New Critical Writings in Political Sociology

Volume Three
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology
Series Editors: Kate Nash, Alan Scott and Anna Marie Smith

Titles in the Series:

New Critical Writings in Political Sociology,

Volume One:
Power, State and Inequality
Alan Scott, Kate Nash and Anna Marie Smith

New Critical Writings in Political Sociology,

Volume Two:
Conventional and Contentious Politics
Kate Nash, Alan Scott and Anna Marie Smith

New Critical Writings in Political Sociology,

Volume Three:
Globalization and Contemporary Challenges
to the Nation-State
Anna Marie Smith, Alan Scott and Kate Nash
New Critical Writings in
Political Sociology
Volume Three
Globalization and Contemporary
Challenges to the Nation-State

Edited by

Anna Marie Smith

Cornell University, USA

Alan Scott
University of Innsbruck, Austria

Kate Nash
Goldsmiths College, University ofLondon, UK
First published 2009 by Ashgate Publishing

Published 2016 by Routledge

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Copyright © Anna Marie Smith, Alan Scott and Kate Nash 2009. For copyright of individual
articles please refer to the Acknowledgements.

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Wherever possible, these reprints are made from a copy ofthe original printing, but these can themselves
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

New critical writings in political sociology
vol. 3: Globalization and contemporary challenges to the
Nation-State
I. Political sociology
T. Scott, Alan, 1956- II. Nash, Kate, 1958- TIT. Smith,
Anna Marie
306.2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

New critical writings in political sociology / edited by Alan Scott, Kate Nash and Anna Marie Smith.
v. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Contents: v. I. Power, state and inequality - v. 2. Conventional and contentious politics - v. 3.
Globalization and contemporary challenges to the nation-state.
ISBN 978-0-7546-2756-2 (v. 3 : aile paper)
I. Political sociology. T. Scott, Alan, 1956- II. Nash, Kate, 1958- TIT. Smith, Anna Marie.
JA 76.N43 2009
306.2--dc22 2008003785

ISBN 9780754627562 (hbk)

Contents

Acknowledgements VII
Series Preface IX
Introduction XI

PART I CRISIS OF THE NATION-STATE?

1 Michael Mann (1997), 'Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-
State?', Review ofInternational Political Economy, 4, pp. 472-96. 3
2 Paul Q. Hirst (2002), 'Another Century of Conflict? War and the International
System in the 21st Century', International Relations, 16, pp. 327-42. 29

PART II DIASPORIC MOVEMENTS, NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL

RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

3 Peter Uvin (1999), 'Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths
to Mass Violence', Comparative Politics, 31, pp. 253-7l. 47
4 Ashutosh Varshney (2003), 'Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality',
Perspectives on Politics, 1, pp. 85-99. 67

PART III INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE 'DEVELOPMENT

INDUSTRY'

5 Balakrishnan Rajagopal (2000), 'From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World,

Social Movements, and the Expansion of [nternational [nstitutions', Harvard
International Law Journal, 41, pp. 530-78. 85
6 Tim Mitchell ([999), 'America's Egypt: Discourse of the Development Industry',
Middle East Report, 169, pp. 18-36. [35

PART IV STATE-BUILDING AND DEMOCRATIZATION

7 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (199[), 'What Democracy is ... and is
Not', Journal of Democracy, 2, pp. 75-88. [55
8 Thomas Carothers (2002), 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', Journal of
Democracy, 13, pp. 5-21. [69
9 Guillermo O'Donnell (1996), 'Illusions about Consolidation', Journal of
Democracy, 7, pp. 34-51. [87
vi New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

PART V POST-COMMUNISM

10 Ernest Gellner (1991), 'Nationalism and Politics in Eastern Europe', New Left
Review, 1, pp. 127-34. 207
11 Valerie Bunce (2003),' Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the
Postcommunist Experience', World Politics, 55, pp. 167-92. 215

PART VI HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEES, IMMIGRANTS, MIGRATION

12 Bryan S. Turner (1993), 'Outline of a Theory of Human Rights', Sociology, 27,

pp.489-512. 243
13 Stephen Castles (2003), 'Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social
Transformation', Sociology, 37, pp. 13-34. 267
14 Jacqueline Bhabha (1996), 'Embodied Rights: Gender Persecution, State
Sovereignty, and Refugees', Public Culture, 9, pp. 3-32. 289

PART VII REGIONALISM, MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND THE EU

15 Raimo Vayrynen (2003), 'Regionalism: Old and New', International Studies

Review, 5, pp. 25-5l. 321
16 Richard Bellamy (2006), 'Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation, and Democracy in
the EU', European Law Journal, 12, pp. 725--42. 349

PART VIII COSMOPOLITANS AND THEIR CRITICS

17 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider (2006), 'Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the
Social Sciences: A Research Agenda', British Journal of Sociology, 57, pp. 1-23. 369
18 Craig Calhoun (2002), 'The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward
a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism', South Atlantic Quarterly, 101,
pp. 869-97. 393

Name Index 423

Acknowledgements

The editors and publishers wish to thank the following for pennission to use copyright
material.

Blackwell Publishing for the essays: Raimo Vayrynen (2003), 'Regionalism: Old and New',
International Studies Review, 5, pp. 25-5l. Copyright © 2003 Blackwell Publishing Ltd;
Richard Bellamy (2006), 'Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation, and Democracy in the EU',
European Law Journal, 12, pp. 725-42. Copyright © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Cambridge University Press for the essay: Ashutosh Varshney (2003), 'Nationalism, Ethnic
Conflict, and Rationality', Perspectives on Politics, 1, pp. 85-99. Copyright © 2003 Cambridge
University Press.

Comparative Politics for the essay: Peter Uvin (1999), 'Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and
Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence', Comparative Politics, 31, pp. 253-71. Copyright
© 1999 Comparative Politics.

Duke University Press for the essays: Jacqueline Bhabha (1996), 'Embodied Rights: Gender
Persecution, State Sovereignty, and Refugees', Public Culture, 9, pp. 3-32. Copyright ©
1996 Duke University Press; Craig Calhoun (2002), 'The Class Consciousness of Frequent
Travelers: Toward a Critique ofActually Existing Cosmopolitanism', South Atlantic Quarterly,
101, pp. 869-97. Copyright © 2002 Duke University Press.

Harvard International Law Journal for the essay: Balakrishnan Rajagopal (2000), 'From
Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of
International Institutions', Harvard International Law Journal, 41, pp. 530-78. Copyright ©
2000 Harvard International Law Journal.

Johns Hopkins University Press for the essays: Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl
(1991), 'What Democracy is ... and is Not', Journal o/Democracy, 2, pp. 75-88. Copyright
© 1991 Johns Hopkins University Press; Thomas Carothers (2002), 'The End of the
Transition Paradigm', Journal o/Democracy, 13, pp. 5-21. Copyright © 2002 Johns Hopkins
University Press; Guillenno O'Donnell (1996), 'Illusions about Consolidation', Journal 0/
Democracy, 7, pp. 34-51. Copyright © 1996 Johns Hopkins University Press; Valerie Bunce
(2003),'Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience',
World Politics, 55, pp. 167-92. Copyright © 2003 Johns Hopkins University Press.

MERIP for the essay: Tim Mitchell (1999), 'America's Egypt: Discourse of the Development
Industry', Middle East Report, 169, pp. 18-36. Copyright © 1999 MERIP.

New Left Review for the essay: Ernest Gellner (1991), 'Nationalism and Politics in Eastern
Europe', New Left Review, 1, pp. 127-34. Copyright © 1991 New Left Review.
viii New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Sage Publications for the essays: Paul Q, Hirst (2002), 'Another Century of Conflict? War
and the International System in the 21st Century', International Relations, 16, pp. 327-42.
Copyright © 2002 Sage Publications; Bryan S. Turner (1993), 'Outline of a Theory of Human
Rights', Sociology, 27, pp. 489-512. Copyright © 1993 Sage Publications; Stephen Castles
(2003), 'Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation', Sociology, 37,
pp. l3-34. Copyright © 2003 Sage Publications.

Taylor and Francis for the essay: Michael Mann (1997), 'Has Globalization Ended the Rise
and Rise of the Nation-State?', Review of International Political Economy, 4, pp. 472-96.
Copyright © 1997 Taylor and Francis.

Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently
overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first
opportunity.
Series Preface

This series of three volumes of 'critical writings' in political sociology seeks to provide a
balanced and comprehensive range of influential essays and, in exceptional cases chapters,
within this subfield published since the 1970s. There is a bias towards the more recent period
partly because many earlier pieces are available in similar collections, but, more importantly,
because the shifts of direction that political sociology has taken over the last 20 years make
some earlier debates look - at least for the moment - somewhat arcane. One example is the
heavy emphasis on class in the earlier period (see the Introduction to Volume Two for a fuller
discussion). The influence of feminism and post-structuralist thought, as well as empirical
evidence of the shrinking of the working class, and thus the decline of its political significance
(discussed in Volume One by Colin Crouch), have shifted attention away from social class as
a (at one time the) central concern. Some analysts (for example, Pakulski and Waters, 1996)
have gone so far as to argue that class is now largely an irrelevance in understanding political
phenomena, while others (for example, Savage, 2000) have sought to redirect and reshape our
understanding of the class-politics nexus.
A further example of shifting interests is the fading into distant memory of the dispute
between instrumentalist and structuralist Marxists (represented by Ralph Miliband and Nicos
Poulantzas respectively) that was so central to debates in political sociology in the 1970s.
There is a brief discussion of the issues involved in the essay by Steven Lukes (Volume
One), and Louis Althusser's Marxist-structuralist analysis of the state (the locus classicus
in this literature) can be found in Volume Two, but Miliband and Poulantzas themselves are
not reprinted here. What is still influential in Poulantzas's work is rather represented in this
series by the generation(s) of political sociologists who have followed him and who continue
to extend this Gramsci-Althusser-Poulantzas line of thought, notably Bob Jessop and Neil
Brenner (both in Volume One).
There is a thematic division of labour both between and within the volumes. Volume One
covers power, the state and inequality; Volume Two covers conventional and contentious
politics; and Volume Three brings the story up-to-date by covering globalization and other
'contemporary challenges' to the nation-state. This is, of course, a loose classification. For
example, while Volume One contains many of the 'traditional' concerns of political sociology
- such as, state formation, power and legitimation in its coverage ofthe more recent literature
it inevitably touches on themes, such as the emergence of 'new state spaces' (Brenner) below
and above the level of the nation-state, that are taken up again in Volume Three.
We should also say something here about the criteria we have applied in making this
selection. While the volumes contain many seminal and famous contributions of the kind
that would appear in any such collection - for example, Steven Lukes and Michel Foucault
on power (Volume One), Claus Offe on social movements and Judith Butler on (the end of)
sexual difference (Volume Two), or Ernest Gellner on nationalism (Volume Three) - we have
not simply used citation indexes to identify the 'greatest hits', since to have done so would
have produced a thematically very unbalanced collection. As one of the central aims was to
x New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume One

retain a balance in order to provide potential users with the full range of work that can be
gathered under the - admittedly wide - umbrella of political sociology, we have used a more
thematic approach - one that seeks to cover the full range of empirical and theoretical issues
that have been of concern to political sociologists. As a result, some extremely influential
pieces have not been reproduced here. For example, you will not find Michael Mann's 'The
Autonomous Power of the State' (1984), one of the most frequently reproduced and cited
papers in political sociology to have appeared in the period covered here. This is because we
wanted to include one of Mann's more recent pieces (on globalization, in Volume Three) and
because the topic of state formation and the sources of state power are well represented by
other important authorities, notably Charles Tilly and Gianfranco Poggi (Volume One). The
essay by Tilly is an example of another feature: we have not always chosen to represent well-
known political sociologists by reproducing their best-known work. Instead, we have tended
to go for pieces that are either representative or which display their more recent thinking. The
Tilly piece, for example, is an introduction to an edited collection, but it contains some useful
indications as to how his thinking about state formation slightly altered after the publication
of Coercion, Capital, and European States in 1992.
Despite our efforts to provide a balanced and comprehensive collection, it would, of course,
be foolish to claim that the interests and preferences of the three editors played no role. There
is also some bias towards theoretical, synthetic and broad-brush approaches rather than the
reporting of empirical data that may be of interest primarily to specialists.
Finally, political sociology is a subfield that crosses disciplinary boundaries: sociology,
anthropology, human geography and political science. To have included only essays that are
representative of a strictly political sociology enterprise (whatever that might be) would have
restricted the scope of the series too severely, and we have not attempted it. There are thus
essays quite directly addressed to, for example, geographers (for example, David Harvey,
Volume One), which nevertheless are of direct relevance to key issues in political sociology.
In this respect, the series is eclectic as well as broad, but this strikes us as a fair reflection of
work in the field. A similar point can be made with respect to its theoretical pluralism: for
better or worse, there is nothing like a dominant paradigm in political sociology.

KATE NASH, ALAN SCOTT AND ANNA MARIE SMITH

Goldsmiths College, University of London, UK
University of Innsbruck, Austria and
Cornell University, USA

References

Mann, M. (1984), 'The Autonomous Power ofthe State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results', Archives
Europeenes de Sociologie, 25(2), pp. 188-89.
Pakulski, 1. and Waters, M. (1996), The Death of Class, London: Sage.
Savage, M. (2000), Class Analysis and Social Transformation, Buckingham: Open University Press.
Tilly, C. (1992), Coercion, Capital, and European States: 990-1992, Oxford: Blackwell.
Introduction

Contemporary political sociologists are confronting an extraordinary challenge: the entire

global system underwent a radical transformation in the final decades of the twentieth century.
These enormous changes can be thematically summed up in regional and systemic terms. In
Southern Europe, democratic forces triumphed over right-wing authoritarian regimes. Military
dictatorships were also replaced by elected civilian governments in several Latin American
countries. Authoritarianism declined in East and South Asia. In Eastern Europe, the collapse
ofthe Soviet empire introduced major changes in the political landscape. No less than 15 post-
Soviet republics were established after the Soviet Union broke up. If we add in the dissolution
of the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak states, we can count a total of 27 new countries. One-
party regimes were reduced in number in sub-Saharan Africa, and Mandela's African National
Congress ushered South Africa into the post-apartheid era (see Carothers, this volume, pp.
169-85). Analysts have, on the whole, retreated from a strongly optimistic position on these
changes; they now tend to regard these transitions as fragile, uneven, institutionally flawed,
incomplete and stalled (see O'Donnell, this volume, pp. 187-204). The heady days of the late
1980s and early 1990s, when US leaders enthusiastically declared that the USA had won the
Cold War - a time in which Huntington (1991) heralded the transitions as the forward march
of the 'third wave' of democracy - are now long past. These profound transformations have
stimulated the search for new social science and normative paradigms as scholars attempt to
generate interpretations that are adequate to the complex historical moment.
An exclusive focus on these regional developments, however, would be insufficient; the
entire world-system and its fundamental elements have undergone major changes. Continuing
the pattern already established during the great European empires in the industrial era,
capitalist accumulation is precipitating a transnational circulation of raw materials, finished
goods, investment funds and technical knowledge. The exploitation oflabour and the pressures
exerted by capital's representatives on governing institutions are hardly new phenomena.
However, capitalism became a truly global phenomenon for the first time towards the end
of the twentieth century. State socialism, which had been held up as a viable and desirable
alternative to capitalism by Soviet leaders, crumbled. In China, market reforms introduced
direct foreign investment and capital accumulation under the continuous leadership of the
Communist Party and the national elite. In the former Soviet bloc, the disintegration of
Communist Party hegemony and the rejection of state socialism by the political actors who
gained some decision-making power after 1989 - that is, the elites and, to a lesser extent, the
masses - ushered in privatization and the free market. For a time, leaders across the globe
overwhelmingly endorsed the 'Washington consensus' in favour of deregulating investment
relations and financial transactions, selling off all publicly-owned industries and resources,
reducing public expenditures on social programmes and prioritizing measures necessary for
the maintenance of sound monetary indicators (Bunce, 2001, p. 44).
The precise character of the relationship between democratization and economic
development remains a debated topic (Robinson, 2006). Although the cross-national evidence
xii New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

suggests that democratization and free-market policies are, to some extent, compatible and
mutually supportive, this relationship varies in form and strength from region to region.
The lingering effects of the previous authoritarian regimes remain salient; as such, cross-
regional variations are inevitable. Other influences that yield region-specific results include
the exact nature of the reform agenda and the 'payoffs attached to different approaches to
democratization and economic reform' (Bunce, 2001, p. 45).
The world-system and the nation-state have also been radically transformed by various
types of global interconnectedness. Trade, investment, cultural exchange, travel patterns,
and communication lines that criss-cross nation-state borders have dramatically accelerated
over the last few decades. Transnational social movements and international organizations
have become much more prominent, while the power of the largest global corporations now
surpasses that of most countries. War, economic crisis, famines and state failure have spurred
large-scale migrations, humanitarian aid projects and the formation of substantial refugee
settlements. At the same time, diasporic identification, ethnic cleavages, gender differences
and socioeconomic inequality are complicating the whole question of the isomorphic 'fit'
between 'nation' and 'state'.
In this volume we present essays that explore the exposure of the nation-state and the
post-Second World War world-system to global forces. Is globalization actually reducing and
transforming state sovereignty? Do we now inhabit, as Hardt and Negri (2001) suggest, a
single empire with an increasingly homogeneous structure - domination by the corporate
elite of the proletarianized masses? Or are we witnessing the deployment of plural labour-
disciplining regimes and a wide variety of state structures and official discourses (Ong,
2006)? Clearly, ethnic, racial and religious identities remain salient, but how do they
correspond to and intersect with continuous nation-state spaces that are demarcated by legally
recognized borders? Have transnational movements, migration, sociocultural exchange and
the displacement of massive refugee populations seriously undermined the nation-state? Are
international and non-governmental organizations (lOs and NGOs) becoming, in the eyes of
the stateless and the excluded, the only credible representatives to whom one must address
one's rights claims? In what conditions do democratic state-building projects actually enhance
political, civil and social rights, and when do they tend to contribute to the consolidation of
elite power? How are the dilemmas surrounding state-building projects complicated by factors
such as the pursuit by major powers, like Russia, the USA and China, of their geopolitical
interests, and the consolidation of regional institutions such as the European Union (EU) or
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)? International organizations, for all
their rhetorical endorsement of human rights, often fail to advance peace and social justice.
The United Nations, for example, has not been able to act decisively at key moments to stop
famines and genocidal wars, and major international actors, such as the USA and the most
powerful corporations, tend to regard international law in an instrumental manner. Should
democratic forces put their faith in a cosmopolitan vision of global citizenship, especially when
they tackle quintessentially international and transnational problems like peace, terrorism, the
drug trade and the protection of the environment?
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xiii

Globalization Processes, Undecided and Complex Outcomes

By the end ofthe nineteenth century, the economies ofthe great European imperial metropoles
were heavily dependent on trade with their colonies; in this sense, there is nothing new about
the formation of deep economic linkages between the developed countries and the rest of
the world. Looking beyond the data on the sheer volume of trade as a proportion of the
national economy, however, we can grasp the novel character of contemporary globalization.
Technological innovations have massively diminished time and distance in today's capitalist
markets. The amount of investment capital and speculative funds that transnational corporations
send around the globe on a daily basis is gigantic compared with the cross-border financial
flows of previous eras, while passenger numbers and cargo loads continue to grow every
year. Fibre optics, satellite communications, digital technology and the Internet have made
it possible for various actors, from entrepreneurs coordinating multinational production sites
to radical activists engaged in local or transnational forms of protest, to benefit from the
'information age' (Savitch, 2002, p. 181).
Wallerstein (2000, p. 250) maintains that the term 'globalization' is itself misleading. He
contends that it is premature for intellectuals to declare that state sovereignty has withered
away, that our identities have become profoundly unstable, and that the free market has
triumphed once and for all over democratic forces. Instead, he identifies the present moment
as an age oftransition and instability that could give rise to any number of different outcomes.
The period between 1945 and the 1970s saw the consolidation of the USA's political and
economic power. Emerging from the war as the only industrialized country with an intact
industrial base and a virtually undamaged infrastructure, the USA easily dominated this
era of capitalist growth. It depended heavily, however, on a stable world order and an ever-
expanding demand for its goods, both domestically and abroad. When Western Europe and
Japan recovered and began to compete effectively with the USA, and the global economy was
hit hard by rising oil prices and stagnating demand levels, economic crisis became the order
of the day. Developing countries were crippled by unmanageable debts, while the USA itself
spent its way out of recession and into its own international indebtedness over the long term
by indulging in massive military expenditures, inegalitarian tax cuts, inadequately regulated
mortgage schemes and consumerism on credit. Although EastAsia seemed to be the exception
during the 1980s - the economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore
flourished, followed by South-east Asia - they too succumbed to a spectacular crisis only
a few years later. Although capital is cunning enough to exploit the latest technological
innovations in communication and transportation to relocate production time and time again
across numerous far-flung sites in search of lower wage costs, Wallerstein contends that it is
possible that this process will finally come up against its own limits and that the resistance
of low-wage workers will culminate in a full-blown crisis in legitimacy. This outcome is
especially likely insofar as the 'Washington consensus' monetary policies make compensating
the lower strata through benefits and service provision increasingly difficult (Wallerstein,
2000). This is not to underestimate the tremendous diversity of resistance practices on the
part of the displaced and unemployed. The latter may forego democratic coalition-building in
favour of millenniaI myths or xenophobic attacks on migrant workers, for example (Comaroff
and Comaroff, 2002). In our globalizing conditions, legitimacy crises can take on an infinite
variety of guises.
xiv New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

The nation-state would face a serious challenge in each of the possible scenarios
Wallerstein proposes. Whether these globalizing pressures yield a complete triumph of
capital or a massive legitimacy crisis, non-state actors are bound to become more salient.
Corporations, private police forces, ethnic group-based militias, mercenaries, pirates, drug
cartels and terrorist organizations are encroaching upon the state's monopoly over security
in an increasingly chaotic world (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 263). Multinational bodies like the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and regional supranational organizations such as the EU
appear to be displacing the autonomous nation-state once and for all (Spruyt, 2002, p. 127).
National governments are increasingly relying on for-profit non-state actors, such as banks,
Internet service providers, mercenaries and service delivery contractors, to act as their proxies
(Farrell, 2006; Singer, 2001). International transitions, domestic pressures, internal violence
and economic crises have caused several states to fail, such that they can no longer control
their peripheral regions or make a meaningful contribution to the security and welfare oftheir
citizens. In wholly failed states like Somalia and Sudan, the putative national government
lacks the capacity to command its constituents' loyalty; indeed, the most powerful forces in a
failed state often undermine security and foment ethnic antagonisms themselves to advance
their own instrumental interests (Rotberg, 2004). In legal discourse the principle of territorial
sovereignty remains intact, and we can now speak of a 'world society' that has generated
standardized and highly influential models of nation-state identity and purpose (Meyer, 2000,
p. 234). Nevertheless, transnational interdependencies, both military and economic, and
regional trade agreements have profoundly undermined the autonomy of all but the most
powerful states (Spruyt, 2002, p. 142). Although scientists are now absolutely certain that
human-created climate change will have a major impact on the globe, and transnational activist
organizations are mounting an unprecedented campaign to promote global environmental
protection, it is far from clear exactly how the nation-states and the global system as a whole
will respond to the social, economic and political pressures related to climate change and
environmental degradation (Speth and Haas, 2006; Wapner, 1996; Schreurs, 2003).
The regulation of economic processes is increasingly a polycentric matter in which the
nation-state is obliged to cooperate with - or at least contend with - the interventions of
lOs, supranational or multinational regional organizations, and subnational governmental
actors such as large cities and semi-autonomous territories. A whole range of governmental
institutions, working at diverse levels of jurisdiction, may be acting simultaneously, with
greater or lesser degrees of coordination, in the same geographic area. Each of them may be
working to adjust trade barriers, stabilize markets, and build up the infrastructure so that it
favours particular economic sectors. They might also be working to enhance the potential
for collective action among local stakeholders by setting up business federations, consumer
groups or labour councils. Their policies could be designed to attract certain types of direct
investment through targeted corporate tax policies, subsidies and sector-specific deregulation.
At the same time, they might be seeking to discipline unruly labour or to protect the interests
of the vulnerable wage-earners and the poor, depending upon their alliance with labour and
the low-income sector (Le Gales, 1998).
What appears to us as a 'global economy' may be more accurately described as a cluster of
regional trading blocs: the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners,
Mercosur or Latin America, and the members ofASEAN. The growth in trade and investment
within each of these four blocs is far greater than the increases between the blocs, or between
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xv

them and the rest of the world (Berger, 2000, pp. 47-8). From this perspective, the entire
question of the major factors behind the expansion of economic interconnectedness takes
on a new shape. Instead of concerning ourselves exclusively with the impact of independent
variables, such as changes in communication and transport technologies, or the trends in
comparative advantage, we should also be exploring the political processes that lead to the
formation of effective regional trade agreements.

Regional Governance and the European Union's 'Democratic Deficit'

Vayrynen argues in Chapter 15 that the shifting and complex nature of regionalism necessitates
careful attention to definitional and methodological issues. Given the variety of regional
agreements, we should not assume that we will always be able to use a 'jigsaw' approach in
which the borders of each region are given to us in discrete, sharply bounded and static forms.
Clearly, geographical proximity is a key factor behind regional agreements; neighbouring
states often have strong incentives to form an economic trading bloc or a security alliance,
for example. In other cases, geographical proximity is enriched by the formation of shared
identities based on common norms and shared cultural orientations. A regional trade agreement
may depend upon the fact that the businesses in neighboring countries subscribe to a common
approach to the market, the legitimacy of governmental regulation and the desirability of
free trade. In some cases, the demand for regional integration can come 'from below': that
is, from the market and civil society actors who are responding to externalities. Take, for
example, the dilemmas faced by the fishing industries located in several different countries
that are located on the shores of the same ocean. Each national industry might understand that
over-fishing is taking place, and that the trend is introducing a negative externality, namely
the depletion of the common stock. However, each national fishing industry would probably
not choose to voluntarily submit to rules limiting its catch unless it could be reassured that all
ofthe other national fisheries would be bound by a common set of seasonal quotas, and would
face significant sanctions for any violation. Wary of a free rider problem, the national fishing
industry would probably oppose restrictive domestic legislation until a regional agreement
guaranteed collective action.
Market actors and civil society organizations may be enduring high opportunity costs
because of the prevailing institutions, and they may therefore seek relief in the form of
regionally coordinated rules, regulations and policies. The constructivist tendency within
international relations places the emphasis, with respect to regionalism, on shared norms and
values, such as the common subscription among ASEAN members to the 'ASEAN way' of
resolving mutual conflicts. With the stress on the common exposure to externalities and the
salience of norm sharing, these approaches to regionalism adopt a view that is much less static
than the traditional state-centric security perspective.
Although the decline of the bi-polar Cold War system, the rise of globalization, and the
shrinking of the state has made room for the rise of regionalism, Vayrynen also cautions
against taking a one-sided perspective on the phenomenon. In the post-Cold War period,
supraregional, subregional and microregional organizations have also flourished. Further,
the conditions in most regions are not conducive to the establishment of the primacy of
regional governance over state sovereignty. In the case of ASEAN, for example, the sharing
of 'ASEAN way' dispute resolution principles (mutual respect, noninterference in domestic
xvi New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

affairs, consultation, and the dedication by each member state to building up a resilient
government that can ward off internal threats) and the establishment of intraregional ties
among the member states has not meant that the region has been able to eliminate mutual
conflicts or to lead its member states to adopt a common approach to extraregional economic
problems. In other cases, such as Latin America and the Middle East, regional unity remains
relatively weak and uneven in part because external powers, such as the USA, continue to
exert a great deal of influence.
By contrast, the EU has achieved the highest degree of integration of all the regional
bodies and has expanded eastwards. For all its relative success, the EU has nevertheless been
widely criticized as insufficiently representative and accountable. Habermas (2001) contends
that a pan-European identity, based on a commitment to human rights, a shared concept of
social justice and a European public sphere, should become the foundation for an EU demos.
'Public-interest' critics counter that citizens seek certain goods from their governments -
high employment, economic growth and environmental protection - and they expect them
to deliver these goods through effective and equitable policies and corrections for market
failure. Excessive democratic deliberation, they continue, would make the EU inefficient; in
some cases, intergovernmental bargaining or the delegation of decision-making to unelected
expert bodies are far preferable to processes involving popular participation. In Chapter 16
ofthis volume Richard Bellamy holds that both approaches cannot avoid the difficulties that
arise from the lack of a democratic consensus in Europe on 'rights' and the 'public interest'
in the first place. If the EU precociously promulgates human rights principles or regulatory
standards before the European demos emerges and democratic endorsement is given, then the
EU might exacerbate its own 'democratic deficit'.
The implications ofthe EU's democratic deficit are serious. Not only does an EU democratic
deficit render its institutions illegitimate, it also spreads corrosively into the societies of the
member states. The actors within the EU that are primarily responsible for setting economic
development, monetary and trade policies - the European Commission, the European Court of
Justice and the European Central Banl" - are largely insulated from democratic accountability.
With the shift in economic steering functions, such as monetary and trade policies, to the
supranational level, the governing executives in the member states can increasingly ignore
their national legislatures. It is entirely rational for them to seek to influence the EU bargaining
sessions that take place behind closed doors instead of prioritizing domestic deliberation.
Voters may have the greatest purchase in terms of democratic accountability where the
representatives in their national legislatures are concerned. However, if EU supranational
government has effectively stripped these bodies of their policy-making capacity, the citizens
ofthe member states will lack democratic control over the policies that have the greatest impact
on their everyday lives (Offe and Preuss, 2006). The problem is only exacerbated by the fact
that powerful economic actors can utilize the EU's provisions for capital movement within
the region to press member states for favourable policies even where EU law leaves national
sovereignty more or less intact. (Pollack, 2005, p. 385). Without institutionalized dissent,
effective vehicles for blocking arbitrary decision-making and the popular teaching effects of
vigorous political contestation, the EU's democratic deficit becomes an almost unavoidable
outcome. An anti-democratic cycle can be set into motion, as popular perception of the EU
as an unaccountable and alien government stimulates apathy and fatalism, and encourages
political illiteracy instead of engagement. Offe and Preuss (2006) nevertheless hold open the
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xvii

possibility of addressing the EU's democratic deficit. Rejecting the view that European society
is too differentiated to support a supranational demos, they envision the consolidation of an
organic supranational republicanism based on the shared values of tolerance and respectful
coexistence,
The formation of a robust pan-European concensus in favour of human rights may prove to
be an increasingly difficult task. As the East European countries from the former Soviet bloc
and Russia have joined the Council of Europe, they have signed and ratified the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and have accepted the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), It remains to be seen, however, whether these
new member states will comply with the Court's rulings. As an aside, it should be noted
that the relationship between the ECHR and the European Court of Justice remains an open
question.
We should also consider the risks inherent in the construction of a robust pan-European
identity. If the solidarity between two Europeans who are 'foreign' to one another - such as a
Belgian steelworker and a Greek olive-grower- is founded upon their shared opposition to the
figure of the non-European and non-Western 'other' who threatens to penetrate the borders of
'Fortress Europe', European republicanism could ultimately be harnessed to advance highly
illiberal policies targeting both non-European immigrants and the ethnic/racial minorities that
are already settled within the member states. It is not clear, for example, that the European
republicanism envisioned by Offe and Preuss would serve as an adequate antidote to racism
in France. French republicanism claims to transcend minority particularism in favour of
Enlightenment universalism, but French society is deeply marked by post-colonial racial
antagonisms, social exclusion and xenophobia (Leca, 1992; Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991).
The EU did not intervene effectively in a timely manner to stop the obvious forward march
of extreme chauvinism and to block ethnic cleansing before bloodshed took place within
its own region - that is, in the former Yugoslavia. Certainly, Bosnia can be constructed as
the 'exotic' atypical case in which the lines of cultural, religious and national divisions are
deeply rooted in complex historical patterns, as well as a bitterly contested zone made up of
multiple civilizations that dangerously overlap one another. Because it was not a monolithic
entity, the former Yugoslavia had plenty of pressure points that were ripe for exploitation
by right-wing populist leaders. However, it could also be argued that these same features
actually make Bosnia an exemplary European case. The interpretation of history is hotly
debated throughout Europe, just as it is in Bosnia. Even if we set aside the whole issue of the
settlement of the post-colonial populations within the EU member states since the Second
World War, there is no place in Europe that is not the site of religious, linguistic, cultural and
ethnic tensions (Balibar, 2004, p. 6). A European republican movement could only spawn
a truly democratic civic consciousness insofar as it found the political will to confront the
profound problem of racial discrimination and ethnic exclusion. Not only would it have to
unity diverse citizens across the borders of the different member states without conjuring up
the threat of a common enemy - the non-European and non-Western 'other' - it would have
to make anti-racist multiculturalism one of its foundational values. The enormous extent of
the challenge becomes clear when we recall the degree of diversity and the presence of ethnic
tensions that exist within each member state as well.
Bhabha (1999) also points out that the EU's displacement of national sovereignty is uneven.
For example, each member state retains its traditional prerogative over naturalization and
xviii New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

citizenship law, Paradoxically, an immigrant cannot gain EU citizenship without obtaining

member-state citizenship; buthe or she must negotiate the specific naturalization and citizenship
law of the EU country that he or she enters the region. The immigrant cannot challenge the
legitimacy of naturalization law or appeal a member state's decision on citizenship in the
European Court of Justice. The EU does not require its members to conform to a uniform
minimum standard of justice where naturalization law is concerned. EU protection against
the unjust actions of the member state therefore arrives only after the naturalization and
citizenship decisions have been made, at a time that is too late for those who have been
arbitrarily excluded.

