Narag VS Narag 291 SCRA 451

(Cohabitation, Mutual Love, and Respect)

FACTS:

On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated the Code of Ethics
for Lawyers. It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag has
abandoned his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level.

Another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She alleged therein that (1)
she fabricated the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters
between the respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from “emotional
confusion arising from extreme jealousy.” The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a
faithful and responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous
relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family. Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of
Desistance and a Motion to Dismiss which she filed before the IBP commission on bar discipline. In a
Decision dated October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for
failure to prosecute.

On November 25, 1991, this Court received another letter from the complainant, with her seven
children as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained that she
had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous threats against her.

Respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be affirmed. Denying that he had
threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had voluntarily executed her Affidavit of
Desistance and Motion to Dismiss, even appearing before the investigating officer, Commissioner Racela,
to testify under oath “that she prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free
will and affirmed the contents thereof.”

In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied abandoning his family
to live with his paramour. However, he described his wife as a person emotionally disturbed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Narag shall be disbarred.

RULING:

YES, Atty. Narag shall be disbarred.

In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.

Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove
otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has
solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death. The moral delinquency
that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of
the inviolable social institution of marriage.

Groitis VS Campos Rueda, 35 Phil 252

(Cohabitation, Mutual Love, and Respect)

FACTS:

The parties were legally married on January 7, 1915. The defendant, one month after he had
contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on
his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to
perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually
on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who
always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induced him to
maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body;
and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant
desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in
the home of her parents.
 An action by filed the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From
a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint
do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to
amend, the latter appealed. It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant
cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial
decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

RULING:

YES. Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

Marriage is something more than a contract, though founded upon the agreement of the parties.
When once formed a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change by agreement,
and the rights and obligations of which depend not upon their agreement but upon the law. The spouses
must be faithful to, assist, support, and live with each other.

The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, may
maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy,
notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to furnish
support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own
home the one having the right to the same.

The complaint of the wife which alleges unbearable conduct and treatment on the part of the
husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance.

Tenchavez VS Escano, 17 SCRA 674

(Cohabitation, Mutual Love, and Respect)

FACTS:

Not satisfied with the decision of this Court, promulgated on 29 November 1965, in the above-
entitled case, plaintiff-appellant Pastor B. Tenchavez and defendant-appellee Vicenta F. Escaño,
respectively, move for its reconsideration; in addition, Russell Leo Moran, whom said defendant married
in the United States, has filed, upon leave previously granted, a memorandum in intervention.

Vicenta F. Escaño, the appellee claims that state recognition should be accorded the Church’s
disavowal of her marriage with Tenchavez. However, on the facts being gathered: On 10 September
1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage, without stating that papal dispensation was
actually granted, the reason being that Vicenta’s claim that dispensation was granted was not indubitable,
and her counsel, during the trial in the lower court, did not make good his promise to submit the document
evidencing the papal dispensation; in fact, no such document appears on record. The Church’s disavowal
of the marriage, not being sufficiently established, it cannot be considered. Vicenta’s belated appeal to
Canon law, after she had sought and failed to obtain annulment in the civil courts, and after she had
flaunted its principles by obtaining absolute divorce, does not, and cannot, sound convincing. Particularly
when account is taken of the circumstances that she obtained the Nevada divorce in 1950 and only
sought ecclesiastical release from her marriage to Tenchavez in 1954.

On the other hand, Pastor B. Tenchavez claimes that the award of moral damages against
Vicenta Escaño is assailed on the ground that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of
consortium and desertion of her. The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not
countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff’s
feelings in a manner “contrary to morals, good customs or public policy”.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.
2. Whether or not Pastor B. Tenchavez can claim moral damages for the refusal to perform
wifely duties and desertion of husband.

RULING:

1. NO, the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is not valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.
 Church disavowal of marriage should be proven. — Although it was alleged that papal
dispensation for the first marriage was granted, no such document appears OR record, To be considered,
the Church’s disavowal of the marriage must be sufficiently established.

2. NO, Pastor B. Tenchavez cannot claim moral damages for the refusal to perform wifely duties
and desertion of husband.

The award of moral damages against the wife is assailed on the ground that her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium and desertion of her husband are not included in the
enumeration of cases where moral damage may lie. The argument is untenable. The acts of the wife (up
to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by law), constitute a willful infliction 01 injury
upon plaintiff’s feelings in a manner “contrary to morals, good customs or public policy” (New Civil Code,
Article 21) for which paragraph 10 of Article 2219, authorizes an award of moral damages.

Dadivas VS. Villanueva, 54 Phil 92

(Fixing the Family Domicile)

FACTS:

The plaintiff, Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, was married to the defendant, Rafael Villanueva, on
July 16, 1905. To them have been born three children who were, at the time of the trial of this case in the
lower court, aged respectively 18, 10 and 9 years. The grounds on which separate maintenance is sought
are infidelity and cruelty. With respect to the first of these charges the proof shows that during the period
of about ten years prior to the institution of the action, the defendant was guilty of repeated acts of
infidelity with four different women, and even after the action was begun, he is shown to have had illicit
relations with still another, an incident which is incorporated in the case by means of the amended
complaint. Though at all times protesting against these irregularities in her husband's conduct, the plaintiff
appears to have exhibited forbearance; and she long continued in marital relations with him with a view to
keeping the family intact as well as with hope of retrieving him from his erring course. In the end,
however, the incorrigible nature of the defendant in his relations with other women, coupled with a lack of
consideration and even brutality towards the plaintiff, caused her to withdraw from the domestic hearth
and to establish a separate abode for herself and two younger children. This final separation occurred on
April 20, 1927, about one month before the present action was begun.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff can ask separate maintenance from respondent after she left their
domicile.

