2/3/2020 G.R. No. 210669 | Hi-Lon Manufacturing, Inc. v.

Commission on Audit

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 210669. August 1, 2017.]

HI-LON MANUFACTURING, INC., petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to annul and set aside the
Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No. 2011-003 1 dated January 20,
2011, which denied HI-LON Manufacturing, Inc.'s (HI-LON) petition for
review, and affirmed with modification the Notice of Disallowance (ND) No.
2004-032 dated January 29, 2004 of COA's Legal and Adjudication Office-
National Legal and Adjudication Section (LAO-N). The LAO-N disallowed
the amount of P9,937,596.20, representing the difference between the
partial payment of P10,461,338.00 by the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) and the auditor's valuation of P523,741.80, as just
compensation for the 29,690-square-meter road right-of-way taken by the
government in 1978 from the subject property with a total area of 89,070
sq. m. supposedly owned by HI-LON. The dispositive portion of the
assailed COA Decision No. 2011-003 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for
review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, ND No.
2004-32 dated January 29, 2004 amounting to P9,937,596.20 is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification on the reason thereof that the
claimant is not entitled thereto.
On the other hand, the Special Audit Team constituted under
COA Office Order No. 2009-494 dated July 16, 2009 is hereby
instructed to issue a ND for the P523,741.80 payment to Hi-Lon not
covered by ND No. 2004-032 without prejudice to the other findings
to be embodied in the special audit report. 2
This Petition likewise assails COA's Decision 3 No. 2013-212 dated
December 3, 2013 which denied HI-LON's motion for reconsideration,
affirmed with finality COA Decision No. 2011-003, and required it to refund

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2/3/2020 G.R. No. 210669 | Hi-Lon Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commission on Audit

payment made by DPWH in the amount of P10,461,338.00. The

dispositive portion of the assailed COA Decision No. 2013-212 reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, Commission on Audit
Decision No. 2011-003 dated January 20, 2011 is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH FINALITY. Hi-Lon Manufacturing Co., Inc. is
hereby required to refund the payment made by the Department of
Public Works and Highways in the amount of P10,461,338.00. 4
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, the government, through the then Ministry of
Public Works and Highways (now DPWH), converted to a road right-of-way
(RROW) a 29,690 sq. m. portion of the 89,070 sq. m. parcel of land
(subject property) located in Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna, for the Manila
South Expressway Extension Project. The subject property was registered
in the name of Commercial and Industrial Real Estate Corporation (CIREC)
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40999.
Later on, Philippine Polymide Industrial Corporation (PPIC) acquired
the subject property, which led to the cancellation of TCT No. T-40999 and
the issuance of TCT No. T-120988 under its name. PPIC then mortgaged
the subject property with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
a government financing institution, which later acquired the property in a
foreclosure proceeding on September 6, 1985. TCT No. T-120988, under
PPIC's name, was then cancelled, and TCT No. T-151837 was issued in
favor of DBP. CAIHTE

Despite the use of the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the property as

RROW, the government neither annotated its claim or lien on the titles of
CIREC, PPIC and DBP nor initiated expropriation proceedings, much less
paid just compensation to the registered owners.
Upon issuance of Administrative Order No. 14 dated February 3,
1987, entitled "Approving the Identification of and Transfer to the National
Government of Certain Assets and Liabilities of the Development Bank of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank," the DBP submitted all its
acquired assets, including the subject property, to the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) for disposal, pursuant to Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986.
On June 30, 1987, APT disposed of a portion of the subject property
in a public bidding. The Abstract of Bids 5 indicated that Fibertex
Corporation (Fibertex), through Ester H. Tanco, submitted a
P154,000,000.00 bid for the asset formerly belonging to PPIC located in
Calamba, Laguna, i.e., "Land (5.9 hectares) TCT 4099, buildings &
improvements, whole mill," while TNC Philippines, Inc. and P. Lim
Investment, Inc. submitted a bid of P106,666,000.00 and
P138,000,000.00, respectively. With respect to the former assets of

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Texfiber Corporation (Texfiber) in Taytay, Rizal i.e., "Land (214,062 sq. m.

