135 Nev.

, Advance Opinion 61
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA, No. 75662

Appellant,
vs. FILED
RIGOBERTO INZUNZA,
DEC 2 6 2019
Respondent.
EUZATK A. BROWN
OLE PREMF OURT
SY
fl•LEEPIC

Appeal from a district court order granting respondent's

pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment. Eighth Judicial District Court,
Clark County; Carolyn Ellsworth, Judge.
Affi rrned.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District

Attorney, Jonathan VanBoskerck, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
Jacob J. Villani, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,
for Appellant.

Darin Imlay, Public Defender, and Deborah L. Westbrook and P. David

Westbrook, Chief Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County,
for Respondent.

BEFORE HARDESTY, STIGLICH and SILVER, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

The question presented in this case is whether the district court
abused its discretion in granting respondent Rigoberto Inzunza's pretrial
motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his Sixth Amendment right

SUPREME COURT
to a speedy trial. The district court applied the factors enunciated in Barker
OF
NEVADA

(0) 1947A ADD

- 5211-5
 v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505
U.S. 647, 651-54 (1992), and concluded that the State violated Inzunza's
right to a speedy trial because the States gross negligence caused a 26-
month delay between the filing of charges and Inzunza's arrest, and the
State offered nothing to rebut the presumption that the delay prejudiced
Inzunza. We conclude that, given the length of the delay and the finding
that it was caused by the State's gross negligence, the district court did not
err in concluding that Inzunza was entitled to a presumption of prejudice
under the Barker-Doggett factors. The State did not rebut this presumption
in its opposition to Inzunza's motion to dismiss or at the evidentiary hearing
before the district court, nor has the State explained on appeal how Inzunza
was not prejudiced by the delay. Therefore, we affirm the district court's
dismissal of the indictment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rigoberto Inzunza lived with E.J.'s mother when E.J. was nine
years old. During this time, Inzunza allegedly sexually assaulted E.J. while
her mother was at work and her siblings were sleeping. The abuse was
alleged to have continued for at least a year until Inzunza eventually moved
out and relocated to New Jersey. Six years later, 15-year-old E.J. disclosed
to her therapist that Inzunza had sexually assaulted her. The therapist
informed E.J.'s mother, and E.J. and her mother both went to the North Las
Vegas Police Department (NLVPD) to file a police report. The NLVPD
interviewed E.J. and began an investigation into Inzunza. E.J.'s mother
informed Detective Mark Hoyt that Inzunza lived in New Jersey. She also
gave Detective Hoyt printouts from Inzunza's Facebook profile that
depicted his car, New Jersey license plate, and his employer's work truck
with the business's name and number. Following an attempt to locate

SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA

(0) 1947A
2
Inzunza locally, Detective Hoyt submitted the case to the District Attorney's
(DNs) office to file charges against Inzunza.
On December 3, 2014, one month after E.J. reported the sexual
assault, the State filed a criminal complaint charging Inzunza with 10
counts of sexual assault of a minor under 14 years of age and 5 counts of
lewdness with a child under 14 years of age. The NLVPD's records
department staff entered the warrant into the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) database, but consistent with NLVPD policy, no one
informed Detective Hoyt, and Detective Hoyt made no further effort to
follow up on the case. A little over two years later, on January 29, 2017,
Monmouth County Sheriffs Department arrested Inzunza in New Jersey
based on the outstanding warrant. He was transported to Nevada, and the
State subsequently obtained an indictment, adding another count of sexual
assault of a child under 14 years of age.
Inzunza moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the State had
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and his due process
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Inzunza complained
of the delay between the day he was charged and his arrest, which was
approximately two years and two months.
The State conceded that the NLVPD knew that Inzunza was in
New Jersey, but it explained that it would have been futile for the NLVPD
to contact New Jersey authorities before the State obtained a warrant for
Inzunza's arrest. It further explained that the State's policy does not alert
the detective when the warrant issues, so the error was in the NLVPD
"failing to check up and then seeing that a warrant was approved and then
following up on the information from New Jersey." Detective Hoyt
explained at the evidentiary hearing that he had relied on the DA's office to