RULING:

YES, the plaintiff can ask separate maintenance from respondent after she left their domicile.

SEPARATE MAINTENANCE FOR WIFE.—In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home
and to require separate maintenance from her husband, it is not necessary that the husband should bring
a concubine into the marital domicile. Repeated illicit relations with women outside of the marital
establishment are enough. The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations
with a husband whose propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.

Garcia VS Santiago, 53 Phil 952

(Fixing the Family Domicile)

FACTS:

In her complaint, CIPRIANA GARCIA, the plaintiff alleges that she was married to the defendant
Isabelo Santiago on April 8, 1910, and that from that date they lived together as husband and wife, until
continued family dissensions compelled her to leave the conjugal dwelling on February 3, 1925; that
defendant Alejo Santiago is a son of Isabelo Santiago by his first wife, and Prisca Aurelio is a daughter of
plaintiff by her first husband; that said Alejo Santiago seduced Prisca Aurelio, and the latter gave birth to a
child; and that the other defendant Isabelo Santiago, instead of seeing to the vindication of the honor of
plaintiff's daughter by requiring his son to marry her, has refused to have anything to do with the matter,
thus seemingly countenancing the illicit relations between them;

That with a view to favoring materially the said Alejo Santiago and fostering his whims and
caprices, defendant Isabelo Santiago has been conveying, and is attempting to convey, to said Alejo
Santiago property belonging to their conjugal partnership, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff's rights;
that, among the property that defendant has conveyed or is attempting to convey to Alejo Santiago, the
lands specifically described in the complaint are the most important ones, which, with others, had been
acquired by plaintiff and defendant Isabelo Santiago during their married life with money belonging to the
conjugal partnership, and with the products and fruits of the property of the conjugal partnership, or
through the industry of the two; that said property produces annually around the neighborhood of 4,500
cavanes of palay at P4 per cavan; that by reason of the attitude of defendant Isabelo Santiago, respecting
the illicit relations of his son and Prisca Aurelio, and his fraudulent acts conveying to said Alejo Santiago
property belonging to the conjugal partnership, plaintiff and Isabelo Santiago have had several
discussions and quarrels, which culminated in their separation on February 3, 1925, which separation
became necessary in order to avoid personal violence; that notwithstanding plaintiff's repeated demands,
defendant Isabelo Santiago has continually refused to provide for her support, and plaintiff could not live
in their conjugal dwelling, because of the illicit relations between Alejo Santiago and Prisca Aurelio,
countenanced by the other defendant Isabelo Santiago;

ISSUE:

Whether or not the separation between the plaintiff and the defendant is unjustified.

RULING:

NO, the separation between the plaintiff and the defendant is not unjustified.

In a case of serious disagreement between husband and wife, and the wife is virtually driven out
of their home by the husband and threatened with violence if she should return, the wife, though she may
not be free from blame, cannot be compelled to cohabit with her husband, and she is entitled to a
reasonable maintenance allowance.

It clearly appears that the spouses led a rather stormy life subsequent to the dishonor of the
plaintiff's daughter, Prisca, and that quarrels were frequent In the last of these quarrels, the husband,
according to the plaintiff's testimony, went so far as to order her to leave his house and threatened to
illtreat her if she returned. It also appears that, aside from the quarrels, she had very unpleasant
experiences in other respects. Her young daughter was, and still is, under her care, and her assertion that
her husband's son was the cause of her daughter's pregnancy is probably not unfounded. It requires no
stretch of the imagination to conclude that to keep the two young people under the same roof with the
opportunity to continue their illicit relations would create a very embarrassing situation for the girl's
mother.

Atilano VS CHUA CHING BENG, 103 Phil 255

(Fixing the Family Domicile)

FACTS:

Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were joined in lawful wedlock in Zamboanga City in May of
1951, after which marriage, the couple sailed for Manila and established their residence with the parents
of the husband. In October of the same year, at the husband's initiative, they went to Zamboanga City to
pay the parents of the wife a visit, and it seems that he was prevailed upon by the wife's parents to return
to Manila leaving her behind, with the understanding that she would follow him later, which apparently she
failed to do.

On September 30, 1953, Pilar Atilano filed with the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga a
complaint for support against her husband, alleging that they had been estranged and living separately
since October, 1952, by reason of incessant marital bickerings and quarrels brought about by
incompatibility of temperament and above all, by defendant's inability to provide for themselves a home
separate from the latter's parents; that she was staying with her parents in Zamboanga City, without
employment nor had she any property of her own. She, therefore, prayed that as defendant was under
legal obligation to support her, he be ordered to give her a monthly allowance of P200.00 from the date of
the filing of the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Pilar is entitled to support when she refused to live with Chua.

RULING:

NO, Pilar is not entitled to support when she refused to live with Chua.

