Well Test Standards WTS 1
Well Test Standards WTS 1
Well Test
Global
Document Type:
Standard
Title:
Rev. 2
Revision List
Rev. 2
Table of Contents
Section Page
PURPOSE .............................................................................................................................. 6
SCOPE ................................................................................................................................... 6
RESPONSIBILITIES .............................................................................................................. 6
1.1 RISK ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................ 7
1.1.1 What is a Risk Assessment? ........................................................................ 7
1.1.2 Responsibilities ............................................................................................ 7
1.1.3 Definitions ..................................................................................................... 8
1.1.4 Procedure ..................................................................................................... 8
1.1.5 Some Useful Tips When Risk Assessing: .................................................... 9
1.1.6 Documenting Your Risk Assessments: ........................................................ 9
1.1.7 Implementing and Communicating: .............................................................. 9
1.2 MANUAL HANDLING .............................................................................................. 10
1.2.1 Manual Handling Regulations 1992 (UK Only) .......................................... 10
1.2.2 Some Important Definitions ........................................................................ 10
1.2.3 Mandatory Requirements for Manual Handling Operations ....................... 10
1.2.4 Offshore – Operational Sites ...................................................................... 10
1.3 FOAMING OIL ......................................................................................................... 12
1.3.1 Characteristics ............................................................................................ 12
1.3.2 Separator Design ....................................................................................... 12
1.3.3 Agitation ...................................................................................................... 14
1.3.4 Application of Heat ..................................................................................... 14
1.3.5 Chemicals ................................................................................................... 14
1.3.6 Additional Methods ..................................................................................... 14
1.4 CONTAMINATED EQUIPMENT ............................................................................. 15
1.4.1 Post Test Guidelines for H2S & LSA Scale Contamination ........................ 15
1.4.2 Offshore Equipment Inspection .................................................................. 15
1.4.3 Return of Equipment from H2S Contaminated Well Tests ......................... 15
1.4.4 LSA Scale – Low Specific Activity Scale .................................................... 16
1.5 HIGH PRESSURE / HIGH TEMPERATURE WELL TESTING .............................. 18
1.5.1 Definition..................................................................................................... 18
1.5.2 Planning ...................................................................................................... 18
1.5.3 Safety ......................................................................................................... 18
1.5.4 Differences from a Standard Well Test ...................................................... 19
1.5.5 Operational Issues ..................................................................................... 21
1.6 SOUR GAS WELL TESTING .................................................................................. 23
1.6.1 Characteristics and Effects......................................................................... 23
1.6.2 Occurrence ................................................................................................. 24
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Rev. 2
Rev. 2
PURPOSE
The purpose of this Well Test Standard (WTS) manual is to set out the framework for achieving the
highest operational and engineering standard when designing, selecting equipment, training and
selection of personnel and conducting well test operations in a well test environment.
The following verbal forms shall be used when reading this document.
Shall Used to indicate requirements strictly to be followed and which no deviation is
permitted, unless accepted and dispensed / conceded by the Well Test Product Line
Should Used to indicate that several possibilities exist, without mentioning or excluding others,
or that a certain action is preferred but not necessarily required
May Used to indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of this document
SCOPE
This WTS manual applies to those tasked with the design, selection and operation of well test
systems. This practice is tailored specifically to Expro surface Welltest operations which are
generally for temporary deployments. Compliance with the WTS shall be mandatory.
RESPONSIBILITIES
The process of designing, selection of equipment, well test crew training and selection, operation of
well test equipment is the responsibility of the Regional Operations departments.
Well Test Product Line is responsible for the maintenance of the WTS and ensuring that it is
updated where necessary in line with current best practice.
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TOC
More Simply: Think about what could go wrong and decide if enough has been done to prevent
it.
Risk assessment forms a vital part of our proactive health and safety management systems and
culture.
The risk assessment process consists essentially of an identification of all hazards present in
any operation and an estimate of the risks involved, taking into account whatever precautions
are already being undertaken. For more details please refer to process flowchart:
Please refer to Risk Assessment example WT001 which was completed for a Flare Boom
Installation – please note that this is an uncontrolled copy for reference purposes only. This
example clearly identifies the primary goals. As you can see in this example there are numerous
required control measures that have been identified for this task.
1.1.2 Responsibilities
Base Managers are responsible for risk assessments being carried out to cover the areas they
control.
Supervisors/Shift Supervisors or senior crew members are responsible for carrying out all risk
assessments undertaken on an offshore or land operational installation.
All crew members must comply fully with all findings of the risk assessment. All control
measures put in place must be strictly adhered to.
Expro’s policy is two or more persons must be involved in all risk Assessments
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1.1.3 Definitions
Hazard
A hazard is anything that may cause harm, such as (chemicals, electricity, working from ladders,
an open drawer etc).
Risk
The risk is the likelihood, high or low, that somebody could be harmed by these and other
hazards, together with an indication of how serious the harm could be.
Harm
− Injury to personnel however slight
− Adverse affects on health short- or long-term
− Anything which has an environmental impact
− Equipment damage, delay, loss of productivity
Accident
Is an unplanned and undesired event that has led to injury, damage or other loss?
Near Miss
Is an unplanned and undesired event that could have led to injury, damage or other loss?
Safe
− A condition where risks have been reduced and controlled to the level required by
specific regulations and is deemed, as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP)
− Free from danger
− Secure from risk
− Unable to do harm
1.1.4 Procedure
The Expro Group have identified a need to ‘risk assess’ all tasks that have the potential to cause
harm to individuals, have a potential environmental impact or a financial impact to the company
or third-party organisation.
