The God of Ploti
nus must be what He is, must do what He does; all the actions which
proceed from Him bear the stamp of a must be character. As Inge
remarks: “The efficacy of petitionary prayer was a problem for
them [the Neo-Platonists], both because of their belief in the regu
larity of natural law, and because it was not easy for them to admit
that the higher principle can be affected in any way by influence from
beneath.” It follows, then, that coöperation on the part of man
to obtain a favor which he may desire is a notion which has no
meaning for the Neo-Platonist.
This prayer of petition is likewise mentioned by Licentius.
When Augustine speaks to his pupil of the pleasure which will be
afforded both of them when the latter's father resolves to devote
himself to philosophy, Licentius, overcome with emotion, exclaims:
“When, O God, shall I see this? And yet, I should not despair of
receiving anything from You.”
In the third book of the Contra Academicoſ we find reference to
a doctrine which is closely associated with the name of Augustine
and which is likewise found in Plotinus, the doctrine of illumina

lapsante vestigio humanam vitam errorum omnium plenissimam ingredereris;

excepit te circumfluentia divitiarum, quae illam aetatem atque animum, quae
pulchra et honesta videbantur avide sequentem, illecebrosis coeperat absorbere
gurgitibus, nisi inde te fortunae illi flatus, qui putantur adversi, erupuissent
pene mergentem.”
* Ibid., L. II, c. I, n. 1-2 (XXXII, 919).
* W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, II, 200.
71 Contra Academicos, L. II, c. VI, n. 18 (XXXII, 928).
84 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

tion. In his effort to defend the view of the Academics, Alypius

expresses the wish that some Divine Being were present in order to
point out to them the truth about which they were so greatly
concerned and which Proteus-like seemed unable to be grasped.”
Augustine expresses great pleasure at this statement of his friend.
You said [Augustine remarks] not only briefly but also rev
erently that only some Divinity can show man what is true.
Therefore I have heard nothing in this discussion that has
given me greater pleasure, nothing that seems more impor
tant, nothing more likely, and if this Divine Being is present,
as I trust He is, nothing that is more true. . . . For . . . that
Proteus just j is represented as the likeness of
truth. It is the character of truth, I say, which Proteus sus
tains or supports; and none can attain it if, deceived by
false representations, he loosens or relaxes his hold on the
knots of reason.”

According to this passage, Augustine seems to be of the opinion

that the human mind cannot of itself recognize truth, that it cannot
express true judgments unless it receives direct assistance from God.
In other words, truth results from a direct relation between the
human intellect and the Divine Ideas. Plotinus likewise has a doc
trine of illumination. With him, too, the Divine Ideas enlighten
all men, but this light is no different in nature than is the human
intellect itself, for man is, so to speak, the offspring of the Divine
Intelligence. Since by nature man is divine, by that very fact he
possesses the light necessary to arrive at truth. He is not a creature
in need of Divine assistance, but rather a being trying to recover
what he himself fundamentally is. In other words, according to
Plotinus, illumination belongs to man because he is part of God.
In the passage of this dialogue to which we have referred it seems
evident that Augustine is thinking of a positive Divine assistance
72 Ibid., L. III, c. V, n. 11 (XXXII, 940).
73 Ibid., L. III, c. VI, n. 13 (XXXII, 940): "Etenim numen aliquod aisti
solum posse ostendere homini quid sit verum, cum breviter, tum etiam pie.
Nihil itaque in hoc sermone nostro libentius audiwi, nihil gravius, nihil prob
abilius, et, si id numen ut confido adsit, nihil verius. . . . Proteus enim ille . . .
in imaginem veritatis inducitur. Veritatis, inquam, Proteus in carminibus os
tentat sustinetque personam, quam obtinere nemo potest, si falsis imaginibus
deceptus comprehensionis nodos vel laxaverit vel dimiserit.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 85

which man requires in order to know the truth, an assistance which is

unnecessary in the system of Plotinus.
Throughout the Contra Academicos one is strongly impressed
with the deep affection and high regard that Augustine has for the
Platonists, especially for Plato and Plotinus. Plato is “the wisest and
most learned man of his age, who spoke in such a way that what
ever he said became important.” Again, he speaks of the counte
nance of Plato as being "the purest and brightest in all philoso
phy.” His doctrine shone forth (emicuit) especially in the person
of Plotinus, “a Platonic philosopher who was considered so much
like Plato that one would have to believe that they lived at the same
time, but so much time intervened between them that one would
have to think that the latter had come to life again in the person
of the former.”76
Evidence of definitely Platonic doctrine is by no means lacking
in this dialogue, especially in regard to the soul and its relation to
the body. Speaking of the hidden virtue in the soul of Romanianus,
Augustine says: “Will such virtue as that not come to light some
time and change the derision of many who are in despair into hor
ror and amazement, and after speaking on earth of certain indica
tions, as it were, of the future, casting aside the burden of the body,
return once more to heaven?” Again, he says: “We are now treating
of our life, of our morals, of our soul which, while returning, as it were,
to the realm of its own divine origin, anticipates by comprehending the
truth . . . that it will triumph over immoderate desires and . . . will so
reign as to return more surely into heaven.” The subject of truth, he
74 Ibid., L. III, c. XVII, n. 37 (XXXII, 954): “Plato vir sapientissimus et
eruditissimus temporum suorum, quiet ita locutus est, ut quaecumque diceret,
magna fierent . . .”
75 Ibid., L. III, c. XVIII, n. 41 (XXXII, 956).
76 Ibid., L. III, c. XVIII, n. 41 (XXXII, 956). Augustine, Retractationes,
L. I, c. I, n. 4 (XXXII, 587), disapproves of the excessive praise bestowed
in this treatise upon the Platonic philosophers: “Laus quoque ipsa, qua
Platonem vel Platonicos seu Academicos philosophos tantum extuli quan
tum impios homines non oportuit, non immerito mihi displicuit.”
77 Contra Academicos, L. II, c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 920).
78 Ibid., L. II, c. IX, n. 22 (XXXII, 929-930). In the Retractationes, L. I, c. I,
n. 3 (XXXII, 587), Augustine explains that in using the word return (redi
turus) he did not have in mind that human souls have fallen from heaven
and have been cast into bodies on account of some sin, but that he had refer
ence to their going back to God, the Author of their being: “Alio loco de
animo, cum agerem dixi: Securior rediturus in coelum. Iturus autem, quam,
86 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

says elsewhere, “pertains to the hope of a happy soul.” And again, he

speaks of the soul as enjoying wisdom after man has ceased to be
mortal.89 -

When Trygetius, who objects to the statement of Licentius that

happiness consists merely in seeking the truth, attempts to force his
fellow-student to acknowledge that he who is still seeking truth
cannot be considered perfect, the latter admits that whoever has not
attained his goal is not perfect. Yet he still insists that man in the
present state in which he finds himself must be content with a
whole-hearted search for truth. “I think,” he says, “that God alone
knows truth, or perhaps the soul of man when it has left this dark
prison of the body.” Later on Licentius argues that the man who
is seeking truth is both wise and happy: wise from the very fact
that he is seeking, and happy from the fact that he is wise "since
he divests his mind, in so far as he can, of all the wrappings of the
body (omnibus involucris corporis) and collects himself within the
depths of his own consciousness.”
All of these passages bear evidence of the influence of the Pla
tonic and Neo-Platonic doctrine of man as primarily a soul, and of
the body as a detriment to the soul in the exercise of its activity,
both intellectually and morally. However, Augustine likewise re
marks that the body, if properly used, is of no hindrance to man:
“For how does any sense of the body help or hinder him who is
inquiring into his moral life? Indeed, it is of no hindrance except
to those who have placed the highest and only true good of man in
pleasure.” A Neo-Platonist would hardly give expression to such
an opinion.

rediturus dixissem securius, propter eos qui putant animos humanos pro
meritis peccatorum suorum de coelo lapsos sive dejectos, in corpora ista de
trudi. Sed hoc ego propterea non dubitavi dicere, quia ita dixi in coelum,
tanquam dicerem, ad Deum qui ejus est auctor et conditor . . .”
79 Contra Academicos, L. III, c. IX, n. 18 (XXXII, 943).
80 Ibid., L. III, c. IX, n. 20 (XXXII, 944).
81 Ibid., L. I, c. III, n. 9 (XXXII, 910): “Veritatem autem illam solum Deum
nosse arbitror, aut forte hominis animam, cum hoc corpus, hoc est tenebrosum
carcerem, dereliquerit.” Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, IV, viii, 4; II, ix, 7; also
Plato, Gorgias, 493 A; Cratylus 400 C.
* Contra Academicos, L. I, c. VIII, n. 23 (XXXII, 917).
83 Ibid., L. III, c. XII, n. 27 (XXXII, 948).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 87

C. De Ordine
The treatise De ordine” is dedicated to Zenobius, the mutual
friend of Augustine and Romanianus, who, Augustine remarks, is
extremely interested in the subject of the order which exists in the
universe, and has not as yet received a satisfactory explanation of
it.” The participants in the discussion are Augustine, his mother,
his pupils, and Alypius.
In subject matter and mode of treatment the dialogue De ordine
bears a striking resemblance to Plotinus's tractates on Providence”
and on Fate.” The application of our criteria, however, reveals in
the treatise some doctrines which are specifically Christian.
All things in the universe, Augustine observes, are arranged
and governed by Divine Providence with an admirable order.
Chance has no place in a unified realm where everything has a defi
nite cause and where all proximate causes, linked together, can
be traced to a primal cause which is responsible for the being and
the ordering of whatever the universe contains. But how can a
84 The date of composition of this dialogue cannot definitely be ascertained from
the Retractationes. Augustine writes: “Per idem tempus, inter illos qui de
Academicis scripti sunt, duos etiam libros de Ordine scripsi . . .” Cf. Retracta
tiones, L. I; c. III, n. 1 (XXXII, 588). From internal evidence in the De
ordine it would seem that the first book of this dialogue was written on the
day after the discussion contained in the De beata vita: "Hic ego erection spe
alacriore quam soleo esse, cum aliquid ab his requiro, quod rem tantam et
tam subito, heri pene ad ista conversus adolescentis animus concepisset . . .”
Cf. De ordine, L. I, c. III, n. 8 (XXXII, 982). Apparently, then, the first
book of the De ordine was written between the first and second books of the
Contra Academicos. However, internal evidence in the second book of the De
ordine would seem to indicate that it was composed after the third book of
the Contra Academicos : “Hunc vero totis viribus comprehendit qui jam uni
versae veritatis index futurus, ille cujus mentionem fecit Alypius, cum de
Academicis quaereremus, quasi Proteus in manibus erat.” Cf. De ordine, L.
II, c. XV, n. 43 (XXXII, 1015). The reference to Proteus was made in Con
tra Academicos, L. III, c. V, n. 11 (XXXII, 940). Cf. D. Ohlman, De 5.
Augustini dialogis in Cassiciaco scriptis, pp. 19-23.
85 De ordine, L. I, c. VII, n. 20 (XXXII, 987): “Nam Zenobius noster multa
mecum saepe de rerum ordine contulit, cui alta percontanti, nunquam satis
facere potui, seu propter obscuritatem rerum, seu propter temporum augustias.”
86 Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 1-18; III, iii, 1-7.
87 Ibid., III, i, 1-10.
A. Dyroff, “Úber Form und Begriffsgehalt der Augustinischen Schrift De
ordine” in Aurelius Augustinus (Cologne, J. P. Bachem, 1930), finds no
certain trace of Neo-Platonism in this dialogue, but much that is Stoic and
Neo-Pythagorean in thought, with a tinge of Aristotelianism. “Plotin ist ja . . .
hier im Grunde nicht originell,” p. 48.
88 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

divine and beneficent Providence be said to exercise a universal

guidance and control when lack of harmony appears so evident both
in the physical and the moral order? “For this in itself is a rather
important subject of inquiry that the parts of a flea's body are so
wonderfully and definitely arranged, while in the meantime human
life is heaved about and tossed here and there by the instability of
innumerable disturbances.”
This difficulty, Augustine believes, is owing to two causes:
first, the scope of man's vision is so limited that he cannot discern
the unity and perfection of the entire plan of the universe. If, for
example, anyone observing a pavement inlaid with a vast number
of little stones should notice only a small portion of it, he would
blame the craftsman for the seeming confusion and incongruity in
the pattern, but should the observer behold the mosaic when com
pleted, he would marvel at the beauty and symmetry displayed
therein. In like manner, even the most learned men who try to
embrace with their weak minds the meaning and arrangement of
the universe find fault with the defects that seem to mar the har
mony which they are seeking. Secondly, in the present condition in
which he finds himself man is so immersed in sensible things that
it is no easy task for him to refuse to accept unconditionally the in
formation received by way of the senses and to seek the truth
within the sanctuary of his mind.” If he succeeds in doing so, he will
realize that order indeed prevails in the universe, that all things to the
extent that they have being are good, that physical evils have no positive
reality but are merely varying degrees of privation of the good. As such,
they have a definite place in a universe in which variety is no unimpor
tant factor in contributing to the charm and splendor of the whole.
Whatever is less perfect and even that which is unsightly accentuate by
antithesis the beauty of other things. For example, the elegant dic
tion of the poet would pass unnoticed, were there no solecisms and
barbarisms occasionally to mar the delightful passages in the
88 De ordine, L. I, c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 979): “At enim hoc ipsum est plenius
quaestionum, quod membra pulicis disposita mire atque distincta sunt, cum
interea humana vita innumerabilium perturbationum inconstantia versetur et
fluctuet.”
89 Ibid., L. I, c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 979).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 89

poem.” Even the ugliness of moral evil does not subvert the order
of the universe, for the justice of God is exercised in meting out
adequate rewards to those who observe the moral law and condign
retribution to those who violate it.” Thus Augustine analyzes to
his own satisfaction the order of the universe and assures himself
that nothing falls beyond the dominion of a kind and beneficent
Providence.
If we turn to the Enneads of Plotinus, we find a striking parallel
in the interpretation of order. “All things,” Plotinus says, “save
those Firsts of the Eternal Existents which, by the fact that they
are Firsts, can not be referred to outside causes, are due to cause.”
It is absurd to claim that the existence and structure of the universe
depend on chance. The universe, which eternally existed, is rendered
harmonious and orderly by a Providence which rules in it as a uni
versal consonance with the Divine Intelligence. That there is im
perfection in it is to be expected, as it is a realm of multiplicity.
But even if the cosmos were less beautiful, it would be absurd to
condemn the whole on the merits of the parts, which must be
judged only as they enter harmoniously into the whole.” It must
be viewed in its totality and not in its details:
For it stands a stately whole, complete within itself, . . . the
minutest of things a tributary to the vast total, the marvelous
art shown not merely in the mightiest works and sublimest
members of the All, but even amid such littleness as one
would think Providence must disdain; the varied workman
ship of wonder in any and every animal form; the world
of vegetation, too; the grace of fruit and leaves, the lavish
ness, the delicacy, the diversity of exquisite bloom: and all
this not issuing once, and then to die, but made ever and
ever anew as the Transcendent Beings move variously over
this earth.*

90 Ibid., L. II, c. II, n. 9—c. IV, n. 14 (XXXII, 998-1001); L. I, c. VI, n. 15–

c. VII, n. 19 (XXXII, 985-986).
91 Ibid., L. II, c. VII, n. 22 (XXXII, 1004-1005).
92 Plotinus, Enneads, III, i, 1.
98 Ibid., III, ii, 3.
94 Ibid., III, ii, 3, 13.
90 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

The conflict of opposites is ever being enacted in the drama of

the universe, but just as in music high tones and low tones enter
into the principles of harmony, so, too,
In the Universe at large we find contraries—white and black,
hot and cold, winged and wingless, reasoning and unreason
ing; but all these elements are members of one living body,
their sum-total; the Universe is a self-accordant entity, its
members everywhere clashing, but the total being the mani
festation of a Reason-Principle.”
Even moral evil enters into the universal scheme without mar
ring the total harmony. When man does evil, he is singled out for
condemnation. Vice even contributes something to the general
good, Plotinus observes, in that its punishment serves as an example
to others: “By setting men face to face with the ways and conse
quences of iniquity, it calls them from lethargy, stirs the deeper
mind and sets the understanding to work; by the contrast of evil
under which wrong-doers labor, it displays the worth of the
right.”
It would seem, then, that Augustine and Plotinus are in agree
ment in their analysis of the nature of evil and in their attempt to
render the notion of it compatible with an ordered universe gov
erned by an all-wise Providence. And yet Augustine expresses an
idea that is wholly out of place in Neo-Platonic thought, the asso
ciating of the government of the universe with the Divine will.
Men, he says, who are perplexed by the evils which are everywhere
mingled in human affairs are sometimes led to believe either that
Providence does not extend to all things or that evils proceed from
the will of God—"both conclusions blasphemous, but especially the
latter.” The Neo-Platonic universe is one in which necessity holds
sway; hence it would be inconsistent to ascribe the disposition of
events therein to the will of God. Plotinus, it is true, in the eighth
tractate of the sixth Ennead speaks of the will of the One. But the
95 Ibid., III, ii, 16.
96 Ibid., III, ii, 5.
97 De ordine, L. I, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 978): “Quamobrem illud quasi neces
sarium is quibus talia sunt curae, credendum dimittitur, aut divinam pro
videntiam non usque in haec ultima et ima pertendi, aut certe mala omnia
Dei voluntate committi. Utrumque impium, sed magis posterius.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 91

Neo-Platonic God is of such a nature that He has to consent to what

ever is. The universe, Plotinus says, “stands in need of harmonizing
because it is the meeting ground of Necessity and Divine Reason—
Necessity pulling toward the lower . . . while yet the Intellectual
Principle remains sovran over it.” This Divine Intelligence which
has emanated necessarily from the Supreme Principle is, according
to Plotinus, the source of the universal Providence which produces
order in a universe whose eternal existence results from a necessity
inherent in the nature of the Divine Intelligence.” In such a uni
verse the notion of Providence would have to be quite different
from that in a world whose relation to God is such as Augustine
seems to represent it in the treatise De ordine.
That, in the opinion of Augustine, there is a personal relation
ship between God and man and consequently that God's providence
extends directly to individuals in the universe—a notion definitely
Christian—seem quite evident from his doctrine of petitionary
prayer as expressed in this dialogue. He urges his companions to
pray not for riches, honors, or transitory possessions but for those
things which will make them good and happy. And he entreats his
mother to join her prayers with theirs for that intention, since he
is convinced that it is due to the efficacy of her intercession with
God that he is obsessed with a desire and love for truth.” Again,
he tells us that daily he begs God to heal the wounds of his soul.”
Such petitions would be meaningless did Augustine not believe that
God has direct knowledge of individuals and that His providence
extends immediately to them. This notion of prayer is very different
from that contained in Neo-Platonic doctrine. The efficacy of
prayer, as Plotinus conceives it, is due to a sort of metaphysical
98 Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 2.
99 Ibid., III, ii, 1.
100 De ordine, L. II, c. XX, n. 52 (XXXII, 1019): "Oremus ergo, non ut
nobis divitiae, vel honores, vel hujusmodi res fluxae atque nutantes, et quovis
resistente transeuntes, sedut ea proveniant, quae nos bonos faciant et beatos.
Quae vota ut devotissime impleantur, tibi maxime hoc negotium, mater, in
jungimus; cujus precibus indubitanter credo atque confirmo mihi istam men
tem Deum dedisse, ut inveniendae veritati nihil omnino praeponam, nihil
aliud velim, nihil cogitem, nihil amem.”
191 Ibid., L. I, c. X, n. 29 (XXXII, 991).
92 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

sympathy which prevails throughout the universe. As he expresses

it:

There is no question of a will that grants. . . . Some influ

ence may fall from the being addressed upon the petitioner,
or upon someone else, but that being itself . . . perceives
nothing at all. The prayer is answered by the mere fact that
part and other part are wrought to one tone like a musical
string which, being plucked at one end, vibrates at the other
also.10?

The idea of prayer as expressed by Augustine somehow does not

fit into the scheme of abstract relationship which exists among all
things in the universe of Neo-Platonism.
In his praise of the disciplines (disciplinae liberales) and espe
cially of dialectic, Augustine also reminds us of Plotinus. A mod
erate and ready knowledge of the liberal arts, Augustine says, rend
ers us more eager and better equipped for embracing the truth.*
But dialectic is “the discipline of disciplines.” It instructs us how to
teach; it teaches us how to learn. In dialectic reason provides us
with a revelation of itself: it discloses what it is, what it wishes,
what power it has. Therefore it is the highest and most useful of
the disciplines.” Plotinus likewise is loud in his praise of dialectic.
It is necessary to know it in order to appreciate the harmony of the
intellectual world. It is a discipline which gives man the power of
pronouncing upon the nature and purpose of things—what each is,
to what kind it belongs and in what rank it stands in its kind, and
whether its being is real being. Philosophy is supremely precious,
but dialectic is the most valuable part of philosophy.” It is the
task of wisdom and dialectic to present all things as universal and
stripped of matter for treatment by the understanding.”
In the treatise De ordine there is evidence on the part of Augus
tine of an extreme emphasis on the spiritual, which places, as it
were, the center of gravity in the soul and which causes him to con
sider human nature in terms of the mind. While holding to the
102 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, iv, 40-41.
103 De ordine, L. I, c. VIII, n. 24 (XXXII, 988).
104 Ibid., L. II, c. XIII, n. 38 (XXXII, 1013).
195 Augustine also expresses the opinion that dialectic is the most important part
of philosophy. Cf. Contra Academicos, L. III, c. XIII, n. 29 (XXXII, 949).
106 Plotinus, Enneads, I, iii, 4-5.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 93

unity of man, he has a tendency to regard him as a soul using a

body, a definition Platonic in origin and one which is also charac
teristic of Neo-Platonic thought. He remarks to Trygetius:
You deny, then, that the wise man consists not only of a
body and a soul, but also wholly of a soul, if indeed it is
absurd to deny that that part of man which makes use of the
senses belongs to the soul. For it is not the eyes or the ears,
but something else which perceives through the eyes. But if
we do not grant to the intellect the power to know itself,
we do not grant it to any part of the soul. It remains that
this power is attributed to the body, a statement, however,
than which nothing more absurd could be made, according
to my way of thinking.”
In other words, sensation, in the opinion of Augustine, results
from a sort of vital presence of the soul within the body. Here we
find a theory of sensation quite in keeping with that of Neo
Platonism. Plotinus, too, speaks of the body as an instrument of the
soul and looks upon sensation as primarily a spiritual process, since
he defines it as that by which the soul apprehends through the
employment of the body.”
This emphasis upon the spiritual part of man is again apparent
when Augustine urges Licentius not completely to abandon his
former interest in poetry, since moderate attention to the liberal
arts is a means of advancing in wisdom. Those who are not con
cerned about the cultivation of wisdom are satisfied with a mere
consciousness of God. “But,” Augustine adds, “that gracious and
delightful Spouse seeks other men, or to speak more truly, other
souls while they animate this body, now worthy to be united to
Him, for whom it is not sufficient to live, but to live happily.”
107 De ordine, L. II, c. II, n. 6 (XXXII, 996): “Negas ergo; inquam, non
solum ex corpore et anima, sed etiam ex anima tota constare sapientem; siqui
dem partem istam qua utitur sensibus, animae esse negare dementis est. Non
enim ipsi oculi vel aures, sed nescio quid aliud per oculos sentit. Ipsum autem
sentire, si non damus intellectui, non damus alicui parti animae. Restat ut
corpori tribuatur, quo absurdius dici nihil interim mihi videtur.” Cf. L. II,
c. III, n. 10 (XXXII, 999).
108 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, vii, 8.
* De ordine, L. I, c. VIII, n. 24 (XXXII, 988-989): “Alios autem viros, vel,
ut verius loquamur, alias animas, dum hoc corpus agunt, jam thalamo suo
Gignas conjux ille optimus ac pulcherrimus quaerit, quibus non vivere, sed
beate vivere satis sit.”
94 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

The same esteem and admiration for philosophy which has

already been noted in the writings of this period” are manifest in
the dialogue On Order. Philosophy is “our true and solitary habi
tation;” it is “a sacred inner shrine.” It centers its attention on
a twofold question: God and the human soul. The study of the
latter provides us with a knowledge of ourselves; the consideration
of the former, with a knowledge of our origin, of the Parent of the
universe of Whom reason can give no adequate knowledge since
He is better known by not being known.” Philosophy is fairer than
Pyramus and Thisbe, than Cupid and Venus, and such loves as the
poets maintained have enraptured the hearts of men.” He who
devotes himself to philosophy pursues an arduous journey along one
of the paths which will guide him in the ordering and enrichment
of his life—the path of reason. For there are two ways at man's dis
posal by which he may be instructed in the knowledge and the
love of God in Whom his happiness is centered: the way of faith
and that of reason. “The former is prior in time,” Augustine says,
“the latter, in meaning (re). The one has the preference when there
is a question of acting; the other is of more weight in striving
after something.” Chronologically faith must precede reason for
before one can understand something, he must, in a sense, admit
that there is such a thing. Hence, Augustine remarks, "no door but
that of authority is open to those who desire to learn what is good,
great, and hidden.”
The path of reason is waiting to receive these men after they
have left the cradle of authority in order to teach them how reason
able were those things which authority provided for them and to
explain the meaning of truths which they accepted on the strength
110 Cf. De beata vita, c. I, n. 1-2 (XXXII, 959); Contra Academicos, L. II,
c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 919); L. III, c. II, n. 3 (XXXII, 935).
111 De ordine, L. I, c. III, n. 9 (XXXII, 982).
112 Ibid., L. I, c. XI, n. 31 (XXXII, 992).
113 Ibid., L. I, c. XVIII, n. 47 (XXXII, 1017). This idea is likewise com
mon to Neo-Platonism. Cf. Enneads, III, viii, 9-10; VI, viii, 11.
114 De ordine, L. I, c. VIII, n. 21 (XXXII, 987).
115 Ibid., L. II, c. IX, n. 26 (XXXII, 1007): “Tempore auctoritas, re autem
ratio prior est. Aliud est enim quod in agendo anteponitur, aliud quod pluris
in appetendo aestimatur.”
116 Ibid., L. II, c. IX, n. 26 (XXXII, 1007): ". . . evenit ut omnibus bona
magna et occulta discere cupientibus, non aperiat nisi auctoritas januan.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 95

of Divine authority, in so far as they can be understood. Not

many men, in fact, only those who have been trained in the disci
plines (disciplinae liberales) advance very far along the path of
reason. It is possible for the others to live happily on earth, and
their happiness in the life to come will depend upon how well or
ill they have regulated their lives in accordance with the instruction
which they have received.” However, Divine authority, which is
“true, reliable, and supreme,” which transcends every human
power, bids man not to be held down by the allurement of sensible
things but to fly to reason, for it tells him that he can acquire
great things by the use of this power. And yet whatever reason can
attain is transmitted in a more hidden manner and still with greater
assurance (ſecretius firmiuſque) “through those sacred teachings in
which we are initiated and by which the life of those who are good
is purified not by the intricacies of arguments, but by the authority
of the Mysteries.”
Hence it seems evident that, although Augustine exalts reason
as a very important factor in the pursuit of wisdom and a means
of which only a rare and gifted class of men can make adequate use
in the attainment of truth, he has no intention by this encomium to
depreciate the rôle of faith. Through the avenue of faith we attain
"recretius firmiusque” the truths at which reason aims to arrive.
Knowledge which is characterized by greater assurance, even
though it be more obscure, is surely of a higher order than that
which is less certain but more obvious. In fact, on several occasions
Augustine, at least implicitly, asserts that by the exercise of reason
alone one cannot arrive at truth in all its fulness. Even in the case

117 Ibid., L. II, c. IX, n. 26 (XXXII, 1007).

118 Ibid., L. II, c. IX, n. 27 (XXXII, 1007): “Auctoritas autem partim divina
est, partim humana: sed vera, firma, summa est ea quae divina nominatur.”
119 Ibid., L. II, c. IX, n. 27 (XXXII, 1007-1008): “Illa ergo auctoritas divina
dicenda est, quae non solum in sensibilibus signis transcendit omnem hu
manam facultatem, sed et ipsum hominem agens, ostendit ei quousque se
propter ipsum depresserit: et non teneri sensibus, quibus videntur illa miran
da, sed ad intellectum jubet evolare; simul demonstrans et quanta hic possit,
et cur haec faciat, et quam parvi pendat. Doceat enim oportet et factis po
testatem suam, et humilitate clementiam, et praeceptione naturam; quae om
nia sacris, quibus initiamur, secretius firmiusque traduntur: in quibus bonor
um vita facillime, non disputationum ambagibus, sed mysteriorum auctori
tate purgatur.”
96 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

of learned men the intellect is weak;” it requires the special assist

ance of God if it is to attain what it desires. Augustine not only
spends a portion of each night in meditation;” he also prays” and
begs his mother whose love for wisdom, he believes, is even greater
than her love for him,” to offer her prayers for him and his com
panions.” He alone will see the beauty of truth “who lives well,
prays well, studies well.” In order to live a happy and useful life,
the young should be taught to love God, to meditate upon Him, to
seek Him, uniting themselves to Him by faith, hope, and charity.”
Again, he says: “I am but a child in philosophy and, when I ask,
I do not care very much through whom He gives me a reply Who
daily hears me complaining.” It appears evident, therefore, that
Augustine is of the opinion that reason must be supplemented by
something on a higher level if man is to arrive at truth in its ful
neSS.

In the mind of Augustine there is unquestionably no conflict

between faith and reason. Philosophy bids those who are attempt
ing to advance along the path of reason not to despise the
mysteries of faith but to understand them in so far as they can be
understood. Philosophy is the sister of faith and has no other func
tion than to inform its advocates about that Being Who is the
Originator of the universe, Whom the Sacred Mysteries declare to
be one omnipotent God and at the same time "a threefold powerful
God, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.” They likewise
teach “how marvelous a thing it is that so great a God deigned
to assume and put on the body of our nature; the more worthless
it appears, the more overflowing is His mercy and the more com
120 Ibid., L. I, c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 979).
121 Ibid., L. I, c. III, n. 6 (XXXII, 981).
122 Ibid., L. I, c. VIII, n. 25 (XXXII, 989).
123 Ibid., L. I, c. XI, n. 32 (XXXII, 994).
124 Ibid., L. II, c. XX, n. 52 (XXXII, 1019).
125 Ibid., L. II, c. XX, n. 51 (XXXII, 1019): “Videbit autem [pulchritudinem
veritatis] qui bene vivit, bene orat, bene studet.”
1* Ibid., L. II, c. VIII, n. 25 (XXXII, 1007): "Apte congruenterque vivant.
Deum colant, cogitent, quaerant, fide, spe, charitate submixi.”
*** Ibid., L. I, c. V, n. 13 (XXXII, 984): “Nam et ego in philosophia puer
sum, et non nimis curo, cum interrogo, per quem mihi ille respondeat, qui
me quotidie querulum accipit.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 97

pletely and absolutely removed from the pride of those endowed

with great genius.”
In this passage Augustine uses language that is definitely Chris
tian to express the doctrine of the unity and trinity of God. He is
one omnipotent God and yet a tri-potential Being. While this state
ment does not explicitly assert the equality of the three Divine Per
sons, it would seem to indicate that each member of this Trinity is
possessed of equal power. There is likewise discernible in the same
text a clear reference to the doctrine of the Incarnation. It is true that
the Neo-Platonic God could, in a way, be said to have assumed the
lowly "body of our nature,” since matter comes from the One and,
although it is the lowest term in the process of emanation, can
rightly be said to participate in the lofty nature of the One; yet the
notion of mercy and humility as characterizing this act of con
descension would scarcely be consistent with Neo-Platonic thought,
since a God Who by His very nature is forced to act as He does
could hardly be said to exercise mercy and humility in His relations
with man.

Earlier in the discussion Augustine also expresses the equality of

the Father and the Son. When we speak of God, Trygetius re
marks, Christ does not come to our mind, but rather God the
Father. It is only when we mention the Son of God that Christ
occurs to us. Augustine corrects his pupil with the statement that
the Son of God is not improperly called God.” It is only due to
the fact that a relation of equality exists between the Divine Per
sons Who comprise the Christian Trinity that one can be called
God with the same precision as each of the other two. Hence,
although by such a statement Augustine does not explicitly affirm
128 Ibid., L. II, c. V, n. 16 (XXXII, 1002): "Nullumque aliud habet negotium,
quae vera, et, ut ita dicam, germana philosophia est, quam ut doceat quod
sit omnium rerum principium sine principio . . . quem unum Deum omnipo
tentem eumque tripotentem. Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, docent
veneranda mysteria, quae fide sincera et inconcussa populos liberant; nec
confuse ut quidam; nec contumeliose, ut multi praedicant. Quantum autem
illud sit, quod hoc etiam nostri generis corpus, tantus propter nos Deus
assumere atque agere dignatus est, quando videtur vilius, tanto est clementia
plenius, et a quadam ingeniosorum superbia longe lateaue remotius.”
** Ibid., L. I, c. X, n. 29 (XXXII, 991). Cf. De civitate Dei, L. X, c.
XXIV (XLI, 300-301), in which Augustine criticizes the Platonists' con
cept of God.
98 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

the equality of the Father and the Son, the fact that he deems it
proper to designate both Persons by the name of God would seem
to indicate that he had in mind the equality of the Father and the
Son. The Neo-Platonic Nous could not, strictly speaking, be called
God, if one were to apply that title to the first of the Hypostases.
That in which some sort of dualism is implied cannot with pre
cision be designated by the same title as the Being in which per
fect unity is found. If, then, the term God is applied to the One,
it does not with absolute propriety specify the second Principle of
the Neo-Platonic Trinity.
In Augustine's stern rebuke to his pupils for their childish
rivalry and desire of vain glory in a discussion of such great im
portance, we have testimony of the spirit of sincere repentance and
humility which characterized his life at the home of Verecundus.
“Do not, I entreat you,” he says, addressing them, “add to my un
happiness. My own wounds are sufficient for me and I beg of God
daily with many tears to heal them, and yet I am often convinced
that I am too unworthy to be healed as quickly as I desire.” Such
an expression of abasement and remorse would be altogether out of
harmony with the Neo-Platonic notion of sin and its effacement,
for, after all, the true man, that is to say, the soul, never sins, since
by nature it is divine. Its moral evil is that of forgetfulness of itself,
and all that is necessary to rectify the error is to rouse itself from
the realm of sense by access to philosophy.” The wise man of
Plotinus is always serene and calm and satisfied.” Repentance, re
morse, regret are sentiments quite unknown to him.
The De ordine contains an interesting passage on memory, a
subject which Augustine always found most fascinating” and one
which holds an important place in his psychology. The discussion
had reached the point at which Licentius remarks that the only
knowledge which is suitable for the wise man is that which he
130 De ordine, L. I, c. X, n. 29 (XXXII, 991): “Nolite, obsecro vos, geminare
mihi miserias. Satis mihi sint vulnera mea, quae ut sanentur, pene quotidianis
fletibus Deum rogans, indigniorem tamen esse me qui tam cito saner quam
volo, saepe memetipse convinco.”
131 Plotinus, Enneads, III, vi, 5.
132 Ibid., I, iv, 12.
183 In the Confession; Augustine makes an interesting and detailed analysis of
the rôle both of sensory and intellectual memory. Cf. Confessiones, L. X, c.
X-XXVI (XXXII, 786-795).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 99

acquires by means of his intellect. The knowledge which he attains

through the avenue of the senses is not to be included in that
which is sufficient to render him wise. And yet even the man who
is eager in the pursuit of wisdom, whose soul, purified by virtue, is
intent upon God, possesses by way of the senses a power which is
advantageous and is deserving of a place in the soul of him who
is considered wise; namely, the faculty of memory. It is possible
for man in the depths of his soul to ponder over and enjoy Him
Who is wholly immaterial and not subject to change. However, in
the present condition of change and alteration in which he finds
himself, memory is a valuable and even necessary servant in that it
furnishes man with a means of preserving what would otherwise
be lost and of organizing it in an orderly fashion, with the result
that the material is of benefit to himself and to other men with
whom he is associated.” Licentius concludes:

I do not think that anything ought to be entrusted to it

[memory] by the wise man if he is absorbed in God . . . but
that servant [memory], now well instructed, carefully pre
serves that with which he may sometimes supply his master
when he is arguing and which may prove a welcome service
to him, as to a very just man under whose authority he sees
that he is living. And the servant does this not, as it were,
by a process of reasoning but according to the prescription
of that law and of the highest order.”
Plotinus would be rather loath to ascribe to memory the impor
tant rôle which Augustine here assigns it. To the Neo-Platonist
memory is a mark of weakness in the soul. It is a substitute for that
perfect activity which the soul once had, but which it now has lost.
In its original state the soul was completely absorbed in the con
templation of the One. It was lost, as it were, in the contempla
tive vision which it then enjoyed. A good soul, therefore, is forget
ful. But having fallen and become imprisoned in the body, the soul
134 De ordine, L. II, c. II, n. 6-7 (XXXII, 996-997).
185 Ibid., L. II, c. II, n. 7 (XXXII, 997): “Nec omnino huic, inquit, commen
dari quidquam arbitror a sapiente; siquidem ille semper Deo infixus est,
sive tacitus, sive cum hominibus loquens: sed ille servus jam bene institutus
diligenter servat quod interdum disputanti domino suggerat, et ei tanquam
justissimo gratum faciat officium suum, sub cujus se videt potestate vivere.
Et hoc facit non quasi ratiocinando, sed summa illa lege summoque ordine
praescribente.”
 100 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

now tends to reconstruct the original life it had when it was united to
the One. In other words, the soul must now do by memory what
it once did by its very presence. Hence memory is an imperfection
in the soul. Had it never fallen from perfect unity, there would be
no need for memory.” “The memory of things here,” Plotinus
says, "bears the soul downwards to this universe; . . . the thing it
has in mind it is and grows to. For . . . in its very sensesight, it is
the lower in the degree in which it penetrates its object.” How
ever, in its fallen state the soul must have recourse to memory,
fraught with dangers as it is, for bridging over the distance which
separates it from the One. By so doing, the soul can make its mem
ories “the starting point of a new vision of essential being.”
It seems likely, then, that Augustine's concept of memory and its
function is not the same as that of the Neo-Platonist.

D. Soliloquia
The most exalted and unquestionably the most unique of the
dialogues composed at Cassiciacum is the Soliloquia.” Contrary to
his custom Augustine extends no invitation to his mother, his
pupils, and his friends to take part in this disputation, but wrapt in
silence, he engages in a long and prayerful discussion with his Rea
son. Augustine converses with Augustine. And he himself selects
the title of the work. “Since we are talking with ourselves alone,”
he says, addressing Reason, “I wish it [the discourse] to be called
and inscribed Soliloquia, a new name, it is true, and perhaps not a
euphonious one, but quite suitable for setting forth the thought.”
186 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, iii, 32; IV, iv, 6.
187 Ibid., IV, iv, 3.
188 Ibid., IV, viii, 4.
189 It can not with precision be determined when the Soliloquia was written. In
the Retractationes it is placed after the De ordine. Augustine rather in
definitely says: “Inter haec scripsi etiam duo volumina secundum studium
meum et amorem, ratione indagandae veritatis, de his rebus quas maxime
scire cupiebam, me interrogans, mihi respondens tanquam duo essemus, ratio
et ego, cum solus essem.” Cf. Retractationes, L. I, c. IV, n. 1 (XXXII,
589). From internal evidence in a letter to Nebridius it appears that this
treatise was completed after the other dialogues at Cassiciacum. Cf. Epistulae,
III, 1. (XXXIII, 64).
140 Soliloquia, L. II, c. VII, n. 14 (XXXII, 891): "Quae quoniam cum solis
nobis loquimur, Soliloquia vocari et inscribi volo; novo quidem et fortasse
duro nomine, sed ad rem demonstrandam satis idoneo.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 21 (1

The most sublime and beautiful passages of the Soliloquia are

the prayers which are interspersed in the dialogue between Augus
tine and his Reason. Three times he pauses in the converse with his
somewhat mysterious interlocutor” to offer a prayer of adoration,
praise, and supplication to God. The long and solemn invocation
at the opening of the treatise in many respects could represent the
outpouring of the heart of Christian and Neo-Platonist alike,
although the mode of expression is perhaps predominantly Neo
Platonic. Augustine thus addresses God:
God, the Father of truth, the Father of wisdom, the Father
of the true and highest life, the Father of blessedness, the
Father of that which is good and fair, the Father of intel
ligible light, the Father of our awakening and illumination,
the Father of the pledge by which we are admonished to
return to Thee. 142

This God, the framer of the universe, created out of nothing the
world which the eyes of all perceive to be most beautiful. All things
which He created are good although some have a greater or a less
degree of goodness. He is the source of the order and harmony which
reign throughout the universe. According to His fixed laws the
planets revolve in their orbits, the sun and moon give light, the
seasons pass in orderly succession. He created man to His own
image and likeness and endowed his soul with the attribute of free
will. He is the true delight of the soul; to forsake Him is to perish,
to return to Him is to live. To Him alone Augustine pledges his
fidelity: “Henceforth Thee alone do I love, Thee alone I follow,
Thee alone I seek, Thee alone I am prepared to serve, for Thou
alone art Lord by a just title, of Thy dominion do I desire to
be.”43 In such a strain both Christian and Neo-Platonist might be
expected to address himself to God.
141 Augustine, Soliloquia, L. I, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 869), thus describes his
interlocutor: “Sive ego ipse, sive alius quis extrinsecus, sive intrinsecus,
nescio.” However, the title which Augustine gives the treatise would seem
to indicate that he identifies Reason with "ego ipse.”
142 Soliloquia, L. I, c. I, n. 2 (XXX, 870): "Deus pater veritatis, pater sapien
tiae, pater verae summaeque vitae, pater beatitudinis, pater boni et pulchri,
pater intelligibilis lucis, pater evigilationis atque illuminationis nostrae, pater
pignoris quo admonemur redire ad te.”
148 Ibid., L. I, c. I, n. 5 (XXXII, 872): "Jam te solum amo, te solum sequor,
te solum quaero, tibi soli servire paratus sum, quia tu solus juste dominaris;
tui juris esse cupio.”
 However, a careful analysis of this exalted prayer reveals char
acteristics which seem to label it as specifically Christian. Not only
is it a prayer of aspiration and adoration; it is likewise a cry of
humble supplication, of sincere repentance, and of entire abandonment
to God:

O Lord, most merciful Father, receive, I pray, Thy fugitive;

enough already surely have I been punished; long enough
have I served Thy enemies whom Thou hast under Thy feet;
long enough have I been the sport of fallacies. . . . To Thee
I feel I must return: I knock at Thy door; let it be opened
to me; teach me how to go to Thee. Nothing else have I but
the will: nothing else do I know than that fleeting and
perishable things should be spurned, permanent and lasting
things should be sought. This I do, Father, because this alone
I know, but I do not know the way by which I may come to
Thee. Teach me, show me, give me what I need for the
journey.”
And he concludes his humble petition with an earnest request for
an increase of faith, hope, and charity, in order that he may have
a better knowledge of God and of his soul.
Augustine realizes that it is only by the special help of God
that he is able to make the prayer: “Grant me first rightly to invoke
Thee; then to show myself worthy of being heard by Thee; lastly,
deign to set me free.” But he has confidence that his petition will
not be in vain: "Tell me whither I must tend to behold Thee, and
I hope that I shall do all things Thou mayest enjoin.”
Thus the prayer with which Augustine begins his Soliloquia
possesses all the qualities requisite for a Christian prayer. It is a
prayer of petition, as well as of aspiration and of homage, and
144 Ibid., L. I, c. I, n. 5 (XXXII, 872): “Recipe, oro, fugitivum tuum,
Domine, clementissime pater: jamjam satis poenas dederim, satis inimicis
tuis, quos sub pedibus habes, servierim, satis fuerim fallaciarum ludibrium.
. . . Ad te mihi redeundum esse sentio: pateat mihi pulsanti janua tua;
quomodo ad te perveniatur doce me. Nihil aliud habeo quam voluntatem;
nihil aliud scio nisi fluxa et caduca spernenda esse; certa et aeterna requiren
da. Hoc facio, Pater, quia hoc solum novi; sed unde ad te perveniatur ig
noro. Tu mihi suggere, tu Ostende, tu viaticum praebe.” Cf. De ordine, L.
II, c. XX, n. 52 (XXXII, 1019).
145 Soliloquia, L. I, c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 869): “Praesta mihi primum ut bene te
rogem, deinde ut me agam dignum quem exaudias, postremo ut liberes.”
146 Ibia, L. I, c. I, n. 5 (XXXII, 872): “Dic mihi qua attendam, ut aspician
te, et omnia me spero quae jusseris esse facturum.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 103

therefore comprises something quite incongruous with the relation

which Neo-Platonism has established between God and man. More
over, although the diction which Augustine uses in his solemn
entreaty bears a close resemblance to that which Plotinus employs
in speaking of the Good, his prayer is not lacking in phrases which
have a direct reference to the Scriptures. He addresses that God
through Whom death is swallowed up in victory;” God, Who
leadest us to the door of life, Who causest it to be opened to them
that knock;” God, Who givest us the bread of life, through
Whom we thirst for the draught which being drunk we never
thirst;” God, Who dost convince the world of sin, of justice, and of
judgment;” God, through Whom we are not in bondage to the
weak and beggarly elements.” Augment in me faith, hope, and
charity.”
Again before undertaking the consideration of the immortality
of the human soul, Augustine's interlocutor bids him implore the
Divine assistance, and he briefly but reverently repeats his twofold
petition: knowledge of God and of himself.”
Once more as the long inquiry on the nature of truth becomes
more and more involved, Reason reminds Augustine that Divine
aid is necessary to assist them in their perplexity, which assuredly
will be granted if their faith is lively and their prayer is fervent.
And forthwith he offers up an earnest petition for light: "O God,
our Father, Who exhortest us to pray . . . hear me groping in
this darkness and stretch forth Thy right hand to me. Shed upon
me Thy light, recall me from my wanderings; bring Thyself to me
and let me return to Thee.”
Here we find Augustine begging for light with which even his
noblest power, his intellect, can not provide him. It is a positive
147 1 Corinthians, XV, 54.
148 Matthew, VII, 8.
149 John, VI, 35.
150 Ibid., XVI, 8.
151 Galatianſ, IV, 9.
1521 Corinthians, XIII, 13.
153 Soliloquia, L. II, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 885).
154 Ibid., L. II, c. VI, n. 9 (XXXII, 889): “Deus, Pater noster, qui ut oremus
hortaris . . . exaudi me palpitantem in his tenebris et mihi dexteram porrige.
Praetende mihi lumen tuum, revoca me ab erroribus; te duce in me redeam
et in te.”
104 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

assistance which he requires and which can be afforded him only by

that merciful Father Who exhorts us to pray and Who never fails to
stretch forth His right hand to those who make supplication to
Him. It is a light which is indispensable to man simply because he
is not God. To the Neo-Platonist also light is necessary in order
that the soul may know and aspire to God. “This light,” Plotinus
says, “is from the Supreme and is the Supreme; we may believe in
the Presence when . . . He comes bringing light: the light is the
proof of the advent. Thus the Soul unlit remains without that
vision; lit, it possesses what it sought.” But how is this light to
be obtained? By “a contact purely intellective.” In order to arrive
at it, man must “cut away everything” that obscures that light
which man himself may be said to possess by the fact that his
nature makes him fundamentally divine. It is not a gift which the
Neo-Platonist entreats of God. He can not, strictly speaking, im
plore "Thy light” as something quite distinct from himself. The
light which is his by nature has merely grown dim by the contact of his
soul with sensible things. Hence he must make every effort to re
cover it and thereby to restore to himself what in reality is his.
Augustine's prayers for light, therefore, seem to contain something
quite different from what the basic principles of Neo-Platonism in
respect to the nature of man and his relation to the One would
permit.
The special assistance which the soul requires from the Divine
Illuminator in order to arrive at the state in which it can apprehend
God and find in Him its happiness are the theological virtues of
faith, hope, and charity. In the first place, the eyes of the soul must
be sound if it is to know God, that is to say, the soul must be
purified from the stain of sin. This is first effected by the virtue of
faith because, as Augustine says, “if it does not believe that other
wise it will not see, the soul gives no attention to its health.”
But even though the soul may realize the need of purification in
order to attain this knowledge, it may despair of ever acquiring the
155 Plotinus, Enneads, V, iii, 17.
156 Ibid., V, iii, 17.
157 Ibid., V, iii, 17.
158 Soliloquia, L. I, c. VI, n. 12 (XXXII, 876): ". . . si non credat aliter se
non esse visuram non dat operam suae sanitati.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 105

dispositions requisite for what it desires, and therefore “hope must

be added to faith.” But faith and hope must be supplemented by
charity for, if love is lacking, the soul will not be impelled eagerly
and unintermittently to pursue that knowledge which will lead it to
its final end; on the contrary, it will be satisfied to center its affec
tions on the things of earth with which it comes in contact through
the avenue of the senses. Man, therefore, is in need of a three
fold gift if he is to acquire the knowledge requisite for union with
God:

Faith, whereby the soul believes that the thing to which it

ought to turn its gaze is of such a nature that, being seen,
it will give happiness; hope, whereby the soul judges that, if
it looks attentively, it will see; charity, whereby the soul
desires to see and to be filled with joy at what it beholds.”
Of these three virtues faith and hope are necessary for the soul
only during the time of its sojourn on earth when it can attain only
a partial realization of the end it has in view. In the life to come,
faith will be replaced by vision itself; hope will not be needed, for
the soul will already have possessed that for which it hoped; char
ity, however, will remain and, furthermore, will continue to in
crease as the soul acquires a deeper appreciation of the infinite
beauty of God.”
But it is not only a knowledge of God which is unattainable
by unaided human reason. The apprehension of truth in any field
requires special assistance on the part of God. This doctrine of
illumination is explicitly stated by Augustine. As the earth is visible,
so too is light. But it is impossible to see the earth unless it is
illumined. In like manner those truths which are taught in the
schools and which, when grasped by the human mind, must needs
be accepted by it as absolutely true cannot be understood unless
they are illumined by some other source. "Therefore,” Augustine says,
“as in this visible sun we may observe three things: that it is, that
15° Ibid., L. I, c. VI, n. 12 (XXXII, 876): “Ergo fidei spes adjicienda est.”
160 Ibid., L. I, c. VI, n. 13 (XXXII, 876): "Sed et ipse aspectus quamvis
jam sanos oculos convertere in lucem non potest, nisi tria illa permaneant:
fides, qua credat ita se rem habere, ad quam convertendus aspectus est, ut
visa faciat beatum; spes qua cum bene aspexerit, se visurum esse praesumat;
charitas qua videre perfruique desideret.”
* Ibid., L. I, c. VII, n. 14 (XXXII, 876-877).
106 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

it shines, that it illuminates, so in that God most far removed

Whom thou dost wish to apprehend, there are three things: that
He is, that He is apprehended, and that He makes other things to
be apprehended.”
It seems clear, then, that Augustine considers that light which
man requires in order to know the truth as a special help, a positive
assistance given to him by God, the Divine Illuminator. It is some
thing which man himself in no way possesses. It is necessary for
him due to the very fact that he is man. This concept of illumina
tion is not in harmony with the doctrine of light as found in Neo
Platonism. For Plotinus, it is true, the light by which man knows
the truth is divine, but man also is divine. In a real sense the light
of human intelligence is just as divine as is that of the Divine
Intellect. It is different in degree, but not in nature. The soul needs
only to withdraw from sensible things, to retire within itself, and
it is in possession of that light which becomes more luminous in
proportion as the soul succeeds in emancipating itself from all ma
terial things.
Throughout the Soliloquia one is impressed with Augustine's
deep appreciation of the worth and dignity of every human soul.
His affection for his friends, he admits to Reason, is due to the
fact that each has a rational soul, which, he adds, “I love even in
highwaymen.” Although he feels justified, he goes on to say, in
despising those who misuse that jewel of great value, he cannot at
the same time help loving the soul which its owner thus mistreats.
Therefore, he loves his friends in proportion to the value which
each sets upon his spiritual soul.” In other words, the dignity of
the soul is the basis for establishing the spiritual equality and for
recognizing the inherent worth of every human being, a notion
quite in keeping with Christianity but somewhat foreign to the
aristocratic idea of class distinction prevalent in Greek thought and
also expressed by the founder of Neo-Platonism, who speaks of the
162 Ibid., L. I, c. VIII, n. 15 (XXXII, 877): “Ergo quomodo in hoc sole
tria quaedam licet animadvertere; quod est, quod fulget, quod illuminat:
ita in illo secretissimo Deo quem vis, intelligere, tria quaedam sunt: quod
est, quod intelligitur, et quod caetera facit intelligi.”
Cf. Contra Academicos, L. III, n. 13 (XXXII, 940).
168 Soliloquia, L. I, c. II, n. 7 (XXXII, 873).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 107

mere populace as only machines destined to minister to the first

needs of virtuous men.”
In this dialogue we again have evidence of the prominent rôle
which memory plays in the psychology of St. Augustine. Memory is an
important aid in the attainment of truth both from a negative and
a positive point of view. If, for example, one has forgotten some
thing, others by making suggestions may try to assist him to recall
what he desires. As each new proposal is made, perhaps he rejects it
since he knows it is not that which he has been attempting to re
call, and eventually he may not be able to bring back to mind what
he desires. But even in that case memory is of advantage to him in
arriving at the truth since, by enabling him to reject the false sug
gestions which were made, it prevents him from being misled and
deceived. Again, one may see something and feel assured that at
some time or other he has come upon it before, and yet he may be
unable to recall the time, the place, or the circumstances connected
with the experience. By a process of inquiry, however, the whole
situation even to minute details may flash across his memory and
he finds no difficulty in recovering the entire truth for which he
has been searching.”
How dreadful, then, even though the soul be proved immortal,
if death should result in the loss of memory, in the oblivion of all
things, and perhaps of truth itself. “It cannot be expressed,” Augus
tine says, “how much this evil is to be feared. For of what sort will
be that eternal life or what death is not to be preferred to it if the
soul lives in such a way as we see it live in a child just born ?”
This aspect of memory and especially its important contribution to
the enrichment of the life of the soul even after the death of the
body is a doctrine to which the Neo-Platonist would be unwilling
to subscribe. How could memory, in his opinion, be a channel of
beatitude for the individual soul? The existence of such a function
in man is at best only an accidental one. It would never have been
164 Plotinus, Enneads, II, ix, 9.
165 Soliloquia, L. II, c. XX, n. 34 (XXXII, 902).
166 Ibid., L. II, c. XX, n. 36 (XXXII, 904): "Non potest satis dici quantum
hoc malum metuendum sit. Qualis enim erit illa aeterna vita, vel quae mors
non ei praeponenda est, et sic vivit anima, ut videmus eam vivere in puero
mox nato”
108 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

realized, had man not fallen away from perfect unity. Hence knowl
edge derived from memory is indeed an imperfect type. How
absurd, then, for a Neo-Platonist to regret the loss of memory in
the life to come. On this subject Augustine is assuredly not in agree
ment with Plotinus.
Augustine's acceptance of the function of memory as presented
to him by Reason is followed by a proposed solution for another
difficulty which has been for him a source of no little perplexity.
In the course of the discussion Augustine and Reason have arrived
at the conclusion that science and truth are imperishable since the
one is identified with the other, and that both are inseparably united
with the human mind. But if science is always in the mind, how
does it happen that so few are familiar with it and that even these
during the years of childhood were totally unconscious of it? It
would be absurd to say that the minds of the untrained are not
minds or that science is in their mind without their being aware of
it. Such is the problem which Augustine presents to Reason and for
which the latter offers a solution by a doctrine of reminiscence. Just
as the exercise of memory enables us once more to have knowledge
of that which temporarily has been forgotten, so, too, those who are
well instructed in the special sciences (disciplinis liberalibus) are
merely, by the power of recall, reacquiring, so to speak, the knowl
edge which formerly was theirs but which forgetfulness has totally
obscured. Reason says:
By learning they disinter them (disciplinas liberales), buried
in oblivion, no doubt, within themselves and in a manner
dig them out anew; and yet they are not satisfied nor do
they refrain themselves until the whole aspect of truth of
which, in those arts, a certain effulgence already gleams
forth upon them, is most fully and clearly beheld by them.”
Memory, therefore, is a power of vast importance in the intellec
tual life of man, since even the acquisition of the most abstract
187 Ibid., L. II, c. XX, n. 35 (XXXII, 902-903): “Tales sunt qui bene
disciplinis liberalibus eruditi; siquidem illas sine dubio in se oblivione
obrutas eruunt discendo, et quodammodo refodiunt: nec tamen contenti sunt,
nec se tenent donec totam faciem veritatis, cujus quidam in illis artibus
splendor jam subrutilat, latissime atque plenissine intueantur.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 109

branches of knowledge is partially effected by the exercise of the

faculty of recall.”
The emphasis on the spiritual part of man, which is so noticeable
in Augustine's early writings and which bears a close resemblance to
the attitude of Plotinus, appears likewise in the Soliloquia. The in
comparable superiority of the spiritual soul over the material body has
a tendency to cause Augustine to depreciate the latter. We should culti
vate a great disrelish for sensible things, Reason advises, and should
use them with the greatest precaution lest, while we carry about with
us this body, our souls should be prevented from seeing “that supernal
light which deigns not even to show itself to those shut up in this
cage of the body unless they have been such that, whether it were
broken down or worn out, it would be their native airs into which they
escaped.” This happy state is possible only to those who have ac
quired a supreme contempt for sensible things.”
168 This doctrine would seem to include the Platonic notion of the prečxistence
of the soul. E. Gilson is of the opinion that in his early writings Augustine
leaned toward this doctrine of Plato. Cf. E. Gilson, Introduction a l'étude de
saint Augustin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1929), pp. 94-95. R. Jolivet holds that
Augustine's doctrine was rather that of the revivifying of ideas infused into
the soul at the moment of its creation by God. Cf. R. Jolivet, Dieu soleil
des esprits (Paris: Desclée et cie, 1934), pp. 124-125. At any rate, Augus
tine in the Retractationes disapproves of the mode of expression which he
used in the Soliloquia in explaining how abstract knowledge is acquired. Re
ferring to the passage cited in note 167, Augustine remarks: “Sed hoc quoque
improbo: credibilius est enim propterea vera respondere de quibusdam disci
plinis, etiam imperitos earum, quando bene interrogantur, quia praesens est
eis, quantum id capere possunt, lumen rationis aeternae, ubi haec immuta
bilia vera conspiciunt; non quia ea noverant aliquando, et obliti sunt, quod
Platoni, vel talibus, visum est.” Cf. Retractationes, L. I, c. IV, n. 4 (XXXII,
590). -

16° Soliloquia, L. I, c. XIV, n. 24 (XXXII, 882): “Penitus esse ista sensibilia

fugienda, cavendumque magnopere, dum hoc corpus agimus, ne quo eorum
visco pennae nostrae impediantur, quibus integris perfectisque opus est, ut
ad illam lucem ab his tenebris evolemus: quae se ne ostendere quidem digna
tur in hac cavea inclusis, nisi tales fuerint ut ista vel effracta vel dissoluta
possint in auras suas evadere.” Cf. Contra Academicos, L. I, c. III, n. 9
(XXXII, 910); De ordine, L. I, c. VIII, n. 24 (XXXII, 988).
In the Retractationes Augustine explains that this is not to be interpreted in
a Neo-Platonic sense: "Et in eo quod ibi dictum est, Penitus esse ista sensi
bilia fugienda, cavendum fuit, ne putaremur illam Porphyrii falsi philosophi
tenere sententiam, qua dixit: Omne corpus esse fugiendum. Non autem dixi
ego, omnia sensibilia; sedista, hoc est, corruptibilia; sed hoc potius dicendum
fuit: non autem talia sensibilia futura sunt in futuri saeculi coelo novo et
terra nova.” Cf. Retractationes, L. I, c. IV, n. 3 (XXXII, 590).
110 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Augustine attaches the utmost importance to purity of soul as a

requisite for the attainment of knowledge and consequently for the
apprehension of truth.” Therefore he whose soul is stained and lan
guishing with sin can never hope to find the twofold object which
alone is worthy of his quest; namely, the knowledge of God and of
himself. However, in his doctrine of purification Augustine never vili
fies the body. It is not the body which he blames for the difficulty
which the soul experiences in the acquisition of virtue; it is rather the
uncontrolled passion for fleeting and perishable things which, through
the agency of the body, allure and entice the soul from the path of vir
tue, and thereby prevent it from centering its attention upon God and
itself, which should be the principal objects of its love. In order effec
tively to carry on its search for God, the soul must be pure from all
stain of the body, which means, Augustine says, that "it is removed and
purged from the lusts of mortal things.” Hence, contrary to Neo
Platonic doctrine,” he does not condemn the body itself, but rather the
misuse of those sensible things which captivate the soul and with which
it comes in contact through the material body united with it to form the
creature, man.
Although the senses themselves are incapable of affording knowl
edge, they are useful as a starting point in the acquisition of it. They
are to be employed somewhat as the traveler uses the ship which is of
great advantage in transporting him to the destination which he has
in view. But once he has arrived there, he abandons the ship as some
thing which is no longer of any service to him. In like manner the
senses of the body are of assistance to the soul in the early stages of the
process of knowledge, but they are somewhat of a hindrance as it
advances further into the realm of abstract knowledge. "It seems to
me,” Augustine adds, “that it would be easier to sail on dry land, than
to learn geometry by the senses, although young beginners seem to
derive some help from them.”
171 Cf. Soliloquia, L. I, c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 870).
172 Ibid., L. I, c. VI, n. 12 (XXXII, 875): "Oculi sani mens est ab omni
labe corporis pura, id est, a cupiditatibus rerum mortalium jam remota atque
purgata.”
178 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, III, vi, 6; VI, iv, 15.
174 Soliloquia, L. I, c. IV, n. 9 (XXXII, 874): “Quare citius mihi videtur in
terra posse navigari, quam geometricam sensibus percipi, quamvis primo dis
centes aliquantum adjuvare videantur.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 111

St. Augustine's deep regard for Plato and Plotinus is again ex

pressed in the Soliloquia. These philosophers have uttered many beau
tiful things about God and the human soul, even though they may not
have understood the truths which they expressed.” His profound
respect for St. Ambrose, although he does not speak of him by name,
can also be inferred. When Augustine and Reason encounter some
difficulty in their attempt to prove the immortality of the soul, Reason
reminds him that men of great genius have written on that subject and,
since their writings are accessible, he need not despair of finding the
truth, "especially when here before our eyes is he in whom we have
recognized that eloquence for which we mourned as dead to have
revived in vigorous life. Will he suffer us, after having taught us in
his writings the true manner of living, to remain ignorant of the
true nature of living?” And Augustine replies that he is quite con
vinced that the proper explanation could be obtained from this source,
but, he adds: “One manner of grief I have, that we have not the
opportunity of making known to him our zealous affection either
towards him or towards Wisdom. . . . He is so far removed and we
are so circumstanced that we have scarcely the opportunity of so much
as sending him a letter.”
The Soliloquia is concluded by an implicit admission on the part
of Reason of her inability to answer Augustine's final objection; namely,
whether the death of the body will result in loss of memory to the soul,
even though it be immortal. In this dilemma he is urged to appeal to
Divine authority. There is no need for disquietude. God Himself has
promised that after the dissolution of the body He will grant them
something which will insure their happiness and will bestow upon them
complete fulness of truth.” It seems manifest, then, that Augustine
175 Ibid., L. I, c. IV, n. 9 (XXXII, 874).
176 Ibid., L. II, c. XIV, n. 26 (XXXII, 897): ". . . praesertim cum hic ante
oculos nostros sit ille, in quo ipsam eloquentiam quam mortuam dolebamus,
perfectam revixisse cognovimus. Illene nos sinet, cum scriptis suis wivendi
modum docuerit, vivendi ignorare naturam”
177 Ibid., L. II, c. XIV, n. 26 (XXXII, 897): "Non arbitror equidem et
multum inde spero, sed unum doler quod vel erga se, vel erga sapentiam
studium nostrum non ei ut volumus, valemus aperire. . . . Sed ita longe abest,
et ita nunc constituti sumus, ut vix ad eum vel epistulae mittendae facultas
Sit.”
***Ibid., L. II, c. XX, n. 36 (XXXII, 904): “Bono animo esto; Deus aderit,
ut jam sentimus, quaerentibus nobis, qui beatissimum quiddam post hoc
Corpus, et veritatis plenissimum sine ullo mendacio pollicetur.”
112 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

considers evidence guaranteed by Divine authority of a higher order

than that which the human reason can grasp. The mind of man, though
equipped with the most abstract knowledge, must eventually have re
course to faith for an answer to problems for which it can find no
adequate solution.
E. Epiſtulae
According to the Benedictine Editors” of the writings of St.
Augustine, four letters written by him at Cassiciacum have been pre
served. The first of these letters is addressed to his intimate friend,
Hermogenianus.” The latter evidently had written to Augustine, com
plimenting him on his treatise Contra Academicos and expressing
pleasure that he had vanquished the Academics.”
In his reply to this congratulatory epistle Augustine expresses his
deep admiration for Platonic philosophy. It was not his intention, he
tells Hermogenianus, to attack the philosophers of the Academy. On
the contrary, he had tried to imitate them in so far as he was able,
for it was his opinion that their doctrine, if rightly interpreted, issued
from the pure fountainhead of Plato whose exalted teachings they
tried to preserve intact by concealing them from the vulgar herd
(pecoribus) who held to the materiality of the human soul.”
His treatise against the Academics had afforded considerable profit
and pleasure to himself, Augustine observes, because in it he had
effected to his own satisfaction the triumph of truth and, as a result,
179 The chronological order of St. Augustine's letters can not be ascertained
from the Retractationes, since they are not included in the revision which he
had intended to make of all his works. Cf. Retractationes, L. I, prologus
(XXXII, 583).
From internal evidence in the letters and in the treatises mentioned in them,
the Benedictine Fathers formulated a chronological arrangement of his
letters, which has been universally adopted. Two hundred and seventy letters
of St. Augustine are given in the Benedictine Edition of his works. Cf.
Migne, Patrologia Latina, (XXXIII). One hundred and sixty of these
translated into English are found in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of
the Christian Church, edited by P. Schaff (Buffalo: The Christian Literature
Co., 1886-1888), vol. I. This translation was used for citing references in
our study of these letters. A translation of Augustine's letters is also found
in The Works of Aurelius Augustine (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1870
1874), vols. VI-VII.
180 Epistulae, I, 3 (XXXIII, 62).
181 Ibid., I, 3 (XXXIII, 62). The content of this letter indicates that it was
written after the Contra Academicos, the first treatise mentioned in the
Retractationes.
182 Epistulae, I, 1 (XXXIII, 61).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 113

had been incited to the study of philosophy from which he had been
kept by despair of arriving at truth. “What I most rejoice in,” he says,
" . . . is that I have broken and cast aside those obnoxious bonds by
which I was kept away from the bosom of philosophy through despair
of attaining that truth which is the nourishment of the soul.”
The second letter of this period was written by Augustine to his
very dear friend, Zenobius.” In a most charming manner he expresses
his sincere affection for Zenobius and the deep regret occasioned by
his absence. Augustine urges him to hasten the opportunity of return
ing to Cassiciacum in order to continue the discussion which they
have not yet completed.”
In this letter Augustine disparages sense realities by contrast with
those with which the intellect acquaints us. By means of the bodily
senses we are placed in contact with that which is perishable and sub
ject constantly to change; hence the “true and divine philosophy.”
urges us to repress our love for such things as being most dangerous,
in order that “the mind, even while using the body, may be centered
upon and ardently inflamed by those things which are always the same
and which afford pleasure by an attraction which rightly belongs to
them.” This is assuredly a high ideal, Augustine admits, as he him
self often longs for the physical presence of his friend, even though
he is able frequently to enjoy the thought of him. But “at the same
time,” he adds, “I watch and try, in so far as I am able, not to center
my love on anything which can be separated from me against my
will.187

183 Ibid., I, 3 (XXXIII, 62-63): ". . . me delectat . . . quod mihi abruperim

odiosissimum retinaculum, quod ab philosophiae ubere desperatione veri,
quod est animi pabulum, refrenabar.”
184 Zenobius was the friend to whom Augustine dedicated the treatise De ordine
and whose character he so beautifully describes in the opening chapter of
the dialogue.
185 Augustine has reference to the discussion on the order which prevails in the
universe, a subject in which Zenobius was extremely interested. Cf. De ordine,
L. I., c. VII, n. 20 (XXXII, 987). This letter apparently was written before
the completion of the work. -

* Epistulae, II, 1 (XXXIII, 63): “Vera et divina philosophia monet . . . ut

se toto animus, etiam dum hoc corpus agit, in ea quae semper ejusdem modi
sunt, nec peregrino pulchro placent, feratur atque aestuet.”
187 Ibid., II, 1 (XXXIII, 63): “Invigilo tamen, quantum queo, et enitor, ut nihil
amem quod abesse a me invito potest.”
114 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

The recipient of the third letter written during Augustine's so

journ at the country home of Verecundus was Nebridius.* The theme
of this epistle is much the same as that to which Augustine devoted
his first treatise completed at Cassiciacum; namely, what constitutes
true happiness. Nebridius evidently had written to congratulate him
on the happy life which he was now enjoying. After reading his
friend's letter, he retired to meditate long and earnestly on the meaning
of the felicitations which Nebridius had offered him, “Augustine him
self speaking with Augustine.” For some time, he tells us, he held
converse with his thoughts; then, as was his custom, he prayed and fell
asleep.” The report of this experience forms the subject matter of
his letter to Nebridius.
Nebridius, Augustine says, regarded him as happy. But how could
such an appellation as a happy man be given to him, since only he
who is wise can rightly be considered happy? Perhaps his friend was
using the term merely in a relative sense as, for example, one speaks
of objects as being square or round, although they differ widely from
a perfect square or circle, and as one is accustomed to use the term,
man, although it can with precision be applied only to Plato's ideal
man. Certainly Nebridius did not mean that Augustine was truly
happy.”
But in what does the happy life consist? Assuredly not in the pos
session and enjoyment of sensible things. Philosophers have rightly
held that he is indeed poor whose heart is attached to sensible effects,
however abundantly he may be supplied with them, whereas he is truly
rich who is engrossed in the things of the mind, for this world with
which our senses acquaint us is but an image of that which the under
standing apprehends.” The intelligible world may be compared to
number as cognizable by the intellect, which is susceptible of infinite
188 Augustine portrays the nobility of the character of Nebridius and the in
timacy of the friendship which existed between Nebridius and himself, in
the Confessiones, L. IX, c. III, n. 6. (XXXII, 765-766).
189 Epistulae, III, 1 (XXXIII, 64): “Has loguelas habui, Augustinus ipse cum
Augustino.”
190 Ibid., III, 4 (XXXIII, 65).
Cf. De ordine, L. I, c. III, n. 6 (XXXII, 981).
191 Epistulae, III, 1 (XXXIII, 64).
192 Ibid., III, 3 (XXXIII, 65).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 115

augmentation but not of infinite diminution;” and the sensible world,

to number or quantity as known by the senses, which has a limit to
its increase but is susceptible of infinite diminution. Perhaps this is the
reason why philosophers claim that riches are to be found in those
things about which the understanding is exercised, and poverty in those
things that have reference to the senses.”
From this Platonic train of thought Augustine returns to the con
sideration of the meaning of a happy life. If Nebridius thought me
happy, Augustine ponders within himself, it was doubtless on account
of the chain of reasoning which I have often entertained and which
"I am wont to caress as if it were my only treasure;” namely, the
consideration of the nature of man and of his destiny. Of what does
man consist? Of a soul and of a body. Which of these is nobler? Un
questionably, the soul. The beauty and harmony which men praise in
the body is illusive, whereas true beauty is found within the soul
which, therefore, should be loved and cherished more than the body.
The soul of man is endowed with his highest power, the intellect,
which is the dwelling place of truth. In order to use his intellect to
advantage, man should resist the pleasures which the senses afford him,
by acquiring the habit of doing without these gratifications and of
desiring better things. This soul which is the habitation of truth must
be immortal for, if it should perish, then truth dies, or intelligence is
not truth, or intelligence is not a part of the soul, or that which has
some part immortal is liable to die—all of which conclusions are ab
surd. Therefore, the happy life consists in the knowledge of truth and
the attainment of wisdom, which constitute the riches of the soul. In
this respect, then, Augustine observes, Nebridius was right in judging
him to be, if not absolutely happy, at least, happy in a sense, because
he derived great pleasure from reasonings such as this.”
In the fourth letter, which is likewise addressed to Nebridius,
Augustine relates the progress he has made in the knowledge and
appreciation of eternal things. This information was being given in
198 Augustine does not seem to have been acquainted with the decimal system,
according to which there is no limit to the descending series at the right of
the decimal point any more than there is to the ascending series at the left
of the point.
194 Epistulae, III, 2 (XXXIII, 64).
195 Ibid., III, 3 (XXXIII, 65).
196 Ibid., III, 4 (XXXIII, 65).
116 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

response to a request made by his friend. “You ask me to tell you,”

Augustine remarks, "how far in this my leisure . . . I am making
progress in learning to discriminate those things in nature with which
the senses are conversant from those about which the understanding is
employed.” Augustine is pleased to be able to answer that he is
gradually advancing in the knowledge and love of truth. He acknowl
edges that he still is often distracted by the allurement of sensible
things, but that he experiences little difficulty in recollecting himself
when he considers that “the mind and the intelligence are superior to
the common faculty of vision, which would not be true if that which
we grasp by the intellect were not of greater value than what we
perceive by the senses.” This reflection, he adds, and the prayers
which he offers to God to implore the assistance of which he stands in
need arouse within him so great a desire for God and for those eternal
things which in the highest sense are real, that he sometimes wonders
why he should ever have to persuade himself of the reality of those
things which are as truly present to his soul as he is to himself.”
Such is the report which Augustine sends Nebridius in regard to the
advancement which he himself has made along the path of wisdom
in the seclusion of Cassiciacum.
The burden of these four letters is the twofold maxim which
Augustine time and again repeats in the writings of the period with
which we are concerned: first, that sensible things are a source of error
and disquietude and therefore are to be contemned; secondly, that only
those things which are apprehended by the intellect are permanent and
abiding and hence are greatly to be desired by man. These principles
are strongly enunciated by Plotinus also.” However, Plotinus persists
in attributing the evils attendant upon sensible things to the matter
which is a constituent part of them and which of its very nature is
evil, a notion to which Augustine nowhere gives expression.
197 Ibid., IV, 1 (XXXIII, 66): ". . . petis ut tanto nostro otio, . . . indice
mus tibi quid in sensibilis atque intelligibilis naturae discernentia profeceri
mus.”
198 Ibid., IV, 2 (XXXIII, 66): “Nam plerumque perturbatos et sensibilium
plagarum curis refertos mentis oculos illa tibi notissima ratiuncula in
respirationem levat, mentem atque intelligentiam oculis et hoc vulgari as
pectu esse meliorem: quod non ita esset nisi magis essent illa quae intelli
gimus, quam ista quae cernimus.”
199 Ibid., IV, 2 (XXXIII, 66).
200 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, vii, 10.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 117

Augustine once more stresses the need of asking God's assistance

through prayer” in order to arrive at such detachment from sensible
realities as to assure an appreciation and enjoyment of those things
"which eternally abide.” Moreover, he does not intimate any substan
tial union of man's soul with God as it increases in the knowledge and
love of Him, however clearly he may grasp these spiritual realities.
For Augustine the result of man's purification from the sensible does
not seem to be as Plotinus describes it: "Thus he will often feel the
beauty of that word "Farewell: I am to you an immortal God,' for he
has ascended to the Supreme, and is all one strain to enter into like
ness with it.”202

* Epistulae, IV, 2 (XXXIII, 66). Cf. Contra Academicos, L. II, C. I, n. 1-2

(XXXII, 919) De ordine, L. II, c. XX, n. 52 (XXXII, 1019); Soliloquia,
L. I, c. I, n. 5 (XXXII, 872).
* Plotinus, Enneads, IV, vii, 10.
 CHAPTER IV

AT MILAN

A. De Immortalitate Animae

The treatise De immortalitate animae" is a sequel to the second

book of the Soliloquia, the last work which Augustine completed at
Cassiciacum, and has for its purpose to develop further arguments for
establishing the immortality of the soul. Augustine does not seem to
have been wholly satisfied with the attempt which he had made in his
discourse with Reason at substantiating the imperishability of the soul;”
hence he wrote this brief treatise as a sort of reminder for himself,”
he tells us, to consider more at length the conclusion at which he had
arrived in the Soliloquia; namely, that the human soul is immortal.
Since Augustine proposes in this brief and somewhat sketchy work
to establish for himself by means of reason the immortality of the
1 According to the Retractationes, L. I, c. V, n. 1 (XXXII, 590), this treatise
was written at Milan to which Augustine returned after his sojourn at Cas
siciacum: “Post libros Soliloquiorum jam de agro Mediolanum reversus,
scripsi librum De Immortalitate Animae . . .” Opinions vary in regard to the
precise time of Augustine's return to Milan. According to the Benedictine
Editors of the works of Augustine, he returned at least toward the beginning
of Lent, as it was necessary for candidates who were to receive Baptism at
Easter to enroll themselves among the "competentes” at that time. Cf. Vita s.
Augustini episcopi, L. II, c. XI, n.1 (XXXII, 140). D. Ohlman holds that
on the testimony of St. Ambrose (Comment. in s. Lucam) it is certain that
Augustine entered his name among the “competentes” on the feast of the
Epiphany and therefore left Cassiciacum at the beginning of January, 387 A.D.
Cf. D. Ohlman, De J. Auguſtini dialogis in Cassiciaco scriptis, pp. 25-26.
Others, for example, G. Boissier, Revue des deux mondes, LXXXV (1888),
66, claim that he spent the winter at Cassiciacum and returned to Milan about
Easter time.
2 Soliloquia, L. II, c. XX, n. 36 (XXXII, 904): “Haec dicentur operosius at
que subtilius, cum de intelligendo disserere coeperimus, quae nobis pars pro
posita est, cum de animae vita quidguid sollicitat, fuerit quantum valemus
enucleatum atque discussum.” These words were uttered by Reason to Augus
tine toward the close of the Soliloquia.
8 Retractationes, L. I, c. V, n. 1 (XXXII, 590): “Post libros Soliloquiorum . . .
scripsi librum de Immortalitate Animae, quod mihi quasi commonitorium esse
volueram propter Soliloquia terminanda, quae imperfecta remanserant.” Augus
tine describes this treatise as being so obscure that it was tedious and scarcely
intelligible even to himself. It was incomplete, he says, when, without his
knowledge, it passed into the hands of men: “Sed nescio quomodo me invito
exiit in manus hominum, et inter mea opuscula nominatur. Qui primo ratio
cinationum contortione atque brevitate sic obscurus est, ut fatiget, cum legitur,
etiam intentionem mean vixque intelligatur a meipso.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 119

soul, it is not to be expected that he would make use of arguments

distinctively Christian. However, in our study of the De immortalitate
animae" it seems advisable to keep in mind our criteria" for distin
guishing the basic doctrines of Neo-Platonism from those of Chris
tianity, in order to detect, if possible, whether or not the views ex
pressed in this treatise are compatible with or opposed to the funda
mental teachings of the one or of the other.
In many respects the arguments presented in the De immortalitate
animae bear a striking resemblance to those offered by Plotinus. Augus
tine's explanation of the mode of presence of the soul within the body
is precisely the same as that proposed by the founder of Neo-Plato
nism. The soul is present, Augustine says, in the entire body and in
each and every part of it. When a disturbance occurs in any portion
of the body, the entire soul is aware of it, and yet it experiences the
affection not throughout the entire body, but in the very place in which
it occurs. Consider, for example, perception of pain. If a pain is in the
foot, the eye takes note of it, the tongue speaks of it, the hand is
moved to it. This would be impossible if there were not a unified prin
ciple in the body, which functions simultaneously in every part of it.
The localization of pain is not effected by a system according to which
the pain is felt by the part of the soul which is present in each particu
lar section of the body, but is unperceived by other parts that function
elsewhere. The entire soul perceives the pain but perceives it as located
in the foot: “Entire therefore is the soul present simultaneously to
parts one by one because it perceives simultaneously in parts one by
one.”6

* Some writers who accept, as well as those who reject the Christian conversion
of Augustine in 386 A.D. mention this little treatise as an illustration of the
profound influence exerted on him by Neo-Platonism. Cf. F. Wörter, Die
Geisterentwicklung des heiligen Aurelius Augustinus, p. 163. P. Alfaric,
L'évolution intellectuelle de faint Augustin, p. 411, observes in reference to
this work: “Ici --- iſ [Augustin] suit presque pas à pas le septième livre de
la quatrième Ennéade, qui s'intitule également De l'immortalité de l'ame. . . .
Il prouve . . . que le Néoplatonisme a exercé une influence de plus en plus
grande sur l'esprit du nouveau converti.”
* Cf. Chapter II, D–E.
* De immortalitate animae, c. XVI, n. 25 (XXXII, 1034): “Tota igitur singu
lis partibus simul adest, quae tota simul sentit in singulis.” Citations in Eng
lish translation are taken from De immortalitate animae, translated by F. E.
Tourscher (Philadelphia: The Peter Reilly Co., 1937).
120 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

In much the same fashion, though at greater length, Plotinus argues

against materialistic psychology by showing that the soul is present in
the body in various parts according to its power, but completely re
lated to all parts, “an 'all everywhere,' a complete identity present at
each and every point, the part all that the whole is.” And in order
to clarify his doctrine, Plotinus likewise uses as an illustration the per
ception of pain. Although the pain itself is in some particular section
of the body, the percepton of it is in the soul. The soul is not made
conscious of the pain by a process of transmission, by a sort of relay
system according to which the pain passes from one portion of the
body to another until eventually it arrives at the seat of consciousness.
On the contrary, the soul is immediately aware of the pain because it
belongs to the very nature of the soul “to be identical to itself at any
and every spot.”
Both Augustine and Plotinus insist that the soul is the principle
of life and the source of movement in the body. It is by virtue of the
soul, Augustine says, that the body is animated, that it subsists as a
living body. Indeed, the soul is identified with life itself and for that
reason cannot be said to die: "That life which leaves those things that
die, because it is itself soul, and it leaves not itself, does not die.”
This living substance moves the body but is itself unmoved. That move
ment is a fact in the universe is too obvious to be denied. But there
can be no movement where there is no life, and there can be no life
where something more than matter is not present. Hence there must
be something which, while it moves things changeable, is itself un
changed and this we call the soul. Plotinus likewise regards the soul as
the life-giving principle which animates the body and is the immediate
source of its activity. “We perceive the body,” he says, “and by its
movement and sensation we understand that it is ensouled, and we say
that it possesses a soul.” The soul is the “sustaining principle of
things individually . . . the leader and provider of motion to all else.”
In fact, the body could in no way exist, were it not for the sustaining
7 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, vii, 5.
8 Ibid., IV, vii, 7; Cf. IV, ii, 1.
9 De immortalitate animae, c. IX, n. 16 (XXXII, 1029): "Haec autem vita,
quae deserit ea quae moriuntur, quia ipsa est animus, et seipsam non deserit;
non moritur animus.”
10 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, iii, 20.
11 Ibid., IV, vii, 9.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 121

power of the soul.” The dynamic character of the soul is one of the
outstanding principles of the psychology of Augustine and Plotinus.
Beginning with sensation, which both of them regard as the lowest term
of the soul's spiritual activity through the instrumentality of the body,
the function of the soul becomes gradually more complex as it partici
pates in the activities in which the body plays a rôle, although a rather
unimportant one by contrast with the soul.
Augustine seems at this period to have believed in the existence of
a world-soul,” a doctrine explicitly taught by Plotinus. This universal
soul performs for the world the same service as the individual soul
does for the body. By the soul the world subsists, Augustine says, and
“it is by that very fact that it is animated, whether universally, as the
world, or individually, as every animal within the world.”
Augustine and Plotinus are also of the opinion that by its reason
ing faculty the soul stands aloof from and is impregnable to change
which might seem inevitable because of its connection with the body.
The soul may be said to suffer change, Augustine says, according to the
experiences of the body, since the body to which it is joined is affected
by age, illness, and labors, as well as by whatever affords it any pleas
ure. It may likewise be thought to change on account of its own agita
tions and emotions, resulting from its union with the body: its fears, its
delights, its studies. But none of these experiences need be dreaded by
the soul, since it is the subject to which reason is united and reason is
imperishable. Therefore none of these changes by which the body is
affected can move the soul.” In like manner Plotinus teaches that im
mutability in the soul is quite compatible with the various joys, sor
rows, desires, and fears which attack the soul, since by the possession
of reason it is not susceptible to passion. The soul whose reasoning
faculty is sound “entertains . . . experiences unexperienced, . . . pos
sesses in a kind of non-possession, and knows affection without being
affected.”ió

12 Ibid., IV, vii, 3.

18 Augustine disapproves of this statement in the Retractationes, L. I, c. V, n. 3
(XXXII, 591): “Illud quoque temere dictum est: A summa essentia speciem
corpori per animam tribui qua est, in quantumcumque est. Per animam ergo
corpus subsistit et eo ipso est, quo animatur, sive universaliter, ut mundus,
sive particulariter, ut unumquodgue animal intra mundum."
** De immortalitate animae, c. XV, n. 24 (XXXII, 1033). Cf. note 13.
* Ibid., c. V, n. 7-9 (XXXII, 1024-1025).
* Plotinus, Enneads, III, vi, 1.
122 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

In his discussion of the various causes which might be thought to

effect the dissolution of the soul, Augustine rejects the notion which,
he says, some have held, that the soul is merely the organizing princi
ple (temperatio) of the body, that it exercises only a sort of har
monizing function in the body. This idea is easily refuted by a brief
consideration of the nature of the soul. A moment's reflection will con
vince a person that his intellect functions more readily and more pro
ficiently, the more he withdraws from the distractions of the material
world. Now, if the soul were but a harmonizing factor in the body,
such a procedure would be impossible, as the soul would then not be a
substance but only a quality inherent in the body as its subject. As
Augustine expresses it:
For [if the soul were the organizing principle of the body]
that which would have no proper nature of its own, and
would not be a substance, but would be inherent in a sub
ject body as color and as shape, inseparably, could by no
means endeavor to turn itself from itself, from its own sub
ject body to grasp things intelligible, and, in so far as it
could turn away from the organic action of the body, behold
those things [intelligible which transcend the world of mat
ter], and by that beholding become more noble and rank
higher.”
Moreover, what the intellect comprehends when, so to speak, it closes
its eyes upon the things of sense, are not corporeal and yet they are
in a far higher sense than any material things possibly could be, since
they are unchangeable. It would be absurd to suppose that such in
corporeal realities could exist in a material body as their subject, for.
how could the immaterial qualify that which is corporeal?
Plotinus also argues against the notion of the soul as harmony, but
his arguments are not the same as that presented by Augustine. The
soul, he says, is prior to a body. It rules, guides, and often combats
the body. It is a real being. Were it merely a harmony, the soul would
not possess such characteristics. Besides, if the soul were a harmony,
17 De immortalitate animae, c. X, n. 17 (XXXII, 1029-1030): "Non enim ea
res [animus] quae naturam propriam non haberet, neque substantia esset, sed
in subiecto corpore, tanquam color et forma inseparabiliter inesset, ullo modo
se ab eodem corpore ad intelligibilia percipienda conaretur avertere, et in
quantum id posset in tantum illa posset intueri, eague visione melior et
praestantior fieri.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 123

another soul would have to exist before it in order to produce the

harmony, since the notion of harmony always presupposes a musician
who produces it by manipulating the strings of his lyre in accordance
with the principles of music. Hence the soul can by no means be called
the harmony of the body.”
Augustine emphasizes the superiority of the soul over the body
by pointing out their respective places in the scale of being. In the
universe is found a hierarchy of beings, each holding its rank accord
ing to the perfection of the nature which it possesses, and each receiv
ing something from that which is superior to it:
In the natural order, the more powerful give to lower
[planes of being] the quality which they have received from
the Supreme Beauty. . . . In this, then, are the things which
are inferior in so far as they are, that the quality by which
they are is given to them by the more powerful: which
things more powerful are also truly more excellent.”
In a descending scale Augustine mentions three grades of being:
God, the human soul, the human body: “And not anything is found
that can be between the Supreme Life, which is changeless Wisdom
and Truth, and that which at the last is made to live, that is, the
[human] body, but the life-giving soul.” Plotinus likewise recognizes
various grades in the hierarchy of being which has its beginning in
perfect unity and which proceeds “forever outward until the universe
stands accomplished to the ultimate possibility.” In this hierarchy the
order of descent from perfect Unity is the Intellectual Principle, the
All-Soul, the individual souls, and the body into which each of them
enters and which is lowest in the scale of being, since it is composed
of matter, the final term in the process of emanation.”
18 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, vii, 8, D. Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 85E-86D.
19 De immortalitate animae, c. XVI, n. 25 (XXXII, 1034): “Tradunt ergo
speciem a summa pulchritudine acceptam potentiora infirmioribus naturali
ordine. . . . Eoque sunt quae infirmiora sunt, in quantum sunt, quod species
eis, qua sint a potentioribus traditur; quae quidem potentiora etiam meliora
sunt.”
20 Ibid., c. XV, n. 24 (XXXII, 1033): “Nec invenitur aliquid quod sit inter
summam vitam, quae sapientia et veritas est incommutabilis, et id quod ulti
mum vivificatur, id est corpus, nisi vivificans anima.”
* Plotinus, Enneads, IV, viii, 6.
2? Ibid., III, viii, 1-10.
124 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

While both Augustine and Plotinus speak of the planes of being

which constitute the universe, there seems to be a notable difference
in their idea of the relation which exists between the classes of which
the hierarchy is composed. Plotinus emphasizes the necessary relation
ship between them, the must be extension of the process of being, a
notion which is totally lacking in the doctrine of Augustine. According
to Plotinus, “something besides a unity there must be . . . every Kind
must produce its next; it must unfold from some concentrated princi
ple . . . and so advance to its term in the varied forms of sense . . .
it [this power] must move forever outward.” The soul “is under
compulsion to participate in the sense-realm also.” In other words,
it is a link of necessity which binds each member in the scale of being
with its immediate inferior, and therefore a chain of necessity which
unites “the plurality of these beings” with the unity of which they are
the offspring. This idea of necessity is completely lacking in Augustine.
The soul gives to the body something which it, in turn, has received
from the Supreme Wisdom and Truth.” And speaking of the various
beings in the order of nature, he adds: “And surely, if they give, they
do not take away.” While we find no explicit statement of a free
gift proceeding from the “Supreme Beauty” and bestowed upon the
various classes in the hierarchy of being, the tone of the entire passage
would seem to indicate it as such. There is no hint of any muſt be
character in the universe of Augustine, which, on the contrary, is quite
noticeable in that of Plotinus.
In his rather pronounced emphasis on the spiritual part of man,
Augustine has a tendency to minimize the rôle played by the senses
in the acquisition of knowledge. The highest form of knowledge, that
which is attainable through the exercise of reason, is not acquired by
the assistance of the body. In fact, the intellect functions better when,
so to speak, it has turned away from the distractions which enter
through the body: “That which at best is not an impediment cannot
be an aid to the soul endeavoring to understand.” Again, in condem
nation of the doctrine that the soul is but a harmonizing or framing
23 Ibid., IV, viii, 6.
24 Ibid., IV, viii, 7.
25 De immortalitate animae, C. XV, n. 24 (XXXII, 1033).
26 Ibid., C. XVI, n. 25 (XXXII, 1034): "Et utique cum tradunt non adimunt.”
27 Ibid., C. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 1021): “Non igitur [corpus] potest adjuvare ani
mum ad intellectum nitentem, cui non impedire satis est.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 125

element in the body, Augustine says: “Perhaps then we are to believe,

as some have thought, that life is a kind of framing of the body. To
whom surely this would never have so seemed, if, by means of the
habit of bodies, they had used the power to see those things that truly
are and that remain changeless.” In other words, the objects of the
material world with which we come in contact through the senses of
the body tend to distract the mind, thereby rendering it more difficult
for it to pursue a course of abstract thinking.
And yet Augustine does not depreciate the body or vilify it, as
does Plotinus, for the ill effects which result to the spiritual soul on
account of its union with the material body. Time and again in his
treatise, De immortalitate animae, Augustine speaks of the Soul as
being “more noble,” because the incorporeal, which is changeless, must
needs belong to a higher order of being than that which is material,
but he nowhere degrades the body or regrets its union with the soul
to form the being, man. The relation between soul and body is an
intimate one. The soul not only gives the body life, but also its sub
sistence and its beauty. “Every impulse of the soul,” he says, “in ref
erence to the body [is one of four acts], either that it possesses the
body, or that it makes it live, or that it causes it in a certain manner
to be built up, or that by some agreement it procures the body's wel
fare.” The soul is pleased, he says, when the body is overpowered
by sleep because this phenomenon of nature relaxes the body and re
freshes it from its labors. “It [sleep quiets the senses of the body
and in some ways closes them, so indeed, that the soul with pleasure
yields to this change of body: because such a change is according to
nature, which recreates the body for labors.” In Plotinus, however,
there is frequent evidence of an aversion for the body. It is for the

*Ibid., c. X, n. 17 (XXXII, 1029): "Nisi forte vitam temperationem aliquam

corporis, ut nonnulli opinati sunt debemus credere. Quibus profecto nunquam
hoc visum esset, si ea quae vere sunt, et incommutabilia permanent, eodem
animo a corporum consuetudine alienato atque purgato videre valuissent.”
* Ibid., c. XIII, n. 20 (XXXII, 1031): “Nam omnis ejus appetitus ad corpus,
aut ut id possideat, est, aut ut vivificet aut ut quodammodo fabricetur, aut
quolibet pacto ei consulat.”
* Ibid., c. XIV, n. 23 (XXXII, 1032): “Corporeos enim sensus sopit et claudit
quodam modo, ita sane uttali commutationi corporis cedat anima cum volup
j quia secundum naturam est talis commutatio quae reficit corpus a labori
us.”
 126 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

most part a detriment to the soul. “We (the human soul) lies under
fetter.” “The sphere of sense [is of] the Soul in its slumber; for all
of Soul that is in body is asleep, and the true getting-up is not bodily
but from the body.” The soul enters the body only through compul
sion.” It is more correct to speak of the body as being in the soul than
of the soul within the body. “If the soul were visible . . . we would
say the minor was within the major, the contained within the con
tainer, the fleeting within the perdurable.* Plotinus likes to think of
the soul as being apart from the body, for it is only in that state that
it can return to the perfect Unity from which it should never have been
separated. In a word, man is the soul; the body should have had no
part in his being.
Throughout this little treatise on the human soul it is interesting
to note the method which Augustine uses to establish its immortality.
He studies from every angle the various powers of the soul as observ
able in the activities of man, both in his sleeping and in his waking
hours. His proof par excellence is that based upon the ability of the
human mind to recognize the truth. The objective truths contained in
the various branches of learning are changeless and therefore everlast
ing.” Hence, the human soul which comprehends these truths must
be immortal. This basic proof of Augustine is quite different from the
fundamental argument of Plotinus. While he likewise develops other
arguments for the immortality of the human soul, the founder of Neo
Platonism proposes as his chief proof the divine and eternal nature of
the soul.” This seems to be the principal reason for his lengthy dis
cussion” on the immateriality of the human soul. The soul being iden
tified with the divine and the eternal must also be immortal.
While no specifically Christian doctrine is to be found in our
analysis of the De immortalitate animae, on the other hand, no teach
ing contrary to what is basically Christian can be detected in it. Un
31 Plotinus, Enneads, II, ix, 7.
32 Ibid., III, vi, 6.
33 Ibid., IV, iii, 9.
34 Ibid., IV, iii, 20; VI, iv, 16.
35 De immortalitate animae, c. I-II (XXXII, 1021-1022).
36 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, vii, 10 (15).
37 Ibid., IV, vii, 1-10. Cf. T. Parry, Augustine's Psychology during His First
Period of Literary Activity with Special Reference to His Relation to Platonism
(Leipzig. R. Noske, 1913), p. 62.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 127

questionably, as has been pointed out, there is a marked similarity

between the proofs offered by Augustine and Plotinus. However, even
though he may have been influenced by the arguments of the founder
of Neo-Platonism, it does not seem justifiable to conclude that Augus
tine borrowed from Plotinus the proofs for the immortality of the
soul. His own profound interest in the soul and his extraordinary
propensity for introspection would naturally lead Augustine to study
from every angle the normal operations and powers of the soul. Hence
it would seem that the arguments which he formulated can well have
been based upon facts which he himself observed.* At any rate, the
proofs established in this treatise are such as could be accepted by
Christian and Neo-Platonist alike. The absence of the idea of necessity
in Augustine's concept of the relationship between the various grades
of being in the universe would seem to be a point worth stressing as
differentiating his doctrine from a principle which is fundamental in
Neo-Platonism. This circumstance, of course, is not of positive value,
and therefore is not conclusive.