TCT (493917) 506665, buildings & improvements, whole mill"), only
Fibertex submitted a bid of P210,000,000.00.
In a Certification 6 dated July 1, 1987, APT certified that Fibertex
was the highest bidder of PPIC and Texfiber assets for P370,000,000.00,
and recommended to the Committee on Privatization to award said assets
to Fibertex. In a Letter 7 dated November 10, 1988, APT certified that
Fibertex paid APT P370,000,000.00 for the purchase of the said assets
formerly belonging to PPIC and Texfiber.
Meanwhile, Fibertex allegedly requested APT to exclude separate
deeds of sale for the parcel of land and for improvements under the
subject property covered by TCT No. 151837 in the name of DBP. Having
been paid the full bid amount, APT supposedly agreed with Fibertex that
the land would be registered in the name of TG Property, Inc. (TGPI) and
the improvements to Fibertex. Thus, APT executed two (2) separate Deeds
of Sale with TGPI and Fibertex with regard to the property, namely:
a. Deed of Sale between APT and TGPI executed on October
29, 1987 for the sale of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
T-151837 for a consideration of P2,222,967.00.
b. Deed of Sale between APT and Fibertex executed on 19
August 1987 for the sale of improvements (machinery,
equipment and other properties) on the same property for a
consideration of P154,315,615.39.
Upon complete submission of the required documents and proof of
tax payments on December 9, 1987, the Register of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna, cancelled DBP's TCT No. 151837 and issued TCT No. T-158786
in the name of TGPI, covering the entire 89,070 sq. m. subject property,
including the 29,690 sq. m. RROW. From 1987 to 1996, TGPI had paid
real property taxes for the entire 89,070 sq. m. property, as shown by the
Tax Declarations and the Official Receipt issued by the City Assessor's
Office and Office of the City Treasurer of Calamba, Laguna, respectively.
On April 16, 1995, TGPI executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of HI-LON over the entire 89,070 sq. m. subject property for a
consideration of P44,535,000.00. HI-LON registered the Deed with the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, which issued in its name TCT No.
383819.
Sometime in 1998, Rupert P. Quijano, Attorney-in-Fact of HI-LON,
requested assistance from the Urban Road Project Office (URPO) DPWH
for payment of just compensation for the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the
subject property converted to a RROW. The DPWH created an Ad Hoc
Committee which valued the RROW at P2,500/sq. m. based on the 1999
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal valuation.

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2/3/2020 G.R. No. 210669 | Hi-Lon Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commission on Audit

On December 21, 2001, a Deed of Sale was executed between HI-

LON and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Lope S. Adriano,
URPO-PMO Director, by authority of the DPWH Secretary, covering the
29,690 sq. m. parcel of land converted to RROW for a total consideration
of P67,492,500.00. On January 23, 2002, the Republic, through the
DPWH, made the first partial payment to HI-LON in the amount of
P10,461,338.00.
On post audit, the Supervising Auditor of the DPWH issued Audit
Observation Memorandum No. NGS VIII-A-03-001 dated April 2, 2003
which noted that the use of the 1999 zonal valuation of P2,500.00/sq. m.
as basis for the determination of just compensation was unrealistic,
considering that as of said year, the value of the subject property had
already been "glossed over by the consequential benefits" it has obtained
from the years of having been used as RROW. The auditor pointed out that
the just compensation should be based on the value of said property at the
time of its actual taking in 1978. Taking into account the average value
between the 1978 and 1980 Tax Declarations covering the subject land,
the Auditor arrived at the amount of P19.40/sq. m. as reasonable
compensation and, thus, recommended the recovery of excess payments.
DETACa

Upon review of the auditor's observations, the Director of the LAO-N

issued on January 29, 2004 ND No. 2004-32 in the amount of
P9,937,596.20, representing the difference between the partial payment of
P10,461,338.00 to HI-LON and the amount of P532,741.80, which should
have been paid as just compensation for the conversion of the RROW.
Acting on the request of Dir. Lope S. Adriano, Project Director
(URPO-PMO) for the lifting of ND No. 2004-032 dated January 29, 2004,
the LAO-N rendered Decision No. 2004-172 dated May 12, 2004, affirming
the same ND, and stating the value of the property must be computed from
the time of the actual taking.
Resolving (1) the motions for reconsideration and request for
exclusion from liability of former DPWH Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar, et
al.; (2) the request for lifting of Notice of Disallowance No. 2004-032 of OIC
Director Leonora J. Cuenca; (3) the motion to lift the disallowance and/or
exclusion as person liable of Ms. Teresita S. de Vera, Head, Accounting
Unit, DPWH; and (4) the appeal from ND No. 2004-032 of former Assistant
Secretary Joel C. Altea and of Mr. Rupert P. Quijano, Attorney-in-Fact of
HI-LON, the LAO-N issued Decision No. 2008-172-A dated June 25, 2008,
which denied the appeal and affirmed the same ND with modification that
payment of interest is appropriate under the circumstances.
Aggrieved, HI-LON filed a petition for review before the COA. In its
regular meeting on June 9, 2009, the COA deferred the resolution of the
petition, and instructed its Legal Service Section to create a Special Audit

