BOOK REVIEW
INDIA’S CHINA WAR
Author Neville Maxwell
Language English
Review By Lt Akhil Saxena
P No. 43490-R
Design. AMOUT
About the Author.
1. Neville Maxwell was The Times’ South Asia correspondent for eight years from 1959
and during his tenure in New Delhi, had the opportunity to see the India-China border
dispute from the Indian side. Maxwell’s account admittedly suffers from a lack of access to
Chinese sources, comparable to the sort of access he had to India’s dirty linen.
Nevertheless, Maxwell’s India’s China War is considered to be one of the most authoritative
books on this topic, especially because Maxwell is supposed to have somehow accessed
the yet to be declassified Henderson Brooks report.
2. As any other author, Maxwell also had to depend on the government owned
newspapers, radio and its declarations for the information from the Chinese side. He lived in
India. He reported from South Asia. He did not have access to Chinese information and
geography. He had good relation with Indian elites. So, it is this book’s limitation that it
cannot be authorized officially from China in spite of Zhou En-lai’s acclamation. One
scepticism in the possibility of prejudice of Maxwell is always alive because he was one-
sidedly informed.
Introduction.
3. The book came out six years after the 1962 Sino India Conflict. The Book was first
published by Jaico Publishers and later by Natraj publishers. The author, as stated above
was the correspondent for ‘The Times’ in New Delhi. Being placed in India, he had a
ringside view of the war from the very country that was fighting it and was well qualified to
pen his thoughts on the conflict
Layout and Contents.
4. While the quality of printing leaves a lot to be desired, the book has been well laid out
in terms of contents. The book, along with the usual preface, notes and bibliography has
also been divided into the following:-
(a) Historical Introduction
(b) Collision Course
(c) The Forward Policy
(d) The Border War
(e) Ceasefire
5. In addition the narrative has been supplemented with well placed sketches and
illustrations that help the reader get an explicit understanding of the events as they
unfolded. The sketches, some of them drawn in free form aid easy comprehension of the
battles and lay of the ground. The maps are scaled and accurate to a large degree and help
in visualising the manoeuvres of the two belligerent forces . What, however, is missing is
photographs. While it is understandable that the writer was not actually there in the actual
battle or even in the vicinity, there would have been many open source photographs of the
conflict that were available through newspapers and journals of the time. The inclusion of
the photographs of the conflict would have greatly aided the reader to get a perspective of
the terrain, actual battle conditions and even the degree of horrors of the war. Only those
who have been exposed to and maybe scarred by conflict will see the ugly, undignified form
of death, despair and misery that are the usual accompaniments of war. A few well placed
and illustrated photographs of the same would have greatly aided comprehension and
understanding of the ugly realities of the toll of war.
Analysis of the major thesis presented in the Book.
6. Entirely India’s fault. Maxwell insinuates that the war was entirely India’s fault.
While that may not be entirely accurate, the author presents more than ample evidence of it
in the course of his book. Maxwell’s thesis is based on the fact that India inherited its
borders from the British, who by virtue of being the paramount power in the region,
arbitrarily drew boundaries as it suited them. After the British left, India clung to those
boundaries, though China, which had taken over Tibet by then, disputed them. Maxwell says
that after India’s independence, ‘the boundaries of India ceased to be the pawns of the
British in their Great Games with imperial rivals, and became cell walls of a national identity.
No longer could boundaries be conceived or shifted by men whose concern was no longer
territory, but strategic advantage; henceforth they enclosed the sacred soil of the
motherland, and politicians could tamper with them only at their peril.’
7. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s Stature and Obduracy. The author succinctly brings
out in the initial parts itself that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru refused to negotiate with the
Chinese, though he went out of his way to please them in other respects, such as in
admission to UN membership. Later, India instituted a forward policy which involved
aggressive border patrolling by the Indian Army and the setting up of puny, indefensible
pickets very close to the McMahon line. According to Maxwell, one of the pickets, the Dhola
Post, on the Thag La Ridge, was actually a few miles north of the McMahon line, in other
words, outside Indian territory. This happened because the McMahon line did not pass
through the highest point in the Khinzemane sector, but the Indian government thought it
ought to. Maxwell says that in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) China was willing to
let India occupy territory south of the actual McMahon line and not the McMahon line as
arbitrarily redrawn by India. When the PLA aggressively surrounded the Dhola Post, Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru ordered the Indian army to throw the Chinese out of India’s borders. The
Indian army started planning Operation Leghorn, an attack on Chinese pickets surrounding
Dhola Post, even though Dhola Post was definitely north of the line drawn by Henry
McMahon.
8. Empty talk. Maxwell tells us that ‘both sides were sabre rattling, but India’s
scabbard was empty.’ India’s army was weak since India had been focussing on growth and
development. More importantly, defence minister Krishna Menon liked to cut Army’s chiefs
to size. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Krishna Menon were confident that China would not
attack and more importantly, the Chinese army would not resist India’s forward push.
9. China’s Pre-emption. Faced with the possibility of an attack by India, China
launched a pre-emptive strike on 20 October 1962, which coincided with the Cuban missile
crisis. The initial Chinese attacks routed the Indian army. After that there was a lull for over 3
weeks. The second phase of attacks from 14 November 1962 onwards, completed the
Chinese victory. In the Western sector, China occupied and held Aksai Chin. In NEFA, the
Chinese retreated to the McMahon line, after handing back to India a huge quantity of
captured stores. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and other Indian leaders had repeatedly assumed
how China would find it difficult to supply its troops on the border. It turned out that China
had good supply links through the relatively flat Tibetan plateau, which in winter receives
less snowfall than the mountainous NEFA. It was India that struggled to supply its troops
and Maxwell claims that many Indian soldiers died of cold and exposure, compounded by
inadequate clothing and lack of food, during forced marches.
10. Strategic Blunder: Inept Military Commanders. In the course of the book, the
author points out that when Lieutenant General Umrao Singh, General Officer Commanding
(GOC) of the Siliguri-based XXXIII Corps questioned the practicability of Operation Leghorn,
putting his objections in writing, Army Chief General Thapar and Lt Gen L.P. Sen, the
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of the Indian Army's Eastern Command,
sought his removal from his command of XXXIII Corps. Lt Gen L.P. Sen suggested that Maj
General SHFJ Manekshaw be appointed to replace him. The then Def Minister, Krishna
Menon is said to have baulked at the prospect. Earlier Manekshaw had faced charges of
anti-national expressions and disloyalty and had been denied promotion to Lt General. So, a
new corps, the IV Corps, was created and the Chief of General Staff Lt Gen B.M. Kaul, the
very same man who had filed a complaint against Manekshaw, was tasked with heading it.
Kaul had never commanded troops in combat, but no one cared, save for the soldiers.
Kaul’s performance was so bad that, at the end of the war, President Radhakrishnan
responded to the rumour that Kaul had been captured by the Chinese by saying ‘it is
unfortunately not true.’
11. The View from Peking. Though Maxwell doesn’t have access to Chinese
sources, he tries to understand the rationale behind China’s actions. China obviously found
Indian terms - a total refusal to negotiate, unacceptable. This obduracy stemmed from the
fact that Nehru’s considered himself such a larger than life leader in the international stage
that he was , maybe wrongly convinced that his bluster and so called firm resolve will see
that Chinese being pushed out by the Indian Army , which , sadly was thinly spread on the
ground with poor equipment and dated logistics. There were other reasons which might
have persuaded the Chinese leadership to go for the military option. A war could prompt US
assistance to India, as it did, and expose to the USSR how close India was to the
Americans. Maxwell does not subscribe to the western theory that China wanted to humble
India and put a brake on India’s growth and development. Maxwell says that Chinese never
considered India to be China’s equal. India had a very good reputation as a peaceful nation
while the Chinese communists were considered to be war mongers. The longer the dispute
dragged on, the more sympathy India generated. By defeating India decisively and at the
same retreating to their original positions in NEFA, China made it clear that it only wanted
India to come to the negotiating table and settle its international boundary.