3
 file charges, and return the case to NLVPD to get a warrant and enter the
warrant into the NCIC database. He then "hope[dr that utilizing the NCIC
database would work to apprehend Inzunza, but he never followed up on
the New Jersey identification or Facebook information or attempted to
contact authorities in New Jersey. He indicated that it was not the
NLVPD's policy to follow up on a case once submitted to the DA's office, to
call other jurisdictions without a warrant, or to follow up on Facebook leads.
Rather, after he submits a case to the DA's office, the case is "out-of-sight
out-of-mine for the department. Finally, Detective Hoyt explained that it
was not customary for the already taxed police department to expend
additional resources in tracking down the perpetrator in a case that was not
"high profile," but rather a "common sexual assaule case.
The district court concluded that the State had been grossly
negligent in pursuing Inzunza. Applying the principles and factors under
the Barker-Doggett test, the district court determined that the case should
be dismissed because: (1) the delay between the filing of charges and the
time of Inzunza's arrest was presumptively prejudicial, (2) the State's gross
negligence caused the entire delay, (3) Inzunza was not required to assert
his right to a speedy trial earlier when he did not know about the charges
or arrest warrant, and (4) the State had not rebutted the presumption that
the delay had prejudiced Inzunza.
The State appeals the dismissal, arguing that the district court
abused its discretion because the Barker-Doggett factors do not weigh in
Inzunza's favor.
DISCUSSION
We review a district court's decision to grant or deny a motion
to dismiss an indictment based on a speedy trial violation for an abuse of

SUPREME COURT
discretion. See Hill v. State, 124 Nev. 546, 550, 188 P.3d 51, 54 (2008)
OF
NEVADA

cO) 1947A
4
 (reviewing for abuse of discretion a denial of motion to dismiss an
indictment based on grand juror bias); cf. State v. Craig, 87 Nev. 199, 200,
484 P.2d 719, 719 (1971) (reviewing for abuse of discretion a grant of motion
to dismiss an indictment based on a statutory speedy trial violation). In
evaluating whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial
has been violated, this court gives deference to the district court's factual
findings and reviews them for clear error, but reviews the court's legal
conclusions de novo. See United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 1160-61
(9th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Carpenter, 781 F.3d 599, 607-08
(1st Cir. 2015) (noting that most federal circuit courts review district court
rulings on Sixth Amendment speedy trial claims de novo).
The Barker-Doggett speedy trial test
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy.. . . trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. We evaluate a claim
alleging a violation of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right by applying
the four-part balancing test the United States Supreme Court set out in
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, and clarified in Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651. Under
this test, courts must weigh four factors: "[I] ength of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. What is prevalent throughout speedy
trial challenges is that "there [are] no hard and fast rule[s] to apply • • • ,

and each case must be decided on its own facts." United States v. Clark, 83
F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1996). Additionally, "[n]o one factor is
determinative; rather, they are related factors which must be considered
together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." United States
v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks

SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA

1.01 1947A
5
dilf I,' 5'
1111='
 omitted). We therefore lay out the intricate Barker-Doggett test and the
factors necessary for us to consider in this case.
Length of delay
The first factor, length of delay, is a "double [i]nquiry." Doggett,
505 U.S. at 651. First, to trigger the Barker-Doggett speedy-trial analysis,
the length of the delay must be presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 651-52;
United States v. Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2009). A post-
accusation delay meets this standard "as it approaches one year." Doggett,
505 U.S. at 652 n.1; see also United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105,
1114 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that "[m]ost courts have found a delay that
approaches one year is presumptively prejudicial"). Second, if the speedy-
trial analysis is triggered, the district court must consider, "as one factor
among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare
minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim." Doggett, 505
U.S. at 652; United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006).
The length of time extending beyond the threshold one-year mark tends to
correlate with the degree of prejudice the defendant suffers and will be
considered under factor four—the prejudice to the defendant. Doggett, 505
U.S. at 652.
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Inzunza's length of delay from charge to arrest was
sufficient to trigger the Barker-Doggett analysis. A 26-month delay from
charge to arrest is well over a year and, therefore, is long enough for the
district court to classify as presumptively prejudicial so as to trigger the
speedy-trial analysis. In arguing that this delay "is not so lengthy as to
greatly prejudice Inzunza," the State ignores a string of cases allowing a
Barker-Doggett analysis for significantly shorter delays than in Doggett.

SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA

(0, 1947A <4ftp

6
 See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 789 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2015) (analyzing
a 27-month delay, of which 10 months were attributable to the government);
United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998) (analyzing a 26-
month delay, of which 14 months were attributable to the government);
United States v. Beamon, 992 F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (analyzing a
17- and 20-month delay attributable to the government).
Reason for delay
The second factor, the reason for the delay, focuses on whether
the government is responsible for the delay and is the "focal inquiry" in a
speedy trial challenge. United States v. Alexander, 817 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th
Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court's finding on
the reason for delay and its justification is reviewed "with considerable
deference." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. The Barker Court outlined three types
of governmental delay, with each assigned a corresponding weight:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper the defense should be weighted heavily
against the government. A more neutral reason
such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be
considered since the ultimate responsibility for
such circumstances must rest with the government
rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid
reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to
justify appropriate delay.
407 U.S. at 531 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, and applicable to these
facts, "[o]ur toleration of negligence varies inversely with the length of the
delay that the negligence causes." United States v. Oliva, 909 F.3d 1292,
1302 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks oinitted).
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion under
factor two when it found the 26-month delay was caused entirely by the

SUPREME COURT
State's "gross negligence." Though Detective Hoyt had knowledge of
OF
NEVADA

(0) 1947A
7
 Inzunza's whereabouts, he did not attempt to contact Inzunza or have him
arrested during the entire 26-month period. Moreover, there was no
evidence showing that Inzunza was aware of the charges before the date of
his arrest. Therefore, the district court correctly found that the State was
solely responsible for the delay. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 (affording a
district court's finding "considerable deference" when it determines the
reason for delay and its justification).
Assertion of the right
The third factor is "whether in due course the defendant
asserted his right to a speedy trial." Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d at 778 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32 (explaining that
Itlhe defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right . . . is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived
of the right"). The State argues that this factor weighs against Inzunza
because he did not assert his right to a speedy trial during the period of time
between the filing of charges and his arrest. However, this argument
misses the fact that a defendant must know that the State had filed charges
against him to have it weighed against him. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653-
54 (stating that a defendant who is ignorant as to the formal charges
against him "is not to be taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after
his arrest"). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the assertion of the right was not weighed against Inzunza under
Doggett.
Prejudice to the defendant
The last factor we must consider is prejudice to the defendant.
In assessing prejudice, courts look at the following harms that the speedy-
trial right was designed to protect against: "oppressive pretrial

SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA

,0) 1947A
8
I ;1
I
 incarceration," "anxiety and concern of the accused," and "the possibility
that the defense will be impaired." Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. "Of these, the
most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." Id. The only
relevant interest here is the last, as Inzunza was not incarcerated before his
arrest, nor did he suffer anxiety given that he was unaware of the charges
against him.
"[I] mpairment of ones defense is the most difficult form of
speedy trial prejudice to prove because time's erosion of exculpatory
evidence and testimony 'can rarely be shown.'" Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655
(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Thus, "courts should not be overly
demanding with respect to proof of such prejudice." 5 Wayne R. LaFaye et
al., Criminal Procedure § 18.2(e) (4th ed. 2015). As Doggett makes clear,
the prejudice factor of Barker may weigh in favor of the defendant even
though he "failed to make any affirmative showing that the delay weakened
his ability to raise specific defenses, elicit specific testimony, or produce
specific items of evidence." 505 U.S. at 655. For example, in Doggett, the
Supreme Court found that the delay between the defendant's indictment
and arrest, of which six years was solely attributable to the government's
negligence, was sufficiently egregious to presume prejudice. Id. at 657-58.
When the presumption of prejudice is applied, the State is afforded the
opportunity to rebut the presumption and detail how the defendant was not
prejudiced by the delay. See id. at 658. If the State is unable to rebut the
presumption, the Barker factors will weigh in a defendant's favor,
necessitating the "severe remedy of dismissal," which is "the only possible
remedy" when a defendant's speedy-trial right has been denied. Barker,
407 U.S. at 522.

SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA

1.0) 1447A
9

ii=1=1
 Relieving the defendant of showing actual prejudice is typically
triggered in cases in which the delay is five years or more. See, e.g., United
States v. Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 232 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[T]his Court
and others generally have found presumed prejudice only in cases in which
the post-indictment delay lasted at least five years."); see also United States
v. Velazquez, 749 F.3d 161, 175 (3d Cir. 2014) ("Negligence over a
sufficiently long period can establish a general presumption that the
defendant's ability to present a defense is impaired, meaning that a
defendant can prevail on his claim despite not having shown specific
prejudice."). However, a "bright-line rule is not appropriate under the
Barker-Doggett test, and, therefore, the presumption of prejudice is not
forfeited simply because Inzunza's delay is less than five years. Ferreira,
665 F.3d at 708-09. Rather, "Mlle amount of prejudice a defendant must
show is inversely proportional to the length and reason for the delay."
Alexander, 817 F.3d at 1183 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-56).
In this case, we face the difficult task of analyzing contextually
a delay that is greater than one year but less than five, coupled with a
reason for the delay that is something more than mere negligence, but less
than bad-faith intentional misconduct on the government's part. Oliva, 909

1We previously held in State v. Fain, 105 Nev. 567, 569-70, 779 P.2d
965, 966-67 (1989), that dismissal of the indictment was improper because
the defendant was unable to show particularized prejudice from the nearly
41/2-year delay. However, Fain predates Doggett, which rejected a
defendant's requirement to affirmatively establish prejudice in every case
to prevail on a speedy trial claim. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-56 (detailing
that "consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically
demonstrable and that "affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not
essential to every speedy trial claim"). Therefore, we recognize that Doggett
overruled Fain to the extent Fain precluded the court from presuming
prejudice to the defendant under certain circumstances.