The Key steps in all risk assessments are laid out below and must be considered when carrying
out assessments in the workplace. They are:
• Identify the hazards
• Analyse the probable effects/consequences
• Assess the overall risk
• Accept/Reject the risk
• Identify further action for rejected risks and reassess
For more details please refer to guide:
HSEQC/GRP/GUI/2.1: Identification, Assessment and Control of Hazards
Hazards
There are a myriad of Workplace hazards to consider when considering all tasks in a risk
assessment. Some examples are laid out below.
− Slipping & Tripping − Falls/Falling objects − Noise − Hot/Cold surfaces or working
environment − Fumes/Dusts/Gases
− Chemicals − Sharp edges/tools/objects
Risk
There are two elements associated with risk:
− Chance or likelihood
− Consequence or severity
The likelihood of the harm from a hazard affecting us multiplied by the severity resulting from the
exposure to the hazard.
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Definition of ALARP
If the cost in terms of time, effort, money or inconvenience, associated with the workplace
precaution outweighs the BENEFIT of the risk reduction, then it is not reasonably practicable to
use that workplace precaution. Basically the cost must be weighed up against the benefit.
A.L.A.R.P. – As Low as Reasonably Practicable.
People at RISK
− Consider all personnel that may be at risk from a hazardous activity – not just the
people performing the task!
− When considering/including others in a risk assessment you must consider how
different groups of people face different levels of risk
− When considering others be imaginative but realistic
− Pay particular attention to those persons more at risk
Risk Rating
Expro use a risk rating that is simply the quantified total sum of the likelihood ranking number,
multiplied severity rating number.
− Risk Ratings are used to prioritise risk
− Following the Risk Rating. The risk can be evaluated to determine whether or not the
task or operation is safe
For more details please refer to Risk Assessment/Incident Potential Matrix:
HSEQC/GRP/FRM/2.1: Risk Assessment/Incident Potential Matrix
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Load – Generally, this would be a discrete movable object and could include a patient receiving
medical attention. This definition also covers material supported on a shovel or fork. However an
implement, tool or machine such as a hammer or chainsaw would not be included.
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S – Stop!
A – Assess the task!
F – Formulate a plan!
E – Execute!
Simple control measures can be put in place for all sorts of manual handling tasks undertaken
by Expro personnel. Some examples are given:
− If time permits, use the crane!
− If practical, use a chain block
− If practical, use an air driven winch (tugger)
− Multi-man lifting – why attempt to lift something yourself? Get assistance from your
workmates - Teamwork!
− Use a barrel lifter or barrel grabs
− Use a pallet trolley
− Use a porter’s trolley
Most, if not all of these mechanical aids should be available on most installations. If you require
a specific mechanical aid or lifting device to assist you in a task, ensure that it is on site. If it is
not, re-evaluate the task. Can the lift be performed using another method?
Discuss manual handling at your pre-job safety meetings. Manual handling is a huge part of
rigging up any well test or clean up package.
Always use a mechanical device when moving or lifting something you cannot safely cope with.
A serious back injury will alter your quality of life forever.
A Simple Message
The next time you are about to manually handle something, ask yourself this:
“Can I safely handle this load with no risk of injury to myself or others?”
If the answer to this is No then Stop, Assess, Formulate, Execute
Do not proceed until you are satisfied that you have done everything in your powers to
ensure this task is performed safely.
If you follow these recommendations, you should lead an injury free life.
If you choose to ignore these recommendations you could possibly suffer years of pain and
immobility which will affect your quality of life and may stop you enjoying the things you like
most.
Think before you act!
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1.3.1 Characteristics
The major cause of ‘foaming’ in crude oil is the presence of impurities in the wellbore fluids
which cannot be removed prior to the separator. CO2 is a common impurity which will increase
the likelihood of producing foam.
Completion, drilling or work over fluids which are incompatible with the well bore fluids can
cause foam.
Foaming oil is a common problem with Heavy Crude oil production.
Oil-continuous foam that contains dispersed gas bubbles produced at the wellhead, form heavy
oil reservoirs under solution-gas drive. The nature of the gas dispersions in oil distinguishes
foaming oil behaviour from conventional heavy oil.
The gas that comes out of solution in the reservoir does not coalesce into large gas bubbles or
into a continuous flowing gas phase. Instead it remains as small bubbles entrained in the crude
oil, keeping the effective oil viscosity low while providing expansive energy that helps drive the
oil towards the producing well. Foaming oil accounts for unusually high production in heavy oil
reservoirs under solution-gas drive.
Presence of foam during a Well Test or Clean Up operation can cause the following:
− Pollution due to carry over in the gas line
− Prevent good separation and reduce separator capacity
− Prevent accurate level control and monitoring in the separator
− Disrupt liquid and gas metering
− Disrupt pumping operations
− Cause potential burning problems
The main factors that assist in ‘breaking’ foaming oil are:
− Good separator design
− Settling
− Agitation
− Heat
− Chemical additives
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The cyclonic inlet devices should have smooth surfaces, which will create high centrifugal
forces. These high centrifugal forces will cause a significant proportion of the foam to be broken
down thus reducing the proportion of foam to total liquids.
The cyclones apply a controlled shear force to the incoming liquids.
Retention time
Increasing the retention time of the oil as it passes through a separator allows more time for the
foam to ‘break’ out of the oil. If this approach is combined with cyclonic inlet devices, foam can
be virtually eliminated from the vessel.
The retention time allows for the produced oil and gas to reach equilibrium at the separator
operating pressure. The retention time is the vessel liquid storage volume divided by the liquid
flow rate.