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Team from the Fraud Audit and Investigation Office to investigate and
validate HI-LON's claim.
In its assailed Decision No. 2011-003 dated January 20, 2011, the
COA denied for lack of merit HI-LON's petition for review of the LAO-N
Decision No. 2008-172-A, and affirmed ND No. 2004-032 dated July 29,
2004 with modification declaring the claimant not entitled to just
compensation. The COA also instructed the Special Audit Team to issue
an ND for the P523,741.80 payment to HI-LON not covered by ND No.
2004-032, without prejudice to the other findings embodied by the special
audit report.
On the issue of whether or not HI-LON is entitled to just
compensation for the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject property, the
COA found that the evidence gathered by the Special Audit Team are fatal
to the claim for such compensation.
First, the COA noted that the transfer of the subject property in favor
of TGPI, the parent corporation of HI-LON, was tainted with anomalies
because records show that TGPI did not participate in the public bidding
held on June 30, 1987, as only three (3) bidders participated, namely:
Fibertex Corporation, TNC Philippines, Inc., and P. Lim Investment, Inc.
Second, the COA pointed out that the Deed of Sale between APT
and Fibertex has a disclosure that "The subject of this Deed of Absolute
Sale, therefore, as fully disclosed in the APT Asset Catalogue, is the total
useable area of 59,380 sq. m.," 8 excluding for the purpose the 29,690 sq.
m. converted to RROW. The COA added that such exclusion was
corroborated by the Abstract of Bids duly signed by the then APT
Executive Assistant and Associate Executive Trustee, showing that the
land covered by TCT No. T-151387 was offered to the public bidding for its
useable portion of 5.9 hectares only, excluding the subject 29,690 sq. m.
converted to RROW.
Third, the COA observed that HI-LON is a mere subsidiary
corporation which cannot acquire better title than its parent corporation
TGPI. The COA stressed that for more than (7) seven years that the
subject property was under the name of TGPI from its registration on
December 9, 1987 until it was transferred to HI-LON on April 16, 1995,
TGPI did not attempt to file a claim for just compensation because it was
estopped to do so as the Deed of Sale executed between APT and TGPI
clearly stated that the 29,690 sq. m. RROW was excluded from the sale
and remains a government property. Applying the principle of piercing the
veil of corporate fiction since TGPI owns 99.9% of HI-LON, the COA ruled
that HI-LON cannot claim ignorance that the 29,690 sq. m. RROW was
excluded from the public auction.
Having determined that HI-LON or its predecessor-in-interest TGPI
does not own the RROW in question, as it has been the property of the
Republic of the Philippines since its acquisition by the DBP up to the
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present, the COA concluded that the proper valuation of the claim for just
compensation is irrelevant as HI-LON is not entitled thereto in the first
place.
Dissatisfied, HI-LON filed a Motion for Reconsideration of COA
Decision No. 2011-003 and a Supplement thereto.
On December 3, 2013, the COA issued the assailed Decision No.
2013-212 denying HI-LON's motion for reconsideration, affirming with
finality its assailed Decision No. 2011-003, and requiring HI-LON to refund
the payment made by DPWH in the amount of P10,461,338.00. aDSIHc

In this Petition for Certiorari, HI-LON argues that the COA committed
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it held (1) that there was no property owned by HI-LON that was taken by
the government for public use; (2) that the 89,070-sq. m. subject parcel of
land, including the 29,690 sq. m. portion used as RROW by the
government, had been the property of the Republic of the Philippines; (3)
that HI-LON is not entitled to payment of just compensation; and (4) that it
collaterally attacked HI-LON's ownership of the subject land, including the
RROW. 9
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the COA
acted within its jurisdiction when it evaluated and eventually disallowed
what it found to be an irregular, anomalous and unnecessary disbursement
of public funds. The OSG agrees with the COA that HI-LON is not entitled
to payment of just compensation because the 29,690 sq. m. portion used
as RROW is already owned by the Republic since 1987 when DBP
transferred the entire 89,070 sq. m. subject property to APT, pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 14. The OSG emphasizes that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated October 29, 1987 between the Republic (through
APT) and TGPI clearly stated that the subject thereof, as fully disclosed in
the APT Asset Specific Catalogue, is the total useable area of 59,380 sq.
m., hence, the 29,690 sq. m. portion used as RROW was expressly
excluded from the sale. Besides, the OSG notes that the COA aptly found
that there were only three bidders who participated in APT's public bidding
of the subject property and TGPI was not one of the bidders. There being
an anomaly in the transfer of the property from APT to TGPI, the OSG
posits that HI-LON, as TGPI's successor-in-interest, is not entitled to just
compensation.
Stating that the intention of Proclamation No. 50 was to transfer the
non-performing assets of DBP to the national government, the OSG
maintains that APT has no authority to offer for sale the said portion
because it is a performing asset, having been used by the government as
RROW for the Manila South Expressway since 1978. Considering that the
said 29,690 sq. m. portion was not sold and transferred by APT to TGPI,
the OSG submits that TGPI cannot also transfer the same portion to its
subsidiary, HI-LON. The OSG concludes that HI-LON is not entitled to
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payment of just compensation as it is not the owner of the said portion, and
that the COA properly ordered full disallowance of the P10,461,338.00
paid to HI-LON.
HI-LON's Petition for Certiorari is devoid of merit.
In support of its claim of entitlement to just compensation, HI-LON
relies on the Deed of Sale dated October 29, 1987, and insists that its
predecessor-in-interest (TGPI) acquired from the national government,
through APT, the entire 89,070 sq. m. property, which was previously
registered in the name of DBP under TCT No. 151837. HI-LON asserts
that the 29,690 sq. m. RROW was not excluded from the sale because: (1)
APT referred to the entire property in the Whereas Clauses as one of the
subject of the sale; (2) APT made an express warranty in the said Deed
that the properties sold are clear of liens and encumbrances, which
discounts the need to investigate on the real status of the subject property;
and (3) the title registered in the name of DBP, as well as the titles of the
previous owners, CIREC and PPIC, contains no annotation as regards any
government's claim over the RROW.
HI-LON's assertions are contradicted by the clear and unequivocal
terms of the Deed of Sale 10 dated 29 October 1987 between APT and
TGPI, which state that the subject thereof is the total usable area of 59,380
sq. m. of the subject property. Contrary to HI-LON's claim, nothing in the
Whereas Clauses of the Deed indicates that the object of the sale is the
entire 89,070 sq. m. property, considering that the 29,690 sq. m. portion
thereof had been used as road right-of-way (RROW) for the South
Expressway, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
was the mortgagee of a parcel of land (hereafter to be referred to
as the "PROPERTY") covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
151837 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Laguna
(Calamba Branch), more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 2-D-I-J of the subd. Plan
Psd-39402, being a portion of Lot 2-D-1, described on
plan Psd-18888, LRC (GLRO Rec. No. 9933, situated
in the Bo. of Mayapa & San Cristobal, Municipality of
Calamba, Province of Laguna. Bounded on the N.E.
by Lot No. 2-D-1-I; of the subd. Plan; on the S., by the
Provincial Road; on the SW., by Lot 2-D-1-K of the
subd. plan and on the NW., by Lot No. 2-B of plan
Psd-925. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan,
being S. 62 deg. 03'W., 1946.22 from L.M. 5,
Calamba Estate; Thence — N. 64 deg. 35'E., 200.27
m. to point 2; S.21 deg. 03'E. 166.82 m. to point 3; S.
12 deg. 30'E, 141.01 m. to point 4; S. 10 deg. 25'E,
168.29 m. to point 5; N. 84 deg. 47'W, 215.01 m. to
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point 6; N. 13 deg. 44'W., 150.99 m. Thence — to