* Cf. F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A., “St. Augustine's Philosophy, Right Thinking and

Right Living,” The Ecclesiastical Review, (1933), 121-123.
 CHAPTER V

AT ROME

A. De Moribur Eccleſiae Catholicae

The work entitled De moribuſ eccleſiae catholicae" was intended
by Augustine as a polemic against the heresy of Manichaeism.” This
treatise represents his initial contribution to the “anti-Manichaean
Pentateuch,” which was written between the time of his baptism and
his ordination to the priesthood.
In the De moribus ecclesiae catholicae Augustine openly attacks the
Manichaeans by opposing to their doctrines and their moral conduct
the teachings and practices of the Catholic Church. Their pretended
claim to moral superiority over the Catholic Christians so exasperated
him that he could not refrain from doing what lay in his power to pre
vent them from “deceiving the inexperienced,” as was exemplified
some years before in his own case."
Before attempting to depict the moral teachings of the Catholic
Church, Augustine exposes the two outstanding falsehoods of the
Manichaeans, by which they try to deceive the unwary: “that of finding
fault with the Scriptures which they either misunderstand or wish to
1 The treatises De moribus ecclesiae catholicae and De moribus Manichaeorum
are mentioned together in the Retractationes as having been written at Rome:
“Jam baptizatus autem cum Romae essem, nec ferre tacitus possem Mani
chaeorum jactantiam de falsa et fallaci continentia vel abstinentia, qua se ad
imperitos decipiendos, veris Christianis, quibus comparandi non sunt, insuper
praeferunt, scripsi duos libros; unum de Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, alterum
de Moribus Manichaeorum.” Cf. Retractationes, L. I, c. VII, n. 1 (XXXII,
591-592).
2 iºn is a form of religious Dualism established by the Persian Manes
in the latter half of the third century A. D. It recognized the existence of two
eternal Principles, the Power of Good and that of Evil, which are responsible
for the blending of good and evil in the universe. It professed to explain by
reason the origin, nature, and destiny of the universe in opposition to the
º of Christianity which the Manichaeans ridiculed as a religion based
on faith.
* This group of writings includes the De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, De
moribus Manichaeorum, De libero arbitrio, De Genesi adversus Manichaeof,
De vera religione. The title was given to these works by Bishop Paulinus
who in a letter to Augustine, Epistulae, XXV, 2 (XXXIII, 101), makes
reference to “Pentateucho tuo contra Manichaeos.”
* Retractationes, L. I, c. VII, n. 1 (XXXII, 592).
* Augustine was involved in the errors of Manichaeism for nine years. Cf. Con
fessiones, L. III, c. VI-X (XXXII, 686-691).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 129

be misunderstood,” and "that of making a show of chastity and of

notable abstinence.” His motive is not vindictive, he assures the fol
lowers of Manes, for he desires rather to cure than to conquer them.
In his exposition of Catholic teaching and morality he hopes to make
clear how easy it is to pretend to virtue and how difficult to practice
it.7
In the treatise De moribus eccleſiae catholicae Augustine once
mores discusses the relative importance of authority and reason in
enabling man to arrive at truth. Since his purpose is to refute the
erroneous moral teachings of the Manichaeans by expounding the doc
trines of the Catholic Church, it is important, he believes, to employ a
method suitable for an exposition of this kind. Should he make use
of arguments from reason or those established by authority? In the
order of nature, he says, authority precedes reason and sometimes may
even be necessary in order to confirm the testimony of reason. Man's
reason is darkened by sin and evil habits with the result that he is
unable to attain a clear perception of truth; so it becomes necessary
for him to flee to the wholesome shade of authority in order that the
eye of reason, grown weak by sin, may behold the light of truth.”
However, yielding to the perversity of the Manichaeans, Augustine
purposes to adopt the only method they are accustomed to accept;
namely, arguments from reason. Although such a method, in his opin
ion, is not appropriate for a discussion of this nature, he deems it per
missible if by it he may be able to effect the moral cure of some of
their number.”
Again, he tells us that in human affairs reason is employed, not be
cause of its greater certainty but because custom has rendered it easier

* De Moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 1311): ". . . Scripturas

reprehendunt vel quas male intelligunt vel quas male intelligi volunt . . .
vitae castae et memorabilis continentiae imaginem praeferunt.” The English
translation of this treatise is found in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
of the Christian Church, IV, 41-63. This translation was used for citation of
references.
* Ibid., c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 1311).
* Cf. Contra Academicos, L. III, c. XX, n. 43 (XXXII, 957); De ordine, L.
II, c. V, n. 16 (XXXII, 1002); L. II, c. IX, n. 26-27 (XXXII, 1007);
Soliloquia, L. II, c. XX, n. 36 (XXXII, 904).
* De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. II, n. 3 (XXXII, 1311-1312).
* Ibid., c. II, n. 3 (XXXII, 1312).
130 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

to use. It is of little assistance, however, in the acquisition of a higher

type of knowledge:
When we come to divine things this faculty turns away;
it cannot behold; it pants, and gasps, and burns with desire;
it falls back from the light of truth, and turns again to its
wonted obscurity not from choice but from exhaustion. How
dreadful, how deplorable it is that the soul should suffer
greater weakness when it is seeking rest from its toil. There
fore when we are hastening to withdraw into the darkness,
it will be well that by the appointment of adorable Wisdom
we should be met by the friendly shade of authority and
should be attracted by the wonderful character of its con
tents and by the utterances of its pages, by figures and
shadows, as it were, which temper the truth.”
How merciful and benevolent, he adds, is Divine Providence which did
not abandon man after his violation of God's law, but by means of
faith in the true religion and by the observance of its precepts enabled
him to rise to the knowledge of God Who has been pleased to make
Himself known by the teachings of the Patriarchs, the Prophets, the
Apostles, and the Martyrs.”
Augustine once more expresses the doctrine of the superiority of
faith to reason when he speaks of the praise and honor that is due the
Blessed Trinity. Man's love for God, he says, will increase in fervor in
proportion to the glory and esteem which he renders to Him. By ful
filling this duty of love and adoration he cannot help advancing with a
sure and firm step to a life of perfection and happiness. This is what
is meant by the pursuit of the Highest Good to which man's every act
must be directed. That such a good exists is unquestionably true; and,
he adds, “we have shown by reason, as far as we were able, and by

11 Ibid., c. VII, n. 11 (XXXII, 1315): "At ubi ad divina perventum est, avertit
sese: intueri non potest, palpitat, aestuat, inhiat amore, reverberatur luce
veritatis, et ad familiaritatem tenebrarum suarum, non electione, sed fatiga
tione convertitur. Quam hic formidandum est, quam tremendum, ne majorem
inde concipiat anima imbecillitatem, ubi quietem fessa conquirit. Ergo refugere
in tenebrosa cupientibus per dispensationem ineffabilis Sapientiae, nobis illa
opacitas auctoritatis occurrat, et mirabilibus, rerum, vocibusque librorum veluti
signis temperationibus veritatis, umbrisque blandiatur.”
12 Ibid., c. VII, n. 12 (XXXII, 1315-1316).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 131

Divine authority which goes beyond our reason, that it is nothing else
but God Himself.” 18
By the avenue of faith, Augustine tells the Manichaeans, man is
able to arrive at the very summit of wisdom and of truth. And in his
appeal to the Manichaeans to renounce their ignorance and obstinacy,
he urges them to hasten to the bosom of the Catholic Church where
they will find truths more excellent and more exalted than words can
express. “May God vouchsafe to show you,” he says, addressing them,
“that neither is there among the Manichaeans the Christian faith which
leads to the very apex of wisdom and truth, the attainment of which is
the truly happy life, nor is it anywhere but in the Catholic teaching.”
This idea is once more expressed at the conclusion of Augustine's
discussion on the four moral virtues in their relation to the love of
God and the knowledge of truth. The Apostle tells us, he observes, that
eternal life consists in knowing "Thee, the true God, and Jesus Christ
Whom Thou hast sent.” Eternal life, therefore, is knowledge of the
truth. How perverse, then, are those who claim that their teaching of
the knowledge of God will make us perfect. Those who desire such
knowledge must first love with sincere affection Him Whom they
desire to know. “Hence,” Augustine concludes, “arises that principle
on which from the beginning we have insisted, that there is nothing
more wholesome in the Church than that faith is superior to reason.”
It is quite evident that faith has no place in a Plotinian scheme of
the universe. The God of Neo-Platonism could give no revelation to
man, hence faith in the Catholic Christian sense of the word, as Augus
tine seems here to use it, is without meaning to the Neo-Platonist.
What might appear to be faith for a disciple of Plotinus is rather a
sort of confident hope of holding communion with the One, or perhaps
what Bosanquet calls “the consciousness inherent in the finite-infinite
** Ibid., c. XIV, n. 24 (XXXII, 1321): “Id enim esse patuit, et ratione quan
tum valuimus, et ea quae nostrae rationi antecellit auctoritate divina, nihil
aliud quam ipsum Deum.”
* Ibid., c. XVIII, n. 33 (XXXII, 1325): ". . . aderit Deus qui ostendat vobis
neque apud Manichaeos esse christianam fidem, quae ad summum apicem
sapientiae veritatisque perducit, qua perfrui, nihil est aluid nisi beate vivere;
neque esse uspiam, nisi in catholica disciplina.”
15 John, XVII, 3.
* De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. XXV, n. 47 (XXXII, 1331): “Unde illud
exoritur, quod ab initio satagimus, nihil in Ecclesia catholica salubrius fieri,
quam ut rationem praecedat auctoritas.”
132 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

being, so far as his full nature affirms itself, that he is one with some
thing which cannot be shaken or destroyed.” Plotinus speaks of be
lief, but applies the term to knowledge derived through sensation. He
says: “It is thus, I suppose, that in sense-perception we have belief in
stead of truth; belief is our lief; we satisfy ourselves with something
very different from the original which is the occasion of perception.”
The Christian doctrine of the Unity and Trinity of God and of the
respective rôles of the Divine Persons in the mystery of the Godhead
is clearly expressed by Augustine in his discussion on the love of God
as the most important duty incumbent upon man. “We ought then to
love God, the Trinity in Unity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; for this
must be said to be God Himself, for it is said of God truly and in
the most exalted sense, 'of whom are all things, by whom are all
things, in whom are all things’.” That the trinity of Persons com
prises one only God is evident from the words of Paul the Apostle
for he adds: “To Him be glory.” He does not say “to Them,” Augus
tine observes, for God is one. Through the Son and the Holy Spirit
man is enabled to know God and to be united to Him. Christ, the Son
of God, we are told by the Apostle, is the Wisdom of God,” and
Christ Himself tells us that He is the Truth. If we ask, then, what it
means to live well, the answer assuredly must be to love virtue, to love
wisdom, to love truth: Virtue which is inviolable and immutable, Wis
dom which never gives place to folly, Truth which knows no variation.
Through this Virtue, and Wisdom, and Truth the Father Himself is
seen for He says by the mouth of St. John the Apostle: “No man
cometh unto the Father but by Me.” To Him we cleave by sanctifica
tion which is attained by perfect love, the only security for our not
turning away from God and for our being conformed to Him rather
than to this world, for, as St. Paul remarks, “He has predestinated us
that we should be conformed to the image of His Son.” Now, this
sanctification by which we are united to the Father and the Son is
effected by the Holy Spirit Who is likewise God and of the same
17 B. Bosanquet, The Value and Destiny of the Individual (London: Macmillan
Co., 1923), p. 241.
18 Plotinus, Enneads, V, v, 1.
19 Romans, XI, 36.
20 1 Corinthians, I, 23-24.
21 John, XIV, 6.
22 Romans, VIII, 29.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 133

identical nature and substance as the Father and the Son. It is through
love that we are conformed to God and we have every hope of attain
ing this required love for, as the Apostle says, it is shed abroad in our
hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given unto us.” And Augustine adds:
But we could not possibly be restored to perfection by the
Holy Spirit, unless He Himself continued always perfect
and immutable. And this plainly could not be unless He
were of the same nature and of the very substance of God,
Who alone is always possessed of immutability and invari
ableness.”

This love, he elsewhere observes, “inspired by the Holy Spirit, leads

to the Son, that is, to the Wisdom of God, by which the Father Him
self is known.”25
It is quite evident, therefore, that Augustine believes in the equality
of the Divine Persons Who constitute the Christian Trinity, for the
notion of equality follows as a logical consequence from that of con
substantiality. Hence his conception of the Trinity is very different
from that of Neo-Platonism in which the idea of consubstantiality is
rendered impossible because of the inequality which exists between the
One, the Nous, and the World-Soul. It is true that, in explaining the
law of procession, the Neo-Platonist could say that through the Soul-of
the-All we know the Nous and through the Nous, the One, but he
could in no way affirm the equality of the three Principles which con
stitute the graded Triad of Plotinus.
Brief reference is likewise made to the doctrines of the Incarnation
and Redemption. In explaining the duties imposed upon man by the
virtue of temperance, Augustine reminds us of the exhortation of St.
Paul to put off the old man and take on the new.” By the old man is
meant Adam who sinned and by the new man "him whom the Son of

23 Ibid., V, 5.
* De moribus eccleſiae catholicae, c. XIII, n. 23 (XXXII, 1321): "Nullo modo
autem redintegrari possemus per Spiritum sanctum, nisi et ipse semper et
integer et incommutabilis permaneret. Quod profecto non posset, nisi Dei
naturae esset ac ipsius substantiae, cui soli incommutabilitas atque ut dicam,
invertibilitas semper est.”
* Ibid., c. XVII, n. 31 (XXXII, 1324): "Quae [charitas] inspirata Spiritu
sancto perducit ad Filium, id est, ad Sapientiam Dei, per quam Pater ipse
Cognoscitur.”
* Colossians, III, 9, 10.
134 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

God took to Himself in consecration for our redemption.” That

redemption, as understood by Augustine at this period, signifies some
thing more than merely the assumption of human nature by the Son
of God seems evident from a remark made at the beginning of the
discussion on the morals of the Church. He intends to use the method
of reason, he observes, and, by doing so, to yield to the obstinacy of
the Manichaeans for, he adds, “I like to imitate, as far as I am able, the
gentleness of my Lord Jesus Christ Who took upon Himself the evil
of death itself, wishing to free us from it.” From these words it
seems reasonable to conclude that Augustine believed that Christ be
came the victim of our reconciliation and that the redemption of man
kind was accomplished by the sufferings and death of the Son of God.
One of the most beautiful passages of the treatise on the morals of
the Church and, we may add, one that expresses a doctrine which is
thoroughly Christian, is Augustine's exposition of the law of charity.
Man's chief duty is to love and praise the Blessed Trinity. As his
praise improves and extends, so his love and affection increase in fer
vor. “And when this is the case, mankind cannot but advance with
sure and firm step to a life of perfection and bliss.” This perfect love
of God may be designated by the name of virtue. What are commonly
known as the moral virtues are in reality but four forms of love.
Temperance is love which keeps itself entire and incorrupt for God.
By the practice of this virtue man restrains his passion for whatever
would lead him to violate the law of God. Temperance enables him to
make a proper use of everything which this life requires and at the
same time to regard all things, such as bodily pleasures, honors, desire
of vain knowledge, as despicable by comparison with the possession
and enjoyment of God. Fortitude is love which delights in bearing
hardships and afflictions: labor, pain, and even death itself for love
of God. The example of those who exhibit great fortitude in enduring
privations and suffering for love of gold, of praise, and even of vile
27 De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. XIX, n. 36 (XXXII, 1326): “Vult autem
intelligi, Adam qui peccavit, veterem hominem; illum autem quem suscepit in
Sacramento Dei Filius ad nos liberandos, novum.”
*Ibid., c. II, n. 3 (XXXII, 1312): “Delectat enim me imitari, quantum valeo,
mansuetudinem Domini mei Jesu Christi, qui etiam ipsius mortis malo, quo
nos exuere vellet, indutus est.”
* Ibid., c. XIV, n. 24 (XXXII, 1321): "Quod cum fit, nihil aliud ab humano
genere quam certo et constanti gradu in optimam vitam et beatissimam
pergitur.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 135

pleasure is an incentive for the lover of God to bear all things rather
than forsake the Divine object of his love. Holy Scripture furnishes
us with classic examples of the heroic practice of this virtue in the
person of holy Job and of the valiant mother of the Machabees. Jus
tice is love serving God alone. In regard to the things with which the
just man perforce must come in contact in this life, he makes them
subject to himself and therefore subject to their Creator Whom he
loves. Prudence is love which constantly keeps watch lest any evil
influence should creep in and almost imperceptibly separate us from
the Sovereign Good. This love, inspired by the Holy Spirit, leads us to
the Son through Whom we come to the knowledge of the Father.
To live well, then, is nothing else but to love God with all the heart,
with all the soul, with all the mind. This is the one perfection of man
by which alone he can succeed in attaining the purity of truth.*
The law of charity likewise embraces man in his relation to him
self and to his neighbor. As to himself, it is obvious that he who loves
God cannot help loving himself, for he alone has a proper love for
himself who aims diligently at attaining the supreme and perfect Good.
Since this is nothing else but God, what can prevent him who loves
God from loving himself?" In regard to one's neighbor, God has been
pleased to formulate for man a special precept: “Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself.” The first and lowest degree of this love requires
that he cherish no malice or evil design against anyone, for man is the
nearest neighbor of man.* The human race forms one vast society, the
members of which are united by the bond of mutual love. Verily, there
is no surer step to the love of God than the love of man for man.* The
love of God is first in beginning, the love of one's neighbor is first in
coming to perfection. No one can think that, while he despises his
neighbor, he will arrive at happiness and be united to God by love.*
The love of one's neighbor demands the fulfillment of a twofold
duty: to his body, and to his soul. As to the body, one must, if possible,
assist his neighbor with whatever may preserve or restore his bodily
30 Ibid., c. XVI-XXVI (XXXII, 1322-1332).
* Ibid., c. XXVI, n. 48 (XXXII, 1331).
** Matthew, XXII, 59.
* De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. XXVI, n. 49 (XXXII, 1332).
* Ibid., c. XXVI, n. 48 (XXXII, 1331).
* Ibid., c. XXVI, n. 51 (XXXII, 1332).
136 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

health, with food and drink, shelter and clothing. In a word, this
obligation is satisfied by the practice of the corporal works of mercy.
One's duty to the soul of his neighbor is discharged by advising and
instructing him whenever the opportunity presents itself, and by imbu
ing him with the fear and love of God. Augustine thus summarizes the
duty of fraternal charity: "He, then, who loves his neighbor endeavors
all he can to procure his safety in body and in soul, making the health
of the soul the standard in his treatment of the body. And as regards
the soul, his endeavors are in this order, that he should first fear and
then love God.”* These doctrines are embodied in the Old Testament
as well as in the New.” How, then, can anyone who lays claim to the
name of Christian refuse to fulfill the precepts of the love of God and
of one's neighbor, which are so explicitly stated in the Christian
Scriptures? "On these two commandments,” Christ Himself says,
“hang all the law and the prophets.” This twofold mandate is the
epitome of the moral code of the Catholic Church.
The law of charity toward one's neighbor as portrayed by Augus
tine notably differentiates his doctrine of love from that of Neo
Platonism. The love of God unquestionably holds a very important
place in Neo-Platonic thought. In his tractate on Love” Plotinus
speaks in beautiful and highly figurative language of the soul's love
for God. Love is an activity of the soul desiring the Good.” It is
natural for the soul to love God and to yearn to be united with Him.
"Love—born at the banquet of the gods has of necessity been eternally
in existence, for it springs from the intention of the soul towards its
best, towards the Good.” Besides the heavenly Aphrodite, there is
also “the Aphrodite who presides over earthly unions,” in other
words, love which is found in marriage, which also "has its touch of
36 Ibid., c. XXVIII, n. 56 (XXXII, 1334): "Qui ergo diligit proximum, agit
quantum potest ut salvus corpore salvusque animo sit: sed cura corporis ad
sanitatem animi referenda est. Agit ergo his gradibus, quod animum pertinet,
ut primo timeat, deinde diligat Deum.”
37 On account of the contempt of the Manichaeans for the Old Testament, in
this treatise Augustine often insists on the agreement in doctrine between the
Old and New Testaments.
38 Matthew, XXII, 40.
39 Plotinus, Enneads, III, v.
40 Ibid., III, v, 3.
41 Ibid., III, v, 10.
42 Ibid., III, v, 2.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 137

upward desire.” However, in Neo-Platonism there is no place, at

least theoretically, for the universal, all-embracing bond of love which
by personal sympathy and service unites all men to one another, the
love which Augustine styles “a sort of cradle of our love to God.”
This love, he says, demands more than mere good will and can be
fulfilled “only by a high degree of thoughtfulness and prudence.”
That the kind and amiable founder of Neo-Platonism practiced charity
toward his neighbor is evident from Porphyry's biography of his mas
ter. Plotinus, he says, “was able to live at once within himself and for
others. . . . Not a few men and women of position, on the approach
of death, had left their boys and girls, with all their property, to his
care, feeling that with Plotinus for guardian the children would be in
holy hands.” Theoretically, however, Neo-Platonic ethical and social
doctrine was characterized by an unsympathetic individualism. The
needs and sufferings of others did not personally interest the Neo
Platonist engrossed, as he was, in the attainment of communion with
God. That a deep concern for alleviating the physical and mental pains
of others and for rendering them assistance both in soul and body is a
means of advancing in one's love for God does not seem to have been
a principle of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of love.” It is true that
Plotinus says “we are in sympathetic relation to each other suffering,
overcome, at the sight of [others'] pain,” but the “sympathetic con
tact” of which he speaks is merely a sort of metaphysical bond uniting
the various parts of “the One-All,” which, as he says elsewhere, “are
wrought to one tune like a musical string which, being plucked at one
end, vibrates at the other also.” This relationship is lacking in the
personal touch that characterizes the precept of charity which Augustine
describes in this treatise and which he represents as a commandment
given to man by Christ Himself.
43 Ibid., III, v, 3.
44 De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. XXVI, n. 50 (XXXII, 1332).
45 Ibid., c. XXVI, n. 51 (XXXII, 1332).
46 Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 8-9.
47 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 8; II, ix, 9.
Dean Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, II, 191, in his critique of Neo
Platonic ethics remarks: “The dependence of souls on each other for the
achievement of their perfection is a truth which Christianity taught and Neo
Platonism neglected.”
48 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, ix, 3.
49 Ibid., IV, iv, 32.
50 Ibid., IV, iv, 41.
138 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Augustine's delineation of charity towards one's neighbor, while

fully satisfying the requirements of the Christian law of love, is char
acterized, however, by an attribute which seems to border somewhat
on Neo-Platonic apathy. Those who render assistance in warding off
evils and distresses from their neighbor are called compassionate,
Augustine says, even though they should be so wise that no painful
feeling disturbs their mind in the exercise of compassion. No doubt,
he adds, the word compassionate implies suffering in the heart of the
man who feels for the sorrow of another. But it is equally true that a
wise man ought to be free from painful emotion when he assists the
needy. To act from motives of benevolence and at the same time with
tranquillity of mind is quite deserving of the epithet, compassionate.
The fear of distressful emotion, however, must not deter one from
the fulfillment of his duty toward his neighbor. The ideal to be aimed
at is the imitation of the compassion of God toward man.”
Augustine's conception of the nature of man, as expressed in this
treatise against the Manichaeans, seems to assign a more important rôle
to the body than has been observable in the works which have been
analyzed thus far.” Man, he says, is a being composed of soul and
body. Neither one without the other could be called man, for the body
would not be man without the soul, nor would the soul be man if there
were not a body animated by it. Unquestionably, then, the nature of
man comprises the notion of a soul and of a body. However, that the
union of a spiritual soul and a material body is still somewhat of a
puzzle to Augustine is evident from the series of questions he proposes
after having formulated his definition of man. Is man, he asks him
self, a soul and body as in a double harness, or like a centaur? Or do
we mean by man his body only as being in the service of the soul
which rules it, as, for example, the word lamp denotes not the light and
the case together, but only the case, when, as a matter of fact, it is on
account of the light that it receives its name? Or by the term, man,
do we mean only the mind and that on account of the body which it
rules, just as the word horseman implies not the man and the horse,
but only the man as employed in using the horse? “This dispute,” he
51 De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. XXVII, n. 53-54 (XXXII, 1333).
52 Cf. Contra Academicos, L. I, c. III, n. 9 (XXXII, 910); De ordine, L. I,
C. VIII, n. 24 (XXXII, 988); Soliloquia, L. I, C. XIV, n. 24 (XXXII,
882).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 139

says, “is not easy to settle; or if the proof is plain, the statement re
quires time.” Of one thing, however, he is quite convinced; namely,
that whatever makes for the perfection of his soul will, as a conse
quence, perfect the man, whether we consider him as a soul and a
body, or either as a soul or a body only.”
Throughout this treatise, as was noted also in those already studied,
there is no hint of condemnation or disparagement of the body. The
soul which rules it and which by its presence supplies it with whatever
invigorates it and adds to its beauty and perfection must restrict the
pleasures of the body which have their source in the material things
with which the senses come in contact. This is accomplished by the
virtue of temperance which enables man to regulate his desire for sen
sible things and to employ them only in so far as they are useful to
him, in order that they in no way may interfere with or corrupt his
love for God.” In fact, the fulfillment of the law of charity toward
one's neighbor has reference to his body as well as to his soul. The cor
poral no less than the spiritual works of mercy are required. Since
"man . . . is a rational soul with a mortal and earthly body in its
service,” he who loves his neighbor must do good partly to his body
and partly to his soul.
Augustine's profound respect and veneration for the Sacred Writ
ings is discernible on every page of this work against the Manichaeans.
The entire treatise might well be named an apology for the Holy
Scriptures, which he defends with all the power of his pen. The Old
Testament in particular he diligently upholds against the Manichaeans
who use every effort to heap ridicule and contempt upon its teachings.
Augustine finds in the Old Testament support and confirmation of
every doctrine and every moral discipline which the New Testament
imposes upon the conscience of its adherents. The way of salvation and
of happiness is pointed out by the perfect harmony of both these
Sacred Writings.” God Himself in His goodness and mercy has given

* De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. IV, n. 6 (XXXII, 1313): “Difficile est

istam controversiam dijudicare: aut si ratione facile, oratione longum est.”
* Ibid., c. V, n. 8 (XXXII, 1314).
* Ibid., c. XIX, n. 36—c. XX, n. 37 (XXXII, 1326-1327).
* Ibid., c. XXVII, n. 52 (XXXII, 1332): “Homo . . . animo rationalis est
mortali atque terreno utens corpore.”
* Ibid., c. XVIII, n. 34 (XXXIi, 1325).
140 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

us in the two Testaments a rule of conduct. “Of the marvelous order

and divine harmony of these Testaments it would take long to speak,”
Augustine says, "and many pious and learned men have discoursed on
it. The theme demands many books to set it forth and explain it, as
far as it is possible for man.” The anthropomorphisms, the figurative
language, the simple and inelegant mode of expression found in the
Old Testament in no way lessens its authority. The doctrines veiled
beneath them were inspired by the Spirit of God, for the God of both
Testaments is one.” In order to demonstrate the substantial agreement
of the Old Testament with various portions of the New, Augustine
quotes freely and often at length from both Scriptures, especially from
the Epistles of St. Paul, the Book of Wisdom, and the Psalms, of
which he appears to have been particularly fond.”
Finally, Augustine's long and beautiful tribute to the Catholic
Church, “the true mother of Christians,” seems to bear evidence of his
deep regard and sincere affection for Christianity and its teachings. In
her is found a rule of life, a doctrine of salvation according to which
man is enabled to fulfill his duty to God, to his neighbor, to himself.
She teaches him the nature of God, the manner in which He should
be served, the happiness which will accrue to him who faithfully ob
serves the Divine precepts. She accommodates her instruction to the
variety of needs and requirements of the vast multitude within her
fold: “Thy training and teaching are childlike for children, forcible
for youths, peaceful for the aged, taking into account the age of the

58 Ibid., c. XXVIII, n. 56 (XXXII, 1334): “De quorum Testamentorum

admirabili quodam ordine divinoque concentu, longissimum est dicere, et
multi religiosi doctidue dixerunt. Multos libros resista flagitat ut pro merito,
quantum ab homine potest, explicari et praedicari queat.”
59 Ibid., c. XVII, n. 30 (XXXII, 1324).
60 This treatise contains forty-four citations from the Epistles of St. Paul, thir
teen from St. Matthew, seven from the Book of Wisdom, six from the Psalms,
six from St. John, five from Deuteronomy, three from Ecclesiasticus, one from
each of the following: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Leviticus. Job, Machabees, St.
Luke. It would seem, then, that Augustine's knowledge of Scripture at this
time was not so defective as he would lead us to believe. Correcting an error
in a citation from the Psalms, he remarks: “Mendositas nostri codicis me
fefellit minus memorem Scripturarum, in quibus nondum assuetus eram.” Cf.
Retractationes, L. I, c. VII, n. 2 (XXXII, 592).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 141

mind as well as of the body.” The temporal happiness and eternal

welfare of each of her children is for her a special care. She legislates
for the individual, the family, the state:
Thou subjectest women to their husbands in chaste and
faithful obedience, not to gratify passion, but for the propa
gation of offspring, and for domestic society. Thou givest
to men authority over their wives, not to mock the weaker
sex, but in the laws of unfeigned love. Thou dost subordi
nate children to their parents in a kind of free bondage and
dost set parents over their children in a godly rule. Thou
bindest brothers to brothers in a religious tie stronger and
closer than that of blood. Without violation of the connec
tions of nature and of choice, thou bringest within the bond
of mutual love every relationship of kindred and every alli
ance of affinity. Thou teachest servants to cleave to their
masters from delight in their task rather than from the
necessity of their position. Thou renderest masters forbear
ing to their servants from a regard to God, their common
Master, and more disposed to advise than to compel. Thou
unitest citizen to citizen, nation to nation, yea, man to man
from the recollection of their first parents, not only in soci
ety but in fraternity. Thou teachest kings to seek the good
of their people; thou counsellest peoples to be subject to
their kings.”
By fidelity to her precepts her children are purified and sanctified
on earth, whether engaged in the tumult and activities of the world,
as are the greater number of her subjects; or in instructing others in the
way of salvation, as are her clergy and her bishops; or in solitude,
prayer, and contemplation, as are her cenobites and hermits; or in the
Sacred precincts of the cloister where multitudes of men and women
devote their time to prayer and labor, the fruits of which they dis
tribute to their needy fellow men. And so the children of the Church,
of every age and race and condition: rich and poor, young and old,
strong and weak, literate and illiterate, noble and ignoble, bear witness
* De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. XXX, n. 53 (XXXII, 1336): "Tu pueri
liter pueros, fortiter juvenes, quiete senes, prout cujusque non corporis tantum
sed et animi aetas est, exerces et doces.”
*Ibid., c. XXX, n. 53 (XXXII, 1336). Because of the beauty of the thought
and the felicity of expression it seemed worth while to quote this long
passage.
142 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

by their holiness of life to the exalted doctrine and the watchful care
of their common mother.”
The moral code which Augustine portrays and extols in his apos
trophe to the Catholic Church and which is exemplified in the lives of
many of her children is, in great measure, common to Neo-Platonism
also. It seems evident, however, that Augustine has reference to these
moral doctrines as explained by the Church which was divinely estab
lished to teach and expound the truths embodied in the Holy Scrip
tures.” In the Catholic Church is vested the authority of both Testa
ments, the Old and the New. If you once considered what the Prophet
declares of Wisdom,” he tells the Manichaeans, "with great alacrity,
sincere love, and full assurance of faith you would betake yourselves
bodily to the shelter of the most holy bosom of the Catholic Church,”
in which is found the truth established on both Testaments. This legacy
of truth is disseminated by the official teachers of the Church: the
bishops, priests, and other ministers.
Do you listen to the learned men of the Catholic Church
[Augustine bids the Manichaeans] with as peaceable a dis
position, and with the same zeal that I had when for nine
years I attended on you: there will be no need of so long a
time as that during which you made a fool of me. In a
much, a very much, shorter time you will see the difference
between truth and vanity.”
Moreover, the solidarity which Augustine portrays as characteristic
of the Church, and the bond of sympathy which unites its members,
regardless of age or rank, are quite in harmony with his delineation
of the Christian law of charity in reference to one's neighbor, and out
of keeping with the moral isolation and lack of sympathy which,
theoretically at least, are discernible in Neo-Platonism.
63 Ibid., c. XXXI-XXXIII (XXXII, 1337-1341).
64 Ibid., c. I, n. 1-2 (XXXII, 1310-1311); c. XXX, n. 64 (XXXII, 1337).
65 Wisdom, VI, 13-21.
* De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. XVII, n. 32 (XXXII, 1325): "Confestim
abjiceretis omnes ineptias fabellarum, et vanissimas imaginationes corporum,
totosque vos magna alacritate, sincero amore, firmissima fide, sanctissimo Ec
clesiae catholicae gremio conderetis.”
* Ibid., c. XVIII, n. 34 (XXXII, 1326): “Brevi dicam quod sentio: audite
doctos Ecclesiae catholicae viros tanta pace animi, et eo voto quo vos ego
audivi; nihil opus erit novem annis quibus me ludificastis. Longe omnino,
longe breviore tempore, quid intersit inter veritatem vanitatemque cernetis.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 143

B. De Moribus Manichaeorum

The treatise De moribus Manichaeorum may be regarded as a sequel

to the De moribus ecclesiae catholicae.* It has for its purpose an ex
position of the inconsistencies and absurdities of Manichaean doctrine,
and of the flagrant immorality even of the "elect” who simulate the
practice of rigid asceticism.
In his analysis and critique of the morals of the Manichaeans
Augustine is especially concerned with the refutation of their doctrine
of evil. The conflict between the eternally existing Principles of Good
and Evil, which, according to the Manichaeans, resulted in the blending
of good and evil in the world, is, in his opinion, a most pernicious doc
trine and one which wreaks havoc in the moral life of man. In a man
ner somewhat like that of Plotinus” Augustine once more” explains
in great detail the nature of evil. Evil as such does not exist. There is
no positive evil in the universe, since it is found only in that which
possesses some degree of goodness. It has no nature or substance of its
own. The poison, for example, which is produced by the body of the
scorpion is not an evil to the animal itself. In fact, if the poison were
entirely removed from its body, the scorpion would die. The poison is
an evil for the body which receives it, and causes it to lose the goodness
it formerly possessed.”
God is not the author of evil, Augustine maintains for, since He
is the cause of the being of all things, He could in no way at the same
time be the cause of their not being, that is, of their falling off from
essence and tending to non-existence. Evil, then, which is merely the
perversion, the negation, the privation of the good is realized only in
those things which have a finite being and therefore are subject to
mutation and corruption. In this respect they differ from the Highest
Good Who is possessed of supreme existence, of existence in the high
est and truest sense of the term, and therefore has a being that is im
mutable, incorruptible, impervious. The goodness of God prevents evil
from bringing anything to non-existence. The solution which both
reason and religion offer for the problem of evil is that whatever is,
68 Cf. Chapter V, note 1.
* Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 5; III, ii, 4; III, ii, 8; I, viii, 3; I, viii, 4; I, viii, 9.
70 Cf. De ordine, L. II, c. II, n. 9—c. IV, n. 13 (XXXII, 998-1001); L. II, c.
VII, n. 22 (XXXII, 1004-1005). t

” De moribus Manichaeorum, c. VIII, n. 11 (XXXII, 1349-1350).

144 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

in so far as it is, has its being from God. Its falling away from being,
however, is not from God and yet is always ordered by Divine Provi
dence in harmony and agreement with the entire plan of the universe.”
Even moral evil does not destroy the order of the world. “When
rational souls fall away from God, although they possess the greatest
amount of free will, He ranks them in the lower grades of creation
where their proper place is. So they suffer misery by the Divine judg
ment while they are ranked suitably to their deserts.”
Augustine's analysis of evil as a lack, a negation, a corruption of
good is in agreement with that of the founder of Neo-Platonism.”
And yet the one differs from the other in a notable respect, since
Augustine makes no mention whatever of matter as the source of evil,
a doctrine of considerable importance in the philosophy of Plotinus.
With him matter is destitution, ugliness, darkness, utter disgraceful
ness.” In a special manner it is the cause of moral evil, for to what
else is due the fall of the soul except its union with a material body?
Matter is something foreign to the nature of the soul and therefore is
the source of its weakness. “It [matter] encroaches upon the Soul's
territory and, as it were, crushes the Soul back; and it turns to evil all
that it has stolen until the Soul finds strength to advance again. Thus
the cause, at once, of weakness of the Soul and of all its evil is mat
ter.” With Augustine the fall of the rational soul is due to its power
of free will. “They possess the greatest amount of free will,” he
remarks when speaking of the souls' abandonment of God.
Although in his explanation of the distinction between the Creator
and created things Augustine does not explicitly and clearly affirm the
Christian doctrine of creation, that is, of the existence of the universe
as due to an act of the Divine will, yet, as he analyzes the problem of
evil, it is obvious that such a doctrine is implied. The Catholic Church,
72 Ibid., c. VII, n. 10 (XXXII, 1349). -

73 Ibid., c. VII, n. 9 (XXXII, 1349): “Itaque etiam animas rationales, in

quibus est potentissimum liberum arbitrium, deficientes a se, in inferioribus
creaturae gradibus ordinat, ubi tales esse decet. Fiunt ergo miserae divino
judicio, dum convenienter meritis ordinantur.”
74 Plotinus, Enneads, I, viii, 5, seems to regard evil as complete and entire
absence of good. Cf. R. Jolivet, Le problème du mal d'après saint Augustin
(Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1936), p. 147.
75 Plotinus, Enneads, II, iv, 16.
78 Ibid., I, viii, 11.
77 De moribus Manichaeorum, c. VII, n. 9 (XXXII, 1349).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 145

he says, declares that God is the cause of all natures and substances
and that He is the one Good that is supremely good. There is another
good, however, that is good by participation and by having something
bestowed on it. This being is called a creature. It is not of itself
intrinsically good, since it possesses its being as something which it
holds from another. And a thing cannot be good by nature when it is
spoken of as being made, which indicates that the goodness was
bestowed. Thus, he adds, on the one hand, God is good, and on the
other, all things which He has made, although they are not so good
as He who made them.”
There is a difference between the meaning of facio and creo, Augus
tine goes on to say in explanation of the text of Isaias, Ego facio bona
et creo mala.” Creo expresses the notion of forming or arranging
(condere et ordinare); hence, in some texts we find the word condo
substituted for creo. To make (facere) is used in regard to things
which previously were not in existence, but to form (condere) has
reference to the ordering or arranging of that which already had some
kind of existence, so as to make it better or greater. Such are the things
which God arranges when He says: “I form evil things,” that is, things
which are of such a nature as to be able to fall off (deficere) and tend
to non-existence, not things which have reached that to which they
tend. For it has been said that nothing is permitted by Divine Provi
dence to arrive at non-existence.”
Augustine seems here to distinguish between the notion of exist
ence, that is, of how things come to be, and that of essence or how
things come to be as they are, facio being the term used to express the
former and creo or condo, the latter. All things to which God gave the
attribute of existence, all things whose being He produced are good.
The kind of nature or essence which these things possess and to which
He gave existence is such that it can have a less degree of goodness.
In other words, they are creatures and therefore imperfect in the order
of essence and existence. Augustine, then, seems to distinguish between
the principle of the being, of the existence of the universe and the
principle or source of the order and arrangement found therein. Such
78 Ibid., c. II, n. 3—c. IV, n. 6 (XXXII, 1346-1347).
79 Isaias, XLV, 7.
* De moribus Manichaeorum, c. VII, n. 9 (XXXII, 1349).
146 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

a doctrine would have no meaning for Plotinus since, following, as

he did, the traditional trend of Greek philosophy, he was dealing with
a universe that is eternal and therefore whose existence did not have to
be accounted for. Plotinus thus explicitly formulates his opinion on
the eternity of the world:
Of course the belief that after a certain lapse of time a Kosmos
previously non-existent came into being would imply a fore
seeing and a reasoned plan on the part of God providing for the
production of the Universe and securing all possible perfec
tion in it. . . . But since we hold the eternal existence of the
Universe, the utter absence of beginning to it, we are forced
. . . to explain the providence ruling in the Universe as a uni
versal consonance with the divine Intelligence . . .”
To give existence to things and to keep them in existence, therefore,
was a problem that would have no place in the Neo-Platonic universe.

C. De Quantitate Animae
The third treatise” which Augustine devotes to the study of the
human soul and its powers is the De quantitate animae.” It is a dia
logue in form and represents a discussion with Evodius who begs to
be enlightened on the nature of the soul. At Augustine's suggestion
Evodius proposes six questions as an outline for the information he
desires: “1. What is the origin of the soul? 2. What is its quality?
3. What is its quantity or measure? 4. Why is the soul given to the
body? 5. How is the soul affected when it is united to the body?
81 Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 1.
Cf. Augustine's criticism of the Platonists' doctrine of the eternal existence of
human souls in De civitate Dei, L. X, c. XXXI (XLI, 311).
82 The Soliloquia and De immortalitate animae were likewise devoted to a
consideration of the nature and powers of the soul.
88 In the Retractationes we are informed that this treatise was written at Rome
since it follows the “review” of the writings on the morals of the Catholic
Church and of the Manichaeans. Augustine thus comments on the place in
which the dialogue was written and also his purpose in composing it: “In
eadem urbe [Roma] scripsi dialogum in quo de anima multa quaeruntur ac
disseruntur. . . . Sed quoniam quanta sit, diligentissime ac subtilissime dis
putatum est, ut eam, si possemus, ostenderemus corporalis quantitatis non
esse, et tamen magnum aliquid esse, . . . totus liber nomen accepit ut appella
;
594).
de Animae quantitate. Cf. Retractationes, L. I, c. VIII, n. 1 (XXXII,
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 147

6. How, when it has departed?” Augustine gives only passing con

sideration to the other questions, but centers his attention upon the
soul's quantity or measure, the discussion comprising this delightful
treatise which exalts the dignity and grandeur of the human soul.
An analysis of this little work discloses much that indicates the
agreement of Augustine and Plotinus on various questions pertaining
to the soul, on points, however, which are not inconsistent with the
basic principles either of Christianity or of Neo-Platonism. It likewise
reveals differences between their doctrines, some of which are signifi
cant for the purpose of our thesis. -

Augustine's main objective is to demonstrate that the soul has no

corporeal magnitude, no material mass or bulk, while itself is the cause
of life and energy in all things which are possessed of life. Not con
tent, however, with establishing the incorporeality of the human soul—
for it is the human soul that forms the center of his interest—by
analyzing the various powers which elevate it above all material being
and enable it to become united to God Himself by love and contempla
tion, he substantiates the dignity and grandeur of the soul of man.
In Augustine's discussion of the hierarchy of powers which the
human soul possesses, we find a striking analogy to arguments pro
posed by the founder of Neo-Platonism in his refutation of materialis
tic psychology. The first or lowest property of the soul is that by which
it exercises its function of animating and sustaining the material body
to which it is united. The very presence of the soul is the source of
the life and the subsistence of this mortal frame of earth. It unifies the
body, distributes nourishment throughout the various members, and
causes it to grow and develop. Whatever beauty or symmetry the body
possesses it owes to the indwelling of the spiritual soul. And yet, even
the irrational and vegetative soul possesses power such as this.” Pre
cisely the same doctrine is found in the writings of Plotinus; namely,
that everything possessed of life has a soul which is the cause of its
subsistence and animation: “The body, container of soul and of nature,
cannot even in itself be as a soulless form would be . . . the body
* De quantitate animae, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 1035): "Quaero igitur unde sit
anima, qualis sit, quanta sit, cur corpori fuerit data, et cum ad corpus venerit
qualis efficiatur, qualis cum abscesserit?” The citations in this study are taken
from De quantitate animae, translated by F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A., (Phila
delphia: P. Reilly Co., 1933).
* Ibid., c. XXXIII, n. 70 (XXXII, 1073-1074).
148 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

holding animal or vegetative life must hold also some shadow of

Soul.”86
The power of the soul as manifested in sentient life is still a higher
one. The activities that the soul carries on through the medium of the
body which it rules establish beyond doubt the incorporeal nature of
the soul. The first and simplest of these activities is sensation, which
Augustine, in agreement with Plotinus, refuses to accept as taking place
on a material level but which he assigns as an activity belonging to the
soul alone. This does not mean that the body takes no part whatever
in this function of the soul; it plays, however, only a minor rôle, the
activity belonging uniquely to the soul, for sensation means that what
the body experiences is not hidden from the soul.” It carries on this
activity through the organs of the body, the five senses being the
channels, so to speak, of which the soul makes use in order to come
in contact with the objects of the visible world. In every sense-percep
tion an organ of sense is affected, but the awareness of what takes
place belongs exclusively to the soul. In this activity the powers of the
soul are localized in certain parts or sections of the body:
Through the sense of touch the soul extends itself, and by it,
discerns and feels things hot and cold, rough and smooth, hard
and soft, light and heavy. Then again it distinguishes between
unnumbered differences of taste and smell and sound and the
shapes of things by [the act of] tasting, smelling, hearing and
seeing. And in all these it knows and seeks the things that are
in accord with the nature of its own body: it rejects and shuns
what is opposed.*
Manifold indeed are its activities in the material body which it rules.
It provides for the propagation of the human race; “it makes provi
sion for offspring, not in the fact of begetting only, but in nourish
ing, caring for, and protecting.” It never grows weary, never relaxes,
86 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, iv., 18.
87 De quantitate animae, c. XXIII, n. 41 (XXXII, 1058).
88 Ibid., c. XXXIII, n. 71 (XXXII, 1074): “Intendit se anima in tactum, et
eo callida, frigida, aspera, lenia, dura, mollia, levia, gravia sentit atque dis
cernit. Deinde innumerabiles differentias saporum, odorum, sonorum, for
marum, gustando, olfaciendo, audiendo, videndoque dijudicat. Atque in is
omnibus ea quae secundum naturam sui corporis sunt adsciscit atque appetit:
rejicit fugitaue contraria.”
89 Ibid., c. XXXIII, n. 71 (XXXII, 1074): “Fetibus non jam gignendis tan
tummodo, sed etiam fovendis, tuendis, alendisque conspirat.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 149

never is in need of recreation or of rest. At definite times when the

body, its good servant, is enjoying a respite from its labors, the ever
active soul is employed in reviewing, revolving, rearranging the vast
number of images of realities which it has received in no fixed order
through the avenue of the senses.” Plotinus, too, is always conscious
of the spiritual character of reality. It is impossible, he believes, to
explain existence or operation on the level of that which is material.
Since nothing material can affect a spiritual substance, sensation must
take place upon a spiritual plane and therefore is an activity peculiar
to the soul.91
Another power which belongs to the sentient function of the soul
is that of memory by which the soul recalls the sense impressions which
it has received through the medium of the body. By the exercise of this
power the soul can contain within itself images of realities, large and
small, near and far; great cities, a broad sweep of lands,” vast spaces
of the sky and earth and sea, while itself has no extension. Truly this
is a marvelous power.” And yet the irrational animal possesses this in
common with man.
The third power which establishes the exalted nature of the soul
is that of intellectual memory and reason, activities distinctively human.
By the former man is able to preserve all the learning of past ages.
By the use of abstract signs and symbols books are written, documents
are preserved and transmitted to posterity, perpetuating the findings of
the arts and sciences. Add to this the faculty of reason and its exercise
by which man can pass from the apprehension of what is known to that
which is unknown. “Note the flowing streams of eloquence, the vari
eties of poetry; the thousands of means of imitation for purposes of
play and of jest, the art of music, accuracy of measurements, the science
of numbers, the conjecturing of things of the past and the future from
the present. Great are these things and distinctively human.”
90 Ibid., c. XXXIII, n. 71 (XXXII, 1074).
91 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, I, i, 2; III, vi, 1; IV, iv, 22-28; IV, v, 1-8; IV, vi,
3; IV, vii, 6-8.
92 De quantitate animae, c. V, n. 9 (XXXII, 1040).
98 Ibid., c. XIV, n. 23 (XXXII, 1048).
94 Ibid., c. XXXIII, n. 72 (XXXII, 1075): "Cogita . . . fluvios eloquentiae,
carminum varietates, ludendi ac jocandi causa milleformes simulationes,
modulandi peritiam, dimetiendi subtilitatem, numerandi disciplinam, praeteri
torum ac futurorum ex praesentibus conjecturam. Magna haec et omnino
humanae.”
150 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Plotinus likewise analyzes” at great length the various activities of

the soul, of which Augustine treats as comprising its first three powers.
Sensation, memory, both sensuous and intellectual, discursive reason
ing—all furnish convincing proofs of the incorporeality of the human
soul and therefore provide strong arguments against materialistic psy
chology for which Plotinus has the greatest loathing and contempt,
since it militates against the spirituality of the soul. Considered in
themselves, however, Plotinus does not rate these functions or activi
ties as perfections of the soul, as they unquestionably are in the esti
mation of Augustine; on the contrary, they are marks of weakness and
of imperfection in the soul.” Sensation, imagination, memory, reason
ing are facts, but facts which portray the sad condition of the soul,
due to its contact with multiplicity. Pure unity is the natural state of
the spiritual soul, the state, so to speak, in which it breathes its native
air. Because it fell from unity, it is obliged to substitute, as it were,
for the Beatific Vision which it once enjoyed knowledge derived by
means of these powers of the soul. Memory especially is the bridge by
which it tries to span the distance which separates it from the Ideas
with which it was formerly united. A good soul is a forgetful soul.
Reminiscence is for souls that have lost the vision of the Supreme.”
The fourth power of the soul has reference to the moral life of
man. When the soul arrives at this degree of perfection, it realizes
the excellence of its spiritual nature by which it is exalted above all
that is material. “Compared to its own power and its own beauty, the
soul dares to discern and to hold the power and the beauty of material
things less worth.” Therefore, it makes an earnest effort to eradicate
whatever may defile or tarnish in the least its purity. It forms a high
estimate of its duty to itself, to its neighbor, to society at large. It
humbly submits to the authority and laws of wise men, convinced
that, in obeying human law, it is, in reality, subjecting itself to God
Who speaks through those in whom He has vested power. On this
95 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, III, vi, 1; I, i, 2; I, i, 7; IV, iii, 23; IV, iii, 26; IV,
iii, 27-32; IV, iv, 2-8.
98 Ibid., IV, iv, 3-4; III, vi, 6.
97 Ibid., IV, iv, 3-5.
98 De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII, n. 73 (XXXII, 1075): “Hinc enim anima
se non solum suo, si quam universi partem agit, sed ipsi etiam universo cor
pori audet praeponere, bonague ejus bona sua non putare, atque potentiae
pulchritudinique suae comparata discernere atque contemnere.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 151

plane the soul is engaged in a constant struggle, in continuous war

fare against the vexations and allurements of the world. At times it
is overwhelmed with an excessive fear of death, although it is firmly
convinced of the justice of Divine Providence which does not permit
death unjustly to befall anyone. As the process of purification con
tinues, the soul attains an ever clearer realization of the holiness of
God and of its own unworthiness. But difficult though it is to arrive
at a proper balance between fear and trust, the soul can attain this state
also by the help of God from Whom all things have their being and
Who sustains and rules them by His power and justice. To Him the
soul appeals with prayerful confidence as it advances along the arduous
path of sanctification.”
In the fifth degree of its progress the soul labors joyfully but still
with effort to continue in the state of virtue at which it has arrived.
It realizes that “to build up purity is one thing; to hold it is another;
another is the action by which it permits itself not again to be
defiled.” The greater is its effort, the more confidently it advances
toward God, “that is, on to the contemplation of Truth itself, and that
Truth supreme, the transcendent reward for which there has been so
much labor.”
In the sixth step of its advancement the soul hastens rapidly
toward the enjoyment of contemplation. It keeps its glance directed to
the highest vision of the soul, the end it has in view. “For it is one
thing to have the eye of the soul cleared so that it may not look to no
purpose, and see wrongly; another thing to maintain and to build up
the health of the eye; another again to direct a restful and right view
upon that which is to be seen.” The danger that threatens the soul
at this stage is discouragement of attaining the perfect purity required
99 Ibid., c. XXXIII, n. 73 (XXXII, 1075).
100 Ibid., c. XXXIII, n. 74 (XXXII, 1076): “Aliud est enim efficere, aliud
tenere puritatem; et alia prorsus actio qua se inquinatam redintegrat, alia
qua non patitur se rursus inquinari.”
101 Ibid., c. XXXIII, n. 74 (XXXII, 1076): “Tunc vero ingenti quadam et
incredibili fiducia pergit in Deum, id est, in ipsam contemplationem veritatis,
et illud, propter quod tantum laboratum est, altissimum et secretissimum
praemium.”
102 Ibid., c. XXXIII, n. 75 (XXXII, 1076): “Aliud est enim mundari oculum
ipsum animae, ne frustra et temere aspiciat, et prave videat; aliud ipsam
custodire atque firmare sanitatem; aliud jam serenum atque rectum aspectum
in id quod videndum est, dirigere.”
152 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

for the contemplation of the Supreme Good, and consequently a yearn

ing for the miserable indulgence which it formerly enjoyed. Hence it
earnestly begs in the words of the Prophet: “Create a clean heart in
me, God, and renew a right spirit within my breast,” that is to say,
it implores the Divine aid that is necessary in seeking the Truth. For
only he can attain this happiness, whose heart is pure, who has freed
himself from all attachment to the things of earth.”
The seventh degree, the highest state of perfection of the soul,
should more appropriately be termed its abiding place (mancio). For
the soul has now arrived at the contemplation of God. Augustine thus
describes the blissful experience:
What, shall I say, are the joys, what is the enjoyment of the
supreme and true Good, the breathing of what peace and what
eternity? Great souls have declared these things so far as they
judged that they are to be declared—great souls,” incompar
ably great, of whom we believe that they beheld and that now
they behold these things.”
By the help of God the soul can persevere in the way which He has
pointed out and thereby arrive at the ecstatic contemplation “of the
Supreme Cause, or the Supreme Author, or the Supreme Principle of
all things.” Thus Augustine describes the degrees or steps by which
the soul can ascend to the possession and enjoyment of God.
Plotinus also depicts the upward journey of the soul to God and
at the same time the various steps of its discovery of itself; namely,
purification, intellection, vision—in reality, but two aspects of the same
experience. The soul's pursuit of God is nothing else than the pursuit
of unity which it lost through its contact with the world of matter
when it became united with the body. Surrounded, as it is, by sensible
realities, the soul tends to identify itself with the material universe and,
103 Psalms, I, 12.
104 De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII, n. 75 (XXXII, 1076).
105 Augustine probably has reference to St. Paul and Plotinus for whom he had
great admiration. Both of them enjoyed a mystical union with God. Cf. 2
Corinthians, XII, 2-5; also, Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 23.
106 De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII, n. 76 (XXXII, 1076): "Quae sint gaudia,
quae perfructio summi et veri boni, cujus serenitatis atque aeternitatis afflatus,
quid ego dicam 2 Dixerunt haec quantum dicenda esse judicaverunt, magnae
quaedam et incomparabiles animae, quas etiam vidisse ac videre ista
credimus.”
107 Ibid. c. XXXIII, n. 76 (XXXII, 1076).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 153

in doing so, continues in its state of darkness and of separation.”