Typical retention times are:
° API gravity Retention time (minutes)
35+ 0.5 to 1
30 2
25 3
<20 4+
If foams exist the above retention times can be increased by two to four times.
If high CO2 is being produced then a minimum retention time of five minutes is advised.
To increase the retention times it may be required to use stage separation, whereby the two or
more separators are used in series, with the operating pressure of each separator being
dropped at each stage. This allows more gas to break out at each stage and thus reduce the
foaming problems.
Oil flow rate measurements are not made until the final stage at which point there should be no
problem with foam giving false flow rates.
NOTE: It may be necessary to have an additional separator or knock-out vessel tied into
the gas line(s) from the upstream separator(s) in order to collect and measure any oil that
has carried over with the foam before allowing the gas to flare (i.e., acting as a gas
scrubber). Gas rates should be measured at this point to obtain accurate flow data.
The operating level of the separator should be at the vessel mid-point to allow for a greater
surface area to be exposed for better separation.
Coalescing Plates
Coalescing plates can be another design feature which will allow the oil and gas to coalesce
together. The small gas bubbles will coalesce and make a larger gas bubble which will separate
from the oil more freely. The coalescing plates can also ensure the flow through the separator is
laminar which can improve separation.
Level Monitoring
Typical level monitoring and control systems on standard separators can be problematic with
the foam in the vessel. Sight glasses may not show a true fluid level, the separator can be fitted
with ultrasonic radar transmitters which will indicate both the fluid level and the foam level.
The level control is affected due to the float or displacer being designed to detect a typical fluid
gravity. If the separator has external float chambers these can become full of foam. The float or
displacer should be internal to the vessel. Radar level transmitters can be fitted to detect and
control the level of the fluid.
Rev. 2
1.3.3 Agitation
NOTE: Agitation is not easily achievable in well testing situations.
Agitation is helpful in ‘breaking’ foaming oil where the foam bubbles are mechanically locked by
the surface tension and viscosity of the oil. It does this by causing the gas bubbles to coalesce
and separate from the oil in less time than would be required were agitation not employed.
Agitation is not easily achievable in well testing situations
Agitation can be obtained by stirring, vibrating the baffle plates within the separator vessel, it will
have a limited ‘agitation effect’ on the crude.
1.3.5 Chemicals
Any chemical that reduces the surface tension of crude oil will assist in ‘breaking’ foaming oil.
Silicon defoamers are currently considered the most effective chemicals to use for this purpose.
They appreciably reduce the foaming tendency of the oil by destabilising the surface of a
foaming oil to such an extent that the foam bubbles can no longer support themselves, i.e. the
thin film that exists between pockets of gas either ruptures or is not permitted to form. This
allows entrained gases to escape easily, leaving a clear interface.
These antifoam chemicals should be injected at the lowest point in the test string as possible,
e.g. sub-sea tree, etc.
As foam is also created by pressure drops throughout the system, anti-foam chemicals should
be injected upstream from these i.e. choke manifold, separator inlet, liquid control valves, tank
inlet etc.
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1.4.1 Post Test Guidelines for H2S & LSA Scale Contamination
Expro’s commitment to quality continues after any particular job has finished. All equipment
returned from an offshore location is subjected to a rigorous inspection and maintenance
procedure.
All equipment returned to base undergoes an inspection on arrival and has routine maintenance
carried out on it, as laid out in the maintenance procedures manuals. The actual maintenance
required is identified on the ‘job cards’ which details the maintenance procedures, any special
maintenance requirements to follow and allows for the work completed to be signed off by the
person carrying out the maintenance.
Rev. 2
• Personnel safety must be considered at all times when dealing with H2S contamination
• All Expro personnel who may be involved in handling H2S contaminated equipment
must have received specialist H2S training
If any equipment returned to base is suspected to contain any LSA contaminants or this
equipment must be quarantined immediately. Thorough checks for the presence of LSA Scale
should then be carried out. Only properly trained and qualified personnel should carry out these
checks using the correct equipment, which should be calibrated and certified.
Specialist third-party cleaning companies should be called in to deal with any contaminated
equipment.
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If you are not suitably trained and qualified in the use of radioactivity measuring equipment, you
must not get involved in this process. Leave it to the experts.
If no suitably qualified personnel are available to carry out these checks the Well
owners/operators should ensure someone is mobilised to the location to carry out these checks.
The operating company is responsible for the safe disposal/decontamination of LSA materials
as laid down in the Radioactive Substances act of 1960 (UK only).
Operating bases outside the UK should ensure that they comply with all national and local
legislative requirements as prescribed in their respective Country.
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1.5.1 Definition
The definition of a High Pressure/High Temperature (HPHT) well is:
“Any well where the undisturbed bottom hole temperature at total depth or the prospective
reservoir section is greater than 300°F (150°C) and either the maximum anticipated pore
pressure exceeds a hydrostatic gradient of 0.8 psi/ft (representing an Estimated Mud Weight
(EMW) of 1.85 S.G. or 15.4 pounds per gallon (ppg)) or pressure control equipment with a
working pressure greater than 10,000 psi (690Bar) is required”.
On the UK Continental Shelf all wells must be drilled in accordance with the Design &
Construction Regulations, designed and published by the UK Health & Safety Executive.
Similar legislation exists in the rest of the oil producing world.
If the Clients well meets both of the criteria in the definition above, it should be treated as an
HPHT well.
The detailed requirements of all proposed HPHT wells should be examined closely.
1.5.2 Planning
The Planning of a HPHT test is extremely important, the design will achieve the client’s
objectives whilst complying with the comprehensive risk assessments and HAZOP completed
for the well test.