point 7; N. 13 deg. 45'W., 27.66 m. to the point of
beginning; containing an area of EIGHTY-NINE
THOUSAND SEVENTY (89,070) SQUARE METERS,
more or less. All points referred to are indicated on
the plan and are marked on the ground by PLS. cyl.
conc. mons. bearings true detloop deg. 03'E., date of
original survey Jan. 1906 — Jan. 1908 and Sept.
1913 and that of subd. survey, Aug. 23-25, 1953. ETHIDa

[As per Tax Declaration No. 9114, an area of 29,690

sq. m. had been used (road-right-of-way) for the
South Expressway. The subject of this Deed of
Absolute Sale, therefore, as fully disclosed in the APT
Asset Specific Catalogue, is the total useable area of
59,380 sq. m.] 11
WHEREAS, the PROPERTY was subsequently acquired by
DBP at public auction in a foreclosure sale as evidenced by a
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale dated September 6, 1985 issued by Mr.
Godofredo E. Quiling, Deputy Provincial Sheriff, Office of the
Provincial Sheriff of Laguna, Philippines, x x x
WHEREAS, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14 issued
on February 3, 1987 [Approving the Identification of and Transfer to
the National Government of Certain Assets and Liabilities of the
Development Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Bank], DBP's ownership and interest over the PROPERTY were
transferred to the National Government through the ASSET
PRIVATIZATION TRUST (APT), a public trust created under
Proclamation No. 50 dated December 8, 1986.
WHEREAS, in the public bidding conducted by the APT on
June 30, 1987, the VENDEE [TGPI] made the highest cash bid for
the PROPERTY and was declared the winning bidder.
WHEREAS, the sale of the PROPERTY has been authorized
by the COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION under Notice of Approval
dated July 21, 1987 of the APT;
WHEREAS, the VENDEE [TGPI] has fully paid the VENDOR
[Government of the Republic of the Philippines, through APT] the
purchase price of the PROPERTY in the amount of PESOS: TWO
MILLION TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN (P2,222,967.00).
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above
premises and for the sum of PESOS: TWO MILLION TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-
SEVEN (P2,222,967.00), Philippine Currency, paid by the VENDEE
to the VENDOR, the VENDOR does by these presents sell, transfer

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and convey the PROPERTY hereinabove described unto the

VENDEE, its successors and assigns, subject to the following
conditions:
1. The VENDOR hereby warrant that the
PROPERTIES shall be sold and transferred free and
clear of liens and encumbrances accruing before
August 18, 1987, and that all taxes or charges
accruing or becoming due on the PROPERTIES
before said date have or shall be fully paid by the
VENDOR;
2. Documentary Stamp Taxes, Transfer Taxes.
Registration fees, and all other expenses arising out
of or relating to the execution and delivery of this
Deed shall be for the account of and paid by the
VENDEE;
3. Capital gains tax, if any, payable on or in
respect of the transfer of the PROPERTY to the
VENDEE shall be for the account of and paid by the
VENDOR.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused
these presents to be signed at Makati, Metro Manila this [29th] day
of [October], 1987. 12
As the Deed of Sale dated October 29, 1987 is very specific that the
object of the sale is the 59,380. sq. m. portion of the subject property, HI-
LON cannot insist to have acquired more than what its predecessor-in-
interest (TGPI) acquired from APT. Article 1370 of the New Civil Code
provides that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations
shall control. Every contracting party is presumed to know the contents of
the contract before signing and delivering it, 13 and that the words used
therein embody the will of the parties. Where the terms of the contract are
simple and clearly appears to have been executed with all the solemnities
of the law, clear and convincing evidence is required to impugn it. 14
Perforce, HI-LON's bare allegation that the object of the Deed of Sale is
the entire 89,070 sq. m. area of the subject property, is self-serving and
deserves short shrift.
The Court thus agrees with the COA in rejecting HI-LON's claim of
ownership over the 29,690 sq. m. RROW portion of the subject property in
this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
As clearly shown in the Abstract of Bids, the subject of the
bidding was 59,380 sq. m. only. The Deed of Sale expressly states
that — cSEDTC