12. Attention to Detail. The author brings out the drama in his narrative by
placing small details in the narrative to make it an enjoyable read. For example, while
detailing the launch of the actual assault by the Chinese, he tells us that ‘at 5:00 a.m. on the
20th October 1962, the Chinese fired two Very lights; on the signal, Chinese heavy mortars
and artillery, drawn up without cover on the forward slope of the Thag La ridge, opened a
heavy barrage on the central Indian positions. The weight of the Chinese attack was thrown
against the Indian positions in the centre of the river line; the Gorkhas and the Rajputs bore
the brunt of the assault. Their positions had been infiltrated. The Indian units fought back
fiercely against overwhelming odds, but one after the other, their positions were overrun –
the Indians met the final Chinese assaults with the bayonet. By 09:00 the Gorkhas and
Rajputs on the river line were finished. The Chinese had by then brought Tsangdhar under
attack. By then this vital position was defended only by a weak company of Gorkhas – which
had been preparing to march out to Tsangle – and the two paratroop guards. Firing over
open sights, these fought on, until the crews were wiped out.’
13. International Opinion. The US, UK and other western governments sided with
India. The USSR adopted a surprisingly neutral note and seemed to be more in favour of
China than India. This was mainly on account of the Cuban missile crisis - the USSR
desperately needed Chinese support. Most non-aligned governments stayed non-aligned
and India was disappointed. No Arab country expressed sympathy or support for India.
Nkrumah of Ghana actually rebuked the UK for sending aid to India, this despite Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru having visited Ghana very recently. Ethiopia and Cyprus were the only
non-aligned countries to support India. Formosa was willing to side with India in any hostile
action towards China, but on the boundary dispute, its position was the same as that of
China’s. Maxwell tells us that ‘one of the last acts of the Chinese Nationalists’ Ambassador
in New Delhi was to remind the Indian Government that China did not recognise the
McMahon line, and held the (1914) Simla Convention invalid.’
14. Abandoning a Sensible Defence Plan. In October 1959, the Eastern command
under General Thorat had recommended a triple tiered defence structure in the north-east.
The first line of defence would consist of posts close to the McMahon line. These would act
as a mere trip wire, expected to fall back in case of a Chinese advance. Secondary strong
points would be set up behind the first line to fight a delaying action. The third tier was the
actual defence line, where the attacker would be halted. Bomdi La was to be one of the
anchors of this defence line, which would be easily supplied from the plains. The attacker
would struggle with extended lines, whilst Indian troops would fight close to their supply
lines. This was a good plan, but was abandoned since the politicians were unwilling to
subscribe to a course of action which would result in losing large areas without a fight. Thus
the Indian army was stretched all across the McMahon line, deployed in small groups at
places where the civilian Intelligence Bureau expected the Chinese to infiltrate through.
15. Compounding of Mistakes. It was not just the political leadership which made
so many errors. The military leadership under B.M. Kaul at first failed to provide a realistic
picture to the politicians. Rather, they allowed the politicians to live in a fool’s paradise.
Later, after the initial shock and retreat, ‘on 23rd October, orders went out from IV Corps to
the force at Tawang that they were to withdraw to Bomdi La, some sixty miles back on the
road to the plains; that in the calculations of the IV Corps, was the farthest point to the north
where the Indians could build up more quickly than the Chinese. All formations concerned
were informed that the build-up was to be at Bomdi La.’ However, Brigadier Palit urged that
the stand be made at Se La, a high pass only fifteen miles behind Tawang. From Misamari
on the plains to Se La was one hundred and forty miles, a round trip of six days for trucks.
The politicians liked the idea though; less the terrain yielded to China, less the defeat for
India. Therefore Lt Gen Sen countermanded the order to pull back to Bomdi La and ordered
that Se La be held. ‘The decision was crucial and disastrous.’