The planning will include:
− Safe and Environmentally acceptable production of hydrocarbons to surface
− Responsive initiation of multiple barriers down hole and at surface
− Reliable isolation and maximum security of the well
− System tolerance of variable pressure and temperature
− Maximum reliability with minimum intervention
A detailed well test design report will be produced, this is MANDATORY, the well test design
report will detail all the well parameters and all the required changes to the well test package for
the HPHT test.
The well test design report will be approved by Expro, client and a third-party certifying authority
(if applicable), therefore the well test design report PID, equipment layout shall be adhered to.
1.5.3 Safety
HPHT well test completion and design is more prone to failure since it typically operates closer
to its load, stress, pressure, temperature and chemical limits. The probability of failure also
increases due to the equipment tooling being less accurate and un-calibrated at undefined
HPHT conditions – software solutions are often designed (calibrated) for ‘normal’ wells. In
addition there is often increased organisational and human failure to fully appreciate, due to the
increased complexity, reduced flexibility, and equipment interactions and dependencies of
HPHT operations.
The keep it simple principle is very applicable to HPHT well tests and completions, due to the
increased probability of failure as detailed above, the increased complexity leads to increased
risk.
Safety awareness should be of paramount importance for HPHT wells. HPHT well testing
identifies issues and raises specific safety impacts in HPHT wells that should be addressed
during design and operations. These are specific to the character and behaviour of HPHT wells.
Methodical hazard identification and subsequent mitigation must be employed by everyone if the
risk to health, safety and the environment is to be reduced to a level deemed ‘As Low As
Reasonably Practical’ (ALARP). This will include the use of techniques such as HAZOP, HAZID
and other rigorous methods on a more frequent basis, safety and risk assessment should be a
primary objective during any HPHT well testing operations.
Rev. 2
Specialised Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) i.e. full face visors, gloves for use due to the
high equipment temperatures etc. Experienced competent crews should be utilised for HPHT
well tests.
Equipment Selection
All of the well test equipment upstream and including the choke manifold shall be suitably rated
for the pressure and temperature requirements. Hydraulic oils need to be chosen for the correct
operating temperature.
Coflon
A Coflon is a high temperature rated flexible flow line although the maximum certified
temperature is +266°F. The Coflon can also be utilised as a flexible section for any heat
expansion experienced during the flow periods.
Expansion loop
If a Coflon is not incorporated in the rig up an expansion loop could be required this will be
designed and detailed in the pre job planning and well test design report.
Flow lines
Pipe work with metal to metal connectors i.e. Techlok, Grayloc hubs will be supplied to allow for
the HPHT requirement. The specifications for these are superior to API flanges and hammer
unions, they also eliminate the use of specialised elastomers.
Data Header
The data header will have metal to metal connectors i.e. Techlok, Grayloc. All instrumentation
ports will be 9/16" Autoclave Engineer High Pressure (AEHP) and have double block and bleed
valves. Consideration should be given to direct mounting of the instrumentation due to the heat
transfer from the pipe work, it is typical to have an interconnecting HPHT instrumentation hose
or liner to reduce the heat transferred to the instrument.
Sampling upstream of the choke manifold should be kept to a minimum due to the high
pressures and temperatures.
Choke manifold
The choke manifold should be a double block design although two off-choke manifolds can be
utilised with an upstream and downstream diverter manifold, the choke manifolds will be rigged
up in parallel.
The adjustable choke should be designed to operate safely and accurately with high differential
pressures i.e. power chokes, master flo.
Rev. 2
If possible all the choke manifold valves and adjustable choke should be hydraulic actuated to
reduce the human interaction with the high surface temperature.
Downstream equipment
A second choke manifold may be required to step down the pressure; this will reduce the high
differential across the upstream choke manifold therefore reducing the possibility of hydrate
formation and erosion due to the high velocities.
A heat exchanger will be required to increase the well effluent temperature due to the high
differential and cooling across the upstream choke manifold, the heat exchanger adjustable
choke can be used to reduce the high differential. The heat exchanger can also be used to cool
the well effluent by acting as a heat sink if the shell is filled with water.
The separator maximum working pressure may be pressure down rated due to the high
temperature effect on the ANSI flanges of the vessel. The well test design report will high light
the hi pilot set pressures, relief valve and rupture disk settings.
All other downstream equipment with ANSI flanges may be pressure down rated due to the high
temperature, this will be highlighted in the well test planning report.
The relief line pipe work maybe of a larger I.D. due to the proposed high rates
Rev. 2
Explosive Decompression
One of the major problems encountered in testing high pressure wells, is the problem of
explosive decompression. This phenomenon causes problems in that when seals are
compressed under high pressure some gaseous elements diffuse into the seal. If a rapid
pressure drop occurs or after frequent pressure cycling, materials not resistant may suffer
extensive damage, usually in the form of splits and/or blisters. This is because the entrained gas
expands against the elasticity of the rubber causing severe internal damage that may split or
rupture the elastomer seal.
This problem is especially prevalent where there is a high CO 2 content in the well gas stream
and if this is the case then explosive decompression may occur at relatively low pressures. This
is due to the ability of the CO2 to permeate the elastomer.
It is recommended that elastomer seals with hardness rating above 85 RHD be used if explosive
decompression is expected to be a problem or if high concentrations of CO2 are expected.
The critical parameters most likely to affect Explosive Decompression performance are:
a) Gas type
b) Pressure and decompression rate
c) Temperature
d) Soak time at pressure
e) Seal volume and exposed seal surface area
f) Initial squeeze (strain exerted on seal while rigging up hammer union)
One type of rubber seal designed to overcome this problem is the Anson Super-seal which is
based on Viton B (a high fluorine content fluoroelastomer) which is given the compound name
FR 58/90 (the 90 refers to the hardness of the rubber).
