Subject: Persons and Family Relations

Doctrine: -
Topic: Parental Authority
Subtopic: Articles 209-215 FC, RA 8972
Digester: Celmar Galindez

G.R. Nos. 77737-38 August 15, 1988

Facts

The testimony of complainant Janalita Rapada purports to show that in her cohabitation with
the accused, without the benefit of marriage, Christina Marie was born. Her birth certificate
bears an entry of the name of the accused as the father and the Affidavit of Acknowledgment
duly signed by him.

At the present, the child receives a monthly support from the accused in the sum of $150.00
thru the child's mother, Janalita Rapada. Aside from this monthly support, Janalita Rapada
obtained a promise from the accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and also a
commitment to declare the child after his citizenship. This will entitle the child for all the
benefits and privileges extended to dependents of American US Navy servicemen like free
medical check-up.

Issue

Whether the private respondent has parental obligations to the petitioner even if the latter
was an illegitimate child.

Ruling

No, the private respondent has parental obligations to the petitioner even if the latter was an
illegitimate child.

Article 211 of the Family Code erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted children
on one hand and acknowledged illegitimate children on the other, insofar as joint parental
authority is concerned. Illegitimate children have rights of the same nature as legitimate and
adopted children. This is enunciated in Art. 3, P.D. 603 which provides that "all children shall
be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy,
sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors."
In this case, the respondent court further ruled that Christina Dempsey is not entitled to the
rights arising from the parental responsibility of her father, she being an illegitimate child.
Reliance was made on Art. 17 of P.D. 603 which defines the joint parental authority of
parents over their legitimate or adopted children. The respondent court's observations are
wrong because the law itself protects even illegitimate children. Illegitimate children have
rights of the same nature as legitimate and adopted children. This is enunciated in Art. 3,
P.D. 603 which provides that "all children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth
without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political
antecedents, and other factors." Rights must be enforced or protected to the extent that it is
possible to do so.

Hence, private respondent has parental obligations to the petitioner even if the latter was an
illegitimate child.

Full text ahead

G.R. Nos. 77737-38 August 15, 1988

CHRISTINA MARIE DEMPSEY, a minor and represented by her mother, Janalita Rapada,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LXXV, Third Judicial Region, Olongapo City, and
JOEL DEMPSEY, respondents.

Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for petitioners.

Miguel F. Famularcano, Jr. for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition denominated as one for review on certiorari and/or a special civil action for
certiorari from the decision rendered by the respondent court on November 28, 1986 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 460-86 and 461-86, entitled "The People of the Philippines v. Joel
Dempsey."

On January 30, 1986, two separate informations were filed against respondent Joel
Dempsey before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch II, Olongapo City charging him with
violation of Article 59 (par. 2) of P.D. 603 and Article 46, par. 8 of P.D. 603.

The Informations read:

That on or about and during the period from December 1985 to the present, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously leave their conjugal dwelling
at No. 15 Ohio Street, Upper Kalaklan, Olongapo City and abandon his child Christina R.
Dempsey and deprive him (sic) of his love, care and protection she from the accused (sic)
since then, by continuously failing and refusing to give adequate support to the said minor
child and despite pleas, the accused without lawful justification, failed, disregarded and still
continues to fail and disregard to perform his obligations to his said minor child Christina R.
Dempsey,

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 69-86

That on or about and during the period from December 1985 to the present, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail and refuse to provide his
child Christina R. Dempsey with adequate support, as defined in Article 290 of the Civil
Code, despite the fact that he is capable of supporting his child, and despite pleas, the
accused without lawful justification, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to provide
his child with adequate support, to the damage and prejudice of the said child.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)

The facts of the case are summarized by the Trial Court as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The testimony of complainant Janalita Rapada purports to show that in her cohabitation with
the accused, without the benefit of marriage, Christina Marie was born on October 01, 1984,
at the St. Jude's Family Clinic, Olongapo City where she delivered the child. Her birth
certificate, Exhibit "A" bears an entry of the name of the accused as the father and Exhibit
"A-1 " the Affidavit of the Acknowledgment duly signed by him.