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[As per Tax Declaration No. 9114, an area of 29,690

sq. m. had been used (road-right-of-way) for the
South Expressway. The subject of this Deed of
Absolute Sale, therefore, as fully disclosed in the
APT Asset Specific Catalogue, is the total useable
area of 59,380 sq. m.]
The government cannot enter into a contract with the highest
bidder and incorporate substantial provisions beneficial to the latter
which are not included or contemplated in the terms and
specifications upon which the bids were solicited. It is contrary to
the very concept of public bidding to permit an inconsistency
between the terms and conditions under which the bids were
solicited and those under which the bids were solicited and those
under which proposals are submitted and accepted. Moreover, the
substantive amendment of the terms and conditions of the contract
bid out, after the bidding process had been concluded, is violative
of the principles in public bidding and will render the government
vulnerable to the complaints from the losing bidders.
Thus, since the area of [29,690 sq. m. which later became]
26,997 sq. m. covered by the ROW was not subject of the public
bidding, Hi-Lon cannot validly acquire and own the same. The
owner of this property is still the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx. 15
Citing Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization 16 where it was held
that Proclamation No. 50 does not prohibit APT from selling and disposing
other kinds of assets whether they are performing or non-performing,
necessary or appropriate, HI-LON contends that regardless of whether or
not the RROW is a performing or non-performing asset, it could not have
been excluded in the sale of the entire 89,070 sq. m. property pursuant to
the said Proclamation.
Concededly, the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject property is not
just an ordinary asset, but is being used as a RROW for the Manila South
Expressway Extension Project, a road devoted for a public use since it was
taken in 1978. Under the Philippine Highway Act of 1953, "right-of-way" is
defined as the land secured and reserved to the public for highway
purposes, whereas "highway" includes rights-of-way, bridges, ferries,
drainage structures, signs, guard rails, and protective structures in
connection with highways. 17 Article 420 of the New Civil Code considers
as property of public dominion those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the state, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character.
Being of similar character as roads for public use, a road right-of-
way (RROW) can be considered as a property of public dominion, which is
outside the commerce of man, and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be

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the object of a contract, 18 except insofar as they may be the object of

repairs or improvements and other incidental matters. However, this
RROW must be differentiated from the concept of easement of right of way
under Article 649 19 of the same Code, which merely gives the holder of
the easement an incorporeal interest on the property but grants no title
thereto, 20 inasmuch as the owner of the servient estate retains ownership
of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the
same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement. 21
As a property of public dominion akin to a public thoroughfare, a
RROW cannot be registered in the name of private persons under the
Land Registration Law and be the subject of a Torrens Title; and if
erroneously included in a Torrens Title, the land involved remains as such
a property of public dominion. 22 In Manila International Airport Authority v.
Court of Appeals, 23 the Court declared that properties of public dominion,
being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition
through public or private sale. "Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to
public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public
dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale." 24
It is, therefore, inconceivable that the government, through APT,
would even sell in a public bidding the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject
property, as long as the RROW remains as property for public use. Hence,
HI-LON's contention that the RROW is included in the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 29 October 1987, regardless whether the property is a
performing or non-performing asset, has no legal basis.
Neither can HI-LON harp on the express warranty in the Deed of
Sale that the subject property is clear from any encumbrance, and the lack
of annotation of the government's claim of RROW on the TCTs of CIREC,
PPIC and DBP covering the subject property, to bolster its claim of having
acquired ownership of such property in good faith.
There is no dispute as to the finding of COA Commissioner Juanito
G. Espino and DPWH Officer-in-Charge Manuel M. Bonoan based on the
examination of land titles of the subject property that the entire 89,070 sq.
m. area thereof was never reduced in the process of seven (7) transfers of
ownership from Emerito Banatin, et al., in 1971 to HI-LON in 1996, nor was
there an annotation of a RROW encumbrance on the TCTs of CIREC,
PPIC, DBP and TGPI. Be that as it may, HI-LON cannot overlook the fact
that the RROW was taken upon the directive of the Ministry of Public
Works and Highways in 1978 for the construction of the Manila South
Expressway Extension project. Such public highway constitutes as a
statutory lien on the said TCTs, pursuant to Section 39 of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496) and Section 44 of the Property Registration
Decree (Presidential Decree No. 1529): SDAaTC

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Section 39. Every applicant receiving a certificate of title

in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent
purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value
in good faith, shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except
those noted on said certificate, and any of the following
encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the
laws or Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine Islands
which the statutes of the Philippine Islands cannot require to
appear of record in the registry.
Second. Taxes within two years after the same have become
due and payable.
Third. Any public highway, way, or private way established
by law, where the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries of such highway or way have been determined. But if
there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of
registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered,
such easements or rights shall remain so appurtenant
notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with the land
until cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate,
or in any other manner.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 44. Statutory Liens Affecting Title. — Every
registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith,
shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted
in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which
may be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the
laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law
required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be
valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within
two years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over
the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to
the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that
period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or
recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof
have been determined.