The level of fluorine in the elastomer is thought to have a major effect on the solubility of gas in
the seal and thus resistance to explosive decompression as does the hardness of the
elastomer. Generally, the harder the elastomer seal the greater the resistance to gases
permeating into it.
The disadvantage of this is that the harder the seal, the worse the sealing properties.
If possible, bleeding down systems slowly will help prevent explosive decompression occurring.
Explosive decompression is one of the prime reasons why Expro recommend the use of metal
to metal type seals for all upstream pipework and components. If possible, metal to metal seals
should be used on all equipment installed upstream of the heat exchanger on the high-pressure
side of the system.
Rev. 2
Separation
Separation issues can arise due to the high temperatures ‘flashing off’ the condensate, this will
create measurement problems with both the gas and the condensate rates.
The separator internals may also be affected by the high temperature, mist extractors may not
work so efficiently, causing wet gas to be metered and a smokey flare.
Liquid level displacers need to be checked for temperature rating, as level control may be
affected.
Daniel’s plate holders need to be checked for temperature rating as this can affect the sealing
around the orifice plate and the gas metering.
Fluid meters need to be rated for the proposed high temperatures.
Rev. 2
TOC
H2S Concentrations
In dealing with H2S several different units may be in use for measuring its concentration.
Expro standardize on PPM – Parts Per Million for concentration in gas.
Other unit and conversions:
1% = 10,000ppm.
0.65 Grains per SCF (Standard Cubic Foot) = 10ppm
0.001MOL% and VOL% = 10ppm
15 MG/M3. = 10ppm
Rev. 2
1.6.2 Occurrence
H2S occurs worldwide in various concentrations associated with gas, oil and water. It is found in
porous formations and can be encountered during rigging up and down for production logging
and perforating operations on oil or gas wells. It is encountered particularly during sampling
operations during well test operations.
Where H2S is not expected from a newly completed or existing well there maybe cases
where certain chemicals used may result in the formation of H2S. Checks for H2S on new
or existing wells will be carried out until it is established whether the presence of H 2S is
present.
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1.6.3 Equipment
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Rev. 2
• At least one stand alone vehicle for escape shall be available at the work site. On
offshore locations, a standby vessel must be available.
• The use of escape masks (gas masks) devices as a work pack is strictly forbidden.
Escape masks may only be used once.
• On onshore and offshore locations, two means of escape or exit must be available.
• Muster points must be in an upwind location, all personnel are to be aware of the
muster point location, muster points are to be clearly defined.
• Additional Emergency Shut Down Stations to be placed at air breathing plant
equipment and at the muster stations.
Cascade System
In known or suspected H2S areas each cascade system will be made up from a set of bottle
banks. These banks will be charged from a main compressor with back-up compressor on
location.
Each system will be a high-pressure system regulated down to supply various plug in points
along the system loop.
Air pressure at the plug in points will be regulated down to 100 to 130psi to allow for easy
connection and not over pressuring of the face mask.
Each cascade system will be able to accommodate the total number of personnel on location as
well as supply a 50% additional coverage as a minimum requirement. The system is required to
sustain the total number of persons on location for a minimum of one hour while totally masked
up and using the system simultaneously.
Only a qualified person can service all cascade systems and air packs. If no qualified person is
available then a registered company must be used.
If the cascade system is used on a regular weekly basis for drills, air quality testing must be
performed weekly and recorded; air quality must conform for grade D breathing air.
Rev. 2
Rig Up
• Prior to rig up on any suspected H2S well, HAZOP/HAZID/Risk Assessments shall be
performed to identify access, egress, muster points, vent and flare locations as a
minimum.
• Rig up Welltest package as per Expro Well Test Design Report (WTDR) for specific
well/operation.
• Ensure all vent lines are hard pipework with the vent exit below the hull of the offshore
installation, for onshore operations the vent line should be diverted via an interlocked
diverter manifold to a downwind safe area. (H2S scrubber’s can be utilised on vent
lines.)
• Atmospheric tanks should not be used in known H2S applications. However, if
atmospheric tanks are required then a risk assessment along with following shall be
mandatory controls:
a) Ensure that fluids are only pumped to the tank.
b) That they are sealed tanks with no local venting i.e. no Whessoe type vents
etc.
c) The atmospheric tank vent line is hard piped and vented to a safe downwind
area. (H2S scrubber’s can be utilised on vent lines.)
d) Ensure a H2S gas detector is available around the perimeter of the
atmospheric stock tank
• Ensure all vent lines are pressure tested to MAWP to ensure integrity.
• Ensure shrinkage tester vent is piped to a suitable containment vessel or a downwind
safe area.
Rev. 2
• Once H2S levels are established and are less than 10ppm in air all test personnel can
de-mask. All well test personnel to carry SCBA units during test period.
• If H2S level is more than 10ppm in air then permanent donning of SCBA required for
test duration. (Limits may differ due to regional/client legislation.)
• During all operations when controlled release of hydrocarbons is required i.e. sampling,
choke change, orifice plate change etc. SCBA set shall be donned.
• No gas sampling with gas gravitometer to be taken in pressurised lab. Cabin.
• Ensure all sampling containers are suitable for H2S and have been marked up with H2S
contamination.
• When hydrocarbons containing H2S are flared/burnt a by product of Sulphur Dioxide
(SO2) will be present within the atmosphere and is an equally toxic by product. The
flare will appear to be a blue colour.