Where the root-cause of all differences between the husband and wife could be traced to
disagreements common among relatives by affinity that misunderstanding with in-laws who may be
considered third parties to the marriage, is not the moral or legal obstacle that the lawmakers
contemplated in the drafting of Art. 299 of the new Civil Code. The law, in giving the husband authority to
fix the conjugal residence (Art. 110, New Civil Code) does not prohibit him from establishing the same at
the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized norm of morality, especially if he is not fully capable
of meeting his obligation as such head of a family without the aid of his elders.

Although the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity and render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109) and that the wife is entitled to be supported, our
laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal
justification she establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the former, yet and in Such
event there is no plausible reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband.

Pelayo VS Lauron, 12 Phil 453

(Mutual Help and Support)

FACTS:

On the 23d of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician-residing in Cebu, filed a complaint
against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of October of said year,
at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon
arrival he was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to
give birth to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escaño, it was
found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove the fætus by means of forceps which
operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which service he was
occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient several
times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants
refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that judgment be
entered in his favor as against the defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together
with any other relief that might be deemed proper.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical assistance
rendered to their daughter-in-law.

RULING:

NO, the defendants are not obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical assistance rendered to
their daughter-in-law.

Among the reciprocal obligations existing between a husband and wife is that of support, which
obligation is established by law. The law does not compel any person to support a stranger unless such
person bound himself to do so by an express contract. Where a husband whom the law compels to
support his wife is living, the father and mother-in-law of the latter are under no liability to provide for her.

Silva VS Peralta, 110 Phil 57

(Use of Surname)

FACTS:

Saturnino Silva, then an American citizen and an officer of the United States Army and married to
one Prescilla Isabel of Australia, had been ordered sent to the Philippines during the enemy occupation to
help unite the guerrillas in their fight for freedom. Sometime during the year 1944, Florence, a younger
sister of the defendant, was accused of having collaborated with the enemy, and for this she was
arrested, and, accompanied by Esther. It was during said investigation that Silva first met Esther.
Florence and her sister, appellee herein, went to live with the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Camilo Doctolero at
Davao.

Silva professed love for Esther. Having been made to believe that he was single, she accepted
his marriage proposal; and the two were married on January 14, 1945 by one Father Cote on the
occasion of a house blessing. No documents of marriage were prepared nor executed, allegedly because
there were no available printed forms for the purpose. Hence, the lovers lived together as husband and
wife. From the "marriage", a child, named Saturnino Silva, Jr., was born.

On May 8, 1945, Silva sustained serious wounds in the battle of Ising, for which reason, he was
transferred to Leyte, and later to the United States, for medical treatment. While in the States, he divorced
Priscilla Isabel and later, on May 9, 1948, contracted marriage with plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva.
 Upon his return to the Philippines, appellee Esther Peralta demanded support for their child, and,
upon his refusal, instituted a suit for support in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Thereupon, the
present action was filed against Esther, and another suit against her was instituted in Cotabato.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Esther Peralta can use the surname of Saturnino Silva.

RULING:

NO, Esther Peralta cannot use the surname of Saturnino Silva.

There being no marriage between appellant "S" and appellee "P", it would be improper for the
latter to continue using the former's surname and representing herself as his wife. Article 370 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines authorizes a married woman to use the surname of her husband; and impliedly, it
also excludes others from doing likewise.

Tolentino VS CA, 162 SCRA 66

(Use of Surname)

FACTS:

CONSTANCIA C. TOLENTINO, the petitioner is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino, their
marriage having been celebrated on April 21, 1945 in Manila. The union produced three children.

Respondent Consuelo David was legally married to Arturo Tolentino on February 8, 1931. Their
marriage likewise produced children. The marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law
during the Japanese occupation on September 15, 1943 by a decree of absolute divorce granted by the
Court of First Instance on the ground of desertion and abandonment by the wife. The trial court granted
the divorce on its finding that Arturo Tolentino was abandoned by Consuelo David for at least three (3)
continuous years.

Thereafter, Arturo Tolentino married a certain Pilar Adorable, who however, died soon after their
marriage. Tolentino subsequently married Constancia on April 21, 1945.

Consuelo David, on the other hand, continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and
up to the time of the filing of this complaint.

The third party defendant, in his answer, admitted that the use of the surname Tolentino by the
private respondent was with his and his family’s (brothers and sisters) consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname
of her former husband from whom she was divorced.

RULING:

NO, the petitioner cannot exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her
former husband from whom she was divorced.

On the principal issue of whether or not a divorced woman may continue using the surname of
her former husband, Philippine law is understandably silent. We have no provisions for divorce in our laws
and consequently, the use of surnames by a divorced wife is not provided for. There is no merit in the
petitioner’s claim that to sustain the private respondent’s stand is to contradict Article 370 and 371 of the
Civil Code. It is significant to note that Senator Tolentino himself in his commentary on Art. 370 of the Civil
Code states that “the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband’s surname. She cannot be
prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it.”

Yasin VS Shari’a District Court, 241 SCRA 606

(Use of Surname)

FACTS:

On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition
to resume the use of maiden name". On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order which
petitioner is hereby ordered to effect the necessary amendment of the petition within one (1) week from
receipt hereof so as to reflect the formal requirements adverted to.

Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is
not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden
name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083), and after marriage of her former husband to another woman.

The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990, on the
ground that the petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of
Rule 103, Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would result
in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for
change of name.

RULING:

NO, a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is not a petition for change of name.

Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right,
nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In
view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of
name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her
maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding,
where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent proof as annexes, which appear to be
satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use
of maiden name must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.

Remo VS Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 614 SCRA 281

(Use of Surname)

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then
expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries
appear in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as
her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still
subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement
passport.

Petitioner’s request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III, representing
petitioner, wrote then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason expressing a similar request. On 28
August 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota, denied the request, On 15 November
2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President.

On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal and ruled that Section 5(d) of
Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 “offers no leeway for any other
interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a
married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes.” The Office of the President further
held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter will control the former regardless
of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239.On
28 October 2004, the Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. In its Decision of 27 May 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the
ruling of the Office of the President.
ISSUE:

Whether petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can
revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her
marriage.

RULING:

NO, the petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, cannot
revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her
marriage.

Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These
instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since
petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement
passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based
only on the severance of the marriage.

Perez VS Perez, 109 Phil 654

(Relief from Courts)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Antonio Perez, in his own representation and as guardian ad litem of his adoptive son,
Benigno Perez y Tuason, initiated this civil case against Angela Tuason de Perez, the plaintiff 's wife and
Benigno's mother. The complaint states three causes of action.

Under the first cause of action, it is averred that the defendant is squandering all of her estate on
a young man by the name of Jose Antonio Campos Boloix, because of which Benigno Perez y Tuason,
acting through his guardian ad litem, the plaintiff, prays that his mother, the defendant, be declared a
prodigal and placed under guardianship; that a suitable person or institution be appointed to administer
her properties; and that during the pendency of this suit, a writ of injunction be issued to prevent the
continued waste and dissipation of her properties.

In his second cause of action, the husband Antonio Perez, for and in his own behalf, asserts that
by virtue of the said alleged acts of prodigality committed by the defendant wife, the conjugal partnership
of gain is being dissipated to the prejudice of both spouses; wherefore, he prays for a writ of injunction to
restrain her from "dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains".

Finally, as a third cause of action, the plaintiff husband avers that, in addition to the
aforementioned acts, the defendant has repeatedly advised him, as well as other persons, that she
intends to marry Jose Campos Boloix and to have a child by him not withstanding her present marriage to
the plaintiff, Antonio Perez; and that, if she could not have such a child, she was willing to have one by
any other person, just to put plaintiff in a ridiculous and embarrassing position.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case falls under the Court of First Instance.

RULING:

NO, the case does not fall under the Court of First Instance.

Since the complaint asks that defendant be placed under guardianship because of her prodigality,
and prays that a suitable person or institution be appointed to administer her properties, the action falls
squarely under the provisions of subsection (b), Sec. 38-A, Republic Act No. 1401, as a "case involving
guardianship" exclusively cognizable by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

Inasmuch as the plaintiff seeks to recover damages because his wife's acts placed him "in an
embarrassing and contemptible position" and causing him grave anxiety, wounded feelings, extreme
humiliation," the case involves acts of a spouse that "brings . . . . . dishonor . . . . . upon the other" under
Art. 116, Civil Code; hence, pursuant to subsection (d), Sec. 38-A of Republic Act No. 1401, this action
likewise falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
 Arroyo VS Vazquez, 42 Phil 54

(Relief from Courts)

FACTS:

Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vazquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by
marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived
together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their
common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts had been
made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by
him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife.

The defendant answered, ad-mitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband's
home without his consent; but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been
compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her hus-band. Accordingly she in turn prayed for
affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3)
and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate mainte-nance. Upon hearing the cause the
lower court gave judgment in favor of the defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts can make an order to one of the spouses to cohabit with each other.

RULING:

NO, the courts cannot make an order to one of the spouses to cohabit with each other.

In an action by the husband against a wife to obtain a restitution of conjugal rights, the court
entered a judicial declaration to the effect that the wife had absented herself from the marital home
without sufficient cause, and she was admonished that it was her duty to return. The court, however,
refrained from making an order absolute requiring her to return.

Where the wife is forced to leave the marital home by ill-treatment from her husband, he can be
compelled to provide for her sepa-rate maintenance, without regard to whether a cause for divorce exists
or not.

Collector VS Fisher, 110 Phil 686

(Property Relations between Spouses)

FACTS:

Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of British parents and married in
the City of Manila on January 23,1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, another British subject) died on
February 22, 1951 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., whereto he and his wife moved and established
their permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947,
and which was duly probated in the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted
his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the real and personal properties acquired by the spouses while
residing in the Philippines, with a total Total Gross Assets of P130,792.85.

On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due time, Stevenson's will was
duly admitted to probate by our court and lan Murray Scott was appointed ancillary administrator of the
estate, who on July 11, 1951, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the reservation of
having the properties declared therein finally appraised at their values six months after the death of
Stevenson.

On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed an amended estate and inheritance tax
return in pursuance of his reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and for the
purpose of availing- of the right granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and
interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein. On September 7,
1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax return.