Anti-globalization' Backlash '?

Hirst and Thompson argue that as globalization begins to substantially challenge the sovereignty
of the nation-states and as transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations,
regional governments and international agencies continue to push their way on to the world
stage as the primary political forces, we will see a 'severe anti-globalization "backlash"
as nationally-rooted publics experience a loss of the benefits of domestic governance and
increased exposure to international pressures' (Hirst and Thompson, 2002, p. 249). In fact,
the late twentieth century witnessed the enormously important expansion of transnational
movements, international non-governmental organizations, and advocacy networks that are
challenging the forward march of global capital, the violation of human rights, the USA's
pursuit of worldwide hegemony, and the perpetuation of gender-based oppression (Keck and
Sikkink, 1998; Carr, 1999; Tarrow, 2001; Desai, 2005; Smith, 2001).
But Hirst and Thompson also point out that the globalizing forces may be perversely
creating favourable conditions for the generation of their own limitations insofar as they give
rise to the reassertion of the nation-state. The USA's self-interested position on trade is a case
in point. Even as the Americans demand the submission of other trading partners to free-trade
policies, such as the dismantling of protectionist tariffs, they have been quite selective in
applying the same principles at home. US negotiators have ensured that, for the most part, the
sectors in the US economy that are exposed to liberalized trade rules are the ones in which
the country enjoys enormous competitive advantage (Hirst and Thompson, 2002, p. 249).
Moreover, there are limits to globalization in the developing regions as well. Even if the
states in the developing world lost their capacity to exercise their sovereignty to a meaningful
degree, the hegemony of globalizing forces would remain contested. Both the masses and
the elites in the developing countries would deeply resent the economic power exercised by
the developed world. If capitalist forces ever managed to completely absorb or displace the
nation-states in the developing world, they might nevertheless encounter serious challenges
in the form of terrorism, widespread violations of intellectual property law, popular protest,
petty theft, and the growth of informal economies and organized crime (Hirst and Thompson,
2002, p. 249).
There is, in fact, some evidence that middle-income and poor countries have suffered
from the dismantling of trade barriers, while a small number of wealthy industrialized
countries have gained significantly. The intensification of poverty in Africa during the final
decades of the twentieth century, during which protectionist trade policies were weakened, is
particularly dramatic (Brune and Garrett, 2005, p. 410). Scholars have reached a consensus
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xix

on the fact that as China and India opened up their economies, they experienced spectacular
growth rates. However, it is very unclear whether we can build a generalizable model out
of their particular records, and insufficient data and serious disputes among scholars about
methodology continues to bedevil these comparisons. For example, economists influenced
by the work of Amartya Sen favour 'human development' indexes over the measurement of
GNP per capita (Beneria, 2003, pp. 16-21); and feminist advocates who are eager to critically
assess country-specific progress towards the gender justice objectives outlined in the 1995
UN Conference on Women in Beijing and in subsequent international agreements lament the
fact that comprehensive and gender-sensitive data sets have been slow to develop (Walby,
2005).
Countries which lack strong domestic financial institutions that can handle the volatility
that inevitably follows from trade and direct foreign investment appear to be particularly ill-
equipped to reap significant gains from global economic development (Brune and Garrett,
2005, p. 411). Income inequality within Britain and the USA has increased since the 1970s,
and most scholars agree that the introduction of neoliberal reforms is at least partly responsible
(ibid., p. 415). j Although studies on the relationship between globalization and inequality
within other countries have generated mixed results, it seems clear that it is the poor who
have borne the brunt of the adjustment costs in the developing world (ibid., p. 416) and that
the widening of the social divide between the haves and the have-nots has become an almost
worldwide phenomenon (de Senarclens, 2001, p. 509). Global trade and investment patterns
have produced spectacular crises such as the collapse ofthe East Asia economy between 1997
and 1999 (Wade, 2000); extreme volatility and deep recessions are bound to make an already
inegalitarian pattern of distribution even harder to bear for the unskilled and the poor.
Paradoxically, to the extent that globalization aggravates inequality, exclusion and social
upheaval, it may very well contribute to the rise of aggressive nationalist movements and the
adoption of severely reactionary social policies by domestic governments (Appadurai, 2006).
Liberal modernists have claimed, for example, that we are moving along a more or less unilinear
evolutionary path that will culminate in a post-national era as we transcend archaic communal
ties. The persistence, resurgence and remarkable malleability of nationalist identification -
organized around a deep sense of communal identity, based on collectively shared symbols
and myths, and yet mobile and pliable in the sense that is it capable of responding to an
endless series of sociopolitical shifts (Anderson, 1991; Smith, 1996; Croucher, 2003) - call
into question these liberal and modernist claims about our historical position.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the intensification of various nationalist sentiments
will strengthen the legitimacy of the state. With political institutions failing to accommodate
nationalist ambitions and with the resurgence of national communities that criss-cross
territorial lines or remain stateless, the precise 'fit' between 'nation' and 'state' remains a
vexed question (Guibernau, 2004). Turner and Corbacho optimistically contend that:

... national governments will continue to perform the tasks that their citizens want them to perform
[such as the] regulat[ion of] the private sector, assur[ing] at least a minimum standard of living for
their most needy citizens, and set[ting] out goals as clearly as possible so that the efficiency of public
agencies can be measured and evaluated. (Turner and Corbacho, 2000, p. 110)

Other major factors include the relative weakness and continuing decline of organized labour
and the intensification of skill-based technological change (Brune and Garrett, 2005, p. 416).
xx New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

However, to take but one example, the dismal performance of the Bush administration
during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 casts serious doubt on this sort of rosy
scenario. In the developed world alone, we will probably continue to witness a wide variety of
nation-state responses to economic development and inequality, ranging from egalitarian and
democratic responsiveness along the lines practised by the Scandinavian countries to the Bush
administration's model of divide and rule in the USA, in which the wealthy were showered
with tax breaks and the least well-off were subjected to aggressive policing and enormous
economic pressures (Wacquant, 2002; Piven and Cloward, 1993).
All this implies that we can only make, at best, a conditional prediction with respect to the
state's response to social cleavages. The fulfilment of the ideal functions specified by Turner
and Corbacho requires a domestic balance of power among the prominent political actors
that favours an egalitarian ethos, as well as a sufficiently powerful national government. To
the extent that these are lacking, and the ideal functions enumerated by Turner and Corbacho
are not fulfilled, we will probably witness even greater sociopolitical tensions. Turner and
Corbacho are on firmer ground, however, when they predict that the highly functioning nation-
states will continue to jealously guard their jurisdiction over immigration and naturalization
policies (2000, p. 111).
Sassen (1999) usefully reminds us that the complex realities of our globalizing conditions
are such that we cannot sustain an 'either/or' approach. It is from only the most reductionist
perspective that we can conclude that there are only two possible outcomes: either the nation-
state will be utterly displaced by corporations and supranational institutions or it will adapt
perfectly to the new interdependencies and emerge out ofthis historical moment with renewed
strength and vitality. Sassen, by contrast, rejects this sort of reductionism. The states themselves
are actively participating in the construction of the legal and regulatory environment in
which global capital conducts its business. It is the nation-state, for example, that sets tariffs,
signs regional trade agreements and adopts a common currency. Sassen further argues that
domestic governments and societies are undergoing their own transformations as a result of
their profound involvement in global economic development. The governmental sectors that
are linked to international finance may substantially augment their authority, even though the
influx of foreign capital might remain quite minimal. By the same token, the nation-state must
cope with global firms that are acquiring legally enforceable 'rights' and with supranational
organizations that exert an unprecedented degree of influence on domestic decision-making.
'Washington consensus'-styled International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality, for
example, entails a standard package of domestic institutional features, including the autonomy
ofthe central banl<-, anti-inflation fiscal discipline and parity in exchange rates (Sassen, 1999).
In this manner, Sassen returns to the themes introduced by Linda Weiss in Volume One on
the remarkable adaptability of the nation-state in globalizing conditions and, in the case of
those states with strong capacities, the renewal of state power in the international economic
system.
A country that only opens its national economy up to the global system in a minor way
might still witness a major transformation in its domestic politics. The board of directors
for a US industrial firm, for example, does not have to hire illegal workers from Mexico and
Central America or relocate production south of the border in order to press its US workers
to accept lower wages and thereby contribute to the general dis empowerment of labour. The
board merely has to make a plausible threat to do so. Relatively small increases in the hiring
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xxi

of migrant workers, trade and foreign direct investment can set significant shifts in domestic
conditions into motion (Berger, 2000, p. 46). The relationship between nation-states and
private firms becomes all the more complicated insofar as intra-industry trade constitutes
impressive proportions of cross-border transactions (ibid., p. 47).
Where structural adjustment policies and cuts in social spending lead to unemployment,
social service reductions, and impoverishment, women are typically expected to pick up the
slack as unpaid care-givers. The decline in men's wages can also trigger renewed pressures
on women to increase their paid labour efforts, especially insofar as food and other necessities
become more expensive (Beneria, 2003, pp. 47-53). Although claims for public support
addressed to the nation-state remain an indispensable tool for the advance of gender justice,
the nation-state has been much too ambivalent and uneven where the interests oflow-income
women are concerned to be considered as a reliable ally against the gendered inequality that
can arise as a result of globalization. 2 Global capital's expansion of the service sector and
semi-skilled labour-intensive manufacturing for export in developing countries has had a wide
variety of effects on women workers. While low wages and exploitative conditions remain
commonplace, some of these women have obtained a higher income and have enhanced their
bargaining power within their kinship groups as a result (ibid. pp. 91-130). A few women are
even using their wages from export-production-oriented work to found women's centres and
legal assistance programmes that have, in turn, transformed their social status and political
identities (Bergeron, 2001). 3
In Chapter 1, Michael Mann tackles the challenge of predicting the nation-state's future in
our globalizing conditions. His conceptual framework establishes five different categories of
sociospatial networks. Contemporary social interactions may take the form of local networks
located at the level of subnational social relationships; national networks, whose boundaries
more or less correspond to those of the nation-state; international networks: the relations
between national entities or the nation-states themselves; transnational networks: the relations
that pass through and criss-cross national boundaries, such as those that create and sustain a
common cultural or ethnic identity in multiple countries; and global networks that operate
effectively across most, if not all, of the globe. Mann's perspective allows us to probe the
question of globalization's impact with much more precision. The expansion of international
networks can be entirely compatible with the maintenance of a strong nation-state, for
example. During the era of industrial capital accumulation, the rise of the industrialists
coincided with the enhancement of the nation-state and its international networks. It was the
local networks that were displaced by industrial capital's transnational networks; by and large,

As an aside, we should note that the rhetoric about globalization often takes a gendered form.
When, for example, global capital is depicted as a great masculine force naturally destined to overwhelm
and victimize the feminized local economy, this deployment of gendered tropes may contribute to a
popular sense of apathetic resignation about global corporate power and the concealment of local
capital's interests.
This is not to suggest that feminists approach the existing data-sets and models on the
socioeconomic impact of globalization in an uncritical manner. Many feminist economists who are
studying the impact of structural adjustment policies have argued that many of the dominant social
science models, such as neoclassical economics and rational-choice analyses of decision-making,
are radically insufficient interpretive paradigms, and that the capturing of gendered injustice requires
alternative methodologies (Beneria, 2003, pp. 41--62).
xxii New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

the consolidation of the nation-state was compatible with, and was sometimes complemented
by, the emergence of these particular transnational linkages.
Whereas Sassen points out the mutual interdependence between the relevant sectors of
the nation-state and contemporary global capital, Mann argues that even when a country's
economy is being opened up to globalization, it may be benefiting from the assistance of
national and international networks. The ownership, assets, and research and development arms
of the global corporations are disproportionately located in their 'home' country's territory.
Of course, economic integration in Europe has created a fully transnational market system
and supranational form of governance. For Mann, however, Europe remains an extreme case
that cannot be generalized to the globe. Globalism will remain 'impure' and the relationship
between national and transnational networks will retain its symbiotic character. Even the
quintessential phenomenon of globalization, the relocation of a factory from the developed
West to a low-wage developing country, can be partly explained in terms of factors that are
linked to national and international networks. Mann contends that it is 'the Koreas' and 'the
Mexicos' - that is, the countries that have the closest trade ties and friendliest relations with
the developed nations - that tend to play host to the factories that were previously located in
the OECD nations (p.12). (It is not clear exactly how Mann would account for production
migration to China and India, however.)
To take another example, transnational social movements can end up enhancing many
different types of networks, thereby generating mixed results where the nation-state is
concerned. Environmentalists, for example, may seek to build a transnational civil society,
but they may also find themselves obliged to appeal to the nation-state representatives who
populate the intergovernmental organizations that are increasingly charged with ecological
preservation (p. 21). Mann concludes that the only network that is bound to decline is the local
one; ethnic tensions may lead to the fragmentation of existing states into smaller and more
homogeneous nation-states (pp. 25-26).

War, Terrorism and Transnational Ethnic Conflict

It is also unlikely that global disarmament treaties, international law tribunals and the
consolidation of international norms will completely displace the nation-state in the security
arena. Once again, the trends are complicated in their variety and mixed in their structures.
After the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC
on 11 September 2001 by the terrorist organization, AI-Qaeda, the USA and Britain ushered in
a historic turn towards a relegitimation of warfare. In Afghanistan, the USA sought to destroy
Taliban strongholds by engaging in what Shaw (2002) has dubbed 'risk-transfer militarism'.
In some respects, the Americans and the British tried to adopt a similar strategy when they
invaded Iraq. (In fact, Mann (2004) suggests that the lack of a reliable local surrogate
force, as well as ineffective political and ideological strategies, made the failure of imperial
hegemony for the Americans highly likely in Iraq, regardless of the USA's obvious military
superiority.)
In a 'risk-transfer' operation, the Western countries seek to minimize their own military
casualties. The Western countries target hostile forces through this operation, and they
tolerate a substantial death toll where their local surrogate forces and civilian populations are
concerned (Shaw, 2002). Thus the 'risk-transfer' approach could weaken humanitarian norms,
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xxiii

since the latter value all human lives equally, oppose military aggression and condemn civilian
losses, In Chapter 2 Paul Hirst takes a pessimistic view on the consolidation of international
human rights norms and holds that while it seems likely that most states will generally respect
economic regulations, Western countries will probably continue to practise a double standard,
The USA abides by international law on security matters quite narrowly and only insofar as
such compliance allows it to advance its geopolitical interests, The USA and the EU counsel
non-European governments to respect human rights norms, but they often refuse to be bound
by them in turn (pp, 41--42), Indeed, the USA has unsigned the Rome Treaty that established
the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the grounds that it encroaches upon its sovereignty
and illegitimately exposes individual US citizens - especially military service personnel and
administration officials - to criminal prosecutions and convictions (McNerney, 2001). By the
same token, it could be argued that the international human rights movement has achieved
a great deal, especially since the early 1990s. With several international and regional treaty
bodies now holding individuals and states accountable for human rights violations on a regular
basis, and with the growing trend among international non-governmental organizations to
establish partnerships with local democratic forces to expose wrongdoing, a certain degree
of guarded optimism on human rights may be in order, especially where the core geopolitical
interests of the great powers, such as the USA, Russia and China, are not at stake.
Although terrorist organizations seem to be rivalling the nation-states in the security arena
in several regions of the world, we are actually witnessing a blurring of the line between state
and non-state actors (Kaldor, 2003, p. 175). Kaldor (2003) cautions against an ethnocentric
interpretation ofIslamic fundamentalism and its impact on the international system. Sweeping
generalizations about the more than 1 billion Muslims across the globe cannot be sustained
in light of Islam's tremendous diversity; even within a single country, SunnilShia, urbani
rural, and class differences among and between Muslims can be quite pronounced. From a
political perspective, the apolitical pietist movements and secular Muslims share very little
in common with political Islam, the mass movements that seek political power to establish
a God-fearing society (Sadowski, 2006; Mahmood, 2005). Kaldor points out that the trend
towards extremist political mobilization, which often involves violent strategies, can be found
among many national groups and that terrorist organizations proclaim affinities with all the
major world religions (Kaldor, 2003, p. 174). The sheer sum of terrorist-related incidents
may not have increased since the 1970s; what is new in recent decades is the complex
integration of violent religious and secessionist organizations with traditional political actors,
such as political parties, key leaders and governing regimes (ibid., p. 175). Long-running
conflicts in the Middle East or in African countries, such as Sudan and the Congo, themselves
produce pockets of lawlessness in which extremist ideologies, arms dealing, insecurity
and the recruitment of new volunteers can flourish (ibid., p. 187). Kaldor calls the major
terrorist organizations like AI-Qaeda 'regressive globalizers': they respond to the insecurities
associated with globalization and they take the form of complex transnational networks that
rely on cross-national fundraising, criminal activity and the latest digital communication and
media technologies. At the same time, however, they pursue an altogether familiar goal: they
seek to control existing nation-states or to bring new ones into being. They claim that such
control would allow them to roll back the degenerate effects of globalization and to establish
ethnically homogeneous and/or morally pure societies within a sovereign territory (ibid., p.
195).
xxiv New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

In extreme cases, ethnic conflict can become so widespread and destructive that it can
bring a nation-state to the verge of failure and even total collapse. Country-specific analysis
may remain indispensable, however, even where the outcome, such as state failure, is the
same. Peter Uvin argues in Chapter 3, for example, that the ethnic conflicts in Rwanda and
Burundi, two neighbouring countries in East-Central Africa, belong to distinct paradigms. In
Burundi, severe ethnic-based discrimination and inequality gave way to a full-blown civil war.
Resources in Rwanda, by contrast, were distributed along regional and social lines, rather than
ethnic differences. Although the governing class was Hutu in Rwanda, there were many Hutu
have-nots as well. The elite Hutu deflected popular discontent by fomenting the aggressive
exclusion of the Tutsi minority, despite the fact that most of the previous Tutsi rulers had fled
the country. With the routinization of Hutu violence against the Tutsi, it was a small step to
genocide.
From the perspective of many democratic theorists, the presence of plural ethnic and
religious groups does not necessarily constitute a threat to a liberal democratic polity; rather
than exclusion and suppression, they propose various models for accommodation, compromise,
deliberation and mutual learning across differences (Bellamy. 2000; Kymlicka, 1995;
Benhabib, 2002; Young, 2000). By the same token, nationalist identification remains salient
in the midst of increasing transnational interdependencies; the dislocations that often arise out
of globalizing conditions may even be strengthening an 'us' versus 'them' attitude (Croucher,
2003; Kaldor, 2004) that can animate many different types of collective action, from the
relatively benign formation of sports fan clubs to the most vicious types of ethnic cleansing
(Mann, 1999). Looking in particular at the 'nationalism of resistance', Ashutosh Varshney
(Chapter 4) contends that we can best understand nationalist or ethnic identification as a
combination of what Weber called 'value rationality' with 'instrumental rationality'. Extreme
acts of self-sacrifice on behalf of one's' people' appear to be irrational if we uncritically define
reason in an exclusively instrumental manner. Because the 'nationalism of resistance' prizes
dignity and self-respect above all else, even when the assertion of a collective identity and the
pursuit of a shared world vision is likely to end in defeat, actors who are compelled by this
type of belief system are primed to accept costly sacrifices and to remain steadfast to their
cause over long periods of time.

International Organizations, the 'Development Industry', and Non-governmental

Organizations

According to Said (2003), Western discourse is shaped by 'Orientalism', the tendency to regard
the developing countries as a more or less homogeneous bloc unified by the backwardness of
their cultures. Although Said certainly recognizes that Westerners are capable of tremendous
compassion and generosity towards the not-West, he cautions that even their most apparently
altruistic engagements are generally framed by a confidence in the superiority of modern
Euro-American values and knowledge, and by a firm belief in the deep-seated incompetence
of the developing world where self-government is concerned. In a similar vein, Tim Mitchell
(Chapter 6) dissects the rhetorical manoeuvres that lie behind the international development
agencies' naturalistic description of Egypt as an 'overpopulated' country that is poorly
endowed in arable land. He argues that Egypt has the potential to achieve self-sufficiency in
food, given its modest population growth and its impressive record in agricultural productivity.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xxv

The problems of widespread malnutrition and dependency on agricultural imports cannot be

blamed on the country's geophysical resources. For Mitchell, elite decision-making, acute
socioeconomic inequalities, a lack of democratic accountability and foreign intervention all
work together to produce a shortage in affordable food commodities. For example, domestic
agricultural production has been dramatically skewed in favour of meat industry inputs. The
resulting red meat, poultry and dairy products are largely consumed, however, by a relatively
minute fraction ofthe country's population, namely the wealthy elite. This massive production
imbalance has nevertheless been deliberately promoted by the Egyptian and US governments,
as well as the IMF, through taxation, subsidy and loan schemes. The geographic determinism
espoused by the 'development industry' - the international NGOs, UN agencies, the USA and
other foreign donors - displaces questions of social inequality and conceals the influence of
the US government and the development industry itself within Egypt.
In Chapter 5, Balakrishnan Rajagopal also seeks to enhance our interpretation of the
expansion of international organizations (lOs) while rejecting a simplistic 'realist' argument
that would reduce them to nothing more than the strategic instruments of powerful nation-states.
Rajagopal also objects to the functionalist account that portrays the lOs' expansion between
the late 1970s and 1990s as an apolitical and technical process. He seeks to demonstrate how
the resistance practices of 'Third-World' social movements - peasants, ethnic and religious
groups, environmentalists, disgruntled masses and poverty advocates, feminists and so on
- were central to the lOs' development.
The picture becomes even more complicated when we take into account the various ways
in which NGOs strategically position themselves as advocates for 'the people'. Indeed, NGOs
and transnational advocacy networks have been able to reframe key issues, attract public
attention and persuade reluctant governments to fulfil treaty obligations and address human
rights claims, environmental demands, calls for peace and disarmament (Jacobson, 2000, pp.
156-59; Simmons, 1998). At the same time, NGOs have been drawn into a new series of
difficult political dilemmas. In Latin America, feminist NGOs that might otherwise maintain
an organic connection with social movements on the ground are pressed to take a technical-
professional form by the neoliberal state, insofar as the latter deploys them in its policy-
making process as 'gender experts' or as social service delivery subcontractors, thereby
distancing them from their movement constituencies (Alvarez, 1999).
As Rajagopal explains, the response of the World Bank and the IMF to popular resistance
and the NGO campaigns has certainly not been uniform in all cases. In some countries, they
have encouraged particular movements. In others, however, they have deflected, demobilized,
and coopted the dissenters. In a more general sense, the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the
WTO, have intruded upon the policy-making areas that previously fell under the jurisdiction
of national governments. Although these lOs have responded to both the prodding of NGOs
and popular protest by adopting enhanced transparency and monitoring protocols, it is not
at all clear that ordinary citizens can have a meaningful impact on their decision-making
or effectively hold them accountable (Woods and Narlikar, 2001). Rajagopal nevertheless
maintains that the structures, agendas and investments of the World Bank and the IMF result
in part from their intensive, albeit ambivalent, interactions with subaltern political actors.
xxvi New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Democratization, 'Transitology' and Post-communism

Occupying a position adjacent to the development industry, the US 'democracy promotion

community' has also built up a shared world-view, namely the democratic transition paradigm.
As Thomas Carothers explains in Chapter 8, the US governmental bodies and NGOs that
seek to promote democracy abroad tend to view virtually every collapsing dictatorship or
authoritarian regime as if it were embarked upon a common and unstoppable journey towards
economic liberalization and sociopolitical democratization. It would be unfair to describe this
model as an unalloyed form of 'Orientalism'; one of the virtues of the democratic transition
perspective is that it rejects colonial racist ideas about the impossibility of democratic
government outside the Western context, and, indeed, optimistically predicts the triumph
of democracy in a wide range of cultural settings. Nevertheless, the democratic transition
paradigm does construct Euro-American government as quintessentially democratic and also
assumes that every country that has broken with a dictatorial tradition will naturally follow
a teleological unfolding process that will culminate in the adoption of the Euro-American
model. While that optimism has been proven well founded in a few cases - for example, in
Spain, Greece, Poland, Hungary, Chile and Taiwan - the record in the vast majority of 'third-
wave countries' is much more mixed. For all their post-authoritarian developments, such as
the regular holding of elections and the acceptance of an organized political opposition, they
nevertheless fail to satisfy the democratic conditions of 'transitology'. Carothers argues that
the democratic deficit in these countries is so great that the transitologists' habitual attachment
of qualified democratizing labels to these countries has become an act of wishful thinking.
Some societies in transition have broken decisively with authoritarianism but retain
authoritarian enclaves. [n other cases, transitioning countries have no coherent and competent
state apparatus that can enforce the law and protect their citizens' rights. An elected executive
in these conditions may face such an incomplete set of constraints that it can easily step
outside the rule of law. [f a post-authoritarian society possesses any ofthese flaws, the society
in question fails to meet the requirements for a 'consolidated democracy'. [n such a country,
democracy is not yet 'the only game in town' (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Comparative overviews
that merely locate various post-authoritarian societies along an ideal democratization trajectory
can therefore lack analytical purchase. [n Chapter 9, Guillermo O'Donnell borrows Dahl's
(1996) concept of 'polyarchy' to capture several Latin American countries in their mid-1990s
conditions with more precision. A polyarchy has regular elections that are generally free and
fair, a military that is subordinate to civilian rule, a relatively free press, and respects the
people's freedom of association. However, it also lacks key liberal democratic and republican
features. For example, even though the polyarchal states are brought under the rule of law,
they usually tend to lack 'horizontal accountability'. State agencies are generally not brought
under the scrutiny and control that ought to be exerted by other state agencies and branches of
government. As such, claims O'Donnell, a polyarchy can be marred by clientilism, corruption,
and the unchecked expansion ofthe executive branch.
The timing of the transition from authoritarianism is itself a complex puzzle. For example,
Geddes suggests that because the officers in a military dictatorship tend to value the military
institution itself above and beyond governing power, they may 'cling less tightly to power'
when they sense that the unity and capacity of the military is becoming threatened (Geddes,
1999, p. [40). Military dictatorships, such as the junta that ruled Argentina between [976 and
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xxvii

1983, are typically plagued by internal disagreements and splits before the transition, They
often sit down at the bargaining table with the democratic opposition well before popular
protests break out. 'Personalist' dictatorships, by contrast, usually attempt to hold on to
power at all costs, Personalist dictators may be senior officers in the military, but they tend to
prioritize their own individual agendas over the status of the armed forces as a whole, They
usually strive to inculcate a cult of personality and prefer to concentrate power within a very
small circle of family members and hand-picked and trusted advisers, They do not tolerate
opposition from career military officers and sometimes establish an elite security force that
reports directly to them, The latter in turn may enter into a rivalry with the traditional armed
forces and be deployed in secret missions designed to root out alleged 'traitors' among
military officers, the upper echelons of the dictator's own party, or the intellectual elite, The
Somoza dictatorships in Nicaragua that ended in 1979 with the Sandinista uprising are classic
examples of personalist dictatorships, Transition from this form of authoritarianism is often a
drawn-out affair in which mass rebellion plays a key role (Geddes, 1999, pp. 140-41).
Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (Chapter 7) certainly recognize the plurality of
democratic forms, but they nevertheless insist that, in every truly democratic society, policy-
makers are held accountable in the public sphere by the citizens, usually through the indirect
avenues afforded by the competitive election of representatives to legislative bodies. They
argue that even where a democratic ethos is lacking - as in a society whose coherence
relies on the strategic prudence of antagonistic actors rather deeply held sentiments of
egalitarianism, solidarity, liberty and the inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities, for example
- the democratic system of government can nevertheless be safeguarded by the contingent
consent of the people. In this sense, Schmitter and Karl argue that democratizing transitions
can succeed even where the society has not already established a robustly democratic way of
life. Of course, such transitions may in fact create conditions conducive to the inculcation of
democratic 'habits'; the authors' point is that the shift away from authoritarianism towards
liberty, equality and freedom can proceed even where these values are not widely shared (p.
163).
Students of Rousseau are familiar with this paradox: how can a democratic government
be successfully founded when the society in question has not yet given rise to a democratic
people, given that the very founding of a democracy depends on the presence of an already
constituted and vibrant democratic culture (Rousseau, 2006; Connolly, 1993; Honig,
2001)? Valerie Bunce's (Chapter 11) intervention on the importance of mass protest and the
constraints upon elite decision-making is apposite. She argues that the post-communist cases
present significant challenges to the received wisdom about democratic transitions that had
been built up out of empirical research on southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s
and 1980s. To take but one vector of her essay as an example, the transitologists had come to
believe that, in an ideal path to democracy, a tightly restricted set of authoritarian elites and
representatives of the democratic opposition would strive to 'forge compromises that promote
political stability during the construction of a democratic order' (p. 219). Given the uncertain
context, these pacts can usefully limit the range of reform issues that make it to the bargaining
table and establish a functioning transitional government with representation from across the
political spectrum.
In other words, this type of solution to the Rousseauian paradox is piecemeal and pragmatic,
rather than radical and democratic. Paradoxically, it makes sense for the democratic opposition
xxviii New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

to collaborate in the demobilization of 'the people' at this moment. From the transitology
perspective, the democratic forces tactically gain from the foreclosure of mass protests
because it helps them to carve out a limited and manageable agenda that they can then bring
to the bargaining table, thereby enhancing their chance of successful negotiations with the
authoritarian leaders, The authoritarians and their close allies in the military would, of course,
seize upon any evidence of 'disorder' as an indication that only the return of a full-blown
dictatorship would preserve the nation from total chaos. By blocking huge demonstrations
in the streets and massive strikes that might cripple virtually every economic sector, the
democratic opposition advances its position by weakening the authoritarians' ability to
legitimate a coup d'etat.
However, Bunce points out that the transition to democracy in many East European
societies, such as the Czech Republic, Poland and the Baltic states, actually began with mass
protests. Popular mobilization aided democratization by expanding the political imaginary in
a democratic direction, thereby opening up previously unthinkable governmental alternatives
as genuinely legitimate, coherent and viable possibilities. With people demonstrating on
the streets, the authoritarian leaders felt that they had to enter into negotiations with the
democratic forces. The democratic leaders thereby gained an improved strategic position and
the encouragement that they needed to press their case all the more assertively. Moreover,
the protests helped to lay the basis for a strong performance by the democratically-oriented
candidates in subsequent elections (p. 220). These transitions are all the more remarkable
given the fact that they involved ambitious and radical political and economic reforms. Mass
demonstrations caused the authoritarians to lose confidence in their power and encouraged the
democratic leaders to set aside moderate compromises (p. 222). In short, these particular post-
communist features cannot be reconciled with the transitologists' ideal narrative.
One of the many caveats and complexities noted by Bunce revolves around the timing of
specifically nationalist types of popular protest. In countries such as Croatia, Georgia and
Kosovo, nationalist mobilizations sprang up well before the fall of state socialism, due to
the strong sense of national identity among the masses and local elites. In these cases, local
ethnic minorities turned to the Soviet centre and the Communist Party for assistance in the
face of the exclusionary nationalist movements. The Soviet forces in both Moscow and the
satellite state in turn cracked down on the popular nationalist movement and advanced their
divide-and-rule objectives by enhancing the power of the local minorities and suppressing
the liberal-democratic opposition. In this sense, early nationalist protest was a symptom of,
and a factor behind, the reduction of the political terrain to a bitterly contested zero-sum
national/ethnic struggle. (Although this account is designed to capture a transitional pattern,
it can nevertheless help us to understand the alliances that have endured well beyond the
post-communist transition moment. Bunce's argument anticipates, for example, the tensions
between Russia and the government of Georgia that flared up to the level of armed conflict
in 2008, when Russia crossed over the Georgian border ostensibly to protect the separatist
region of South Ossetia from Georgia's national government.)
It is no coincidence, then, that the Soviet bloc countries that had relatively early nationalist
mobilizations now tend to lag far behind where democratization is concerned. As Bunce points
out, democracy tends to be more advanced in the countries in which nationalist mobilizations
began later, after state socialism had already begun its final decline. Critics have also pointed
to a contiguous set of problems related to democratic mobilization. In countries like the
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xxix