The first step in the soul's discovery of God and, therefore, its discovery
of itself consists in purification which, for Plotinus, means the com
plete elimination of all sense life. By its union with the body the soul
has fallen from unity, and in this state of dispersion pursues the
pleasures of the body and becomes forgetful of that perfect unity
from which it originally came. Purification is the only means at its
disposal for effecting its return, which is nothing more or less than
flight from multiplicity, eradication of all sensations and emotions,
not only of those that are evil, but of everything that has to do with
matter.” Plotinus thus explains the process: -

What is meant by purification of the Soul is simply to allow

it to be alone; (it is pure) when it keeps no company; when
it looks to nothing without itself; entertains no alien thoughts
. when it no longer sees in the world of image, much less
elaborates images into veritable affections. Is it not a true puri
fication to turn away towards the exact contrary of earthly
things?”
Such a method of purification is quite different from that of which
Augustine speaks in his delineation of the fourth degree of power of
the soul. As the soul, he says, acquires a deeper appreciation of its own
superior beauty and excellence in comparison with the loveliness and
power of earthly things, “as it delights itself the more, so much the
more does it withdraw from things that defile, and it endeavors to
make itself stainless and very clear and fair.” This does not necessi
tate a flight from sensible things, but consists rather in making a
proper use of them. This purity of heart, as described by Augustine,
results in a deeper realization of one's duty to his neighbor, in humble
submission to human law and authority, as representing the authority
of God, in a strong and vigorous fight against the vexations and
allurements of the world,” a somewhat different process, though
108 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, viii, 4.
109 Ibid., IV, iii, 32.
110 Ibid., III, vi, 5.
111 De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII, n. 73 (XXXII, 1075): "Et inde quo
magis se delectat, eo magis sese abstrahere a sordibus, totamgue emaculare
ac mundissimam reddere et comptissimum."
112 Ibid., c. XXXIII, 73 (XXXII, 1075).
154 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

basically similar in purpose, from the self-recollection which forms

the essential element in Neo-Platonic purification.
By purifying itself, Plotinus says, the soul enters "into relation
with its own.” It hastens toward the light, toward the vision which
it has always possessed, though in a state of darkness while the soul
is encaged within the body.” When it ceases to take part in the pleas
ures of the body, it becomes “all Idea and Reason, wholly free of
body.” It now has reached the stage of intellection and is ready to
ascend “towards the Good, the desired of every Soul.” Its every act
becomes an effort toward contemplation. Finally, the vision bursts upon
the soul. It once more becomes completely restored to itself. It emerges
from the duality that is foreign to its nature. "In this seeing, we
neither hold an object nor trace distinction; there is no two. The man
is changed, no longer himself nor self-belonging; he is merged with
the Supreme, sunken into it, one with it.”
What will be the recompense for those who “will take the upward
path, who will set all their forces towards it, who will divest them
selves of all that we have put on in our descent?” Plotinus thus
describes it:

And one that shall know this vision—with what passion of

love shall he not be seized, with what pang of desire, what
longing to be molten into one with This, what wondering de
light! . . . all our labor is for This, lest we be left without part
in this noblest vision, which to attain is to be blessed in the
blissful sight, which to fail of is to fail utterly.”
Thus for Plotinus the result of contemplation is the complete sub
mergence of the soul into the Absolute Beauty, into the perfect Unity
from which it came and from which it should never have been sep
arated. It is, therefore, the loss of the soul's identity, of its own indi
viduality.
How, according to Augustine, are those affected who, upon reach
ing the seventh degree of the soul's perfection, enjoy the vision and
118 Plotinus, Enneads, I, ii, 4.
114 Ibid., I, ii, 4.
116 Ibid., I, vi, 6.
116 Ibid., I, vi, 7.
117 Ibid., VI, ix, 10.
118 Ibid., I, vi, 7.
119 Ibid., I, vi, 7.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 155

the contemplation of Truth? They will attain, he says, a deep apprecia

tion of the beauty and value of eternal verities by comparison with
created things, although the latter considered in themselves are marvel
ous and beautiful, since they have been made by God. They will have
a clearer understanding of the mysteries of faith, of the truths of the
Catholic Church, which we have been commanded to believe, the
"milk” of doctrine which St. Paul mentions as having been dispensed
to little ones, and which is still to be venerated and revered, even when
understood in the light of contemplation. They will also comprehend so
clearly the workings of the Divine Law in respect to corporeal nature
that even the truth of the resurrection of the body will appear as cer
tain as is the fact of the rising of the sun when it has set. Then they
will realize the folly of those who ridiculed the mystery of the Incar
nation, the fact that human nature was assumed by the Eternal Son
of God Who was born of a Virgin and became our exemplar in the
path which leads to salvation. Finally,
in contemplating the truth, from what side soever one can con
template it, so great is the joy, so great the purity, the sincerity,
undoubting trust in the reality of things, that one may think
that he has not at any time known anything else, when he did
appear to himself to know [here in this mortal frame]; and
then the soul entire is not impeded from full allegiance to
the full truth; death, which before was dreaded, that is, flight
and escape from this body, now may be desired as the highest
favor. 120

As the soul advances toward the height of contemplation, it requires

assistance which itself can not provide but which is furnished by the
true religion by which the soul renews through reconciliation its loyalty
to God Whom it has abandoned. “Religion links the soul, then, in this
120 De quantitate animae, c. XXXII, n. 76 (XXXII, 1077): "Tanta autem in
contemplanda veritate voluptas est, quanta cumque ex parte eam quisque con
templari potest, tanta puritas, tanta sinceritas, tam indubitanda rerum fides,
ut neque quidquam praeterea scisse se aliquando aliquis putet, cum sibi scire
videbatur; et quo minus impediatur anima toti tota inhaerere veritati, mors
quae antea metuebatur, id estab hoc corpore omnimoda fuga et elapsio, pro
summo munere desideretur.”
Cf. Augustine's criticism of the Platonists, Confessiones, L. VII, c. IX, n.
14 (XXXII, 741) and De civitate Dei, L. X, c. XXIX (XLI, 307) for
their refusal to recognize the Incarnation of the Son of God; also De civi
tate Dei, L. XXII, c. XI (XLI, 775), for their denial of the resurrection of
the body.
156 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

third act and begins to lead it; in the fourth it makes it clean; in the
fifth it reforms; in the sixth it introduces; in the seventh it nourishes
[the soul].” With the help of God, therefore, and by the faithful
observance of His commandments, the soul will arrive at the permanent
enjoyment and contemplation of Truth Itself when it leaves the body
whose dissolution is the penalty of sin.”
There is a notable difference, then, between the condition of the
soul when it has reached the mount of contemplation, as depicted by
Plotinus and by Augustine. For both the ecstatic joy and bliss of the
soul is indescribable, but for Plotinus the state of vision is accompanied
by the merging of the soul into the being of the Sovereign Beauty.
There is no trace of any distinction between the One and the soul;
“there is no two,” as Plotinus expresses it. In other words, the soul
loses its identity when it becomes absorbed in the contemplation of
perfect Unity from which it unfortunately was separated by its union
with the body, but which it has again discovered. It becomes its true
self when, so to speak, it becomes all One, that is to say, all God.
In the doctrine of Augustine there is no hint whatever of this absorp
tion, this merging of the soul into God. The same joy and exultation
accompanies the state of contemplation as was noticeable in the descrip
tion of Plotinus, but during these moments of ecstatic bliss the soul
retains its own identity; it still remains a creature.” It obtains a clearer
insight into the hidden things pertaining to the nature of God and
even that of man, since it attains, as has been said, a deeper assurance
of the future resurrection of the body. The knowledge which the soul

121 De quantitate animae, c. XXXVI, n. 80 (XXXII, 1080): “Innectit ergo

[religio vera] animam in illo actu tertio, atque incipit ducere; purgat in
quarto; reformat in quinto; introducit in sexto; pascit in septimo.”
122 Ibid., c. XXXVI, n. 81 (XXXII, 1080).
128 Ibid., c. XXXVI, n. 77 (XXXII, 1077): “Audisti quanta vis sit animae et
potentia; quod ut breviter collegam, quemadmodum fatendum est, animam
humanam non esse quod Deus est; ita praesumendum, nihil inter omnia quae
creavit, Deo esse propinquius.” Cf. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. XI,
n. 18 (XXXII, 1319): "Secutio igitur Dei, beatitatis appetitus est; conse
cutio autem, ipsa beatitas. At eum sequimur diligendo, consequimur vero, non
cum hoc omnino efficimur quod est ipse, sed ei proximi, eumque mirifico et
intelligibili modo contingentes, ejusque veritate et sanctitate penitus illus
trati atque comprehensi.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 157

acquires by its act of contemplation, as described by Augustine,” in no

way harmonizes with the system of Plotinus, for such knowledge,
according to the latter, implies the duality of the soul and God, and
duality for Plotinus means the separation of the soul from Unity, and
consequently the loss and the dispersion of itself since its natural
condition is union with the One.”
After concluding his description of the perfections of the soul
Augustine expresses a doctrine which Neo-Platonism would be quite
unwilling to accept. “These things being so,” he says, “who can justly
bear it ill that the soul was given to move and to guide the body?
An order of things so grand and so divine could not be better linked
together.” Such a notion of the union of the body and the soul is
not consistent with a system which bears an ethical prejudice against
the body and therefore sees nothing but harm resulting to the soul
because of its union with the body.
In his treatise on the measure of the soul Augustine speaks again.”
of the relative importance of authority and reason in the attainment of
the truth. When Evodius urges him, during his detailed exposition of
the comparative excellence of geometric figures, to hasten to the point
at issue, Augustine reminds him that the subject of their discussion,
the nature of the soul, is one of no little difficulty and of considerable
importance, and therefore they must proceed slowly if they are to make
a clear and careful analysis of their problem. For it is one thing to
*** Augustine's conception of the various steps comprising the soul's ascent to
God is in complete harmony, except for nomenclature, with the well-known
stages of purgation, illumination, and union established by later Christian
mystics. Cf. C. Butler, Western Mysticism, pp. 26-37; F. Cayré, La contem
plation Augustinienne, p. 73.
** E. Hendricks, Augustin, Verhältnis zur Mystik (Würzberg: Rita Verlag u.
Druckerei, 1936), p. 183, thus distinguishes Augustine's concept of the soul's
possession of God from that of Plotinus: “Während Augustin davon nichts
weiss und nicht nur gegen den theoretischen Pantheismus, sondern auch
gegen die mystische Einigung ausdrücklich Stellung nimmt, beschreibt Plotin
das Vergöttlichungsempfinden bei der mystischen Gottesschau als ein Ein
wenden der Seele mit dem Einen, als ein Erlöschen des Bewusstseins des
eigenen Ichs und ein Aufgehen in Gott.”
** De quantitate animae, c. XXXVI, n. 81 (XXXII, 1080): "Quae cum ita
sint, quis est qui juste stomachetur, quod agendo atque administrando cor
pori anima data sit, cum tantus et tam divinus rerum ordo connecti melius
non possit.”
*** Cf. De ordine, L. II, c. IX, n. 26-27 (XXXII, 1007-1008); De moribus
ecclesiae catholicae, c. II, n. 3 (XXXII, 1311-1312); c. VII, n. 11-12
(XXXII, 1315-1316).
158 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

trust the authority of others, he adds, and quite another to trust one's
own reason. The former course is a great abridgment and entails no
labor. It is a safe and reliable means for those who are too busy or
whose minds are too slow to gain knowledge through the use of rea
son. The majority of men are so constituted mentally that, if they
wished to grasp the truth by reason, they would be deceived by the
appearances of reason and hence would fail to arrive at the truth which
they desired. These men will find it of great advantage to trust author
ity of the very highest order and to shape their lives accordingly.
There are others, however, who cannot restrain their eagerness to reach
the truth by means of reason. Such men must take great care not to
be satisfied with arriving at conclusions by a superficial exercise of this
power, but must be contented only with that of which right reason
assures them, reason that is sure and free from all semblance to what
is false, if, he adds, this can in any way be found by man.”
Augustine in this passage seems to affirm the superiority of reason
over authority as a means of arriving at the truth. However, it is human
authority to which he here refers. In the case of those who find author
ity a safer course to follow, he heartily approves of their making use
of it, provided that it is of the highest order. That Augustine is con
vinced of the inefficacy of reason alone in enabling man to attain a
high degree of union with God is evident from the admonition he
gives in his discussion of the seventh degree of power of the soul.
“This plainly I dare now say to you, that, if we shall hold persever
ingly the course which God commands for us, the course which we
have undertaken to be held, we shall come by God's Power, and God's
Wisdom, to that Supreme Cause, or the Supreme Author, or the
Supreme Principle of all things.” For Plotinus there is no need of
external guidance or help as one pursues his journey to the mount of
vision. All that is required is to “turn away forever from the material
beauty that once made his joy” and to direct his gaze to the interior
** De quantitate animae, c. VII, n. 12 (XXXII, 1041-1042).
129 Ibid., c. XXXIII, n. 76 (XXXII, 1076): “Illud plane ego nunc audeo
tibi dicere, nos si cursum quem nobis Deus imperat, et quem tenendum
suscepimus, constantissime tenuerimus, perventuros per Virtutem Dei atque
Sapientiam ad summam illam causam, vel summum auctorem, vel summum
principium rerum omnium.”
** Plotinus, Enneads, I, vi, 8.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 159

light. The human reason of itself is capable of attaining this result.”

As Henry observes: "Plotinus declares that the true philosopher should
walk alone on the road to God, and he arrives by his own means, so
he thinks, at the end of the journey.”
In describing the effect of training on the soul, Augustine once
more” inclines to the doctrine of reminiscence. Why, Evodius asks,
if the soul is everlasting, has that of a child just born not brought some
knowledge with it into life? Without entering upon any discussion to
explain his meaning, Augustine briefly remarks:
You are moving a great, a very ponderous question indeed; and
I know not whether there is a problem more important, a prob
lem on which our thoughts are directly opposed, so that to you
it appears that the soul has brought no art with it, to me it
seems that it brings them all; and what is said to be learning is
no other thing than remembering or recalling.”

In commenting on the grandeur and the dignity of the human

soul, Augustine stresses the Christian teaching of the incomparable
value of every individual soul. The human soul by reason of its spiritual
nature is equal to the angels and is only less in dignity than God, its
Author and Creator. While showing special veneration and love for
souls made perfect by the practice of virtue, we should not forget to
aid by every means within our power the erring souls, not prompted
by a spirit of pride and vain glory, but in fulfillment of the law of
charity which bids us do whatever we can to recall men from the
path of error, even those who have injured us or who wish to do us
harm. Because of the inherent greatness of their soul, we ought to
181 Ibid., I, vi, 9.
*** P. Henry, S.J., “Augustine and Plotinus,” The Journal of Theological
Studies, XXXVIII (1937), 15.
183 Cf. Soliloquia, L. II, c. XX, n. 35 (XXXII, 902-903).
*** De quantitate animae, c. XX, n. 34 (XXXII, 1055): "Magnam omnino,
magnam, et qua nescio utrum quidquam majus sit, quaestionem moves, in
qua tantum nostrae sibimet opiniones adversantur ut tibi anima nullam,
mihi contra omnes artes secum attulisse videatur; nec aliud quidquam esse
id quod dicitur discere, quam reminisci et recordari.” In the Retractationes
Augustine asserts that from this statement it is not to be inferred that the
soul learned these arts in a former life before it was united to the body.
What he means is that the soul is so constituted by nature that it has the
capacity of apprehending things of an intelligible order. The arts which
pertain to the senses, for example, medicine or astronomy, must, however,
be acquired by learning. Cf. Retractationes, L. I, c. III, n. 2 (XXXII, 594).
160 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

hate not those who are crushed by vices, but the vices themselves, not
the sinners, but their sins.” This attitude toward the erring and the
sinful is quite different from that of the founder of Neo-Platonism,”
as has already been pointed out.”
Augustine's optimism notwithstanding the fact of moral evil in the
world, a characteristic likewise prominent in the doctrine of Ploti
nus,” is again” noticeable in the treatise on the measure of the soul.
God Who has subordinated the body to the human soul and the soul to
Himself has thereby effected so exquisite a harmony in the universe that
not even the deformity of moral evil with the resultant punishment of
the evil doer mars the beauty of the whole. The power of free choice
has been bestowed upon the soul by the all-wise Lord of all creation
but, even though the soul abuses this marvelous gift, the order which
prevails throughout the universe is not disturbed.”

D. De Libero Arbitrio
During his sojourn in Rome Augustine planned and partially com
pleted” a treatise on a subject in which he seems to have been par
ticularly interested and to which he makes reference in several of his
early writings”—the origin and nature of moral evil. Like the majority
of the works composed from the time of his retreat at Cassiciacum, this
study is a dialogue in form. It represents a discussion with Evodius on
the free choice of the will.
In the first book Augustine declares the supremacy of faith and the
need of Divine aid which reason requires in order that it may arrive
185 De quantitate animae, c. XXXIV, n. 77-78 (XXXII, 1077-1078). Cf. Solilo
quia, L. I, c. II, n. 7, (XXXII, 873).
186 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, II, ix, 9.
187 Cf. Chapter III, D.
138 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 5; III, ii, 8.
139 Cf. De ordine, L. I, c. VII, n. 19 (XXXII, 986).
140 De quantitate animae, c. XXXVI, n. 80, (XXXII, 1079-1080).
141 The treatise consists of three books, but since the second and third were
written in Africa after Augustine's ordination to the priesthood, our study
will embrace only the first book, which belongs to the period with which we
are concerned. Cf. Retractationes, L. I, c. IX, n. 1 (XXXII, 595): “Cum
adhuc Romae demoraremur, voluimus disputando quaerere unde sit malum.
. . . Tres libri quos eadem disputatio peperit, appellati sunt, de Libero Ar
bitrio. Quorum secundum et tertium Africa jam etiam Hippone-Regio pres
byter ordinatus, sicut tunc potui, terminavi.”
142 De ordine, L. I, c. VII, n. 19 (XXXII, 986); De moribus Manichaeorum,
c. VII, n. 9 (XXXII, 1349); De quantitate animae, c. XXXVI, n. 80
(XXXII, 1079-1080).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 161

at truth. It is not because he is not convinced that the will is free

that he sets out to analyze the problem of human freedom from every
point if view. He firmly believes this doctrine on the authority of
faith,” but wishes, if possible, to understand what he has already
accepted on the assurance of Divine authority. When Evodius makes
known his perplexity about accepting human freedom and at the same
time exonerating God from any charge of responsibility for sin, since
free choice is a power of the human soul and all souls owe their very
being to the creative act of God, Augustine urges him to remain stead
fast in his faith even though he may not understand what he believes,
for nothing is more excellent than the authority of God. "Have a
manful mind,” he bids his friend, “and believe what you believe. For
nothing better is believed even though the reason why it is may not
be evident. Indeed, to have the very highest esteem of God is most
truly the beginning of piety.”
Again, when speaking of the nobility of the rational mind when it
is endowed with wisdom, which renders it inferior only to God Him
self, Augustine adds: “But because the problem is hard and it is not
now asked pointedly so that it may come to understanding, though it
is held by firmest faith, let us make a careful and accurate study of
the whole question.” The fact of his firm belief in the abuse of free
will as the reason for the fall of man from the perfect state in which
he was created, and for the hardships which ensued upon the ill use of
this power is also expressed by Evodius even though, he adds, his in
tellect finds difficulty in grasping such a truth.* Although this state
ment was not made by Augustine himself, the very fact that he does
143 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 1222-1223). In the Retractationes,
L. I, c. IX, n. 1 (XXXII, 595), Augustine thus expresses the plan and pur
pose of this treatise: "Et eo modo disputavimus, ut si possemus, id quod de
hac re divinae auctoritati subditi cfedebamus, etiam ad intelligentiam nos
tram, quantum disserenda opitulante Deo agere possemus, ratio considerata
et tractata perduceret.”
144 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. II, n. 5 (XXXII, 1224): "Virili animo esto, et
crede quod credis: nihil enim creditur melius, etiamsi causa lateat curita sit.
Optime namgue de Deo existimare verissimum est pietatis exordium.” The
citations in this study are taken from De libero arbitrio, translated by F. E.
Tourscher, O.S.A. (Philadelphia: The Peter Reilly Co., 1937).
*** Ibid., L. I, c. X, n. 21 (XXXII, 1233): “Sed quoniam res ardua est, neque
nunc opportune quaeritur, ut ad intelligentiam veniat, quanquam robustissima
teneatur fide, integra nobis sit hujus quaestionis, diligens et cauta tractatio.”
1* Ibid., L. I, c. XI, n. 23 (XXXII, 1234).
162 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

not disapprove of it or question it in any way, as is his wont, when

disagreeing with an interlocutor, would seem to indicate that this is a
doctrine to which he himself subscribes.
The superior authority of the Sacred Scriptures to that of profane
history is explicitly mentioned by Augustine, when Evodius proposes as
a criterion for establishing adultery an evil act the fact that it is con
demned by men. Augustine rejects this norm of condemnation as a
certain proof for guilt by referring him to sacred history, “that very
history which excels by Divine authority,” from which we learn
that the Apostles and Martyrs were convicted of crime because they
confessed their faith in Christ and that even He Himself endured the
penalty of condemnation.” Augustine's ready acceptance of the Divine
authority of the Holy Scriptures and his deep regard for truths acquired
by the avenue of faith would seem to indicate that he was not an
absolute intellectualist, such as was Plotinus for whom the human
intellect of itself is capable of arriving at the truth. Moreover, the no
tion of a Divine Being suffering condemnation, of which Augustine
speaks with great respect, would be preposterous in the opinion of the
Neo-Platonist. 149
That reason without the special help of God cannot hope to under
stand how the human soul can abuse the power of free choice, and
yet how God can be vindicated of any charge of coöperating in the
guilt of man is several times repeated by Augustine. The problem of
the origin of evil, he tells Evodius, is one which harassed himself in
early youth and which drove him to associate with heretics” who
attempted to solve it by the lure of empty fables. Had it not been for
the love of finding the truth, which was granted him by Divine aid,
he would never have been able even to begin a rational inquiry as to
the nature of evil. His own unfortunate experience, therefore, impels
Augustine to give special assistance to Evodius in order to clarify for
him the problem of moral evil.
147 Ibid., L. I, c. III, n. 7 (XXXII, 1225): "Recense historiam, ne te ad
alios libros mittam, eam ipsam quae divina auctoritate praecellit.”
148 Ibid., L. I, c. III, n. 7 (XXXII, 1225).
149 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 8.
150 Augustine here refers to Manichaeism in which he was involved for nine
years. Cf. Confessiones, L. II, c. VI, n. 10–c. X, n. 18 (XXXII, 686-691).
The treatise De libero arbitrio belongs to his early anti-Manichaean works.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 163

For God will be with us [Augustine adds] and He will make

us understand what we have believed. For we are truly con
scious that we hold the step prescribed by the prophet, who
says: Unless you believe, you ſhall not underſtand. We believe,
then, that all things that are are from God; and yet that God
is not the author of sin.”

The human reason often experiences great difficulty in arriving at

truth but, if it is assisted by God, there is no problem, however per
plexing and involved, that can not be clarified. It is necessary, however,
to have great confidence in Him and to implore His aid. This encour
aging advice Augustine gives Evodius when the latter expresses his
doubt of ever finding a complete solution for the difficulty involved in
human freedom. “Attend, then, with all your mind,” he bids Evodius,
"and, trusting in piety, enter upon the way of reasoning. For nothing
is so hard and difficult as not to be made, by God's assistance, very
plain and clear. Depending upon Him, therefore, and praying for help
from Him, let us study what we have begun.” And when Evodius
begins to grasp the argument by comprehending that man is rendered
superior to all other beings of the visible universe by the faculty of
reason, although in other respects he is inferior in power to irrational
animals, Augustine joyfully exclaims: “See how easily, God helping,
that is done which men think to be very difficult. For I confess to you
this question is solved, as I understand it, which I had thought would
hold us as long perhaps as all the points discussed from the beginning
of our disputation.” Again, at the conclusion of the discussion he
tells his friend that at a future time they will continue their investiga
tion, with the help of God, confident that, if they entrust themselves
to the guidance of Divine Providence, they will arrive at the under
151 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. II, n. 4 (XXXII, 1224): “Aderit enim Deus, et
nos intelligere quod credidimus, faciet. Praescriptum enim per prophetam
gradum, qui ait, Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis, tenere nos, bene nobis
conscii sumus. Credimus autem ex uno Deo omnia esse quae sunt; et tamen
non esse peccatorum auctorem Deum.”
*** Ibid., L.I, c. VI, n. 14 (XXXII, 1228): “Imo adesto animo, et rationis vias
pietate fretus ingredere. Nihil est enim tam arduum atque difficile, quod non
Deo adjuvante planissimum atque expeditissimum flat. In ipsum itaque sus
pensi atque ab eo auxilium deprecantes, quod instituimus, quaeramus.”
*Ibid., L. I, c. VII, n. 16 (XXXII, 1230): "Vide quam facile fiat Deo adju
vante, quod homines difficillimum putant. Nam ego, fateor tibi quaestionem
istam, quae, ut intelligo, terminata est, tamdiu nos retenturam putaveram,
quam fortasse omnia quae dicta sunt ab ipso nostrae disputationis exordio.”
 164 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

standing of the difficult problem of the free choice of the will.” In

this treatise, then, there is abundant evidence of Augustine's convic
tion” that the human intellect is unable to grasp the truth unless it
receives the special help of God and is guided by Him as it pursues its
inquiries, a doctrine to which Plotinus, in his excessive confidence in
the power of human reason when properly disposed, would be unwill
ing to assent.”
In this dialogue on human freedom we find explicitly stated a doc
trine of creation ex nihilo. Whoever has the most profound esteem and
reverence for God, Augustine says, is on the road to piety. God is all
powerful and absolutely immutable, and therefore is supreme above all
other beings. He is the Creator of all good things and is far more ex
cellent than that which He created. He is the most just Ruler of all
things which He has made not by the aid of any other being, but of
Himself and by His own all-sufficient power. “Whence it follows,”
Augustine adds, “that He created out of nothing.” And then he
expresses clearly the Christian doctrine of the generation of the Son
of God and of the perfect equality which exists between Him and the
Divine Begetter. After speaking of the creation of the world, Augus
tine continues: “He did not create from Himself, but conceived [from
His own substance] what is equal to Himself, Him Whom we call the
only Son of God, Whom, when we endeavor to pronounce more clearly,
we name the Power of God and the Wisdom of God, by which He
made out of nothing all things that are made.”
In this description of the creation of the world and of the genera
tion of the Son of God we find a doctrine which differs radically from
Neo-Platonic thought, a doctrine which is specifically Christian. Accord
ing to the Christian view there is an essential difference between crea
154 Ibid., L. I, c. XVI, n. 35 (XXXII, 1240).
165 Augustine has frequently expressed this idea in the works of this period. Cf.
Contra Academicos, L. III, c. VI, n. 13 (XXXII, 940-941); Soliloquia, L. I.
c. VIII, n. 15 (XXXII, 877); De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII, n. 76
(XXXII, 1076); De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. II, n. 3 (XXXII,
1311-1312).
156 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, I, vi, 9.
157 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. II, n. 5 (XXXII, 1224): “Ex quo fit ut de nihilo
creaverit omnia.”
158 Ibid., L. I, c. II, n. 5 (XXXII, 1224): “De se autem non creaverit, sed
genuerit quod sibi par esset, quem Filium Dei unicum dicinus, quem cum
planius enuntiare conamur. Dei Virtutem et Dei Sapientiam nominamus, per
quam fecit omnia, quae de nihilo facta sunt.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 165

tion and generation. When the Christian says that the world was
created by God, he means that all things of which the universe is
comprised received their being from Him. God Who Himself is per
fect in the order of existence bestowed existence upon other beings
which, as a consequence, have only a derived being and, therefore, are
inferior to Him from Whom they received it. In other words, creation
always implies the idea of inequality between the Creator and the crea
ture. Hence the term cannot be applied to the Divine begetting of the
Son of God. The Divine Wisdom was generated by the eternal Father
and therefore is equal to and consubstantial with Him by Whom He
was begotten. With Plotinus this is not the case. There is no difference
between the generation of the second Hypostasis by the One and the
generation of the universe by the World-Soul. The universe is, in the
same sense, a part of the Divine Being as is the Word which was first,
so to speak, in the order of production. In each stage of emanation
from the One there is a corresponding degree of inequality. Plotinus
could not say that what the One engendered “is equal to Himself.”
The clear-cut distinction which Augustine here seems purposely to
make between the relation of the world to God, a relation effected
through His activity as Creator, and that of His only Son begotten of
His own substance and equal to Himself, indicates that his idea was
definitely Christian and far removed from the Neo-Platonic notion of
the relation existing between the One, the Nous, and the universe.
Augustine's attitude toward material possessions and temporal
goods, as expressed in his disputation with Evodius, is completely in
harmony with the teachings of a Christian system of ethics. After
speaking of the sanction of human law and showing that the penalty
imposed by it has reference only to external acts and does not extend
to the interior disposition, which is the cause of moral guilt even before
the act itself is perpetrated, Augustine explains that external things
are not to blame if man sins by inordinate love for or by improper
use of them. He who does not rightly order his will in reference to
the things which he employs makes himself subject to these goods
which, in order to be good, should be subordinate to him. If his atti
tude is such that he is prepared to hold these temporal possessions and
to use them as right reason dictates, without unduly centering his heart
on them, with the result that he is unaffected by their loss, then they
 166 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

are goods indeed or, better still, it is he who makes them good. Silver
and gold, therefore, are not to be blamed on account of the avaricious
man, nor is food on account of the glutton, nor wine on account of
the drunkard. Things themselves are not to be censured when they
are badly used, but he is guilty who makes a wrong use of them.
Wherefore [Augustine concludes] it is in order now to note
and to consider whether wrongdoing is aught else than to
possess things temporal and things which are sense-perceived,
through the body, the least excellent part of man—to pursue
these things as great and marvelous, neglecting things eternal
which the mind enjoys by itself, which the mind perceives by it.
self, and loving which it cannot lose. For in this one class all
wrongdoing, that is, all sins seem to me to be included.”
In Augustine's account of the nature of moral evil, it is to be
observed, there is not the slightest allusion to the union of the soul
with the material body and, as a result, its contact with the things
of sense, as the source of all its moral difficulties, which, as has previ
ously been mentioned,” is so clearly stated in the doctrine of Plotinus.
With Augustine the disorder is to be traced to the will itself. In answer
to the question: whence do we do wrong, he replies: “If I mistake not,
reason has shown that we do wrong from a free choice of the will.”
Such is Augustine's conception of the cause of sin, whereas Plotinus
definitely assigns to matter the rôle of villain in the drama of moral
evil. “This is the fall of the Soul, this entry into Matter; thence its
weakness: not all the faculties of its being retain free play, for Matter
hinders their manifestation.” It is true that, notwithstanding his
repeated condemnation of matter” as the source of evil, Plotinus
159 Ibid., L. I, c. XVI, n. 34 (XXXII, 1240): “Quocirca licet nunc animadver
tere et considerare, utrum sit aliud male facere, quam neglectis rebus aeternis,
quibus per seipsam mens fruitur, et per seipsam percipit, et quae amans
amittere non potest, temporalia et quae per corpus hominis partem vilissimam
sentiuntur, et nunquam esse certa possunt, quasi magna et miranda sectari.
Nam hoc uno genere omnia malefacta, id est peccata, mihi videntur includi.”
160 Chapter V: B, C.
161 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. XVI, n. 35 (XXXII, 1240): “Nisi enim fallor,
ut ratio tractata monstravit, id facimus ex libero voluntatis arbitrio.”
162 Plotinus, Enneads, I, viii, 11.
163 Cf. Ibid., I, viii, 4; I, viii, 5; I, viii, 7; I, viii, 8.
Cf. De civitate Dei, L. X, c. XXX (XLI, 310) and L. X, c. XXIV (XLI,
301) in which Augustine criticizes the Platonists' doctrine that matter is
essentially evil and that moral evil is due to the union of the soul with the
body.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 167

ascribes to man freedom of action and asserts that our will “remains
free and self-disposing in spite of any orders which it may necessarily
utter to meet the external.” Moreover, he also teaches that man is
justly held responsible for his evil deeds. “Man is singled out for
condemnation when he does evil; and this with justice.” And yet,
we find him asserting that the principle of free action is not an absolute
possession of all men, that the evil acts of some are necessarily the
result of their character. He says, too, that necessity and freedom do
not contradict each other; that necessity includes free choice.” Then,
again, he seems to hold that men are morally unable to lead a good
life since evil belongs to the very nature of things and comes from
necessity.” In fact, there is such a mixture of determinism and free
dom in the ethical doctrines of Plotinus, that it is difficult at times to
discern which element prevails. However, time and again he returns
to the notion of moral evil as synonymous with the dispersion of the
soul, which was effected by its union with a material body.
In many respects, however, Augustine's treatise on the free choice
of the will resembles closely the teachings of Plotinus. Both insist that
moral evil can in no way be attributed to God. Since He is good and
just, Augustine says, God can not be regarded as the author of evil.”
Plotinus likewise asserts that no blame can be laid on Providence for
the evil which exists within the world.” Both Augustine and Plotinus
associate moral evil with uncontrolled, irregular desires. The wicked
servant, Augustine says, who kills his master through fear of being
punished for his misdemeanors is guilty of homicide because he failed
to turn away his affections from things which cannot be possessed with
out fear of losing them. It is not that desires in themselves are evil.
They are natural to all men, to the good as well as to the bad. The
good, however, keep them under control and never permit them to be
fixed on anything which the will has no power to retain.” Plotinus
likewise speaks of passions and desires as attacking the soul and lead
ing it to sin. But the various affections of the soul: desire, sor
164 Plotinus, Enneads, VI, viii, 6; Cf. VI, viii, 1; III, ii, 7.
165 Ibid., III, iii, 4.
166 Ibid., IV, viii, 5.
167 Ibid., III, ii, 5; III, iii, 5; I, viii, 5; III, ii, 10.
168 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 1222-1223).
169 Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 7.
179 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. IV, n. 9-10 (XXXII, 1225-1227).
168 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

row, rage, fear are associated by him with the corporeal element in
man. The soul takes up false notions by ceasing to be purely itself,
that is, by being united with a material body; hence all desires or appe
tites are to be condemned with the exception of one; namely, the soul's
aspiration toward the Intellectual Principle which is really its true
abode.171
Both Plotinus and Augustine recognize a hierarchy of powers in
man. Like the lowest forms of organic life, he assimilates nourishment,
he grows, he can reproduce his kind. Like the brute animals, in addi
tion to vegetative powers he has the sentient faculties of sight and
hearing, of taste and smell and touch. By reason, however, he is ele
vated far above all other beings. When reason controls the movements
of his soul, he can truly be said to be master of the visible world.”
But when the passions are not under the command of reason, when
the soul is deprived of wisdom by the assault of base desires, then its
state is lamentable indeed. Pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, anxiety
and fear are constantly striving for the mastery. The soul is tormented
by avarice, ambition, pride, envy, sloth, in a word, by every vice that
passion can produce. The soul descends from its high plane of wis
dom to serve its base desires.17°
In this treatise on the free choice of the will, Augustine again.”
suggests the possibility of the preexistence of the soul. When Evodius
raises an objection against man's accountability for sin on the ground
that he cannot rightly be said to have ever possessed the high degree
of wisdom requisite for the control of passion, Augustine takes excep
tion to the statement that man never possessed wisdom:
You say this as though you had it clearly proved that we never
were wise. You mark the time indeed since we were born into
this life. But because wisdom belongs to the soul there is a ques
tion of importance, whether the soul, before its union with the
body, may have lived another kind of life, or whether at any
171 Plotinus, Enneads, I, viii, 12; III, vi, 4.
172 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. VIII, n. 18 (XXXII, 1231). Cf. Enneads, I, i, 7.
173 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. XI, n. 22-23 (XXXII, 1233-1234). Cf. Enneads,
II, iii, 8-9; IV, iii, 16; IV, viii, 4.
*** Cf. Soliloquia, L. II, c. XX, n. 35 (XXXII, 902-903); De quantitate ani
mae, c. XX, n. 34 (XXXII, 1055).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 169

time it lived wisely. This is an unsolved problem, and must be

studied in its own proper place.***
It is evident that Augustine at this period had not acquired a wholly
satisfactory solution for the problem of the origin of the human soul.**

i75 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. XII, n. 24 (XXXII, 1234): “Ita istuc dicis,

quasi liquido compertum habeas nunquam nos fuisse sapientes: attendis enim
tempus ex quo in hanc vitam dati sumus. Sed cum sapientia in animo sit,
utrum ante consortium hujus corporis alia quadam vita vixerit animus, et an
aliquando sapienter vixerit, magna quaestio est, magnum secretum, et suo
considerandum loco."
*** In a letter addressed to Jerome (Epistula CLXVI) in 415 A.D. Augustine
still mentions his perplexities concerning the human soul, especially its
9rigin. He seems to prefer the doctrine of the separate creation of each' soul
for each individual body.
 CHAPTER VI

AT TAGASTE

A. De Generi contra Manichaeof

After Augustine's return to Africa the first fruits of his pen were
devoted to the vindication of the first three chapters of Genesis against
the preposterous charges raised by the Manichaeans. His purpose in
renewing the attack” upon those revilers of the Sacred Writings com
prising the Old Law, Augustine tells us by way of introduction to the
treatise, was to expose their errors in simple language and unadorned
style, for the benefit of those who might find some difficulty in fol
lowing the arguments in his former works against the disciples of
Manes.”
In his defense of the first chapter of Genesis Augustine expounds
at length the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo and attributes the
existence of the universe to an act of the Divine will. In answering
the absurd questions proposed by the Manichaeans in reference to crea
tion, he explains that God created all things out of nothing, but not in
the sense that He created the various things mentioned by the Sacred
Writer in the account of the first six days of creation. When it is said
that “in the beginning God created heaven and earth,” the meaning
is that He created the formless matter which contained potentially all
things which later were developed from it. This unformed matter is
first called heaven and earth, not because it was these things, but be
cause it had the capacity of becoming them." This mode of speech is
not unusual. Just as we sometimes speak of the seed of a tree as con
taining its roots, branches, leaves, and fruit, not because it does contain
1 Retractationes, L. I, c. X, n. 1 (XXXII, 599): "Jam vero in Africa consti
tutus, scripsi duos libros de Genesi contra Manichaeos.”
2 Augustine had already refuted Manichaean doctrine in his De moribuſ ec
clesiae catholicae, De moribus Manichaeorum and De libero arbitrio.
3 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. I, n. 1 (XXXIV, 173).
L. Gourdon, Essai sur la conversion de faint Augustin, p. 81, calls this
treatise a feeble attempt at expounding Christian and evangelical faith: "C'est
un timide essai d'exposition de la foi chrétienne et évangélique'.”
4 Generis I, 1.
5 De Generi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. VII, n. 11 (XXXIV, 178): “Informis
ergo illa materia quam de nihilo Deus fecit, appellata est primo coelum et
terra, et dictum est, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram; non quia jam
hoc erat, sed quia hoc esse poterat: nam et coelum scribitur postea factum.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 171

them, but because they will be developed from it, so too heaven and
earth were contained in the seed, as it were, of the formless matter. This
unformed matter is likewise called “invisible and empty earth,” and
“darkness upon the face of the deep,” and, again, "water over which
the spirit of God was moved.” All these names, Augustine observes,
signify the unseen and unformed matter from which God established
the world.” And since the formless mass was made from nothing, it
is properly said that God created the world ex nihilo.”
God did not beget (genuit) all things but made them out of
nothing so that they would not be equal to Himself by Whom they
were made, nor to His Son through Whom they were made, nor to
one another. And He made them thus because He willed to do so. The
will of God is the cause of all things that are.” If the Manichaeans
desire to know why God created, the answer, Augustine says, is very
simple; namely, because of His Divine will. And should they, pro
ceeding with their inquiry, demand why God willed to create, they
are asking for something greater than the will of God, than which
nothing can be greater.” He willed that the things of the visible uni
verse should have varying grades of perfection, that some should be
better than others, in order that the universe as a whole might have
that degree of goodness which He desired it to have. Time and again in
his comparison of the dogmas of the Church with the Manichaean
errors” Augustine stresses the dualism which characterizes reality: on
the one hand, the nature of God (matura Dei) and, on the other, the
nature which God made from nothing (natura quam Deus fecit ex
nihilo). It is precisely because the latter is inferior to God, because it
differs from Him in nature, that it is changeable and contingent. And
not only is the existence of the universe due to an act of the Divine
will, its preservation likewise is dependent upon Him. In other words,
Divine Providence is the completion of His creative act. Since His
6 Genesis I, 2.
* De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. VII, n. 12 (XXXIV, 179): “Sed sub
his omnibus nominibus materia erat invisa et informis, de qua Deus condidit
mundum.”
* Ibid., L. I, c. VI-VII (XXXIV, 178-179).
* Ibid., L. I, c. II, n. 4 (XXXIV, 175).
10 Ibid., L. I, c. II, n. 4 (XXXIV, 175).
* Ibid., L. II, c. XXIX, n. 43 (XXXIV, 219–220).
172 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

will governs and directs all things, nothing happens contrary to what
He desires.” :

Unquestionably we find here a thoroughly Christian exposition of

the origin of the universe. It proceeds from God not through any
necessity of nature, as Neo-Platonism is forced to admit, but solely by
the election of the Divine will.
Augustine believes that time came into being simultaneously with
the beginning of the sensible universe. God made time, so to speak,
when He created heaven and earth. Hence the absurdity of the ques
tions proposed by the Manichaeans. If in the beginning God created
heaven and earth, they ask, what did He do before He made them?
And why was He suddenly pleased to make what He had not made
before throughout the ages of eternity? To the first question Augustine
replies that God created heaven and earth not in the beginning of time,
but in Christ, the Word of the Father, by Whom and in Whom all
things were made.” But even though we believe that He created at
the beginning of time, we must understand, he adds, that before
the beginning of time there was no time, For God made time and
therefore, before He made it, there was no time. Hence we can
not say that there was any time when God had not yet created any
thing. If time began to exist simultaneously with heaven and earth,
there can not have been any time before creation. In regard to the sec
ond question, the word "suddenly” has no meaning, since time did
not exist before creation.*
Plotinus likewise says that time began with the production of the
sensible world. However, since he upholds “the eternal existence of
the universe, the utter absence of a beginning to it,” time, as he uses
the word, has a different meaning from that which Augustine here
ascribes to it. For Plotinus, “the Soul laid aside its eternity and clotted
itself with Time” in order to fashion the world of sense. “The origin
of Time, clearly, is to be traced to the first stir of Soul's tendency
towards the production of the sensible universe with the consecutive
12 Ibid., L. II, c. XXIX, n. 43 (XXXIV, 220): “Cujus enim voluntas superat
omnia, nulla ex parte quidquam sentit invitus.”
13 John I, 1, 3.
** De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. II, n. 3 (XXXIV, 174-175).
* Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 1.
16 Ibid., III, vii, 11.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 173

act ensuing.” For Plotinus, then, time is not associated with the
problem of the origin of the universe, but rather with the logical rela
tion of the many to the One.
The doctrine of the Incarnation and the Virgin birth of Christ,
and also that of the second coming of the Son of God are expressed
by Augustine as he continues his defense of Genesis. In explaining the
symbolic meaning of the seven days in which creation was accom
plished, he says that on the sixth day God created man to His own
image and likeness and gave him power over the beasts of the earth
and the fowls of the air, just as in the sixth age of the history of
the world Christ our Lord was born in the flesh and established His
reign in the Church, which was to guide and direct both the Jews and
Gentiles who came within its fold.”
Again, in explaining the prophetic aspect of the opening chapters of
Geneſis, Augustine says that Adam, the father of the human race, is
symbolic of Christ Who left His Father by appearing among men and
in the form of man when “the Word became flesh and dwelt among
us.” In so doing He did not change His nature, that is, the nature
of God, but He likewise took upon Himself the nature of an inferior
person, the nature of man. It was not in the dignity of the Godhead
by which He is equal to the Father that He appeared among men but,
as the Apostle says, He emptied Himself,” subjecting Himself to the
weakness of human nature. And He was born of the Virgin Mary
who in no ordinary way but by the power of the Holy Spirit conceived
within herself the Son of God.”
The seventh day, on which God rested after the creation of the
world and which He blessed and sanctified, is symbolic of the seventh
age of the temporal history of the universe, or rather of the dawn
which will usher in the eternal life of man when Christ our Lord will
come again in majesty and splendor. Those who have done good works
and have followed the injunction of the Apostle, "Be ye perfect as
17 Ibid., III, vii, 12.
18 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. XXIII, n. 40 (XXXIV, 192). Cf. L.
II, c. V, n. 6 (XXXIV, 199).
19 John, I, 14.
20 Philippians, II, 7.
* De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. II, c. XXIV, n. 37 (XXXIV, 215-216).
174 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

also your Father Who is in Heaven is perfect” will then forever rest
with Christ in the brightness of a day that will have no end.”
The doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God, as Augustine
here expresses it, is in opposition to the entire current of Neo-Platonic
thought. For Plotinus the body was a veritable scandal. Since the soul
becomes bad by uniting with the material body,” it would indeed
be absurd to conceive of a Divine Being taking upon Himself the
nature of man. The second coming of Christ, then, as described by
Augustine, would be utterly without meaning to the Neo-Platonist.
The origin, nature, and destiny of man are described at length in
this treatise against the Manichaeans. Man consists of body and soul.
His body was formed of the slime of the earth into which, according
to the Mosaic account, God breathed the breath of life, and man
became a living soul.” The enemies of the Old Testament are bitter
in their criticism of the text which states that God fashioned man from
the slime of the earth. Was He lacking in matter of a higher order, that
He should form for man a weak and mortal body? They do not seem
to know, Augustine says, that the human body became corruptible only
after sin entered the world. The Divine Artificer would have preserved
this fragile body from want and dissolution, had man obeyed the law
imposed upon him.” And God breathed into that which He had
fashioned the breath of life; in other words, He created a rational
soul and joined it to the body as its principle of life. This spiritual
soul was made by God but is not a part of Him or of His nature, as
the boastful Manichaeans erroneously assert. The Creator bestowed
upon this rational soul powers which render man vastly superior to the
animals over which he was placed in dominion.”
In regard to the time of the creation of the human soul Augustine
seems to be uncertain. If, up to the time that God breathed into man
the breath of life, only his body had been formed, then we ought
to understand that his soul was united to his body at that time, whether
the soul had already been made but was still, as it were, in the mouth
22 Matthew, V, 48.
23 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. XXIII, n. 41 (XXXIV, 193).
24 Plotinus, Enneads, I, viii, 4.
25 Geneſis, II, 7.
26 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. II, c. VII, n. 8 (XXXIV, 200).
27 Ibid., L. II, c. VIII, n. 10-11 (XXXIV, 201-202).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 175

of God, that is to say, in the keeping of God, or whether it was created

precisely at the time that He breathed into the material body which
He had fashioned the breath of life, thereby creating through His
own power the human soul.” It is through his rational soul that man
was made to the image and likeness of God. However, even with
respect to his body he is superior to the animal world, since the bodies
of beasts are inclined to the earth, whereas that of man was given by
God an upright position as if to remind him that he should keep his
mind elevated to God.”
Notwithstanding the nobility of the human soul, it is quite distinct
from the nature of God. That it was created by Him and therefore is
neither a part of Him nor partakes of His nature is evident from the
words of the Prophet: “He Who fashioned the soul of all men made all
things.” How absurd it is, Augustine adds, for anyone to say that
the soul is of the same nature as God, when it is weighed down by
vices and miseries." Since man's dignity and superiority lie in his
possessing a rational soul, by temperance and modesty he must rule
over the carnal passions and unlawful pleasures which attack him
through the senses of his body, as well as by the avenue of thought.
By so doing he will keep his body subservient to his soul, and soul and
body will live in peace and concord with each other. Then man will
live a tranquil and a happy life when his passions are in harmony with
reason and with truth. They that are Christ's, as the Apostle says,
have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences.” This
struggle with his evil inclinations must not cease until “death is swal
lowed up in victory,” that is to say, until man deserves to be admitted
into everlasting life, which was forfeited for himself and his posterity
by the parent of the human race and which had to be regained by the
difficult road of penance.” Hence Adam's stretching forth his hand
toward the tree of life is symbolic of the cross through which eternal
life is regained. Man will then enjoy the blessed life of Paradise when,
28 Ibid., L. II, c. VIII, n. 10 (XXXIV, 201).
29 Ibid., L. I, c. XVII, n. 28 (XXXIV, 186-187).
80 Psalms, XXXII, 15.
31 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. II, c. VIII, n. 11 (XXXIV, 202).
32 Galatians, V, 24.
33 1 Corinthians, XV, 54.
34 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. XX, n. 31 (XXXIV, 187-188).
176 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

by the mercy of God, he who was dead will be revivified and he who
was lost will be found.*
Not all the members of the human race, however, will be ranked
among the number of the blessed in the life to come. Either temporary
sufferings of purgation or eternal torments will await those who per
severe in disobeying the Divine law. It is only during the days of
our life on earth, Augustine says, that we are obliged to suffer.
According to the Divine mandate, man must bear his afflictions until
he returns to the earth from which his body was taken, that is, until
the close of his mortal life. He who cultivates his field and eats his
bread with the interior dispositions, as appointed by God, will termi
nate his sorrows and sufferings with the present life. But he who
fails to do so, who allows thorns and thistles to prevent the good grain
from flourishing will suffer perforce during the time of his life on
earth and in the life to come will suffer either the fire of purgation
or eternal punishment.” Hence Augustine recognizes three states:
Heaven, Purgatory, and Hell, which await man after the present life,
depending upon the manner in which he satisfies the Divine Justice
during the time of his probation on earth. No one, he observes, can
evade that sentence.”
The doctrine of the origin and nature of man, as expressed in this
treatise, is quite different from that of Neo-Platonism and wholly in
conformity with the Christian view. Though undecided in regard to the
time of the creation of the human soul, Augustine accepts the doctrine
of the creation of man as given in Genesis and he expressly states that
both the body and soul of man were fashioned by God. While stressing
the superiority of the rational soul, he also emphasizes the perfection

35 Ibid., L. II, c. XXII, n. 34 (XXXIV, 213-214).

36 Ibid., L., II, c. XX, n. 30 (XXXIV, 212): "Et hoc illi dictum est, qui
coluerit agrum suum, quia ista patitur donec revertatur in terram, ex qua
sumptus est, id est, donec finiat vitam istam. Qui enim coluerit agrum istum
interius, et ad panem suum quamvis cum labore pervenerit, potest usque ad
finem vitae hujus hunc laborem pati: post hanc autem vitam non est necesse
ut patiatur. Sed qui forte agrum non doluerit, et spinis eum opprimi per
miserit, habet in hac vita maledictionem terrae suae in omnibus operibus suis
et post hanc vitam habebit, vel ignem purgationis vel poenam aeternam.”
37 Ibid., L. II, c. XX, n. 30 (XXXIV, 212).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 177

of the material body as God created it, which would have remained
incorruptible, had the father of the human race not violated the Divine
command. Augustine explains clearly and in detail that the spiritual
soul, however noble, remains but a creature and therefore is wholly
distinct from and inferior to its Creator.
Plotinus would be unwilling to acknowledge such perfection as
Augustine here ascribes to the body, and would also reject his doctrine
of creation, emphasizing, as it does, the clear-cut distinction between the
Creator and the creature. “Before we had our becoming Here we
existed There, men other than now, some of us gods:” Plotinus says;
"we were pure souls, Intelligence inbound . . . with the entire of
reality, not fenced off—integral to that All.” This doctrine evidently
is very different from what Augustine teaches about the origin and
nature of man.