At the present, the child receives a monthly support from the accused in the sum of $150.00
thru the child's mother, Janalita Rapada. Aside from this monthly support, Janalita Rapada
obtained a promise from the accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and also a
commitment to declare the child after his citizenship. This will entitle the child for all the
benefits and privileges extended to dependents of American US Navy servicemen like free
medical check-up. Efforts were made with the Naval Legal Service Office, US Naval
Facilities, Subic Bay, Philippines to compel the accused to fulfill these commitments but to
no avail. To seek redress thru the Court, she engaged the services of Atty. Estanislao L.
Cesa, Jr., offering P5,000.00 as Attorney's fee payable after the cases are decided.
xxx xxx xxx

At the Naval Legal Service Office, someone entertained her demand for the accused to
declare Christina Marie as his dependent and after his American citizenship. She was of the
belief that these could be done not knowing that the American who entertained her demands
had no authority to effect the same. (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

Upon arraignment, the private respondent freely, voluntarily, and spontaneously entered a
plea of guilty to the offense charged in the Information.

On August 26, 1986, the Trial Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against
him, considering the mitigating circumstances of his voluntary plea of guilty, this Court
sentences him to a prison term of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) days to Four (4) months
of Arresto Mayor, medium period and fine of Three hundred (P300.00) Pesos for each of the
cases and to pay the costs.

For the civil liability, judgment is rendered against accused Joel Dempsey confirming the
payment of US $150.00 monthly support to Christina Marie and to continue payment thru
Janalita Rapada, to be used solely for the needs of the child until she reaches the age of
majority; to recognize the child Christina Marie as his natural child; to pay Christina Marie
thru Janalita Rapada the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damage; and to pay the sum of
P5,000.00 as attorney's fee to Atty. Manuel Rosapapan as Chairman of the Committee on
Legal Aid of the IBP Chapter of Zambales Olongapo City and the same to form part of the
legal aid fund.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 23-24)

The private respondent appealed the municipal trial court's decision to the regional trial court
and prayed that the award on civil liability be set aside and the penalty of imprisonment be
reduced to a penalty of fine only.

In a decision rendered on November 28, 1986, the respondent regional trial court reversed
the municipal trial court's decision on the following grounds:

1. Parental authority to which certain parental obligations are attached pertains only to
legitimate and adopted children unlike petitioner who is an acknowledged illegitimate minor
child of private respondent; that in cases of abandonment of minors, the proper forum is the
Department of Social Welfare where the person to whom the minor has been left must report
immediately (Art. 161, P.D. 603).

2. A person cannot he held criminally liable for failure to support a minor child.
3. The Municipal Trial Court had determined a matter not within its competence and
authority.

Hence, the present petition on pure questions of law.

The petitioner maintains that the penalty of imprisonment and fine in both cases is
sanctioned by the law and jurisprudence and that the award of civil liability is justified.

We find merit in the instant petition.

The respondent court committed reversible error when it failed to take into account that the
decision of the municipal trial court was based on the private respondent's plea of guilty.
Respondent Joel Dempsey did not and does not challenge the validity of Presidential Decree
No. 603, Articles 46 and 59 on certain obligations of parents to their children and Articles 60
and 210 penalizing violations of mandatory provisions. As a matter of fact, respondent
Dempsey's appeal impliedly recognizes the validity of the judgment of conviction because he
asked that the penalty of imprisonment be changed to fine, not that the trial court's decision
was void or that he be acquitted.

There can be no question about the trial court's jurisdiction over the criminal prosecutions.
Article 69 of P.D. 603 penalizes abandonment of a minor child by its parent, as provided in
Article 59, with imprisonment from two to six months or a fine not exceeding five hundred
pesos or both. Article 210 penalizes a violation of the obligation to give adequate support
found in Article 46 with imprisonment not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding two
hundred pesos or both, unless a higher penalty is provided for in the Revised Penal Code or
special laws.