GDR, Slovenia, Czechoslovakia and Poland, popular protest movements played a key role
in toppling the regime and voting their dissident leaders into government. Einhorn notes that
women were 'active at all levels in pre-1989 peace, human rights, and other opposition or
dissident movement in East Central Europe' (1991, p. 16). Nevertheless, they constituted
only a small minority of the elected representatives in the new governments and were almost
completely absent at the ministerial level. In this sense, the popular movements betrayed
fundamental liberal-democratic principles by failing to secure an equitable representation
of women. They also failed to preserve women's rights in key areas such as reproductive
freedom and the provision of services like childcare that facilitate free decision-making in
circumstances where paid labour has to be combined with care-work (Einhorn, 1991).
According to Ernest Gellner (Chapter 10), we can make sense of the fact that different
nationalist movements are associated with such dramatically different outcomes by contrasting
the East European nationalist narrative with that of its West European counterpart. The
dawning of modernity and industrialization was central to the rise of nineteenth-century-styled
nationalism in Western Europe. In the pre-industrial period, agrarian feudalism lent itself to
the weaving together of an intricate cultural fabric that featured robust local particularisms
and deeply held parochial sentiments. Modern industrialism, with its emphasis on universal
education, a rationalized and codified legal system, countrywide standardization in market
relations, a professional bureaucracy and a central government endowed with at least a
minimal degree of authority and competence, is much more oriented towards the emergence
of a nationwide culture and political ethos. From this perspective, nationalist identification is
not so much the upwelling of an irrepressible atavistic 'herd instinct', but the by-product of
the rapid bourgeoisification of modern society. In the Soviet case, by contrast, Leninist and
Stalinist statism severely interrupted this trajectory; the Soviet bloc countries experienced
industrialization as centre-periphery domination. The party, rather than the business
leaders and the rapidly expanding middle class, became the vehicle for the introduction and
enhancement of industrial development. Further, as Bunce points out, Brezhnev deliberately
weakened the central state in order to appease otherwise restless rent seekers (pp. 233-34).
Nationalist movements within the Soviet bloc therefore found great opportunity in state
socialism's decline.
Lacking a foundation in modern industrialism, East European nationalisms have taken on
highly diverse characteristics. Indeed, Gellner finds resemblances between various modern
East European nationalist movements with each of Western Europe's historical stages of
nationalist development. Where 'ethnic irredentism ... [and] murderous violence' was largely
reserved, in the West European case, to the pre-1945 period, Gellner finds similar mobilizations
in contemporary Eastern Europe (p. 212). Gellner recognizes that Northern Ireland and the
Basque region are exceptions to what he regards as Western Europe's evolution beyond
violent forms of ethnic nationalism. Going beyond this concession, it should also be noted
that xenophobia and racial-ethnic nationalist movements are also thriving in Western Europe
as well; even if they are rarely responsible for murderous violence, they can certainly rise
to the level of severe exclusions. These nationalist forces take aim first and foremost at the
non-European immigrant, rather than territorial claims that would conflict with the interests
of other European countries. Gellner, however, overlooks their prominence in contemporary
Western Europe, perhaps because they lack an irredentist orientation. Nevertheless, their
ferocity and widespread appeal are such that they should not be underestimated.
xxx New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Post-colonial theory regards nationalism as a 'Janus-faced' phenomenon; although it is

all too often wielded by authoritarians, nationalism has also been a central rallying point
for the anti-colonial struggles, Anti-colonial nationalism is not a throwback to a premodern
period in which the timeless ethnic loyalties were more salient. As a response to colonialism,
nationalist social movements were quintessentially modern, notwithstanding the fact that they
were built out of a shared longing for a geographical homeland, The retrograde dimension
of nationalism's 'Janus-face' is all the more likely to come to the fore today, given that
contemporary nationalisms seek to tie cultures and identities to a fixed territory and therefore
work against the grain of the deterritorializing effects of migration and capital exchange
(Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge and Chakrabarty, 2000, pp, 578-89),
Authoritarian forces in the countries formerly governed by centralized state socialism
(the former Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia and Albania) can still call up the reactionary energies
of exclusionary nationalism today, more than two decades after Gorbachev launched the
perestroika movement. In Gellner's terms, these nationalist identifications are insufficiently
mediated by a shared subscription to a common socioeconomic project, like industrialization,
which can be persuasively depicted as serving the interests of every social sector and income
bracket. Gellner also cautions that the ethnic patterns in these countries are enormously
complicated (p. 212). In many cases, nationalist-ethnic affiliations are often the popular
associations that lie most readily to hand in the chaos ofthe post-Soviet environment, especially
in countries like Russia in which extreme social dislocations are common, and state weakness,
governmental incompetence and corruption make an effective political resolution of competing
demands unlikely. The investment among the governing elites in official secrecy and the
renewal of the security apparatus is such that they continue to view the appeal to nationalist
loyalty as a helpful tool for the deflection of popular calls for governmental transparency and
accountability. Although Bunce's research cautions against any simplistic dismissal of every
nationalist mobilization as an intrinsically anti-democratic force, Gellner's argument usefully
draws our attention to the limitations of a political model that is explicitly or implicitly based
on West European history and thereby sharpens our appreciation of the complicated post-
communist terrain and the relatively high degree of uncertainty that characterizes many of the
democratic transitions in the region.
At the same time, the durability of Russia's flawed democracy is remarkable. Although
the Soviet collapse teaches us to appreciate the brittleness of the state socialist institutions,
post-Soviet Russian society has also proven that it possesses remarkably robust coordination
mechanisms such that it can continue to function well enough under conditions of great
uncertainty. Expectations about what fellow citizens will do in a new context - shaped not
only by instrumentalist calculation and incentive, but also by cultural beliefs and historical
legacies - can bring about a series of rapid cascading shifts across several equilibrium points
in the midst of profound disorder (Laitin, 2000).

Human Rights, Migration and Cosmopolitanism

In Chapter 12, Bryan Turner argues that the slow development of a sociology of rights stems
from the scepticism of Marx, Durkheim and Weber towards the universalism of human rights
theory and natural law. Sociologists have found Marshallian discourse on citizenship that
specifies civic, political and social rights much more attractive because it appears to be value-
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xxxi

neutral and does not depend on a universal ontology. Turner persuasively points out the covert
normative dimension in Marshall: for Marshall, citizenship ought to evolve according to the
three-stage narrative in order to address the needs of the working class without challenging
the capitalist structure of the social order. He concludes that the concept of citizenship is too
bound up with the nation-state system and domestic social control interests to operate as an
adequate foundation for human rights in our globalizing condition. Turner proposes, instead,
that we develop a set of human rights principles that would be binding for the nation-states
throughout the global community on the basis of two fundamental tenets : first, our shared
experience of vulnerability in the face of corporeal frailty and the precarious nature of our
social institutions; and, second, our collective sympathy for the 'other'.
Turner's approach to the human body is reminiscent of various feminist phenomenological
theories. However, the most promising feminist thinkers working in this vein propose an
approach to reproductive rights that is simultaneously based on women's common experiences
of the female body and yet sensitive to the stratification of women along racial, ethnic and
national lines (Eisenstein, 2004; Petchesky, 2003; Silliman et. al., 2004).
Martha Nussbaum (2006) has offered a vision of ethical cosmopolitanism that resembles
that of Turner, but it has met with an ambivalent response. Clearly, if we could build up a 'thin'
theory of universal human rights that would eschew Eurocentrism in favour of multicultural
sensitivity and yet be substantial enough to endow the individual with meaningful protections
and entitlements, we would be greatly enhancing the struggles for social justice around the
globe. Although the USA has refused to support the International Criminal Court (ICC),
scholars and advocates nevertheless argue that legal proceedings such as the international
war crimes tribunals can persuade elites and masses alike to comply with international
humanitarian norms and to moderate the cycles of revenge and counterattack in the aftermath
of atrocities and genocide (Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004). The stateless populations in particular
- refugees, asylum seekers and indentured workers who are trafficked across international
borders, and peoples displaced by major military confiicts (see Castles, Chapterl3; Bhabha,
Chapter 14) - depend on international law when they advance their human rights claims. By
the same token, an imperialist hegemon, such as the USA, can advance its strategic interests
by constructing military intervention as a noble cause intended to defend the human rights of
oppressed minorities, such as the Kurds in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, or women in the Taliban's
Afghanistan (Abu Lughod, 2002). Only a robust mobilization oflocal resistance, transnational
human rights movements, and actors in the global civil society can guard against such an
opportunistic distortion of the human rights tradition.
There is much to be admired in Turner's emphasis on human rights and Nussbaum's theory
of ethical cosmopolitanism. Unlike Rawls, these thinkers do not accept the notion that the
individual has a fully-fledged moral obligation only towards his or her fellow members of a
given nation-state society. On the contrary, Turner and Nussbaum insist that the citizenship
status or the geographic location of an individual human being has no bearing on the question
of whether he or she is a person of moral concern for us. Like Young and Pogge, Turner and
Nussbaum can move from the conceptualization of transnational and international morally
binding ties to a theory of cosmopolitan obligation. Young, for example, proposes a model
in which 'all agents who contribute by their actions to the structural processes that produce
injustice have responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices' (Young, 2007, pp. 159-
60). In particular, she praises the anti-sweatshop movement for grasping the morally binding
xxxii New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

tie between affluent clothing consumers and the highly exploited workers in the textile
manufacturing sector, even though that bond typically takes on a cross-national character
(Young, 2007, pp. 159-86). For his part, Pogge (1992) proposes a model of institutional
reform in which governmental authority would be subtracted from the nation-state and then
vertically dispersed across a series of nested units operating at various non-state jurisdictional
levels, from global administrations to local governments.
However, Turner and Nussbaum must confront the consequences that follow from the
fact that the human experience of the body is deeply mediated by culture. The project of
constructing a universal principle of corporeal frailty, human capability and disability will
always come up against cultural specificities. There will always be more than one possible
way of constructing a rational argument about the 'self' and his/her relationship to the
'community'. The best way for democratic political forces in the developed world to proceed
is not to fall back on top-down liberal educational missions designed to instill the virtue of
'compassion' in the developing societies that lack democratic governments. Given that such
a mission would inevitably champion a Euro-American-centred perspective, it would end up
suppressing alternative ways of thinking about caring for the 'other' and thereby augment
colonization. The task instead is to deepen the 'democratization of knowledge' and expand
the mutually transformative dialogues between different ethical paradigms (Truong, 2006).
We should turn up the volume on the voices of the subordinate groups who live in specific
institutional conditions of exploitation and domination and take on the democratic lessons
that are embedded in their diverse struggles against capitalist greed and racist discrimination,
state-sponsored religious intolerance and the informal types of gendered oppression and
homophobia that flourish all too often within the family (Young, 2000). This 'minoritarian'
cosmopolitanism (Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge and Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 582) can take
various forms, such as the gathering of testimony from the individuals and groups who have
been traditionally excluded, or the study of a truly comparative political theory, in which the
works of Du Bois, Morrison, Gandhi and Muslim feminists are placed next to the canonical
texts of Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau and Rawls (Dallmayr, 2003). At the same time, we need
to 'provincialize' the Euro-American tradition and consider the possibility that what Euro-
American-centrism regards as universal moral principles may actually be a vernacular discourse
that is heavily marked by historical context, local dialect, domination and exclusion.(Pollock,
Bhabha, Breckenridge and Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 582).
The treatment of refugees brings into sharp reliefthe contradiction between two foundational
legal principles: the sovereignty of the state and the universality of human rights. On the one
hand, the state has an absolute right as a sovereign power to police its own borders and to
establish and enforce its own immigration policy according to its own interests. On the other
hand, the enormously significant developments in human rights law since the end of World
War II have had a significant effect upon state sovereignty. International customary law, the
international human rights agreements and jus cogens (the international peremptory norms
that do not allow any derogations whatsoever) all have their foundation in the universalistic
concept of the dignity of the human being. From this perspective, each person, regardless of
his or her nationality, is the bearer of inalienable rights that every nation-state must respect.
Under jus cogens, severe violations of human dignity such as slavery, torture and genocide
are now absolutely prohibited. Every state is bound by jus cogens; the obligation to refrain
from these practices does not depend upon the state's decision to sign an agreement or to
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xxxiii

accept the jurisdiction of a treaty body, Sovereignty has also been transformed with respect to
the state's authority over its own people. The Nuremberg trials established a new approach to
sovereignty; the court's decisions clearly held that the state could not commit extreme human
rights violations against its own population, and that wrongdoers would be held accountable by
the international community. Since then, it has been argued, with increasing validity in many
quarters, that the international community has the duty to intervene where such violations
are taking place. Even further, various human rights bodies have formulated the principle of
the nation-state's 'duty to protect'; under this emerging doctrine, the state's right to remain
free from outside intervention diminishes insofar as it fails to protect the rights of the persons
living in its territories or under its jurisdiction.
The duties of the nation-state with respect to refugees have been clearly established in
several international human rights agreements. In the terms set down by the 1984 Convention
Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), state
parties may not 'expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing he would be in danger of being subjected to torture'
(Art.3) This duty is unconditional. Even if the state is itself undergoing severe disruptions as
a result of a natural crisis, civil disturbances, or foreign invasion, it may not send a refugee
back to his or her country of nationality if there is a strong likelihood that that person will be
tortured within its territory. Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
the state parties are prohibited from 'expel[ling] or return[ing] ('refouler') a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group, or political opinion.' (Art 33). In the 1951 Convention, the 'non-refoulement' duty is
given a wider expression than it is in the CAT. The 1951 Convention bans the return of the
refugee wherever a threat to his life or freedom exists insofar as that threat arises out of his
or her membership within one of the enumerated categories. The Convention allows for some
conditionality; if it could be reasonably argued that the refugee poses a danger to the security
ofthe host country, or ifthe refugee has been convicted in the final j udgment of a legal process
of a particularly serious crime and therefore endangers the community ofthe host country, the
host country may legitimately disregard the non-refoulement duty. However, the Convention
does not allow state parties to reserve the right to violate Art. 33. States that wish to sign and
ratify the Convention may not carve out exceptions for themselves where the non-refoulement
obligation is concerned. It could nevertheless be argued that the non-refoulement obligation
is quite minimal; it merely stops a state party from returning a refugee to a country if there
is reason to believe that he or she would face torture, or if there is reason to believe that he
or she would face execution or persecution on one of the enumerated grounds. It does not
create an affirmative right ofthe refugee to asylum in the host country. The host country could
meet its non-refoulement obligations either by granting the refugee permanent asylum, by
allowing the refugee to remain within its territory on a temporary basis until the risk oftorture,
execution or persecution ceased, or by transferring him or her to a third country in which the
risk of torture, execution or persecution did not exist.
In Chapter 14, Jacqueline Bhabha addresses one of the more contested dimensions of
refugee law, namely its application to cases involving gender-oriented oppression. Because
the 1951 Convention makes no reference to gender-based persecution, women refugees who
are fleeing this type of human rights violation and who wish to assert their non-refoulement
xxxiv New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

rights and to apply for asylum have had to engage in complex legal manoeuvres. They have
had to argue, first, that women constitute a 'social group' and that where a woman is fleeing
from gender-based oppressive practices in her home country, she can legitimately claim that
she has a 'well-founded fear' of persecution that meets the Convention's threshold standard.
However, the receiving countries have often had a strong bias against open border immigration
policies and have wished to send signals back to the refugee's home country that it is quite
difficult to gain asylum status. This is especially the case where the persecution in question
is widespread; the concern of the receiving country is that large numbers of refugees would
successfully press their claims for asylum in the wake of a favourable decision. For these
reasons, the receiving countries have opposed the gender-based asylum claims of women
refugees in their domestic courts.
Judges have therefore had to contend with a whole set of new and difficult questions.
When a practice such as compulsory veiling, the mandatory practice of an extremely
conservative variant of the Islamic faith, or submission to a strict family planning programme
is widespread in the refugee's home country and enjoys the support of many men and
women, can the receiving country legitimately argue, on cultural relativist grounds, that
the refugee's claim lacks merit? Bhabha comments that the well-intentioned post-colonial
critics who raise objections to the 'Western' universalistic approach to human rights might
be unwittingly providing support for the officials in the receiving states who would like to
downplay the significance of gender oppression in foreign countries in order to undermine
this type of asylum claim. She readily concedes that, in some cases, feminist articulations
of the universalist principle can be coopted by anti-Islamic discourse, such that the West is
constructed as the perfect champion of women's freedom and equality, and the entire Islamic
faith is associated with misogyny, cultural backwardness and human rights violations. She
endorses a pragmatic and institutionally specific approach to human rights that is sensitive to
these strategic complexities and that is capable of detecting the importance of the universalist
principle in the context of refugee and asylum law.
The 1951 Convention, and the related international and state bureaucracies that have been
built up to execute its terms, make a very clear distinction between the voluntary migrant and
the officially recognized refugee. An individual can only gain recognition under the latter
category insofar as he or she can demonstrate that he or she has a 'well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion' (Art 1.2). He or she must show that it is precisely because of that fear that
he or she has left his or her country of nationality and that he or she is unable or unw illing to
seek the protection ofthat country. As Castles argues in Chapter 13, this definition is becoming
highly problematic. The developed countries were dismayed by the growth of refugees in the
early 1990s after the fall of the USSR, the dismantling of the Soviet bloc and the end of the
Cold War. They adopted policies that were deliberately designed to stem the movements of
migrants out of weak and failed states. In one notorious case, the US Coast Guard patrolled
the waters off Haiti's shores to block the mass exodus of Haitian refugees who took to the
seas in rickety craft after the 1991 military overthrow of the Aristede government. Castles
notes that as a result of the discouragement of cross-border refugee movements, the numbers
of officially designated refugees actually declined from 18.2 million in 1993 to 12.1 million
in 2000. However, Castles also points out that these numbers are deceptive. They do not
include the masses who are fleeing across borders to escape persecution but who do not fit
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xxxv

into the criteria established by the 1951 Convention, He uses the much more inclusive term
of 'forced migrants'; he includes, within this category, the officially recognized refugees,
the persons fleeing persecution who have not been designated as such, internally displaced
persons, individuals who are obliged to migrate after man-made and natural disasters, and the
men, women and children who are caught up in the exploitative labour trafficking networks.
According to Castles, the forced migrant often has complex motives for leaving his or her
area of origin. He or she may be seeking to escape a failed state, like the Congo or Mugabe's
Zimbabwe, where catastrophic economic conditions and human rights abuses are both rampant.
Castles draws our attention to the 'asylum-migration nexus': the plural motivations among
migrants and asylum seekers for their flight. Insofar as the political sociology of displacement
expands its scope by looking beyond the specific group that has won official recognition as
refugees, it becomes much better equipped to capture forced migration.
Castles notes that there are complicated hierarchies at work in forced migration. It
is often the best-off workers who can migrate out of a crumbling economy or dangerous
political situation. Even the undocumented migrants who cross borders illegally in search
of work include many individuals who are relatively privileged with respect to their poorest
counterparts in their home communities. In the absence of catastrophic conditions, economic
migrants disproportionately come from families with middle-level incomes in their countries
of origin, and the middle-range developing countries have more emigrating workers per
capita than the poorest countries (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005, p. 101). Nevertheless, the
forced migrants often become the 'have-nots' in their new surroundings. Forced migration
is, in this sense, an expression of globalization's highly stratified character. Further, forced
migration is a phenomenon that reflects our transnational connectedness: the ways in which
social change in the South can have a major impact in distant lands. The developed countries
of the North have been transformed by their legal admission of forced migrants, and their
societies have also been transformed by the influx of undocumented persons. In addition, they
have militarized their borders and adopted increasingly exclusionary immigration policies
in response to migration and security concerns. The migrants who have been turned back
from the borders of the developed world often end up settling in a third group of countries,
namely the' intermediate' states; their settlement in the latter countries has sometimes had a
significant impact upon local labour markets, racial-ethnic tensions and political stability.
At the other end of the continuum of migrants, we can find the highly privileged border
crossers for whom legal status and ease of mobility are signs of elite status and contributing
factors behind social stratification. It is the people who are wealthy, respected and
sociopolitically well connected who can become the true cosmopolitans by travelling at will,
studying abroad, taking international vacations, spending sojourns in foreign countries, and
settling comfortably in a new nation-state with full legal status. It could be argued, then, that
the cosmopolitan sense that one is a 'citizen of the world' who is welcome almost everywhere
and who can travel and sample various ways of life and normative perspectives at will is an
experience that is reserved for the elite.
With Castles, Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider (Chapter 17) call for the displacement of
'methodological nationalism' - the assumption that the nation-state is the structuring principle
of social and political action - with a cosmopolitan sociological perspective. Beck and Sznaider
hold that it is only by adopting the 'cosmopolitan outlook' that we can adequately grasp
contemporary phenomena such as the transnational networks of production and consumption
xxxvi New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

or the growing popular awareness of ecological and terrorist threats that criss-cross national
boundaries. Although nation-states will continue to thrive, transnational relations of
interdependence are ubiquitous and are becoming the object of popular consciousness. It is
certainly true that globalization has led to the standardization of commodities, information
systems and management styles. This homogenization has been greatly aided by the rapid
growth of mass educational systems and transnational intellectual exchange (Meyer, 2000,
p. 235). Nevertheless, Beck's and Sznaider's empirical claim about the profound shift in
popular frameworks may require further discussion. Can we assume that a transnational
phenomenology would be equally valid when we compare, for example, the salience of
transnational connectness in the perceptions of elite individuals, as compared to those of the
people who suffer from severe poverty and social exclusion?
In addition, the political consequences that follow from the assertion that more individuals
are aware of our transnational connectedness are unclear. People could react to the perceived
intensification of international security risks, for example, in any number of ways. If popular
fears about terrorist attacks become commonplace, right-wing forces could seize upon that
sense of vulnerability as an opportunity to advance an authoritarian agenda. By the same
token, it is possible that President Barack Obama benefited from American voters' exhaustion
with the Bush administration's fear-mongering in his historic 2008 election victory, and that
many were genuinely concerned about the fact that the USA was widely regarded abroad as
a 'rogue' nation.
The abstract theory of ethical cosmopolitanism risks becoming parochial insofar as it
eschews engagement with the messy world of concrete political struggles; an adequate moral
theory must value the empowerment of the subordinated groups and excluded individuals
in their specific locations within institutional settings (Dallmayr, 2003, p. 438). In addition,
cosmopolitan discourse does not have a natural partisan tendency; in its abstract form, it is
normatively ambiguous. It is possible, for example, that the leading candidate for a truly
global ideology is the neoliberal belief in the virtue of limited government and the primacy
of the free market. Born out of the Thatcherite and Reaganite transformations in right-wing
parties in the developed countries and followed soon after by various accommodations on the
part of centrists and some leftists, neoliberalism received a major boost as the shockwaves
from the collapse of the Soviet bloc were felt throughout the world. Emerging in domestic
political battles and greatly aided by the contingent downfall of state socialism, neoliberalism
was then aggressively promoted by the USA as it enjoyed an unrivalled dominance over global
financial and trade institutions (Berger, 2000, pp. 51-52). At the same time, the disadvantaged
have definitely benefited from the progressive cosmopolitan outlook that has affirmed the
universal dignity ofthe human person, bolstered human rights claims, and inspired the effective
political mobilization of the excluded. We can observe this progressive type of cosmopolitan
orientation at work in the remarkably vigorous transnational movements that are addressing
issues related to human rights, peace, aboriginal rights and environmental justice.
Social justice struggles targeting the nation-state remain crucial to the advance of liberty,
equality, solidarity and democracy. Even if progressive cosmopolitanisms did bear fruit in the
form of redistributive policies, the advancement of gender justice, the promotion of human
rights and the mobilization of the excluded, each social justice struggle would still have to
retain deep roots in the local resistance traditions and would still have to usher into the local
political process a series of radical transformations. As Calhoun cautions in the closing essay
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three xxxvii

to this volume, •cosmopolitanism without the strengthening oflocal democracy is likely to be

a very elite affair' (p, 397),

ANNA MARIE SMITH

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 Part I
Crisis of the Nation-State?
This page intentionally left blank
 [1]
Has globalization ended
the rise and rise of the nation-state?
Michael Mann
Sociology, UCLA

ABSTRACT
Using a model distinguishing local, national, inter-national, transnational
and global interaction networks, I analyse four supposed 'threats' to
nation-states - global capitalism, environmental danger, identity politics
and post-nuclear geopolitics. All four actually impact differently on nation-
states in different regions, contain both state-weakening and strengthening
tendencies, and increase the significance of inter-national as well as
transnational networks. Capitalist transformation is slightly weakening the
nation-states of the north (most clearly so within the EU), yet economic
development would strengthen southern nation-states. The decline of
'hard geopolitics' in a post-nuclear age weakens northern, but not most
southern, states. Yet 'soft geopolitics' is everywhere bringing new state
functions and maintaining the strength of inter-national networks. Identity
politics, contrary to most views, probably strengthens nationally bound
politics. These patterns are too varied to permit us to argue simply either
that the nation-state and the nation-state system are strengthening or
weakening. But the expansion of global networks seems to weaken local
interaction networks more than national ones.

KEYWORDS
The state; capitalism; new social movements; globalization; networks.

INTRODUCTION
The human sciences seem full of enthusiasts claiming that a new form
of human society is emerging. The most enthusiastic compare today
with the eighteenth century, whose Industrial Revolution, whose 'mod-
ernism' and whose 'Enlightenment' supposedly revolutionized human
society. They say we are in the throes of a comparable transition to
a 'post-industrial' or 'postmodern' society. Other terminologies imply
rather less revolutionary change. Terms such as 'late capitalism',
4 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE

'late modernity' or 'radical modernity' are used to suggest varying

degrees of continuous versus disruptive change. 'Globalist' words also
invoke varying degrees of enthusiasm: 'global capitalism' may refer
only to a major extension of an old economy, while 'global society'
usually implies a radically novel phenomenon in the history of human
society.
The enthusiasts comprise a very varied group of litterateurs, philo-
sophes, historians, sociologists, political and business economists,
geographers and environmentalists. They agree about very little - espe-
cially about whether the changes are to be welcomed. But on one point
they do agree: contemporary changes are weakening the nation-
state. From postmodernists like Baudrillard or Lyotard or Jameson
to geographers like Harvey or Taylor to sociologists like Giddens or
Lash and Urry, to the business economists well represented by The
Economist, come similar statements about the 'undermining', 'under-
cutting', 'outflanking' or 'marginalization' of the nation-state (for recent
exemplars, see Taylor, 1996; Lash and Urry, 1994; Featherstone, 1990;
Harvey, 1989; The Economist, 1995). Some qualify this in one respect.
Since 'ethnicity' looms large in scenarios of 'postmodern fragmentation',
these often see nationalism as resurgent in the world today. But for the
old nation-state, we find largely epitaphs.
Many enthusiasts are west Europeans - not surprisingly, since this
particular region of the globe offers most political support to their
epitaph for the state. Many (both marxian and neoclassical) are
materialists who point to the great changes under way in capitalism and
believe these will necessarily transform the rest of the social structure.
The core of most arguments rests on the technological-informational
innovations of our times. Transport and information systems providing
rapid (often instantaneous) access to the world provide the infrastruc-
tures of a global society. I accept that this potential infrastructure of
globalism exists: the logistics of communication and so of power have
indeed been revolutionized. Persons, goods and especially messages
circulate the globe so that the enthusiastic vision of a single global
society is a technologically possible one. But is it actuality? To suggest
that it is, various groups of enthusiasts advance four main theses.

1 Capitalism, now become global, transnational, post-industrial, 'infor-

mational', consumerist, neoliberal and 'restructured', is undermining
the nation-state - its macroeconomic planning, its collectivist welfare
state, its citizens' sense of collective identity, its general caging of
social life.
2 New 'global limits', especially environmental and population threats,
producing perhaps a new 'risk society', have become too broad and
too menacing to be handled by the nation-state alone.
473
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 5

ARTICLES

3 'Identity politics' and 'new social movements', using new technology,

increase the salience of diverse local and transnational identities at
the expense of both national identities and those broad class identi-
ties which were traditionally handled by the nation-state. For this and
for the previous reason we are witnessing the stirrings of a new
transnational' civil society', social movements for peace, human rights
and environmental and social reform which are becoming truly
global.
4 Post-nuclearism undermines state sovereignty and 'hard geo-politics',
since mass mobilization warfare underpinned much of modern
state expansion yet is now irrational. Martin Shaw's perception
of the emergence of a 'world state' is perhaps the most measured
version of this thesis (see pp. 497-513 of this journal). It is very
much a minority view in the discipline of International Rela-
tions, most of which remains attached to the study of the sovereign
state.
So the empirical part of this article will investigate whether these four
nation-state-weakening theses are correct. Since they downplay political
power relations, it also considers two political counter-theses.
A State institutions, both domestic and geopolitical, still have causal
efficacy because they too (like economic, ideological and military insti-
tutions) provide necessary conditions for social existence: 1 the
regulation of aspects of social life which are distinctively 'territorially
centred' (see Mann, 1986: Ch. 1). Thus they cannot be the mere conse-
quence of other sources of social power.
B Since states vary greatly, if (A) is true, these variations will cause
variations in other spheres of social life. Even within Europe states
differ in size, power, geography and degree of centralization. Across
the globe, variations dramatically increase: in degree of democracy,
level of development, infra structural power, geopolitical power,
national indebtedness, etc. They also inhabit very different regional
settings. Can contemporary capitalism, even if reinforced by environ-
mental limits, 'cultural postmodernity' and demilitarization, render
all this variation irrelevant, and have the same effects on all coun-
tries? Or will these variations cause variation among these forces, and
so limit globalization?

Only the most breathless of enthusiasts would deny all validity to these
counter-theses - or to the survival of the nation-state as wielder of some
economic, ideological, military and political resources. The task is to
establish degrees of relative causality: to what extent is the nation-state
being transformed, to what extent is it declining - or even perhaps still
growing?
474
6 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE

But to establish this we must also make some conceptual distinctions.

