G.R. No.
L-30452, September 30, 1982
MERCURY DRUG CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. NARDO DAYAO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
dated March 30, 1968 in Case No. 1926-V and the Resolution of the Court en banc dated July 6, 1968
denying two separate motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners and respondents.
The factual background of Case No. 1926-V is summarized by the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations as follows:
"This is a verified petition dated March 17, 1964 which was subsequently amended on July 31, 1964 filed
by Nardo Dayao and 70 others against Mercury Drug Co., Inc., and/or Mariano Que, President & General
Manager, and Mercury Drug Co., Inc., Employees Association praying, with respect to respondent
corporation and its president and general manager:
1) payment of their unpaid back wages for work done on Sundays and legal holidays plus 25% additional
compensation from date of their employment up to June 30, 1962;
2) payment of extra compensation on work done at night
The respondents alleged, among others, that:
1) the company being a service enterprise is excluded from the coverage of the Eight Hour Labor
Law, as amended;
2) that no court has the power to set wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or other conditions
of employment to the extent of disregarding an agreement thereon between the respondent
company and the petitioners, and of fixing night differential wages;
3) that the petitioners were fully paid for services rendered under the terms and conditions of the
individual contracts of employment;
Issue:
1) Did the respondent CIR erred in declaring the contracts of employment null and void as being
contrary to public policy and in sustaining, accordingly, private respondents' claims for 25%
sunday and legal holiday premiums?
2) Was sustaining private respondents' claims for nighttime work premiums valid?
Ruling:
1) No. the court ruled that although a service enterprise, respondent company's employees are
within the coverage of C. A. No. 444, as amended known as the Eight Hour Labor Law, for they
do not fall within the category or class of employees or laborers excluded from its provisions.
Citing Section 4, C. A. No. 444:
“No person, firm or corporation business establishment or place of center of labor shall compel
an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays unless he is paid an additional
sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular remuneration: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That
this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing some public service such as
supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of transportation or
communication.”
Payment of extra or additional pay for services rendered during Sundays and legal
holidays is mandated by law. Even assuming that the petitioners had agreed to work on
Sundays and legal holidays without any further consideration than their monthly salaries, they
are not barred nevertheless from claiming what is due them, because such agreement is
contrary to public policy and is declared null and void by law.
2) After the passage of Republic Act 875, this Court has not only upheld the industrial court's
assumption of jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay or for payment of
additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and for night work but has
also supported such court's ruling that work performed at night should be paid more than work
done at daytime, and that if that work is done beyond the worker's regular hours of duty, he
should also be paid additional compensation for overtime work.
The "waiver rule" is not applicable in the case at bar. Additional compensation for nighttime
work is founded on public policy, hence the same cannot be waived. (Article 6, Civil Code). On
this matter, We believe that the respondent court acted according to justice and equity and the
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and should be
sustained.
(Note: the labor code was not in effect during this case thus the 10% night differential was not
applicable. No law was passed as regards to paying such premiums. The ruling was based on
public policy and the mandate of the fundamental law in favor of labor.)