ISSUE:

What law governs the property relation of the spouses?

English Law governs the property relation of the spouses.

Since the marriage took place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the old Civil Code and
not Article 124 of the new Civil Code which became effective only in 1950. It is true that both articles
adhere to the nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses where one of them is a
foreigner and they have made 110 prior agreement as to the administration, disposition, and ownership of
their properties. In such a case, the national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in determining
the property relation of the spouses. There is, however, a difference between the two articles in that Art.
124 expressly provides that it shall be applicable regardless of whether the marriage was celebrated in
the Philippines or abroad, while Art. 1325 is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land. What has
been said, however, refers to mixed marriages between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In the instant
case, both spouses are foreigners who married in the Philippines. In such a case, the law determinative of
the property relation of the spouses would be the English law even if the marriage was celebrated in the
Philippines, both of them being foreigners.

Domalagan VS Bolifer, 33 Phil 471

(Requisites for Donation)

FACTS:

In the month of November, 1909, JORGE DOMALAGAN, the petitioner and CARLOS BOLIFER,
the defendant entered into a contract by virtue of the terms of which he was to pay to the defendant the
sum of P500 upon the marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan with the daughter of the defendant, that
later, in the month of August, 1910, he completed his obligation under said contract by paying to the
defendant the said sum of P500, together with the further sum of P16 "as hansel or token of future
marriage," that, notwithstanding said agreement, the said Bonifacia Bolifer, in the month of August, 1910,
was joined in lawful wedlock to Laureano Sisi; that immediately upon learning of the marriage of Bonifacia
Bolifer he demanded of the defendant the return of the said sum of P516 together with the interest and
damages; that the damages which he suffered resulted from the fact that he, in order to raise said sum of
P500, was obliged to sell certain real property belonging to him, located in the Province of Bohol, at a
great sacrifice.

To the complaint the defendant presented a general denial. He also alleged that the facts stated
in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action. Upon the issue thus presented the cause was
brought on for trial. After hearing the evidence the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, in an
extended opinion in which all of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause is carefully analyzed
reached the conclusion "of fact that plaintiff delivered to defendant the sum of P516 sued for and that
Carlos Bolifer and Laureana Loquero received and did not return the said amount," and for the reason
that the evidence did not sufficiently show that the plaintiff had suffered any additional damages, rendered
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in said sum of P516 together with the
interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the 17th of December, 1910, and costs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the
delivery of the money by reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective.

RULING:

YES, the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery of
the money by reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective.

Section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides that certain contracts mentioned
therein shall not be enforced by an action unless they are evidenced by some note or memorandum. Said
section simply provides the method by which the contract mentioned therein may be proved. It does not
declare that said contracts are invalid simply because they were not reduced to writing, except perhaps
the one mentioned in paragraph 5 of section 335. A contract may be valid between parties, even though it
is not clothed with the necessary form. The form required by said section is for evidential purposes only. If
the parties permit a contract to be proved, without objection as to the form of the proof, it is then just as
binding as if the statute had been complied with.

The plaintiff paid to the defendant the sum of P516, as a consideration for a promise to marry.
Later the promise was not fulfilled, Held: That the plaintiff could recover said sum of money.
 Serrano VS Solomon, 105 Phil 998

(Requisites for Donation)

FACTS:

Alejandria Feliciano, whose father went to Hawaii to seek his fortune and who until now resides
there, had been left to her father's friend named Estanislao Serrano who took care of and raised her from
the age of 12 until she reached womanhood. On June 21, 1948, defendant Melchor Solomon married
Alejandria. On the same day of the marriage but before the marriage ceremony he executed the alleged
Deed of Donation. Less than nine months after the marriage, or rather on March 2, 1949, Alejandria died
without issue. Several months thereafter Estanislao Serrano commenced the present action to enforce
and implement the terms of the alleged donation particularly that portion thereof to the effect that if
Alejandria died before her husband Melchor and left no children, then one half of Melchor's properties and
those acquired by him and his wife would be given to those persons who had raised and taken care of her
namely, Estanislao Serrano.

Acting upon the motion for dismissal the trial court found that the donation could not be regarded
as a donation propter nuptias for the reason that though it was executed before the marriage, it was not
made in consideration of the marriage and, 'what is more important, that the donation was not made to
one or both of the (marriage) contracting parties, but to a third person.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation made by Melchor can be considered as donation propter nuptias.

RULING:

NO, the donation made by Melchor cannot be considered as donation propter nuptias.

A deed of donation executed before the marriage by one of the spouses which, among other
things, provides that the marriage would have to be childless and one of the spouses would have to die
before the donation would operate, cannot be regarded as one made in consideration of marriage.

In order that a donation may be considered as a donation propter nuptias. it must not only be
made before the marriage and in consideration of the same but it must also be in favor of one or both of
the spouses.

Solis VS Barroso, 53 Phil 912

(Requisites for Donation)

FACTS:

The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso begot three children named Alejo, Eugenia and
Marciana Lambino. On June 2, 1919 said spouses made a donation of propter nuptias of the lands
described in the complaint in favor of their son Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis in a private document
in consideration of the marriage which the latter were about to enter into. One of the conditions of this
donation is that in case of the death of one of the donees, one-half of these lands thus donated would
revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. On the 8th of the said month of
June 1919, Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis were married and immediately thereafter the donors
delivered the possession of the donated lands to them. On August 3, 1919 donee Alejo Lambino died. In
the same year donor Juan Lambino also died. After the latter's death, his wife, Maxima Barroso,
recovered possession of the donated lands.