We can roughly distinguish five socio-spatial networks of social inter-
action in the world today:
1 local networks - which for present purposes just means subnational
networks of interaction;
2 national networks, structured or (more neutrally) bounded by the
nation-state;
3 inter-national networks, that is relations between nationally constituted
networks. Most obviously, these include the 'hard geopolitics' of
inter-state relations which centre on war, peace and alliances. But
they also include 'soft geopolitics' between states - negotiations about
more peaceable and particular matters like air transport communica-
tions, tax treaties, air pollution, etc. And they include relations
between networks that are more nationally than state-constituted: for
example, the emergence of 'national champions' playing on a broader
playing-field - whether these are football teams or giant corporations;
4 transnational networks, passing right through national boundaries,
being unaffected by them. These might not be very extensive -
perhaps a religious sect organized across two neighbouring countries
- or they might be continent-wide or even worldwide. Many trans-
national arguments about contemporary society rest on a 'macro-
regional' base. Examples are the frequent distinctions between
'Liberal/Anglo-Saxon', 'Nordic / Social Democratic' or 'Christian
Democratic / corporatist' forms of contemporary social organization;
5 global networks cover the world as a whole - or, perhaps more realis-
tically, they cover most of it. But we should distinguish between net-
works which radiate universalistically or particularistic ally across the
globe. The feminist movement may spread through almost all coun-
tries, but usually only among rather particular, smallish groups. The
Catholic Church has some presence in all continents but only has quite
a narrow base across Asia, while being near-universal across Latin
America. The capitalism evoked by many of the enthusiasts is a uni-
versal global network, evenly diffusing through economic and social
life just about everywhere. Thus global networks might be formed by
either a single universal network or by a more segmented series of net-
works between which existed rather particularistic relations.
Over the last centuries local interaction networks have clearly dimin-
ished in relative weight; while longer-distance networks - national,
inter-national and transnational- have become denser, structuring more
of people's lives. Genuinely global networks have emerged relatively
recently. Note that global networks need not be the same as transna-
tional networks, though many enthusiasts equate them. Nor are they
necessarily economic in nature. Global networks may be constituted by
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geopolitics (as Shaw argues) or by ideological movements like a religion

or socialism or feminism or neoliberalism - the combination amounting
perhaps to a new transnational civil society.
Since national and inter-national networks are constituted or funda-
mentally constrained by the nation-state, the future of the nation-state
thus turns critically upon the answer to two questions: Is the social signif-
icance of national and inter-national networks declining relative to some
combination of local and transnational networks? And to the extent that global
networks are emerging, what is the relative contribution to them of
national/inter-national versus local/transnational networks?

THE 'MODEST NATION-STATE' OF THE NORTH

I start with the most familiar and dominant form of state in the world
today. In the 'west', or more precisely the 'northwest' of western Europe
and its white colonies, arose a state claiming formal political sovereignty
over 'its' territories and a legitimacy based on the 'people' or 'nation'
inhabiting them. This is what we mean by the nation-state.
The regulatory powers of such states expanded through several
centuries. First, from the end of the Middle Ages they increasingly
plausibly claimed a monopoly of judicial regulation and military force.
Then, in the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth centuries they spon-
sored integrating communications infrastructures and basic control of the
poor. The twentieth century saw welfare states, macroeconomic planning
and the mobilization of mass citizen nationalism. All the while more states
legitimated themselves in terms of 'the people', either 'representing' the
people (liberal democracies) or 'organically embodying' it (authoritarian
regimes), with varying degrees of civil, political and social citizenship. To
a degree, therefore, northwesterners became 'caged' into national inter-
action networks, and these became supplemented by the inter-national
relations between nation-states which we know by the term 'geopolitics'.
This is the now familiar story of 'the rise and rise' of the nation-state
and the nation-state system - to which I have contributed myself (Mann,
1986, 1993a). Yet we should note that the expansion of these national and
inter-national networks always proceeded alongside the expansion of
certain 'transnational' power relations, especially those of industrial
capitalism and its attendant ideologies (liberalism, socialism), plus the
broader cultural networks provided in the northwest by European I
Christian I 'white' senses of collective identity. National and inter-
national interaction networks thus grew much more at the expense of
local than of transnational networks. For example, in the very period in
the late nineteenth century when European states were deepening their
national education and public health infrastructures, raising tariffs and
beginning to drift nearer to war against each other (examples of national
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GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE

and inter-national caging), transnational trade was rocketing to form the

same proportion of world production as it now forms, and the north-
western powers were acting together, with a smug sense of cultural supe-
riority, to Christianize, exploit and drug the Chinese, Indeed nation-state
growth presupposed a broader global expansion, most obviously to finance
it, but also perhaps because a sense of nationhood may have presupposed
the sense of European / Christian / white superiority which endowed all
the classes and both sexes of the northwest with a sense of their own
moral worth and equality, Indeed, the last great expansionist surge of the
nation-state, from 1945 to the 1960s, may have also involved both. States
were flush with funds from massive economic expansion and they pos-
sessed the war- and reconstruction-generated institutions to spend them;
and northwestern nations, having taught their colonials the values of 'civ-
ilization', now 'granted' them independence in their own European form,
as nation-states. Thus the past saw the rise of transnational capitalism and
cultural identities alongside the rise of the nation-state and its inter-
national system. They have always possessed a complex combination of
relative autonomy and symbiotic interdependence.
Most northwestern states also lost certain functions during the period
of their expansion. As they became more 'secular', they relinquished
powers over moral regulation, which they had in principle possessed
in association with Churches (though Church rather than state infra-
structures had usually enforced such moral regulation in earlier
centuries). Remember also that most of economic life had never come
into the realm of the state: we call it 'private' property. Thus much of
social life remained or became more private, outside the sphere of compe-
tence of the nation-state, even during its great period of expansion.
Property remained private, gays remained in the closet. Capitalism and
morality were substantially autonomous of the state. I suggest later that
moral autonomy is now declining.
Thus only a 'modest nation-state' became dominant in the northwest.
In the course of the twentieth century it defeated three rivals. One was
the 'multi-national empire': the dynastic empires of the Habsburgs,
Romanovs and Ottomans, with weaker states and little national identity
- a less 'nation-statist' alternative. But the other two defeated states were
actually far more nation-statist. Fascism sought a much stronger, author-
itarian state which would supposedly embody the essence of a more
rigidly and more ethnically defined nation. By 1945 fascism was discred-
ited - at least for the two generations which have followed. State
socialism also sought a stronger state (supposedly only in the short run).
Though not strictly nationalist, its increasing tendency to equate the
proletariat with a broader 'people' or 'masses' gave it a similar prin-
ciple of legitimation. And its economic autarchy and rigid surveillance
greatly intensified its 'national' caging. Its discrediting lasted longer and
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seemed finished (for the present) by 1991. Both of these defeated regimes
also claimed a monopoly of morality, which the 'modest nation-state'
never did. It was the responsibility of the state to cultivate 'Soviet Man'
or what was 'consciously German'. Had these more ambitious 'nation-
states' both triumphed and the world had then globalized, its global
society would have been constituted by a segmental series of global
networks between which the most particularistic, and probably warlike,
relations would have existed. Since they did not, any subsequent glob-
alism might be expected to be rather more universal in character.
Since 1945 the modest victor further diffused across almost all the rest
of 'the north', i.e. the whole European continent and increasing regions
of East and South Asia. Its formal trappings have also dominated 'the
south', while all states meet in a forum called 'The United Nations'. The
modest nation-state might seem to dominate the entire globe. In some
limited senses it actually does. Only a few states do not base their legit-
imacy on the nation, or lack a monopoly of domestic coercion or real
territorial boundedness. Almost all manage to implement policies
oriented towards basic population control, health and education.
Plunging mortality and rising literacy have multiple causes but some
lie in the realm of effective public policy. For these reasons I will go
ahead and describe contemporary states as nation-states. Yet most of
them actually possess rather limited control over their territories and
boundaries, while their claims to represent the nation are often specious.
For much of the world a true nation-state remains more aspiration for
the future than present reality. The nation-state's rise has been global,
but modest and very uneven. The modest nation-state came to dominate
the 'north', has been part of its expansion and represents a desired future
for the bulk of the world's people. Is all this now threatened?

THE CAPITALIST THREAT

The enthusiasts have correctly identified many important transforma-
tions of capitalism. It is not necessary here to document capitalism's use
of new 'informational' and 'post-industrial' technology to expand
through much of the world and penetrate more of social life. But how
great is its threat to the nation-state? And just how 'global' and/or
'transnational' is it?
In a formal geographic sense capitalism is now more or less global.
Two great geopolitical events permitted massive extension. First, decol-
onization largely ended the segmentation of the world economy into
separate imperial zones. Second, the collapse of Soviet autarchy opened
up most of Eurasia to capitalist penetration. Only Iran, China and a
handful of smaller communist countries now maintain partial blockages,
and these are declining or may be expected to start declining soon. China
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retains distinct property forms (mixing private with varieties of public

ownership and control), and there still also remain (declining) areas of
subsistence economy scattered through the world. Yet capitalist
commodity exchange clearly dominates. With no confident adversary in
sight, capitalism is becoming - at least minimally - global. That was not
so in 1940, or even in 1980. It is obviously a major transformation.
But are its global networks 'pure' in the sense of being singularly uni-
versal, or do other more particularistic principles of social organization
also help constitute them? An economy may be global, but this may be
conferred by help from national and inter-national networks of interac-
tion. After all, more than 80 per cent of world production is still for the
domestic national market. Since economic statistics are gathered at the
level of the nation-state, it is unknown what is the relative contribution
to this of truly national exchanges compared to the contributions made
by multiple local interaction networks. The national economy is presum-
ably considerably less integrated than the statistic suggests - especially
in backward countries and bigger advanced countries like the USA or
Australia. Yet the nation-state clearly does systematically structure many
economic networks. The ownership, assets and R&D of 'multinational'
corporations (including banks, mutuals and insurance firms) remain dis-
proportionately in their 'home' state, and they still lean on it for human
capital (education), communications infrastructures and economic pro-
tectionism (Carnoy, 1993; Castells, 1993). Nonetheless, even among the
more fixed multinationals, their sales reach, organization of production
and investment flows are also substantially transnational. Strategic
alliances with corporations of other 'nationality' are now proliferating,
weakening the national identity of property - though many of these
arrangements occur to evade protectionism and might decline if it did.
Finance is far more transnational, as evidenced by the growing
complexity of financial markets and of the models supposed to be
capable of explaining them - from random walk to chaos theories. Yet
its institutions continue to exhibit bureaucratic regularity, much of it
with a pronounced national character. The employees of Nikko Europe
start their London workday before the Tokyo stock market closes. They
relay the latest information first to their European-based customers,
who are actually mostly Japanese corporations. Then, as Wall Street
awakes, the information is transmitted westward and London shuts
down for the night. Financial markets also reveal a national/transna-
tional duality. On the one hand, trading in government bonds, in
currencies, in futures and in wholesale dealing between banks, is largely
transnational, often distinctively 'offshore', slushing through the bound-
aries of states subject to very few controls. On the other hand, company
shares tend to be fixed to particular national stock markets and to
national corporate laws and accountancy practices (Wade, 1996).
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Of course, western Europe has gone more transnational, sponsoring

a unique degree of continental economic integration. Here lies a genuine
single market, a movement which will probably end in a single currency
within twenty years (at least in its core), and predominantly 'Euro-'
rather than national attempts at protectionism. Here 'national champion'
corporations are becoming 'Euro-champions', assisted as much by EU
government as by the nation-state.
Obviously, such economic complexities should be explored at a much
greater length than I can attempt here. But two points emerge: Europe
is extreme (this will be further explored later), and real capitalist inter-
action networks remain profoundly mixed. Symbiosis between the
national and the transnational remains.
A third point also emerges: most 'transnational' economic relations
cannot be necessarily equated with a global universalism. The bulk of
capitalist activity is more 'trilateral' than global, being concentrated in
the three regions of the advanced 'north': Europe, North America and
East Asia. These contain over 85 per cent of world trade, over 90 per
cent of production in advanced sectors like electronics, plus the head-
quarters of all but a handful of the top 100 multinationals (including
banks). This does not necessarily mean capitalism is not global. It may
only indicate that the north is rich, the south is poor - and that both
are locked together in a global network of interaction. But it does suggest
that capitalism retains a geo-economic order, dominated by the
economies of the advanced nation-states. Clusters of nation-states
provide the stratification order of globalism. Among other consequences,
this protects the citizens of the north: the poorly educated child of an
unskilled worker in Britain or the United States will enjoy far better
material conditions of existence (including twenty more years of life)
than will his/her counterpart in Brazil or India. True, inequalities
within all these nation-states are widening, yet it is almost inconceiv-
able that the bulk of the privileges of national citizens in northern
countries could be removed. That would cause such social disorder as
to be incommensurate with a stable and profitable capitalism. The
nation-state provides some of the structure, and some of the stratifica-
tion structure, of the global networks of capitalism. If the commodity
rules, it only does so entwined with the rule of - especially northern -
citizenship.
The global economy is also subject to loose and predominantly
'soft' inter-national regulation in the shape of organizations like G7,
GATT, the World Bank or the IMF. These are also northern-dominated.
Some of these are involved in seemingly endless negotiations of trade lib-
eralization - and these are likely to drag on a lot longer since national
governments have been recently raising non-tariff barriers. We are
nowhere near global free trade, but we may be moving a little closer and
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this is at present ideologically dominant. But is this just another liberal-

ization phase in the normal historical oscillation around the middle zone
between the free trade and protectionist poles? That depends on the res-
olution of other tendencies discussed in this article.
So, at the moment and probably also for the near future, a rapidly
globalizing economy does not only acquire its character from transna-
tional networks of interaction. What adds up to the global is a very
complex mix of the local, the national, the inter-national (represented in
my discussion mostly by northern trilateralism) - and the truly trans-
national. The transnational commodity does not rule the globe.
Over time some of these national and inter-national structurings may
decline. Northern domination of the world economy may diminish
because of the pressures of comparative advantage. Apart from very
high-tech activities, much productive enterprise may migrate to the
lower costs of the south, producing more globalization (though not
necessarily much reducing inequality). But so far migration has operated
not by some 'transnational' logic (of random walk?) but by some combi-
nation of four other principles: the possession of useful natural
resources, geographical propinquity (neighbouring countries), geopolit-
ical alliances (friendly countries), and state and civil society stability
(predictable countries). Whereas the first factor is found fairly randomly
through the world - and so oil alone can develop rather backward,
distant countries - the last three factors are generally interconnected.
The historical development of the major northern economies emerged
amid broader regional settings, from which neighbouring states and
societies also benefited. Thus expansion has mostly been to the Koreas
and the Mexicos, friendly neighbours with relatively developed nations
and states, rather than, say, to most African countries. Nor does most
growth take a regional, 'enclave' pattern within states (except where
raw materials matter, or where extension is over a border and the neigh-
bouring government sponsors 'enterprise zones'). Development then
tends to diffuse across the core territories of these states, aiding the
development of their overall civil societies and their drift towards
becoming nation-states. Thus extension of the north - and so global-
ization - has depended upon, and in turn reinforced, the nation-states
benefiting from it. This form of globalization reinforces national
networks of interaction.
Since finance capital seems more transnational than industrial capital,
its constraints upon the nation-state are usually those most emphasized
by the enthusiasts. Its mobility and velocity produce financial movements
which dwarf the fiscal resources of states and which constrain two of the
three props of post-war state fiscal policy - interest rates and currency
valuation (taxation being less affected). Yet it is difficult to assess the over-
all significance of this, for two reasons. First, the numbers do not offer
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real precision about power relations. Since currencies, shares, futures, etc.
can be traded many times over in a single day, the paper value of 'finan-
cial flows' vastly exceeds that of world trade, and continues to grow. But
power cannot be simply read off such sums. What are being traded are
property rights to raw materials, manufactured goods and (increasingly)
services, almost all of which have much greater fixity of location and
therefore presumably a degree of national identity.
Second, it is not clear how effective macroeconomic planning ever was
in the northwest. It seemed effective while massive growth was occurring
and governments had access to surpluses. Many were able to be mildly
interventionist (though selective incentives were generally more effec-
tive than physical controls). But since then we have seen the collapse
not only of Keynesian economics but also of economic theory in generaL
Economists now more or less admit they have no explanation of any
of the great booms or slumps of the twentieth century (or at least one
that does not depend on singular events like great world wars).
Macroeconomic planning was a general ideology surrounding some
highly abstract concepts, from which were precariously derived some
technical tools (including, most fundamentally, national accounting) and
policies (which in fact also depended on contingencies). Macroeconomic
planning still contains such a mixture, though its emphasis has changed.
The ideological pretensions and the ability to expand spending have cer-
tainly declined. Thus we may expect looser and fiscally more cautious
national/inter-national (i.e. trilateral) macroeconomic policies: a prolifer-
ation of G7 and GATT guidelines and piecemeal liberalizing agreements;
MITI-style 2 collaboration and incentive programmes more than national-
ization or direct state investment; central banks more than politicians; less
the pretence of controlling markets than of signalling intentions to them;
and, above all, no increases in taxation masquerading as grandiose
economic theory.
Nor are the reasons for these less than dramatic power reductions
easy to interpret. As the economy has internationalized, real living stan-
dards have stagnated and inequalities widened (apart from East Asia).
If national governments are increasingly constrained in their economic
planning and welfarist pretensions, this might be due to either trans-
national tendencies or recession - transformations such as 'restructuring'
may be a response to both. For example, Latin American 'import-
substitution' policies throve on the regional economic expansion made
possible by the Second World War; this expansion collapsed under the
mountain of indebtedness accumulated by easy credit during the 1970s
followed by the stagnation and inflation of the 1980s. 'Restructuring' is
now extreme across much of the region, virtually eliminating national
macroeconomic planning and trimming welfare states. But this may
result less from transnationalism than from the power conferred on
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finance capital and its major institutions by the burden of debt: the cred-
itors can enforce repayment terms. The creditors comprise the usual
mixed bag: banks with national identities but transnational activities,
inter-national and predominantly northern agencies like the World Bank
and the IMF, and the US government with the dual motive of protecting
Ameri-can investors and making the region more geopolitically and geo-
economically friendly / subordinate to itself. In contrast, however, current
Korean 'restructuring' can be a mere reorientation of rather stronger
macroeconomic policy because, though it had considerable debt, its
economic growth meant the debt could be paid off and further foreign
investment attracted.
Similarly, the fiscal crisis afflicting most states of the north and south
alike may be more the product of recession than of transnational capi-
talism. My previous work (Mann, 1986, 1993) gives me the confidence
to say that, at least since the thirteenth century, citizens have only consis-
tently agreed to pay a higher proportion of their incomes in taxes during
wartime. Their reluctance to stump up during the peaceful 1970s and
later, in a period of recession (when their real incomes were stagnant
or falling), is hardly surprising. It is the historical norm, not the unique
product of 'postmodernity' or 'globalism'. Political movements resting
traditionally on the nation-state, like Social Democracy, Christian
Democracy and the US Democratic Party, have indeed entered some-
thing of a crisis. They have stalled and entered modest decline (more
in terms of their ability to devise radical policies than to attract votes).
Again, it is not entirely clear why. Did it result from the new powers
of transnational capital (plus perhaps Euro-institutions in Europe) or
from citizens refusing to support 'tax and spend' policies amid stagnant
or declining real incomes? Probably both, but I have not yet seen
the research which could clearly differentiate these rival hypotheses.
Of course, if growth does not resume, or if its unevenness continues to
widen inequality and deepen unemployment, some of its political effects
in weakening the Centre-Left might be similar to those identified by the
enthusiasts. Social citizenship seems to have peaked in the north and it
may now be in moderate secular decline. Yet this could be reversed by
a variety of future trends: economic recovery, changing demographics
(i.e. an ageing or a better-educated population should reduce unem-
ployment and so inequality) or political backlashes.
Yet national economies also vary considerably - in their prosperity,
their cohesion and their power. Consider first the three main regions
of the north. North America is dominated by its superpower, the
USA. This has an unusual state, dominated by its unique war machine
and (rather meagre) social security system. Most other governmental
activities which in most other northern countries are mainly the province
of the central state (criminal justice, education and most welfare
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programmes) are the concern of fifty separate 'states' or local govern-

ments in the USA. Three major industries are closely entwined with the
federal government, agriculture, the military-industrial complex and
health care, and may be said to be somewhat (if particularistically)
planned. They are likely to remain so - though the current plan is to
downsize the military by just under a quarter over two decades. Many
other industries have closer relations with 'state' and local governments,
for example property development and construction. Federal legislation
has been traditionally tight in the area of labour relations and monop-
olies, especially restraining the growth of US unions and banks. But
there has been little macroeconomic planning by any level of govern-
ment. The principal 'planning' agency (over interest rates) is the Federal
Reserve Bank, which is largely autonomous of government. There is no
serious American industrial policy; this is left to the post-war power-
houses of the US economy, the large corporations. Much of this is due
to the radical separation of powers enshrined by the US constitution. A
coordinated political economy cannot easily be run by a President and
his cabinet, two Houses of Congress, a Supreme Court and fifty 'states'
(which are also fragmented by the same separation of powers) - espe-
cially when they belong to different political parties. Thus it is difficult
to see much of a weakening of US government powers, since these were
never exercised very actively. Of course, recession alone means they
cannot be exercised now. Amid stagnant family living standards, no
government agency can raise the taxes to throw money after any policy.
On the other hand, in certain other respects, it might be said that the
American nation-state is actually tightening. Organizations as diverse as
banks, TV stations and newspapers are becoming more nationally inte-
grated and the recent absorption of staggering numbers of immigrants
(immigration is back to the pre-1914 level) by the school system and the
labour market indicates formidable national solidarity.
Of course, the USA has been influenced by capitalist transformations.
Competitive pressures from the two other northern geo-economies have
been most visible in the creation of NAFTA, a free trade area embracing
the USA, Canada and Mexico, with some prospects for its eventual
extension to other stable economies in Central and South America.
Though the Canadian and US economies were similarly advanced and
already partially integrated, the combination of 'southern' Mexico and
the 'northern' USA has led some to view NAFTA as a microcosm of the
new global economy. Yet Mexico exemplifies those 'principles of orderly
extension' I noted earlier. It is a neighbour, a friend and a very stable
state: ruled for seventy years by a single party, mildly coercive but so
far capable of responding institutionally to pressure. It provides quite
good infrastructures and a fairly literate and healthy labour force, and
a nation beset by no general civil conflict.3
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US hegemony in the continent also makes NAFTA unique - and very

different to the European Union. Canada is an advanced but small client
economy with a weak state - perhaps shortly to disintegrate. Mexico is
much poorer, and has recently become more debt-ridden and a little
less politically stable. But the USA is itself wavering, beset by doubts
about free trade and Latino immigration, and its political fragmentation
makes coordinated decision making difficult. Thus NAFTA embodies
three distinct power processes: it is a kind of 'mini global economy'; yet
it is also geopolitically dominated by one nation-state; and this nation-
state has a peculiarly fragmented polity and political economy. The
combination of the three is unique in the world, but - as we are seeing
- the entwining of transnational capitalist transformation with political
and geopolitical institutions is quite normal.
East Asia is at present also dominated by a single nation-state, though
Japan is not a military superpower. Japanese political economy differs
from both North American and European, with far more coordination
between the state and capitalist corporations (and, in a more dependent
role, the labour unions): 'Governing the market', Wade (1990) calls it;
'Governed interdependence', say Weiss and Hobson (1995). Such
national coordination has been adapted in varying forms across the
smaller economies of East Asia. These include active industrial policies
centring on selective tax rates or conditional subsidies for key or export
sectors, public absorbing of risk for innovation and government coor-
dination of inter-firm collaboration for technology upgrading (Weiss,
1995). These countries also have political stability and an advanced civil,
i.e. 'national', society which is stable, literate and broadly honest. They
have also experienced phenomenal growth. Though growth is stuttering
in Japan, this is not true of the rest of East Asia.
Thus these East Asian governments have a buoyant tax base and the
growth to support debt, and their countries are attractive to foreign
investors. They can raise taxes to expand welfare and they can bargain
with foreign business from a position of strength. They have fairly equal
income distribution and they provide extensive public services like edu-
cation and housing. They protect their domestic industries, if in different
ways. Korea and Malaysia have their own automobile industries behind
protectionist markets. Thailand takes a different East Asian tack. Japanese
automobile plants are already there, the American majors are now nego-
tiating to move in plants. The Thai government seems to deal from
strength. It offers no tax breaks and requires substantial local component
ratios. The Philippines offers a much bigger domestic market, big tax con-
cessions and no strings. Yet the auto manufacturers prefer Thailand.
Why? They say it is because the Thai government is both more honest
and more stable. American and Japanese accountants can calculate future
profit and loss much more precisely there (USA Today, 5 March 1966).
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Presumably not all the desirable difference comes from the characteris-
tics of government. Thai society probably also embodies more literacy,
more discipline, more honesty, But these are all characteristics of a
national network of interaction, of the nation-state. East Asia offers dif-
ferent combinations of capitalist transformation and nation-states.
Europe is the only one of the three regions to have experienced signif-
icant political transformation. 4 This has reduced what we might call the
'particularistic' autonomy of its member states. They can no longer do
their own peculiar things across many policy areas - from the labels on
products to the torturing of suspected terrorists. In the long run this may
impact on major constitutional variations. The increasing lobbying pres-
sure on both Euro- and national government (which must now represent
more interests more effectively than it did in the past), combined with the
EU's regional policy (offering many financial resources), seems likely to
produce more uniform distribution of power between central and local
government. Constitutional rights of citizens and minorities are also con-
verging. The states are both converging and losing powers to Brussels.
The original impetus for all this was mainly geopolitical and military: to
prevent a third devastating war in the continent, more specifically to bind
Germany into a peaceful concert of nation-states. The United States had its
own, primarily geopolitical, reasons for encouraging it. Thus the 'Six' and
the 'Nine' were being bound together before much of the capitalist trans-
formation had occurred. But since the chosen mechanisms of binding were
primarily economic, they were then intensified by this transformation. The
economy of Europe has thus been substantially transnationalized.
Yet the European Union also remains an association between nation-
states, an inter-national network of interaction. Specific geopolitical
agreements between Germany and France, with the support of their
client Benelux states, have always been its motor of growth. Germany
and France, like the other states, have lost many particularistic
autonomies. But, when allied, they remain the masters on most big
issues. Ask Germans what economic sovereignty, ask the French what
political sovereignty they have lost, and they are hard pressed to answer.
The minor and economically weaker states may seem to have lost more,
but their sovereignty on the big issues was more limited in the past.
Britain has stood to lose most, because of its historic geopolitical inde-
pendence from the rest of Europe. And they vote and acquire ministries
based on a combination of their population size and economic muscle.
They' are states and national economies, represented by statesmen (and
women) and national technocrats and business leaders. This is not tradi-
tional 'hard' geopolitics, since the agenda is primarily economic and
the participants believe war between them is unthinkable. It is 'soft' geo-
politics structured by much denser inter-national (plus the remaining
national) networks of interaction.
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Thus Europe has been politically and economically transformed, with

a substantial decline in the particularistic autonomy and sovereignty of
its nation-states. Though the mechanisms for negotiating these transfers
of powers have been largely geopolitical (supplemented by the enthu-
siasm of Euro-wide federalists), they are institutionalized through rules,
institutions and practices that have become fairly transnational, trans-
forming social expectations right across Europe. Yet all this coexists with
a far denser, if 'softer', set of inter-national networks. Since the density
of both is historically unprecedented - no Delian or Hanseatic League
or confederacy ever penetrated so transnationally or inter-nationally into
social life - we have no political term to describe it. The political legacy
of the Greek language is finally superseded. Maybe the best term is just
'Euro'. If so, it may not be the future of the world.
It would be unwise to generalize about 'the south', given its variety.
Some of it may well follow East Asia into the north. A genuine transna-
tional penetration would integrate bits of territory here, there and
everywhere, by 'random walk', almost regardless of state boundaries.
But this seems rather unlikely, since stable government, social order,
and education and health systems still seem the minimum of what
substantial foreign investment and economic development require, and
geopolitical alliances retain some, though less, relevance (unless some
new world tension replaces the old Cold War). These all require social
organization coordinated at the national or state leveL What other
agency can provide them? If Chile is making it into the north, then it
will be because its already fairly stable state and civil society were rein-
forced by a firm anti-Leftism, a state-imposed order and a state-imposed
economic neoliberalism which were attractive to foreign investors, espe-
cially the USA. If the richer Arab countries make it, it will be because
of their oil - but this has also been accompanied by formidable states.
China and India - one-third of the world's population - offer different
combinations of massive economic resources, strong civil (i.e. 'national')
societies and ambitious state regulation. Will the sense of national citi-
zenship in such countries be diminished or strengthened by economic
success? Surely it will be strengthened.
At the other extreme deeply troubled states in Africa seem to be frag-
menting for premodern rather than postmodern reasons. Their claim to
modernity, including the constitution of a nation-state, proved paper-
thin. International capitalism would like to prop them up, not to
fragment them. But it has insufficient local power or attention-span to
do so. There are more attractive areas, with stronger states and civil
societies.
Thus the vital issue for the nation-state across most of the world is
the level of development - of the economy narrowly considered, but
also of two of the preconditions of this: the 'civility' of the country and
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ARTICLES

the infrastructural capacity of the state, The entwined expansion of all

three. produced the nation-state in the northwest and its extension to a
broader north. If world development stalls, then so will the extension
of the nation-state; indeed, some 'paper' nation-states may collapse. But
if development is possible, it will occur in those countries which most
resemble nation-states and it will in turn enhance them.
But suppose that the drift of the economy is towards more and more
transnational globalism, that free trade is largely achieved as the EU,
NAFTA, the Asian and Pacific Conference countries and other trade
groups merge under the loose umbrella of GATT, that multinationals
become more cosmopolitan, that development of the south becomes
more diffuse, less nation-state-centric. Would this amount to a single
transnational! global economy in which the commodity and the single
market ruled universally?
The answer is both yes and no. All goods and services would then
have a price on a single market and capitalist enterprises would organize
their financing, production and exchange. 'Consumerism' already domi-
nates, some of the enthusiasts say; business accountancy practices
spread through previously insulated institutions like civil services or
universities; and athletes sell their skills to the highest bidder on free
and relatively new markets. Such commodity penetration would
broaden.
But even so, the rules of those markets might still have their particu-
larities, some being the effects of national and inter-national networks of
interaction. Though a far broader range of goods are now bought and
sold, many of the most important ones are not actually sold as com-
modities on free markets. None of the three biggest industries
in the US economy, defence, health care and (probably) illicit drugs, are
simply dominated by commodity production, though all involve con-
siderable transnational networks. In defence the government is a monop-
olistic customer for hi-tech weapons systems and it decides what other
states (friendly ones) will be allowed as customers; supply is not very
competitive (sometimes only one manufacturer will 'tender' and some-
times profit is calculated on a cost-plus basis). The weapons embody more
'use' than 'exchange' value - the USA must have them, almost regardless
of cost, and the corporation can produce them without much thought of
market risk. The health care industry offers its wares more competitively,
though the industry has a peculiar multi-tiered structure, involving con-
siderable bureaucracies (of insurance companies, Health Maintenance
Organizations, etc.), organizationally differentiated according to the cus-
tomer's ability to pay. And again, for customers who can afford to pay,
the product is more of a use than an exchange value. Health preservation
(defined by current medical practices and power) is desired at almost any
price. Of course, both these industries involve massive multinational cor-
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GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE

porations and the global finance networks involved in their investment.

But these are funnelled into organizations with distinctive national and
(in the case of defence) inter-national organization. In the third industry,
illicit drugs, the delivery to the consumer seems largely commodity
exchange. But the industry is also structured by the intersection of law
and state policing of its boundaries with distinctively criminal organiza-
tion of secrecy and violence. Addiction also produces consumers for
whom the product is a use value, to be obtained at almost any price
(including crime). Thus the commodity need not rule, even through an
eminently capitalist-seeming economy. The economy involves diverse
social practices and values, which provide their own 'blockages' to the
rule of commodity exchange.
Though the capitalist economy is now significantly global, its glob-
alism is 'impure', a combination of both the transnational and the
inter-national. The potential universalism of the former is undercut by
the particularisms of nation-states - and indeed also by the particu-
larisms of human social practices at large.