16. A failed Birthday Gift for Pandit Nehru. It was meant to be a birthday gift for
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. On 14 November 1962, Indian troops from the 6th Kumaon
battalion attacked the Chinese at Walong. They got to within fifty yards from the crest and
then stopped, spent. The Chinese not only wiped off the Kumaonis, but also followed up and
attacked the main Indian defence positions on the 16th at first light. By 10:00 a.m. a general
withdrawal ordered. Kaul and the G.O.C, Maj Gen M.S. Pathania left Walong in the last
Otter. When Kaul got to Teju, he sent out a frantic signal asking that foreign armed forces be
invited to fight China. Finally on the evening of 17th when Pathania wanted to pull troops
from Se La, he could not contact Kaul. Army Chief Thapar and Lt Gen L.P. Sen were
available, but they refused to take a decision though they were Kaul’s superiors and had
been involved in making war plans till then. Precious time was lost. In any event, withdrawal
was no longer a great idea and the Chinese not only killed off many of the retreating
soldiers, even the 48 Brigade at Bomdi La, the only organised Indian formation left in NEFA,
was finally destroyed. Maxwell says that ‘the subsequent hour or so in quiet corps
headquarters at Tezpur, with the Chief of Army Staff and the G.O.C-in-C Eastern Command
refusing to take responsibility for an urgent operational decision, when there was no one
else to take it, was the real nadir for the Indian army, not the impending debacle among the
steep ridges of NEFA.’
17. The Indian army faced a total rout in NEFA, but not so in the Western sector where
Maxwell tells us that General Daulet Singh of the Western Command rapidly built up
strength to reinforce the Ladakh front. Also, Western Command, unlike the Eastern
Command, showed more concern for the survival of its troops, not ordering isolated units to
fight it out in useless sacrificial gestures as was done in NEFA. ‘When there was a tactical
reason for ground to be held, the troops did fight it out, to the last round or the last man; but
they were not, as so often in the eastern sector, left to hold tactically insignificant and
indefensible positions until overrun.’ About 90% of Indian casualties were in NEFA.
18. Small Mercies. According to Maxwell, the Chinese did not attack Chushul or any
other position outside their claim areas, though the Chinese had overrun the heights around
Rezang La and had started shelling Chushul when the unilateral ceasefire came into effect.
19. PR Victory for China. After launching its attack on 20 October 19962, China
claimed that Indian troops had launched large scale attacks against Chinese posts in
Namka Chu in NEFA and Chip Chap and Galwan valleys in Aksai Chin and that Chinese
troops had responded in self-defence. This self-obscuration was a mistake. Everyone knew
that India did not have the ability to launch such large scale attacks. If China had spoken the
truth, that its attack was pre-emptive, that Indian troops were planning an attack in Thag La
as part of Operation Leghorn, it may have been believed.
20. Foreign Aid. Once fighting started, American jet transports were landing in India
at the rate of eight flights a day, each carrying about twenty tons of equipment – automatic
rifles, heavy mortars and recoilless guns etc. The UK too threw in its support. The French
however stayed true to their mercenary colours and wanted payment for any assistance
given. Israel too helped, though when India suggested that Israel supply weapons using
vessels that did not carry Israeli flags, Ben Gurion is supposed to have said, ‘no flag, no
weapons.’ Israel finally sent a shipment of heavy mortars in a ship flying the Israeli flag.
21. Public reactions in India. India’s political classes and urban masses reacted
with fervent patriotism. Several thousand ethnic Chinese were interned in camps in
Rajasthan and Maxwell tells us that some of the internees were expelled to China. I don’t
know how true the bit about expulsion to China is - I’ve never read that anywhere else. After
China launched its second phase of attacks in the middle of November, there was general
panic in India since the press had led the public to believe that the initial drawbacks were
the result of Chinese treachery and that Indian troops were poised to reverse their losses. In
NEFA, the Indian government expected the Chinese to takeover Tezpur. Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru made an urgent, open appeal to the United States for assistance with fighters and
bombers. Maxwell tells us that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s request was very specific – for
fifteen American air force squadrons – non-alignment be damned. As the civil administration
evacuated Tezpur, the government ordered a scorched earth policy, but luckily, the
administration did not have sufficient personnel to blow up everything.