The surviving donee Fortunata Solis filed the action, which is the subject matter of this appeal,
against the surviving donor Maxima Barroso and Eugenia and Marcelina Lambino, heirs of the deceased
donor Juan Lambino, with their respective husbands, demanding of the defendants the execution of the
proper deed of donation according to law, transferring one-half of the donated property, and moreover, to
proceed to the partition of the donated property and its fruits.

The court rendered judgment based upon article 1279 of the Civil Code granting plaintiffs prayer
and ordering the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of the plaintiff, adequate in form and
substance to transfer to the latter the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the
original donation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation is valid.

NO, the donation is not valid.

Article 633 provides that in order that a donation of real property may be valid it must be made in
a public instrument. This is the article applicable to a donation propter nuptias in so f ar as its formal
validity is concerned. The only exceptions to this rule are onerous and remuneratory donations, in so far
as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on
contracts (art. 622), and those which are to take effect upon the donor's death, which are governed by the
rules established for testamentary succession (art. 620).

In the instant case the donation propter nuptias did not become valid neither did it create any right
because it was not made in a public instrument; and article 1279 of the Civil Code is not applicable
because it refers to contracts, valid in themselves, and not to the form required for their validity, which
they already have, but it simply refers to the essential requisite to make them effective.

Mateo VS Lagua, 29 SCRA 864

(Requisites for Donation)

FACTS:

Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land situated in Asingan,
Pangasinan. Sometime in 1917, Lagua, in a public instrument, donated Lots to their son Alejandro Lagua,
in consideration of the latter's marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on 15 May 1917
and the couple took possession of the properties, but the Certificates of Title remained in the donor's
name.

In 1923, Alejandro, died. His widow, Bonifacia Mateo, and her infant daughter lived with Cipriano
Lagua, who then undertook the farming of the donated lots. At the start, Cipriano Lagua was giving to
Bonifacia the owner's share of the harvest from the land. In 1926, Cipriano refused to deliver the said
share, thus prompting Bonifacia to resort to the Justice of the Peace Court of Pangasinan, from where
she obtained a judgment awarding to her possession of the two lots, plus damages.

On 31 July 1941, Cipriano Lagua executed a deed of sale of the same two parcels of land in favor
of his younger son, Gervasio. This sale notwithstanding, Bonifacia Mateo was continuously given the
owner's share of the harvest until 1956, when it was altogether stopped. Bonifacia Mateo was seeking for
the annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua and for recovery of possession of the
properties. On 3 January 1967, judgment was rendered in favour to her.

On 18 August 1957, the spouses Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimero commenced an action
against Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter for reimbursement of the improvements allegedly made by
them on the Lots and damages but got dismissed. Paintiffs appealed to the Court of First Instance. At
about the same time, another case was filed, this time by Gervasio Lagua and Cipriano Lagua, for
annulment of the donation of the two lots, insofar as one-half portion thereof was concerned. It was their
claim that in donating the two lots, which allegedly were all that plaintiff Cipriano Lagua owned, said
plaintiff not only neglected leaving something for his own support but also prejudiced the legitime of his
forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio Lagua.

On November 12, 1958, while the cases were pending final resolution, Cipriano Lagua died. On
23 December 1960, the court rendered plaintiffs spouses having been declared possessors in bad faith
and not entitled to any reimbursement of the expenses and improvements put up by them on the land.
The other suit was, likewise, dismissed on the ground of prescription, the action to annul the donation
having been brought only in 1958, or after the lapse of 41 years. Defendants' counterclaims were similarly
dismissed although they were awarded attorneys' fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a donation propter nuptias is revocable.

RULING:

YES. donation propter nuptias is revocable.

Donations propter nuptias (by reason of marriage) are without onerous consideration, the
marriage being merely the occasion or motive for the donation, not its causa. Being liberalities, they
remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if they should infringe the legitime
of a forced heir.
 Matabuena VS Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284

(Void Donations)

FACTS:

The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister of the deceased Felix Matabuena,
maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now
appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting
that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter’s stand.

In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff’s complaint
alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the
donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the
aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely
because such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until
1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965.

The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus:
“A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during
the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20,
1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses.
They became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation
had been executed.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.

RULING:

YES, the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship.

While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses during the
marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.

There is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband
and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for
thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks
to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian, it would not be just
that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be
better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand
that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.