10
 F.3d at 1302 ("[T]he length of the delay impacts our determination of
whether the Government's negligence weighs heavily against it."). While it
is clear that intentional delay on the State's part would present "an
overwhelming case for dismissal," Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656, it is less obvious
whether something less than intentional delay—here, gross negligence—
should result in dismissal when the delay is just over two years. Our
canvass of federal caselaw involving similar lengths of delay caused by
government negligence reveals that courts have applied the following
factors in determining whether prejudice should be presumed: the length of
the post-charge delay, whether the length of the post-charge delay was
compounded by a lengthy and inordinate pre-charge delay, the complexity
of the alleged crime, the investigation conduct by law enforcement, and
whether the negligence was particularly egregious.2 We find these factors

2See, e.g., Oliva, 909 F.3d at 1305-06 (analyzing a 23-month delay and
determining "Mlle Government's negligence" did not favor the defendant);
Brown v. Romanowski, 845 F.3d 703, 717 (6th Cir. 2017) (evaluating a 25-
month delay and finding the government's actions were "negligent at most"
and did not favor the defendant); Moreno, 789 F.3d at 81 (attributing a 10-
month delay to the government for failing "to exercise reasonable diligence,"
but the delay did not favor the defendant); Ferreira, 665 F.3d at 705, 708-
09 (reasoning a 35-month delay and the government's "gross negligence"
favored the defendant); Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d at 778-80 (analyzing a 36-
month delay and the government's "serious negligence weighed in favor of
the defendant); United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 272-73 (4th Cir. 2009)
(reasoning a 24-month delay and "'neutral factor[s]" such as a "complex
conspiracy charge did not favor the defendant); Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1338-
39 (examining a 24-month delay and "egregious" government negligence
favored the defendant); Dent, 149 F.3d at 185 (reasoning the government's
action was "to blame for only 14 months of a 26-month delay and thus did
not favor the defendant); Beamon, 992 F.2d at 1013-14 (determining a 17-
and 20-month delay for two defendants coupled with "the government's
negligence" did not favor the defendants).
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA

Mi 1947A
11
 useful and apply them here. See Ferreira, 665 F.3d at 705 ("No one factor
is determinative; rather, they are related factors which must be considered
together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
In arguing that the district court erred in presuming prejudice,
the State asserts that the delay was justified by the fact that Inzunza had
moved to New Jersey, meaning that Detective Hoyt could not locate him
using local investigative procedures. The State acknowledged before us
that the detective was negligent in pursuing Inzunza, but insisted that fact
is not a determinative factor because Detective Hoyt's investigation was
consistent with the NLVPD's policy. We disagree and hold that the extent
of the State's negligence and its inaction weighs in favor of Inzunza.
The record shows that the State had the means to locate
Inzunza and failed to take any steps to do so. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-
53 (detailing that "[f]or six years the [g] overnment's investigators made no
serious effort to [find him] . . . , and, had they done so, they could have found
him within minutes"). The victim's mother provided Detective Hoyt with
Facebook printouts with specific information about Inzunza's whereabouts
in New Jersey. Detective Hoyt had Inzunza's location, and the printouts
depicted his license plate and his employer's work truck, business name,
and number. Further, the NLVPD crime report shows Inzunza's address in
New Jersey and his employer's address. See Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1335
(recounting that law enforcement knew the defendant's phone numbers,
where he lived, and where he worked). The only step taken by law
enforcement to apprehend Inzunza was putting the arrest warrant in the
NCIC database. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53; see also Ingram, 446 F.3d at
1338 (reasoning the government's "feeble efforts to locate" the defendant

SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA

(al 1947A
12
and the lack of evidence showing the defendant evaded law enforcement
weighed against the government). Thus, we hold the investigation by law
enforcement weighs in favor of Inzunza. The actions—or in this case the
inaction—of law enforcement, despite the overwhelming information
provided by E.J.'s mother to locate Inzunza, is fatal to the States argument.
See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657 ("Condoning prolonged and =justifiable delays
in prosecution would both penalize many defendants for the state's fault
and simply encourage the government to gamble with the interests of
criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorial priority.").
As to the State's contention that Detective Hoyt was merely
following NLVPD policy, this fact does not negate the district court's finding
that the delay was caused by the States gross negligence. The detective's
failure to pursue leads to locate Inzunza in New Jersey and the NLVPD's
policy of not notifying the detective in charge of the case that a warrant has
issued is dilatory. See United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 987 (11th Cir.
1997) ("Government actions which are tangential, frivolous, dilatory, or
taken in bad faith weigh heavily in favor of a finding that a speedy trial
violation occurred." (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Loud Hawk,
474 U.S. 302, 315-17 (1986))); Dilatory, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) (defining "dilatory" as "[d] esigned or tending to cause delay"); see also
Ingram, 446 F.3d 1339 (finding the government's "delay intolerable where
the officer in charge "knew that he was the only law enforcement agent
responsible for arresting Ithe defendant]; and he had more than enough
information to do so"). Had Detective Hoyt been informed that the warrant
issued, steps could have been taken to arrest Inzunza that may have shifted
the reason for delay from gross negligence to a valid reason to justify the
delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. The only effort made by the State was

13
 placing Inzunza's warrant in the NCIC database and hoping this singular
action by the State was sufficient to apprehend Inzunza. Cf. Erenas-Luna,
560 F.3d at 775, 777 (agreeing with the lower court's conclusion that the
government was "clearly seriously negligent" when it omitted placing a
defendant's warrant in the NCIC database and "%Med] to take appropriate
action[ ] to attempt to apprehend" the defendant in a timely manner
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to show that
Inzunza knew about the charges or that he was fleeing from the NLVPD
when he left the state. See United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758, 763
(9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that a defendant who is aware of the charges
against him or her and flees or otherwise causes the delay forecloses any
Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim). Therefore, we agree with and defer
to the district court's determination that the State's gross negligence was
the sole reason for the delay of 26 months—entitling Inzunza to a
presumption of prejudice. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 (giving "considerable
deference" to district court's determination).
With the burden shifted to the State to rebut the presumption
of prejudice, we conclude the State failed to meet its burden. See Doggett,
505 U.S. at 658. As the district court noted, the State "offered no rebuttal
evidence at the evidentiary hearing . . . [andl did not address prejudice in
its Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." In its opening brief, the
State argues that during the evidentiary hearing the district court told the
State "to stop" when it began to offer its argument why Inzunza was not
prejudiced by the delay. Despite the State's attempt to rebut the district
court's findings, we find no motions or pleadings in the record detailing the
State's argument to supplement the evidentiary hearing. Further, the State

SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA

(01 I947A
14
makes no persuasive rebuttal before this court or otherwise describes what
evidence it intended to introduce to the district court. Because the State
raises an issue on appeal that was not properly raised (or preserved) before
the district court, we need not consider it. Brotvning v. State, 120 Nev. 347,
354, 91 P.3d 39, 45 (2004) ("[A]n appellant must present relevant authority
and cogent argument; issues not so presented need not be addressed by this
court." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also NRAP 28(a)(10)(A)
("[T]he arg-ument . . . must contain . . . appellant's contentions and the
reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record
on which appellant relies.").
The State further argues before us that the delay did not
actually prejudice Inzunza because he was arrested during the statute of
limitations period. This argument is misguided. Statutes of limitations
deal with the period between the commission of the crime and the filing of
charges, not the time period between obtaining a warrant to arrest until
actual arrest, which is at issue here. Additionally, the statute of limitations
period is meant to give the victim more time to come forward, not afford law
enforcement more time to arrest the perpetrator. Therefore, we affirm the
district court's finding that the State has not persuasively rebutted the
presumption of prejudice entitled to Inzunza under the Barker-Doggett
factors.
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right is evaluated under the
Barker-Doggett test, and we must afford the severe remedy of dismissal to
Inzunza because it is "the only possible remedy" when a defendant's speedy-
trial right has been denied. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522. The crimes alleged
against Inzunza are serious. But the unusual facts concerning pre-arrest
delay compel our affirmance of the district court's findings and conclusions

15
 that Inzunza properly invoked his speedy-trial right, he was entitled to a
presumption of prejudice, and the State failed to rebut the presumption.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the indictment.

J.
Hardesty

We concur:

J.
Stiglich

J.
Silver

SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
16
(0) I947A