CASE DIGEST
PEOPLE V. AARON
Citation. 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980)
Brief Fact Summary.
The Supreme Court of Michigan consolidated three case, where Defendant was convicted of second-
degree murder for a homicide that occurred in the course of an armed robbery and two convictions similar
to Defendant’s were reversed because the trial courts erred in failing to instruct the jury that the element of
malice must still be found to sustain a conviction of felony murder.
Synopsis of Rule of Law.
The felony murder rule should be abolished, because it improperly eliminates a jury’s consideration of
malice.
Facts.
Aaron (Defendant) committed a homicide in the course of an armed robbery. He was consequently
convicted of first-degree felony murder. The jury received instructions that Defendant could be found guilty
of first-degree murder if it was determined that he killed the victim during the commission, or attempted
commission, of an armed robbery. Michigan does not have a felony-murder statute that classifies as a
murder any death occurring in the course of a felony, regardless of the defendant’s mental state. Instead,
Michigan’s first-degree murder statute makes a homicide a first-degree murder if it happens during the
course of one of the enumerated felonies, including arson, criminal sexual conduct, robbery, larceny,
breaking and entering of a dwelling, or kidnapping. Two convictions similar to Defendant’s were reversed by
the court of appeals, which held that the trial courts erred in failing to instruct the jury that the element of
malice must still be found to sustain a conviction of felony murder.
Issue.
Whether the felony murder should be abolished because the rule eliminates a jury’s consideration of
malice.
Held.
Yes. Defendant’s conviction is reversed, the case is remanded and the other two reversals are affirmed.
The felony murder rule should be abolished, because it improperly eliminates a jury’s consideration of
malice.
Discussion.
The felony-murder rule inappropriately excludes from the jury’s consideration the question of whether the
facts of a crime prove a defendant acted with malice. Both the history and commentary existing on the
felony-murder rule suggest that the rule finds its basis in faulty premises, and the rule has fallen out of favor
completely in England and more gradually in the United States. Lord Coke’s first descriptions of the rule
have been severely criticized, and nineteenth century English case law developments demonstrate the
push to restrict application of the doctrine to very limited circumstances. Eventually, England completely
abolished the felony-murder rule. Though only a few American states have done the same, many have
imposed legislative and judicial limitations narrowing the rule’s scope. The Model Penal Code lists at least
seven such restrictions, including that the underlying felonious act must be dangerous to life, the homicide
must be a natural and probable consequence of the felony, and the felony must be independent of the
homicide. Each of these restrictions illustrates the states’ mounting disappointment with the rule. In
Michigan specifically, the purpose of enacting the current first-degree murder statute was to ensure
punishments fit the offenses and reduce the number of capital crimes. The statute was not meant to codify
the common law felony-murder rule. However, because the statute encompasses all types of common law
murders, including felony murder, the rule must be reviewed. Michigan courts have thoroughly restricted the
felony-murder doctrine. Following this framework, this court concludes that the rule should be abolished,
because it does not give the jury the proper opportunity to determine if a defendant acted maliciously, which
is an essential element of any murder. The facts involved in the commission of a felony may tend to prove
malice, but whether they do or not is a question for the jury and cannot be inferred simply from the
occurrence of the felony. Abolishing the kind of malice that can be inferred from commission of an
underlying felony will not have much of a practical effect in most cases. Often, it is unnecessary to apply the
felony-murder rule, because other types of malice may be inferred from facts.