Harding VS Commercial Union, 38 Phil 464

(Void Donations)

FACTS:

In 1913 Levy Hermanos, the Manila agents for the Studebaker automobile, sold the automobile to
John Canson for P3,200; that under date of October 14, 1914, John Canson sold the said automobile to
Henry Harding for the sum of P1,500; that under date of November 19, 1914, the said Henry Harding sold
the said automobile to J. Brannigan for the sum of P2,000; that under date of December 20, 1915, J. C.
Graham of Los Banos sold the said automobile Henry Harding of the city for the sum of P2,800; that on or
about January 1, 1916, the said Henry Harding gave the said automobile to his wife, Mrs. Henry E.
Harding, one of the plaintiffs, as a present;

The said automobile was repaired and repainted at the Luneta Garage at a cost of some P900;
that while the said automobile was at the Luneta Garage, the said Luneta Garage, acting as agent for
Smith, Bell & Company (limited), solicited of the plaintiff Mrs. Harding the insurance of said automobile by
the defendant Company; that a proposal was filled out by the said agent and signed by the plaintiff Mrs.
Henry E. Harding, and in said proposal under the heading Triee paid by proposer' is the amount of '3,500'
and, under another heading "Present value" is the amount of P3,000.
 On March 24, 1916, the said automobile was totally destroyed by fire, and that the iron and steel
portions of said automobile which did not burn were taken into the possession of the defendant by and
through its agent Smith, Bell & Company (limited), and sold by it for a small sum, which had never been
tendered to the plaintiff prior to the trial of this case, but in open court during the trial the sum of P10 as
the proceeds of such sale was tendered to plaintiff and refused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mrs. Harding can recover from defendant the sum of P3,000 and interest.

RULING:

YES, Mrs. Harding can recover from defendant the sum of P3,000 and interest.

A wife has an insurable interest in the property given to her by her husband. Where it appears
that the proposal form, while signed by the insured, was made out by the person authorized to solicit the
insurance, the facts stated in the proposal, even if incorrect, will not be regarded as warranted by the
insured, in the absence of willful misstatement. Under such circumstances the proposal is to be regarded
as the act of the insurer

Sumbad VS CA, 308 SCRA 575

(Void Donations)

FACTS:

After the death of his wife, Agata B. Tait, in 1936, George K. Tait, Sr. lived in common-law
relationship with Maria F. Tait to whom on April 2, 1974 he donated a certain parcel of unregistered land
in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. George K. Tait, Sr. himself passed away on December 24, 1977. From 1982 to
1983, Maria F. Tait sold lots included within the Sum-at property in favor of private respondents Eduard
Okoren, Gregorio Acoking, Evelyn Saclangan, Mary Atiwag, Jaime T. Fronda, Barbara Tallongen, Julia
Piyes, Glen Paquito, and Felicitas Alinao.

On July 24, 1989, petitioners Emilie T. Sumbad and Beatrice B. Tait brought an action for quieting
of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private
respondents. They alleged that they are the children and compulsory heirs of the spouses George K. Tait,
Sr. and Agata B. Tait of Bondoc, Mountain Province.

Petitioners further alleged that from 1982 to 1983, Maria F. Tait, without their knowledge and
consent, sold lots included within the Sum-at property to private respondents and had no right to sell the
Sum-at property; that the deeds of sale are null and void and did not transfer title to private respondents;
that petitioners discovered the transactions only in 1988 but, as soon as they learned of the same, they
lost no time in communicating with private respondents; and that private respondents refused petitioners’
request for a meeting, leaving the latter no other alternative but to file the case in court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of donation executed by George Tait in favor of Maria Tait is valid and
effective.

RULING:

YES, the deed of donation executed by George Tait in favor of Maria Tait is valid and effective.

This Court has ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. Even assuming that they are not thus precluded,
petitioners were unable to present evidence in support of such a claim. The evidence on record does not
show whether George K. Tait, Sr. was married to Maria F. Tait and, if so, when the marriage took place.
If, as petitioners claim, Maria F. Tait was not married to their father, evidence should have been
presented to show that at the time the deed of donation was executed, their father and Maria F. Tait were
still maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice Tait’s testimony is only to the effect that in 1941 Maria F.
Tait became their stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George K. Tait, Sr. and Maria F. Tait
continuously maintained common-law relations until April 2, 1974 when the donation was made.
 Onas VS Javillo, 59 Phil 733

(Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities)

FACTS:

Crispulo Javillo died intestate on the 18th of May, 1927, in the Province of Capiz. On July 25,
1927, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance praying that an administrator of this estate be
appointed, and after hearing Santiago Andrada was named administrator. He submitted two projects of
partition. The first was disapproved by the lower court and from that order some of the heirs appealed to
this court which appeal was dismissed.The second project of partition dated September 9, 1931, is the
one now on appeal in this case.

Crispulo Javillo contracted two marriages. The first, with Ramona Levis. To this marriage five
children were born, to wit, Consolacion, Mercedes, Caridad, Soledad and Jose Javillo, the appellees in
this case. After the death of Ramona Levis, Crispulo Javillo married Rosario Oñas. To this marriage four
children were born, to wit, Joaquin, Ana, Bernardo and Porillana. Rosario Oñas is the appellant in this
case.

The parties entered into the following agreement as to the property acquired during the first and
second marriages. The lower court erred in holding that all the properties acquired during the second
marriage of Crispulo Javillo with Rosario Oñas were acquired with the products of the properties of the
first marriage of said Crispulo Javillo with Ramona Levis, and in approving the manner of distributing the
estates among the heirs of ,the first and second marriages, as indicated in the project of partition now in
question.

The lower court erred in approving the second project of partition dated September 9, 1931,
notwithstanding that the same did not include all the properties of the deceased Crispulo Javillo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that the partition that was approved by the lower court is valid.

RULING:

NO, the partition that was approved by the lower court is not valid.