ENVIRONMENTAL LIMITS, NEW

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND A NEW TRANSNATIONAL
CIVIL SOCIETY
Through population growth, soil and plant erosion, water shortages,
atmospheric pollution and climate change, we encounter a second form
of globalism - reinforced by the dangers of biological, chemical and
nuclear warfare alluded to later. We are indeed living in Beck's 'risk
society' (though this is not the only society we are living in) and have
only done so in the second half of the twentieth century. On some of
these issues the traditional 'solution' of letting the south or the poor
starve can endure. But on others, humanity together faces severe risks.
These are not identical to the risks of capitalism, though the two are
deeply entwined (since capitalism is now the dominant form of
economic production). The 'mastery' and 'exploitation' of nature, and
the enormous increase in human potentiality to do so throughout the
globe, are also attributable to industrialism and to the other modes of
production developed in the modern period. State socialism (and fascism
too) was even more destructive of the environment, while the petty
commodity production of small peasants has also been forced into many
destructive practices. Nation-states, scientific establishments and (until
the last few years) virtually all modern institutions contributed their
piece of destruction. And rampant popUlation growth also has sources
other than capitalism, for example military, religious and patriarchal
practices. To deal with these risks responses must go beyond the nation-
state and capitalism alike.
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Present responses on environmental issues seem mainly two-fold.

First, organizations are already in action embodying variant forms of
the famous environmental maxim 'Think globally, act locally'. These are
mainly mixed local-transnational pressure groups and NGOs, some
of them formal pressure groups (like Greenpeace), others carried by
professional and scientific networks (of soil scientists, ornithologists,
demographers, etc.). They are more 'modern' than 'postmodern', since
they reject scientific-material exploitation of nature on primarily scien-
tific and social-scientific grounds. Though their elites originated in
the north, they have increasingly spread globally, among both highly
educated southern elites and among diverse, and rather particular,
groups threatened by real material problems. Such networks use the
most modern and global means of communication. In exploiting these,
they sometimes outflank national government and international capital
alike - as consumers mobilized through western Europe to boycott Shell,
humiliate the British government, and force the towing back of the Brent
Spar oil platform in 1995. We may expect more of this.
Is this a 'global civil society'? Its structure is not entirely new: in the
early twentieth century socialists (and, to a lesser extent, anarchists, paci-
fists and fascists) also generated extensive transnational networks
covering much of the globe, using similarly advanced technology
(printing presses, immediate translation, dictaphones, etc. - see Trotsky's
remarkable study in Mexico City). The socialists launched a wave of
revolutions, some successful, most unsuccessful. Many of the more ideal-
istic proponents of the notion of a new civil society expect its scale
eventually to dwarf such historical analogies.
Second, however, there is also increasing deployment of intergovern-
mental agencies: macroregional and continental agencies, UN con-
ferences, etc. Their key participants, those who could implement coor-
dinated policy decisions, are representatives of nation-states. 'Soft
geopolitics' is becoming denser in this arena too. The other main dele-
gates are the 'experts' mentioned two paragraphs above, who lead a
double life. Though nurtured in transnational professional associations,
they must adopt the perspective of the nation-state, persuading govern-
ments that global concerns are actually in the national interest. Some
hit on excellent wheezes. Some American ornithologist managed to
persuade the State Department to insert into its aid programme to Belize
a requirement to protect a rare bird of which the Belize planners had
not previously heard. More significantly, feminists involved in devel-
opment agencies are pressuring reactionary dictators in the south to put
more resources into the education of women since this will reduce the
birth rate (one of the primary goals of almost all southern governments).
Thus environmental issues mainly encourage dual networks of inter-
action, one a potentially local/transnational civil society, the other
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GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE

inter-national, in the form of 'soft' geopolitics. The former may tran-

scend the nation-state, the latter coordinate states more tightly together,
though perhaps in partly consensual terms which are not incompatible
with a gradual spread of a civil society. Again it is a mixed story.
And this is also the case with others among the 'new social move-
ments'. It is usually argued that those concerned with the 'new politics'
of identity - of gender, sexuality, lifestyle, age cohort, religion and
ethnicity - weaken national (and nationally regulated class) identities,
replacing or supplementing them with local-cum-transnational sources
of identity. Ethnic politics are too variable to be dealt with in a few
paragraphs (and I am writing about them at length elsewhere). So one
sentence will do here: ethnic politics may fragment existing states, but
- given the defeat of alternative multinational and socialist states - they
fragment them into more, supposedly more authentic, nation-states. But
for other social movements based on identity politics, I wish to argue
that on balance they strengthen existing nation-states.
I argued earlier that the 'moderate nation-state' began by staying out
of areas of social life considered 'private'. The household was especially
sacred, and states stayed outside the family life of all but the very poor.
Secular states generally lacked their own moral concerns, taking over
moral conceptions from religion. Their legislation might firmly prohibit
certain forms of personal behaviour yet government relied more on
citizens' internalizing morality than on enforcement. Where citizens did
not wish to comply, they privately evaded - and states usually lacked
effective infrastructures of enforcement. Apparent exceptions - child and
female labour prohibitions were the main nineteenth-century instance
of new legislation being enforced - resulted because they were believed
to violate the patriarchal household and Christian sexual conduct.
The twentiethth century changed this, through new political move-
ments and the penetration of the welfare state into the private realm.
States are now asked to legislate and enforce moral conduct in what
had been hitherto private arenas. I can no longer pollute the public
environment by smoking. My dog's defecations are also more restricted.
I can no longer beat my wife or children. If I leave them, I must make
due provision for their wellbeing. Much of the new legislation is para-
doxically framed in the spirit not of restrictiveness, but of extending
personal freedoms. Gays may practise their lifestyle openly; women may
abort unwanted foetuses. But this results not in a neoliberal absence of
state regulation; it would only if there could be some consensual final
resting-post for definitions of what is public and what is private. Instead
it produces a continuous, highly contentious political debate and legisla-
tive stream. May gays get married, rear children, join the military, run
scout troops? For how long, for what reasons, in what ways and in what
type of clinic can women abort foetuses? Does the presumptive father
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ARTICLES

have any say? We need laws on all these issues and for the complicated
welfare entitlements they imply, Thus passionate pressure groups
organize and 'culture wars' appear. The USA is extreme, both its main
political parties partially hijacked by these 'new social movements'. But
most countries across the world are now politicized by such moral
issues.
These culture wars do involve some transnational and some global
interaction networks. Feminists, gays, religious fundamentalists, etc.
use emerging global networks of communication and NGOs, and they
focus energies on the UN as well as their own state. However, most
contending actors demand more regulation by their own nation-state
through its legal or welfare agencies: to restrict or liberalize abortion,
pre-marital conception and single parenting; to clarify harassment, child
abuse and rape and the evidence needed to prosecute them; to guar-
antee or restrict the rights of those with unorthodox sexual preferences
or lifestyles. Since authoritative social regulation remains overwhelm-
ingly the province of the nation-state, the emergence of new identities
may ultimately reinvigorate its politics and broaden its scope. New
social movements claim to be turned off by class politics. Perhaps class
politics will decline - but not national politics in general.

POST-MILITARISM AND A NEW WORLD ORDER

As Martin Shaw argues, it is in the realm of hard geopolitics that the
northern nation-states have experienced the most radical transformation
- because this is where they learned the bitterest lessons. In the two
great northern wars (more commonly called the world wars) they
suffered perhaps 70-80 million dead - as a direct consequence of the
nation-state system. s Through those wars they also pioneered weapons
so devastating that they could no longer be actually used for any rational
'hard geopolitical' purpose. Northern states are now less willing to
engage themselves in wholesale war than almost any states in history.
The original backbone of the nation-state is turning to jelly.
But again our three regions vary. None are more reluctant militarists
than the Europeans, the guilty perpetrators of both wars, reliant for their
defence for the last fifty years on the USA and presently faced by no
serious threat to their security. Though the EU contains two nuclear
powers, has its Franco-German brigade and its curious Western
European [Defence] Union, all this is less significant than the unpre-
cedented virtual absence of serious 'hard geopolitics' within Europe.
Germans remain the most constrained of all by anti-militarism. The
determination to break with the terrible character of European history
is probably the most causally determining modern transformation of all,
and the one which is most encroaching upon traditional national sover-
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GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE

eignties. But to make European history the general pattern of the world
would be ethnocentric in the extreme. And if it was, then the analogy
would require more than just a restructuring of capitalism reinforced
by a 'cultural turn'. The analogy would require future wars killing many
millions of people in other regions of the world, before they too cried
'enough'.
Yet most Japanese may also have cried 'enough'. They are at present
reluctant militarists. Some Japanese politicians are bolder than their
German counterparts in expressing nationalism, but they still get
slapped down. Yet East Asia is potentially an insecure region. The
United States differs again. It suffered little during the two great
northern wars - indeed its economy greatly benefited. It is a military
superpower, still projects a standing armed force of 1,200,000 into the
next century, and still modernizes its hardware. It remains the global
policeman, a role which European and Japanese governments are keen
to see continue and may even help finance. But even in the USA defence
cuts have been sizeable and it is doubtful that the American electorate
has the stomach for warfare in which many American lives would be
lost. In any case these northern regions dominate the world without
war.
The world nonetheless remains conflict-ridden, with a substantial
place for 'hard' geopolitics. Consider this list: rising ethnic separatism,
conflict between potentially nuclear states like India and Pakistan or the
two Chinas, China's geopolitical role incommensurate with its real
strength, the instability of Russia and some smaller well-armed powers,
the prevalence of military regimes in the world, the likely proliferation
of nuclear weapons and the largely uncontrolled current spread of
chemical and biological weapons through the world. Who knows what
eco-tensions, resulting from water shortages, foreign-dominated
exploitation of a country's habitat, etc. might lurk around the corner?
It is unlikely militarism or war will just go away. All these threats consti-
tute serious obstacles to the diffusion of transnational and universal
global networks.
The threats could conceivably be contained by a global geopolitical
order, though this would be partially segmented. It must centre for the
foreseeable future on the USA, flanked perhaps by greater coordination
with the bigger northern states and with the United Nations. Shaw sees
their combination as providing an emerging global order, though
acknowledging that it is not a true 'state' and that it remains dual, torn
between what he calls its 'western' and 'world' components. Actually,
it seems a triad, since its core is not western but American - adding a
further level of unreliability. The American electorate may not wish to
provide the 'mercenaries' to police the world. It may agree to police its
neighbours, a few strategic places and vital resources like oil, but not
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ARTICLES

most of the world - or the more powerful rivals. It seems a long

way to either a transnational or a geopolitical order for the world as a
whole.
And even the more warlike scenarios mentioned above would not
actually be on a par with the nation-state's horrendous past. 'Hard'
geopolitics - that is, terrible wars - caused its initial growth and
remained one-half of it until recently. Hard geopolitics are now in
relative decline in the north, though not everywhere. Though the
dangers presented by weapons of war have increased, these actually
reduce the mobilizing power of states. If states have lost some of their
traditional core, are they therefore in general decline? The argument
seems most plausible in Europe, least across large swathes of the south.
Moreover, we have seen that 'soft' geopolitics may be rising to comple-
ment the hard variety, buttressed by the new national mobilizations
described above.

CONCLUSION
This article has analysed four supposed 'threats' to contemporary nation-
states: capitalist transformation, environmental limits, identity politics
and post-militarism. We must beware the more enthusiastic of the glob-
alists and transnationalists. With little sense of history, they exaggerate
the former strength of nation-states; with little sense of global variety,
they exaggerate their current decline; with little sense of their plurality,
they downplay inter-national relations. In all four spheres of 'threat' we
must distinguish: (a) differential impacts on different types of state in
different regions; (b) trends weakening and some trends strengthening
nation-states; (c) trends displacing national regulation to inter-national
as well as to transnational networks; (d) trends simultaneously strength-
ening nation-states and transnationalism.
I have hazarded some generalizations. Capitalist transformation seems
to be somewhat weakening the most advanced nation-states of the north
yet successful economic development would strengthen nation-states
elsewhere. The decline of militarism and 'hard geopolitics' in the north
weakens its traditional nation-state core there. Yet the first three
supposed 'threats' should actually intensify and make more dense the
inter-national networks of 'soft geopolitics'. And identity politics may
(contrary to most views) actually strengthen nation-states. These patterns
are too varied and contradictory, and the future too murky, to permit
us to argue simply that the nation-state and the nation-state system are
either strengthening or weakening. It seems rather that (despite some
postmodernists), as the world becomes more integrated, it is local inter-
action networks that continue to decline - though the fragmentation of
some presently existing states into smaller ethnically defined states
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GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE

would be something of a counter-trend, i.e. the reduction of the nation-

state to a more local level.
Global interaction networks are indeed strengthening. But they
entwine three main elements. First, part of their force derives from the
more global scale of transnational relations originating principally from
the technology and social relations of capitalism. But these do not
have the power to impose a singular universalism on global networks.
Thus, second, global networks are also modestly segmented by the par-
ticularities of nation-states, especially the more powerful ones of the
north. Third, that segmentation is mediated by inter-national relations.
These include some 'hard' politics, and if these turned again to major
wars or international tensions, then segmentation would actually
increase. Yet at present the expansion of 'soft' geopolitics is more strik-
ing, and this is rather more congenial to transnationalism. Is this a single
'global society'? Not in the strongest sense often implied by the more
enthusiastic theorists. These global networks contain no singular, rela-
tively systemic principle of interaction or integration. My own view of
'society' is less demanding, since I conceive of human societies as always
formed of multiple, overlapping and intersecting networks of interaction.
Globalism is unlikely to change this. Human interaction networks are
now penetrating the globe, but in multiple, variable and uneven fashion.

NOTES
1 Clearly, stateless societies existed (indeed they dominated much of human
existence on earth) and they still exist in the world today. But states seem
necessary to advanced social life - though anarchists disagree.
2 MITI - the highly interventionist Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry.
3 Chiapas is the only province where ethnic conflict can plausibly arise, since
mestizos dominate everywhere else. This is because Chiapas was acquired
from Guatemala in the 1920s.
4 I have discussed this in more detail, and with some comparisons with other
regions, in an earlier article (Mann, 1993b). As the present article indicates,
however, my views have since modified in certain respects.
5 Obviously, these wars had complex causes. However, as I have tried to show
in the case of the First World War (see Mann, 1993a: Ch. 21), they centre
on the institutions of the nation-state more than they do on any other power
organization (such as capitalism).

REFERENCES
Carnoy, M. (1993) 'Whither the nation-state?', in M. Carnoy (ed.) The New Global
Economy in the Information Age, College Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State
University Press.
Castells, M. (1993) 'The informational economy and the new international
division of labor', in M. Carnoy (ed.) The New Global Economy in the
Information Age. College Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press.

495
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ARTICLES

Economist, The (1995) 'The World Economy: Who's in the driving seat?',
7 October,
Featherstone, M. (1990) 'Global culture: an introduction', Theory, Culture and
Society 7.
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity.
Harvey, D. (1989) The Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford: Blackwell.
Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1994) Economies of Signs and Space, London: Sage.
Mann, M. (1986, 1993a) The Sources of Social Power, Vol. I: From the Beginning to
1760 AD, Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
- (1993b) 'Nation-states in Europe and other continents: diversifying, devel-
oping, not dying', Daedalus 122.
Taylor, P. (1996) 'Embedded statism and the social sciences: opening up to new
spaces', Environment and Planning A, 28 (11).
Wade, R. (1990) Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Rise of the Market
in East Asian Industrialization, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (1996) 'Globalisation and its limits: reports of the death of the national econ-
omy are greatly exaggerated', New Left Review, forthCOming.
Weiss, L. (1995) 'Governed interdependence: rethinking the government-
business relationship in East Asia', The Pacific Review 8.
Weiss, L. and Hobson, J. (1995) States and Economic DeVelopment. A Comparative
Historical Analysis, Cambridge: Polity Press.

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 [2]
Another Century of Conflict? War and the International
System in the 21 st Century
Paul Q. Hirst, Birbeck College, London, UK

Abstract

This article examines the major factors likely to affect sources and methods of armed
conflict in the coming century. First, it considers the role of changing military
technology, concentrating on the Revolution in Military Affairs. Second, it then turns
to the issue of possible balances between economic conflict and cooperation and their
effects on war, including whether the current extreme economic inequality within and
between nations will be reduced by widespread industrialization and the prospects for
China becoming an economic equal of and military rival to the USA. Third, it
considers how climate change may affect the role of states and the sources of conflict
between them. Finally, it raises the question of whether international norms will be
extended and consolidated, leading to greater cosmopolitan governance. It concludes
that this is unlikely in an environment where states are facing confrontational non-state
actors and where the major powers are forced to intervene in collapsing states. The
article envisages a century of conflict, different from the 20th century but in many
ways no less brutal.

Keywords: climate change, international norms, military technology, war

The period since the end of the Cold War in 1989 is in many ways similar to the
situation roughly a century ago, from the 1880s to 1914. Both were and are
periods of large-scale and turbulent change in economics, politics and military
technology. The liberal international economy of the belle epoque, created from
the 1850s, was in some ways more open and dynamic than that of today.! Military
technology changed out of all recognition between 1850 and 1900. The world was
threatened by terrorism and by colonial revolts and areas of instability outside
European rule. 2 The Great Powers cooperated in the face of such challenges and
sought to reconcile differences in commercial and colonial questions wherever
possible. The picture of the pre-1914 world as one of intense and inevitable
antagonism between the Great Powers is far from accurate; conflict and
cooperation were more evenly balanced. This rapid change produced a large body
of reflection on the future of war and international politics. 3 Some of it was
fatuous and designed to foment conflict between the Powers; such as the English
penchant for invasion scare stories. Some of it was serious and remarkably
prescient; such as Ivan Bloch's recognition that the new weapons would lead to
stalemate, to prolonged war and thus to the end of the existing liberal economic
system. 4 In the early 20th century a fashionable view among liberal intellectuals
was that war between the Great Powers would be so futile and economically
30 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

328 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

destructive that it would become impossible. The political imperative was thus
disarmament and international cooperation. It should be remembered that across
the political spectrum before 1914 it was believed that conflict between the
Powers could be contained and cooperation promoted through international
agreements. s This was not just the view of intellectuals and pacifists - many
mainstream politicians believed this too and participated in the attempts to restrict
and humanize war through new international norms as embodied in the Hague
Conferences of 1899 and 1907.
The situation is somewhat similar today, but with the major difference that
there is now an economic but no longer a military great power system. The G7
dominate the planet economically, but they are all close allies linked in a network
of international agreements, norms and arbitration procedures that the participants
at the Hague could only have dreamed about. In 1900 the current economic
hegemon, the British Empire, faced several powers whose industrial and military
power was growing rapidly relative to its own. The Pax Britannica related to the
world maritime, commercial and financial system. Its functioning depended on
peace, but Britain had no capacity to enforce peace on the major continental
powers. Britain could contain Germany only by sacrificing the sources of its
hegemony and then had no capacity to challenge the USA. In 1922 the UK
conceded naval parity to the USA and thus forfeited hegemony. The British defeat
at Washington was thus more significant in signalling the realities of British
power than the victory over Germany in 1918.
Now the USA is the unrivalled military hegemon. No other power or
combination of powers can rival it either in military spending or in military
technology.6 It dominates the sealanes and airways of the world trading system.
The EU, an economic equal, is a military weakling despite a large defence
expenditure. China and Russia have neither the economic nor the military capacity
to challenge the USA; they can defend their own territory but they cannot project
power significantly beyond their borders. From 1945 to 1989, Americans did not
see things this way, although their military and economic dominance was even
greater in the 1950s than it is today. The USA was convinced that it could be
beaten in technological, economic, and military races with the USSR from the
Sputnik crisis and the Missile Gap into the 1980s.7 Until the early 1990s many
commentators were convinced that the foundations of the US economy were
crumbling and that the USA would be overtaken by Japan as the world's largest
economy. Even now some commentators are attempting to cast China in this role.
In just over 10 years the USA has moved from Paul Kennedy's weary titan,
doomed to decline, to unchallenged superpower. 8
In this context many commentators believe that war between the major powers
is obsolete. Economics has displaced war; both leaders and populations are
concerned above all with national prosperity. The dispute resolution procedure of
the WTO will adjudicate on commercial conflicts between nations. Thus the
advanced industrial countries will not use force against one another; but only for
humanitarian protection, peace enforcement and against failed states, the anarchy
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 31

ANOTHER CENTURY OF CONFLICT? 329

of which threatens international security. Wars will increasingly be within the

borders of poor and failed states. Military intervention will be police action by
major powers without a direct interest in the local conflicts. There are two views
on this development. The first is the optimistic opinion that war will become
increasingly illegitimate: it will be gradually normatized out of existence by
international law. Aggressive war and inhumanity in war will become inter-
national criminal acts for which individuals will be accountable before the
standing International Criminal Court (ICC). This view is endorsed by most
human rights lawyers and cosmopolitan political theorists like David Held and
Mary Kaldor. 9 The bleaker view is that of the military historian Martin van
Creveld.lO He holds that Clausewitzian war between states is disappearing, but it
is being replaced by non-state conflicts and actors like terrorist groups and
militias. This will be difficult to deal with and will lead to forms of paramilitary
and police action that will be vicious and difficult to regulate with norms. This
view is conditioned by his experience of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and it
gains considerable credence in the aftermath of 11 September. Both outcomes are
possible: the simultaneous existence of norms that apply to some, and extra-legal
police action that applies to others.
If many believe conventional interstate war is obsolete, others believe that the
dominant fact is the changing technology of warfare. The 'Revolution in Military
Affairs' (RMA) will lead to a very different transformation of war, that in which
new high-tech systems remove the old constraints on information and force
projection. 11 This will reinforce the dominance of the USA. It will have world-
wide real time information on military events, and it will be able to project its
power with new weapons from secure bases and the continental USA. The new
weapons will be truly efficient, far more accurate and destructive than anything
hitherto. They will enable small forces to disorganize and destroy mass armies.
Thus they make possible a 'post-heroic' policy of intervention, in which the USA
need not risk its soldiers' lives to achieve policy objectives remote from the
everyday concerns of its citizens. In a way this also takes us back a century, to
colonial victories like Omdurman in 1898 where the Anglo-Egyptian army lost 48
dead, against 11,000 Mahdist dead.
This article is not an exercise in futurology; neither does it attempt specific
prediction. It concentrates on examining some of the major current hypotheses
about war and the international system in the coming century against the available
evidence. The making of predictions about particular future wars is almost always
likely to be wrong. Projecting forward current trends is also likely to be refuted by
events: whether it be generalizing from the recent experience of humanitarian
intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, or extrapolating from China's rate of growth
in the mid-1990s to its possible role as a Great Power rival to the USA after 2020.
The only way to look forward is to try to assess the fundamental forces likely to be
acting throughout the century and to see how they might create new sources of
conflict, new ways of fighting, or new environments in which conflict may take
place. There are four basic forces in play and their role needs to be assessed:
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330 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

technological change in warfare; changing balances of economic power and

inequality between nations; climate change; and changing cultural standards and
international norms.

Military technology

The hardware on which American military dominance is based is neither that

impressive nor mostly that new. Consider the weapons systems used in
Afghanistan. B52s are nearly 50 years old - the plane first flew in 1952. The first
carriers on the scene were the Enterprise, which is 40 years old, and the Carl
Vinson, the design of which is 25 years old. The F14s, 16s and 18s that make up
most of the air power first entered service in the early to mid-1970s. Even cruise
missiles first entered service in the late 1970s. The earlier generation of 'smart
bombs' and precision-guided munitions were designed to fulfil the 1980s AirLand
Battle strategy in Europe and to counter large numbers of Soviet tanks and planes
by achieving a high ratio of hits to weapons launched. Replacement platforms like
the F22 and F35 are not wonder weapons. Combat aircraft, for example, are close
to realistic engineering limits. What has changed US military power is the way
such assets are managed. Until the late 1970s US strategic nuclear and
conventional forces were kept strictly separate. Conventional forces had limited
access to the key 'national' resources of intelligence gathering and communication
through satellites. Such resources were too important to be compromised by use in
marginal conflicts and were reserved for managing the threat of nuclear war. Their
use might reveal how much knowledge the USA had. Since the early 1980s
satellite intelligence and communications has been made increasingly available to
conventional forces. Likewise, the services decided to adopt civilian computers
and benefit from exponential gains in processing power and cost reduction. The
result has been to create a flexible system based around software. All the services
can intercommunicate across the globe in real time, they have close to real time
access to satellite data, and they can use remote sensing to identify targets and
direct weapons to them. When the Global Positioning System (GPS) became
operational in 1990 the USA acquired the means rapidly to reprogram weapons
like Tomahawk cruise missiles against targets and for airplanes to precision-guide
weapons to targets with low risk. This has made US air power truly effective and
made every major ship in the fleet an offensive system rather than just part of a
defensive screen for the big carriers.1 2
It is important to realize that US military dominance has been assembled out of
bits created at different times for different purposes, and that its gathering together
the elements of an intelligent and controllable system was very recent. The USA
had few of its current capabilities a decade ago. It also shows how much potential
there is further to develop the technologies of the Revolution in Military Affairs.
The essence of the revolution is the further integration of information and
communications technology into military structures and developing new weapons
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ANOTHER CENTURY OF CONFLICT? 331

to exploit such integration. This will produce major change over the next 20-30
years that dwarfs what has happened since the 1980s. However, some of the
claims made for the RMA are ridiculous. Technology will never eliminate the fog
of war - remember what happened when somebody fed an old street map of
Belgrade into a computerized targeting database? Sensors cannot get into bunkers.
War will never become a conflict between remote-controlled machines in which
nobody gets killed.13 A war fought with hypersonic cruise missiles from the USA
would be ludicrously expensive and would render America impotent if enemy
information warriors jammed the GPS signal on which such navigation would
rely. Some infantry will be needed at least to illuminate targets and also to make
sure that allied ground forces are doing what they should and do not defect.
But the RMA is real and it will have two phases. 14 The fIrst will reconfigure
the armed forces around the new information systems. Armies have been
cumbersome hierarchical structures with long command chains. The different
services have tended to perform distinct functions in parallel with limited
cooperation. New technologies require institutional and operational change. In the
future, commanders down to squad leaders will be networked; they will access
information horizontally and coordinate through the Internet. Frontline troops will
have local and remote sensor data, enabling them to detect enemies early, and be
able to call down massive firepower based on precision-guided munitions with a
high kill rate. Generals will be able to see the whole combat situation and to
assign resources across the whole theatre to a single squad. Similarly, the different
services will combine assets systematically in one campaign. Undoubtedly
bureaucratic rigidities will limit this, and the major services will not dissolve, but
frontline forces will get used to exploiting the flexibility of the new technology.
The second phase will take place over the next 20 to 30 years. Three
technological breakthroughs may make entirely new weapons possible: the further
miniaturizing of computers, advances in robotics and nanotechnology (molecular
scale machines). Conventional ships, planes and missiles are close to the limits of
useful engineering feasibility. Highly centralized information and battle
management systems like AWACS or Aegis are vulnerable to attack by precision-
guided weapons and to swamping by electronic warfare. Imagine then a new
range of small weapons-cum-sensors: micro-aircraft that fly by their own sensors
and mini-computers; intelligent jumping mines, that can communicate with one
another and other systems; networked groups of missiles using different sensors
and each carrying many deadly self-guided sub-munitions. Such weapons will
form a dense and decentralized web. They will share information, building up a
picture of attacks or targets through their separate sensors. They will coordinate
attack or defence locally across the web, independent of central control. Such a
network would be hard to destroy. Its defensive potential should be obvious. It
may be easy to mass-produce some of these weapons from the new generic
technologies of the civilian economy. Such networked weapons sound like an
advert for future American power. But are they? States like China are probably
going to be able to make some of these weapons soon after the USA. They will
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332 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

not be expensive like AWACS. They will create defensive webs that will be hard
to penetrate, even for advanced weapons. Unlike centralized and second-rate air
defence systems, like that of Iraq, they will be hard to destroy. Such networked
warfare might keep the USA out of any country able to buy such systems off the
shelf, except at high cost in casualties. US offensive dominance is not therefore
guaranteed by the Revolution in Military Affairs.
How might the USA respond in order to retain its offensive power? First, by
micro- and nano-weapons sown over the battlefield from high altitude. People are
scared of biological and chemical weapons today. Yet their direct military value is
limited. They invite countermeasures and deterrence. They are useful to terrorists,
but otherwise hard to deliver or control to any military purpose. Nanotechnology
may offer an alternative. Molecular machines could act like bacteria. They do not
mutate and they have a finite life. Imagine millions of nanobots sown over the
defensive battlefield. They could smother weapons systems, eating vital parts, and
they could find their way through the air vents of bunkers or amoured vehicles,
eating the occupants alive. Currently such weapons are entirely hypothetical and
they may not happen but, even if they do not, micro-systems will happen and they
will be able to accomplish a great deal of this destruction too. Second, imagine a
true robot weapons system. It would have high local mobility, it would be
toughened, it would have complex sensors, and it would have computerized
decision procedures designed to act on them. It would replace infantry in high-risk
environments like urban areas, jungles, or high-tech defensive networks. It would
not look like the robot from the film The Terminator, but it would do the same job.
It could be a mini-helicopter with micro-weapons or it might look like a metal
insect armed with a laser. Imagine if such weapons had been available to be
dropped into Afghanistan to comb the caves and bunkers for Osama bin Laden,
with his picture in their memory banks. These weapons are conceivable. They
would make warfare more terrible and brutal, not less. Against conventional
armies they would make war a one-sided massacre. Against defence systems they
might be highly effective, but they could be used against US forces too in the long
term and also let loose on Western cities. One must hope that computers cannot
get much smaller and that nanotechnology is just too difficult to mass-produce.
The third element is one that the USA will not just seek to exploit by 2030, but
that it is necessary for it to secure now, and that is space. IS The USA needs to
protect its satellites. Its intelligence, communications and weapons guidance
cannot work without them. It also needs to deny such assets to enemies in a
conventional war. Thus it needs defences against missiles, and anti-satellite
systems to attack others' satellites. This is one reason the US military is so keen to
expand the current limited missile defence system into an open-ended research
programme to follow on from Star Wars. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
was a folly, conceived as a shield against mass ICBM attack from the Soviet
Union, but the notion of space weapons systems was far from foolish. If the USA
can protect its satellites, then in the long run it will be able to launch precision
attacks from space with a variety of weapons, including kinetic bombs. Space
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ANOTHER CENTURY OF CONFLICT? 333

weapons will be ever more important to the USA as it seeks to maintain its
military dominance. They will not suffer from the weaknesses of aircraft carriers
or the need for fixed bases. They will literally be above the new weapons
networks of phase two of the RMA.
Thus the RMA will reinforce US dominance in the short term, it may challenge
American offensive power in the medium term, and it will force the USA to
exploit space in order to prevail. The militarization of space is probably inevitable
and will take war into a new dimension. On earth, rivals to US power, whether
terrorist groups or states, will be able to exploit new technologies too and to act on
specifically American and Western weaknesses. US military power and Western
society are wholly dependent on information. If flows of information are disrupted
or information systems corrupted, chaos can ensue. Thus information war,
whether by direct action or cyber terrorism, is a rational and asymmetrical strategy
for information-weak societies and political movements. Key military assets will
be hard to penetrate, but, for example, the traffic control computers in Des Moines
or the Belgian social security system may not. 16 Like the future terrorist use of
weapons of mass destruction, information war is highly probable. If aggressive
war does become dominated by non-state actors, then one should assume it will be
bloody and difficult to suppress. The sort of futile military actions, like those of
Israel against the West Bank in the spring of 2002, may become commonplace, as
the powerful states lash out. A 'war' on terrorism is ultimately unwinable while
there are causes that create terrorists. It will also erode support for human rights
on the part of populations subject to terrorist outrages and also lead to states
curtailing the freedom of the peoples they seek to defend in the search for
terrorists. American dominance is not guaranteed by technology nor will the forms
of military superiority the USA can maintain and exploit necessarily protect it
from its most likely and pressing enemies. Those who see the RMA as a guarantee
of another' American Century' ought to think again.