In regard to the destiny of man Augustine, in agreement with

Plotinus, admits a state of eternal happiness in the life to come for
those who have lived well during the brief span of their existence on
earth. Augustine likewise speaks of two kinds of punishment that in
the next life await those who have not conquered their passions and
evil desires: the fire of purgation, and eternal punishment (vel igni;
purgationem vel poenam aeternam). While he does not explicitly say
that the former kind is temporary, the meaning of the word (purgare)
would lead us to believe that, since it has a purifying function, it is
temporal in character. Plotinus also teaches a doctrine of punishment
for wicked souls. He speaks of degrees of intensity and duration of
their sufferings, meted out by Divine ordinance, and of the temporary
character of these penalties.” Purgation is effected by means of rein
carnation: “For the faults committed here, the lesser penalty is to
enter into body after body—and soon to return—by judgment accord
ing to desert, ... but any outrageous form of ill-doing incurs a propor
tionately greater punishment administered under the surveillance of
chastising daimons.” Those who have lived merely sensuous lives

* Plotinus, Enneads, VI, iv, 14.

* Ibid., IV, iii, 24.
*9 Ibid., IV, viii, 5.

|
178 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

and others who have not even reached the level of sense enjoyment are
reincarnated according to their deserts:
Those that have lived wholly to sense become animals—corre
i. in species to the particular temper of the life—
erocious animals where the sensuality has been accompanied
by a certain measure of spirit, gluttonous and lascivious animals
where all has been appetite and satiation of appetite. Those who
in their pleasures have not even lived by sensation, but have
gone their way in a torpid grossness, become mere growing
things, for this lethargy is the entire act of the vegetative, and
such men have been busy be-treeing themselves.”
Augustine's idea of purgation by fire seems to have no affinity with this
doctrine of rebirth.
Time and again in this treatise Augustine, in accord with Plotinus,
says that all things of which the universe is comprised are beautiful
and good. If the individual works of God are carefully considered,
he remarks in language which savors of Neo-Platonism, they are found
to be established, each in its own class, with due measure, number,
and order. How much more beautiful, then, must be the entire uni
verse, each part of which has a beauty peculiar to itself, though not
all the parts are equally endowed, as is exemplified in the human body
in which the symmetry and comeliness of the various members con
tribute to the beauty of the whole.* All natures are good and God
Himself, being the highest nature, is the Highest Good. All others
are from Him and they are good in so far as they are, because He made
all things good although He willed that there be found among them
varying degrees of goodness.” God made nothing evil, for evil has
no positive existence. When the Sacred Writer says that darkness was
on the face of the deep, he means that God had not yet created light,
for darkness is but the absence of light, just as silence is the cessation
of sound, and emptiness, the place in which no body is present.*
41 Ibid., III, iv, 2.
Dean Inge, “Plotinus” in Proceedings of the British Academy (London:
Oxford University Press, 1929), XV, 23, holds that Plotinus is scarcely in
earnest “when he indulges in a half-humorous myth about souls being sent to
inhabit the bodies of º animals.”
42 De Genesi contra Manichaeof, L. I, c. XXI, n. 32 (XXXIV, 188-189).
43 Ibid., L. II, c. XXIX, n. 43 (XXXIV, 219–220). -

44 Ibid., L. I, c. IV, n. 7 (XXXIV, 176-177); L. I, c. IX, n. 15 (XXXIV,

180).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 179

In his treatment of evil, however, Augustine once more” differs

from Plotinus by ascribing moral evil solely to the will of man. The
human will alone is the cause of sin and evil in the world. On account
of the sin of the father of the human race the earth was cursed and
brought forth thorns and thistles, so that man might ever have before
his eyes the awful consequences of sin and thereby be reminded care
fully to avoid it and to obey the law of God.” God is not to blame
for the sin of man. He so created him that he need not sin unless
he wills to do so. Man is not forced to do evil, but does so of his own
free will.” The union of his spiritual soul with a material body is not,
as Plotinus believed,” the primary cause of man's sin and misery. It is
true, as Solomon observes, that “the corruptible body is a load upon
the soul and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth
upon many things.” Labor and sorrow is man's portion on earth, but
solely on account of his disobedience. It is difficult to resist the phan
tasms which enter the soul by the avenues of sight and hearing, and
yet it is through these very senses that we receive the admonition of
Truth. Itself.50
When man by sin unfortunately falls away from God, he has it in
his power to return to Him by penance. God in His mercy did not
exclude the parents of the human race from Paradise. He dismissed
them from the garden of delights but afforded them the privilege of
regaining by penance what they had lost by sin.” All men have it
within their power, if they so desire, to observe the law of God and
thereby arrive at the enjoyment of eternal life. As Augustine expresses
it:

We should know that there is another light [different from

that of the visible sun] in which God dwells, whence is that
light of which the Gospel speaks, That was the true Light
which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world.”
. . . This light does not nourish the eyes of irrational animals,
* Cf. De moribus Manichaeorum, c. VII, n. 9 (XXXII, 1349); De libero ar
bitrio, L. I, c. XVI, n. 35 (XXXII, 1240).
* De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. XIII, n. 19 (XXXIV, 182).
* Ibid., L. II, c. XXII, n. 34 (XXXIV, 213-214).
* Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, VI, iv, 14-15; I, viii, 4.
* Wisdom, IX, 15.
* De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. II, c. XX, n. 30 (XXXIV, 211-212).
* Ibid., L. II, c. XXII, n. 34 (XXXIV, 213-214).
* John, I, 9.
180 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

but the pure hearts of those who believe in God and are turned
from the love of visible and temporal things to the observance
of His precepts. All men can do this if they so wish, for that
Light enlightens every man that cometh into this world.”
Here we find explicitly stated a doctrine of grace. Salvation is for all
those who desire it, since the supernatural gift requisite for it is be
stowed upon every man who is willing to accept it. Whoever fails to
observe the law of God has no one but himself to blame, since Divine
aid is accessible to everyone who desires to avail himself of it.
The various steps in the process which begins with temptation and
terminates in sin are clearly outlined by Augustine. First of all there
is the evil suggestion which enters the soul either by way of thought
or through the senses of the body. Pleasure follows the evil impulse,
but it does not constitute the sin for, if it is resisted, the wiles of the
devil are overcome. When reason manfully restrains and checks the
motions of passion, not only is no sin committed, but we are crowned
as victors when the moral struggle with temptation will have ceased.
If, on the other hand, reason consents and decides that it will have
whatever passion suggests, we shall be debarred from happiness, as
were the parents of the human race dismissed from paradise. It is not
necessary that the sinful act be perpetrated in order to constitute the
sin. The sin is committed even if no act should follow, for the evil
lies in the consent of the will.”
The vice which Augustine seems particularly to decry is pride.
Pride marks the beginning of apostasy from God. As soon as the soul
becomes swollen with this vice, it falls away from truth and therefore
from God, for, as the Sacred Writer has said,” why should dust and
ashes be proud?” Pride is the mother of heretics, such as are the
Manichaeans, who dare so unduly to exalt the human soul as to make

53 De Genes; contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. III, n. 6 (XXXIV, 176): “Sed nos

intelligamus aliam lucem esse in qua Deus habitat, unde est illud lumen de
quo in Evangelio legitur, Erat lumen verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem
venientem in hunc mundum. . . . Illud autem lumen non irrationabilium avium
oculos pascit, sed pura corda eorum qui deo credunt, et ab amore visibilium
rerum et temporalium se ad ejus praecepta implenda convertunt. Quod omnes
homines possunt si velint, quia illud lumen omnem hominem illuminat veni
entem in hunc mundum.”
54 Ibid., L. II, c. XIV, n. 21 (XXXIV, 207).
* Ecclesiasticus, X, 9, 14.
* De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. II, c. V, n. 6 (XXXIV, 199).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 181

it of the same nature as God Himself." Pride is the beginning of all

sin.” It was the temptation which Satan suggested to Eve in the earthly
paradise when he urged her, in violation of God's order, to eat of
the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, telling her that
by so doing she and Adam would become like gods.” It was pride
which prompted Adam indirectly to place the blame for his dis
obedience upon God, since, when forced by God to confess his guilt,
he replied: “The woman whom Thou gavest me to be my companion
gave me of the tree and I did eat.” For nothing, Augustine observes,
is so familiar to sinners as to wish to attribute to God the cause of
their moral downfall; they desire to be equal to God and to be free
from the yoke of His dominion.” Yielding, as he did, to this despicable
vice, man deservedly was cast down to the mortality of the brute beasts.
By this punishment we are warned of the great evil of pride and of
the diligence which we should exercise in avoiding it.”
In exposing the errors of the Manichaeans throughout this treatise,
Augustine exalts the authority of the Holy Scriptures, insisting that the
figures and allegories of the Old Testament are quite intelligible
when explained according to Catholic faith,” and supporting his ex
position of the various passages from Genesis by citations from the
New Law. The spiritual man, Augustine says, who is the good servant
of Christ and tries to imitate Him in so far as he is able, draws his
spiritual nourishment from the Holy Scriptures. They provide for him
intellectual and moral guidance, as well as the means of advancing in
faith, hope, and charity—virtues which will enable him to arrive at
eternal life and which the fire of tribulation is unable to destroy.*

57 Ibid., L. II, c. VIII, n. 11 (XXXIV, 202).

58 Ibid., L. II, c. IX, n. 12 (XXXIV, 203).
59 Ibid., L. II, c. XV, n. 22 (XXXIV, 207).
60 Genesis, III, 12.
61 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. II, c. XVII, n. 25 (XXXIV, 209).
62 Ibid., L. II, c. XXI, n. 32—c. XXII, n. 33 (XXXIV, 212-213). Cf. De beata
vita, c. I, n. 3 (XXXII, 960); c. IV, n. 35 (XXXII, 976).
68 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. II, c. II, n. 3 (XXXIV, 197).
64 Ibid., L. I, c. XXIII, n. 40 (XXXIV, 192-193).
182 - SAINT AUGUSTINE:

B. De Muſica

The treatise on music was commenced by Augustine in 387 A.D.

before his baptism at Milan and was completed by him upon his return
to Africa about 389 A.D." It is the only extant work of a group of
studies on the seven liberal arts, which he had planned to develop by
the method of question and answer for the purpose, as he himself tells
us, "of passing by certain definite steps through that which is corporeal
and arriving at the incorporeal.” The completion and preservation
of this study were probably due to the fondness for music with which
he was imbued by the reading of the Psalms of David. Speaking of
their melody some two decades after the composition of this treatise,
Augustine remarks: CThat holy man loved sacred music, and has more
than any other kindled in me a passion for its study.”
The treatisel De musica is a dialogue in form and represents a
lengthy discussion between a teacher and his pupil.” The first five
books consist of an abstruse explanation of the technique of rhythm,
metre, and verse. In the sixth book the master and pupil pass from
the consideration of sensible numbers, such as are found in the art
of music, to those of a higher type, which have no relation to that
which is corporeal, but are unchangeable and are found in immutable
truth itself.

65 Retractationes, L. I, c. VI (XXXII, 591): “Per idem tempus quo Mediolani

fui, Baptismum percepturus, etiam Disciplinarum libros conatus sum scribere.
. . . Sed earum solum de Grammatica librum absolvere potui, quem postea de
armario nostro perdidi: et de Musica sex volumina. . . . Sed eosdem sex libros
jam baptizatus, jamgue. ex Italia regressus in Africam scripsi: inchoaveram
quippe tantummodo istam apud Mediolanum disciplinam.”
66 Ibid., L. I, c. VI (XXXII, 591): ". . . etiam Disciplinarum libros conatus
sum scribere, interrogans eos qui mecum erant, atque ab hujusmodi studiis
non abhorrebant: per corporalia cupiens ad incorporalia quibusdam quasi passi
bus certis vel pervenire vel ducere.”
67 Epistulae, CI, 4 (XXXIII, 369): "Amavit enim vir ille sanctus musicam
piam et in ea studia nos magis ipse quam ullus alius auctor accendit.”
* Several manuscripts mention Augustine and Licentius as the teacher and pupil,
respectively. In a note on the first chapter of the treatise the Benedictine
editors remark (XXXII, 1081-1082): “In capite Operis, apud Albinensem
MSS habetur: Incipit dialogorum Augustini et Licentii de Musica liber
primus. Titulum persimilem praeferunt Regius codex et Victorini duo. In
MSS autem Corb. Arnult. et aliis plerisque interlocutores Augustinus et Licen
tius ex nomine designantur per totum opus, ubicumque in editis notae affixae
sunt Magistri ac Discipuli.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST 2 183

In his doctrine of sensation which Augustine proposes in consid

erable detail in this treatise, he again” reminds us forcibly of the
process as expounded by Plotinus.” Sensation is the result of the vital
presence of the soul within the body. Since the soul is vastly superior
to the body, it can not be affected by the latter. The thought of a
material body exerting any influence on the soul is detestable in the
opinion of Augustine. If the body could exercise any effect upon the
soul, it would be necessary to regard the soul as inferior to the body.
And he adds: “What more deplorable, what more abhorrent a notion
than this could be believed?” Therefore, sensation must be regarded
as a function of the soul, an activity which it performs through the
instrumentality of the body over which it exercises supreme authority.
The soul animates the body for the purpose of acting within it, and
it acts with more or less attention according to the force or energy which
is applied by some external agent against the physical organs of the
body. Being wholly present in the body, the soul is indirectly aware
of whatever takes place therein, but becomes more attentive when there
is an impact, so to speak, of some external object on an organ of the
body of which it has been appointed the ruler and guardian. “When
anything is applied to the body,” Augustine says, “causing, so to speak,
an alteration in it, [the soul] performs its activities more carefully,
adapting them to each special place and organ; then it is said to see,
to hear, to smell, to taste, to touch.”
The soul acts upon the sense organs of the body through various
media. Augustine regards the medium between the soul and body in
visual sensations as a luminous substance. The medium for auditory
sensations is a clear, mobile substance having the nature of air; for

69 Cf. De quantitate animae, c. XXIII, n. 41 (XXXII, 1058); c. XXXIII, n.

71 (XXXII, 1074); De ordine, L. II, c. III, n. 10 (XXXII, 999).
G. De
Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, I, i, 2; IV, vi, 3; IV, iii, 23; IV, iii, 26.
musica, L. VI, c. V, n. 8 (XXXII, 1168): “D. Quid est ergo quod in
audiente contingit? M. Quidguid illud sit quod fortasse invenire aut explicare
non possumus, num ad hoc valebit, ut animam corpore meliorem esse dubi
temus? Aut cum hoc fatemur, poterimusne operanti corpori et numeros im
ponenti eam subdere; ut illud sit fabricans, haec autem materies de qua et in
qua numerosum aliquid fabricetur? Quod si credimus, deteriorem illam creda
mus necesse est. Quo quid miserius, quid detestabilius credi potest?”
** Ibid., L. VI, c. V, n. 10 (XXXII, 1169): “Cum autem adhibentur ea quae
nonnulla, ut ita dicam, alteritate corpus afficiunt; exserit attentiores actiones,
suis quibusque locis atque instrumentis accommodatas; tunc videre, vel audire,
vel olfacere, vel gustare, vel tangendo sentire dicitur.”
184 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

sensations of taste, something having the property of moisture; for

those of smell, a vapory substance; for sensations of touch, a something
turbid, so to speak, and possessing the nature of earth.”
Again we are reminded of Plotinus in the hierarchy which Augus
tine establishes as he discusses the various kinds of numbers with

which music is concerned. When we pronounce the verse Deus, creator

omnium,” what causes these four iambic feet of which the verse con
sists to reach the level of perception? Is it due merely to the sound
which is heard, or to the sense organ which receives the sound, or to
the act of pronouncing them, or to the fact that the verse is known,
that is to say, to the numbers which are stored up in our memory?”
With these questions in mind Augustine proceeds to analyze carefully
the experience which he mentioned. Beginning with the lowest type,
the corporeal numbers or those pertaining to sound, which are pro
duced by vibrations in the air, he studies in succession, according to
their respective importance, the numbers which have their dwelling
in the soul: those of hearing, speech, and memory, which have refer
ence to the soul in the exercise of its corporeal functions; and finally
the two classes of judicial numbers by which the soul passes judgment
on external sounds.”
UThe symbolism of numbers, which plays an important rôle in
Pythagoreanism, Platonism, and later Neo-Platonism,” also holds a
prominent place in the treatise on music. Numbers had a peculiar
fascination for Augustine. He classifies them as sensible and spiritual,
as imperfect and perfect. He studies them from every angle. Three
is a perfect number because it has a beginning, a middle, and an end,
73 Ibid., L. VI, c. V. n. 10 (XXXII, 1169).
74 The first verse of the celebrated hymn of St. Ambrose who introduced into the
Church of Milan the practice of congregational singing. Ambrose is said to
have composed more than ninety hymns. In the Confessiones, L. IX, c. VII,
n. 15 (XXXII, 770) Augustine gives an account of the introduction of
psalms and hymns into the Church at Milan by its holy Bishop.
75 De musica, L. VI, c. II, n. 2 (XXXII, 1163).
76 Ibid., L. VI, c. VI-XI (XXXII, 1171-1181).
77 Plotinus wrote a tractate on numbers, Enneads, VI, vi, in which he discusses
chiefly the origin of number and the relation between number and being. Iam
blichus of Chalcis (died about 330 A.D.) seems to have been particularly
interested in numbers. He wrote several mathematical treatises. Cf. De com
muni mathematica scientia, edited by N. Festa (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner,
1891); Theologoumena arithmeticae, edited by V. De Falco (Leipzig: B. G.
Teubner, 1922); In Nicomachi arithmeticam, edited by H. Pistelli (Leipzig.
B. G. Teubner, 1894).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 185

and that which constitutes the beginning and the middle is equal to the
end.” Numbers are permanent, immutable, eternal. They are not
affected by time or place or circumstances. “That one and two should
not be three and that two should not correspond to the double of one
no one can effect, whether he be of the living or the dead, or of ages
yet to come.” Wherever there is number, there is likewise beauty.
And whenever we are impressed by beauty, even as found in sensible
things, if we analyze the reason for their attraction, we realize that it is
due primarily to number. The harmony of number is a constant source
of pleasure, whereas inequality and lack of symmetry cause us dis
pleasure and annoyance. Why do we find certain colors, light, and
sounds agreeable and pleasing, whereas others are offensive and un
pleasant? It is because we are seeking for that which will harmonize
with our own nature, and are repelled by that which is not in agree
ment with ourselves. In other words, we find delight in the law of
equality. And wherever equality and similitude are found, there also
is the quality of number.”
The numbers of a lower order with which the soul is busied while
devoted to temporal concerns have a beauty of their own, but only of
an ephemeral nature since, derived, as it is, from things of sense, it
can not help being transitory and perishable. We must employ these
sensible numbers in so far as they are useful, but should seek our
delight and happiness only in those of reason.* The equality which is
found in these sensible numbers is but a shadow of the supreme, im
mutable, eternal equality which is found in God. From Him the human
soul receives the power of grasping that which is unchangeable, for
example, that one and two are three, that two is twice as much as one,
and all other things which pertain to number.”
The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is briefly expressed in this dia
logue. At the conclusion of the treatise while repeating the end he had
in view in the composition of the work, Augustine says that it was not
intended for those who, accepting the authority of Holy Scripture,
* De musica, L. I, c. XII, n. 20 (XXXII, 1095).
79 Ibid., L. VI, c. XII, n. 35 (XXXII, 1182): “Ut autem unum et duo non sint
tria et ut duo uni non duplo respondeant, nullus mortuorum potuit, nullus
vivorum potest, nullus posterorum poterit facere.”
80 Ibid., L. VI, c. XIII, n. 37-38 (XXXII, 1183-1184).
* Ibid., L. VI, c. X, n. 25—c. XI, n. 33 (XXXII, 1177-1181).
** Ibid., L. VI, c. XII, n. 34-35 (XXXII, 1181-1183).
186 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

adore one supreme God consisting of a consubstantial, unchangeable

Trinity from Whom, by Whom, and in Whom are all things, and
who worship this Blessed Trinity by faith and hope and love. The wor
shippers of this triune God are not in need of such purification as can
be attained by the faint gleam of human reasoning, but are cleansed
in the burning fire of ardent charity.*
Reference is likewise made to the Incarnation of the Son of God,
as also to His sufferings and death for man. The body, Augustine says,
lost its pristine beauty on account of the first sin and, as a result,
became subject to corruption and to death. And yet it still retains a
beauty and dignity of its own, notwithstanding the wound which it
received by sin. In order to repair this disorder the Wisdom of God,
in a wonderful and ineffable manner, deigned to assume a human body.
He took upon Himself the nature of man without sin but not without
the condition of the sinner, for He willed to be born, to suffer, and to
die as other men. He did this not because of any merit due to us, but
on account of His own surpassing goodness, that we might be on our
guard against pride which was the cause of our misfortunes rather
than avoid the humiliations which He endured without deserving them,
and that we might with calm minds pay the penalty of death which
we deserve, since He, the sinless One, endured it for our sake.*
The evil of pride is denounced by St. Augustine in many passages
of this treatise. The love of action, which causes the soul to turn away
from the contemplation of eternal numbers and to become engrossed
and find pleasure in those of sense which are merely imitations of the
former, has its roots in pride, a vice by which the soul prefers to
imitate God rather than to serve Him. It is rightly execrated in Holy
Scripture as the beginning of all sin. “Why,” the Son of Sirach asks,
“is earth and ashes proud” For the soul is nothing of itself, other
wise it would not be changeable and would have nothing lacking in its
essence. Since, then, it is nothing of itself, whatever it is, it has re
ceived from God. If it remains in its own order, it is quickened in mind
and knowledge by the presence of God Himself. Its own good, there
fore, is found within itself. But when it goes forth in search of external
things, it becomes swollen with pride; it empties itself, as it were, and
sº Ibid., L. VI, c. xvii, n. 59 (xxxii, 1193-1194).
84 Ibid., L. VI, c. IV, n. 7 (XXXII, 1166-1167).
85 Ecclesiasticus, X, 9.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 187

separates itself far from God not after the manner of local distance,
but by the dispositions of its intellect. When pride holds sway within
the soul, it craves for praise and honor and renown. It becomes in
flamed with the desire to excel all others and, by so doing, it com
pletely turns its glance away from that pure and sincere truth which
is none other than God Himself.8°
What is the soul to do that finds itself in this miserable plight?
It must hasten back to God and seek its rest and joy in Him. Holy
Scripture suggests the means by which this may be accomplished;
namely, the observance of the twofold commandment of the love of
God and of our neighbor—precepts by no means as difficult as they
might appear to be, for should it not be easier to love the reality
rather than the shadow, to desire perfect equality rather than the
similitude?" Truly, the love of this world involves more hardship
than does the love of God, for He Himself has said: “My yoke is
light.”* The soul, then, must so regulate itself as no longer to center
its love upon beauty of a lower order or to limit its interest to sensible
numbers which have reference only to that which is fleeting and
perishable. On the contrary, it should focus its attention upon that
higher beauty and those eternal numbers which, without any effort, it
will continue to enjoy when united with its incorruptible body after
the resurrection. This can be attained by the practice of the virtues
which, in reality, are but different forms of charity or love of God;
namely, prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude. These virtues, which
effect the purification and sanctity of the soul while it is engaged
in the labors and difficulties of this life, will be perfected and con
summated in the blessed life to come when they will be known as
contemplation, sanctification, impassibility, ordination.*
The cause of all sin is in the will. The soul has both a master and
a servant; the former is God, the latter is the body. When the proper
order is observed, the soul allows itself to be governed by its master,
while itself controls and directs the actions of its servant. As God be
comes more and more the object of its love, the body becomes less and
86 De musica, L. VI, c. XIII, n. 40-41 (XXXII, 1184-1185); Cf. De beata vita,
c. I, n. 3 (XXXII, 960); De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. II, c. IX, n. 12
(XXXIV, 203); L. II, c. XXI, n. 32 (XXXIV, 212-213).
87 De musica, L. VI, c. XIV, n. 43-44 (XXXII, 1186).
88 Matthew, XI, 30.
** De musica, L. VI, c. XVI; n. 51-55 (XXXII, 1189-1191).
188 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

less a rebellious and ungovernable servant. On the other hand, when

He is disregarded, the soul becomes more and more intent upon its
frail and mortal helpmate. It pursues the pleasures of the body, be
comes engrossed in material things, and, as a result, injures its own
health as well as that of its servant.” The spiritual delectation which
the soul experienced when it attached itself to God is exchanged for
pleasure of a lower order. As the Apostle says: “Where thy treasure is,
there also is thy heart.” Now, where the heart is, there either happi
ness or misery is to be found. If the soul becomes attached to the high
est numbers, to eternal, immutable, imperishable equality, that is, to
God, it is happy; if it turns away from them and takes delight in
numbers of a lower order, it is wretched.” It is not that the latter in
themselves are bad. On the contrary, material things are beautiful and
good, each according to its own class and order. It is the love of these
things, the attachment to inferior beauty, which pollutes the soul.
Hence the soul alone is responsible for sin. In centering its affec
tion upon those things which it should merely use, it reverses the
proper order which it should observe. It, so to speak, deordinates itself
through its desire for the lower pleasures afforded by the body. The
body is not to be blamed but rather the soul for its misuse of the
servant that was given it by God. As Augustine expresses it: “That
which sullies the soul is not evil because the body, too, is a creature of
God . . . but by comparison with the dignity of the soul, it is con
temned, just as the purity of gold is tarnished when mixed with even
the most refined silver.”
The beauty which the visible universe possesses is that which
Divine Providence has decreed that it should have. Many things in it
may appear to us to be disordered and confused, but this is due to
the narrow range of our vision. If anyone, for example, were placed as
a statue in some one corner of an exceedingly vast and beautiful build
ing, he would not be able to appreciate the beauty of the structure of
90 Ibid., L. VI, c. V, n. 13-14 (XXXII, 1170-1171).
91 Matthew, VI, 21.
92 De musica, L. VI, c. V, n. 13 (XXXII, 1170); L. VI, c. XI, n. 29-30
(XXXII, 1179-1180). -

93 Ibid., L. VI, c. XIV, n. 46 (XXXII, 1187): "Quod autem illam [animam]

sordidat, non est malum, quia etiam corpus creatura Dei est . . . Sed prae
animae dignitate contemnitur; sicuti auri dignitas, etiam purgatissimi argenti
commixtione sordescit.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 189

which he himself is only a part. A soldier from his place in the ranks
cannot observe the order and arrangement of the entire army. The
beauty of a poem can not be discerned by listening to the individual
syllables as they are pronounced, although the entire poem is composed
of them. The source of the disorder in the universe is, therefore, man
himself, since he interprets the order according to his own merits. He
is the sinner and becomes so by his own will, for by it he lost the
universe which he possessed when he obeyed the command of God.
And yet he is ordered in part, since he is bound by the law which he
was unwilling to obey. Even in our evil actions the works of God are
good. “Man in so far as he is man is good; adultery, however, inas
much as it is adultery is an evil act. Yet often a man is born as a
result of this evil act; hence though the act of man is evil, the work
of God is good.”
In these passages we have positive evidence that Augustine's atti
tude toward the body and toward material things in general is quite
different from that of Plotinus. In agreement with the founder of Neo
Platonism,” he again” proclaims the order, beauty, and harmony which
are visible in the universe, and argues that the splendor of the whole
should not be depreciated for the demerits of its parts which should be
judged only in their relation to the whole. With Plotinus,” too, Augus
tine insists that moral evil does not disturb the order of the universe.
In no respect, however, does he attribute evil to the nature of matter.
On the contrary, he explicitly states that the body is good because it
is a creature of God, although its goodness is of a lower order than is
that of the spiritual soul. The body and all other material things are
good when used for the purpose for which they were intended. Their
material nature does not make them evil. Man himself is responsible
for any moral evil associated with them when, in opposition to the
Divine law, he wilfully puts them to a use for which they were not
meant.

** Ibid., L. VI, c. XI, n. 30 (XXXII, 1180): “Homo namque in quantum

homo est, aliquod bonum est; adulterium autem in quantum adulterium est,
malum opus est: plerumque autem de adulterio nascitur homo, de malo scilicet
hominis opere bonum opus Dei.”
* Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 3-8.
* Cf. De ordine, L. I, c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 979); L. II, c. IV, n. 11-14 (XXXII,
999-1001).
* Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 8.
190 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body is clearly expressed in

the treatise on music. If, Augustine says, corporeal numbers are un
noticed when we are thinking about anything spiritual and even some
times when we are engaged in some physical activities, such as sing
ing or walking, how much less will they be a source of distraction to
us when, according to St. Paul, this corruption shall have put on in
corruption, and this mortal, immortality,” that is to say, when God
will have vivified our mortal bodies, as the Apostle says, “because of
the spirit that dwelleth in us.” When face to face we behold this
one God, this eternal Truth, how much more shall we perceive without
disquietude and take pleasure in those numbers by which we experi
enced corporeal things.” -

That Augustine had accepted the dogma of the resurrection of the

body seems unquestionable. In his exposition of the activity of sensa
tion he explains that, when the soul turns away from God to direct
all its attention to the body, it fails to do its duty to its servant. On
the contrary, when the soul is devoted to God, it functions with greater
ease with the result that the body also profits by the fidelity of the
soul and enjoys a state of health in which it does not require the atten
tion of the soul, not that the soul ceases to act in it but because it
acts with much greater facility. This health will be most certain and
lasting when in due time and order the body will be restored to its
pristine stability at the time of the resurrection,” a doctrine, Augus
tine says, which is firmly believed before it is fully understood.”
Such a notion would indeed be repulsive to Plotinus for whom, as
Dean Inge remarks, “the true awakening of the soul is the awakening
from the body, not with the body.”
981 Corinthians, XV, 53.
99 Romans, VIII, 11.
100 De musica, L. VI, c. XV, n. 49 (XXXII, 1188-1189).
101 In the Retractationes, L. I, c. XI, n. 3 (XXXII, 601) Augustine considered
it advisable to correct this somewhat faulty notion in regard to the risen
body. After quoting the passage in the De musica in which he speaks of the
restoration of the body to its former stability, he adds: "Non ita dictum
putetur, quasi non sint futura post resurrectionem corpora meliora, quam
primorum hominum in paradiso fuerunt, cum illa jam non sint alenda cor
poralibus alimentis, quibus alebantur ista: sed pristina stabilitas hactenus
accipienda est, quatenus aegritudinem ita nullam corpora illa patientur, sicut
nec ista pati possent ante peccatum.”
102 De musica, L. VI, c. V, n. 13 (XXXII, 1170).
103 W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, II, 32.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 191

The doctrine of creation ex nihilo and of Divine Providence which

is directed to each individual being in the universe is explicitly stated
at the conclusion of the treatise. The verse Deuſ, creator omnium is
pleasing, Augustine says, not only on account of the beauty and har
mony of the sound, but much more so because of the reasonableness
and truth of the doctrine which the words express; namely, that all
things were created from nothing by God. The elements were pro
duced by Him, each bearing its own specific nature, and were adapted
to form the variety of corporeal things of which the universe is com
prised. “Can not the nature of things, obedient to the command of
God, produce wood from earth and other elements, and could He not
produce the elements themselves (ipsa extrema) from nothing?”
Take, for example, a plant of any kind. It has its beginning from a
seed belonging to its kind. The seed germinates, the stem shoots up
into the air, the leaves unfold, the plant grows strong, it blossoms and
bears fruit or produces again the seed from which another cycle will
result. The same is true, but in a higher degree, of the bodies of ani
mals, in which unity, number, and order are readily discerned. “Can
these things,” Augustine asks, “be made of the elements and could the
elements themselves not be produced from nothing?” And thus pass
ing through the various orders of corporeal beings each of which has
the perfection of form which God ordained for it, we come to the
"rational and intellectual numbers of blessed and holy souls” which
are far above the corporeal natures and which also owe their being
to that Divine law without which not a leaf falls from the tree and
by which our very hairs are numbered.”
Toward the end of the treatise De muſica is a passage which lends
itself to the interpretation of the Platonic doctrine of a universal
World-Soul. The love of this world, Augustine says, is indeed a source
of trouble. The immutability and permanence which the soul seeks in
it can not be found, since the lowest form of beauty has its fulfillment
in the flux which is characteristic of earthly things, and whatever imi
tation of permanence the world possesses is given it through the soul
104 De musica, L. VI, c. XVII, n. 57 (XXXII, 1191-1192): "Et rerum natura
Dei nutibus serviens, ipsum lignum de terra et caeteris elementis facere non
potest; et ipsa extrema non poterat de nullo?”
105 Ibid., L. VI, c. XVII, n. 57 (XXXII, 1192): “An ista de elementis fieri
possunt, et ipsa elementa non potuerunt fieri de nihilo?”
108 Ibid., L. VI, c. XVII, n. 58 (XXXII, 1193).
192 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

which it received from God.” In the Retractatione;” Augustine ex

plains that if the lowest beauty (infima pulchritudo) mentioned in the
passage is referred to the bodies of men and of animals, the state
ment is quite evident, since they are endowed with life, and therefore
possess a soul. If, however, it is applied to all bodies, it will be neces.
sary to conclude, in agreement with Plato and many other philosophers,
that the world is an animal which also has been endowed by God with
a soul. Augustine does not condemn this doctrine but merely says that
there is no proof that it is true.”

C. De Magistro
The treatise De magistro also was written after Augustine's return
to Africa.” It represents a discussion which took place between him
and his talented son Adeodatus” on the rôle played by the teacher
in the process of learning. After an interesting study on the symbolism
of language, Augustine shows his son that human teachers, in reality,
are not teachers at all. The real teacher who imparts knowledge to man
is Christ, the eternal Word and the Wisdom of God, Who is the
interior Master of the human intellect.
This brief dialogue does not contain much that is important for
our thesis. It is concerned chiefly with the doctrine of illumination,
107 Ibid., L. VI. c. XIV, n. 44 (XXXII, 1186): “Laboriosior est hujus
mundi amor. Quod enim in illo anima quaerit, constantiam Scilicet aeternita
temque, non invenit; quoniam rerum transitu completur infima pulchritudo,
et quod in illa imitatur constantiam, a summo Deo per animam trajicitur:
quoniam prior est species tantummodo tempore commutabilis, quam est ea
quae et tempore et locis.”
108 Retractationes, L. I, c. XI, n. 4 (XXXII, 601-602).
109 Ibid., L. I, c. XI, n. 4 (XXXII, 602): “Unde tale aliquid a medictum quo
id accepi possit, etiam in libro de Immortalitate Animae temere dictum
notavi; non quia hoc falsum esse confirmo, sed quia nec verum esse compre
hendo, quod sit animal mundus.”
110 Ibid., L. I, c. XII (XXXII, 602): “Per idem tempus [in Africa constitutus]
scripsi librum cujus est titulus, de Magistro.”
111 Augustine tells us in the Confessions that at this time Adeodatus was but
sixteen years of age. He likewise observes that the genius manifested by his
son filled him with awe. Confessiones, L. IX, c. VI, n. 14 (XXXII, 769):
“Adiunximus etiam nobis puerum Adeodatum ex me natum carnaliter de
peccato meo. Tu bene feceras eum. . . . Est liber noster, qui inscribitur, de
Magistro: ipse ibi mecum loguitur. Tu scis illius esse sensa omnia quae in
seruntur ibi ex persona collocutoris mei, cum esset in annis sedecim. Multa
eius alia mirabiliora expertus sum. Horrori mihi erat illud ingenium: et quis
praeter te talium miraculorum opifex 2"
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 193

which can be found in the writings of Plotinus and which we have

already noted in the early works of Augustine.”
There are two kinds of knowledge, Augustine observes, sense
knowledge and intellectual knowledge. The former is derived from the
objective realities with which we come in contact through the avenue
of the senses. Each sense has its own proper object and the soul, making
use of the various senses as interpreters, derives thereby a knowledge of
the external realities found in the visible universe.” When the external
objects are no longer present to the senses, the mind retains the knowl
edge it has received by storing images of these sense realities in the
treasure-house of memory. “Thus do we carry in the inner courts of
memory,” Augustine says, “images, documents of things perceived
before. Contemplating these in mind, we utter no falsehood when we
speak in good conscience.”
Intellectual knowledge, which constitutes the second type, is attain
able by the interior light of truth shed upon the human intellect by
Christ, the Divine Teacher, the Wisdom of God, Who is the Source of
all truth. It is not the words of the human master that transmit to us
the truth, for they are nothing but arbitrary signs which would be mean
ingless if the intellect itself did not attach a meaning to them, a power
which it possesses through the light of immutable truth shed upon it
by an interior Master Who, as St. Paul observes, dwells within the
interior man.” He is the changeless Power of God and the everlasting
Wisdom Whom every rational being consults and Who bestows light
upon each in proportion to the dispositions of his soul, that is, to the
virtue which it has attained.”
Just as sensible light is necessary in order that by the corporeal
organ of sight we may discern the visible world, so, too, an interior
light is needed, which comes from God Himself, in order that we
112 Cf. Contra Academicos, L. III, c. VI, n. 13 (XXXII, 940-941); Soliloquia,
L. I, c. VIII, n. 15 (XXXII, 877); De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII, n.
76 (XXXII, 1076-1077); De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. VI, n. 14 (XXXII,
1228). Cf also Plotinus, Enneads, V, i, 11.
118 De magistro, c. XII, n. 39 (XXXII, 1216).
114 Ibid., c. XII, n. 39 (XXXII, 1217): “Ita illas imagines in memoriae pene
tralibus rerum ante sensarum quaedam documenta gestamus, quae animo con
templantes bona conscientia non mentimur cum loguimur.” Citations in Eng
lish are taken from De magistro, translated by F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A. (Lan
caster, Pa.: The Wickersham Printing Co., 1924).
115 Ephesians, III, 16-17.
* De magistro, c. XI, n. 38 (XXXII, 1216).
 194 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

may be brought into communication with truth. While the words of the
earthly teacher sound without, the heavenly Master, the Divine Illumi
nator, by bestowing upon the intellect the gift of His light enables it to
comprehend the truth within.” It is only by His favor that man can
know whether or not the words of the human master are true, since
“He alone can teach Who dwells within, Who reminds us that He
is dwelling within, when words are spoken without.”
Plotinus, too, speaks of a Divine Mind, our King, as abiding within
us. Since the soul can dwell upon what is right and beautiful, there
must be what he calls a “permanent Right,” a source and foundation
for this reasoning in the soul. “Further,” he adds, “since the soul's
attention to these matters is intermittent, there must be within us
an Intellectual-Principle acquainted with that Right not by momentary
act but in permanent possession. Similarly, there must be the principle
of this Principle, its cause, God.” Yet for Plotinus, as has been
shown,” the relation of the human mind to the Divine light seems
to be somewhat different from that as expressed by Augustine. Plotinus
speaks of it as something that belongs to man. “We have intellection,”
he says, “both by the characteristic Act of our Soul and by the act of
the Intellectual-Principle upon us—for this Intellectual-Principle is
part of us no less than the Soul, and towards it we are ever rising.”
Illumination is not a gift bestowed by the Illuminator. The soul itself
is part and parcel of that "huge illumination of the Supreme pouring
outwards” until at last it "dwindles to darkness.” In keeping with
his doctrine of emanation Plotinus could say that the soul is as intellec
tive in nature, though not in degree, as is the Divine Mind of which,
through the intermediation of the World-Soul, it is the offspring.”
Hence, in Neo-Platonism there seems to be no trace of any positive
aid given to man by which he may know the truth, as Augustine
expressly teaches in this dialogue.
Augustine's belief in the rationality of faith is unquestionably
established in this treatise. In explaining the passage from the Prophet
117 Ibid., c. XI, n. 38—c. XII, n. 40 (XXXII, 1216-1217).
* Ibid., c. XIV, n. 46 (XXXII, 1220): “Ego vero didici . . . eum docere
solum, qui se intus habitare, cum foris logueretur, admonuit.”
11° Plotinus, Enneads, V, i, 11.
120 Chapter III, B; III, D.
121 Plotinus, Enneads, I, i, 13.
122 Ibid., IV, iii, 9.
128 Ibid., IV, iii, 4-6; VI, iv, 4.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 195

Daniel, And their faraballae were not changed,” as a proof that we

learn not from words sounding without, but from the truth which
teaches from within, he observes that we can not know the three youths
of whom the Prophet treats and who by faith and religion triumphed
over the king and the material fires. Their names as listed by Daniel
can not assist us in knowing the men for whom they stand. Hence we
are forced to believe the facts on the authority of the Sacred Writer who
portrayed them. There is a difference between believing and under
standing, as the Prophet Isaias affirms, for he says: “Unless you believe
you shall not understand.” What I understand, Augustine observes, I
know and I believe. But I do not understand all things that I believe.
And he adds: “And I do not, therefore, not know how useful it is to
take on trust also many things that I do not know. With this advantage
of believing I count also this narrative of the three youths. Wherefore,
while there is a vast reach of things that I can not know, I do know
what is the advantage of believing.”
In his discussion with Adeodatus Augustine comments on the util
ity of vocal prayer as found in the liturgy of the Church. Language,
Augustine tells his son, was instituted for the sole purpose of teaching,
since the function of recall is, in reality, only a division of teaching.
It would seem, however, Adeodatus objects, that this notion in regard
to the purpose of language does not always hold good. For example,
when we pray, surely God is not taught by us, nor does He need to be
reminded of our wants. But, Augustine replies, language is not neces
sary in prayer since God is found within the depths of the rational
soul which He has deigned to make His temple. The official prayers
of the Church, as recited by her priests, are intended, not that God may
hear, but that the people may be reminded of their dependence upon
Him. When the Divine Master taught His followers the words which
they should use in prayer, He did so in order that they might be re
minded to Whom and for what purpose their prayer was being made
when they prayed within the privacy of their soul. Hence, He did not
* Daniel, III, 94—a pre-Hieronymian text.
** Iſaiaſ, VII, 9–a pre-Hieronymian text.
** De magistro, c. XI, n. 37 (XXXII, 1216): “Nec ideo nescio quam sit utile
credere etiam multa quae nescio; cui utilitati hanc quoque adjungo de tribus
pueris historiam: quare pleraque rerum cum scire non possim, quanta tamen
utilitate credantur, scio.”
196 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

teach them words, but realities by means of words.” Plotinus would

hardly approve of vocal prayer or of devotional exercises in common
to which Augustine here refers, since for the Neo-Platonist the only
activity deserving of the name of prayer is that of contemplation.
The doctrine of the two worlds: the realm of sense and that of the
intellect, and of the superiority of the latter to the former, a doctrine
which holds an important place in Neo-Platonic thought, is stressed by
Augustine in this dialogue. “Everything that we perceive,” he says,
"we perceive either by a corporeal organ of sense or by the power of
the mind. The former are the object of the senses, the latter of the
understanding, or to speak after the manner of our authors, we give
the name carnal to the former, spiritual to the latter.” From the
world of sense we derive knowledge only of the properties of the
objects that we perceive through the senses of the body, which the mind
uses as interpreters in order that it may acquire such knowledge. The
intellect, on the other hand, by the interior light of truth is able to dis
cern things of a higher order, realities of thought which transcend the
powers of the organs of sense.”
D. De Vera Religione
The last work composed by Augustine before his ordination to the
priesthood was the De vera religione.” His purpose in writing it,
he tells us, was threefold. In the first place, he desired to show that the
Blessed Trinity, one God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is
to be worshipped by means of the true religion. Secondly, he wished
to exalt the mercy of God which, by a temporal dispensation, bestowed
upon man the true religion; namely, the Christian religion, and to
show man how he ought to devote himself to the worship of God in
accordance with this religion. Finally, his chief purpose in writing the
work was to refute the two natures proposed by the Manichaeans.”
127 Ibid., c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 1195).
128 Ibid., c. XII, n. 39 (XXXII, 1216).
129 Ibid., c. XII, n. 39-40 (XXXII, 1216-1217).
130 Retractationes, L. I, c. XIII, n. 1 (XXXII, 602): “Tunc etiam [in Africa
constitutus] de Vera Religione librum scripsi.”
131 Ibid., L. I, c. XIII, n. 1 (XXXII, 602-603): “In quo [libro de Vera Re
ligione] multipliciter ac copiosissime disputatur, unum verum Deum, id est
Trinitatem, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum religione vera colendum:
et quanta misericordia ejus, per temporalem dispensationem concessa sit
hominibus christiana religio, quae vera religio est, et ad eumdem cultum Dei
quemadmodum sit homo quadam vita sua coaptandus. Maxime tamen contra
duas naturas Manichaeorum liber hic loguitur.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 197

Since Augustine's primary object in writing this treatise was to

invalidate the Manichaean doctrine on the two natures, it is to be
expected that he should devote considerable attention to the nature and
cause of evil. After summarizing the pernicious teaching of the Mani !X,'o
chaeans on the good and evil soul, he proceeds to account for moral
evil by attributing it to the free act of the will. Whatever is endowed
with life, he says, possesses it from God Who is the highest life and Kl)2A
its very fountain and source. All life is good; it is only in so far as
it inclines toward death that life can be considered evil. This falling
off of life, this inclination toward that which may be called nothing
(nequitia) is due to the soul which, of its own will and in opposition
to the law of God, enjoys the body over which God placed it in com
mand. In other words, the ill use which the soul makes of the body
and of that which pertains to it is the cause of evil. The body in itself
is good; it has a certain harmony of parts, a certain beauty without
which it could not even be said to be a body. Like all other things
possessed of being, it owes its existence to Him who is the Highest
Beauty, Who is “one God, one Truth, one Salvation of all, and the .
first and highest Essence from which is everything that is inasmuch as
it is; because everything, in so far as it is, is good.”
Moral evil, then, had its origin in man's disobedience of the Divine
precept: “Of every tree of paradise thou shalt eat. But of the tree of
knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat.” And both in body
and soul man has paid the penalty for the violation of the Divine
mandate. His body became corruptible and his soul, deprived of its own
proper delights, must engage in a constant struggle against that which
is of a lower nature. “This is what is called evil in its entirety; namely,
sin and the punishment of sin.” The bad will is the only thing
which can rightly be called evil. This is true even in regard to the
devil or the bad angel. In so far as he is an angel, he is not bad; he Sºw who
is bad only because his will is perverse. Because he loved himself more
than God, he was unwilling to subject himself to God. Inflated with
182 De vera religione, c. XI, n. 21 (XXXIV, 131-132): “Omnis enim species
ab illo est. Quis est autem hic, nisi unus Deus, una veritas, una salus omnium,
et prima atque summa essentia, ex qua est omne quidquid est, in quantum
est; quia in quantum est quidguid est, bonum est.”
183 Genesis, II, 16-17.
134 De vera religione, c. XII, n. 23 (XXXIV, 132): "Et hoc est totum quod
dicitur malum, id est, peccatum et poena peccati.”
198 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

pride, he revolted against Him and fell. As a result, he became less

than he had been, because he wished to enjoy that which was less
when he wanted to take delight in his own power rather than in
God.185
The sole cause of sin, Augustine continues, is the free choice of the
will. If a person involuntarily contracted sin in some such way as he
contracts a fever, the punishment of damnation which follows as a
result of sin would deservedly appear unjust. But, he emphatically adds,
sin is indeed a voluntary evil, so that in no way can there be a sin
unless it is voluntary, and this is so evident that no one, be he learned
or unlearned, disagrees with this statement. Therefore, either it must
be denied that sin is committed or it must be granted that it is com
mitted by an act of the will. One does not deny that the soul sins
by admitting that it is healed by repentance, that pardon is granted
as a result of penance, and that perseverance in sin is justly condemned
by the law of God. Finally, Augustine says, if it is not by the will
that we do evil, admonition and reproof are to no purpose. If these
were discontinued, however, the Christian law and all religious disci
pline would necessarily be rendered useless and ineffectual. Since it is
unquestionably true that sin is a reality, there can be no doubt that the
soul possesses freedom of choice. Such as serve God willingly are
regarded as His better servants, which would not be the case if they
served Him not voluntarily, but through necessity.”
As in several of his former writings, Augustine takes pains to
stress the fact that all things are good since they owe their existence to
God Who is the Highest Good. Even unformed matter can be con
sidered good since Divine beneficence has made it with the capacity
of becoming something.
Whatever has not yet been formed but still has been begun in
any way so that it can be formed is, through the goodness of
God, capable of receiving form: for it is good to have been
formed. Hence the capacity to receive a form is something good,
and therefore the Author of all good things, Who bestowed
upon them form, also made them with the capacity to be
135 Ibid., c. XIII, n. 26 (XXXIV, 133).
136 Ibid., c. XIV, n. 27 (XXXIV, 133-134).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 199

formed. So everything which is, inasmuch as it is, and every

thing which not yet is, in so far as it can be [something], has
its being from God.”