In this case it does not appear that there was a liquidation of the partnership property of the first
marriage nor does it appear that the heirs asked for such liquidation. The project of partition approved by
the lower court is based on the absurd claim that the capital used in acquiring the twenty parcels of land
of the second marriage was the product of the eleven parcels of the first marriage, and, furthermore, it is
not in conformity with the law.

Vda VS Delizo, 69 SCRA 216

(Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities)

FACTS:

These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages
contracted by Nicolas Delizo. The first, was with Rosa Villasfer, which lasted for a period of eighteen (18)
years; and the second, with Dorotea de Ocampo, which existed for a period of forty-six (46) years, until
the death of Nicolas Delizo on May 3, 1957. The action for partition was instituted on April 15, 1957 by a
daughter and a son of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo and Severino Delizo, and the heirs of
Francisco Delizo, another son, who died in 1943, specifically, Rancivillano, Soltrifilo, Josefina, Eufrosina,
Aurea, Edita, and Fe, all surnamed Delizo (the last three being minors were represented by their mother,
Rosenda Genove) all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and
their nine (9) children, the herein petitioners-appellants, namely Regino, Crispina, Carmen, Basilio,
Hilario, Macario, Sendon, Marciano, and Hermogenes, all surnamed Delizo.

The aforesaid defendants opposed the partition, claiming that the properties described in the
complaint were those of the second marriage. On May 3, 1957, Nicolas Delizo died and was substituted
by his children in the second marriage as party defendants. In the meantime, Special Proceedings
(Intestate Estate of the late Nicolas Delizo) was filed by Dorotea de Ocampo on June 3, 1957. On August
23, 1971, Severino Delizo died intestate and is now represented by his children, namely, Federico,
Severina, Angelina, Segundina, Rosalina, and Brigida, all surnamed Delizo. Involved are the properties
acquired by Nicolas Delizo, among which are sixty-six (66) hectares of agricultural lands in San Jose City,
Nueva Ecija; fifty-eight (58) hectares of riceland in Muñoz, of the same province; and a 150-square meter
lot at Sampaloc, Manila.
 After trial, the lower court rendered judgment on April 27, 1964, distributing the aforesaid
properties as follows: (a) one-half (1/2) pro indiviso to the three (3) children of the first marriage, namely,
Urbana Delizo, Severino Delizo, and the heirs of the deceased Francisco Delizo, viz.: Ranciviliano,
Soltrifilo, Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and Fe; (b) one-fourth (1/4) pro indiviso to the surviving
spouse, Dorotea de Ocampo; and (c) one-fourth (1/4) pro indiviso, in equal shares to the children of both
marriages, nine (9) of whom were begotten during the second marriage, or into thirteen (13) parts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the partition of the conjugal partnership are properties of the two marriages
contracted by Nicolas Delizo.

RULING:

YES, the partition of the conjugal partnership are properties of the two marriages contracted by
Nicolas Delizo.

Division of total mass of properties between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to
duration of each partnership----- There is the established fact that the produce of the lands acquired by
homestead contributed considerably to the acquisition of the properties acquired during the existence of
the second marriage. Also the children of the first marriage, as a matter of equity, should share in the
properties acquired by homestead. To deny the children of the first marriage a share in such properties
would have exacerbated discord instead of enhancing family solidarity and understanding. Considering
these circumstances and since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of each spouse cannot be
determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided between the
two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership.

Rosete VS Provincial Sheriff, 95 Phil 560

(Exclusive Property)

FACTS:

On February 10, 1949, to satisfy said indemnity, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff
levied upon four parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership of Epifanio Fularon and Gliceria
Rosete. These parcels of land were sold at public auction as required by the rules for the sum of
P1,385.00, leaving an unsatisfied balance of P739.34.

On March 8, 1950, Gliceria Rosete redeemed two of the four parcels of land which were sold at
public auction for the sum of ex 879.20, the sheriff having executed in her favor the corresponding deed
of repurchase.

On April 10, 1950, an alias execution was issued to satisfy the balance of the indemnity and the
sheriff levied upon the two parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete and set a date for
their sale. Prior to the arrival of this date, however, Gliceria Rosete filed a case for injunction to restrain
the sheriff from carrying out the sale praying at the same time for a writ of preliminary injunction. This writ
was issued upon the filing of the requisite bond but was later dissolved upon a motion filed by defendants
who put up counter-bond.

The dissolution of the injunction enabled the sheriff to carry out the sale as originally scheduled
and the property was sold to one Raymundo de Jesus for the sum of P970. This development prompted
the plaintiff to amend her complaint by praying therein, among other things, that the sale carried out by
the sheriff be declared null and void. After due trial, wherein the parties practically agreed on the material
facts pertinent to the issue, the court rendered decision declaring the sale null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property become paraphernal and as such is beyond the reach of further
execution.

RULING:

YES, the property become paraphernal and as such is beyond the reach of further execution.

Inasmuch as the wife redeemed two parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership which
were sold on execution, with money obtain by her from her father, the two parcels of land has become
paraphernal and as such is beyond the reach of further execution. She has acquired it by right of
redemption as successor in interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the property of the judgment
debtor. It can no longer therefore be the subject of execution under a judgment exclusively affecting the
personal liability of the latter.