• If any onsite maintenance is required to be carried out then the sour gas maintenance
procedures and risk assessments shall be adhered to.
Rig Down
• Once well test is completed and well killed/abandoned, isolate well test package from
well.
• Depressurise all well test equipment through boom and pump out all tanks to burner.
• Flush all equipment to boom/burner, continually sample the flushed fluids for H2S
content.
• Repeat flushing process until H2S levels are not recorded.
• If possible flushing medium should have H2S scavenger, alternatively purge well test
equipment with nitrogen.
• Once all equipment is rigged down and ready for return to base ensure all used
equipment is marked up stating H2S contamination.
• Transportation of all contaminated equipment should be risk assessed, procedures put
in place and any dangerous goods notification identified.
NOTE: SCBA sets should still be worn and masked up while this operation is
continuing, especially if breaking out equipment etc.
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1.7.1 Planning
If in the planning phase an acid job is anticipated certain points should be addressed with
regards to:
• Equipment suitability
• Personnel safety
• Environmental impact
• Neutralising acid returns
All four points need to be satisfactorily addressed to safely execute the job.
Pipework
All the pipework from the tree to the surge tank is capable of handling the acid.
Always try to flush through the pipework with potable water if at all possible do not leave any
residual acid in the lines for extended periods.
Coflexip Hose
In some instances Coflexip hoses are preferred over hard pipe. Not all Coflexip hoses are
suitable for acid. Two types of Coflexip hoses are in use within the Expro Group: Hoses with
Rilsan or Coflon inner lining. Only the Coflon type hoses are suitable for acid. This has to be
checked in the planning phase, because a Rilsan Coflexip hose could be severely damaged if
exposed to acid.
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1.7.6 Operation
The technical side of flowing back acid is no different than flowing back any other liquids.
• Controlling the well at the choke manifold is no different from unloading water from the
well.
• The separator is set up as normal with the exception that only two-phase separation is
required.
• The surge tank is run the same as under normal conditions.
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passes through the reduced orifice of the adjustable choke resulting in the rapid increase of
velocity downstream of the choke.
The result of this chain of events may be the eventual loosening of the choke seat, the copper
gasket downstream of the choke seat begins to lose the effectiveness of its seal, and this may
lead to a very swift flow path being opened up between the copper gasket and the threads it is
protecting. A very rapid destruction of the threads and choke box will result as the slugs
continue to flow to surface. No matter how tightly the choke seat has been fitted to the choke
box the sonic shocks will soon start this sequence, these results are typically seen in the early
phases of the clean up where the choke sizes are still relatively small. With the orifice around
the adjustable choke needle and seat being small, the flow rapidly changes from laminar type
flow to a more turbulent flow regime, which may eventually result in the loosening of the choke
seat as mentioned earlier.
The above undesirable outcome can best be combated by all or a combination of these
following bullet points:
• If these possible conditions are highlighted at the planning stage, the copper gaskets
used with the choke seats, should be replaced with Harsh Environment Teflon choke
seals (Expro part no. CS 20 –050) this will help effect a better seal & reduce the
possibility of loosening
• It is also recommended that instead of using an Adjustable choke in this situation a
change to a fixed choke by fixed choke regime is followed to maintain a greater control
over the production. The orifice in the fixed choke is slightly larger which helps reduce
the turbulent flow, which can quickly lead to the above event. The fixed choke orifice
will also create less drag on the fluids flowing through and therefore reduce the
turbulence
• If, as mentioned earlier, these conditions are highlighted at the planning stage, a
Masterflo type choke can be substituted for a conventional choke manifold, which
enables more control over the slugging. Its Tungsten internals are also more suited to
these harsher environments. Finally and possibly most importantly at this part of the
clean up as the liquids are produced to surface it is highly recommended that rapid
beaning up is not attempted, wait for stabilization before proceeding to the next choke
size with caution. This should allow a steady production of liquids to surface rather than
the undesirable slug flows, which create the problem
Assumptions
• SAFE and Coiled Tubing Cutting valves (if either used) installed and function tested.
• Surface Test Tree installed with kill-wing and swab valves closed and master valve
open.
• All down hole safety valve(s) open.
• Texsteam pump function tested, and methanol available in sufficient quantity.
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NOTE: On dual train systems, secondary train should be opened early in the flow
period to clear the system of any trapped liquids while gas velocities are still
relatively low. This will reduce the reactive forces caused, should a slug of water be
introduced into a high velocity gas stream.
• Monitor surface pressures/temperatures and nature of produced fluids.
• Take Draeger tests for H2S, CO2 and N2 when first gas at surface (tests for Mercaptans
can also be carried out). Continue testing every three hours or as required.
• Gradually bean up in required choke increments and flow until well clean and desired
drawdown/flow rate is achieved under stable conditions.
• Estimate gas flow rates on each choke setting prior to beaning up
• During Clean-up, as a minimum, it is necessary to produce a volume of fluids at least
equal to the volume of the well bore
• Generally the well will be cleaned up to a rate equal to or greater than the highest rate
that the well will be tested to
NOTE: At end of clean-up period it may be required to flow via test separator to
obtain accurate flow rate data. Liquid levels may be established if separator used at
this stage.
• Close in at choke manifold or down hole tester valve for pressure build-up to record
initial reservoir pressure and temperature. This pressure is necessary to calculate the
A.O.F. or deliverability plots.
• Once stable closed in conditions are reached, open well at choke manifold and flow
well for one or more successive flow rates. These flow rates will generally be of
sequence smallest choke bean to largest.