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Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the

use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27
or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform. 25
Section 39 of Act No. 496 and Section 44 of P.D. No. 1529 provide
for statutory liens which subsist and bind the whole world, even without the
benefit of registration under the Torrens System. Thus, even if the TCTs of
CIREC, PPIC, DBP and TGPI contain no annotation of such encumbrance,
HI-LON can hardly feign lack of notice of the government's claim of
ownership over the public highway built along the RROW, and claim to be
an innocent purchaser for value of the entire 89,070 sq. m. subject
property because such highway prompts actual notice of a possible claim
of the government on the RROW.
Given that prospective buyers dealing with registered lands are
normally not required by law to inquire further than what appears on the
face of the TCTs on file with the Register of Deeds, it is equally settled that
purchasers cannot close their eyes to known facts that should have put a
reasonable person on guard. 26 Their mere refusal to face up to that
possibility will not make them innocent purchasers for value, if it later
becomes apparent that the title was defective, and that they would have
discovered the fact, had they acted with the measure of precaution
required of a prudent person in a like situation. 27 Having actual notice of a
public highway built on the RROW portion of the subject property, HI-LON
cannot afford to ignore the possible claim of encumbrance thereon by the
government, much less fail to inquire into the status of such property.
Invoking the principle of estoppel by laches, HI-LON posits that the
government's failure to assert its right of ownership over the RROW by
registering its claim on the titles of CIREC, PPIC, and DBP since the
29,690 sq. m. portion of the property was converted to a RROW way back
in 1978 until the purported sale of the entire 89,070 sq. m. property to
TGPI in 1987, bars it from claiming ownership of the RROW because it
slept over its rights for almost nine (9) years. HI-LON states that if it were
true that the government was convinced that it acquired the RROW, it
would have lost no time in registering its claim before the Register of
Deeds, instead of surrendering to TGPI the owner's duplicate of TCT No.
151837 in the name of DBP, to facilitate the issuance of a new title over the
entire 89,070 sq. m. property, which includes the 29,690 sq. m. RROW. HI-
LON further claims that the government is estopped from claiming its
alleged right of ownership of the RROW because the DPWH itself offered
to buy and, in fact, executed a Deed of Sale, thereby acknowledging that
the RROW is a private property owned by HI-LON. acEHCD

The failure of the government to register its claim of RROW on the

titles of CIREC, PPIC, DBP and TGPI is not fatal to its cause. Registration
is the ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is inscribed in
the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated on the
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back of the TCT covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or
instrument. 28 It creates a constructive notice to the whole world and binds
third persons. 29 Nevertheless, HI-LON cannot invoke lack of notice of the
government's claim over the 29,690 sq. m. RROW simply because it has
actual notice of the public highway built thereon, which constitutes as a
statutory lien on its title even if it is not inscribed on the titles of its
predecessors-in-interest, CIREC, PPIC, DBP, and TGPI. Indeed, actual
notice is equivalent to registration, because to hold otherwise would be to
tolerate fraud and the Torrens System cannot be used to shield fraud. 30
Meanwhile, the mistake of the government officials in offering to buy
the 29,690 sq. m. RROW does not bind the State, let alone vest ownership
of the property to HI-LON. As a rule, the State, as represented by the
government, is not estopped by the mistakes or errors of its officials or
agents, especially true when the government's actions are sovereign in
nature. 31 Even as this rule admits of exceptions in the interest of justice
and fair play, none was shown to obtain in this case. Considering that only
59,380 sq. m. of the subject property was expressly conveyed and sold by
the government (through APT) to HI-LON's predecessor-in-interest (TGPI),
HI-LON has no legal right to claim ownership over the entire 89,070 sq. m.
property, which includes the 29,690 sq. m. RROW taken and devoted for
public use since 1978.
In arguing that the government had no legal title over the RROW, HI-
LON points out that the government acquired title thereto only in 2001
when a Deed of Sale was executed between HI-LON and the DPWH. HI-
LON claims that when the government used the 29,690 sq. m. portion of
the subject property as RROW in 1978, it never acquired legal title
because it did not institute any expropriation proceeding, let alone pay the
registered owner just compensation for the use thereof.
HI-LON's claim of ownership over the said RROW has been duly
rejected by the COA in this manner:
xxx xxx xxx
By virtue of Administrative Order No. 14, s. 1987, pursuant
to Section 23 of Proclamation No. 50, the 89,070 sq. m. subject
parcel of land, including the 29,690 sq. m. which had been used as
ROW by the Government, was transferred to and owned by the
National Government. TG Property, Inc. cannot acquire a portion of
the parcel of land without authority and consent of the Philippine
Government, being the owner and seller of the said property. Hi-
Lon cannot even claim ownership on the portion of the subject land
without the said deed of sale executed by the Government in favor
of TG Property, Inc. The facts would show that the ROW has been
the property of the Republic of the Philippines since its
transfer from DBP in 1987.
xxx xxx xxx 32
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It bears emphasis that the right to claim just compensation for the
29,690 sq. m. portion which was not exercised by CIREC or PPIC, ceased
to exist when DBP acquired the entire 89,070 sq. m. property in a
foreclosure sale and later transferred it to the national government
(through APT) in 1987, pursuant to Proclamation No. 50. Having
consolidated its title over the entire property, there is no more need for the
government to initiate an action to determine just compensation for such
private property which it previously took for public use sans expropriation
proceedings.
Citing Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which bars collateral attack to
certificates of title, HI-LON asserts that COA erred in ruling that there was
no property owned by HI-LON that was taken by the government for public
use, despite the fact that: (a) the ownership of the subject property was not
raised before the Commission Proper of the COA; and (b) COA has no
jurisdiction over issues of ownership and entitlement to just compensation.
HI-LON stresses that the titles issued to TGPI and HI-LON conclusively
show that they are the registered owners of the entire 89,070 sq. m.
property in Calamba, Laguna, including the 29,690 sq. m. RROW. Absent
any proceeding directly assailing the said titles, the ownership of the said
property by HI-LON and TGPI is beyond dispute. HI-LON further states
that Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals 33 cited by the OSG is
inapplicable because a notice of lis pendens was annotated on the title
subject of the case, unlike the titles of TGPI and HI-LON which contain no
annotation of claims of ownership by the Republic.
Suffice it to state that there is no merit in HI-LON's argument that the
TCTs issued in its name and that of its predecessor-in-interest (TGPI) have
become incontrovertible and indefeasible, and can no longer be altered,
cancelled or modified or subject to any collateral attack after the expiration
of one (1) year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, pursuant
to Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529. In Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of
Vicente Ermac, 34 the Court clarified the foregoing principle, viz.:
x x x While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that
the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it
does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law.
The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is
utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners. SDHTEC

Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of

title. Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not
create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership
or title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in
favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that
the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the
certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the
registered owner. 35
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In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., 36 the Court noted that what cannot be

collaterally attacked is the certificate of title, and not the title itself:
x x x The certificate referred to is that document issued by
the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title
referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not,
represented by that document. x x x Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used.
In Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo, 37 the Court defined collateral attack on the
title, as follows:
x x x When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the
object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus
challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed.
The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to
annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the
other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless
made as an incident thereof. 38
In this case, what is being assailed by the COA when it sustained
the Notice of Disallowance for payment of just compensation is HI-LON's
claim of ownership over the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the property, and not
the TCT of TGPI from which HI-LON derived its title. Granted that there is
an error in the registration of the entire 89,070 sq. m. subject property
previously in the name of TGPI under TCT No. 156786 39 and currently in
the name of HI-LON under TCT No. T-383819 40 because the 29,690 sq.
m. RROW portion belonging to the government was mistakenly included, a
judicial pronouncement is still necessary in order to have said portion
excluded from the Torrens title. 41
HI-LON's assertion that the titles issued to TGPI and HI-LON
conclusively show that they are the registered owners of the entire 89,070
sq. m. property in Calamba, Laguna, including the 29,690 sq. m. RROW is
anathema to the purpose of the Torrens System, which is intended to
guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration,
but cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of
the registered land. 42 On point is the case of Balangcad v. Court of
Appeals 43 where it was held that "the system merely confirms ownership
and does not create it. Certainly, it cannot be used to divest the lawful
owner of his title for the purpose of transferring it to another who has not
acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. Where such
an erroneous transfer is made, as in this case, the law presumes that no
registration has been made and so retains title in the real owner of the
land."

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It is also not amiss to cite Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo 44 where it

was ruled that "if a person obtains title, under the Torrens system, which
includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under
the Torrens system, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become
the owner of the land illegally included." Inasmuch as the inclusion of
public highways in the certificate of title under the Torrens system does not
thereby give to the holder of such certificate said public highways, 45 the
same holds true with respect to RROWs which are of similar character as
roads for public use.
Assuming arguendo that collateral attack of said titles are allowed,
HI-LON claims that its right of ownership of the subject RROW can no
longer be assailed by the COA because it never questioned such right until
after it denied the petition for review. HI-LON notes that ND No. 2004-032
was issued and it was denied payment of just compensation for the RROW
solely on the ground that such compensation should be based on the value
of the lot at the time of the actual taking by the government in 1978. HI-
LON avers that it was surprised to find out that in the Decision dated 20
January 2011, the COA Commission Proper assailed for the first time
TGPI's and HI-LON's right of ownership over the RROW, instead of merely
finding whether or not the valuation of the property should be based on the
value at the time of the taking in 1978 or the value of the P2,500.00/sq. m.
HI-LON's arguments fail to persuade.
COA may delve into the question of ownership although this was not
an original ground for the issuance of the Notice of Disallowance, but only
the proper valuation of the just compensation based on the date of actual
taking of the property. In Yap v. Commission on Audit, 46 the Court ruled
that "COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon
by a government agency's auditor with respect to disallowing certain
disbursements of public funds. In consonance with its general audit power,
respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to
make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed disbursement and
not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon
by the auditor of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise
would render the COA's vital constitutional power unduly limited and
thereby useless and ineffective." Tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the
people's property, the COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. 47 AScHCD

