G.R. No.

118127             April 12, 2005

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity
as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON.
GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON.
HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR.,
HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M.
ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON.
CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON.
DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON.
FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON.
MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP,
HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS,
in their capacity as councilors of the City of Manila, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.

TINGA, J.:

Facts:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. 6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants,
herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila
(City Council).  MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.8

An Ordinance was enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the
said Ordinance prohibits any person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area   to contract and
engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are
used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community

Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized
certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone. 22 The Ordinance, the petitioners
likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the
equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the
Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila.24

Private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates
that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to
an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner
City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.

The lower court presided by respondent Judge Judge Laguio issued a decision declaring the ordinance null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance infringes the due process clause.

Ruling:

Yes, the Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause

The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. . . ."

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process.  It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.  This standard is aptly described as a
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice,49 and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of
the police power.50
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals; to secure
the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights
and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction
without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and
the benefit of the general law.51

The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are "persons" within the
scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.52

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due process" and
"substantive due process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person
of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing
the government must provide when it takes a particular action.53

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a
person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the
government's action.54 Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on
the level of scrutiny used.55 For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is
met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.  But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such
as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is
necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.56

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to
due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise
is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental
law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. 58 Due process requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.59

Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.  A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of
the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.61

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights62 a violation of the due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community.
Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the
means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the promotion of
the moral and social values of the community. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
community's social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed"
under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the
enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape
morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or
establishment; it is in the hearts of men.

Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally
infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and
explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no
power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing
of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary
we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional
authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated
establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection of laws not even under the guise of police power.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is
AFFIRMED.