• The minimum flow rate should produce a pressure drop approximately 5% of shut-in
pressure, or at least to the size required to lift liquids, if any, from the well.
• The maximum flow rate should produce a pressure drop of approximately 25% of shut-
in pressure.
• Any other flow rates should fall equally between these constraints.
NOTE: Drawdown of the well should not be > 50% of shut-in pressure to prevent
possible damage to the well-bore.
• Flow via separator for required flow period, collecting desired samples (PVT, bulk etc.)
as required for each flow rate.
• Each rate must be flowed to stabilisation in order to obtain correct data to calculate
A.O.F. or deliverability plots and prevent need for a retest.
• If flowing for several flow rates work out, during initial shut-in, if one orifice plate can
cover all flow rates (while maintaining > 20% and < 80% of differential range). If not,
use minimum orifice plate changes as possible.
• Close in well at choke manifold (or down-hole tester valve) and observe pressure build-
up until initial reservoir pressure achieved.
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1.9 MAINTENANCE
During any offshore operation where certain equipment requires unplanned or planned
maintenance, this guideline will assist in ensuring that the correct level of maintenance is
conducted and who is responsible for that maintenance.
Simple Tasks
• Isolating and cleaning sight glasses
• Draining pneumatic regulators/oilers
• Filling compressors with lubricating oil
• Cleaning of equipment/pipework etc
• Grease valves after operation
In all cases, a valid permit to work should be in place to cover all maintenance tasks planned,
regardless of how simple you may think they are. Simple everyday tasks similar to those listed
above can be detailed on the permit to work used to cover all activities undertaken during any
shift period. Simply note them down on the permit to work that must be in place to cover the
daily work scope.
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Clearly in this example the valve is no longer in an operational condition because you cannot
operate the valve under pressure whilst the bonnet has been removed.
The risk assessment carried out should identify all hazards associated with the task and the
probable harm that could occur whilst carrying out the maintenance task. As a result the
required controls should then be put in place in order to reduce any risk to a level deemed as
low as reasonable practicable (ALARP) before any work is carried out.
A risk assessment on all tasks requiring equipment intervention is mandatory.
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vessel that may still contain vapours, e.g. flare systems, vent lines, knockout vessels on
Gas legs etc.
• The personnel who are to carry out the vessel entry must complete a full Risk
Assessment and trained in vessel entry
• The atmosphere in the confined space must be tested before it is certified as being safe
to enter, or before safety precautions to be taken upon entry are specified.
• Under no circumstance should a confined space be entered in which the Oxygen
content is lower than 20.9% without wearing breathing apparatus. (See note below.)
• It may be necessary to enter the confined space wearing breathing apparatus to
undertake initial gas check.
• Sludge can lie undisturbed in the bottom of vessels, even after flushing and purging.
Great care should be taken when entering a confined space where sludge may lie
undisturbed. If sludge is disturbed by personnel or equipment inside the vessel it can
release vapours and fumes.
• A safety Sentry must be positioned outside the vessel or space at all times whilst
personnel are working inside. The main purpose for the sentry is to give the alarm
should it become necessary and he should therefore remain at his post at all times
whilst personnel are inside the space. The sentry should never enter the space himself
or attempt a rescue himself. Lifelines should be attached to a harness run back to a
point outside the vessel or confined space.
NOTE:
Normal Composition of air - Nitrogen (N2) 78.09%
Oxygen 20.95%
Argon 0.93%
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 0.03%
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Look Up Table
Well Baseline Solids Evidence of Continuous Time Interval Remarks
type check planned solids checking between
for? production? checks
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Intrusive Devices
There are two intrusive detection systems:
• One system works on the principle of measuring the increase in electrical resistance of
a metallic element exposed to erosion
• Erosion probe, is a sacrificial probe that when fully eroded allows pressure to act on a
pressure gauge thus indicating the presence of solids
The two main suppliers of this equipment to Expro are IICOR and SMS.
Note: Regions may use different preferred vendors from those mentioned above.
Note: Intrusive devices shall only be fitted where solids are not expected to be produced
or shall be fitted downstream of solids removal equipment.
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In addition wall thickness checks shall be carried out as per WTS, section 3.9.2 – Wall
Thickness – INS-002669.
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(lbs/MMscf/d) (ft/sec)
>5 98
4-5 115
3-4 131
1.5 - 3 148
1 - 1.5 165
0-1 180
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b) Oil Wells-
Sand production at surface should be limited to a maximum sand/oil concentration of 50
lbs/1000 bbls for all flow periods with the inclusion of maximum flow rate tests.
Recommendations are that if the sand concentration exceeds this the well should be choked
back and a further sample taken after 1 1/2 volumes of the test string.
In the case where a maximum flow rate is desired this should only be performed after the
sustained sand content has been established.
25-50 lbs Choke back to previous rate if the sand content does
not show a tendency to decline
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It should be noted that solids do not always come to surface straight away. Tubing size,
deviation and flowing parameters, all need to be taken into account. Therefore, it is inadvisable
to attempt to speed things up during the early stages as damage in the well bore may also affect
the well’s long term deliverability.
Note: It is important to ensure that choke sizes are not increased until bottoms up has
occurred, the solids production rate has been established and produced solids rates are
on the decline.
Great care should be taken to recognise that increasing the choke size rapidly could result in an
unmanageable amount of solids at surface resulting in potential screening out of the equipment
and creating excessive DPs. Excess DPs across sandfilter element and desander liner have the
potential for failure with filter collapse or erosion of desander liner.
The solids holding capacities of Solids exclusion equipment are limited and are dependent on
the holding volumes of each vessel. If large volumes of solids are expected during the well clean
up phase and are identified in the preplanning phase then consideration must be made on the
number of units proposed or limitation of the system made clear to the client.