The respondent court erred in its ruling that the trial court determined a matter not within its
competence and authority. There is likewise no basis for its gratuitous finding that a parent
cannot be held criminally liable under P.D. 603 for withholding support from his minor child.
There is absolutely no discussion on this ruling. The records show, however, that Joel
Dempsey's plea of guilt to the charge of withholding support from his minor daughter was
made without a full understanding of that particular charge. Janalita Rapada herself testified
that she is receiving $150.00 a month for the support of the minor Christina Marie Dempsey.
The amount of P3,000.00 monthly appears to fulfill the requirement of "adequate support"
found in Par. 8, Art. 46 of P.D. No. 603. What Rapada wants is a judicial declaration for this
support to continue. This cannot be the basis of a criminal conviction.

As to the information charging abandonment, the private respondent entered his plea of guilt
with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act and with the assistance of
his counsel. The reversal of conviction based on a plea of guilty is an act which is not at all
explained by the respondent court and, therefore, in excess of its jurisdiction. It is
well-settled as a general rule that a plea of guilt is sufficient to sustain conviction without
introduction of further evidence (People v. Formentera, 130 SCRA 114; People v. Balisacan,
17 SCRA 119; People v. Gravino, et al., 122 SCRA 123; People v. Pajarillo, 94 SCRA 828).
Only in such exceptional cases as capital offenses is evidence still required.
The respondent court further ruled that Christina Dempsey is not entitled to the rights arising
from the parental responsibility of her father, she being an illegitimate child. Reliance was
made on Art. 17 of P.D. 603 which defines the joint parental authority of parents over their
legitimate or adopted children. The respondent court's observations are wrong because the
law itself protects even illegitimate children. Illegitimate children have rights of the same
nature as legitimate and adopted children. This is enunciated in Art. 3, P.D. 603 which
provides that "all children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as
to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other
factors." Rights must be enforced or protected to the extent that it is possible to do so.

The Solicitor General points out that the new Family Code promulgated as Executive Order
No. 209, July 17, 1978 erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted children on one
hand and acknowledged illegitimate children on the other, insofar as joint parental authority
is concerned. Article 211 of the Family Code, whose date of effectivity is approaching,
merely formalizes into statute the practice on parental authority.

The respondent court would shift jurisdiction over the case from the municipal trial court to
the Department of Social Services and Development. It is readily apparent that the DSSD
cannot take cognizance of and enforce the criminal sanctions of P.D. 603. Besides, Christina
Marie Dempsey is not an abandoned child in the strict sense of the word as she is still in the
custody and care of her mother. Art. 141 of P.D. 603 defines an abandoned child as follows:
"... Am abandoned child is one who has no parental care or guardianship or whose parents
or guardians have deserted him for a period of at least six continuous months ... ." Article
161 cannot, therefore, be applied to the case at bar. Thus, it is not the Department of Social
Services and Development which has jurisdiction but the Municipal Trial Court.

There is one other point which has to be corrected. As part of the civil liability in its judgment,
the trial court required the accused to recognize Christina Marie as his natural child. This
should not have been done. The recognition of a child by her father is provided for in the
Civil Code and now in the new Family Code. In this criminal prosecution, where the accused
pleaded guilty to criminal charges and the issue of recognition was not specifically and fully
heard and tried, the trial court committed reversible error when it ordered recognition of a
natural child as part of the civil liability in the criminal case.

We also agree with the respondent regional trial court that the penalty imposed is erroneous.
The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees is improper. Although fathers like Joel
Dempsey should be deterred from committing similar acts of irresponsibility, the law does not
allow us to affirm the grant of exemplary damages only on the basis of the facts herein
presented. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded inasmuch as there is not one or more
aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code).

As to the penalties, we agree with the Solicitor General that these should be modified
accordingly. And finally, it should be noted that the Regional Trial Court after declaring that
the Municipal Trial Court acted outside of its competence merely set aside the appealed
decision. Instead of acquitting the accused, it suggested the filing of necessary pleadings
before the proper court.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch
75 of the Third Judicial Region is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of
Branch II of the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City is REINSTATED with the modification
that in Criminal Case No. 6886, Joel Dempsey is sentenced to imprisonment of One (1)
month and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) while in Criminal Case No.
69-86 he is ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.