22. Casualties . Casualty figures released by the Indian defence ministry in 1965
showed that 1,383 Indian soldiers died, 1,696 went missing and 3,968 were taken prisoner.
As mentioned above, about 90% of Indian casualties were in NEFA. Maxwell tells us that
the Chinese army used three divisions in the NEFA fighting, which gave the Chinese a very
narrow numerical superiority in NEFA. However, the Indian forces were so scattered that the
Chinese had no difficulty in putting into effect Mao’s teaching: ‘in every battle concentrate an
absolutely superior force.’ Though the author doesn’t talk of Chinese casualties, he says
that the Chinese suffered substantial casualties where Indians stood and fought, such as in
Thembang on 17th November. Maxwell does say that not one Chinese soldier was taken
prisoner. All Indian prisoners were repatriated by the Chinese within 6 months.
India’s Claim to The Disputed Areas : Author’s View.
23. In the beginning of the book, there is a discussion on disputed territories and each
party’s claim to those territories. The same have been discussed in limited detail in the
following paragraphs.
24. Ladakh and Aksai Chin. Ladakh, we are told, was historically a part of Tibet.
After the tenth century, it asserted its independence, but has always been within Lhasa’s
cultural pull. The famous Dogra chieftain Gulab Singh, who later acquired Kashmir from the
British, invaded Ladakh in 1834 and captured it. Later, the Dogras went further, and
captured Lhasa itself. The Dogra general (the legendary Zorawar Singh whom Maxwell
doesn’t mention by name) made the tactical mistake of wintering in Lhasa and was
marooned and killed, along with his forces. The victorious Tibetans followed up on their
victory and advanced to Ladakh, but were beaten back by Gulab Singh’s armies. In 1846,
the British made Gulab Singh the ruler of Kashmir and at the same time forbade him from
adding to his territory without British consent. This was because the British were worried that
the Chinese would assume that Gulab Singh had British approval for his adventures and
would react against Britain.
25. In the mid 18th century, Britain invited China to participate in the demarcation of the
boundary between Tibet and Ladakh, but the Chinese never played ball. When the British
unilaterally demarcated the boundary, the terrain between the Pangong Lake and the
Karakoram Pass, known as Aksai Chin, was left terra incognito. In 1865, an officer of the
Survey of India, W. H. Johnson showed Aksai Chin to be a part of Kashmir, but his claim
was treated with scepticism even by other Britons. Support for Johnson’s map came from
Maj. Gen Sir. John Ardagh, Director General of Military Intelligence in British India, whose
main interest was to counter any Russian advance in India. In the early 1880s, China
started to show interest in its southern frontiers and erected a boundary marker in the
Karakoram pass and later dispatched an official, Li Yuan-ping to explore the southern
stretches. Later Chinese officials specifically made a claim for Aksai Chin. Maxwell feels that
the claim was most probably the result of Russian advice. George McCartney, a British
representative in Kashgar commented that ‘probably part of Aksai Chin was in Chinese and
part in British territory.’ Though a few British officials favoured a forward policy which would
make Aksai Chin part of British India, in 1899, Britain proposed the Macartney-McDonald
line to China, which gave China almost all of Aksai Chin proper, but left with British India the
Lingzi Tang salt plains, the whole of the Changchenmo valley and the Chip Chap River in
the north. China did not respond to this proposal.
26. In the first decade of the 20th Century, Britain insisted that Aksai Chin was a part of
Tibet, rather than a part of China since the former position would prevent Russia from
encroaching into Aksai Chin. However, after the collapse of (Manchu) Chinese power in the
second decade of the 20th century, Viceroy Hardinge recommended that Aksai Chin should
be shown as British Indian territory. This recommendation was never acted on. In 1914
when Britain convened the Simla Convention in 1914, with Chinese and Tibetan delegates
in attendance, maps presented by Britain showed Aksai Chin to be a part of Tibet. That
China pulled out of the 1914 summit where Britain tried to divide Tibet into Outer Tibet and
Inner Tibet, on the lines of Mongolia, is a different story all together. In 1940-41, the
Government of Sinkiang, under Warlord Sheng Shi-tsai carried out a survey of Aksai Chin
with Russian experts. Britain said and did nothing.