Economic power

Economic power has been seen traditionally to affect international relations in two
direct ways. First, affluent states may fear the loss of relative economic power,
and rising industrial nations can convert their growing economic strength into a
military challenge. Second, states seek to comer markets and sources of raw
materials. How relevant will such factors be in the 21st century? Currently,
economics is not a major source of military friction, certainly not between the
major powers. The WTO system means that nations have access to each other's
markets and to raw materials. With the exception of oil, states need not fear for
vital resources if they have the means to trade. The supply of oil is a collective
issue for the developed nations rather than a source of conflict between them.
Control of Middle East reserves is more vital to Japan, and to a lesser extent the
EU, than it is to the USA. The idea that wars are stimulated by economic
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334 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

interdependence - that economic losers fear political weakness - is not really

credible today.17 Nations have economic alternatives to resolving trade issues.
They can petition the WTO in cases where they believe they have been unfairly
treated, they can then use trade sanctions, and they can also invoke economic
necessity to impose crisis measures. They can in addition seek financial help from
the IMF in order to continue to trade. Before 1914, although the world was
divided into competing empires and although many states adopted protective
tariffs, economic and colonial questions were not the primary source of conflict.
Britain and Germany had resolved most such issues before 1914; what remained a
source of tension was the naval armaments race. In the 1930s economics were a
source of conflict, as states sought to compensate for the collapse of world trade
and investment after 1929 by cornering markets and attempting to build autarchic
economic zones. Economic failure certainly played a part in Japan's continued
aggression in China and Germany's project to build a Grossraumwirtschaji, but
Hitler did not go to war because of Germany's balance of trade. Certainly
economic interdependence could not prevent war - liberals were wrong about that.
But it is clear that economic conflicts did not cause either of the World Wars.
If the classic state-centred view of economic competition is currently largely
irrelevant, an alternative position on the role of economics in relation to the
international system is that the new integrated global economy is hollowing out
the state. 18 Globalization is widely held to have reduced the policy autonomy of
most states, and the more extreme globalization theorists believe that global
markets are dissolving national economies and reducing the relevance of politics.
This view of markets as sovereign, of corporations and markets as the primary
means of social coordination on a world scale, took a huge hit on 11 September. It
has been obvious to all but the most dogmatic economic liberals that markets need
regulation in order to function and that can only be provided by a public power
independent of the immediate market participants. It is also obvious that high
levels of international economic interdependence require a core of common rules
relating to trade, property and technical standards. Such rules require not only
supranational institutions to administer them but also the support and compliance
of states. Markets need to be protected by military force against terrorists, pirates
and rogue states. Even if some of this coordination can be achieved by
international trade associations or by common consent between corporations, as
with the re-emerging lex mercatoria, in the end it is underpinned by state power.
That power requires a combination of scope of action and political cohesion, a
large economic area and a core state or group of states. That is a major reason why
the world economy is not an unstructured global market but is organized around
three key trade blocs: NAFTA, the EU and Japan. 19 Their mutual agreement
ensures that common rules are universally accepted. Each is either centred on a
nation state, or in the case of the EU a core of powerful nation states.
The issue of scale is central. Too much cosmopolitanism and the rules become
too homogeneous and the public power too weak. The EU already has a problem
with fitting common standards to different national cultures. International agencies
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ANOTHER CENTURY OF CONFLICT? 335

would find it difficult to tax or to find legitimacy for military force, unless they
draw on the resources and willing consent of powerful states. Some enthusiastic
globalizers have believed that the future belonged to region states or to city states,
like Singapore.2o Yet such states exhibit a chronic disjuncture between the scope of
their economic activity, which is worldwide, and their capacity to enforce rules,
which is at best local. City states survive because they are embedded in bigger
entities - Hamburg in Germany and the EU - or have protection from major states,
as Singapore did against Indonesia. A world of city states and global markets
would degenerate into ongoing conflict in all probability because trade and politics
operated on different levels - as with Genoa and Venice in the Mediterranean in the
Early-Modem period. Neither city state controlled its trade routes fully - hence the
fusion of trade, war and piracy. This could be sustained because both traded
through armed convoys, hardly a realistic prospect for a city state today.
Undoubtedly small nation states are in a similar position: they either seek bloc
membership or they hope to operate within an international environment secured
by the major states and the supranational institutions that states sustain.
There are two other sources of conflict stemming from economic performance
that are worth considering. The first is China. Some believe that China's economic
growth will make it a Great Power before mid-century. It could then have a GDP
surpassing that of the USA. It would still be relatively poor, having over 1.5 billion
people, but it could convert a significant portion of its collective national income
into military power. It would be a more successful successor to the USSR, and a
real rival to the USA. Perhaps, but China has to get there first. 21 Currently it has
a GDP slightly larger than the size of Italy's but 20 times the population. China
has a triple economy. It has a large peasant sector, still poor and starved of invest-
ment. It still has a large state and collective sector, much of which is inefficient and
labour intensive. This is kept going by loans from the big four state banks, and the
inefficiency of this sector threatens the solvency of those banks and also of the state
which absorbs their liabilities. Finally, there is a private export-oriented sector, the
size of which is disputed but which probably represents about 25% of employment
and 30% of output. This is heavily locked into world trade and is mainly con-
centrated into a series of low-value added export markets. This does not sound like
the recipe for rapid industrial modernization like Japan or South Korea. Only if the
domestic market expands, and genuinely efficient producers oriented towards it
develop, will China fully industrialize. It may happen, but the odds are against it.
China is unlikely to be able to sustain the rates of growth of the mid-1990s. Indeed,
it may be forced to engage in prolonged austerity measures to cope with a triple
crisis of rising unemployment in the state sector, insolvent banks, and an over-
borrowed state. China may become a more effective military power, it may exploit
asymmetrical high-tech niche weapons, but it is unlikely to be a real rival to the
USA as Russia tried to be into the 1980s.1t can defend itself, but who in their right
mind would want to attack and occupy a poor country with 1.3 billion people?
The second issue is global income inequality. In the 1990s it was widely
assumed by international institutions like the World Bank that the recipe for
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336 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

economic development was available to all: international openness, sound money

and a liberalized domestic financial market. 22 After the Asian Crisis and the crisis
in Argentina it should be clear that this rapid financial liberalization is a recipe for
chaos in all but a few exceptional cases. Japan and South Korea did not
industrialize in this way, but with high levels of domestic savings and behind tariff
walls. The odds are that most developing countries will not achieve the transition
to industrial modernity: they will be locked into the international economy as
primary producers and as providers of labour-intensive export goods. The figures
for international inequality are shocking - the richest 20% (about 14% of the
world's population) produce 86% of world GDP, the middle 60% about 13%, and
the bottom 20% just 1% of world GDP.23 If the figures are shocking, the reality is
worse. Populations across the developed world have fled the countryside for
impoverished mega-cities like Cairo or Lagos. (India and China are unusual in
that they still have large peasant sectors.) Such cities are all but ungovernable;
with large numbers of ill-educated young people and large numbers of
underemployed or unemployed. In the Middle East, Latin America and Africa this
impoverished urbanization threatens political stability. Such cities also offer
breeding grounds and havens for anti-Western activists and terrorists. 24
The sources of non-Clausewitzian conflict are thus not diminishing. In the
short term this is the most serious and most intractable threat to Western security,
if not stability. Local political chaos and international terrorism cannot destroy the
international economy or challenge major states. Such forces simply make life
more costly, more risky and less free. The populations of the wealthy world will
have to accept restrictions on their liberty if they wish to combat terrorism. It is
also likely that the developed states will restrict migration and travel from many
poorer countries still further. Such threats to the global economy are not as
dramatic as anti-globalization activists and reborn radicals believe. They are not a
structural threat to the system, like a deadly virus; rather they are like an ongoing
debilitating disease that weakens but does not kill the patient. Western states will
have to accept that the future is that they will have to fight an ongoing 'war'
against terrorism, which at best they can hope not to lose but never to win, and
that they will fight ongoing police actions against protestors, migrants and asylum
seekers. This is a grim prospect, but it is the other side of the refusal to promote
greater development - Western aid is derisory, given the scale of the problem and,
despite Monterrey, will remain so - and to permit migration.

Climate change

Currently corporations and markets are the primary means of the production and
distribution of resources, goods and services; states regulate markets and derive
tax revenue from them. States, therefore, have an interest in maintaining economic
activity, both domestic and international. This could change. Certain key resources
- energy, water, farmland - could become scarce and states may intervene to
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ANOTHER CENTURY OF CONFLICT? 337

secure them in order to protect their populations and to ration resource

distribution. States could thus become more salient and markets less so. This
resource crisis would inevitably lead to more conflictual relations between states,
given imperatives to comer resources like those of the mercantilist era or the
1930s. The reason would be climate change. Global warming is a well-established
tendency for which there is now ample evidence. 25 It could lead to a variety of
phenomena: rising sea levels and a consequent loss of habitable land in highly
populated areas like Bangladesh or the southern coast of China; desertification
and water shortages, for example in the Middle East and Southern Europe; and
even cooling, with harsher winters, in Western Europe should the Gulf Stream be
degraded by cold water from melting Arctic ice. We have no clear idea of how or
when such change could occur; it may be catastrophic and rapid. If so, states
would have no chance to adapt policies gradually but would be forced into crisis
measures. One should assume serious effects by 2030 and possible catastrophic
effects (like massive melting of the poles) by 2080. There is no point accepting
conservative estimates in the belief that this is the sensible 'middle course': we
just don't know. The result could well be huge numbers of environmental refugees
and a struggle between states to comer scarce resources. Assume also in this
context that energy sources will have become scarcer and more costly as a result
of the depletion of oil reserves.
The results of such evironmental changes in a world as unequal as now, and
with the same selfish attitudes prevailing in the developed world, are unlikely to
be pleasant. In this context, states may well fight over resources, and displaced
peoples struggle for the right to settle. In a context of scarcity and conflict one
should not assume that the present open trading economy will function smoothly.
It could well go backwards in the wake of financial and economic crisis
consequent upon climate change. In such a situation the present primacy of
cooperation over conflict between the three major trading blocs might shift in the
other direction, although it would be rash to predict war between the major
developed nations. Indeed, both the EU and NAFfA can shift towards a more
autarchic posture without difficulty - both still have relatively low trade-to-GDP
ratios. The principal conflicts would most likely be between less developed states
and also between forces in the impoverished world and the wealthy states of the
OECD. The EU and the USA currently have no inherently divergent interests that
would lead to armed conflict, and both are likely to have common enemies.
Climate change is seen by those who view globalization as a potentially
positive process as one of the key forces moving us towards extended inter-
national governance. 26 Nation states acting alone cannot prevent or cope with
climate change. Actually, neither can international agencies. It is probably too late
entirely to reverse global warming; at best, drastic action to cut energy
consumption and emissions could retard it and prevent an acceleration into
catastrophic collapse. The problem is that such action would require drastic and
coordinated action by the major powers that are the chief sources of the process.
This is not remotely likely. The measures adopted at Kyoto will not prevent global
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338 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

climate change, but even they are too much for the principal source of energy
consumption, the USA. No international agency could compel compliance with
really effective measures in the absence of an interstate agreement that included
the major powers and that made provision to aid the developing world to obtain
less damaging energy sources. Such an agency would then rest on the power of the
chief states; it would be in no sense truly supranational. The advocates of
cosmopolitan governance today are rather like those who, in the 1920s,
enthusiastically believed in world government through the League of Nations.

Cultural standards and international norms

Cosmopolitans believe that international integration is pushing us towards

extended governance by international law and towards the common acceptance of
international human rights standards. International law currently relies on a
population of states that abide by the rule of law domestically and thus are willing
to accept judgements against them in international forums just as they are to
accept rulings against the government in national courts. It thus remains state-
centred, even if its effect is to limit absolute state sovereignty. How likely is the
continued growth of such a truly global and supranational culture of law? If it
continues to develop, it will be a powerful check upon war not sanctioned by
international law or brutality against one's own citizens. All public officials gUilty
of such acts would be subject to the International Criminal Court, in the absence
of effective domestic action against them.
The odds are that we are close to the end of a period of growth of international
norms, rather than at the beginning. The analogy may be made with the late 19th
and early 20th centuries. Then there was widespread hope that interstate
cooperation and arbitration would mean that the need for war could be all but
eliminated and that weapons of war and the conduct of war rendered more humane
by international agreements. However, during the First World War central parts of
the Hague Conventions were violated first by Germany and then by other
combatants. One should separate those norms essential to the current international
system from the normative aspirations of the cosmopolitans. The international
system has always imposed conditions of membership on states. Sovereignty has
been conceded only to those entities whose structure and behaviour conform to the
prevailing interstate norms.27 The question is whether supranational norms on
state behaviour will prevail over those standards that are convenient to states and
whether they will actually apply to all states. Here there will be a real difference
between economics and politics. The international regulation of business activity
and the proliferation of common standards are essential to the world economy.
Economic norms will continue to proliferate and to be enforced by international
agencies.28 However, some of the core principles of the old international law are
wearing thin, as are those of the new international order of human rights that take
precedence over national sovereignty. The doctrine of national sovereignty when
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ANOTHER CENTURY OF CONFLICT? 339

it crystallized in the 19th century clearly only applied to European states, to the
neo-Europes and subsequently to a few analogues in the non-European world like
Japan. Native rulers were fair game for colonial conquest. Now once again it is
patent that states are not equal, that the sovereignty of some is a fiction, like
Somalia, or seen by the West as a threat, like Iraq. Certainly, the USA is willing to
make up its own international law and to intervene where it perceives it has vital
interests. The West promotes human rights obligations on rulers, but will not in
practice be bound by them. This is true not only of the USA but of the EU too: its
role in intervening in Kosovo and bombing Serbia was dubious at best by current
international standards.
Central to cosmopolitanism is the belief that representative governments tend
to keep the peace internationally and do not attack one another. The growth of
democracy is thus central to international peace and human rights. Cosmopolitans
argue that national democracy needs to be strengthened by greater international
democracy, by a 'global civil society' and by the general acceptance of inter-
national human rights law.29 Central is the belief that democracies do not fight one
another, and liberal states keep the peace, only fighting when attacked. In the past
century liberal and democratic states have been the exception among states, and
they have had powerful undemocratic states as common enemies, like Nazi
Germany or the USSR. Hence it was in their interest to band together, and also the
democracies were the 'haves' of the international system challenged by
expansionist and revanchist powers. The point is that when democracy becomes
commonplace its value as a predictor of state behaviour declines. Democracies
may fight if their vital interests clash; the recent past is too exceptional both in the
number and the international situation of the democratic states to form a
judgement on this matter. States can be subject to demagogic pressures towards
bellicosity because they are democracies. Imagine in the recent tension between
India and Pakistan that some major military incident had occurred by accident in
the context of the upcoming Indian elections. A populist governing party like the
BJP would find it hard to back down.
In the USA powerful voices are emerging to claim that the USA needs a new
definition of its role, coincident with its military dominance and global
responsibilities. They argue that the USA as global hegemon is in fact the centre
of a new empire. US leaders should accept imperial obligations and the need for
ruthless but responsible action that goes with it. If the USA is in fact an empire, it
cannot be bound by the norms of those who are subject to its power. The USA
bears the costs and the obligations of world security; it cannot, therefore, be
subject to institutions like the ICC. Influential American writers like Robert
Kaplan advocate an imperial stance and the need to learn from ancient Rome. 3o In
the UK the diplomat Robert Cooper argues that the West needs to recognize that it
is running a de facto empire and to be more open about it and more willing to
include those subject to it. 31 The sovereignty of lesser states would be an
irrelevance if an explicitly imperial ethos came to dominate among US policy-
makers.
42 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

340 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

The USA in this vision can choose the terms on which it deals with the
international system. It will be multilateral when the policy dimensions are in its
interest and the international institutions involved are substantially under its
control. Thus it will persist with the major institutions of international economic
governance the IMF, World Bank and WTO, but otherwise it will choose why,
how, and when it intervenes. One should not see this as a peculiarity of the Bush
administration; almost any electable US government will follow a variant of this
strategy and, when it does not, it will be constrained by Congress. Thus it is
unlikely that Kyoto or the ICC could have been driven through the Congress, even
had Al Gore, a Democrat committed to the environment and international law,
found himself in the White House. The current US government has refused to
ratify the Kyoto agreements. It has refused to put the ICC convention to Congress
and will not accept the jurisdiction of the Court for its own personnel. It has also
refused to submit to international pressure in its treatment of prisoners from the
Afghan conflict. It is likely for strictly military reasons to abandon at some time in
the future the international conventions preventing the militarization of space, as
we have seen. Moreover, the USA will repudiate the international convention on
landmines. This is because some of the high-tech weapons-sensors it wishes to
deploy in the future are likely to be covered by the very exhaustive definition of
the convention, even though they are not old-fashioned mines. The effect of the
USA's refusal to be bound by these various conventions will undermine the ethos
of the new international law, as it will not apply to the most powerful. All
international norms involve a degree of hypocrisy: they are applied when it is
possible, prudent and convenient to do so. No laws are applied consistently, but
laws that apply to all but are enforced only on some have little legitimacy.
International tribunals have hitherto tried the defeated and the weak. The ICC
raises the stakes; it claims a scope and consistency of application that is new.
Failure to accept its jurisdiction or for major states to cooperate when they have
failed to act domestically will expose its optional nature for the powerful. The
USA is not alone in not signing up to the ICC. China, India and Russia are among
the major states that have not ratified the convention. Moreover, some of the states
that have are hardly advertisements for good governance.
The truth is that politics cannot be completely bound by law, whether national
or international. In a state of exception, leaders are expected to do what is
necessary, and populations will support them. 32 The notion that there can be no
politics outside of law, ignores the fact that law is founded on state power even if
it is much more than just an extension of power. Slobodan Milosevic's defence
before the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Hague will be
central in this regard and is ultimately founded on the claim that all leaders of
sovereign states have the right to practise reason of state, not just the USA or the
EU. If the West has the right to realpolitik, then the same right will be claimed by
every leader of a lesser state, whether dictator or not, and every revolutionary
leader. The West may be unable by necessity to be bound by its own rules, but
then it will find they do not bind. The notion of a liberal cosmopolitan order in
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 43

ANOTHER CENTURY OF CONFLICT? 341

which all politicians are subject to common international legal standards and none
are above them is likely to founder on that fact.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article is not to predict wars; rather it is to outline the
technological, economic, climatic and normative forces that are likely to shape the
context of conflict in the coming century. Those forces are inclining us towards
more conflict rather than less. Moreover, such conflicts will be multiple: between
states, within states, and between states and non-state military actors. Technology
is likely to make war no less brntal than it is now; giving the advanced countries
vast killing power, but also shifting the balance towards the defence and away
from the current offensive dominance of the USA. Technology is also likely to
place deadly weapons in the hands of terrorists. Major states will remain the
salient actors in international politics, and climate change is likely to enhance their
economic role. That states may grow in power is not an unqualified gain for good
governance; they will do so in a turbulent economic and climatic environment in
which they strnggle to secure resources for their populations. Democracy and
liberalism, both domestic and international, will be threatened by the need to
combat terror within and impose Western power without. States are likely to
become more authoritarian and act in violation of human rights more frequently.
International political norms will decline as powerful states flout them and anti-
Western forces exploit such hypocrisy for their own ends. This is not a pleasant
prospect. It may be that the forces outlined here will be less powerful, that
climatic change will not be so dramatic, that the RMA will prove more limited in
scope, that the developed countries will shift resources dramatically to tackle
poverty on a world scale, and that international norms will gain in strength and
contain realpolitik. For that to happen, the attitudes of ordinary citizens in the
developed countries would have to change radically: accepting the reduction of
emissions to check climate change, paying for more for aid, welcoming migrants,
and seeking to eliminate the sources of conflict rather than repress those who take
up arms. It would be a remarkable reversal and it will have to happen soon.

Notes

See K.H. O'Rourke and J.G. Williamson (2000) Globalization and History: The Evolution of a
Nineteenth Century Atlantic Economy. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
2 One forgets the magnitude of the terrorist threat from anarchists and irredentists: between 1881
and 1914 tbey killed the Russian Emperor (1881), the Presidents of France and the United States
(1894 and 1901), the Empress of Austria (1898), the Kings of Italy (1900), Portugal (1908) and
Serbia (1903) and the heir to the Austrian throne (1914) - imagine the hysteria if anything on this
scale were to happen today.
3 See I.F. Clarke (1970) Voices Prophesying War 1763-1984. London: Panther.
4 For Bloch, see J.F.e. Fuller (1932) War and Western Civilization 1832-1932. London:
Duckworth.
44 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

342 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16(3)

5 G. Best (1980) Humanity in Warfare. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

6 See P. Kennedy 'The Eagle has Landed', Financial Times, 2 February 2002.
7 A good treatment of this issue is L. Freedman (1977) us Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic
Threat. London: Macmillan.
8 See P. Kennedy (1989) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. London: Fontana.
9 D. Held (1995) Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan
Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. M. Kaldor (1999) New and Old Wars: Organized Violence
in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press.
10 M. van Creveld (1991) On Future War. London: Brassey's.
11 A good short exposition of the implications of the RMA is Eliot A. Cohen (1996) 'A Revolution
in Warfare', Foreign Affairs 75:2 pp37-54.
12 This growth of US conventional capacity based on space assets is clearly explained in Norman
Friedman (2000) Seapower and Space. London: Chatham Publishing.
13 For an intelligent criticism of the wilder claims for the RMA, see M. O'Hanlon (2000)
Technological Change and the Future of War. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
14 A useful attempt to periodize the evolution of the RMA is M. Libicki (1997) 'The Small and the
Many' in J. Arquilla and J. Ronfeld (eds) in Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the
InfonnationAge. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
15 See G. Friedman and M. Friedman (1996) The Future of War. New York: St. Martin's Press.
16 See Arquilla and Ronfeld (eds) op.cit.
17 This view of conflict through economic interdependence is advanced by the Friedmans op. cit. in
an otherwise sensible argument that the world economy is not globalized.
18 For the positive version of this argument about the collapse of politics before markets see, for
example, T.L. Friedman (1999) The Lexus and the Olive Tree. London: Harper Collins. For the
negative see, for example, H-P. Martin and H. Schumann (1997) The Global Trap: Globalization
and the Assault on Democracy and Prosperity. London: Zed Books.
19 For an account of the regionalization of the world economy, see chapters two and three in P. Hirst
and G. Thompson (1999) Globalization in Question, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Polity Press.
20 See K. Ohmae (1996) The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies. London:
Harper Collins.
21 For sceptical views on China's economic prospects see G.C. Chang (2001) The Coming Collapse
of China. London: Century. J. Studwell (2002) The China Dream: The Elusive Quest for the
Greatest Untapped Market on Earth. London: Profile.
22 The classic statement is the World Bank's 1993 report The East Asian Miracle: Economic
Growth and Public Polky. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23 Figures from UNDP (1999) Human Development Report 1999. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
24 See RD. Kaplan (2001) The Coming Anarchy. New York: Vintage.
25 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's 2000 report is chilling in its implications; this
is perhaps why the USA chose to shoot the messenger and campaigned to sack the Chairman. See
P. Hirst (2001) War and Power in the 21st Century, chapter three. Cambridge: Polity Press.
26 See D. Held (1999) Global Transformations. Cambridge: Polity Press.
27 See P. Hirst (2001) 'Between the Local and the Global: Democracy in the Twenty First Century'
in R. Axtmann (ed) Balancing Democracy. London: Continuum.
28 See J. Weiner (1999) Globalization and the Harmonization of Law. London: Pinter.
29 See for a representative example D. Held (2002) 'Globalization, Corporate Practice and
Cosmopolitan Social Standards', Contemporary Political Theory 1:1 pp59-78.
30 RD. Kaplan (2002) Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. New York:
Random House.
31 Robert Cooper (200 I) 'The Next Empire' , Pro;,pect October 200 I.
32 The classic statement of this argument is Carl Schmitt (1976) The Concept of the Political. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
 Part II
Diasporic Movements, National and
Transnational Religious and Ethnic
Conflicts
This page intentionally left blank
 [3]
Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda

Different Paths to Mass Violence

Peter Uvin

Rwanda and Burundi are two small neighboring countries in East-Central Africa that
share the same ethnic composition: approximately 85-90 percent Hutu, 10-14 per-
cent Tutsi, and 1 percent Twa. Their climate, topography, population density (the
highest and the second highest in Africa, respectively), predominantly agrarian econ-
omy, religion, language, and history are also very similar. Most significant, they
both have been theaters of massive violence between their main ethnic groups, the
Hutu and the Tutsi. Given these similarities, it is no surprise that most analysts
approach mass violence in both countries in an almost identical manner. Kuper
describes Rwanda and Burundi separately but treats them as examples of the same
processes of polarization based on overlapping inequalities. Comparative political
scientists almost always lump Rwanda and Burundi together. Gurr treats them both
as "ethnoclass" conflicts; Harff categorizes them both as "politic ides against politi-
cally active communal groups"; and Stavenhagen treats them as resulting from the
overlap of both socioeconomic and ethnic divisions. I
However, the dynamics that led to massive violence in Burundi and Rwanda are
textbook cases of entirely different processes. Burundi presents a typical example of
how discrimination and u11equal access to scarce resources lead to violence. As the
discrimination took place largely along ethnic lines, the violence and countervio-
lence became ethnic too. Burundi is a case of superimposition of social cleavages,
with fault lines in political power, economic wealth, and ethnicity reinforcing each
other.2 In Rwanda the dividing line between the haves and the have-nots was region-
al and social, not ethnic. Popular discontent was therefore largely an intra-Hutu,
regional matter. However, the affirmation of Hutu (anti-Tutsi) ethnicity and its insti-
tutionalization in public policy were key components of the ruling elite's strategy of
legitimization and control over the state. Whenever this elite was threatened, it exac-
erbated ethnic divisions to thwart democratization and power sharing. Rwanda pro-
vides an almost perfect example of the dynamics that have been discussed by schol-
ars of genocides: the existence of long-standing, widespread, and institutionalized
prejudice; the radicalization of animosity and routinization of violence; the "moral
exclusio11" of a category of people, allowing first their "social death" and then their
physical death. 3
48 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Comparative Politics April 1999

Thus, Rwanda and Burundi represent two very different models of ethnic con-
fhct: of discrimination leading to civil war and of moral exclusion paving the way to
genocide. Because these countries are so similar, it should be possible to identify
the factors that explain their different dynamics. This article will also discuss the
individual motives that bring people to kill their innocent neighbors, thus linking the
macromodels to individual behaviors. It thus also aims to help clarify the relative
roles played by various factors in the construction of ethnicity and violence.

The Precolonial and Colonial Period

Burundians, Rwandans, and outside specialists of the region disagree almost totally
on the nature of precolonial social relations. First of all, they disagree profoundly on
the nature of the distinction between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Are they distinct ethnic
groups, even races, as some contend, displaying major physical differences and his-
torical origins? Or are they socioeconomic groups, akin to castes, or even classes?
For example, whoever acquired a sizable herd of cattle was called Tutsi and was
highly regarded; all farmers were Hutu; and hunters and artisans were Twa. 4
Another important issue that divides the specialists concerns the nature of the
precolonial political system. Were these kingdoms highly centralized and inegalitari-
an, as many accounts suggest, or was the power of the king more theoretical than
real outside the region immediately surrounding the capital? What were the levels of
mutual control, exchange, and obligation between Tutsi and Hutu? What was the role
of lineages, which included both Tutsi and Hutu, in the social and political system?
What possibilities for upward mobility were open to Hutu?5
A third debate follows from the previous two and relates to the impact of colo-
nization. Did colonization, first by Germany and then by Belgium, create ethnicity
ex nihilo, turning socioeconomic stratification into essentialized ethnicity? Or did it
simply codify an already highly unequal and differentiated relationship between
Tutsi and Hutu? Or was it even a liberating force which, through the provision of
education and the organization of elections, aJlowed the Hutu masses to free them-
selves from oppression?
There is no scholarly consensus on answers to these questions. In part, it is diffi-
cult to recreate the histories of oral societies, and the Eurocentric and often blatantly
racist accounts of the first colonizers, missionaries, and ethnographers introduced
distortions as well. However, the main obstacle in reaching a consensus on these
issues is their extreme contemporary political importance. 6 Radically divergent
interpretations of history provide the basis upon which coJlective identities are built
and act as powerful justifications of current behavior.
I wiJl not choose sides in these debates. In order to explain current violence in
both countries it is of little importance to know the exact nature of precolonial politi-

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Peter Uvin

cal relations between Hutu and Tutsi, Gurr synthesizes common wisdom in ethnic
studies when he writes that "the key to identifying communal groups is not the pres-
ence of a particular trait or combination of traits, but rather the shared perception
that the defining traits, whatever they are, set the group apart"7 From before inde-
pendence in 1962, distinct ethnicity has been a fact of life in Burundi and Rwanda,
both at the level of state policy and in individual sentiment
In all likelihood, the cattle-rearing Tutsi, fleeing famine and drought, arrived in
Burundi and Rwanda in successive waves from the north during the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, The agriculturist Hutu they met had immigrated into this fertile
region some centuries earlier, probably from central Africa, The most long-standing
inhabitants of the region were the Twa, a small group of potters and hunters, The
integration of these different groups was extensive: by the time the colonizer arrived,
they spoke the same language, believed in the same god, shared the same culture,
and lived side by side throughout both countries, A similar situation seems to have
prevailed in neighboring regions of Uganda and Tanzania.
Both countries were kingdoms, with slight variations between them. In Burundi a
fine sociopolitical hierarchy prevailed, with a king and a class of princes (pretenders
to the throne) at the top, various levels of Tutsi in the middle (those at the royal
court, the Tutsi-Banyaruguru, socially higher than the ordinary pastoralists, the
Tutsi-Hima), the Hutu at the lower level, and the Twa at the bottom. A fair number of
people from the lower groups was involved in the exercise of various political func-
tions, and many local notables were Hutu. In Rwanda the political and social hierar-
chy between Tutsi (who included the king), Hutu, and Twa was more abrupt and
lacked some of the fluidity that characterized Burundi's.
In both countries the colonial administration acted through the king and his Tutsi
acolytes, the famous indirect rule, consisting of the "incorporation of native authori-
ties into a state-enforced customary order" to the benefit of the colonial power. 8 The
colonizer reserved education and jobs in the administration almost exclusively for
the Tutsi. By the 1950s thirty-one out of thirty-three members of the conseil
superieur du pays were Tutsi, as were all forty-five chefs de chefJeries and 544 of
559 subchiefs.9 At the same time, an extensive reduction in the number of adminis-
trative divisions further distanced the rulers from the ruled. 10
While formally the old political structures of both countries, revolving around the
monarchy, were still intact, colonization profoundly modified their nature. Political,
social, and even economic relations became more rigid, unequal, and biased against
the Hutu, while the power of many people of Tutsi origin greatly increased. The
nature of the state changed. It became a conduit for the rule of the colonizer, impos-
ing onerous legislation, taxes, obligatory cash crops, and compulsory labor, often
abused by local ''Tutsi chiefs [who], secure in the white man's support, acted as rapa-
cious quasi-warlords." II While not all Tutsi were wealthy and powerful under colo-
nial rule,12 almost no Hutu were, and most Hutu suffered greatly from the increased

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Comparative Politics April 1999

demands imposed upon them. Under these conditions, it is no wonder that the strug-
gle for independence became also an ethnic struggle, a fight as much against the
(much closer) local Tutsi "despots" as against the (remote) Belgians. 13 It is also no
surprise that politics after independence became ethnic politics.