However, since all creatures are mutable and contingent, they possess
a less degree of goodness than God, and yet even the lowest species is
good since it has its being from Him. Those things which are imper
fect in the order of being, which have a greater or less degree of
goodness can be vitiated simply because they are not the highest Good.
The only good which is not susceptible to change is God.” Evil, then,
is not due to the nature of material things.
The first vice of the rational soul, Augustine goes on to say, is the
will to do what the Highest Truth forbids. It was on this account that
man was driven from the terrestrial paradise into this world, which
does not mean that he lost a substantial good and incurred a substan
tial evil. When he was dismissed from the earthly paradise, he passed
from an eternal good to a temporal good, from a spiritual to a carnal
good, from an intelligible to a sensible good, from the highest to the
lowest good. Whenever the rational soul sins, it is because it loves
something which is good but is inferior to itself; wherefore the sin is
evil and not that which is wrongly loved. The evil lies in the disorder
of the soul. There would be no evil if the soul subjected itself to its
Creator and realized that through Him all other things are subject to
itself.” Every material thing, when possessed by a soul that loves God,
is good and possesses a beauty of its own; if loved by a soul that
ignores God, it does not thereby become evil, but the sin is evil by
which the creature is so loved that it becomes a source of punishment
to its lover, entangles him in hardships, and nourishes him with false
pleasures since they are neither permanent nor satisfying.”
137 Ibid., c. XVIII, n. 36 (XXXIV, 137): “Nam et quod nondum formatum
est, tamen aliquo modo ut formari possit inchoatum est, Dei beneficio
formabile est: bonum est enim esse formatum. Nonnullum ergo bonum
est et capacitas formae; et ideo bonorum omnium auctor, qui praestitit
formam, ipse fecit etiam posse formari. Ita omne quod est, in quantum est;
et omne quod nondum est, in quantum esse potest, ex Deo habet.” Cf. De
Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. VII, n. 11 (XXXIV, 178).
188 De vera religione, c. XIX, n. 37 (XXXIV, 137).
139 Ibid., c. XX, n. 38-39 (XXXIV, 138).
140 Ibid., c. XX, n. 40 (XXXIV, 138-139).
200 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

The doctrine of the inherent goodness of all things Augustine con

tinues to explain in great detail. In agreement with Plotinus and in
language which at times bears a striking resemblance to that of Neo
Platonism he affirms that evil is no substance, that it is but an absence
or vitiation of the good, and that the blame for moral evil is to be
placed upon the soul which, forgetful of its true nature, becomes en
grossed in the fleeting, perishable things of sense which attract it by
their beauty. As a consequence, the soul loves these things more than
God. Thus, in the midst of his abundance, man remains in want while
he pursues one thing after another, and nothing remains with him.”
Material objects, Augustine insists, are not the cause of sin. The sin
consists in loving them in preference to God from Whom they derive
whatever beauty and attractiveness they possess. Even sin does not
destroy the order and harmony of the universe. While enduring the
suffering which he has brought upon himself by sin, man is good in
that he still exists. It is necessary, Augustine says, that we acknowledge
a weeping man to be better than a joyful worm, and yet the worm has
a beauty peculiar to itself when we consider the structure of its body,
the symmetry and order of its parts. its color, and its smoothness.”
However, in this treatise we again note the same striking differences
between Augustine's doctrine of evil and that of Plotinus, as have been
pointed out in other works of this period;” namely, that in the opin
ion of Augustine all material things without exception are good, and
that moral evil is to be attributed solely to the free choice of the will.
That even formless matter is good is a notion quite opposed to the
Neo-Platonic doctrine of matter.
The three principal vices to which man is prone and which tend
to lead him into sin are curiosity, bodily pleasure, and pride. Augustine
once more gives expression to his particular abhorrence for pride. It
was pride which caused the devil, once a good angel, to prefer himself
to God. Swollen with pride, he who was but a creature was unwilling
to submit to God and fell from his high estate.” By pride man also
141 Ibid., c. XX, n. 40 (XXXIV, 138-139).
142 Ibid., c. XLI, n. 77 (XXXIV, 156-157).
143 Cf. De moribus Manichaeorum, c. VII, n. 9 (XXXII, 1349); De libero
arbitrio, L. I, c. XVI, n. 35 (XXXII, 1240); De Genesi contra Manichaeos,
L. II, c. XXII, n. 34 (XXXIV, 213-214).
144 De vera religione, c. XIII, n. 26 (XXXIV, 133). Cf. De Genesi contra
Manichaeos, L. II, c. VIII, n. 11-12 (XXXIV, 202-203); L. II, c. XVII,
n. 25 (XXXIV, 209).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 201

desires to imitate God. In his craving for nobility and excellence he

wishes to be supreme, to make all things subject to himself. If he
should imitate God by subjecting himself to Him and by living accord
ing to His precepts, he would rightly have all other things subordinate
to himself and would not become so deformed as to fear the little
beast of pride.”
The notion of humble submission and obedience to God is time and
again expressed throughout this treatise. In His mercy God has so miti
gated the punishment of fallen man that he can tend to justice if he
casts aside all pride, bends his neck to the yoke of the one true God,
abandons all confidence in himself, and gives himself to God to be
ruled and governed by Him.” By submitting in this manner to
the Divine Leader, the man of good will can make the annoyances
and hardships of the present life serve his own advantage. He who
subjects himself to the yoke of Christ will have all things subject to
himself; he will experience no difficulty, for his Master has promised
that His yoke is light.” It is natural for man to wish to be uncon
quered. And this superiority is attainable, if man obeys His commands
to Whose image and likeness he has been created. No one can con
quer him who conquers his own vices, and who loves God with his
whole heart and soul and mind, and his neighbor as himself. The love
of God and of one's neighbor is the best antidote for pride.”
In describing the love which man should bestow upon his neigh
bor, Augustine gives a definite portrayal of the requirements of frater
nal charity as established by the Christian code of love.” To fulfil
the precept of charity in reference to one's neighbor, one must wish
for him whatever good things he desires for himself, and must refrain
from wishing that his neighbor suffer any evils which he himself
desires to avoid. And all men must be the recipients of this love, not
only one's friends, but his enemies also. This immutable law of charity
renders those who serve it truly free, unconquerable, perfect, since it
has as its final object God Himself and is not influenced by any ties
145 De vera religione, c. XLV, n. 84 (XXXIV, 160).
146 Ibid., c. XV, n. 29 (XXXIV, 134).
147 Ibid., c. XXXV, n. 65 (XXXIV, 151); c. XLIV, n. 82 (XXXIV, 159);
c. LV, n. 110 (XXXIV, 170).
* Ibid., c. XLV, n. 85–c. XLVI, n. 86 (XXXIV, 160-161).
* Cf. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. XXVIII, n. 56 (XXXII, 1334).
`
202 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

of flesh or any temporal interests. In this respect it is superior to the

love for children, wife, relations, fellow-citizens. For we are all chil
dren of the one heavenly Father and, as such, should love Him and
accomplish His will.” Why, then, should he not be deemed uncon
querable whose love for man has its basis merely on the fact that he
is man, that is to say, a creature of God, made to His image and like.
ness? He whose love for his neighbor is grounded on this motive does
not envy him, since he has no envy for himself; he helps his neighbor
in whatever way he can, because he does the same thing for himself;
he does not feel the need of anyone, since he has no desire for any
one save God to cling to Whom constitutes his happiness. And no one
can deprive him of God.” Throughout the present life he repays the
kindness of his friend, he bears with patience the treatment of his
enemy, he distributes kindness in whatever way he finds it possible.
He is not afflicted by the death of anyone because he loves God with
his whole heart and he knows that whatever is in God's keeping is not
lost to himself, since God is the Master of the living and the dead.”
Such are the dispositions of a man who observes the law of charity.
In His goodness and mercy God has given man a remedy for the
twofold evil of sin and the punishment of sin; namely, authority and
reason. Authority constitutes the temporal dispensation of Divine
Providence for the reformation and renewal of the human race with
reference to its eternal salvation.” Authority requires faith and serves
as a preparation for reason.” When the truths embraced within the
temporal dispensation, that is to say, entrusted to the Church and
embodied in her Sacred Writings, are believed, the mind is purified
and rendered capable of understanding spiritual things which are
permanent and abiding and in no way subject to change, such truths,
for example, as the Unity and Trinity of God, is so far as it can be
understood in this life.” Reason, thus purified, conducts man to
knowledge. There is no cleavage between authority and reason. The
latter is never far removed from the former, since the intellect must

* De vera religione, c. XLVI, n. 87-89 (XXXIV, 161-162).

* Ibid., c. XLVII, n. 90 (XXXIV, 162-163).
15.2 º; c. XLVII, n. 91 (XXXIV, 163); c. XXVIII, n. 51 (XXXIV, 144
* Ibid., c. VII, n. 13 (XXXIV, 128-129).
* Ibid., c. XXIV, n. 45 (XXXIV, 141).
* Ibid., c. VII, n. 13 (XXXIV, 128-125).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST 2 203

consider what authority should be believed, and certainly the authority

of Truth Itself when known is the very highest. But since we are
existing in the temporal order, and therefore are involved in sensible
things, we are hindered in our love for that which is eternal; so a
temporal remedy has been provided to call us to salvation not by
knowledge, but by faith, a remedy which is prior in the order of time
but not in that of nature and of excellence.”
We have strong reason for accepting this faith embodied in the
Catholic Church and in her Scriptures. First of all, there are the
prophecies which history assures us have been fulfilled.” Moreover,
during the first years of her existence miracles were performed in order
to substantiate the truth of the teachings of the Church. After she had
spread throughout the world God discontinued the working of miracles,
since there no longer was need for them and, if man should continue
seeking visible things, he would fail to be impressed by that to which
he grew accustomed.* The truth of the Church is likewise established
by the great number of martyrs who sealed their faith by the shedding
of their blood and by enduring tortures of every description.” Even
the heretics and schismatics admit the strength and power of the
Church, since they call her by no other name than Catholic, a title which
is given to her by all the world.” The moral effect which the teachings
of the Church have produced on the lives of those who have embraced
them is a clear proof of the grandeur of her doctrine. It is no longer
a matter of surprise to see thousands of young men and maidens
renouncing marriage and leading lives of eminent purity.” Vast num
bers of her children live in the world without being contaminated by
it, for they follow the advice of the Apostle: “Love not the world nor
the things which are in the world. . . . For all that is in the world is the
concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and
the pride of life.” This last point which Augustine stresses could,
156 Ibid., c. XXIV, n. 45 (XXXIV, 141).
157 Ibid., c. XXV, n. 46 (XXXIV, 142).
158 Ibid., c. XXV, n. 47 (XXXIV, 142). Augustine explains in the Retracta
tiones, L. I, c. XIII, n. 7 (XXXII, 604-605) that it is not to be understood
that miracles are not now performed in the name of Christ. He cites some
which he himself had witnessed at Milan.
15° De vera religione, c. III, n. 5 (XXXIV, 125).
160 Ibid., c. VII, n. 12 (XXXIV, 128).
161 Ibid., c. III, n. 5 (XXXIV, 125).
182 1 John, II, 15-16.
204 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

at least theoretically, be the boast of the Neo-Platonist as well as of

the Catholic Christian since the renunciation of sensible pleasures and
the practice of chastity were strongly advocated by Plotinus.
Augustine mentions six stages through which the new man, that is,
the man who is regenerated by faith and who lives under the influence
of the new dispensation, passes before he arrives at the enjoyment of
eternal rest with God.” In the first, he is nourished by the good
examples which authority presents to him. In the second stage he passes
from the bosom of authority and by means of reason begins to rise to
the highest and immutable law. In the third, he no longer finds it
difficult to lead a good life and he takes no pleasure in sin. In the
next stage he makes rapid progress in the way of perfection and is
able to endure the persecutions, trials, and difficulties of this life. The
fifth stage is marked by great peace and tranquillity, since in this period
the new man lives in the enjoyment of the highest and ineffable wis
dom. In the sixth, he enters into eternal life and takes on the perfect
form which was made to the image and likeness of God. To these may
be added a seventh stage in which he enjoys eternal happiness. Thus
the end of the new man is everlasting life.”
In addition to the way of authority Divine Providence has given
man another path by which he may advance “from visible things to
those that are invisible and from the temporal to the eternal.” Rea
son, the eye of the soul, passing judgment on material objects, all of
which are good and beautiful though mutable and contingent, is con
vinced of the superiority of that which is eternal and unchanging.
It ought not be useless and in vain [Augustine says] to behold
the beauty of the heavens, the order of the stars, the brightness
of light, the change of day and night, the monthly cycles of
the moon, the fourfold arrangement of the year, the harmony
of the four elements, the great power of seeds, and the numer
ous species of things that are produced, and all things .
ing their own proper order and nature, each in its own kind.”
168 Cp. De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII, n. 70-76 (XXXII, 1073-1077); De
Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. XXIV, n. 42—c. XXV, n. 43 (XXXIV,
193-194).
164 De vera religione, c. XXVI, n. 48-49 (XXXIV, 143-144).
165 Ibid., c. XXIX, n. 52 (XXXIV, 1.45).
166 Ibid., c. XXIX, n. 52 (XXXIV, 145): “Non enim frustra et inaniter in
tueri oportet pulchritudinem coeli, ordinem siderum, candorem lucis, dierum
et noctium vicissitudines, lunae menstrua curricula, anni quadrifariam tem
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 205

By pondering over these sensible things the reason is not indulging

in vain curiosity, but from the consideration of the things that change
it rises to the knowledge of that which is immortal and not subject to
alteration.” Through its faculty of reason the soul has a recognition
of equality, similitude, unity, of those things of which it can form no
conception through the eyes of the body.” Hence it judges that its
own nature is superior to that of the body. But it judges by a law
that itself does not possess since it, as well as the body, is liable to
change. Therefore the soul knows that above itself is a nature that is
unchangeable, the first Life, the first Essence, the first Wisdom; namely,
God, the immutable Truth, by Whom it is enabled to judge truly of
all other things.”
In the dedication of his treatise to Romanianus, Augustine briefly
outlines for his friend the tenets to which Catholic Christians sub
scribe and which they accept at first on the authority of the Church,
as expressed in the Holy Scriptures. The mind purified by faith accepts
and understands, in so far as it is possible in the present life, the doc
trine of the Trinity. Christians believe that every creature, no matter
to what order it may belong, spiritual or material, owes its existence
to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The work of creation is
not limited to any one of the Divine Persons, but belongs entirely to
the triune God. When we say that all things were made by God, we
do not mean, Augustine observes, that one part of the creature was
made by the Father, another by the Son, and still another by the Holy
Spirit, but that each and every nature was created by the Father through
His Son in the gift of His Holy Spirit.” God has been pleased to
imprint, so to speak, the seal of the Blessed Trinity on everything
which He created, for every nature or substance, of whatever rank it
perationem, quadripartitis elementis congruentem, tantam vim seminum
species numerosque gignentium, et omnia in suo genere modum proprium
naturamdue servantia.”
167 Ibid., c. XXIX, n. 52 (XXXIV, 1.45).
168 Ibid., c. XXX, n. 55 (XXXIV, 146): “Porro ipsa vera aequalitas ac simili
tudo, atque ipsa vera et prima unitas, non oculis carneis, neque ullo tali
sensu, sed mente intellecta conspicitur.”
169 Ibid., c. XXXI, n. 57 (XXXIV, 147).
170 Ibid., c. VII, n. 13 (XXXIV, 129): ". . . non ut aliam partem totius
creaturae fecisse intelligatur Pater, et aliam Filius, et aliam Spiritus Sanctus,
sed et simul omnia et unamquamgue naturam Patrem fecisse per Filium in
dono Spiritus sancti.”
206 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

may be, has three characteristics: it possesses a unity of its own; it

has a beauty peculiar to itself and distinct from that of all other things;
it remains in the order to which it belongs.”
Augustine expresses the same idea in another passage in which he
accounts for the contingency and mutability of all created things. If it
should be asked why things are subject to change, he says, the answer
is quite simple; namely, because they do not belong to the highest
order of being. And why not? Because they are inferior to Him by
Whom they were made, God, the eternal Trinity, Who gave them
their being and in His goodness preserves that which He has given
them. Whence did He make them? From nothing, and He gave all
things which He created a being that is good. Even that which is low
est in the scale of being, the formless matter which He created in the
beginning, is good, since it exists from Him Who is the Highest
Good.172
Relying on the authority of faith, Christians also believe in the
Incarnation of the Son of God, that He was born of a Virgin, that
He died for us, arose from the dead, and ascended into Heaven where
He is seated at the right hand of the Father. They believe in the for
giveness of sins, in the day of judgment, in the resurrection of the
body. All these truths are first accepted by faith and then justified
by reason.”
In this profession of faith we find every article of the Apostles'
Creed expressed almost completely in content, if not in the language in
which we have it in its present form.
Elsewhere Augustine explains at greater length the doctrine of the
Incarnation and sketches the public life of Christ, contrasting His
ideals with those of carnal men. The Divine dispensation orders all
things in a manner truly marvelous. In consulting for the welfare of the
human race, the Wisdom of God, that is to say, His only Son, con
substantial and eternal with the Father, deigned to assume human
nature in its entirety.” By so doing, He gave evidence of the nobility
and excellence of the nature possessed by His creature, man. It was
not an ethereal body which He assumed, tempered in such a way that
171 Ibid., c. VII, n. 13 (XXXIV, 129).
172 Ibid., c. XVIII, n. 55 (XXXIV, 137).
178 Ibid., c. VIII, n. 14 (XXXIV, 129).
174 Ibid., c. XVI, n. 30 (XXXIV, 134).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 207

human eye could bear to look at it, but He appeared among men as
a real man, for the nature which He was to redeem had to be assumed
by Him. In other words, Augustine holds that the Incarnation of the
Son of God was necessary in the economy of the salvation of the
human race.”
In His dealings with man, Augustine continues, Christ did nothing
by force,” but respected the gift of free will which had been bestowed
upon man at the time of his creation. Thus He terminated the servi
tude of the Ancient Law and inaugurated the liberty of the New Cove
nant. He established His divinity by miracles and by the suffering
which He underwent for man. He devoted most of his time to in
structing the vast crowds that followed Him, not even interrupting his
instructions, as the Evangelist tells us, to speak to His mother when
she came to Him,” although He was ever submissive to His human
parents. His divinity was manifested in His doctrine; His humanity, in
His life. Through His mother's request, with reluctance, as it were, He
performed His miracle of changing water into wine for, as He re
marked to her, His hour had not yet come.” When it did arrive,
from the cross He commended her to the care of His disciple for
whom He had a special love.” The life of the Son of God was a
marked contrast to that of worldlings. They desire riches; He willed
to be poor. They crave for honor and power; He was unwilling to
become king. Engulfed in pride, they have an abhorrence for insult;
He endured every kind of contumely. They regard injuries as unbear
able, detest corporeal suffering, fear death; He, though just and inno
cent, was condemned to death, was scourged, and suffered the igno
minious death of crucifixion. Thus He showed the vanity and worth
lessness of that which worldly men desire to have and the true value
of suffering those things which they try to avoid.” Such a picture of
the sufferings and death of a Divine Being for mankind would indeed
175 Ibid., c. XVI, n. 30 (XXXIV, 134-135).
** In the Retractationes, L. I, c. XIII, n. 6 (XXXII, 604), Augustine qualifies
this statement by citing Christ's driving the money changers out of the
Temple.
177 Matthew, XII, 48.
178 John, II, 6.
179 Ibid., XIX, 26-27.
180 De vera religione, c. XVI, n. 31 (XXXIV, 135).
208 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

be repugnant to Plotinus who maintains that “not even a God would

have the right to deal a blow for the unwarlike.”
On the day of Judgment He Who at His temporal birth came in
humility will have a second advent in the midst of splendor, when, as
the Apostle says, “we shall all arise but shall not all be changed.”
In the case of those who have lived well, the body of the old man
which during life they attempted to heal will be entirely transformed
into that of the new. The wicked also will arise who, from the begin
ning to the end of their existence, made no effort to put on the new
man, that is, the spiritual man, but they will be precipitated into a
second death.” Those who have made bad use of the senses and the
intellect which were given them, who have centered their thoughts and
their affections upon visible and passing things rather than on those
which are intelligible and eternal, will be cast into exterior darkness
where there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. They loved the
world and the things of the world instead of loving God. But they
who have used the senses of the body for proclaiming the works of
God and for increasing their love for Him, and who have devoted
their thoughts and actions to establishing peace in their own souls and
to knowing God better will enter into the joy of their Lord.” The
risen body of those who have attained salvation will be restored to the
stability which it formerly enjoyed before the sin of Adam.” It will
be incorruptible and immortal. For these it will truly be said that death
is swallowed up in victory.”
Augustine severely reprehends the idolatry and polytheism of the
pagan schools. Notwithstanding the variety of opinions which these
philosophers theoretically held in regard to the nature of God, they
had their temples in common and worshipped many gods, even though
in private some of them taught that there is only one God. Socrates,
it is true, had more courage than the others and ridiculed the false
181 Plotinus, Enneads, III, ii, 8.
182 1 Corinthians, XV, 51.
* De vera religione, c. XXVII, n.50 (XXXIV, 144).
184 Ibid., c. LIV, n. 104-106 (XXXIV, 168-169).
** In the Retractationes, L. I, c. XIII, n. 4 (XXXII, 603), Augustine shows
that the risen body will have greater perfection in that it will not need to be
sustained by corporeal nourishment, but will be spiritualized. Cf. De musica,
L. VI, n. 13 (XXXII, 1170).
* De vera religione, c. XII, n. 25 (XXXIV, 133).
 *

CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 209

worship of his day, but even he and his disciple, Plato, whose writings
are more enjoyable than persuasive, did not convert the people from
their superstitious practices and from the vanity of the world to the
worship of the one true God. Socrates himself joined with the people
in their worship of idols.” The Christian religion, which is the way of
truth and happiness, not only has led to the worship of the one true
God vast numbers throughout the world, but has taught them to appre
ciate and love the superior beauty of the intelligible world which is not
subject to change, and to contemn sensible things which, although they
possess a certain kind of beauty and goodness, yet because they are not
permanent and lasting, should be despised in comparison with that
which always endures. Indeed, the Christian religion has accomplished
results which Plato would have believed impossible of attainment among
men.” If he and others whose teachings were in conformity with
his could again come to life and behold vast throngs believing in and
centering their affection upon spiritual goods, if they could behold
the Christian churches filled and the pagan temples deserted, they
would say: “These are the things which we could not persuade the
people [to accept] and we yielded to their customs, instead of bringing
them to our faith and will.” And, Augustine observes, “they would
see by whose authority men are more easily advised and, changing a few
words and opinions, they would become Christians as very many Pla
tonists in more recent times and in our own day have done.”

E. Epistulae
The ten letters (Epistulae V-XIV inclusive) which are assigned to
the years 388 and 389 A.D. by the Benedictine Editors of the writings
of Augustine represent the correspondence carried on between him
and his devoted friend, Nebridius. Of these letters, seven were written
by Augustine and three by Nebridius.
187 Ibid., c. II, n. 2 (XXXIV, 123).
188 Ibid., c. III, n. 4-5 (XXXIV, 124-125).
189 Ibid., c. IV, n. 6 (XXXIV, 126): "Haec sunt quae nos persuadere populis
non ausi sumus, et eorum potius consuetudini cessimus, quam illos in nos
tram fidem voluntatemque traduximus.”
190 Ibid., c. IV, n. 7 (XXXIV, 126): “Itaque si hanc vitam illi viri nobiscum
rursum agere potuissent, viderent profecto cujus auctoritate facilius consule
retur hominibus, et paucis mutatis verbis atque sententiis christiani fierent,
sicut plerique recentiorum nostrorumque temporum Platonici fecerunt.”
210 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

In the sixth letter Nebridius expresses the intense pleasure afforded

him by the letters of Augustine which, he says, he preserves with the
utmost care because of the important subjects discussed in them and the
ability with which they are treated. “They will bring to my ear,” he
adds, “the voice of Christ, and the teachings of Plato and Plotinus.”
Nebridius then proposes a theory in regard to memory, which he re
quests his friend to criticize.
Augustine discusses at considerable length (Epistula VII) the prob
lem raised by Nebridius. In opposition to the opinion of the latter,
Augustine holds that memory can be exercised independently of images
presented by the imagination. The function of memory is twofold: to
retain that which belongs to the past and which is changeable by nature,
and also that which is permanent in character. For the former, sense
images are required but not for the latter, since what is permanent can
not rightly be said to have passed away. For example, no image is
required to introduce the thought of eternity to the mind and yet
it can not enter therein except by our remembering it. So it would seem
that in regard to some things, at least, memory has no dependence upon
images.
In developing his theory that memory can be spoken of as embrac
ing also those things which have not yet passed away, Augustine once
more” seems to give expression to a doctrine of reminiscence. He says:
Some men raise a groundless objection to that most famous
theory invented by Socrates, according to which the things that
we learn are not introduced to our minds as new, but brought
back to memory by a process of recollection; supporting their
objection by affirming that memory has to do only with things
which have passed away, whereas, as Plato himself has taught,
those things which we learn by the exercise of the understand
ing are permanent, and being imperishable, can not be num
bered among things which have passed away: the mistake into
which they have fallen arising obviously from this, that they
do not consider that it is only the mental act of apprehension
by which we have discerned these things which belongs to the
past; and that it is because we have, in the stream of mental
191 Epistulae, VI, 1 (XXXIII, 67): “Illae mihi Christum, illae Platonem, illae
Plotinum sonabunt.”
192 Cf. Soliloquia, L. II, c. XX, n. 35 (XXXII, 902-903); De quantitate ani
mae, c. X, n. 34 (XXII, 1055).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 211

activity, left these behind, and begun in a variety of ways to

attend to other things, that we require to return to them by an
effort of recollection, that is, by memory.”

In answer to the second question raised by Nebridius, Augustine

holds that images can be formed only of those things which are per
ceived through the senses of the body. The mind, he says, is incapable
of forming any images without using those fallacious instruments
through which the soul is assaulted by that which is mortal and fleet
ing.”
In the tenth letter Augustine discusses with Nebridius the means by
which it might be possible for them to live together, a desire which the
latter had frequently expressed in his letters to his friend. The continued
ill health of Nebridius prevented him from joining the group assembled
with Augustine at Tagaste, while the latter's numerous duties and his
weak constitution rendered it difficult for him often to journey to the
country residence of Nebridius. Besides, Augustine observes, plans and
arrangements required for frequent trips are a constant source of dis
traction and, therefore, an inadequate preparation for the last journey;
namely, death, which alone is really deserving of our consideration.
Hence, it behooves everyone to withdraw as much as possible from the
tumult of things that are passing away, in order, so to speak, to culti
vate an acquaintance with death and to experience joy rather than fear
at the thought thereof, not, however, through insensibility, presump
tion, pride, or superstitious credulity. He who dies to all affection for
earthly things, who has erected, as it were, a sanctuary within his in
most soul to which he retires as much as possible to worship God, as
is verified, Augustine believes, in the life of Nebridius, enjoys a calm
ness of spirit and an enduring peace which, for the most part, abide
with him even in the midst of his duties.” Here again we find Augus
tine, in agreement with Plotinus, advocating the withdrawal of the
mind, in so far as it is possible, from the perishable things of earth,
and the focusing of one's thoughts upon that which is permanent and
abiding.
193 #"; VII, c. I, n. 2 (XXXIII, 68).
194 Ibid., VII, c. II, n. 3-5 (XXXIII, 69-70).
195 Ibid., X, 1-3 (XXXIII, 73-74).
212 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

The subject treated in the next letter of Augustine (Epistula XI) is

the Incarnation of the Son of God. Nebridius had proposed the ques
tion as to why the Son, and not the Father, is said to have become
incarnate. Augustine explains that, according to Catholic faith, the
union of the Persons in the Trinity is so inseparable that whatever is
done by the Blessed Trinity is regarded as being done by the Father
and the Son and the Holy Spirit together. Nothing is done by the
Father which is not also done by the Son and the Holy Spirit, and
nothing by the Holy Spirit which is not also the work of the Father
and the Son, and nothing by the Son which is not also done by the
Father and the Holy Spirit.” From this it would seem to follow that
the entire Trinity assumed human nature for, if the Son did so, and
not the Father and the Holy Spirit, there would be something in which
They acted separately. Why, then, is the Incarnation ascribed only to
the Son 2197

Augustine ventures the following explanation on a subject which

he admits to be extremely difficult. Every nature, that is, every sub
stance, he says, exhibits three things: first, that it is; secondly, that it
is this or that; thirdly, that as far as possible it remains what it is.
The first of these three presents the original cause of the nature from
which all things exist; the second, the particular mode of existence it
possesses or the form according to which it is fashioned in a particular
way; the third indicates the permanence, so to speak, in which all
things are. Now, if it is possible, Augustine continues, that a thing can
be and yet not be this or that, and not remain in its own generic form;
or that it can be this or that and yet not be and not remain in its own
generic form, in so far as it is possible for it to do so; or that a thing
can remain in its own generic form and yet not be and not be this or
that, then it is also possible that in the Blessed Trinity one Person can
do something in which the others have no part. But since it is evident
that whatever is must be this or that, and must remain, in so far as is
possible, in its own generic form, it is also obvious that the three Per
sons individually do nothing in which All have not a part.”
However, just as each of the three questions in regard to every
nature mentioned above receives its name not from all the three, but
196 Cf. De vera religione, c. VII, n. 13 (XXXIV, 129).
197 Epistulae, XI, 2 (XXXIII, 75).
198 Ibid., XI, 3, (XXXIII, 76).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 213

from the special point toward which we are directing our attention, in
other words, just as we can think of one without thinking of the others,
although one necessarily involves the others, so, too, we can think of
special operations as being ascribed to the various Persons of the God
head, so as to distinguish One from each of the Others. Moreover, of
the three questions of which we have spoken, it is natural for us first
to seek to know what a thing is, in knowing which we know that by
which we can infer both that it exists and that it possesses a certain
quality of existence. Hence, it seems to have been necessary that a cer
tain norm or pattern of training be provided for man, as was effected
by means of the Incarnation which is properly ascribed to the Son, with
the result that through Him we can know the Father Himself, that is,
the first Principle from Whom all things have their being, and the
Holy Spirit Whose special function is to bestow upon us a certain in
terior and ineffable charm and sweetness (quaedam interior et in
effabilis ſuavitaſ et dulcedo) for remaining in that knowledge and
despising all mortal things.” This need of distinguishing the three
Divine Persons of the Trinity is due to the finite mind of man, or, as
Augustine expresses it in language decidedly Neo-Platonic, “to our
weakness who have fallen from unity into variety.”
The following letter (Epistula XII), only a fragment of which has
been preserved, is devoted to the same subject; namely, why the Incar
nation is ascribed to the Second Person of the Trinity. The extract con
cludes with the statement that whatsoever was done by the Son of God
Who assumed the nature of man had for its purpose our knowledge
and instruction.”
In the next communication with Nebridius (Epistula XIII) Augus
tine imparts to his friend a few thoughts which occurred to him in re
gard to a question which had frequently agitated them, a question,
he says, “pertaining to a body or kind of body which belongs per
petually to the soul, and which . . . is called by some its vehicle.”
199 Ibid., XI, 4 (XXXIII, 76-77).
200 Ibid., XI, 4 (XXXIII, 77): “Ergo cum agantur omnia summa com
munione et inseparabilitate, tamen distincte demonstranda erant propter im
becillitatem nostram, qui ab unitate in varietatem lapsi sumus.”
201 Ibid., XII, 1 (XXXIII, 77).
*02 Ibid., XIII, 2 (XXXIII, 78): “Necesse est te meminisse quod crebro inter
nos sermone jactatum est nosque jactavit anhelantes atque aestuantes, de
animae scilicet vel perpetuo quodam corpore, vel quasi corpore, quod a non
nullis etiam dici vehiculum recordaris.”
214 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Since it is manifest that the body moves from place to place, it is not
something that can be known by the intellect and whatever is not
known by the intellect cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be known.
However, if something lies within the province of the senses, it is
possible to form an opinion approximating the truth in regard to that
object. But since the body is beyond the province both of the intellect
and senses, it seems useless to waste time speculating upon what can
be known concerning it. “Why, then,” he concludes, “do we not
finally dismiss this unimportant question and with prayer to God raise
ourselves to the supreme serenity of the highest existing Nature?”
In the final letter (Epistula XIV) written to Nebridius, Augustine
discusses two questions which had been proposed in a recent letter
from his friend, both of which seem to be important for our present
purpose. Why is it, Nebridius had asked him, that they, although
separate individuals, do many things which are the same, whereas the
sun does not the same as the other heavenly bodies? Augustine assures
him that the sun also does many things which the other heavenly bodies
do. If, however, it is a matter of surprise to him that the sun alone
of all the heavenly bodies furnishes the light of day, who, Augustine
asks his friend by a comparison of a much higher order, has ever been
manifested to men as being so great as that Man Whom God took into
union with Himself in an entirely different way than He had taken all
other holy and wise men that ever lived? If one were to compare Him
with other wise men, He surpasses them by a superiority far greater
than that by which the sun excels the other heavenly bodies.”
Nebridius had also asked whether the Divine Mind contains an idea
of each individual human being or merely of mankind in general.
Augustine expresses as his opinion that, in the beginning when God
created man, there was in the mind of Him by Whom all things were
made an idea only of man in general but, as time elapsed, there was
also in the mind of God the idea of each and every human being whom
He made. In order to clarify somewhat this matter which he admits
to be obscure, Augustine suggests an illustration taken from geometry.
The idea of an angle is one thing, that of a square is another. When
203 Ibid., XIII, 2 (XXXIII, 78): "Cur ergo, quaeso te, non nobis ad hanc
quaestiunculam indicinus ferias, et nos totos imprecato Deo in summam
serenitatem naturae summae viventis attollimus?”
204 Ibid., XIV, 2-3 (XXXIII, 79-80).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 215

ever I construct an angle, the idea of that particular angle alone is in

my mind, but I can not draw a square unless I fix my attention upon
the idea of four angles at the same time. In like manner, every man,
considered as an individual, has been made according to the idea proper
to himself, but in the making of a nation, although the idea according
to which it is made is also one, it is at the same time the idea not of
one, but of many men collectively.” The doctrine of the humanity of
Christ, as expressed in this letter, is quite out of harmony with Neo
Platonic thought; so, too, is that of the Divine knowledge of indi
viduals, which Augustine attempts to explain to Nebridius. Plotinus's
idea of a universal providence would seem to reject the notion of
the Divine knowledge of things in their distinction from one another.
In a letter to Romanianus (Epistula XV) written after the comple
tion of the treatise De vera religione,” Augustine urges his wealthy
patron to make good use of the leisure which he is enjoying and to
employ well the temporal blessings of which he is but the steward,
since detachment from the perishable goods which one possesses pro
cures for him the recompense of eternal blessings. “Let us, therefore,”
Augustine exhorts Romanianus, “disengage ourselves from care about
the passing things of time; but let us seek the blessings that are im
perishable and sure; let us soar above our worldly possessions. The
bee does not the less need its wings when it has gathered an abundant
store; for if it sinks in the honey, it dies.”
The last three letters which are assigned by the Benedictine Editors
of the works of Augustine to the period preceding his ordination were
written to Celsinus, Gaius, and Antoninus, respectively.
In his letter to Celsinus (Epistula XVIII) Augustine suggests a few
thoughts on the three classes under which all beings are to be grouped.
The first includes corporeal beings, which are susceptible to change in
respect to both time and place. The second consists of spiritual beings,
which are subject to change only in regard to time. The third comprises
that Being which is in no way mutable; namely, God Whose nature is
205 Ibid., XIV, 4 (XXXIII, 80).
208 Ibid., XV, 1 (XXXIII, 81): “Scripsi quiddam de catholica religione, quan
tum Dominus dare dignatus est, quod tibi volo ante adventum meum mittere,
si charta interim non desit.”
297 Ibid., XV, 2 (XXXIII, 81): “Laxatis ergo curis mutabilium rerum, bona
stabilia et certa quaeramus, supervolemus terrenis opibus nostris. Nam et in
mellis copia, non frustra pennas habet apicula; necat enim haerentem.”
216 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

essential blessedness. The beings that belong to the intermediate class

are happy if they are devoted to God, but most wretched when they
stoop to that nature which is lowest. “He who believes in Christ,”
Augustine remarks by way of conclusion,” does not sink his affections
in that which is lowest, is not proudly self-sufficient in that which is
intermediate, and thus he is qualified for union and fellowship with
that which is Highest; this is the sum of the active life to which we
are commanded, admonished, and by holy zeal impelled to aspire.”
Gaius, whom Augustine characterizes as a good and remarkably gifted
man, apparently is being attracted to the Church by instructions given
him by Augustine. The latter bids him carefully to study the writings
which he is sending to him, and if he finds anything faulty in them,
to attribute it to the frailty of their author. If, however, he finds him
self convinced of their truth, Augustine urges him to attribue it to Him
Who is the Source of truth, since no one discerns the truth from any.
thing which the manuscript contains or from the author, but rather
from something within himself, “if the light of truth, shining with a
clearness beyond what is men's common lot, and very far removed from
the darkening influence of the body, has penetrated his own mind.”
The last letter (Epistula XX) appearing in the Benedictine Edition
of the letters of Augustine before he assumes the title of presbyter, was
written to Antoninus whose esteem and affection for Augustine evi
dently were very great. The latter begs Antoninus to pray for him and,
in turn, promises to remember his friend in prayer, “for intercession
on behalf of a brother,” he says, “is more acceptable to God when it
is offered as a sacrifice of love.” After expressing the wish that “the
one true faith and worship, which alone is Catholic" may prosper in
the household of his friend and after promising to assist him in what
ever way is possible, Augustine concludes his letter by exhorting
Antoninus to labor diligently by word and instruction to instil an in
telligent fear of God within the heart of his wife. “For it is scarcely
208 Ibid., XVIII, 2 (XXXIII, 85-86): "Qui Christo credit, non diligit in
fimum, non superbit in medio, atque ita summo inhaerere fit idoneus: et hoc
est totum quod agere jubemur, movemur, accendimur.”
209 Ibid., XIX, 1 (XXXIII, 86): "Nemo enim quod legit, in codice ipso cernit
verum esse, aut in eo qui scripserit; sed in se potius, si ejus menti quoddam
non vulgariter candidum, sed a faece corporis remotissimum lumen veritatis
impressum est.” Cp. De magistro, c. XIV, n. 46 (XXXII, 1220).
210 Epistulae, XX, 2 (XXXIII, 87).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 217

possible,” Augustine says, “that anyone who is concerned for his soul's
welfare, and is therefore without prejudice resolved to know the will
of the Lord, should fail, when enjoying the guidance of a good in
structor, to discern the difference which exists between every form of
schism and the one Catholic Church.”
In these last few letters Augustine stresses the doctrine which holds
so prominent a place in his writings of this period, and one which
Plotinus likewise emphasizes; namely, detachment from the things of
sense and a deep appreciation for those which are imperishable. More
over, Augustine's diction in these letters, as well as in his other cor
respondence of this interval, is often strikingly reminiscent of the
founder of Neo-Platonism. In the final letter, however, the doctrine
of intercessory prayer, as has already been pointed out,” indicates
a different notion of man's relation to God from that which seems to
be characteristic of Neo-Platonism.

211 Ibid., XX, 3 (XXXIII, 87): "Nemo enim fere sollicitus de statu animae
suae, atque ob hoc sine pertinacia inquirendae voluntati Domini intentus est,
qui bono demonstratore usus non dignoscat quid inter schisma quodlibet
atque unam Catholicam intersit.”
212 Cf. Chapter III, B, C.
 CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In the development of our criteria for distinguishing Christianity

from Neo-Platonism we showed that the religion founded by Christ
and the philosophy established by Plotinus differ from each other in
three essential points: in their doctrine of God, in their theory of the
origin of the universe, in their teaching on the nature and destiny of
man. We are now prepared to summarize the results of the application
of this objective norm to the writings produced by Augustine from the
time of his retreat at Cassiciacum until he assumed the duties of the
priesthood at Hippo.

A. Evidences of Christianity
I. THE NATURE OF GOD IN GENERAL

The treatises of this period provide ample evidence that Augustine

believed in a personal God, a Creator, in Whom is a trinity of Persons
in every respect equal. The personal character of God and the personal
relation existing between Him and man is manifested in Augustine's
concept of prayer, especially that of petition and intercession. So im
portant is the rôle which he assigns to prayer, that in almost every
treatise some mention is made of the Divine assistance required by man,
or of the efficacy of prayer either for the petitioner himself or for some
one else for whom the prayer is being offered. In every case the idea
of the need of positive assistance is implied, which would be meaning
less were the prayer addressed to a Being which is merely an abstract
Principle whose nature is such that It can in no way be affected by
anything below it. God is helping us, Augustine says in his earliest
completed work, as we strive for the attainment of perfect happiness."
He reminds Romanianus, the counsellor and patron of his youth, who
has met with temporal reverses, that men not only should struggle
against adversity by the practice of virtue, but especially should implore
the Divine aid with reverence and devotion. He promises to pray for
strength and wisdom for his generous friend whom he likewise urges
to join with him in prayer, bidding him not to give up hope that our
1 De beata vita, c. IV, n. 35 (XXXII, 976).
 S
CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST
EO-P 2 `- 219

prayers can be heard.” He begs his mother, whose purity of heart and
love for wisdom render her intercession particularly efficacious, to offer
her prayers for him and his companions.” God must be invoked in
prayer Who, if implored, will not fail to guide our intellect in the
path of truth.” It is He Who makes us understand what we have
already accepted on authority.” Depending on Him and therefore pray
ing for help from Him, we can be confident of advancing safely on
the path of reasoning." In writing to a friend Augustine begs his
prayers, and promises, in turn, to pray for him, "since intercession in
behalf of a brother is more acceptable to God when it is offered as a
sacrifice of love.”
The most beautiful prayer belonging to the treatises of this period
is the long and fervent petition which marks the opening of the Solilo
quia." It is a prayer of yearning desire and aspiration, of fervent peti
tion and supplication, of humble and repentant love, an expression of
utter helplessness and dependence upon God, concluding with a re
quest for faith, hope, and charity. A prayer of this kind would have
no meaning or purpose, were it not addressed to a Being Who knows
and loves the pleader and Who is able to hear the prayer and render
the desired aid. Hence it seems evident that Augustine believed in a
personal God and in a personal relationship between Him and man.”
It would be futile to address a petition for assistance to the Highest
Principle, the God of Neo-Platonism, for He is beyond all existence,
beyond all thought, beyond all activity.” The prayer of supplication
could have no effect whatever on such a Deity. As Inge remarks: “Ploti
nus would have us approach the higher spiritual powers by contempla
tion and meditation without proffering any requests. . . . The only
2 Contra Academicos, L. II, c. I, n. 1-2 (XXXII, 919-920).
3 De ordine, L. I, c. XI, n. 32 (XXXII, 994); L. II, c. XX, n. 52 (XXXII,
1019-1020).
* De quantitate animae, c. VII, n. 12—c. VIII, n. 13 (XXXII, 1042).
5 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. II, n. 4 (XXXII, 1224).
6 Ibid., L. I, c. VI, n. 14 (XXXII, 1228).
7 Epistulae, XX, 2 (XXXIII, 87).
8 Soliloquia, L. I, c. I, n. 2-7 (XXXII, 869-872).
° One can not agree, therefore, with P. Alfaric who in his L'évolution intellec
tuelle de saint Augustin, p. 527 observes: “S'il (Augustin) était mort après
avoir rédigé les Soliloques ou le traité De la quantité de l'ame on ne le con
sidèrerait que comme un Néoplatonicien convaincu, plus ou moins teinté de
Christianisme.”
19 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, I, vii, 1; V, i, 6; VI, ix, 6; VI, vii, 37; V, vi, 5.
220 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

prayers that seem to be worthy of the name are the unspoken yearnings
of the soul for a closer walk with God.”
Even the gods of the spiritual world and the lower orders of
Divine beings to whom the Neo-Platonist was wont to pray have no
personal interest in the affairs of men. Such petitions, in the words
of Bréhier, were only “a magic formula which produced its effect
necessarily, not because the gods desired it, but in virtue of the sym
pathy which links together all parts of the world. But prayer had never
a personal accent; it never expressed an intimate relation of the soul
with a superior person.” Augustine's concept of prayer, then, unques
tionably is different from that of Neo-Platonism. It possesses all the
qualities requisite for a Christian mode of prayer.
This personal Deity is a Creator Who, Augustine says in one brief,
vigorous statement, "did make out of nothing this world which the
eyes of all perceive to be most beautiful.” He is the Creator of all
things that are,” Who fashioned all things because He willed to do
so,” not by any necessity of His nature. And that which He created He
rules and governs by a most just providence.” “He did not make and
go away and leave the result to itself,” but He exercises a personal
providence over the universe. This providence is but the continuation
of His creative act. “If You abandon [man], he perishes: but You do
not desert him because You are the Highest Good, and no one seeking
You aright has failed to find You.” His watchful care extends to
every human being whom He has created, as Augustine beautifully ex
11 W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, II, 200-201.
12 E. Bréhier, La philosophie de Plotin, p. 114-115: “Le prière . . . qu’elle est
si fréquente non seulement dans la judaisme alexandrin, mais chez les derniers
philosophes paiens, se réduit, soit à une concentration intérieure de l'ame qui
cherche sa propre essence, soit à une formule magique qui produit nécessaire
ment son effet, non pas parce que les dieux l'ont voulu, mais en vertu de la
sympathie qui lie ensemble les parties du monde. Mais le prière n'a jamais
un accent personnel; elle n'exprime jamais un rapport intime de l'ame avec
une personne supérieure.” Cf. J. Guitton, Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin
et ſaint Augustin, (Paris: Boivin et Cie, 1933), p. 255; also E. Hendriks,
Augustins Verhältnis zur Mystik (Würzburg: Rita Verlag u. Druckerei,
1936), p. 182.
18 Soliloquia, L. I, c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 869).
** De quantitate animae, c. XXXIV, n. 77 (XXXII, 1077); c. XXXIII, n. 76
(XXXII, 1077).
15 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. II, n. 4 (XXXIV, 175).
* De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII, n. 73 (XXXII, 1075).
** De immortalitate animae, c. VIII, n. 14 (XXXII, 1028).
* Soliloquia, L. I, c. I, n. 6 (XXXII, 872).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 221

plains to Romanianus, directing all the circumstances of his life in a

manner most conducive to his welfare. It is absolutely certain, Augus
tine tells his friend, that Divine Providence extends even to us and
therefore is treating you according to your deserts.” There was present
in the Divine Mind, he writes to Nebridius, an idea of every human
being whom He made.” And since the Divine will governs and directs
all things, nothing happens contrary to whatever He desires.”
II. THE TRINITY

In this God is a trinity of Persons in every respect equal. In the

earliest treatise of this period Augustine expresses in the abstract, im
personal language of Neo-Platonism, it is true, the doctrine of the con
substantiality and therefore of the equality of the Highest Measure, of
the Truth that proceeds from it, and of That which conducts to Truth.
“These three reveal one God and one substance to those who know
Him.” Shortly afterwards in the discussion on the order which reigns
in the universe, Augustine rebukes Trygetius for saying that the name
of God is, strictly speaking, applied only to the Father.” The one
Supreme God consists of a consubstantial, unchangeable Trinity from
Whom, by Whom, and in Whom are all things.” The creation of the
world is the joint work of the three Divine Persons. Catholic Chris
tians believe that every creature, whether spiritual or corporeal, owes
its existence to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit,” among Whom
a relation of equality exists.” There is a clearly defined difference in
the mind of Augustine—a difference which he seems purposely to
emphasize—between creating and generating. God created all things
out of nothing. “He did not, however, create from Himself, but con
ceived [from His own substance] what is equal to Himself, Him
Whom we call the only Son of God.” Again, he observes that God
19 Contra Academicos, L. I, c. I, n. 1 (XXXII, 906).
20 Epistulae, XIV, 4 (XXXIII, 80).
21 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. II, c. XXIX, n. 43 (XXXIV, 220).
22 De beata vita, c. IV, n. 35 (XXXII, 976).
* De ordine, L. I, c. X, n. 29 (XXXII, 991).
* De musica, L. VI, c. XVII, n. 59 (XXXII, 1193-1194). De moribus ec
clesiae catholicae, c. XIV, n. 24 (XXXII, 1321).
* De vera religione, c. VII, n. 13 (XXXIV, 128-129). Epistulae, XI, 2
(XXXIII, 75).
* De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. XIII, n. 23 (XXXII, 1321).
* De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. II, n. 5 (XXXII, 1224).
 222 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

did not beget (genuit) all things, but that He made them out of
nothing, so that they would not be equal to Himself by Whom they
were made, nor to His Son through Whom they were made, nor to
one another.” Hence the Trinity in which Augustine believed is un
questionably the Christian Godhead and not the Neo-Platonic Deity in
which the Nous is inferior to the One” and the World-Soul unequal
in dignity to the second Principle.
III. THE INCARNATION

The doctrine of the Incarnation is frequently mentioned by Augus

tine. He assures his listeners that Christ, the Son of God, is rightly
called God.” The Sacred Mysteries teach us that the most high God in
His humility and mercy deigned to assume the lowly nature of man.”
When by Divine aid the rational soul of man will have arrived at the
seventh degree of its power, he will contemn those who ridicule the
doctrine of the Sacred Humanity of Christ, who laugh at the idea that
the Son of God was born of a Virgin in order to become the exemplar
of men and direct them in the path of salvation.” In the sixth age
of the world's history Christ, the eternal Word, assumed a human body
and came to dwell among men.” By so doing He did not lose His
Divine nature, but assumed, in addition, that of an inferior, the nature
of man. He was conceived by the Holy Spirit and was born of the
Virgin Mary.” By subjecting Himself thus to the weakness of human
nature, He emptied Himself, as the Apostle says.” In order to repair
28 De Genes; contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. II, n. 4 (XXXIV, 175). Cp. De mori
bus Manichaeorum, c. II, n. 3-4, 6 (XXXII, 1346); c. VII, n. 9 (XXXII,
1349).
29 Hence one finds it difficult to agree with P. Henry when he says that one of
the reasons why Augustine was attracted to Plotinus was that in the philosophy
of the latter the doctrine of the Logos was in conformity with the teaching of
the Church on the Word, as preached by Ambrose. Cf. P. Henry, La vision
d'Ostie (Paris, J. Vrin, 1938), p. 77: "C'est ſqui séduit Augustin] la con
formité de la doctrine de Logos avec l'enseignement de l'Église sur le Verbe
préché par Ambroise.” Augustine holds that the Father is God and that the
Son also is God. Plotinus denies divinity to the first Hypostasis. The One is
more than God, if this term is applied to the second Hypostasis.
30 De ordine, L. I, c. X, n. 29 (XXXII, 991).
31 Ibid., L. II, c. V, n. 16 (XXXII, 1002).
** De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII, n. 76 (XXXII, 1077).
* De Genesi contra Mamichaeos, L. I, c. XXIII, n. 40 (XXXIV, 192).
34 Ibid., L. II, c. XXIV, n. 37 (XXXIV, 215-216); De moribus eccleſiae cath
olicae, c. XIX, n. 36 (XXXII, 1326).
35 Philippians, II, 17.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 223

the wound which human nature received in consequence of the first

sin, and which resulted in the corruptibility of the body, the Wisdom
of God deigned in a wonderful manner to take upon Himself the
nature of man. He willed to be born, to suffer, and to die as other
men. By this amazing act of humility, He, the sinless One, taught us to
be on our guard against pride, which was the cause of our misfortune.”
The Divine dispensation, Augustine tells us in the last treatise of
this period, orders all things in a manner that is indeed marvelous.
In order to repair the damage inflicted on human nature by the sin
of Adam, the only Son of God, eternal and consubstantial with the
Father, assumed in its entirety the nature of man. It was a real body
that he took upon Himself, in every way like that of man, not a
phantasmal or ethereal form which had merely the appearance of a
human body. Indeed, the Incarnation of the Son of God was necessary
in that the nature which was to be redeemed had to be assumed by
Him who willed to be its Redeemer.” In a letter to Nebridius Augus
tine remarks that it seems to have been necessary that a certain norm
or pattern of training (quaedam norma et regula disciplinae) be pro
vided for man in order that he might have a knowledge of the Trinity.
This was effected by the Incarnation which is properly ascribed to the
Son through Whom we know the Father and the Holy Spirit.*
There is no doubt, then, that Augustine at this time believed in the
doctrine of the Incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity, a dog
ma antagonistic to the entire trend of Neo-Platonic thought. In the
opinion of Plotinus the notion of God assuming a body would be
absurd, since even the human soul is enchained by the body.” It is
asleep when united to the body” and only becomes its true self, so to
speak, when it is wholly separated from that which is corporeal.
Moreover, the idea of God humiliating Himself, suffering, and dying
for man would indeed be repugnant to Plotinus. “The law,” he says,
"does not warrant the wicked in expecting that their prayers should
bring others to sacrifice themselves for their sakes; or that the gods
should lay aside the divine life in order to direct their daily concerns.”
36 De musica, L. VI, c. IV, n. 7 (XXXII, 1166-1167).
37 De vera religione, c. XVI, n. 30 (XXXIV, 134-135).
38 Epistulae, XI, n. 4 (XXXIII, 76).
39 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, II, ix, 7.
40 Ibid., III, vi, 6.
41 Ibid., III, ii, 9.
 224 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

IV. THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE

Augustine's teaching in regard to the origin of the universe is

thoroughly Christian, in that he affirms it to have been created by God,
a notion which is basic in Christianity, but wholly lacking in the doc
trine of Plotinus. No theory of creation can be discovered in Neo
Platonism. In the early treatises of Augustine we find brief statements
that the universe was created.” It was created out of nothing, not be
gotten as was the only Son of God Who is equal to Him by Whom
He was begotten.” Its existence is due to an act of the will of God, as
Augustine takes great pains to show in the anti-Manichaean treatises of
the period. It may be advantageous to quote the detailed explanation on
this point, which is found in his defense of Genesis, since it clearly
shows Augustine's position:
God did not beget from Himself those things [which He made]
so that they might be what He Himself is; but He made them
from nothing, that they might not be equal [to one another]
and that they might not be equal to Him by Whom they were
made; for it is just. If, therefore, they [the Manichaeans]
should say: Why did it please God to make heaven and earth?
the answer must be that they should first learn the power of the
human will who desire to know the will of God. For they seek
to know the causes of the will of God when the will of God
is itself the cause of all things that are. For if the will of
God has a cause, it is something that is antecedent to the will
of God, which it is sinful to believe. This reply, therefore, must
be given to him who asks why God made heaven and earth:
because He willed [to do so]. For the will of God is the cause
of heaven and earth, and hence the will of God is greater than
heaven and earth. Moreover, he who says: Why did God will to
make heaven and earth? is seeking for something greater than
the will of God; but nothing greater than it can be found.“
Such an explanation of the origin and cause of the universe is dia
metrically opposed to the necessitarian view which characterizes Neo
Platonism.
The mutability of creatures, Augustine explains, is due to the fact
that they owe their being to a Cause which is beyond themselves and
* Soliloquia, L. I, c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 869); De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII,
n. 76—c. XXXIV, n. 77 (XXXII, 1077).
** De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. II, n. 5 (XXXII, 1224).
** De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. II, n. 4 (XXXIV, 175).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 225

superior to themselves in the order of existence. Things which have a

greater or a less degree of goodness—and all created beings fall under
this category—are subject to corruption for the simple reason that they
are not God, the Highest Good, Who alone is not affected by change.
All other beings are imperfect and defective because of themselves
they are nothing. “God is that Good which can not be vitiated. But all
other good things are from Him, which can of themselves be vitiated
because of themselves they are nothing.” All things in the universe,
then, have some degree of goodness, though God willed that there be
found among them varying degrees of perfection. Even the formless
matter which was created by Him in the beginning is good, since He
made it with the capacity of receiving form.” Evil, therefore, can not
be attributed to the nature of material things. In this respect Augustine
is not in agreement with the doctrine of Plotinus who associates evil
with the nature of matter.”