27. Tawang. The Tawang tract, a wedge of territory to the east of Bhutan, connected
Tibet to the Indian plains. Maxwell says that the British never considered Tawang to be
anything other than Tibetan till the end of the 19th century. In 1907, the UK and Russia
signed an agreement which required both to stay out of Tibet. After the rise of Manchu
China in the 19th century, China was in effective power in Tibet and British officials started
to propose a forward policy which did not receive official sanction. Later, Britain held
negotiations with Tibetans, without Chinese approval, based on which Henry McMahon, the
British foreign Secretary for India, produced a boundary line which showed Tawang to be a
part of British India. McMahon’s maps were accepted by the Tibetan plenipotentiary in
exchange for British assistance in gaining independence from China. McMahon gave the
Tibetans the idea that they could continue to collect taxes in Tawang. The McMahon line
was not mentioned to the Chinese during the 1914 Simla convention. In 1929, when an
authoritative record of the 1914 convention was published as the Aitcheson’s Treaties,
Tawang was not shown to be a part of British India. The McMahon line remained forgotten
till 1935 when a Deputy Secretary in New Delhi, Olaf Caroe, urged a forward policy and
publication of the Anglo-Tibetan agreements. In 1937, a new edition of the Aitcheson’s
Treaties was published, as if it was original 1929 edition, showing Tawang to be a part of
British India. From 1937, the Survey of India also started using the McMahon line, though
New Delhi rejected demands from frontier officials to permanently occupy Tawang.
28. The Tibetans later took the stand that since the British did not secure any degree of
autonomy from China, they were not bound to recognise British claims to Tawang. British
officials carried out occasional punitive expeditions to Tawang and in 1944, it was offered
that the boundary should run through Se La, south of Tawang monastery. Nothing much
came of that proposal, but in 1947 when India got independence, the British had set up
Assam Rifles posts in various parts of Tawang and also excluded Tibetan administrators. In
October 1947, Tibet formally asked India to return to Tibet a wide swathe of territory from
Ladakh to Assam, including Sikkim and the Darjeeling district. India replied that Indo-Tibetan
relations should continue on the same basis as with the British administration. Until 1949,
the situation in NEFA was as the British had left it. India had an outpost at Walong, but other
Indian positions were well back from the McMahon line. Tibetan administration in Tawang
was unchallenged. However, from 1951 onwards, India started to occupy Tawang, despite
Tibetan protests. Local people were not very happy. Maxwell tells us that ‘a strong Assam
Rifles patrol, moving up the Subansiri River in the early 1950s, was warmly welcomed by
one of the tribes, feasted and given shelter – and then massacred almost to a man. Seventy
three riflemen and civilians died.’
29. Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. Maxwell also details how India acquired Sikkim and
brought Nepal and Bhutan within its sphere of influence and the tussle with China over
these territories. Since I’ve already exceeded the acceptable word limit for a book review, I
shall desist from delving into those topics. Please do read this extremely interesting book
yourself to find out more.
Summary.
30. Maxwell has argued that if India were willing to negotiate its boundary with China, it
would have avoided the 1962 war. In all probability he is right. China had offered to give up
its claim to NEFA in exchange for India relinquishing rights to Aksai Chin. While the book
brings out the history and the events leading up to the fateful conflict, te author does not
present the Chinese point of view. Most of his analysis and resulting thesis is well
intentioned conjecture. The book, until recently was the most authoritative tome on the
subject. However one must remember that it is over 45 years old. There has been a No of
books that have since been published on the subjects. A No of well researched and
authoritative articles on the open domain backed by authentic research are also now
available. Part of the controversial Henderson – Brooks- Bhagat report is also available on
the internet, supposedly placed there by Neville Maxwell himself. Although the part wherein
the blame is rumoured to have been placed squarely on the political and higher military
leadership of the day is still classified , the book is invaluable to military personnel of all
ranks and other keen students of military history who wish to learn about this conflict.