The liquid capacities of the desander and the sand filters are limited and are dependent on
insert size on the desander and the mesh size on the filter and the viscosity of the fluid being
handled.
Note: Mud, gels etc should not be flowed through the sand filters when screens are installed as
they will clog up and could rupture due to high differential pressure.
Maximum weights and volumes recorded may differ from what is stated below due to varying
solids density that could be experienced.
THE TEST SEPARATOR AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES SHOULD NOT BE FLOWED
THROUGH DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF CLEAN UP.
The following measures are to be undertaken during this type of clean ups:
a) When opening and closing gate valves, the number of turns to open/close gate valves
versus number of turns achieved should be noted, so as to ascertain if a valve is
‘sanding up’, and therefore, not fully opening/closing
b) Constantly observe both upstream and downstream choke pressures to ensure choke
erosion does not go undetected. Visual choke/adaptor inspection should take place at
least every three hours unless solids production is insignificant
c) Before attempting to flow via the test separator/production loop solids production
should be observed and a solids/proppant rate established
d) Wellhead pressure should be stable (well not slugging). If two sets of sand filters are
available use two in series in case of filter rupture. Flow via separator for one-to-two
hours to obtain flow rate information then continue clean up via clean-up system (check
separator drain for solids/fines)
e) At the end of the clean-up solids production needs to be 2 lbs/hour or less with a
downward trend before flowing for extended periods via the well test package. To
achieve this bean back the well until flowing conditions are satisfactory. (4/64ths is
usually enough). Use the smallest filter size possible without affecting the well
performance and check the separator drain regularly for unfiltered solids/fines
Velocity through the test system should be considered at all times.
f) If for any reason the well is closed in during clean-up it should be reopened with care.
Bean up slowly from a small choke to give a maximum of 100 psi/hour drop in flowing
tubing head pressure until close to previous flowing pressure/choke size. Check solids
production prior to final bean up to original choke size as well
performance/characteristics may have changed due to shut in.
g) The well cleanliness acceptance/solids production will be given by the client based on
their requirement for production.
During Frac Clean-Ups the below should be applied in addition to the above.
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1.11 CO2
Carbon dioxide reacts with water to form carbonic acid, which can give impressively high rates
of corrosion and metal loss. These corrosion rates are much higher than it would be getting from
just water. Water is needed for corrosion to occur so a lot of gas fields which are termed “dry
gas”, which though they may contain high levels of carbon dioxide don’t have corrosion
problems.
It is important to note that corrosion due to Carbon Dioxide only occurs in carbon/manganese
and low alloy steels. This means that stainless steel, copper and nickel alloys are not affected.
The corrosion rate will be lower in thick oil as this will tend to coat the steel surfaces and reduce
the corrosion rate. The corrosion rate is also reduced by the formation of scale; if this is still
present from previous use then the corrosion rate will be reduced.
Be aware that a corrosion rate of 0.0 does not mean no corrosion will be occurring just that it is
less than 0.0 of relevant units.
Corrosion rates caused by CO2 can reach very high levels, (thousands of mm per year) but
various measures can be taken to prevent it.
In some situations a protective scale is formed over the metal preventing the effects of
corrosion. Generally the scale forms when the system is at high temperatures, has little or no
turbulence and has an increased pH. However the scale can be easily removed due to
turbulence or because of other acids that can be present.
The high rates of corrosion that appear in the table below will rarely be seen in real situations
because of other factors that affect the rate of corrosion. These are calculated values and do not
accounts for things like slow removal of corrosion product, insufficient water so water is fully
saturated etc…
1.11.2 Seals
One of the major problems encountered in testing high pressure wells with high concentration of
CO2, is the Rapid Gas Decompression (also known as Explosive Decompression).
Seal damage and observed gas leaks to atmosphere caused by Rapid Gas Decompression in
elastomeric seals have been reported in many types of equipment in the oil and gas industry.
This phenomenon causes problems in that when seals are compressed under high pressure
some gaseous elements diffuse into the seal. If a rapid pressure drop occurs or after frequent
pressure cycling, materials not resistant may suffer extensive damage, usually in the form of
splits and/or blisters. This is because the entrained gas expands against the elasticity of the
rubber causing severe internal damage that may split or rapture the elastomer seal.
It is recommended that elastomer seals with hardness rating above 85 RHD be used if explosive
decompression is expected to be a problem or if CO2 concentration is higher than 5% and/or
dry gas above 35 bar (508 psi), otherwise metal seals should be considered.
The seal failure process due to rapid gas decompression is extremely complex. It depends on
many variables that interact, including the seal material, groove design, gas composition,
system pressure and temperature. Failure is also highly location dependent within the seal
section, with certain locations failing prematurely due to the magnitude of the pressure
differential and the local stress field;
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For more information in regards to the Explosive Decompression, please refer to WTS 1.5,
Section 6.Operational Issues.
Note: For seal selection and computability please refer to WTS 3.09 Pipework supporting
info James Walker Seal compatibility
Where:
V = The Corrosion Rate in mm per year for CO2 saturated salt water
T = Temperature in °C
Tables have been created for the rate of Corrosion per year and in a 24 hour period, with and
without scaling factor. Each table is for a standard pressure which is indicated in the top left
hand corner of the table.
Scaling factor is applicable when the temperature is greater than 60°C. At these temperatures
protective scale is formed which reduces the effect of corrosion. Although the values in the table
are not always accurate because in sections where there is turbulence the protective scale can
be shaken off.
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