V. MAN AND HIS DESTINY

Since man is a creature, like all other finite beings, he was created
by God. By nature he is composed of a spiritual soul and a material
body. In agreement with a classic definition, Platonic in its origin,
Augustine has a tendency to define man as a soul using a body. His
body, as well as all other material things, is good since it was created
by God Who fashioned the body of the father of the human race from
the slime of the earth and breathed into it the breath of life whence,
as the Sacred Writer observes,” man became a living soul.” It is
through this spiritual soul that he was made to the image and likeness
of God.60
Man was endowed by his Creator with a free will. The abuse of
this gift is the cause of all the moral evil in the world. “To the soul
* De vera religione, c. XIX, n. 37 (XXXIV, 137-138).
* Ibid., c. XVIII, n. 36 (XXXIV, 137).
* Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, I, viii, 7-8; I, viii, 10-12.
R. Jolivet, Le problème du mal d'après saint Augustin (Paris: G. Beau
chesne, 1936), points out what he calls the “irremediable scandal” in a system
such as that of Plotinus. Jolivet says, p. 149: "Si l'étre sensible et la matière
procèdent de Dieu par émanation naturelle ou par génération, le Bien essentiel
Se trouve étre l'auteur du mal essentiel.”
48 Genesis, II, 7.
* De Generi contra Manichaeof, L. II, c. VIII, n. 10 (XXXIV, 201).
* Ibid., L. I, c. XVII, n. 28 (XXXIV, 186).
226 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

indeed is given free choice . . . and yet free choice is so given to the
soul that doing anything by means of it disturbs not any part of the
Divine order and law.” Man was placed by God in the state of a
happy life; it was because of his own will that he fell into the hard
ships of this mortal life.” God so created him that he need not sin
unless he wills to do so.” Moral evil originated in man's disobedience
of the Divine law.” The body is not evil nor is it the cause of evil;
sin and the punishment of sin are the only things that rightly can be
called evil.” Both in soul and body man has been obliged to pay the
penalty of his disobedience which had its root in pride, since it was
to this vice that the devil, once a good angel, yielded,” as well as
the parents of the human race in the terrestrial paradise. They wished
to be equal to God and to be free from His dominion,” and thus they
brought upon themselves and their posterity a just penalty which should
be a warning to all men to avoid the great evil of pride.*
Even physical evils, Augustine declares in one passage, are due to
the sin of man. If God bade the earth to bring forth herbs, and fruit
trees to yield fruit, each according to its kind, who, the Manichaeans
inquire, is responsible for the thorns and poisonous herbs, and for the
trees that bear no fruit? These, Augustine replies, are the penalty in
flicted by Divine justice because of the sin of man. The earth was
cursed as a result of man's disobedience. Such things were made by
God after the commission of sin in order to remind man to withdraw
from evil and to be converted to God by obeying His precepts.” For
the most part, however, as has been pointed out in our analysis of the
treatises of this period, Augustine holds that the rational explanation
for physical evil lies in the fact that it has no positive being, but is
merely a lack, a negation which has its basis in the limitation of beings
that have not their existence from themselves.

* De quantitate animae, c. XXXVI, n. 80 (XXXII, 1079); De moribus Mani

chaeorum, c. VII, n. 9 (XXXII, 1349).
52 De libero arbitrio, L. I, c. XI, n. 21-22 (XXXII, 1233).
* De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. II, c. XXII, n. 34 (XXXIV, 213).
** De vera religione, c. XI, n. 21 (XXXIV, 131).
* Ibid., c. XII, n. 23 (XXXIV, 132).
* Ibid., c. XIII, n. 26 (XXXIV, 133).
* De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. II, c. XVII, n. 25 (XXXIV, 209).
* Ibid., L. II, c. XXI, n. 32—c. XXII, n. 33 (XXXIV, 213).
* Ibid., L. I, c. XIII, n. 19 (XXXIV, 182).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 227

Augustine's doctrine of moral evil, then, is quite in harmony with

the Christian notion of free will and sin. Man is free to sin or not to
sin. To the question proposed by the Manichaeans as to why God made
man when He knew that he would sin, Augustine replies that God
made him in such a way that he would not sin unless he willed to do
so:* Augustine, therefore, maintains that without liberty there could be
no sin, a notion which differs from the teaching of Plotinus who, while
attributing to man the responsibility of his evil deeds, insists that the
primary cause of evil in the soul is matter:
The cause, at once, of the weakness of the Soul and all its evil
is Matter. The evil of matter precedes the weakness, the vice;
it is Primal Evil. Even though the Soul itself submits to Matter
and engenders to it; if it becomes evil within itself by its com
merce with Matter, the cause is still the presence of Matter;
the Soul would never have approached Matter but that the pres
ence of Matter is the occasion of its earth life.”

Hence, in the words of Bigg, moral evil, as Augustine saw it, “is not
a disease, but a rebellion.”
Man's destiny is eternal life in which both soul and body will have a
share. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body is expressed in several
treatises of this period. When the soul will have arrived at the seventh
degree of its power, Augustine says in his treatise De quantitate animae,
doctrines which the Church commands us to believe will become intel
ligible. “We shall see also that the changes and vicissitudes of this
corporeal nature are so great while it is ruled by Divine law, that we
may hold even the resurrection of the body, which in part is believed
too late, in part not at all, as so certain that the rising of the sun, when
it has gone down, is not more sure to us.” Again, he says that the
health of the body will be certain and lasting when restored to the
stability it once possessed, a doctrine which is firmly believed before
it is understood.* Catholic Christians, he tells Romanianus, believe in
the resurrection of the body.” The risen bodies of the elect will be
60 Ibid., L. II, c. XXVIII, n. 42 (XXXIV, 218-219).
61 Plotinus, Enneads, I, viii, 11.
6° C. Bigg, Neoplatonism (New York: E. and J. B. Young and Co., 1895), p.
332.
* De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII, n. 76 (XXXII, 1077).
* De musica, L. VI, c. V, n. 13 (XXXII, 1170).
* De vera religione, c. VIII, n. 14 (XXXIV, 129).
º
228 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

incorruptible and immortal, and will be endowed with the perfection

which characterized the body of Adam in the terrestrial paradise before
he disobeyed the Divine mandate.” It seems evident, then, that Augus
tine believed in the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body.
That he experienced difficulty in understanding this dogma does not
disprove his acceptance of it on the authority of faith, as his statements
obviously indicate. The notion of the resuscitation of the material
body and of its sharing with the soul in the joys of a future life would
indeed be intolerable to a Neo-Platonist for whom the material body
is essentially evil.”

VI. FAITH AS A METHOD OF ARRIVING AT THE TRUTH

Augustine assigned great importance to the rôle of faith in the

economy of man's salvation. There are two ways by which man can
arrive at truth: the path of authority and that of reason. Human
authority is liable to error but Divine authority is true, reliable,
supreme.* It is centered in the Sacred Scriptures and in the teaching
body of the Church. Divine authority tells us that the wisdom of God
is none other than the Son of God.” After reading the books of Plato,
Augustine hastened to compare their authority with the authority of
those who handed down to us the Divine Mysteries.” In his efforts to
arrive at truth he has grasped more by faith, he tells Romanianus, than
he has comprehended by reason.” The books sent to him by his kind
patron directed his thoughts to the religion of his childhood.” He is
resolved never to depart from the authority of Christ, since no other is
more reliable.”
When authority is of the highest order, it is a direct and easy path
to the realm of truth.” Christian faith leads to the very apex of wis
dom.” When the soul in its ascent will have arrived at the vision and
86 Ibid., c. XII, n. 25 (XXXIV, 133).
67 Plotinus, Enneads, I, viii, 11; II, ix, 7; VI, iv, 15.
68 De ordine, L. II, c. IX, n. 27 (XXXII, 1007).
69 De beata vita, c. IV, n. 34 (XXXII, 975).
70 Ibid., c. I, n. 4 (XXXII, 961).
71 Contra Academicos, L. II, c. II, n. 4 (XXXII, 921).
72 Ibid., L. II, c. II, n. 5 (XXXII, 921).
73 Ibid., L. III, c. XX, n. 43 (XXXII, 957).
** De ordine, L. II, c. IX, n. 27 (XXXII, 1007-1008); De quantitate animae,
c. VII, n. 12 (XXXII, 1042).
** De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, c. XVIII, n. 33 (XXXII, 1325).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 229

contemplation of Truth, "we shall know how true are the things which
we are commanded to believe, how well and beautifully we were nour X.
ished by mother Church.” How can the soul return to God and seek its
joy in Him, when, diverted by pride from the contemplation of God, it
finds itself engrossed in sensible delights? Holy Scripture suggests the
means; namely, the precepts of the love of God and of one's neighbor.”
The treatise in defense of Genesis against the Manichaeans is entirely
devoted to the exaltation of the Holy Scriptures. Divine Providence per
mits heretics to rant against the Sacred Writings in order to arouse
Christians from their lethargy and to imbue them with a desire to
become better acquainted with the word of God.”
In the final treatise composed before his ordination, Augustine
explains that the true religion, which is found in the Catholic Church,
is the means established by Divine Providence for the regeneration and
eternal salvation of the human race. He who accepts this religion and
observes its precepts will be given the spiritual perception by which he
will be able to understand, in so far as it is possible in the present
life, such mysteries, for example, as the Holy Trinity. This doctrine, as
well as other articles of the Christian Creed, is first accepted on the
authority of faith; only later on can these dogmas be grasped by rea
son, some with a greater, others with a less degree of clearness.”
Since the soul, darkened as it is by sin, is unable of itself to remain in
the path which leads to everlasting life, God in His mercy has been
pleased to appoint a guide to direct man on his way to God and to
remind him of the eternal laws which every rational creature must
observe. Individual men in past ages have been divinely appointed to
this task, but in our own times, Augustine observes, this duty is ful
filled by the Christian religion, the most secure and certain guide to
eternal salvation.80
For Augustine, then, faith holds a very important place in the tem
poral dispensation. Chronologically it must precede reason; it is the
door, so to speak, through which they must pass “who desire to learn
what is good, great, and hidden.” When he assigns to faith priority
** De quantitate animae, c. XXXIII, n. 76 (XXXII, 1077).
* De musica, L. VI, c. XIV, n. 43 (XXXII, 1186).
* De Genesi contra Manichaeos, L. I, c. I, n. 1-2 (XXXIV, 173-174).
* De vera religione, c. VIII, n. 14 (XXXIV, 129).
* Ibid., c. II, n. 3 (XXXIV, 123); c. VI, n. 10 (XXXIV, 127).
* De ordine, L. II, c. IX, n. 26 (XXXII, 1007).
230 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

in the order of time, but to reason precedence in the order of nature and
excellence,” it would seem that he has reference to the permanence of
reason and to the temporary character of faith. The need for faith will
have ceased when the temporal dispensation will have come to an end,
that is to say, at the close of man's life on earth, whereas reason is
immortal. It is a permanent possession, one with which the soul will
continue to be endowed during its eternal existence in the life to come.
“Divine authority transcends every human power,” Augustine says.
And since the truths made known to man by the avenue of faith can
only partially be grasped by reason in the present life,” obviously the
knowledge acquired by means of faith is superior to that obtained by
the path of reason. - --

Since faith, as Augustine uses the term, implies the notion of a

Divine Revelation, there is manifestly no place for it in Neo-Platonic
thought. The soul does not require the light which faith provides.
By its own essential nature, as Plotinus observes, it can even raise itself
to the vision of the supreme Principle, the inaccessible Beauty.”

B. The Development in Augustine'ſ Thought

An analysis of Augustine's writings from 386 to 391 A.D. con
vinces us that their author was a Christian, since they contain doc
trines which are basically Christian and, therefore, incompatible with
the fundamental principles of Neo-Platonism. This fact, however, need
not imply that there was no progress in Augustine's knowledge of
Christianity. In the early treatises the Christian dogmas, which are
rather few in number, are clothed at times in a decidedly Neo-Platonic
garb, for example, the doctrine of the Trinity in the De beata vita.
The doctrines, however, are definitely Christian.* As time elapses, the
specifically Christian teachings increase in number, and are explained
at greater length and in language which decreasingly savors of Neo
82 De vera religione, c. XXIV, n. 45 (XXXIV, 141).
83 De ordine, L. II, c. IX, n. 27 (XXXII, 1007-1008).
84 De vera religione, c. VII, n. 13 (XXXIV, 128-129); c. VIII, n. 15 (XXXIV,
129).
85 Plotinus, Enneads, I, vi, 9.
86 The Neo-Platonic atmosphere of the early works does not seem to warrant
Alfaric's statement that in them “the Christian disappears behind the disciple
of Plotinus,” since specifically Christian content is found in them. Cf. P.
Alfaric, L'évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin, p. 527: “Le Chrétien
disparait derrière le disciple de Plotin.”
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 231

Platonism. From the final work of this period, the treatise De vera
religione, the Apostles' Creed almost in its entirety can be formulated.”
The anti-Manichaean writings, as is to be expected, contain the most
detailed explanation of the basic doctrines of Christianity. The fact
itself that the non-Manichaean works contain fewer Christian dogmas,
of course, does not prove that their author was a more immature
Christian, since they are philosophic in tone and purpose and are not
intended as a defense or explanation of Christianity. However, for the
most part, even among these treatises a greater number of Christian
ideas can be found in the later than in the earlier writings.
In the works of this half decade there is evidence of the deficiency
of Augustine's knowledge in regard to certain Christian dogmas. His
notion of the purpose of the Incarnation seems to have been faulty.
Several times in mentioning this dogma he asserts that the Son of God
Who assumed a human body was truly God and at the same time truly
man. In the later treatises especially, he stresses the doctrine of the
Humanity of Christ and points out the need for His assuming human
nature, as well as the humility exercised by Him in stooping to the
lowly body of our flesh. Hence, there is no doubt that Augustine
believed in the Incarnation of the Son of God. However, he seems
to assign to the Incarnate God the special rôle of a Divine Teacher,
an intellectual Guide through Whom man could attain a better knowl.
edge of the Father. For example, in explaining to Nebridius why the
Incarnation is ascribed to the Son of God, he says that it seemed neces
sary that a certain norm or pattern of training (norma et regula disci
plinae) be provided for man, which was effected by the Incarnation.
The result was that through the Son we are enabled to know the Father
and the Holy Spirit.* Augustine does not seem clearly to have grasped
the part which the sufferings and death of the God-Man played in the
salvation of the human race. In the treatise De musica he seems to
approach more closely to the correct idea in regard to the purpose of
the Incarnation. In assuming the nature of man, he says, Christ became
like other men in every respect except that He was without sin. He
willed to be born, to suffer, and to die as other men. This amazing act
of goodness and humility was accomplished by Christ not because of
87 De vera religione, c. VIII, n. 14 (XXXIV, 129).
** Epistulae, XI, 4 (XXXIII, 76).
232 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

our merits, but in order to teach us that we must beware of pride which
was the cause of our misfortunes, and that we should with resignation
accept the penalty of death, since He, though sinless, endured it for our
sake.” But even here the notion of Christ as our Divine Exemplar
seems particularly to be emphasized.
Augustine's conception of the mission of the Holy Ghost is like.
wise vague and inadequate. He speaks of the Holy Spirit as one of the
three Divine Persons comprising the Blessed Trinity, and of His
equality with the Father and the Son, but the function of this Divine
Person, he rather obscurely explains to Nebridius, is “to bestow upon
us a certain interior charm and sweetness for remaining in the knowl
edge [of the Father] and despising mortal things.” Augustine's inac
curate knowledge concerning the mission of the Holy Spirit is, how
ever, not a matter of surprise since, as has been pointed out,” the the
ology of the Holy Ghost was not developed in the early Church.
At this period Augustine also had a somewhat faulty notion in
regard to the resurrection of the body. He speaks” of the risen body
as endowed with the perfection which that of Adam enjoyed before he
violated the command of God in the terrestrial paradise. In the review
which he made of his works toward the close of his life, Augustine
supplements this notion and explains that, after the resurrection, the
condition of the body will be better than was that of the father of the
human race, in that it no longer will be in need of nourishment. By
its former strength (pristina ſtabilitar), he adds, is meant the free
dom from physical ills which characterized the body of Adam before
he sinned.98
Augustine likewise experienced difficulty in understanding why bap
tism is administered to infants. In the treatise De quantitate animae he
mentions that the advantage of consecrating infant children is a doc
trine which is believed but by no means clearly understood. “Reason,”
89 De musica, L. IV, n. 7 (XXXII, 1166-1167).
90 Epistulae, XI, 4 (XXXIII, 76).
*1 Cf. Chapter III, A, note 51.
* Cf. De musica, L. VI, c. V, n. 13 (XXXII, 1170); De vera religione, c.
XII, n. 25 (XXXIV, 132-133).
*::::".
603).
L. I, c. XI, n. 3 (XXXII, 601); L. I, c. XIII, n. 4 (XXXII,
-
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 233

he adds, “will discover this when it will have been necessary to have
the question answered.”
Notwithstanding Augustine's difficulties and inaccurate notions in
regard to certain Christian dogmas, on the evidence furnished by his
writings from 386 to 391 A.D. it can be said without qualification that
he was a Christian at the time of the composition of his first treatise
at Cassiciacum. Specifically Christian doctrines which he explains later
on are stated definitely, though briefly, in his writings from the begin
ning of this period. A man who accepts fundamental dogmas of Chris
tianity in respect to God, the universe, and man seems rightly to be
called a Christian, even while his knowledge of these and other dog
mas is being expanded and his inadequate notions are being corrected.”
C. Tendency to Speak in Neo-Platonic Terms
Since, as has been pointed out, the writings of Augustine at the
time with which we are concerned differ basically from Neo-Platonism
in their doctrine concerning the nature of God, the origin of the world,
and the origin and destiny of man, how are we to account for his
manifest tendency to express himself in Neo-Platonic terms? The dic
tion and style of the treatises, analogies used by way of illustration, and
ideas contained in his writings not infrequently remind us forcibly of
Plotinus. Was Augustine himself unconscious of this similarity? Or
was the resemblance intentional on his part? It seems quite probable
that it was intentional. And the reason is not difficult to ascertain. Dur
ing nine years Augustine had been involved in the errors of Manichae
ism.” The gross, materialistic views of the disciples of Manes had so
penetrated his mind that, as he himself tells us, he could form no con
cept of anything except in terms of corporeal being.
That the Divine nature should be corruptible—an inevitable con
sequence of the Manichaean theory—was abhorrent to Augustine, and
yet he could not conceive of non-corporeal existence,” with the result
* De quantitate animae, c. XXXVI, n. 80 (XXXII, 1080).
** H. Becker, Augustin, Studien zu feiner geistigen Entwicklung, p. 59, rightly
says: "Als Augustin nach Cassiciacum ging, war seine Entwicklung auf das
Christentum hin also keineswegs abgeschlossen.” One can not agree with him,
however, when he adds: ". . . erst etwa um 387 kann man davon reden, dass
er in dem Christentum das gefunden hat, was er seit so langen Jahren mit
seinem Streben nach Wahrheit gesucht hatte.”
* Cf. Confessiones, L. V., c. VI, n. 10 (XXXII, 710).
* Ibid., L. VII, c. II, n. 3 (XXXII, 734).
 234 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

that even his concept of God was materialistic: “So also did I endeavor
to conceive of Thee, Life of my life, as vast, through infinite spaces on
every side penetrating the whole mass of the universe, and beyond it,
every way, through immeasurable boundless spaces.” Again, speaking
of the difficulty he experienced in extricating himself from this
materialistic atmosphere, he observes: “Could I once have conceived
a spiritual substance, all their strongholds had been beaten down and
cast utterly out of my mind, but I could not.”
The books of the Platonists clarified for him the meaning of spirit,
assisting him thereby to cast off the shackles of Manichaean materialism.
Augustine was most grateful for the service rendered him in his effort
to define spirit, and until the end of his life he had a leaning toward
the Platonists, in reality, the Neo-Platonists. Several times in the writ
ings of this period he mentions in terms of praise the names of Plato
and Plotinus. The countenance of Plato was “the purest and brightest
in all philosophy.” Plotinus was a Platonic philosopher who so closely
resembled Plato that one would almost think that the latter had become
reincarnate in the person of his disciple.” Both of these philosophers
said many beautiful things about God and the human soul.” The
doctrine of the Academic philosophers issued from the pure fountain
head of Plato whose teachings they tried to conceal from the materialis
tic philosophers of their day.” The term “happy” can with precision be
applied only to Plato's ideal man.” The letters of Augustine, Nebridi
us observes, bring to him the teachings of Plato and Plotinus.” And
yet, Augustine remarks that Plato's writings were more enjoyable to
read than effective in persuading since, notwithstanding his lofty ideas
concerning God and the soul, he did not convert the people from their
superstitious practices of worship to the veneration of the true God.”
98 Ibid., L. VII, c. I, n. 2 (XXXII, 733): “Ita etiam te, vita vitae meae,
grandem per infinita spatia undique cogitabam penetrare totam mundi molem,
et extra eam quaquaversum per immensa sine termino.”
* Ibid., L. V., c. XIV, n. 25 (XXXII, 718): “Quod si possem spiritualem
substantiam cogitare, statim machinamenta illa omnia solverentur et abjiceren
tur ex animo meo; sed non poteram.” -

* Contra Academicos, L. III, c. XVIII, n. 41 (XXXII, 956).

191 Ibid., L. III, c. XVIII, n. 41 (XXXII, 956).
* Soliloquia, L. I, c. IV, n. 9 (XXXII, 874).
* Epistulae, I, 1 (XXXIII, 61).
104 Ibid., III, 1 (XXXIII, 64).
10, Ibid., VI, 1 (XXXIII, 67).
” De vera religione, c. II, n. 2 (XXXIV, 123).
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 235

If he could come to life again and behold the marvelous results accom
plished by the Christian religion, “by changing a few words and
opinions” he would become a Christian.” Obviously Augustine was
deeply impressed by Plato and Plotinus.
It seems quite probable, then, that the assistance offered him by
Neo-Platonism in his conflict with Manichaean dualism and that the
spiritual character of its doctrine were accountable for Augustine's
tendency to express Christian thoughts in Neo-Platonic terms. The
philosophy of Plotinus was diametrically opposed to a materialistic
view of the universe and emphasized the spiritual nature of God. It aid
ed him, as has been said, in his attempt to grasp the meaning of
spirit. It was but natural that he should find in it other notions which
seemed to be of service to him. It is obvious, for example, that Augus
tine was deeply impressed by the opposition between the world of sense
and that of spirit, which plays so important a rôle in the philosophy of
Plotinus, since in the various treatises and letters of this period Augus
tine frequently contrasts the ephemeral, delusive character of sensible
objects with the permanent, immutable nature of that which belongs to
the world of spirit.
That Augustine intentionally made use of expressions and compari
sons which he found in Neo-Platonism and which he considered advan
tageous for expressing views fundamentally Christian seems quite evi
dent from what he himself tells us in the treatise against the Academics:
“I am sure that I shall never depart from the authority of
Christ for I find no other more reliable. But what ought to be
attained by the most subtle reasoning—for at the present time
I am so influenced as impatiently to desire to apprehend truth
not only by believing, but also by knowing—I trust I shall find
meanwhile in the works of the Platonists, whatever is not in
contradiction to our Sacred Writings.”
107 Ibid., c. IV, n. 7 (XXXIV, 126).
108 This statement might seem to imply that Augustine was not aware of any
important difference between Platonism and Christianity. However, in its
proper setting it seems to be merely a rather exaggerated form of praise for
the Platonists because of the spiritual element in their philosophy in contrast
with those philosophers who regard it as folly "to despise the world of sense
. . . and submit to the most high God.” Cf. De vera religione, c. IV, n. 6
(XXXIV, 126). In other words, the Platonists were far superior to
... materialistic philosophers.
199 Contra Academicos, L. III, c. XX, n. 43 (XXXII, 957).
 236 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

However, in comprising within his own body of thought notions which

attracted him in “the books of the Platonists,” it would seem that he
transformed them from a Plotinian to a Christian sense. As Jolivet
observes in commenting on the importance of Neo-Platonic influence
on St. Augustine: “It was not Augustine who became a Neo-Platonist,
but Plotinus who became a Christian: Augustine changed him into his
own substance.” In regard to fundamental doctrines, as has been
pointed out in our analysis, the resemblances between the teachings of
St. Augustine and those of Plotinus are only superficial. Neo-Platonic
literature seems merely to have provided for him the material garb in
which he sometimes clothes his Christian doctrines.
On the other hand, it may not be idle conjecture to suggest the
possible dependence of Plotinus on Christian literature for his termi
nology. It is true that no mention of Christianity can be found in his
writings. However, two centuries of Christianity had elapsed before
the time of the great Neo-Platonist. Moreover, Ammonius Saccas, the
teacher for whom he had such deep respect, had been a Christian be.
fore his conversion to paganism. Hence, it may with some reason be
said that Christianity was a part of the intellectual heritage of Plotinus.
After all, the doctrine of the Logos, an important term in Plotinian
philosophy, antedates” Platonism which is supposed to have been
basic in the structure of Plotinus's thought. It is also possible that the
triad of Hypostases in his philosophy had a Christian source, although
the doctrine is by no means Christian. Professor Shorey holds that
neither the first sentence of the Timaeus, which begins, “one, two,
three,” nor what he calls “a bit of jargon in one of the spurious let
ters” of Plato (Epistula II, 312 E) should be regarded as an argu
ment for a Platonic Trinity, although “symbolists and allegorists” have
considered them as a proof that Plato knew the Trinity.”
no R. Jorvet,Le problème du mal d'après saint Augustin, p. 136: "Ce n'était
pas Augustin qui devenait néo-platonicien, mais Plotin qui devenait chrétien:
Augustin le transformait en sa propre substance.” This conclusion would
seem to be correct in opposition to that of Alfaric and Loofs, who hold that
Augustine at this period was a genuine Neo-Platonist, veneered, more or less,
with Christianity. Cf. P. Alfaric, L'évolution intellectuelle de faint Augustin,
p. 527; also F. Loofs, “Augustinus,” Realencyklopädie für protestantische
Theologie und Kirche, II, 267.
111. Cf. Wisdom, IX, 1, 2; XVIII, 15 ff.
112 Dean º The Philoſophy of Plotinus, II, 209, holds that the second
Epistle of Plato was the chief authority of Plotinus for his three Hypostases.
118 P. Shorey, “Plato and Christianity” in Platonism Ancient and Modern
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1938), p. 75.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 237

The question now suggests itself: Was it advisable for Augustine

to make use of Neo-Platonic terms in explaining doctrines which, as
we have seen, were definitely Christian? It would seem that this ques
tion should be answered in the negative. Christian thought can not
adequately be expressed in the language of Neo-Platonic philosophy.
By so doing Augustine attempted, unsuccessfully, we may add, to
christianize a medium which was pagan in character and which conse
quently was not usable in a Christian universe. The philosophy of
Plotinus contained elements which basically were different from those
of Christianity; therefore its diction could scarcely be employed with
entirely happy results in answering problems which Neo-Platonism did
not contain. This may be one reason why it required so long a time
for Christian thought to eliminate a necessitarian view of the universe.
Although St. Augustine himself clearly expresses a Christian doctrine
of creation in various writings of the period with which we are con
cerned, it is possible that a decided predilection for Plotinian language
in expressing other Christian dogmas on the part of one who was to
hold so important a place in the history of Christian thought as did
Augustine, may have had something to do with the lingering extinc
tion of necessitarianism. As late as the thirteenth century we find St.
Thomas contending with this notion.
Augustine's use of this mode of expression seems in his own day
not to have been fraught with the special difficulty which it later on
entailed. In its effort to convert the pagan world Christianity had estab
lished relations, so to speak, with pagan philosophy, so it was to be
expected that in explaining its own doctrines it would make some use
of the terminology of the pagan schools. St. John, for example, knew
the term Logos in its philosophical meaning and maintained that he
could tell philosophy who the Logos was. Hence in the time of Augus
tine there may not have been particular danger in using Neo-Platonic
language to express Christian ideas. The spiritual character of the
philosophy of Plotinus tended perhaps to make it appear feasible at
times to use his terminology. As time elapsed, however, confusion was
bound to result from the similarity between the diction of Plotinus and
that of Augustine with the result that, in recent years especially, there
has arisen no little confusion, even among scholarly writers, in regard
238 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

to the content of the doctrines of Augustine and Plotinus, some read

ing Christian views in Plotinus, and others Neo-Platonic ideas in
Augustine.
D. Christianity Not a Superstructure of Hellenism
In conclusion, it seems advantageous to point out the futility which
must result from any attempt to establish a fusion of Greek and Chris
tian thought. It is not to be denied that they have many points of
contact or that the former exerted some influence upon the latter.
Basically, however, there are boundaries separating the one from the
other, which are quite impassable. The theory of creation which is
lacking in Greek philosophy stands as an insurmountable barrier be
tween them. The attempt to fuse Greek and Western civilization will
have results somewhat analagous to that of blending two immiscible
liquids. If one shakes the liquids violently, they appear homogeneous,
but, on standing a few minutes, they separate definitely. In like man
ner it is impossible fundamentally to unite Greek and Christian thought.
The doctrine of creation renders impossible any such amalgamation.
As Bréhier observes: “The doctrine of the eternity of the world forms
an essential and permanent character of what is called Hellenism in
contradiction to Christianity.”
It seems inadmissible, then, to say that Plotinus was the father of
mediaeval philosophy and that the latter was an outgrowth of Neo
Platonism.” The essential incompatibility of Neo-Platonism and Chris
tianity renders it unfeasible to say that “it was in certain Latin transla
tions of the writings of his [Plotinus's] school that St. Augustine
found the basis for a Christian philosophy he was seeking. It was
Augustine's great authority in the Latin Church that made Platonism
its official philosophy for centuries.” For the same reason one can not
admit that “the religious philosophy to which Augustine was converted
and in which he found satisfaction, was the Platonism of Plotinus
with the doctrine of the Incarnation added to it,” or that Catholic
tº E. Brenier, La philosophie de Plotin, p. 36: “La these de l'éternité du monde
forme un trait essentiel et permanent de ce que l’on appelle l'hellénisme par
opposition au christianisme.”
Cf. also E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, pp. 67-70.
115 J. Burnet, “Philosophy,” in The Legacy of Greece (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1924) pp. 91-93.
116 Ibid., p. 93.
117 W. R. Inge, The Philoſophy of Plotinus, II, 207.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 239

Christianity was “the last creative achievement of classical antiquity,

which may be said to have died in giving birth to it.” Nor can the
opinion be accepted that Neo-Platonism remained the foundation upon
which Augustine erected his theological thought.”
The Christian character of the universe in which men for centuries
have framed their thought seems sometimes to render it difficult even
for eminent scholars to form a concept of one wherein men lived and
thought, which was lacking in a doctrine of creation. It is questionable
whether in such a universe it can be said that “the 'efficient' cause of
the world is thought of definitely as a 'personal God, and this 'creator'
or 'maker' is, strictly speaking, the only God, in our sense of the
word,” or whether it is justifiable to say that “the Demiurge' [in
Plato's Timaeus] really is thought of as a Creator in the full sense of
the word.”izi
Granted that a Christian Revelation intervened between Greek and
Christian thought, is it warrantable to regard Platonism as "a dominant
factor in the formation of the Christian religion?” If, as seems
undeniable, there is no possibility of blending the fundamental no
tions of Christianity and Hellenism, it would seem historically un
sound to say that at about the year 130 A.D. “the religious philosophy
of Greece began to effect an entrance [into Christianity], and it went
straight to the centre of the new religion. It sought to get into inner
touch with Christianity, and conversely, Christianity held out a hand
to this ally.” Still more surprising is the statement that about the
close of the first quarter of the fourth century “Hellenism as a whole
and in every phase of its development was established in the
Church.”124

118 W. R. Inge, “Plotinus,” Proceedings of the British Academy (London: The

Oxford University Press, 1929), XV, 4.
119 F. Loofs, “Augustinus,” in Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie
und Kirche, II, 274.
120 A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (2nd ed., New York: The Dial
Press, 1927), pp. 441-442.
121 Ibid., p. 444.
12? P. E. More, Platonism (2nd ed. rev., Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1926), p. 280: "As a dominant factor in the formation of the Christian
º it [Platonism] has helped to mould the civilization of the western
world . . .”
*** A. Harnack, What is Christianity? (2nd ed. rev., New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1902), pp. 215-216.
124 Ibid., p. 216.
240 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Citations such as these would seem to indicate that the Christian

universe which for centuries has been familiar to Western civilization
can become so familiar as to cause one to lose sight of the fact that the
doctrine of Creation and all that follows from it effected essential
differences between Greek and Christian thought in regard to the all
important problems of the nature of God, the origin of the universe,
and the origin and destiny of man. And perhaps this is the psychologi
cal explanation for the very existence of the problem which we have
so long been discussing.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. SAINT AUGUSTINE
A. PRIMARY SOURCES

Sancti Aurelii Augustini opera omnia in J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina,

16 vols. (Paris: Garnier Bros., 1877-1890).
The complete works of Augustine edited by the Benedictines of St. Maur.
These works, re-edited and emended under the direction of J. P. Migne,
comprise volumes 32-47 of the Patrologia Latina. Volume 47 contains the
index. All the treatises written by Augustine between 386-391 are found in
volume 32 with the exception of De Genesi contra Manichaeos and De vera
ſºlº,
etters.
which are contained in volume 34. Volume 33 comprises the

Opera Sancti Aureli Augustini in Corpus ſcriptorum ecclesiasticorum

Latinorum, editum consilio et impensis Academiae Vindobonensis
(Vienna: A. G. Tempsky, 1896-1913).
Section VIII, Part II is the last volume completed in this edition. Section I,
Part III, edited by Pius Knöll, contains the treatises Contra Academicos, De
beata vita, De ordine. Section II, Part I, edited by A. Goldbacher, contains
the first thirty Epistulae. The Corpus is a critical edition.
The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. First
Series, edited by P. Schaff (Buffalo: The Christian Literature Co.,
1886-1888).
Volumes I-VIII contain the English translation of the Confessions, Solilo
quia, 160 Letters, City of God, and of the doctrinal and moral treatises of
St. Augustine, Volume I, pp. 1-27, contains a sketch of his life and writings.
This edition has indices and references to the Retractationes. -

The Works of Aurelius Augustine, 11 vols., edited by M. Dods (Edin

burgh: T. and T. Clark, 1871-1874).
This edition contains the translation of the City of God, the Letters, and
the moral and doctrinal treatises of St. Augustine. It also has prefaces, in
dices, and references to the Retractationes.
St. Augustine, De beata vita and De immortalitate animae, translated
into English by F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A. (Philadelphia: The Peter
Reilly Co., 1937), pp. xiv, 168.
This book has the Latin text and English translation of both treatises, also
introduction, notes, index for each.
St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, translated into English by F. E.
Tourscher, O.S.A. (Philadelphia: The Peter Reilly Co., 1937), pp.
vii, 442.
This work comprises the Latin text with English translation, introduc
tion, notes, index.
242 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

St. Augustine, De magistro, translated by F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A.

under the title The Philosophy of Teaching (Lancaster, Pa.; The
Wickersham Printing Co., 1924), pp. 99.
This work consists of an introduction, English translation, and notes.
St. Augustine, De quantitate animae, translated into English by F. E.
Tourscher, O.S.A. (Philadelphia: The Peter Reilly Co., 1933), pp.
xi, 230.
This book contains the Latin text, English translation, introduction,
notes, index.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

. Adam, Saint Augustine, The Odyſſey of His Soul (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1932), pp. 65.
This book is the translation of a centenary address Die geistige Entwick
lung des heiligen Augustinus, delivered at Tübingen on May 4, 1930,
and published in 1931. It treats of Augustine's search for truth, which
was found not in the knowledge of Neo-Platonism, but in the love of
God as taught by the Holy Scriptures and the Catholic Church.

Alfaric, L'évolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin. I. Du Mani

chéisme au Néoplatonisme (Paris: E. Nourry, 1918), pp. ix, 555.
Parts I and II of this work present a detailed exposition of Manichaeism
and Augustine's criticism of it. Part III (pages 361-527) treats of Augus
tine's relation to Neo-Platonism. The author holds that in 386 A.D.
Augustine was converted, both intellectually and morally, to Neo-Pla
tonism rather than to the Gospel.

Balthus, Défense des Sr. Pères accurés de Platonisme (Paris: Le

Conte et Montalant, 1711), pp. 640.
The author attempts to show that Platonic philosophy was not taught in
the early Christian Schools. The Fathers of the Church did not embrace
Platonic philosophy; on the contrary, they earnestly combated it. Pages
139-150, 465-494, 531-538 treat of St. Augustine's attitude toward pagan
philosophy, especially that of the Platonists.

. Bardenhewer, Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur, 5 vols. (Frei

burg: Herder and Co., 1913-1932).
Pages 434-522 of volume 4 treat of the life, literary works, philosophy,
and theology of St. Augustine. Pages 439-441 contain a sketch of his
spiritual development from the time of his adherence to Manichaeism
until his ordination.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 243

E. Becker, Auguſtin, Studien zu feiner geiſtigen Entwicklung (Leipzig.

J. C. Hinrich, 1908), pp. 155.
The first part of this work is devoted to a comparison of the accounts
of Augustine's conversion as given in the Confessions and in the early
writings. The second part treats of the sources of Augustine's knowledge;
also the extent of his erudition in the Greek, Hebrew, and Punic lan
guages. The author holds that at Cassiciacum Augustine was a Neo
Platonist rather than a Christian.

L. Bertrand, Saint Augustin (Paris: A. Fayard et Cie, 1913), pp. 461.

This work contains a good biography of Augustine and a discussion of
his work and influence. Pages 15-170 are devoted to the intellectual and
spiritual development of Augustine.
L. Bertrand, Autour de faint Augustine (Paris: A. Fayard et Cie,
1922), pp. 285.
This book discusses the location of Cassiciacum and describes the life of
Augustine and his friends at this place. The author identifies it with
the modern village of Cassago near Milan.
G. Boissier, “La conversion de St. Augustin,” Revue deſ deux mondes,
LXXXV (1888), 43-69.
This article points out and attempts to harmonize the apparent contra
dictions between the content and the spirit of the Confessions and the
early writings of Augustine. The article was later embodied in Boissier's
great work, La fin du paganisme, 2 vols. (Paris, 1891). The subject of
Augustine's conversion is treated in vol. I, pp. 339-379.
C. Boyer, S.J., Christianisme et Néo-Platonisme dans la formation de
saint Augustin (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1920), pp. 225.
This work has for its purpose a defense of the reliability of the Con
fessions in regard to the conversion of Augustine. The author points out
the harmony between the Dialogues and the Confessions on this subject
and maintains that Neo-Platonism was subordinate to Christianity in the
development of Augustine.
C. Boyer, S.J., “La conversion de saint Augustine,” La Scuola Cattolica,
IX (1927), 401-414.
The author sketches three lines of development in the life of St. Augus
tine until the time of his baptism. He likewise defends the account of
Augustine's conversion as recorded in the Confessions.

C. Boyer, S.J., “La contemplation d'Ostie,” Cahiers de la nouvelle

journée, XVII, 137-161.
C. Boyer, S.J., “Autour de l'illumination Augustinienne,” Gregorianum,
VI (1925), 449.
This article treats of Augustine's theory of illumination.
244 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

C. Boyer, S.J., Saint Augustin (Paris: Lecoffre, 1932).

This book treats of Augustine's doctrine on the sovereign good, the
conditions of a moral act, and man's duties to God, his neighbor, and
himself. The author contrasts Augustine's theory of happiness with that
of the Platonists.

E. Bréhier, “Hellénisme et Christianisme aux premiers siècles de notre

ëre,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, CIII-CIV
(1927), 5-35.
The author holds that, notwithstanding Augustine's sympathy for the Neo
Platonists, his doctrine differs essentially from the fundamental theses of
Hellenism.

T. Bret, La conversion de Saint Augustin (Geneva, 1900).

C. Butler, Western Myſticism, the Teaching of SS. Augustine, Gregory,
and Bernard on Contemplation and the Contemplative Life (New
York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1923), pp. xiii, 344.
Pages 23-88 are devoted to the explanation of the mystical doctrines of
St. Augustine and contain numerous citations from his writings by way
of illustration. Pages 195-210 give a comparative analysis of the con
templative and active lives as conceived by Augustine.

F. Cayré, La contemplation Augustinienne. Principes de la spiritualité

de Jaint Augustin (Paris: A. Blot, 1927) pp. xii, 337.
This work is a study of the mysticism of St. Augustine. The author ex
plains the Augustinian doctrine of wisdom and knowledge as related
to contemplation. Pages 87-88 discuss the attitude of the recluse at Cas
siciacum to Christian faith.

F. Cayré, Les sources de l'amour divin (Desclée de Brouwer et Cie,

1933), pp. viii, 271.
This book explains the mode of the Divine presence in the universe,
the Divine transcendence, the Divine attributes, also the doctrines of the
Trinity and the Redemption, as developed by St. Augustine. Pages 44-49
outline the evolution of Augustine's thought during the three important
periods of his life.

W. Cunningham, St. Austin and His Place in the History of Christian

Thought (London: C. J. Clay and Sons, 1886), pp. xiii, 278.
The Hulsean Lectures of 1885. Their purpose is to give an account of
Augustine's philosophical and theological doctrines to serve as an intro
duction to the study of his works. Pages 36-42 treat of the relation of
his doctrines to those of Plato, the Neo-Platonists, and the Schoolmen.
Pages 154-157 discuss his knowledge of Greek.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 245

P. De Labriolle, History and Literature of Christianity from Tertullian

to Boethius (New York: A. Knopf, 1925), pp. ix, 519.
This volume describes the life, works, and influence of the chief Chris
tian writers from the first century of the Christian era until the close of
the sixth. The first chapter of Book IV is devoted to St. Augustine. Pages
396-403 treat of the stages of his conversion.

H. Dörries, “Das Verhältnis des Neuplatonischen und Christlichen in

Augustins ‘De vera religione',” Zeitschrift für die neuteſtamentliche
Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche, XXIII (1924),
64-102.

This article is a study of the Neo-Platonic and Christian elements in the

treatise De vera religione.

A. Dryoff, “Úber Form und Begriffsgehalt des Augustinischen Schrift

De ordine” in Aurelius Augustinus, edited by M. Grabmann and
J. Mausbach (Cologne: J. P. Bachem, 1930), pp. xi, 438.
This essay (pages 15-62 in the book) contains an analysis of the content
and form of the treatise De ordine; also a discussion on the date of com
position of the work and on the sources from which Augustine derived his
material for it.

E. Gilson, Introduction a l'étude de ſaint Augustin (Paris: J. Vrin,

1929), pp. ii, 352.
This work is a comprehensive study of the spirit and content of the
fundamental doctrines of St. Augustine's philosophy. Reference is fre
quently made to the treatises written between 386 and 391 A.D. Pages
302-311 contain a general bibliography of the principal works on St. Augus
tine, written before 1927.

E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, translated by A. H.

Downes (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. viii, 490.
This book consists of the twenty Gifford Lectures delivered at the Uni
versity of Aberdeen in 1931-1932. Their purpose was to define the spirit
of mediaeval philosophy. On pages 29-30 reference is made to the con
version of St. Augustine. Chapter II demonstrates the reality of Chris
tian philosophy.

E. Gilson, "Revue critique,” Revue philosophique de la France et de

l'Etranger, LXXXVIII (1919), 497-505.
This article is a critical review of P. Alfaric's book L'évolution intellec
tuelle de saint Augustine. The author disagrees with the conclusion of
Alfaric that the early writings of Augustine prove him to be a Neo
Platonist rather than a Christian.
246 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

L. Gourdon, Eſſai ſur la conversion de faint Augustin (Paris: A. Coue

slant, 1900), pp. 89.
A comparison of the philosophical Dialogues and the Confesſions of
St. Augustine in relation to the problem of his conversion. The last
chapter treats of the various influences upon his spiritual development,
especially the Neo-Platonic and Christian phases of it. The author holds
that Augustine was not converted to Christianity before 390 or 391 A.D.