Nature of the Postcolonial State

Between 1958 and 1962 a small group of Catholic-educated Hutu overthrew the
monarchy in Rwanda. This so-called social revolution took place with the acquies-
cence, if not connivance, of the departing colonizers, who during the last years
before independence in 1962, in the name of a suddenly discovered attachment to
representative structures as well as out of fear of the more radical (leftist, anticolo-
nial) Tutsi elite, had switched their favor to the Hutu. 14
The "revolutionary" process unfolded in three stages. In late 1959 there were
localized anti-Tutsi violence and small pogroms in some provinces. Hundreds were
killed, and many Tutsi fled the country. In 1960 and 1961 legislative elections result-
ed in the massive victory of Parmehutu, a radically anti-Tutsi party, and the subse-
quent overthrow of the monarchy. More Tutsi, including the previous powerholders,
fled the country. From 1961 to 1964 some of these Tutsi refugees attempted to return
militarily, launching small guerrilla assaults from Burundi and Uganda. These
assaults were easily stopped, but led to organized mass killings of innocent Tutsi
civilians within the country, foreshadowing events thirty years later. In early 1962
more than 2,000 Tutsi were killed; in December 1963 at least 10,000 more died.
During this time, between 140,000 and 250,000 Tutsi, 40 to 70 percent of the sur-
vivors, fled Rwanda. IS
In Burundi the monarchy survived the colonial period with more social strength
than in Rwanda, and as a result a royalist and biethnic party, Uprona (Union pour Ie
Progres National), led by a prince, Louis Rwagasore, won elections both before and
after independence. However, Rwagasore was soon killed by the opposition, and his
party fell apart in internal conflict. Competition for state power developed between
three groups: the Tutsi-Hima, the Tutsi-Banyaruguru, and a small emerging Hutu
elite. The stakes were high. In Burundi, as in Rwanda and most of newly indepen-
dent Africa, the state was the main source of enrichment and power in society and
conferred great opportunities to those who controlled it. Moreover, following the
events in Rwanda, state control became the sole vehicle for Tutsi to retain their privi-
leges, while conversely it was the sole means of rapid social advancement for Hutu.
After a coup d'etat by Micombero in 1966, the Tutsi-Hima, the group that con-
trolled most of the army, monopolized power. To do so, they excluded from political
competition most other Tutsi and Hutu. From 1966 to 1993 political and by exten-
sion economic power in Burundi was tightly held by three military regimes

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Peter Uvin

(Micombero, 1966~82, Bagaza, 1982~87, Buyoya 1987-93) that used their military
might to keep their privileges. All three presidents were Tutsi-Hima from the same
village in the Bururi region, born within two miles of each other (Buyoya is the
nephew of Micombero! ).16 Almost all positions of importance in Burundi were
monopolized by the Tutsi minority. They included the higher levels of the single
party (which continued under the name Uprona but became an instrument of the
power elite seeking to use the symbols of the royal past to legitimize itself), the full
command structure of the army, the police and security forces, and the judicial sys-
tem (even in 1994, only thirteen out of 241 magistrates were HutU).17 Only at the
end of the 1980s was there a noticeable increase in the representation of Hutu in the
formal economy and public sector.
In conclusion, ethnic divisions played a crucial role in the fierce competition for
state power in both countries. In both countries, small groups captured state power
with backing from the army. IS Yet the social composition of the state class was very
different, if not opposite-Hutu in Rwanda, and Tutsi in Burundi. Their social bases
being very dissimilar, these elites employed different strategies to maintain power,
thus setting in motion differing dynamics of conflict.

Power and Legitimacy: Strategies for Elite Maintenance

The two regimes Rwanda has known since independence were not averse to using
repression. Kayibanda's regime (1962-73) chased out or killed most former Tutsi
powerholders and Tutsi politicians, even the most moderate ones, as well as many
opposition Hutu politicians who did not join Parmehutu. The second republic under
General Habyarimana (1973~94) was a military dictatorship. It killed many power-
holders of the first republic (including Kayibanda), and its internal security kept a
tight lid on opposition and dissension for almost two decades. The legal system was
independent only in name, and impunity was the norm. 19 Regular popular elections
were a farce in which Habyarimana was always reelected with more than 98 percent
of the vote. Any critical press was produced at the risk of the journalist's life.
The main strength of these regimes, however, lay not in their oppression, but in
their capacity to legitimize themselves. One strand of legitimization, widely used in
Africa, consisted of the depoliticizing argument that the sole objective of the state is
the pursuit of economic development for the masses. 20 In Rwanda the international
community actively bought into that argument, making the country one of the
world's foremost aid recipients. 21 The second strand was ethnic and emphasized
"social revolution." It was tailored largely for domestic consumption. Its discourse
was based on the notion that Rwanda belongs to the Hutu, its true inhabitants, who
had been subjugated brutally for centuries by the foreign exploiters, the Tutsi, and
that in 1959 the Hutu had wrested power away from their former masters and

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Comparative Politics April1999

installed a true democracy, representing the majority of the people, The notion that
the government is the legitimate representative of the majority Hutu and thus by def-
inition democratic, as well as the sole defense against the Tutsi's evil attempts to
enslave the people again, constituted the powerful core of the legitimization of the
ruling clique's hold on power.22
This ideology was accompanied by an institutionalized structure of discrimina-
tion, especially in areas that allowed vertical mobility such as modern education,
state jobs, and politics. According to Prunier, under Habyarimana's regime "there
would be not a single Tutsi burgomaster or prefect, there was only one Tutsi officer
in the whole army, there were two Tutsi members of parliament out of seventy, and
there was only one Tutsi minister out of a cabinet of between twenty-five and thirty-
five members. The army was of course the tightest."23 The system of ethnic identity
papers introduced by the Belgians in 1935 was maintained by the postcolonial gov-
ernments until the 1994 genocide, greatly facilitating its execution. The return of the
Tutsi refugees was categorically denied with the argument that there was no more
space in Rwanda. A quota system was installed that limited access of people with
Tutsi identification to higher education and state jobs to a number supposedly equal
to their proportion of the population.
This quota system was usually only partly implemented. Most authors agree that
in the public sector-but not at the highest levels, and not at all in the army-Tutsi
remained represented beyond the allocated nine percent. Moreover, in sectors of
society less tightly controlled by the state-commerce and enterprise, nongovern-
mental organizations, and development projects-they were certainly present beyond
that proportion. 24 The quota system and ethnic identification, then, served more to
maintain the distinctions and allow for social control by the state than to actually dis-
criminate. It was part of the institutional structure of Hutu power-administrative
reminders that the Tutsi were different from everyone else and the state was watch-
ing out for the interests of the majority Hutu.
In Burundi the ruling elite represented a very narrow social base. It thus could not
use an ethnic-social discourse to legitimize its position and faced a more permanent
(and often violent) challenge. The regime thus implemented a much higher dose of
repression. The defining events took place in 1972, although purges had already
occurred earlier, most notably in 1965. The fully Tutsi-controlled army, called in to
end a Hutu rebellion in a southern province, went on a two month rampage.
According to most observers, 100,000 to 150,000 Hutu, almost all educated Hutu in
the country (teachers, nurses, administrators), were killed, and 150,000 more fled. 25
This rampage created sufficient fear to suppress Hutu unrest for two decades. For
many years to come Hutu parents would not send their children to school for fear of
making them targets in future pogroms. These events constitute the defining
moments in independent Burundi's history. They crystallized Hutu and Tutsi identi-
ties and created a climate of permanent mutual fear.

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Peter Uvin

[n [988 violence broke out again, Based on false rumors and a widespread dislike
of corrupt local (Tutsi) administrators, Hutu farmers in the two northern villages of
Ntega and Marangara killed up to 3,000 Tutsi, The army intervened to restore order,
killing up to 20,000 Hutu and creating tens of thousands of refugees, In 1991 and
1992, in similar events, hundreds more died, while thousands fled the country,26 All
these cases presented the same pattern: in response to rumors and fear, Hutu peas-
ants attacked and killed local Tutsi, powerholders and even ordinary people. The
army was then sent in to restore order and indiscriminately killed vastly more people
in retaliation. The power base of the small Tutsi ruling clique truly rested on fear and
repression, and the military played a key role in it.
The two successive regimes also attempted to use two legitimization strategies.
First, they too employed the discourse of development to justify the state's
(omni)presence, with less success than in Rwanda, although in the late 1980s, with
the 1972 events long past, the international community seemed willing to believe the
development myth. Interestingly, the regime often imitated its "successful" Rwandan
neighbor; its decentralization policy, for example, was identical to Rwanda's. The
second strategy was the exact inverse of Rwanda's (and more in line with general
African practice): the denial of ethnicity.27 The official ideology claimed that there
were no ethnic groups but only Burundians, equal before the law in Burundi. The
mass murder of 1972, if ever discussed, was euphemistically referred to as "events"
that resulted from the actions of unspecified "extremists."28 Discussion of ethnicity
was taboo in Burundi but dominated people's minds.

From Democratization to Violence

At the beginning of the 1990s three processes combined to pose significant threats
to Habyarimana's regime and the small elite that benefited from it. First, internal dis-
content increased, emanating mainly from disgruntled urbanites but also spreading
to the countryside. It generally took a regional form, with political opposition mainly
in the south and center. The president's district in the north almost fully monopolized
positions of power in Habyarimana's regime, and most public investments took place
in that region. 29 Widespread corruption, geographical exclusion, and disappointment
with the slow pace of development combined in a challenge to the regime from with-
in.3o A second threat was the [990 invasion from Uganda of the Rebel Patriotic Front
(FPR), a small but well trained and equipped guerrilla army led by soldiers who had
previously fought in Museveni's war for control of Uganda which was composed
largely of descendants of \959-63 Tutsi refugees. Although the invasion was pushed
back, the FPR controlled part of the territory in the northeast, and its threat was per-
manent. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced, and the economy suffered
greatly. Finally, following the end of the cold war, the international community sud-

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Comparative Politics April 1999

denly rediscovered its attachment to democracy and put strong pressure on

Habyarimana's regime to democratize and negotiate power sharing with the FPR and
the domestic opposition as a first step toward free elections. 31 Thus, political parties
were allowed in July 1991, and a so-called coalition government was formed in
1992. Parallel negotiations took place in Arusha to end the civil war and integrate
the FPR into the Rwandan army.32
The regime was under attack from all sides, and its most radical factions took
recourse in the usual, time-tested solution: the revival of ethnicity. Ethnicity could
unite the population around the government, take momentum away from the opposi-
tion, combat the FPR, and render elections impossible. These radical factions were
not invited to participate in the Arusha negotiations, but they grew stronger never-
theless (with active support from the presidency) and plotted the use of violence to
reverse these externally inspired changes. 33
From 1990 onward, under the leadership of a small clique surrounding
Habyarimana and his wife known as the akazu (literally, the small house), various
dynamics fostered the radicalization of prejudice. First, the FPR threat was extended
to all Tutsi. The best documented execution of this strategy came immediately after
the FPR's invasion. On the night of October 4, 1990, the army staged an all-night
shooting attack on Kigali and blamed it on the internal Tutsi. This accusation fooled
the world for some time (it was unmasked only months later), strengthened a sense
of psychosis against "the enemy within," and was used to justify the imprisonment
of 10,000 Tutsi.3 4 Most of them were liberated only after months of international
pressure; many were tortured; and some were killed. 35
More generally, at political rallies and speeches as well as in extremist local
newspapers and radio stations (foremost the infamous Radio Libre des Mille
Collines and Kangura, a radical newspaper). Tutsis became the subject of hateful
propaganda. 36 This propaganda included explicit and regular incitations to mass
murder, verbal attacks, the publication of lists with names of people to be killed, and
threats to anyone having relations with Tutsi. The level of propaganda increased
greatly from 1993 onward.
During the same period extremist political parties that openly preached hatred
and violence came into being, again with support from the highest echelons. They
included the Comite de Defense de la Revolution (CDR), a party to the right of but
close to the Habyarimana's, as well as armed militias (the infamous interahamwe
and impuzamugambi).37 These parties and groups radicalized and divided the oppo-
sition and slowed down the Arusha negotiations. By 1993 all opposition parties had
split between radical, "Hutu power" wings close to the CDR and its discourse and
moderate wings. During the genocide most of the leaders of the moderate factions
were slaughtered.
Between 1990 and 1993 thousands of Tutsi were killed in frequent massacres by
mobs directed by local authorities, national politicians, and police. 38 Large amounts

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Peter Uvin

of arms were imported and distributed to the militia, These actions routinized vio-
lence and, together with the radical rhetoric, further dehumanized the Tutsi and legit-
imized violence,39
These processes were not only tolerated but supported morally and financially by
people at the highest levels of government and the military, As the Commission
Internationale d 'Enquete sur les Violations des Draits de I 'Homme au Rwanda
depuis Ie ler octobre 1990 observes, "these massacres",have never been the result of
chance or spontaneous popular movements or even the result of competition between
different parties. There seems to be a central hand, or a number of hands, that master
the genesis and the unfolding of these events."40
On April 6, 1994, when the plane carrying Habyarimana from one more peace
negotiation in Arusha was downed, the final act of the scenario unfolded as scripted.
The violence started the same night in Kigali and was executed largely by the presi-
dential guards and militia, while the international community fled the country. An
interim government replaced provincial governors and communal burgomasters who
refused to allow the carnage with new, extremist ones and flew in the militia from
the capital. Hundreds of thousands of defenseless children, women, and men, pri-
marily but not only Tutsi, were slaughtered. Many participated. 41 The FPR resumed
the civil war and conquered Kigali by July, which signaled the end of the genocide.
Following the FPR's victory, up to two million Hutu, including most of the former
Rwandan army and the militia, fled to camps in Zaire.
In Burundi in 1990 President Buyoya began a slow process of democratization.
The reasons for this move have been the object of much speculation. International
pressure after the end of the cold war is most often mentioned, together with the real-
ization after the 1988 and 1989 events that a strategy of rule based solely on oppres-
sion could not continue indefinitely. Buyoya may be compared to Gorbachev,
reforming the worst aspects of the system that produced him, while seeking to keep
its functioning intact. His reputation as a moderate explains the (tacit) western sup-
port for his second coup d'etat in 1996.
Under the wary eye of important factions of the army and the Tutsi elite, the gov-
ernment initiated a process of democratization using three foundations: intense pro-
paganda on the concept of national (ethnic) unity, a reconciliation effort with official
reports on the history of the country, and an equal distribution of visible political
positions between Hutu and Tutsi. In October 1988 a "government of national unity"
was formed with twelve Hutu and twelve Tutsi ministers, including a Hutu prime
minister. Buyoya, however, cumulated the functions of president of the republic,
president of Uprona, and minister of defense, and the departments of justice, interi-
or, police, and the army remained under Tutsi control. Nongovernmental human
rights organizations were allowed to exist. A "Charter of Unity" was adopted, and
every educated person had to engage in lengthy propaganda sessions to explain to
the farmers the notion of unity. In 1992 Burundi adopted a new constitution that for-

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bade ethnically based parties, obliged all parties to obtain signatures from the coun-
try's nine provinces, and conditioned party recognition on approval by the minister
of the interior.
Elections were finally held in June 1993. Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu and candi-
date of the Frodebu (Burundian Democratic Front), was elected president with 65
percent of the vote, and his party obtained the majority of the seats in parliament
(sixty-five out of eighty-one). Uprona controlled the remainder. Buyoya accepted the
verdict of the ballot box and resigned. Rumors about a coup swept through the city.
Would the army and radical factions of the Tutsi elite accept this outcome?
On October 21, 1993, low-level soldiers killed President Ndadaye and other dig-
nitaries after only three months in office, with at least passive support from the high-
est levels of the army. Popular unrest then erupted throughout Burundi, and thou-
sands of Tutsi were brutally killed, especially in the north and center. It is unclear if
this violence was spontaneous-a reflection of the anger of the peasant masses at the
loss of their first democratically elected Hutu leader-or planned-a policy of
Frodebu cadres to get rid of Tutsi throughout the country.42 The army moved in to
restore order, killing thousands of Hutu in the process. In total, it is estimated that
50,000 to 100,000 persons were murdered in the three months after the coup; one
million fled the country; and hundreds of thousands were internally displaced.
As the president as well as his constitutional successors (the president and the
vice-president of the general assembly) had been killed in the coup, a political stale-
mate followed, which the Uprona used to work its way back into government. After
long negotiations, a new president was chosen in January 1994; he died on April 6 in
the same plane crash as Habyarimana. More arduous negotiations followed, leading
to a convention in October 1994 that gave as many ministerial positions to the
Uprona as to the Frodebu. This new government was ridden with infighting and con-
flict and was largely incapable of ruling the country. It was overthrown in July 1996
in a coup staged by Buyoya. An international embargo followed.
Since September 1993 Burundi has inexorably slid toward total violence. The
majority of Hutu live in constant fear of random reprisals by the army and the mili-
tia. Various Tutsi militia terrorize the Hutu population and kill with impunity. Hate
propaganda flourishes. Journals incite violence, publishing lists of Hutu administra-
tors to be killed. 43 The Hutu inhabitants of Bujumbura, the capital, have largely been
chased out of the city due to a policy reminiscent of the "ethnic cleansing" in the
former Yugoslavia. 44
The Frodebu split between a radical branch (the Conseil National de Defense et
de Democratie, CNDD, directed by Leonard Nyangoma, former Frodebu minister of
the interior, and its armed wing, the Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie, FDD)
and those who still seek a political solution from within the country. Attacks by the
FDD and other Hutu militia have become increasingly brutal and random, affecting
all of the country and causing profound fear among Tutsi as well as Hutu bystanders.

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Peter Uvin

Tutsi live in fear of a repetition of Rwanda's genocide and the violence that followed
the 1993 coup in Burundi. Even the most moderate Tutsi feel they can not abandon
control over the army, their sole protector. As of early 1998, up to 200,000 Hutu and
Tutsi have been killed by the army, the FDD, and related militia, the majority of them
ordinary children, women, and peasants. Hundreds of thousands of people have fled
the country to Zaire, Rwanda, and Tanzania, while hundreds of thousands more Hutu
and Tutsi are internally displaced, living in camps, or dispersed in the hills, afraid to
return home. Burundi has entered one of the most brutal and deadly civil wars in
modern history, fought along ethnic lines.

Why Did People Kill?

Thus, both Burundi and Rwanda have a long-standing history of widespread, indis-
criminate killing. Very often, innocents were slaughtered: women, children, poor
farmers, low-level civil servants, all "ordinary people who were just in the wrong
place at the wrong time."45 Violence has tended to occur at key points of political
change, when the interests of the elites were threatened, but it has also always
involved massive popular participation. Why do ordinary people kill other ordinary
people? Three main motives emerge.
In Burundi the most prevalent motive for violence is fear. People in both ethnic
groups are deeply afraid of being attacked and attack first, in "defensive attack," to
avoid the fate they think is awaiting them. 46 For Hutu peasants the fear of a repeti-
tion of 1972 is still a strong cause of preemptive violence, and indeed one observes
in most accounts of recent violence that rumors of imminent attacks by the army
caused them to strike first. 47 Since 1993 most Tutsi similarly fear that, if they do not
use force to maintain order, they will lose their lives in massive Hutu-Ied violence.
After the 1994 Rwandan genocide, this feeling grew stronger still. Clearly, the fear
of being killed-and hence the necessity for preemptive attack-can be manipulated
on both sides of the ethnic divide. 48
In Rwanda primarily prejudice drives people to participate in mass violence. It
has been maintained and institutionalized by the powers-that-be to protect their
power and privileges. Prejudice has been radicalized every time the elite has been
threatened. It also has fed off events in Burundi from 1965 onward, which "proved"
the evil nature of all Tutsi.
In both Burundi and Rwanda an alternate motive for participation in mass vio-
lence is a desire for revenge. This motive differs from the prejudice described above.
Whereas the latter is based on a collective hatred, revenge comes from a specific
hatred of one or more persons who are perceived as having committed crimes. For
example, a Burundian Hutu who seeks to exact revenge against a Tutsi neighbor who
falsely denounced his family in 1972 may not hate all Tutsi, although the sentiment

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might spill over to others. The issue of revenge is closely connected with that of
impunity, a central feature of life in Burundi and Rwanda. It allows the well-con-
nected (primarily but not exclusively people from the ethnic group in power) to steal
public funds without sanction; it allows military, police, and mobs to kill without
fear. Its impact on society is powerful: it discredits the institutions of law and order
and encourages all forms of abuse since there is no fear of punishment. Through all
these mechanisms, impunity creates violence. 49
A fourth motive that is often said to explain people's participation in mass killing
is opportunism. Personal gain was clearly a motive for militia members at the fore-
front of the radicalization and killing in both countries. The main militia operating in
Burundi in 1995 emerged out of gangs of urban bandits that had been biethnic but
became monoethnicized and better equipped after the 1993 unrest. 50 In Kigali during
the height of the genocide crowds massively looted government offices, international
aid agencies, and businesses. Andre and Platteau in a study of a rural commune in
northern Rwanda demonstrate how the Hutu killed there during the genocide (only
one Tutsi woman lived in the village, and she was murdered, too) tended to be either
the wealthier ones or social outcasts, suggesting that "the 1994 events provided a
unique opportunity to settle scores or to reshuffle land properties."51 However, gen-
erally, the role of opportunism should not be overestimated. For opportunism to
exist, there must be a process of violence in which opportunists can insert them-
selves and do their dirty work; opportunism by definition can not be the primary
explanation. 52
A fifth motive often invoked to explain mass participation in violence, especially
in Rwanda, is obedience. It can mean a general inclination to obey authorities, a
desire to join the dominant group, to not be left behind, or to display solidarity
(important for people who live their whole lives in small groups and for whom mov-
ing is hardly an option), or the more specific fear resulting from blackmail or threat.
Many observers argue that in Burundi and Rwanda there exists a "traditional" cul-
ture of obedience to authority and fear of being different and thus people would kill
when told to do so.53 Although it is true that the culture of daily life in Burundi and
Rwanda does not value the public expression of disagreement the way western cul-
tures now do, it is a gross simplification to deduce that Rwandans participate in
mass murder because they are obedient and conformist by nature. Rwandans and
Burundians choose the messages they will act on and modify them according to their
own preferences. 54 After all, this same population spends an inordinate amount of
time and energy hiding revenues and assets to escape taxation, selling products on
black markets, ripping out coffee plants, intercropping them with food crops, or
badly maintaining them (all forbidden by law), and refusing to show up for obligato-
ry community labor and party meetings. Rwandans are not passive instruments in
the hands of their leaders.
In sum, the predominant motive for popular participation in communal violence

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Peter Uvin

is prejudice in Rwanda and fear in Burundi, In both countries revenge, set against
the backdrop of impunity, has become important, too, Two widely discussed motives,
opportunism and obedience, are much less important than often assumed. These
motives are by and large individual manifestations of the macro trends described
above. Prejudice mirrors, at the individual level, Rwanda's institutionalized dis-
course of prejudice, while fear and revenge follow directly from Burundi's rulers'
use of violence to maintain their privileges.

Conclusion

For practically all Burundians and Rwandans life has become polarized along ethnic
lines. Whatever the historical origins or nuances of ethnicity were, ethnic exclusion
has come to dominate life. Relationships between members of the different groups
have become a rarity-a sign of courage and a deadly risk. 55 How did Burundi and
Rwanda evolve into societies of such radical polarization? And why did they polar-
ize along ethnic lines?
The fundamental determinant of this polarization resides in the relationship
between ethnicity and power in the postindependence states. In both countries there
is an important link between political power-control of the state as an instrument of
accumulation and reproduction of a social class-and ethnicity. However, the nature
of this link differs in each country, and thus the dynamics of conflict differ, too. Both
countries represent more or less archetypical examples of very different categories
of violent conflict.
In Burundi ethnic difference constitutes the dividing line between the haves and
the have-nots. Popular discontent therefore focalized primarily along ethnic lines. A
combination of brutal oppression and the denial of ethnicity were the elite's preva-
lent tools to perpetuate its hold on power. By the end of the 1980s a third method,
cooptation, the entry of increasing numbers of Hutu into higher positions in the
state, allowed the dividing line to become more porous. Cooptation, combined with
democratization, might have weakened the dividing line further, but the 1993 coup
d'etat reaffirmed it brutally. Predictably, bloody violence broke out as both sides
sought to achieve militarily what had been politically impossible.
In Rwanda the dividing line was social and regional, not ethnic. The political
competition for scarce resources was primarily intra-Hutu. Ethnic violence followed
from a "racist" strategy of legitimization used by the ruling elite to maintain its
power. By 1994 the Tutsi as a group were outside of the "scope of justice" or the
"universe of obligation" of society: the moral values that apply to other people did
not apply to them.
The second factor explaining extreme polarization along ethnic lines lies in the
occurrence of violence. Dramatic acts of violence can rigidify social boundaries for

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generations; they can become absorbed in people's sense of self-identity. Although in

both countries violence along ethnic lines may originally have been merely part of a
strategy of aspiring elites to conquer or maintain power, it became a traumatic ele-
ment of the culture of prejudice in both countries. In the words ofVolkan, "the group
draws the mental representation of a traumatic event into its very identity. It passes
the mental representation of the event-along with associated shared feelings of hurt
and shame, and defenses against the perceived shared conflicts they initiate-from
generation to generation."56 As Prunier states eloquently on Rwanda, "in 1959 the
red seal of blood put a final label of historical unavoidability on this mythological
construction, which from then on became a real historical framework."57 The year
1972 played the same role in Burundi. Moroever, psychologists have long observed a
strong relation between victimization and the commission of violence. In other
words, people who have been victims of violence or close witnesses of it, especially
during childhood, tend to perpetrate the same violent behavior later in their life.
Acts of violence also have psychological effects on the people and groups that
committed them. The more violent a group has been against another group, the more
it needs to justify its violence to itself, seeking to believe its acts are moral and justi-
fied. 58 . Perpetrators of violence also come to fear revenge and may thus have to
engage in all kinds of behaviors, including so-called "preventive attack," to defend
themselves.
Violence in each of the two countries affected the other. It produced a sort of dis-
torted mirror, in which the people of each country saw in the other their worst night-
mare. The destructive mirror-like situation of these two countries is unique in the
world. Events in one country are interpreted and used by its (radical) neighbors to
confirm their worst suspicions and fears. The rulers in Rwanda have reinforced the
"truth" of their racist ideology by pointing to the massacres of Hutu (by the
Tutsi-dominated army) in Burundi in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1989, and 1993 to "prove"
that all Tutsi seek the ruthless oppression of the Hutu. Conversely, Tutsi rulers in
Burundi have pointed since 1960 to Rwanda to demonstrate that, if given the chance,
the Hutu are little more than genocidal killers.
Theoretically, the most important lesson to emerge from this analysis is that
social structure does not explain everything. Content is also needed. The social
structure of domination in Burundi and Rwanda is almost identical. Both are
exploitative dicatorships that have favored a small class of haves over the large
majority of have-nots; both countries, moreover, have almost identical economic and
social structures. It thus seems reasonable to put them in the same category when
doing comparative research. Yet this categorization fails to capture the dynamics of
violence in both countries, which are fundamentally different because the social
composition of their elites is different. They have consequently employed divergent
strategies of state control and legitimization, leading to different modalities of
protest and counterrepression. The result in both cases is ethnic violence, but the

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dynamics involved are very different The same degree of political oppression or
social inequality does not produce the same effects everywhere; one of the key vari-
ables is the social composition of the ruling elite and the ensuing dynamics oflegiti-
macy and protest
Moreover, the absence of ethnicity is as important a political marker as its pres-
ence, The political functions of ethnicity are well recognized, Less easily recognized,
however, are the political functions of the absence or denial of ethnicity. In Burundi
(and currently in Rwanda) the explicit denial of ethnicity fulfilled an important legit-
imizing function for the power elite for three decades. If both the denial and the
affirmation of ethnicity are political, one should conceptualize ethnicity as an inher-
ently political phenomenon, even when it is absent in political discourse. Aid agen-
cies should keep this point in mind when working in Africa.
Finally, the most recent and most extreme rounds of violence are the direct result
of processes of democratization set in motion in large part by pressure from the
international community. 59 The relation between democratization and violence has
long been recognized. 60 Both these cases show that the crucial variable is not
increased popular demands, but rather the use of violence by elites that feel their
position threatened. In both countries the groups that benefited from the status quo,
induding the higher echelons of the army, had good reason to fear their fate in the
case of successful democratization and used violence to defend their privileges. If
there are no well-organized, relatively powerful, explicitly democratic groups within
a country, the process of democratization can be easily subverted by those who have
most to lose. The result may well be worse than the starting situation.
In both cases, too, once the reactionary forces used violence to defend their inter-
ests, the international community showed a total unwillingness to defend the
processes it had set in motion. In Rwanda foreigners scrambled out of the country,
leaving their Tutsi friends and employees to be slaughtered; the U.N. peacekeeping
force never received the mandate or the resources to stop the killing. In Burundi a
serious attempt to avert a full-blown civil war was not undertaken until late 1994.
The absence of international action (if not active support for those using the violence
from countries such as France) could be interpreted as an international form of
impunity that encouraged further violence. One of the three factors that promote
genocide, according to Harff, is the "lack of external constraints on murderous
regimes,"61 And Fein has shown that most governments that commit mass violence
are repeat offenders, partly because they see that their previous violence was con-
doned by the international community.62
Since 1993-94 the nature of ethnicity and conflict has become homogenized
across both countries. The political actors in each are taking over the other's discours-
es and tactics. In both Burundi and Rwanda, for example, the Tutsi increasingly
define themselves as a small minority faced by a genocidal Hutu majority, while the
Hutu image of itself as a socially marginalized, forever misunderstood and exploited

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majority has become greatly strengthened. People have come to hate "the other" cate-
gorically and are willing to destroy any member of its group. This hate can clearly be
seen in the extent to which acts of murder are increasingly targeted at children; entire
school classes are massacred by guerrillas and the army. This process of ideological
unification took place parallel to military homogenization. Hutu rebels from Burundi
and Rwanda (and even Zaire) now routinely attack targets in either country together,
and Tutsi rulers from all three countries now jointly "defend" themselves more and
more openly. What were formerly different dynamics are becoming homogenized.
Any hope for an end to violence in either country is receding even further.