It is the policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative

authorities, especially one that was constitutionally created like herein
respondent COA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted
to enforce. 48 Considering that findings of administrative agencies are
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accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are
not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of
discretion, it is only when the COA acted with such abuse of discretion that
the Court entertains a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. 49
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other
words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 51 No
grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the COA when it affirmed
the Notice of Disallowance issued by the LAO-N in line with its
constitutional authority 52 and jurisdiction over cases involving
"disallowance of expenditures or uses of government funds and properties
found to be illegal, irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable." 53 Having determined that HI-LON does not own the
disputed RROW, the COA correctly ruled that HI-LON is not entitled to
payment of just compensation and must accordingly refund the partial
payment made by the DPWH in the amount of P10,461,338.00. To stress,
even if HI-LON is the registered owner of the subject property under TCT
No. T-383819 with an area of 89,070 sq. m., the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 29 October 1987 clearly shows that only the 59,380 sq. m. portion of
the subject property, and not 29,690 sq. m. portion used as RROW, was
sold and conveyed by the government (through APT) to HI-LON's
immediate predecessor-in-interest (TGPI).
In light of the foregoing disquisition, HI-LON's prayer for issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Injunction must necessarily be
denied for lack of clear and unmistakable right over the disputed 29,690
sq. m. portion of the subject property.
Lastly, from the finality of the Court's decision until full payment, the
total amount to be refunded by HI-LON shall earn legal interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum pursuant to Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, because such interest is
imposed by reason of the Court's decision and takes the nature of a
judicial debt. 54
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
DENIED for lack of merit, and the Commission on Audit Decision No. 2011-
003 dated January 20, 2011 and Decision No. 2013-212 dated December
3, 2013 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that a legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid, is
imposed on the amount of P10,461,338.00 that HI-LON Manufacturing
Co., Inc. is required to refund to the Department of Public Works and
Highways.
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SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin,
Del Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Martires, Tijam and
Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Jardeleza, * J., took no part; prior OSG action.
Caguioa, ** J., is on leave.
Footnotes

* No part.
** On leave.
1. Signed by Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar, and Commissioners Juanito G.
Espino, Jr. and Evelyn R. Buenaventura.
2. Rollo, p. 49.
3. Signed by Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido Tan and Commissioners
Heidi L. Mendoza and Rowena V. Guanzon.
4. Rollo, p. 234.
5. Rollo, p. 172.
6. Id. at 173.
7. Id. at 176.
8. Id. at 47.
9. Id. at 21.
10. Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 188-191.
11. Emphasis and underscoring added.
12. Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 188-190.
13. Conde v. Court of Appeals, 204 Phil. 589, 597 (1982).
14. Development Bank of the Philippines v. National Merchandising
Corporation, 148-B Phil. 310, 331 (1971).
15. Rollo, Vol. 1, p. 232. (Emphasis in the original).
16. G.R. No. 112399, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 334, 347.
17. Article II, Section 3 (a) and (k), Republic Act No. 917.
18. Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602, 607 (1915).
19. Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway,
is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity.

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 Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a
permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
 In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation
of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through
the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in
the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.
 This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to
the proprietor's own acts.
20. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 285, 300
(2003).
21. Article 630 of the New Civil Code.
22. Monsignor Acebedo v. Director of Lands, 150-A Phil. 806, 816 (1972);
Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated by Edgardo L. Paras, Volume 2, p.
47 (2008).
23. 528 Phil. 181, 219 (2006).
24. MIAA v. Court of Appeals, supra.
25. Emphasis added.
26. Spouses Domingo v. Reed, 513 Phil. 339, 341 (2005).
27. Id.
28. Tecklo v. Rural Bank of Pamplona, Inc., 635 Phil. 249, 259 (2010).
29. Id.
30. Lavides v. Pre, 419 Phil. 665, 672 (2001).
31. Heirs of Reyes v. Republic, 529 Phil. 510, 519-520 (2006).
32. Rollo, Vol. 1, p. 232. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis added).
33. G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998, 292 SCRA 544.
34. 451 Phil. 368 (2003). (Citations omitted).
35. Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, supra, at 376-377.
(Citations omitted)
36. 661 Phil. 307, 317 (2011).
37. 389 Phil. 153 (2000), cited in Caraan v. Court of Appeals, 511 Phil. 162,
170 (2005).
38. Mallilin v. Castillo, supra, at 165.
39. Rollo, pp. 79-80.
40. Id. at 294-295.
41. Zobel v. Mercado, 108 Phil. 240, 242 (1960).
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42. Balangcad v. Justice of the Court of Appeals, 5th Div., 283 Phil. 59, 65
(1992).
43. Supra.
44. 49 Phil. 769, 773 (1926).
45. Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, supra, at 774.
46. 633 Phil. 174 (2010).
47. Delos Santos v. Commission on Audit, 716 Phil. 322, 332 (2013).
48. Id. at 332-333.
49. Id. at 333.
50. Espinas v. Commission on Audit, 731 Phil. 67, 77 (2014), citing Delos
Santos v. COA, supra.
51. Reyna v. Commission on Audit, 657 Phil. 209, 236 (2011).
52. Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution states:
 Section 2.(1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and
duty to examine, audit, and settles all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government,
or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,
and on post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-
governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from
or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting
institution to submit such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
xxx xxx xxx
 (2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor,
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures
or uses of government funds and properties. (Emphasis added)
53. Section 1, Rule II, 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Audit.
54. Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses
Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015, 756 SCRA 389, 415; See also
Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013).

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2/3/2020 G.R. No. 210669 | Hi-Lon Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commission on Audit

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