M. Grabmann, Die Grundgedanken des heiligen Augustinus iber Seele

und Gott (Cologne: J. P. Bachem, 1929), pp. 111.
This work treats of Augustine's doctrine on the nature of God and His
relation to the world, and also his doctrine on the substantiality, spiritu
ality, and immortality of the soul. The introduction discusses the three
basic notions in the thought of Augustine as manifested from the time of
his earliest writings: truth, the soul and God, the interior life.

M. Grabmann, “Augustins Lehre von Glauben und Wissen und ihr

Einfluss auf das mittelalterliche Denken,” in Aureliuſ Auguſtinus,
edited by M. Grabmann and J. Mausbach (Cologne, J. P. Bachem,
1930), pp. xi, 438.
This volume of essays was written in commemoration of the fifteenth
centenary of the death of St. Augustine. In his exposition of Augustine's
doctrine on faith and knowledge, Dr. Grabmann discusses the rôle of
Neo-Platonism in the development of Augustine's thought.

L. Grandgeorge, Saint Augustin et le Néo-Platonisme (Paris: E. Leroux,

1896), pp. 158.
The author discusses the nature and extent of Neo-Platonic influence
upon the doctrine of Augustine, also the sources and extent of his knowledge
of Greek philosophy. z

H. Gros, “Le valeur documentaire des Confessions de saint Augustin,”

La vie spirituelle, May, 1926, 1-18; June, 1926, 66-88; November,
1926, 15-55; March, 1927, 168-177; July-August, 1927, 259-314.
The purpose of these articles is to establish the documentary value of the
Confeſsions.

R. Guardini, Die Bekehrung des heiligen Aurelius Augustinus (Leip

zig; J. Hegner, 1935), pp. 294.
Part I of this book is devoted to the study of the basic problems with
which Augustine was confronted at various periods and which were of
importance in shaping his interior life. Part II analyzes his inner experi
ences from the time of his childhood until the death of his mother, on
the basis of the evidence of the Confessions.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 247

J. Guitton, Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et ſaint Augustin (Paris:

Boivin et Cie, 1933), pp. xxiv, 387.
This book contains an analysis and critique of the concept of time and
eternity as found in the writings of Plotinus and of Augustine. The
author shows that there is a radical difference between Christianity and
Hellenism in regard to the notion of time and that Augustine's view
is in harmony with the former. Pages 83-102 develop the anti-Plotinism
of Augustine.

. Harnack, Monaſticism: Itſ Ideals and History and the Confessions

of St. Augustine (Oxford: Williams and Norgate, 1901), pp. 171.
Two lectures given by Harnack. Pages 119-155 are devoted to the Con
feſsions. Pages 156-171 treat of the influence of Neo-Platonism on Augus
tine as manifested in his early writings.

. Harnack, History of Dogma, 5 vols., 2nd ed., translated from 3rd

German edition (London: Williams and Norgate, 1897-1899).
The first volume of this work, pages 336-363, contains a sketch of the
historical significance, the history, and the doctrines of Neo-Platonism.
Page 361 treats of its special influence on Augustine. The fifth volume,
pages 61-241, contains a discussion of the historical position of Augus
tine as a philosopher, theologian, and teacher of the Church, also an
interpretation of his doctrines.

. Hendricks, Augustins Verhältnis zur Mystić (Würzburg: Rita Ver

lag u. Druckerei, 1936), pp. 204.
This work is a study of the mystical elements found in selected writings
of St. Augustine at various periods of his life. Pages 56-80 of Part I are
devoted to this problem in the works written at Cassiciacum, Milan, Rome,
and Tagaste. The Appendix contains a section (pp. 181-184) on Augustine's
relation to Neo-Platonism.

. Henry, S.J., La vision d'Ostie (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938), pp. 127.

This work is an analysis of the religious experience of the vision at
Ostia, as recorded in the ninth book of the Confessions. The author
regards as three essential factors in this experience: the influence of the
Enneads of Plotinus, the Holy Scriptures, and the presence of Monica.

. Henry, S.J., “Augustine and Plotinus,” The Journal of Theological

Studies, XXXVIII (1937), 1-23.
This article discusses the relations between Augustine and Plotinus. The
author holds that “Ibi legi—non ibi legi” (Confessions VII, ix, 13) is the
key to the exact interpretation of the relations between them.
248 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

F. Hofmann, Der Kirchenbegriff der heiligen Augustinus in feinen

Grundlagen und in feiner Entwicklung (Munich: M. Hueber,
1933), pp. xx, 524.
This work contains a comparative study of the Confessions and the early
writings of Augustine in regard to his intellectual and spiritual develop
ment. The author believes that the early writings bear the stamp of a far
more powerful Neo-Platonic influence than is indicated in the Confer
Jºozy.

K. Holl, Augustins innere Entwicklung (Berlin: Akademie der Wissen

schaft, 1922).

J. M. Ibero, “La conversion de San Agustin y el camino, a la conver

sion par la fe cattolica,” Razón y Fe, (1921), 164-185.
M. Jacquin, “Revue critique,” Revue des ſciences philoſophiqueſ et
théologiques, X (1921), 275-278.
This article is a critical review of P. Alfaric's position on the conver
sion of St. Augustine, as expressed in L'évolution intellectuelle de saint
Augustin. The author regards Alfaric's conclusion as unsound.

R. Jolivet, Saint Augustin et le Néo-Platonisme chrétien (Paris: Denoël

et Steele, 1932), pp. 276.
The author holds that Augustine's conversion to Christianity occurred
some time before the well-known scene in the garden, as recorded in the
Confeſſions. Neo-Platonism was of great assistance in clearing his intel
tual difficulties. The early writings of Augustine are Christian in thought
and spirit.

R. Jolivet, Le problème du mal d'après ſaint Augustin (Paris: G.

Beauchesne, 1936), pp. 167.
An analysis of the nature of evil and of the origin of physical and moral
evil as found in the writings of Augustine; also a treatment of Augus
tine's concept of Providence. The Appendix (pp. 131-162) is devoted
to a comparison of the views of Augustine and Plotinus in regard to
Providence and the nature of evil.

R. Jolivet, Dieu, ſoleil des esprits ou la doctrine Augustinienne de

l'illumination (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1934).
An analysis of the Augustinian doctrine of illumination which the author
regards as the center of Augustine's thought. Part I treats of the fact
of the illumination of the human intellect by God; Part II, of the man
ner in which it takes place, according to Augustine. The conclusion is
devoted to points of likeness and of difference between the Thomists and
Augustinians on the doctrine of illumination.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 249

B. Kälin, Die Erkenntnislehre des heiligen Augustinus (Sarnen: L.

Ehrli, 1921), pp. 85.
This book treats of Augustine's theory of sense knowledge and intel
lectual knowledge. Pages 4-6 of the Introduction consider the factors
which influenced his spiritual development, also the sources of his
knowledge of Neo-Platonism.

H. Lesetre, “Une conversion classique,” Revue pratique d'apologétique,

XVII (1914), 561-583.
This article treats of the importance of prayer in effecting conversions.
In Augustine's case, conversion was due to his own prayers and those of
of his mother.

A. Loisy, Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses, (1920), 568

569.
This article is a critical review of P. Alfaric's book, L'évolution intellec
tuelle de faint Augustin. The author disagrees with Alfaric's conclusions
in regard to Augustine's conversion.

A. Loofs, “Augustinus” in Herzog-Hauck, Realencyklopädie für protes

tantische Theologie und Kirche, 23 vols. (Leipzig; J. C. Hinrich,
1896-1913), II, 257-285.
This article contains an account of the life and works of St. Augustine.
The author attempts to show that between 386 and 391 A.D. Augustine's
thinking was essentially Neo-Platonic and that Neo-Platonism remained
the foundation upon which he developed his theology.
J. McCabe, St. Augustine and His Age (New York: G. Putnam's Sons,
1903), pp. vii, 516.
A study of St. Augustine and his work. Pages 140-185 treat of the influ
ence of Neo-Platonism on Augustine and of his life and work at
Cassiciacum.

U. Mannucci, “La conversione di S. Agostino e la critica recente,” in

Mircellanea Agoſtiniana, vol. II (Rome: The Poliglott Vatican
Press, 1931).
This book consists of essays commemorating the fifteenth centenary of
the death of St. Augustine. The author of this essay supports the tradi
tional view of the historical reliability of the Confessions in recounting
the conversion of Augustine.

J. Martin, “Saint Augustin a Cassiciacum veille et lendemain de sa con

version,” Annales de philoſophie chrétienne, XXXIX (1898), 303
316; (1899), 410-428.
The author shows that the Dialogues of St. Augustine give evidence of
Platonic and Neo-Platonic influence, but the doctrines contained in them
are thoroughly Christian.
250 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

J. Martin, Saint Augustin (Paris: F. Alcan, 1923), pp. xvi, 403.

This work is an exposition of St. Augustine's theory of knowledge, of
his doctrine on God and His relation to man, on the social order, and
on external nature. Page 389 treats of Augustine's relation to Plato and
the Neo-Platonists.

J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des heiligen Auguſtinus, 2 vols. (Freiburg:

Herder and Co., 1909), pp. xi, 442 and vii, 402.
This is a comprehensive study of the ethical doctrine of Augustine. The
first volume treats of happiness, the moral order, charity as the basis
of morality, cupidity as the source of evil. The second volume treats of
nature and grace, original sin and its effects, Christian morals, and the
life of grace. Chapter I, volume I, discusses briefly the attack made upon
the historicity of the Confessions.

P. Monceaux, "L'évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin,” Journal

def Javants, (1920), 241-253.
The writer of this article reviews the various steps in the intellectual
development of Augustine as treated by P. Alfaric. The latter's conclu
sion, Monceaux believes, exceeds his premises when he affirms that
Augustine, after his baptism, subordinated Christianity to Neo-Platonic
philosophy.

W. Montgomery, Saint Auguſtine. Aspects of His Life and Thought

(New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1914), pp. xi, 255.
This work treats of the life and doctrine of St. Augustine. Pages 32-66
are devoted to his conversion. The author points out and answers the
chief objections raised against the Christian conversion of Augustine
in 386 A.D.

A Monument to Saint Augustine (London: Sheed and Ward, 1930),

pp. 367.
This work consists of ten essays written by a group of scholars in com
memoration of the fifteenth centenary of St. Augustine. The essays treat of
the life and influence of Augustine and of various aspects of his thought.
Augustine's attitude toward Neo-Platonism is mentioned in the essay en
titled “The Philosophy of St. Augustine,” pages 155-196.

J. Murray, “Origen, Augustine, and Plotinus,” The Month, CLXX

(1937), 107-117.
This article discusses the contribution of pagan thought to Christianity,
and especially the relation between the doctrine of Plotinus and Augus
tine on the nature of God and of evil.

H. A. Naville, Saint Auguſtin. Etude ſur le développement de Ja pensée

jusqu'à l'époque de ſon ordination (Geneva: Ramboz et Schuchardt,
1872), pp. 145.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? - 251

Part I treats in general of the development of Augustine's thought from

his childhood until the time of his ordination, as expressed in the Con
fessions. Part II is devoted chiefly to an exposition of Augustine's phi
losophy at this period, especially his doctrine of the fall of man, and his
return to God by the paths of authority and reason; also his doctrine
on the Trinity.

J. Nørregaard, Augustin'ſ Religioſe Gennembrud. En Kirkehistorisé

Underſogelse (København: P. Branner, 1920), pp. 4, 342. Trans
lated into German by A. Spelmeyer under the title Auguſting
Bekehrung (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923), pp. viii-271.
Part I of this work treats of Augustine's development until his acquaint
ance with Neo-Platonism. Part II contains a critical analysis of the
source materials in his early writings and in the Confessions; Part III,
of the concept of God and of the soul in his early works. Chapter 25
discusses Augustine's relation to Marius Victorinus. -

Nourrisson, La philosophie de faint Auguſtin, 2 tomes (Paris: Didier

et Cie, 1865), pp. xii, 483; 464.
Tome I. contains an exposition of Augustine's doctrine on certitude, the
soul, God, the world, human freedom. Tome II is devoted especially to
the erudition of St. Augustine and to the Greek and Latin sources of
his philosophy. It also discusses the influence of his philosophy, par
ticularly on the seventeenth century.

D. Ohlmann, De ſancti Augustini dialogis in Cassiciaco scriptis (Stras

bourg: "Der Elsåsser” Printing Press, 1897).
This work is a study of the chronology of the treatises written at Cas
siciacum. On page 27 is a table representing the order of composition of
the various books of the Dialogues.

T. J. Parry, Augustine's Psychology during His First Period of Literary

Activity with Special Reference to His Relation to Platonism
(Borna-Leipzig: R. Noske, 1913), pp. 90.
This is an analysis of Augustine's theory of the nature of the soul, its
relation to the body, its spirituality and immortality. The author believes
that Augustine's psychology shows the influence of Plato and Plotinus,
but differs from them on important points.

E. Portalié, “Saint Augustin,” Dictionnaire de théologie catholique

(Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1903), T. I, col. 2268-2472.
This article is an admirable and concise study on the works and doc
trine of Augustine. The author discusses (col. 2272-2288) the Christian
development of Augustine at Cassiciacum, also (col. 2325-2328) the
sources of his doctrine and the influence of Neo-Platonism.
252 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

J. Ritter, Mundus intelligibili (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1937),

pp. 153.
This work treats of the concepts of being, of the intelligible world, and
of knowledge, as found in Augustine and Plotinus. The author points
out the similarities as well as the differences between the thought of
Augustine and that of Plotinus, and the Christian meaning to which
Augustine subjected the Neo-Platonism which he adopted.

. Scheel, Die Anschauung Augustins iber Christi Perſon und Werk

(Leipzig; J. C. B. Mohr, 1901), pp. xv, 474.
A detailed study of the development of Augustine's views on the person
and work of Christ, beginning with the time of his adherence to Mani
chaeism. Pages 20-79 of Part II treat of Augustine's Christology during
what the author calls Augustine's Neo-Platonic period, that is, from his
rejection of Manichaeism until 391 A.D.

R. Schmid, Marius Victorinus Rhetor und feine Beziehungen zu Auguſ

tin (Kiel: E. Uebermuth, 1895), pp. 82.
The author traces the influence of Marius Victorinus on Augustine, as
manifested in the early works of the latter.

. Schöler, Augustins Verhältnis zu Plato in geistischer Entwicklung

(Jena: A. Kämpfe, 1897), pp. 122.
This work is a study of Plato's influence on the doctrine of Augustine.
The author holds that the latter's thought was essentially Platonic until
his inauguration as a churchman.

R. Seeberg, Augustin und der Neuplatoniſmus, º 95-113, in Moderne

Irrtimer im Spiegel der Geschichte, edited by W. Laible (Leipzig.
Dorffling und Franke, 1912).
The author holds that Neo-Platonism provided form and content for the
basically Christian thought of Augustine.

W. J. Sparrow-Simpson, St. Augustine's Conversion—An Outline of

Hir Development to the Time of His Ordination (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1930).
This book contains an account of the life, education, and conversion of
Augustine as found in the Confeſsions, also a summary of the treatises
written at the time of and shortly after his conversion.

Theiler, Porphyrios und Augustin (Königsberg: M. Niemeyer,

1933), pp. 74.
The author holds that the influence of Porphyry, both in diction and in
thought, is manifest not only in the early writings of Augustine, but also
in the Confeſsions and to some extent in the City of God. This influence
is especially noticeable in Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 253

W. Thimme, Augustins geistige Entwicklung in den ersten Jahren

mach feiner Bekehrung, 386-391 (Berlin: Trowitzsch und Sohn,
1908).
The author attempts to show that the early writings of Augustine and
not the Confeſsions are of historical value as an account of his conver
sion. The Platonism of Plotinus exercised the dominant influence in
bringing him to Christianity.

W. P. Tolley, The Idea of God in the Philosophy of St. Augustine

(New York: R. R. Smith, 1930), pp. ix, 214.
This book is an analysis of Augustine's concept of God. Pages 17-25
treat of the controversy relative to his conversion in 386 A.D.

F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A., “Augustine's First Studies in Philosophy, His

Influence on Catholic Culture,” The American Ecclesiaſtical Review,
(1930), 113-124.
This article treats of St. Augustine's interest in education as manifested
in the treatises written at Cassiciacum.

F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A., “St. Augustine, the Christian Schoolman—

an Ideal, a Standard,” in Augustinian Studies (Washington, D.C.:
St. Augustine's College, 1937).
The author regards the early works of Augustine as text books, and his
aim from the time of his conversion until his ordination as "a renew
ing of the spirit in the schools of the time.”

F. E. Tourscher, O.S.A., “Saint Augustine's Philosophy, Right Think

ing and Right Living,” The American Ecclesiastical Review,
(1933), 113-125.
The author holds that the plan and subject matter of all the treatises
written by Augustine from the time of his preparation for baptism until
his ordination to the priesthood are parts of one fixed purpose; namely,
to build up a Christian school of thought.

W. Turner, “St. Augustine,” The Catholic University Bulletin, XVIII

(1912), 3-20.
This article is a résumé of the life and philosophy of St. Augustine.
Pages 5-7 treat of his life and interests at the time of his conversion.

J. H. Van Haeringen, De Augustini ante baptirmum ruſticantis operi

buſ (Groningen, 1917).
254 SAINT AUGUSTINE :

A. C. Vega, O.S.A., Saint Augustine, His Philoſophy, translated from

the Spanish by D. J. Kavanagh, O.S.A. (Philadelphia: The Peter
Reilly Co., 1931), pp. xi, 264.
This work treats, in general, of the importance of Augustine as a phi
losopher, of his precursors, his attitude toward faith and reason, his
method, and the actual value of his philosophy. Chapter III discusses
briefly his intellectual development. Pages 239-241 contain a list of the
authentic works of Augustine as found in the Benedictine Edition.
Pages 242-256 are devoted to a general bibliography on Augustine.

G. F. Von Hertling, Augustin (Mainz. Franz Kirchheim, 1902), pp.

111.

This book contains a discussion of the life and philosophy of St. Augus
tine, also a brief account of the history and importance of his polemical
and exegetic works, Retractationes, and the City of God. Pages 3-35 of
Part I treat of his spiritual development until the time of his conversion.

B. B. Warfield, “Augustine and His Confessions,” The Princeton The

ological Review, III (1905), 81-126.
The author holds that the treatises written at Cassiciacum furnish evi
dence that Augustine at that time was a devout Christian thinker. This
and other articles on Augustine have been embodied in Studies in Tertul
lian and Augustine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1930).

F. Wörter, Die Geisterentwicklung deſ heiligen Augustins bis zu

reiner Taufe (Paderborn, 1892).
This work has for its purpose to substantiate the harmony between the
Confessions and the Dialogues of St. Augustine and to show that in
386 A.D. he was converted to Christianity.

G. Wunderle, Über die Hauptmotive zur Bildung von Augustins

Gottesbegriff nach der Darstellung des Confessionen,” Archiv für
Religions.psychologie und Seelenführung, Band V (1931), 1-35.
(Leipzig; Edward Pfeiffer).
This work analyzes from a psychological point of view the concept of
God as portrayed in the Confessions of St. Augustine. The author shows
that Neo-Platonism failed to exert a permanent influence on Augustine,
because it lacked a doctrine of grace which can be associated only with
a personal God Who alone could satisfy Augustine.
M. Wundt, “Ein Wendepunkt in Augustins Entwicklung,” Zeitschrift
für die neutestamentliche Wisſenſchaft und die Kunde der älteren
Kirche, XXI (1922), 53-64.
The author attempts to show that there was a fourth crisis in the spir
itual development of Augustine; namely, the complete break with Neo
Platonic thought and diction in 391 A.D. when Augustine entered the
priesthood.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST 2 . 255

M. Zepf, Augustins Confessiones (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1926).

This work is an analysis of the successive steps in the conversion of
Augustine as portrayed in the Confessions, and supplemented by anterior
writings. The author holds that the conversion was not effected as sud
dently as is represented in the Confessions.

II. THE NEO-PLATONISTS

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

Iamblichus, De communi mathematica scientia, edited by N. Festa

(Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1891), pp. ix, 152.
This book is a critical edition of the Greek text.

Iamblichus, In Nicomachi arithmeticam introductionem, edited by H.

Pistelli (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1894), pp. ix, 195.
This is a critical edition of the Greek text.

Iamblichus, Protrepticus, edited by H. Pistelli (Leipzig; B. G. Teubner,

1888), pp. xiii, 170.
This is a critical edition of the Greek text.

Iamblichus, Theologoumena arithmeticae, edited by V. De Falco (Leip

zig: B. G. Teubner, 1922), pp. xvii, 90.
This is a critical edition of the Greek text.

Plotinus, Enneads, 5 vols., translated from the Greek into English by

Stephen Mackenna (London: Medici Society, 1917-1930).
Vol. I contains the ethical treatises of the first Ennead, with Porphyry's
Life of Plotinus.
Vol. II the Psychic and Physical Treatises, comprising the second and third
Enneads.
Vol. III the treatises on the nature of the Soul, comprising the fourth
Ennead.
Vol. IV on the Divine Mind, being the treatises of the fifth Ennead.
Vol. V on the One and the Good, being the treatises of the sixth Ennead.

Plotinus, Enneades, 6 vols., translated and edited by E. Bréhier (Paris:

Societé d'édition “Les belles lettres,” 1924-1938).
These volumes comprise the Greek text and French translation of all the
Enneads, together with an introduction and notes. Volume I also has the
Greek text and translation of Porphyry's Life of Plotinus.
256 SAINT AUGUSTINE :

Plotinus, Enneader, edited by F. Creuzer and G. H. Moser (Paris:

Firmin-Didot et Cie, 1896), pp. cxvii, 579.
This book contains the Greek text and Latin translation of the Enneads of
Plotinus; also the text and Latin translation of the Sententiae of Porphyry
and of the Institutio theologica of Proclus.
Plotinos,complete Workſ, 4 vols., translated by K. S. Guthrie (Lon
don: George Bell and Sons, 1918).
This work contains a translation of the Enneads of Plotinus, biographies of
Plotinus by Porphyry, Eunapius, and Suidas, and Porphyry's commentary.
It also contains a concordance to Plotinus and studies on his sources, devel
opment, and influence.
Plotinus, Enneades, 2 vols., edited by R. Volkmann (Leipzig: B. G.
Teubner, 1883).
These volumes contain the Greek text of the Enneads of Plotinus. Volume
I also has Porphyry's Life of Plotinus in the Greek text.

G. H. Turnbull, The Effence of Plotinus (New York: Oxford Univer

sity Press, 1934), pp. x, 303.
This book contains extracts from the six Enneadr and Porphyry's Life of
Plotinus, based on the translation by Stephen Mackenna. It also has an
appendix giving some of the most important Platonic and Aristotelian
sources on which Plotinus drew, as well as extracts from later writers who
were influenced by him. Pages 249-252 treat of St. Augustine and Plotinus.

Porphyry, De abstinentia ab animalibus necandis, edited by L. Holste

nius (Cantabrigia: W. Morden, 1655).
This book contains the Greek text and Latin translation of the De abstinen
tia, also the text and Latin translation of Porphyry's De vita Pythagorae,
Sententiae, and De antro nympharum.

Porphyrius, De abstinentia ab eru animalium, edited by P. Victorius

and J. Valentinus (Paddenburg: Abrahamum, 1767), pp. 398.
This volume contains the Greek text of De abstinentia and the Latin trans
lation by J. B. Felicianus; also four of Porphyry's letters entitled De
apoſtasia.

Porphyrius, De philosophia ex oraculis haurienda, edited by G. Wolff

(Berlin: I. Springeri, 1856), pp. vi, 253.
This work contains the Greek text of the De philosophia; also a biography
of Porphyry and a commentary on his doctrine concerning oracles.
Porphyrios, Opuscula selecta, edited by A. Navck (Leipzig; B. G. Teub
ner, 1886), pp. xxiii, 320.
This book consists of selections from the Vita Pythagorae, De antro nym
pharum, De abstinentia, Ad Marcellam, in the Greek text.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST 2 257

Porphyrios, Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, edited by B. Mommert

(Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1907), pp. xxxiii, 56.
This is a critical edition of the Greek text of the Sententiae.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

R. Arnou, Le désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin (Paris: F.

Alcan, 1921), pp. xix, 323.
The author gives an exposition of the Plotinian concept of God, of the
purification of the soul, and its return to God.

J. Barion, Plotin und Augustinus. Unterruchungen zum Gottesproblem

(Berlin: Junker and Dünnhaupt, 1935).
The author discusses the similarities between the doctrines of Plotinus and
of St. Augustine on the nature of God, the relation of God with the
world and of man with God.

C. Bigg, Neoplatonism (New York: E. & J. B. Young & Co., 1895),

pp. viii, 355.
After a brief review of Stoicism and Pythagoreanism the author expounds:
the principal doctrines of Neo-Platonism as found in Plotinus, Porphyry,
Iamblichus, and Proclus. The final chapter treats of the influence of Neo
platonism on the Church.

C. Bréhier, La philosophie de Plotin (Paris: Boivin et Cie, 1928), pp.

xix., 188.
This work comprises a series of lectures given at the Sorbonne in 1921
1922. The subjects treated are chiefly the One, the Nous, and the Soul,
which the author regards as the heart of Plotinian thought. A chapter is
devoted to an explanation of the fundamental problem of Plotinus, as the
author sees it: the religious problem of the destiny of the soul and the
philosophic problem of the rational explanation of reality.

A. Drews, Plotin (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1907), pp. xii, 339.

Part I of this book treats of the origin of Neoplatonism; Part II contains
an analysis of the philosophy of Plotinus; Part III is devoted to the suc
cessors of Plotinus and the decline of Neo-Platonism.

Eunapius, Lives of the Philoſophers and Sophists in Philostratus and

Eunapius, The Lives of the Sophists, translated by W. C. Wright
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1922), pp. xli, 596.
The author discusses the lives of the principal philosophers from Plotinus
to Chrysanthius. Pages 353-373 are devoted to biographies of Plotinus,
Porphyry, and Iamblichus.
 258 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

B. A. G. Fuller, The Problem of Evil in Plotinus (Cambridge: The

º
University Press, 1912), pp. xx, 333.
An analysis of Plotinus's view of the nature of evil. The author considers
the problem under the heads of metaphysical evil, physical and moral evil,
and matter as the principle of evil.

K. S. Guthrie, The Philosophy of Plotinus (Philadelphia: Prophet Pub

lishing Co., 1910), pp. 56 and Appendix.
This work is chiefly concerned with an explanation of the philosophy of
Plotinus. Pages 17-20 treat of the relation of Ammonius Saccas and Ploti
nus to Christianity. The Appendix contains selections from the Enneads
in Greek text and English translation.

F. Heinemann, Plotin (Leipzig. Felix Meiner, 1921), pp. xiii, 318.

The author discusses the historical setting of Neo-Platonism, and the devel
opment of the thought of Plotinus. He also treats of the general character
istics of Plotinus's method and doctrine.

P. Henry, S.J., Plotin et l'occident (Louvain: Spicilegium sacrum

Lovaniense, 1934), pp. 292.
. This book treats of the influence of Plotinus on thinkers of the West,
particularly, Firmicus Maternus, Marius Victorinus, St. Augustine, and
Macrobius, Pages 65-69 treat of the sources of Neo-Platonism for Augus
tine. Chapter III is devoted to Augustine, the convert, and his relation to
Neo-Platonism; chapter IV, to Augustine, the Bishop, and to textual cita
tions from the City of God, which bear evidence of the influence of the
Enneads of Plotinus.

P. Henry, “Le problème de la liberté chez Plotin,” Revue neo-scholar

tique de philosophie, xxxiii (1931), 50-79; 180-215; 318-339.
This article contains an analysis and critique of Plotinus's concept of free
dom with reference to God and man.

W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, 2 vols. (2nd ed.; London:

Longmans, Green and Co., 1923), pp. xx-270; xii-253.
These volumes comprise the Gifford Lectures of St. Andrew, 1917-1918.
They contain a comprehensive exposition of the doctrine of Plotinus. Mac
kenna regards the work as a “necessary foundation for all serious study of
Plotinus.”

W. R. Inge, “Plotinus” Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. xv.

(Oxford: The University Press, 1929), pp. 27.
This work represents the annual lecture on a master mind, given under the
auspices of the British Academy on January 30, 1929. It treats of the life,
philosophy, and influence of Plotinus.
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 259

E. Krakowski, Plotin et le paganisme religieux (Paris: Denoël et Steele,

1933), pp. 299.
The author traces the origin and development of Neo-Platonism, and gives
a brief explanation of the doctrine of Plotinus and his successors. Chapter
IX is devoted to the relation between Neo-Platonism and Christianity.

. Mehlis, Plotin (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann, 1924), pp. 148.

This book is chiefly concerned with an explanation of the doctrine of
Plotinus on the nature of God, and of soul. It also treats of his theory of
knowledge and his mysticism.

. Oppermann, Ploting Leben (Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1929), pp.

60.

The author discusses the death of Plotinus as described by Porphyry and

Firmicus Maternus, also the chronology in Porphyry's Life of Plotinus.

. Perler, Der Nuf bei Plotin und daſ Verbum bei Augustinus als
vorbildliche Urrache der Welt (Freiburg, 1931).
. Shorey, “Platonism in Antiquity—Neo-Platonism,” in Platonism,
Ancient and Modern (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California
Press, 1938), pp. 259.
This work (pages 36-61) is one of eight lectures on the history of Pla
tonism, given by Professor Shorey in 1928-1929 at the University of Cali
fornia. It treats of the features in Plato of which Neo-Platonism is the
exaggeration.

. Whittaker, The Neo-Platonists (2nd ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1918), pp. xv. 318.
This book is a study in the history of Hellenism. The author gives an
exposition of the entire history of Neo-Platonism. Pages 26-131 are devoted
to Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus.
 INDEX

Absolute as a guide to truth, 7, 22, 81

in Neo-Platonism, 48 Divine, 74, 75, 77, 111, 112, 131,
Academics 161-162, 235
Augustine refutes the doctrine of, of the Church and the Scriptures,
78, 81 33, 70, 82, 95
defense of, 84, 112 "unreasoned,” 5
influence on Augustine, 8, 68 Averroists, 15
in relation to Plato, 234
Acts of the Apostles, 43, 44 Bardenhewer, O., 26
Adam Baptism
sin and punishment of, 46, 55, of Augustine, 16, 17, 23, 27, 28,
173, 175, 181, 208, 223, 228, 182
232 of infants, 232, 233
Adam, Karl, 33, 34, 55 Becker, H., 8, 39, 233
Adeodatus, 67, 192, 195 Benedictines of St. Maur, 50, 112,
Africa 209, 215
church of, 45, 46 Bertrand, Louis, 2
works of Augustine written in, Bible, 9-10, 13, 18, 27, 35
170, 182, 192, 196 Bigg, C., 227
Albert the Great, St., 29 Body
Alfaric, Prosper, 9, 10-17, 39, 219, a scandal, in opinion of Plotinus,
230, 236 174
Alypius, 78, 84, 87 Augustine's concept of relation of
Ambrose, St. soul to, 93, 109, 138-139, 148
Augustine's respect for, 111 149, 175, 183, 188-189, 213
Christian doctrine of union of
author of Hymns, 76, 184
influence on Augustine, 11, 24, soul with, 54
25, 30, 31, 35, 36, 69 in itself is good, 197, 226
on the Church of Rome, 45 in relation to soul according to
Plotinus, 49, 50, 54, 85, 93,
Ammonius Saccas, 47, 236 153-154
Anthony, St., 25 not a detriment to soul, 86
Antoninus, 215, 216 risen, 227, 228
Apostles warfare between soul and, 55
teachings of, 130
condemnation of, 162 Boissier, Gaston, 3, 4, 6, 8
Apuleius of Madaura, 52, 63 Bosanquet, B., 131
Aristotelianism, 48 Boyer, C., S.J., 23-25
Ascension
Bréhier, E., 54, 220, 238
Burnet, J., 238
of Christ, 206
of the soul to God, according to
Augustine, 150-152, 154-157; Cassiciacum, 2, 7, 13, 17, 18, 19,
according to Plotinus, 152-154, 20-22, 25-27, 33-34, 36, 38, 40,
156-157 65, 67, 78, 100, 112, 113-114,
118, 160, 218, 233
Asceticism
Christian, 55 Cayré, F., 26-28, 157
Neo-Platonic, 49, 55 Celsinus, 215
Augustine, St., passim Christ, paſsim
Authority Christianity, paſsim
and reason, 129-130, 157-158, 202 Church
205, 228 Apostrophe to the, 140-142
262 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Augustine's defense of the, 14, Creed

15, 128, 131, 203, 217 Apostles', 43-46, 231
Augustine's submission to the, 5, Athanasian, 43, 76
20, 24, 28, 29, 31, 33 Augustine's discourse on the, 46
influence on Augustine, 35-36, 70 Nicene, 43, 53
morals and doctrine of the, 134, Criteria
155, 171, 173, 205, 229
of Africa, 45-46
.. of, 87, 119, 218
of Alexandria, 45
objective for distinguishing Chris
of Antioch, 45 tianity from Neo-Platonism, 40
of Aquileia, 45 Cyprian, St.
of Rome, 45 on the Church of Africa, 45
Cicero De beata vita, 50, 65, 67-78, 80, 87,
doctrine of happiness, 72-74 94, 187, 218, 221, 228, 230
influence on Augustine, 7, 24, 51, De civitate Dei, 40, 51-52, 57, 61-65,
68
67, 97, 146
Civilization De fide et symbolo, 46
Greek, 238, 240 De finibus bonorum et malorum, 72
Western 238, 240 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 65,
Confessions, passim 128, 170-181, 187, 199, 200,
Contemplation 204, 221-222, 224-227
meaning of, according to Augus De immortalitate animae, 65, 118
tine, 151-152, 154-156 126, 220
Plotinus's doctrine of, 152, 154, De Labriolle, P., 26-27
156-157 De libero arbitrio, 65, 128, 160-169,
Contra Academicos, 19, 21, 50, 65, 170, 179, 193, 200, 219, 221,
67, 78-86, 92, 106, 112, 117, 224, 226
129, 138, 164, 193, 219, 221, De magistro, 65, 192-196, 216
228, 234, 235 De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, 38
Conversion 39, 65, 128-131, 133-143, 157,
Christian conversion of Augus 164, 170, 201, 221-222, 228
tine: Con, 3-14, Pro, 14-40, De moribus Manichaeorum, 65, 128,
218-238 160, 170, 179, 200, 222, 226
meaning of, 41-42 De musica, 65, 182-192, 208, 221,
Cratylus, 51 223, 227, 231, 232
Creation De ordine, 65, 67, 87-100, 102, 113
and generation, 164-165 114, 117, 129, 138, 143, 157,
160, 183, 189, 219, 221-222,
Augustine's early acceptance of,
14 228, 230
Christian doctrine of, 56, 144-146, De quantitate animae, 14, 39, 65,
164, 170-173, 176, 177, 191, 146-160, 164, 168, 183, 193,
205-207, 220-221, 224-225 204, 210, 219–220, 222, 224,
formal expression of doctrine of, 226-228, 232-233
7 Development in Augustine's
Greek and Christian doctrine of, Thought, 230-233
238-239 De vera religione, 65, 128, 196-209,
•
Platonists' belief in, 63 212, 215, 221, 223, 225-228,
Creator 230-232, 234-235
Augustine's belief in a, 218, 220 Dialectic
Christian notion of relation of Augustine and Plotinus praise, 92
creature to, 71, 177 Dialogues, 4-5, 9, 12-13, 17-23, 26,
God as, 101, 174, 199 29-30, 33-34, 36, 39
Neo-Platonic concept of, 63 Divine Mysteries, 69, 95, 96, 222,
of the being of things, 144-146 228
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 263

Divine Will Augustine accepts doctrine of,

existence of universe due to the, 160-161
144, 170-171, 220, 224 moral evil results from abuse of,
universe governed in accordance 165-167, 179, 189, 198-199,
with, 90, 172, 221 225, 227
Donatists, 2 soul can abuse power of, 162
Dyroff, A., 87
Gaius, 215-216
Emanation Gasquet, J. R., 44
Plotinus's doctrine of, 48-49, 76 Genesis, 170, 173, 174, 181, 197,
Enneads, passim 224, 225, 229
Epistulae, 50, 65, 112-117, 128, 169, Gilson, E., 14-15, 37, 109, 238
182, 209-217, 219, 221, 223, God
231-232, 234 nature of, 37, 46, 52, 53, 56, 57,
Eternal punishment 61, 62, 69, 218-221
Augustine's doctrine on, 176, 177 Gourdon, L., 6, 7, 38, 39, 170
Eternity of the world Grabmann, M., 29
according to Plotinus, 146 Grace
Evil Augustine's conversion effected
a difficult problem for Augustine, by, 3, 9, 25, 28, 30, 37, 38
162 conversion due to acceptance of,
Christian revelation provides ex 41, 60
planation for, 37 early writings of Augustine con
God not the author of, 14, 167, tain doctrine of, 19, 180
178 Grandgeorge, L., 18
matter as the source of, 49, 64, Guardini, R., 37
144, 166, 200, 225, 227 Guitton, L., 220
moral evil due to abuse of free
will, 144, 166, 178, 189, 197 Happiness -

199, 225-226 and wisdom, 68, 114-115

moral evil not subversive of or attainable through Christianity,
27
der, 89, 90, 144, 200
Neo-Platonic concept of the body Cicero's concept of, 72
as, 55, 65, 167, 179 the result of union with God, 52,
physical evils due to sin of man, 74, 75, 204
226 to Plotinus and the Neo-Platonist,
physical evils have no positive 54, 64, 72
reality, 88, 143, 178, 200, 226 Harnack, Adolf, 4, 5, 17, 239
Plotinus aids Augustine in solv Heaven
ing problem of, 25, 27, 30, 58 Augustine's doctrine on, 176
Evodius, 146, 160, 161, 165 Hellenism, 238-239
Hendricks, E., 157, 220
Faith Henry, P., S.J., 35, 36-37, 56, 159,
and reason, 30, 79, 80, 82, 94, 222
95-96, 130-131, 160-161, 195, Hermogenianus, 112
228-230 Hippo-Regius
as embodied in Church and Scrip council of, 45
tures, 46, 203-206, 228 Hofmann, F., 34
Augustine assents to, 25, 28, 31 Holy Scripture
not subordinated to Neo-Platonic Augustine a student of, 2, 9, 10,
philosophy by Augustine, 16, 18 13, 24, 29, 33, 36, 37, 60, 69,
Fate, 87 81
Free will Augustine's respect for, 139, 162,
a power of the soul, 144, 207, 181
225, 226 authority of, 203, 205
264 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

Church as guardian of, 29-30, 142 Neo-Platonic doctrine of, 53, 58,
citations from, in Augustine's 236
early works, 18, 103, 140, 235 Loisy, A., 16, 17, 23
Manichaean attack on, 128 Loofs, Friedrich, 5, 6, 38, 39, 236,
Hortensius, 7, 24, 37, 68 239
Humility Love
importance of, 23, 33, 70, 223 Christian precept of,
lacking in Neo-Platonism, 59, 60, toward God, 134-135, 187, 201
71, 97, 223 202, 229
Hypostases toward one's neighbor, 106,
Neo-Platonic, 76, 165, 236 135-136, 138, 159, 187, 201
202, 229
Iamblichus, 51, 63 Neo-Platonic doctrine of,
Idolatry toward God, 136
Augustine rebukes Platonists for toward one's neighbor, 106
their, 59 -
107, 137-138
Ignatius of Antioch, St., 45 Lovejoy, A. O., 56
Illumination Luke, St., 42, 43, 140
Augustine's doctrine of, 83-85, Lycopolis, 47
103-106, 192-194, 216
Plotinus's theory of, 84, 104, 106, MacDonald, Alexander, 45
193 Manichaeans
Incarnation Augustine defends Catholic doc
Christian doctrine of the, 96-97, trine against the, 2, 128-129,
155, 173, 186, 206-207, 212 134, 139, 170-171, 224
213, 222-223 Augustine deluded by, 16, 20, 24,
humility of the, 30, 59 68, 233
lacking in Neo-Platonism, 58, 62, doctrine on good and evil, 143,
174, 223 196-197
Inge, W. R., 15, 47, 48, 54, 56, 83, Neo-Platonism helps Augustine
137, 178, 190, 219, 220, 236, 238, to abandon the, 18, 29, 234,
239 235

Intelligible world urged by Augustine to accept

for Plato, the realm of true real Catholic doctrine, 142
ity, 48 Mannucci, U., 29, 30
superiority over world of sense, Man, origin, nature, and destiny of
114-115, 116, 196, 235 Augustine's conception of, 115,
138, 174-176, 225-227
Jacquin, M., 17 Augustine disagrees with Plotinus
Jerome, St., 169 on, 15
John, St., 35, 42, 43, 44, 58, 75, Christian concept of, 47, 52, 54,
132, 173, 179, 207, 237 56
Jolivet, R., 31, 32, 33, 109, 144, Neo-Platonic theory of, 49, 50, 52,
225, 236 54, 56
Joseph, St., 42 Mark, St., 42, 43
Judgment, day of, 174, 208 Martin, Jules, 19
Justin, Martyr, St., 56 Matter
Lastidianus, 67 the source of evil according to
Plotinus and Porphyry, 49, 64,
Lebreton, J., 78 116, 144, 166, 225, 227
Licentius, 67, 78, 83, 86, 93, 99, 182 unformed matter created by God,
Logos 170, 198, 200, 225
Christian doctrine of, 30, 59, 192, Matthew, St., 42, 43, 46, 59, 136,
237 140, 174, 187, 188, 207
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST? 265

Mausbach, J., 28 agreement of the Enneads with the

McCormick, J. F., S.J., 55 doctrine of, 37
an example of the instantaneous
Memory
Augustine's concept of impor type of conversion, 41
tance of, 107-109, 111 Augustine in his early works
function of, according to Augus quotes from, 74, 132, 133, 140,
tine, 98-100, 149-150, 193, 210 155, 173, 175, 190, 193, 208,
222
Neo-Platonic concept of, 99-100,
108, 150 evidence of a Creed in the early
Meno, 51 Church, as found in the writ
Migne, J. P., 1, 112 ings of, 44
Milan, 7, 12, 13, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31, his influence on Augustine, 11,
25, 30, 33, 38, 60, 80, 81
33, 35, 36, 70, 76, 118, 182, 184
Minucius, Felix, 56 Phaedrus, 51
Miracles Philosophy
in the first years of the existence Augustine an ardent lover of, 67,
of the Church, 203 78-79, 81, 92, 94
performed by Christ, 43 Augustine's concept of, in early
Monceaux, P., 16 works, 68-70, 81-82, 96
Monica Planes of being
and Augustine at Ostia, 12 according to Augustine, 123, 124
at Cassiciacum, 73, 76, 77, 87 in the doctrine of Plotinus, 123,
124
Augustine's confidence in prayers
of, 219 Plato
Christian mother of Augustine, 3, Augustine criticizes doctrine of,
23 64, 209
Montgomery, W., 19, 21, 22 Augustine regards Plotinus as a
More, P. E., 239 disciple of, 50, 51, 63, 234
Music -
Augustine's admiration for, 85,
Augustine's fondness for, 182 111, 112, 210, 235
the kinds of numbers with which exaggerated notion of his influ
music is concerned, 184 ence on Augustine, 35
Navigius, 67
his concept of God as Creator,
239
Nazareth, 24 influence on Plotinus, 48
Nebridius, 50, 100, 114-116, 209
Platonists
215, 221, 223, 231, 232, 234
Necessitarianism Augustine admires the, 2, 10, 57,
60, 61, 81, 85, 235
Christianity finds difficulty in
Augustine criticizes the, 59, 60,
eliminating, 237 62, 63, 64, 65
in Neo-Platonic doctrine, 48, 53, Augustine imbued with the doc
91, 124 trines of the, 29
Neo-Platonism, Neo-Platonist books of the, 9, 25, 27, 28, 36,
passim 50, 234, 236
Nørregaard, J., 19, 22, 23 Plotinus, passim
Nourrisson, 51
Numbers
Polytheism
Augustine reprehends pagan
symbolism of, 184-185 schools for their, 208-209
Ohlman, D., 67, 87, 118 Pontitianus, 6, 11, 13
Origen, 45 Pontius Pilate, 43
Porphyry
Palestine, 42, 43 Augustine criticizes doctrines of,
Patriarchs, 130 51, 59, 62, 63, 64
Paul, St. Augustine's estimate of, 9
266 SAINT AUGUSTINE:

biographer of Plotinus, 48, 54, 137 Plotinus's concept of, 150

Portalié, E., 19, 20, 21 Republic, 51
Prayer Resurrection
Augustine's concept of, 83, 91-92, of the body, according to Augus
101, 102-103, 116-117, 163, tine, 155, 156, 176, 190, 206,
195-196, 216-217, 218-220 208, 227, 228, 232
Plotinus's doctrine of, 83, 91-92, of the body, denied by Platonists,
101, 103, 219–220 65
Pride of Christ, 43, 206
an impediment to union with Retractationes, 1, 26, 46, 65, 67, 75,
God, 70 78, 85, 87, 100, 109, 112, 118,
Augustine denounces, 180-181, 121, 128, 146, 160, 170, 182,
186-187, 200-201, 223, 226, 232
of the Platonists, 62 190, 192, 196, 203, 207, 208,
232
Prophets, 130
Providence Romanianus, 78, 79, 82, 83, 85, 87,
205, 215, 218, 227, 228
Augustine's concept of, 9, 52, 87 Rome, 24, 48, 160
91, 130, 144, 145, 151, 163,
171, 188-189, 204, 214-215, Rufinus, 45
220-221, 229 Rule of Faith, 44, 45
Neo-Platonic theory of, 52, 89-91,
146, 189, 215 Schaff, P., 44, 45
Psalms, 140, 175, 182 Scheel, O., 7, 8
Purgation by fire Schmid, R., 51
Augustine's concept of, in a fu Seeberg, R., 19, 20
ture life, 176, 177 Sensation
Purification Augustine's theory of, 93, 148
Augustine's doctrine of, 110, 117, 149, 183-184
150-154 Plotinus's doctrine on, 93, 148,
defects in Neo-Platonic doctrine 183
of, 64-65 Sensible world and sense realities
Neo-Platonic doctrine of, 110, an impediment to spiritual prog
117, 152-154 ress, 152, 153
Pythagoreanism, 184 inferior to the intelligible world,
114-115, 116, 125, 196
Reason
the ephemeral nature of, 113, 205,
as a guide to truth, 70, 71, 94-95, 235
129-130, 202, 204-205 Sergius Orate, 73
Augustine's colloquy with, 100, Shorey, P., 236
103, 106, 108, 109, 111 Simplicianus, 11, 13, 31
harmony between faith and, 30, Sin
80, 82, 96, 202
relative importance of faith and, Augustine's consciousness of, 98
130-131, 158, 160-161, 228-230 Neo-Platonism ignorant of a doc
trine of, 37
Redemption penalty for, 197-199, 208, 226
Augustine's concept of, 133-134 temptation and, 180
Christian doctrine of, 30 the human soul responsible for,
Reincarnation 188, 198, 225, 227
Plotinus's doctrine of purgation Socrates, 209
by, 177-178 Soliloquia, 6, 12, 14, 15, 19, 39, 65,
Reminiscence 100-111, 117, 118, 129, 138,
doctrine of, in Augustine's early 159, 160, 164, 168, 193, 210,
works, 108, 159, 210-211 219, 220, 224, 234
 CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST 2 267

Soul the Holy Ghost, 43, 47, 52, 53,

as harmony of the body, 122-123 67, 77, 78, 132-133, 173, 205,
as principle of life, 120-121, 147 221-223, 232
148 Neo-Platonic, 48, 49, 52-54, 62,
Augustine's estimate of value of 98, 133, 221
the, 107, 159 the One, 48-49, 52-54, 76-77, 90,
Augustine's interest in problems 97, 104, 133, 156, 157, 165, 222
of the, 69, 72, 127 the Nous or Divine Intelligence,
Divine and eternal nature of, 126 7, 49, 52-54, 76, 89, 91, 98, 133,
immortality of, 103, 107, 118, 165, 168, 194, 222
126, 127 the World-Soul, 49, 52-54, 76,
its mode of presence in the body, 121, 133, 165, 191-192, 194,
119-120 222
its superiority over body, 109, Truth
123, 125 and happiness, 86
powers of the, 112 ,146, 148-150, and wisdom, 68
152, 155-156, 168, 183, 184 Augustine's quest for, 71, 116
union of body with, 49-50, 54, 55, is attainable, 78, 81, 82
125, 126, 138-139, 157, 225 is immutable, 126, 182
Sparrow Simpson, W. J., 30 the source of, 74-76, 151-152, 203,
Stoicism, 8, 48 205, 216, 221
Trygetius, 67, 78, 86, 93, 221
Tagaste, 23, 170, 211 Tusculan Disputations, 72
Taylor, A. E., 239 Tusculum, 13
Temptation, 180
Tertullian, 45 Valerius, 1
Testaments Verecundus, 2, 12, 13, 27, 67, 78,
New, 20, 139-140, 142, 181, 207 98, 114
Old, 20, 24, 139-140, 142, 170, Victorinus, Marius, 9, 11, 25, 32,
174, 181, 195, 207 50, 51
Theaetetus, 51 Virgil, 13
Theodorus, Mallius, 67, 68 Virgin Mary, The, 42, 155, 173,
Theological virtues, 102-105 206, 222
Virtue
Thimme, W., 8, 9, 39
Thomas Aquinas, St., 29, 42 a factor in the acquisition of
Tiberius Caesar, 42 knowledge, 73
Timaeus, 51, 239 Cicero's concept of, 72
Time moral, 134-135
Augustine's concept of, 172 Von Hertling, G. F., 19, 20
Plotinus's doctrine on, 172-173
Tolley, W. P., 30 Warfield, B. B., 30
Toyrscher, F. E., 35 Wisdom
Trinity identified with the Son of God,
Christian, 46, 52-54, 62, 75-77, 74-76, 192, 193, 228
96-97, 132-134, 185-186, 205 philosophy the goal of, 70, 79,
206, 212, 213, 221-222 82
the Father, 8, 52-54, 62, 77-78,
97-98, 132-133, 164-165, 173, synonymous with happiness, 68
205, 212-213, 221, 232 Wörter, F., 17, 18, 119
the Son, 8, 47, 52-54, 62, 77, 78, Wundt, Max, 39
97-98, 132-133, 164-165, 173,
205, 221-223, 232 Zenobius, 87, 113