NOTES

1. Ted R. Gurr, Minorilies al Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolilical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: u.s.
Institute of Peace Press, 1993); Barbara Harff, "Recognizing Genocides and Politicides," in Helen Fein,
ed., Genocide Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 35; Leo Kuper, The Pity of It All
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question:
Conflicts, Development, and Human Rights (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1990), p. 16.
2. Helen Fein, "Accounting for Genocide after 1945: Theories and Some Findings," International
Journal on Group Rights, 1 (1993),79-106; more generally, Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in
Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 22; Stavenhagen, p. 77.
3. In general, see William A. Gamson, "Hiroshima, the Holocaust, and the Politics of Exclusion,"
American Sociological Review, 60 (1995), 1-20; Susan Opotow. "Drawing the Line: Social
Categorization, Moral Exclusion, and the Scope of Justice," in Barbara B. Bunker and Jeffrey Z. Rubin,
eds., Conflict, Cooperalion and Justice: Essays Inspired by the Work of Morton Deutsch (San Fransisco:
Josey-Bass, 1995), pp. 347-69; Ervin Staub, "Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory and Extreme
Destructiveness," Journal 0.( Social Issues, 46 (1990), 47-64. On Rwanda, see Fein, "Accounting for
Genocide"; Helen Fein, "More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the
World, 1987," Human Rights Quarterly. 17 (1995), 170-91; Mark Ennals, "Ethnic Conflict Resolution
and the Protection of Minorities: The Quest for NGO Competence Building," in Kumar Rupesinghe, ed.,
Ethnic Conflict and Human Rights (Tokyo: United Nations University and Norwegian University Press,
1988), pp. 12-13; Harff, p. 35; more generally, Gurr, pp. 59,82,126; Stavenhagen, p. 16.
4. See Jean-Pierre Chretien, "Hutu et Tutsi au Rwanda et au Burundi," in Jean-Loup AmseJle and
Edgar M'Bokolo, eds., Au coeur de l'ethnie: Ethnies, tribalisme el Etat en A/rique (Paris: La Decouverte,
1985); Rene Lemarchand, "Power and Stratification in Rwanda: A Reconsideration," Cahier d'Etudes
Aji'icaines, 24 (1966), 592--610; Jacques Maquet, The Premise of Inequalitv in Rwanda: A Study o(
Political Relations in a Central A/i'ican Kingdom (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); Gerard
Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of II Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995);
Claudine Vidal, "Economie de la societe feodale rwandaise," Cahiers d 'Etudes Aji'icaines, 14 (1974).
5. See Prunier; Rene Lemarchand, Burundi and Rwanda (New York: Praeger, 1970); Luc de Heusch,
"Anthropologic d'un genocide: Le Rwanda." Les Temps l'Y{odernes, 49 (December 1994), 1-19:
Dominique Franche, "Genealogie du genocide rwandais: Hutu et Tutsi, Gaulois et Francs?," Les Temps
Modernes, 582 (1995); Jean-Claude Willame, At/x sources de I 'hecatombe rwandaise (Paris: Karthala,
1995). It is certain that Rwanda's northwest, currently the provinces of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, was domi-
nated until the end of the nineteenth century by Hutu kings. Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of
Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda 11!60-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press,

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Peter Uvin

1988); Charlery de la Masseliere, "Le resserrement de l'espace agraire au Rwanda, les paysans dans la
crise," Etudes Rurales, 125 (1992), 99-115.
6. Pierre Erny, Rwanda 1994 (Paris: I..:Harmattan, 1994), p. 25; Robert Archer, Burundi: Vivre dans
la peur (Christian Aid/Church World Action), p. 5.; Andre Guichaoua, "Un lourd passe, un present drama-
tique, un avenir des plus sombres," in Andre Guichaoua, ed., Les crises politiques au Burundi et au
Rwanda (1993-1994) (Lille: KarthalaiUniversite des Sciences etTechnologies de Lille, 1995), pp. 19-20.
7. Gurr, p. 4; also, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991).
8. Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late
Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton Univeristy Press, 1996), pp. 18,42-43.
9. Prunier, p. 27, claims that some of these positions were previously held by Hutu. Colette
Braeckman, Genocide au Rwanda (Paris: Fayart, 1994), p. 36, makes the same claim with slightly differ-
ent data. This position has been best argued by Chretien, "Hutu et Tutsi."
1O. Feltz, p. 284.
11. Prunier, p. 25; Newbury, pp. 118-20; Franche; Willame, p. 113.
12. The average income of Tutsi households, excluding those in political office, was 4,439 Rwandan
francs, while the average income of Hutu households was 4,249 francs. Ian Linden, Church and
Revolution in Rwanda (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1977), p. 226.
13. Mamdani, p. 24.
14. Prunier, p. 49.
15. Kuper; Lemarchand, "Burundi and Rwanda"; Prunier.
16. CAAB, Buyoya, democrate? (Centre d' Analyse et d'Action pour Ie Burundi, 1996).
17. Zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, Le dialogue national peut-if briser la puissance de terreur au
Burundi? Rapport sur l'impact de la conjerence internationale tenue aBujumbura du 15 au 18 mai 1994
sur les efforts du Burundi pour restaurer Ie processus democratique dans Ie pays (Uppsala: Scandinavian
Institute of African Studies, November 1994), p. 8; Archer, pp. 12-13.
18. However, in both countries not all members of the ethnic group in power benefited equally. In
Rwanda the lives of the vast majority of Hutu farmers had not noticeably changed. In Burundi the size of
the ethnic group from which the ruling clique emanated was much smaller, and its members were thus
able to profit from the new regime more broadly. Nevertheless, not all Tutsi benefited equally from the
new system. The pastoral Tutsi in the highlands of Muramvya, for example, were mostly as poor as and
often more malnourished than their Hutu neighbors in the plains.
19. Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992);
I.C.H.R.D.D., Pour un systeme de justice au Rwanda (Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights
and Democratic Development, January 1995); Lindiro Kabirigi, Genocide au Rwanda: Honte pour l'hu-
manite: Reflexions d'un responsable d'une DNG sous-regionale (Kigali: Programme de Recherche et de
Formation pour Ie Developpement, 1994).
20. Peter Uvin, Violence, Aid, and Conflict: Reflections from the Case of Rwanda (Helsinki: World
Institute of Development Economics Research, 1996); Catharine Newbury, "Rwanda: Recent Debates
over Governance and Rural Development," in Goran B. Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., Governance
and Politics in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 193-220; Jean-Pierre Pabanel, "Bilan de la
deuxieme Republique rwandaise: Du modele de developpement Ii la violence generale," Politique
Africaine, 57 (March 1995), 113. For a fascinating study of this function of the development discourse,
see Jonathan Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic
Power in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
21. Uvin, Violence.
22. Jean-Pierre Chretien, "Le Rwanda et la France: La democratie ou les ethnies?," Journal
(March-April 1993), 190; Jean-Pierre Chretien, Rwanda: Les medias du genocide (Paris: Karthala, 1995);
de Heusch, p. 11; Jean Kagabo and Claudine Vidal, 'Textermination des Rwandais Tutsi," Cahiers d'E-
tudes Ajricaines, 34 (1994), 542; Kabirigi; Filip Reijntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise: Rwanda,

269
64 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Comparative Politics April 1999

Burundi, 1988-1994 (Paris: Karthala, 1994); Prunier; Pabanel. On its historical and social bases, see Peter
Uvin, "Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda," Aji-ican Studies Review, 40 (September 1997); Liisa
H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, MemoY]', and National Cosmology among Hutu Refilgees in
Tanzania (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
23. Prunier, p. 75.
24. Andre Guichaoua, "Rwanda: De l'omnipresence des aides au desengagement international,"
L 'Afrique Politique (1995), 34.
25. Robert Kay, Burundi since the Genocide (London: Minority Rights Group, 1987); Catherine
Watson, Tmnsition in Burundi (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1993); Cervenka and
Legum, p. 12.
26. Jean-Pierre Chretien, Andre Guiachaoua, and Guy Le Jeune, "La Crise politico-ethnique du
Burundi: t.: ombre de 1972." Politique Africaine, 32 (1988), 105-10; U.S. Committee for Refugees, World
Re/ilgee Survey (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees. 1992).
27. Jean-Fran~ois Medard "Autoritarismes et democraties en Afrique Noire," Politique Ajricaine, 43
(October 1991),94.
28. See Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (New York: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1994): Cervenka and Legum.
29. From 1982 to 1984 nine-tenths of all public investments took place in the four provinces of Kigali.
Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, and Cyangugu. The first is the capital, and the others are in the north, the president's
region. Gitarama, the most populous province after Kigali, received 0.16 percent, and Kibuye 0.84 per-
cent. World Bank, Rwanda: The Role of the Communes in Socio-Economic Development (Washington,
D.C.: South, Central and Indian Ocean Department, 1987). p. 12.
30. Guichaoua, "Rwanda," p. 15.
3!. Reijntjens, pp. 104ff.; Prunier.
32. Well-documented in Reijntjens.
33. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, Early Warning and Conflict Management (Copenhagen:
DANIDA Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996).
34. Alphonse Nkubito, "Rwanda: Violations des droits de l'homme." Dialogue, 155 (March 1992),22.
35. Prunier; Pabanel, p. 118.
36. More than twenty other papers printed similar materials. Chretien, "Rwanda: Les media du geno-
cide"; Jean-Pierre Chretien, '''Presse Libre' et propagande raciste au Rwanda," Politique Aji-icaine (June
1991),42; Article 19, Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship. Propaganda and State-Sponsored Violence in
Rwanda 1990·1994 (London: Article 19, the International Centre against Censorship, 1996).
37. Human Rights Watch Africa. "Human Rights in Africa and U.S. Policy," Human Rights Watch
Aji-ica, 6 (July 1994).
38. Reijntjens, p. 117.
39. For discussions of the same processes regarding the Holocaust, see Herbert Kelman and V Lee
Hamilton. "Sanctioned Massacres," in Neil 1. Kressel, ed .. Political Psychology: Classic and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Paragon House. 1993). p. 235; John P Sabini and Maury Silver,
"Destroying the Innocent with a Clear Conscience: A Sociopsychology of the Holocaust," in Kresse!. ed.,
pp. 121-23; Daniel 1. Goldhagen. Hitler\- Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1996), p. 137. More generally, see Wilhelmus P. Du Preez, Genocide: The
Psychology of Mass Murder (London: BoyarsiBowerdean, 1994), pp. 83, 101-7.
40. Commission Internationale d'Enquete sur les Violations des Droits de I'Homme au Rwanda depuis
Ie I er Octobre 1990, Rapport Final (Federation Internationale des Droits de I 'Homme, Africa
WatchiUIDHiCIDPDD, 1993).
41. African Rights, Rwanda: Death. Despair and De/iance (London: African Rights, 1994).
42. For qualified support of the former position, see United Nations Secretary General, Rapport au
Secretaire General de la mission prepamtoire chargee d 'etablir les faits au Burundi (New York: United

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 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 65

Peter Uvin

Nations, May 20, 1994); Commission Internationale d'Enquete sur les Violations des Droits de I'Homme
au Burundi depuis Ie 21 Octobre 1993, Rapport Final (Africa Watch, FIDH, Ligue des Droits de la
Personne dans la Region des Grands Lacs, Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture, Centre National pour
la Cooperation au Developpement, NOVIB, 1994). For qualified support of the latter position, see United
Nations Security Council, Rapport de fa Commission d'Enquae des Nations Unies sur Ie Burundi.
(New York: United Nations, August 1996).
43. Patrick de Saint-Exupery, "Burundi: Les tambours du genocide: Comme Ie Rwanda voisin, Ie pays
cede it la haine ethnique," Le Figaro, Mar. 16, 1995.
44. United Nations Secretary General, p. 30.
45. Amnesty International, Burundi: Armed Groups Kill without Mercy (London: Amnesty
International, June 12,1996).
46. Archer, pp. 4-5.
47. Chretien, Guichaoua, and Le Jeune; Rene Lemarchand "11 y a vingt ans: Un genocide selectif au
Burundi," Le Monde, Nov. 4, 1992.
48. Commission Internationale d'Enquete, 1994, p. 179.
49. OXFAM, Rwanda Never Again: The Search for Durable Solutions in the African Great Lakes
Region (London: OXFAM. 1996); Cervenka and Legum, p. 13; Groupe Ecoute et Reconciliation dans
I' Afrique des Grands Lacs, Pour en terminer avec la "culture de f'impunite" au Rwanda et Burundi
(Geneva: Institut Universitaire d'Etudes du Developpement, 1995).
50. Marie-France Cros, "Burundi: Le regne des mil ices," La Libre Belgique, Mar. 21, 1995; "Dans un
maquis hutu," Liberation, Jan. 19, 1995; Ildefonso Nayigizente. Rwanda: Une jeunesse sacriflee pour des
fantasmes (Parti Democrate, 1995), p. 46.
51. Catherine Andre and Jean-Philippe Platteau, Land Tenure under Unendurahle Stress: Rwanda
Caught in the Malthusian Trap (Namur: Centre de Recherche en Economie du Developpement, University
ofNamur, 1995), pp. 34--35.
52. Goldhagen, p. 384.
53. For Rwanda, see Erny. pp. 91. 109, 165ff.: Philip Gourevitch, "After the Genocide," The New
Yorker, Dec. 18 1995, pp. 84,93; Cart, p. 468: Prunier, p. 57; Human Rights Watch, Slaughter among
Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp.
17-18.
54. Guichaoua "Rwanda," p. 38; more generally, lean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, Anthropologie et
developpement: Essai en socio-anthropologie du changement social (Paris: Karthala, 1995), p. 5.
55. Archer; Jeff Drumtra, Life after Death: Suspicion and Reintegration in Post-Genocide Rwanda
(Washington, D.C.: US. Committee for Refugees, 1998).
56. See too Daniel Bar-Tal, "Causes and Consequences of Delegitimization: Models of Conflict and
Ethnocentrism," Journal of Socia/Issues, 46 (1990), 65-81; Vamik D. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies
and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships (Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1994), p.
xxv.
57. Prunier. p. xiii.
58. See Daniel Bar-Tal and Kay Warren, The Violence Within: Cultural and Political Opposition in
Divided Nations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 9.
59. See Lemarchand Burundi: Ethnic Conflict; Reijntjens.
60. For example, Fein, "More Murder"; Horowitz.
61. Harff, p. 43. The other two factors are structural change (a necessary but not sufficient condition)
and sharp internal cleavages combined with a history of struggle between groups.
62. Fein, "Accounting," pp. 86,99.

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 [4]
Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality
By Ashutosh Varshney

Why do we have so many ethnic partisans in the world ready to die as suicide bombers? Does a rational calculus lie beneath the
nationalist pride and passions? Can it be discovered if only we apply our understanding of rationality more creatively? This arti-
cle seeks to answer these questions by focusing on the nationalism of resistance. It argues that a focus on dignity, self-respect, and
recognition, rather than a straightfonvard notion of self-interest, is a better prism for understanding ethnic and nationalist behav-
ior, although self-interest is not entirely absent as a motivation in ethnic conflict. In the process of developing this argument, a
distinction once made by Max Weber-between instrumental rationality and value rarionality-is recovered and refined further.

No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of
Unknown Soldiers .... They are either deliberately empty or no one knows who lies inside them ....
The culrural significance of such monuments becomes even dearer if one tries to imagine, say. a Tomb
of rhe Unknown Marxist or a cenotaph for fallen Liberals. Is a sense of absurdity avoidable? The reason
is that neither Marxism nor Liberalism is much concerned with death and immortality. If the national-
ist imagining is so concerned, this suggests a strong affinity with religious imaginings ....
-Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1983

A re identities rational? Are identity-based conflicts? If one

goes by the history of ideas, these questions have mostly
been answered in the negative. Let me give two illustrations.
of the past century, informs us that the notions of national iden-
tity and nationalism were born with the Counter-Enlightenment.
As the French Enlightenment celebrated the triumph of rational-
In a celebrated essay, Czech novelist Milan Kundera argues that ity, emphasizing its universality and objectivity, a reaction took
science and novels were born together. Indeed, novels were made place, especially in German-speaking Europe. The
necessary by science, for "the more [man] advanced in [scientific Enlightenment intellectuals argued that "methods similar to
and rational] knowledge, the less clearly could he see ... his own those of Newtonian Physics ... could be applied with equal suc-
self ... and he plunged further into what ... Heidegger called ... cess to the fields of ethics, politics and human relationships in
'the forgetting of being."" Following this argument to its logical general.'" Johann Gottfried von Herder, who would later be
end, Kundera claims that the question of identity-Who am I?- called a leading patron of the Counter-Enlightenment, disagreed:
belongs to the realm of being, not to the domain of rationality. "Germans must be Germans and not third-rate Frenchmen; life
The latter deals with the question, How do I get what I want? The lies in remaining steeped in one's own language. tradition, local
two questions may sometimes be related-what I may be able to feeling; uniformity is death.'" The reaction was both against "the
get may begin to define how I see myself and my goals---but they deathly embrace of impersonal, scientific thought" and the
are not the same. French cultural hegemony of Europe'" In a similar vein, Johann
Kundera's argument is about identity per se) not about nation- Gottlieb Fichte delivered his Addresses to the German Nation. It
al or ethnic identity. Is it that national identities are held for was 1808-1809; the Germans, spread among Prussia, Bavaria,
rational reasons? The customary answer is even more emphatical- Bohemia. and Silesia, were yet to be born as a nation under one
ly negative. Isaiah Berlin, arguably the foremost historian of ideas political roof. Herder and Fichte, Berlin argues, were the
ideational fathers of nationalism. s Indeed, nationalism as an idea
arose as a romantic revolt against the universalizing and rational-
Ashutosh Varshney is an associate profossor ofpolitical science at the izing thrust of the Enlightenment.
University ofMichigan ([email protected]). He received many Can the child of the Counter-Enlightenment be analyzed
helpful comments on earlier drafts ofthis paper. He would especial- in an Enlightenment framework? Has rationality, after more than
ly like to acknowledge the criticisms and suggestions of Gabriel two centuries of progress since the Enlightenment, developed
Almond, Benedict Anderson, Robert Bates, Morris Fiorina, Ira capacities to deal with human passions, emotions, and
Katznelson, Pratap Mehta, Vibha Pingle, Ronald Rogowski, James values in an illuminating manner? Is it that beneath the nationalist
Scott, Kenneth Shepsle, Jack Snyder, Sidney Verba, the late Myron pride and passions lies a rational calculus, which can be discovered
Weiner, Elisabeth Wood, Crawford Young, and three anonymous if only we apply our understanding of rationality more creatively?
reviewers of this journal Needless to add, not all ofthem agreed, so Recovering a duality first proposed by Max Weber, I suggest that
the standard disclaimers apply. ethnic or national conflict is best conceptualized as a combination
68 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

of "value rationality" and "instrumental rationality." Both of these serious possibility of high costs thar usually accompany the
rationalities are expressions of goal-directed behavior, but their nationalism of resistance make such an alignment extremely
conceptions of costs widely diverge. Instrumental rationality difficult.
entails a strict cost-benefit calculus with respect to goals, necessi- As scholarly work proceeds further, the concept of value
tating the abandonment or adjustment of goals if the costs of real- rationality will need greater unpacking. I rake the first steps here
izing them are too high. Value-rational behavior is produced by a by concentrating on only one kind of nationalism: the national-
conscious "ethical, aesthetic, religious or other" belief, "indepen- ism of resistance. I am certain that dignity and self-respect cannot
dently of its prospects of success.'" Behavior, when driven by such be the micro foundations of all forms of ethnic or nationalist
values, can consciously embrace great personal sacrifices. Some behavior. Pending later work, for example, it is reasonable to sup-
spheres or goals of life are considered so valuable that they would pose rhat the nationalism of exclusion is driven substantially by
not normally be up for sale or compromise, however costly the hatred andlor deep-rooted condescension: Mrikaner nationalism
pursuit of their realization might be. The means to achieving these in South Mrica, the anti-Semitism of Hitler, and Hindu nation-
objectives might change, bur rhe objecrives themselves would not. alism in India would be some examples. In what follows, the
The term value-rational does not, of course, mean that the claim of dignity and self-respect applies only to the nationalism
values expressed by such behavior are necessarily laudable. of resistance, not to the nationalism of exclusion. 8
Indeed, the values in question may range from pure pride or
prejudice (vis-a-vis some groups or belief systems) ro goals such Terms and Distinctions
as dignity, self-respect, and commitment to a group or a set of Let me start with definitions of the principal terms used here:
ideals. Likewise, value-rational acts can range from long-run ethnicity, nation. and rationality. Not having the same meaning
sacrifices for distant goals to violent expressions of prejudice or for everyone, these terms need clarification.
status. Ethnicity is used in two different ways. In the narrower, popu-
Most of the time and in most places, ethnic or national mobi- larly understood sense, ethnic groups arc racial or linguistic
lization cannot begin without value-rational microfoundations. groups. There is, however, a broader meaning as well. As Donald
For it to be instrumentally used by leaders, ethnicity must exist as Horowitz suggests,9 all conflicts based on ascriptive (birth-based)
a valued good for some. However, ethnic mobilization cannot group identities, real or imagined-race, language, religion, tribe,
proceed on value-rational grounds alone. Strategies are necessary; or caste-----{:an be called ethnic. In this larger usage, ethnic conflicts
coalitions must be formed; the response of the adversary-the can range from (I) the Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern
state, the opposed ethnic group, the in-group dissenters-must Ireland and the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India to (2) the black-
be anticipated. And many would join such mobilization, when it white conflict in the United States and South Mrica and the
has acquired some momentum and chance of success, for entire- Malay-Chinese conflict in Malaysia, (3) the Quebecois problem in
ly selfish reasons. The origins of ethnic mobilization are thus Canada and the Tamil-Sinhala conflicr in Sri Lanka, and (4) Shia-
value-rational, and its evolution may contain a lot of strategic Sunoi troubles in Pakistan. In the narrower view, the first of these
behavior. examples are religious, the second racial, the third linguistic, and
To illustrate this argument in ample detail and for tracrability, the fourth sectarian. The term ethnic has customarily been used in
I shall restrict my analytical focus to only one kind of nationalist the pasr for the second and third types of conflicts, not for the first
or ethnic behavior. A useful distinction is often made between the and fourth.
nationalism of exclusion and the nationalism of resistance. 7 The Proponents of the broader usage do not find the narrower dis-
idea, of course, is quite old. The nationalism of anticolonial tinctions analytically helpful. They argue that rhe form these con-
movements was never comparable to the nationalism of Hitler. flicts take-religious, racial, linguistic, tribal---does not change
In the nationalism of exclusion, a dominant group within a rheir intensity or relative intractability. The broader meaning of
society-domestic or foreign-seeks to impose its own values on ethnic is now increasingly prevalent in the social sciences; I will
the various other groups within that society or seeks to exclude. use the term in this way.
sometimes violently, other ethnic groups from the portals of Also, for the purposes of this paper, the terms ethnicity and
power. Typically, this taltes the form of enforcing language, reli- nation can be used interchangeably. If the discussion were about
gion, or culture via control of the state, or excluding groups from why some ethnic conflicts remain bounded within the existing
power on the basis of ethnic characteristics only. In the national- state boundaries while others gravitate toward independence, a
ism of resistance, a dominated group opposes such a move and distinction between rhe two terms would be essential. Ethnic
seeks to preserve its cultural identity and resist the hegemony and groups, as we know, can live without a state of their own, making
power of the dominant group. do with some cultural rights (e.g., use of mother tongue in
I will argue that digniry and self-respect form the microfoun- schools) or affirmative action; but a nation means bringing eth-
dations of the latter kind of nationalism or ethnic behavior. nicity and statehood together. 1O This distinction, however, is not
Driven by such values, resisting nationalists are willing to endure necessary for our purposes here, because the discussion is about a
very high costs-and for long periods of time. The cost-benefir whole class of conflicts. which are framed in terms of national
calculus in such behavior does not work in a way that can be eas- identiry or ethnicity.
ily aligned with a standard account of instrumental rationality. What abour our third key term, rationality? In its standard
Indeed, long time frames, a radical uncertainty of results, and the economic usage. the term refers to instrumental rationality, and it

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 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 69

has two meanings. First, it means consistency of choice: if I pre- From development microeconomics, we know that demand
fer A over Band B over C, then I must prefer A over C. The sec- for food is relatively, not absolutely, insensitive to price--people
ond meaning is identical with self-interest, Action is rational if it must eat, however expensive food might become-whereas
is aimed at realizing self-interest. If costs of an action outweigh demand for TV sets and cars is remarkably sensitive to price, sug-
benefits, self-interest will not be served; hence a cost-benefit cal- gesting thereby low price elasticity of demand for the former and
culus accompanies analysis based on self-interest, high elasticity for the latter. We can similarly argue that value-
In philosophical discussions, rationality refers to "reasoned rational behavior is relatively inelastic with respect to costs. A
assessment as the basis of action."ll Such an assessment can be fully inelastic behavior as in the Weberian ideal type-with value-
based on self-interest but also on larger values, Self can be broad- rational behavior on the horiwntal axis and cost/price on the ver-
ly defined in terms of group goals, national identity, religious tical-would be represented by a lIat line, but low-elasticity
values, aesthetic considerations, and so on. This larger view behavior would slope downward, like demand curves, although
would also include what Weber called "value rationality," In the slope would not be as steep, as in the case of highly elastic
Economy and Society, Weber categorized social action into four goods such as cars. In this economic analogy, value-rational
types: instrumental-rational, value-rational, norm-oriented behavior is more like the demand for food, and instrumental-
(based on conventions and traditions, without critical delibera- rational behavior like the demand for cars and 'IV sets."
tion), and affective or impulsive (the expression of anger, envy, There is no doubt that an instrumentally rational-or rational
love, et cetera), choice--understanding of human behavior has made remarkable
The alternatives to instrumentally rational behavior are thus progress over the years, extending into newer directions and
not simply emotional or irrational behavior,12 Of the four fields. Behavior covered by such reasoning and models ranges
Weberian categories of human action, the first two are goal- from economic decision making of consumers and firms to
directed, only one of which is instrumental-rational, whose nuclear politics, legislative and bureaucratic behavior, and politi-
unique feature is a strict cost-benefit calculus with respect to goals cal mobilization and ethics. Indeed, the list of topics to which
and means, Such calculus may lead not only to a change of means rational-choice models have been applied continues to grow. '6
for the realization of goals, but also to an alteration of goals if the In principle, one cannot object to pushing a mode of analysis
costs of attaining them are prohibitive. Value-rationality is distin- to fields where it was not applied before. Indeed, several new
guished by a continual pursuit of goals, even if the costs of real- insights in the world of knowledge are generated precisely this
izing them are high; it shows a high degree of commitment. way. Much has been learned on political mobilization by explor-
Which of these categories of behavior is represented by the ing the idea that the self-interest of individuals and the interest of
term rational choice often used in economics and political science? the group to which they belong are two different things: class
Almost without exception, it is instrumental rationality with conflict may therefore be more latent than overt. \7 The prisoner's
which rational-choice theorists identifY. They either do not speak dilemma game has taught us better than many other models that
of goals, concentrating instead on the means; or they assume that rationally behaving individuals may generate a macro outcome
self-interest is the goal of human action. I will, therefore, use that is suboptimal for all. Similarly, how self-seeking political and
these two terms-instrumental rationality and rational choice- bureaucratic behavior, as opposed to the selfish behavior of eco-
interchangeably in this paper. Bur I will not equate rationality nomic agents in competitive markets, can lead to a wasteful use
with rational choice. of society's economic resources and hamper economic growth is a
These distinctions have some important implications for a dis- problem where rational choice has been especially useful as an
cussion of rationality. In a standard rational-choice account, there explanatory tool. 18
is considerable resistance to the idea that different motivations The issue therefore is not whether rational-choice theories
can underlie behavior in different spheres of life: that it may be explain human behavior at all. More germane is rhe question of
perfectly rational for human beings to be instrumentally rational whether rational-choice theories are especially relevant to a spe-
while buying a car, bur value-rational while responding to ques- cific class of problems and a particular realm of human behavior,
tions of national liberation, school choice for children, affirma- and if so, in what ways that realm might be different from oth-
tive action, or multiculturalism in universities. 13 Moreover. ers. 19 In this realm-specific spirit,20 I ask whether and how far
rational choice also remains highly skeptical of the notion thar rational-choice theories can account for erhnic behavior and con-
individual action can be rooted in group interests, not self~ lIict, dominated as they often are by mass politics, not by the
interest. Value-rational behavior would not find identification institutionalized forms of bureaucratic or legislative politics. 21
with group interests irrational.
What else can we say abour value-rationality? According to The Big Gap: Where Do Ethnic
Weber, as already noted, value-rational behavior is pursued "inde- Preferences Come From?
pendently of its prospects of success. ,,14 That notion, in my view, Before ethnic conflict can be explained, a rational-choice analyst is
is best seen as an ideal type, or a pure case of value-rationality. confronted with a twofold task: providing microfoundations of
Any reasonable notion of value-rational behavior cannot be ethnic behavior and explaining ethnic mobilization. To begin with,
insensitive to costs. A more realistic reformulation of Weber's one has to account for why individuals have, or develop, ethnic
notion is required. In order to provide that, let me use the simple preferences. Can such preferences be explained instrurnentally~
economic concept of elasticity. i.e.. as a means to a self-interested end (political power,

www.apsanet.org 87
70 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

economic benefit, survival)? And since it would be instrumentally Ethnic mobilization for political action is not the sarne as ethnic
rational, given self-interest, for individuals to free ride, explaining c()()rdinati()n for economic and social activities. By providing a
ethnic mobilization requires specifYing conditions under which it social occasion, festivals may indeed bring people together even if
would not make sense for individuals to free ride and, in fact, it not everyone appreciates the ritual meaning of celebration or
would be rational to join an ethnic movement or mobilization. mourning; and by forming mutually converging trust, geograph-
The standard rational-choice accounts assume that ethnicity ically spread ethnic kinsmen are also known to have supplied
can be seen instrumentally. They focus primarily on how leaders credit in long-distance trade without a prior explicit contract
strategically manipulate ethnicity for the sake of power.22 This between trading partners.
argument has an intuitive appeal because the behavior of many, if The analogy of a focal point, however, cannot be extended to
not all, political leaders can be cited in support. group action when the costs of participation for the masses are
If presented in this form, the instrumental-rational argument very high. By its very nature. ethnic mobilization in politics is
about ethnicity runs into a serious difficulty. The elite may indeed group action not only in favor of one's group but also against
gain power by mobilizing ethnic identity without believing in it some other group. More rights and power for my group often
themselves, and could therefore behave instrumentally. But if the mean a diminution in the ability of some other group(s) to dic-
masses were only instrumental about ethnic identity, why would tate terms, or a sharing of power and status between groups
ethnicity be the basis for mobilization at all? Why do the leaders where no such sharing earlier existed; in the extreme cases, it
decide to mobilize ethnic passions in the first place? Why do they may even entail the other group's displacement from power or
think that ethnicity, not the economic interests of the people, is status. Ethnicity in intragroup social or economic transactions is
the route to power? And if economic interests coincide with eth- thus very different from ethnicity in inte~roup political con-
nicity. why choose ethnicity as opposed to economic interests for flicts. The former illustrates the value of ethnicity as a focal
mobilization? point; the latter presents problems of a different order. When an
In principle, a rational-choice resolution of these problems individual provides credit to ethnic brethren without an explicit
exists. Ethnicity can serve as a focal point, facilitating conver- contract, incarceration, violence, injury, or death is not likely the
gence of individual expectations, and hence can be useful as a cost he has to keep in mind.25 But depending on how the adver-
mobilization strategy. The idea of focal points comes from sarial group or the state reacts, such costs are not unlikely in eth-
Thomas Schelling's seminal treatment of the coordination prob- nic or national conflicts.
lem in bargaining. In the famous Schelling example: Consider the famous 1930 Salt March in India. The British
rulers monopolized the manufacture and retailing of salt. Seizing
When a man loses his wife in a department store without any prior a symbol that even the illiterate masses could relate to, Mahatma
understanding on where to meet if they get separated. the chances are
Gandhi argued that the British insulted Indians by not letting
good that they will find each other. It is likely that each will think of
them freely make and sell something as basic as salt in their own
some obvious place to meet, so obvious that each will be sure that the
other is sure that it is obvious to both of chem. 23 country and by levying a salt tax. He went on to lead a nonvio-
lent mobilization against salt laws and was later arrested. Civil
Schelling goes on to propose that without having an intrinsic disobedience continued even after his arrest. An American jour-
value for the couple, the lost-and-found section of the depart- nalist gave the following eyewitness account of the early phase of
ment store could be one such place. It will, however, not be a the movement:
focal point if there are too many lost-and-found sections in the
The salt deposits were surrounded by ditches filled with water and
store. A focal point is distinguished by its prominence or unique-
guarded by four hundred native . .. police in khaki shorts and brown
ness: it has the instrumental power of facilitating the formation
of mutually consistent expectations. Schelling then generalizes
the principle:

Spontaneous revolt may reflect similar principles: when leaders can

easily be destroyed, people may require some signal for their coordi-
nation. [which is] ... so potent in its suggestions for action chat
everyone can be sure that everyone else reads the same signal with
enough confidence to act on it, thus providing one another with
immunity that goes with action in large numbers. 24

Ethnicity, in other words, can be viewed as one such focal point

for mobilization; it is not valued for its own sake. Its mobiliza-
tional potential may be deployed by leaders to extract goods and
services from the modern sector, or to establish their own
power.
The idea of a focal point is not sufficient to explain ethnic
mobilization, for it does not distinguish between different kinds
of collective action and what their respective costs might be. Gandhi on the Salt March, 1930

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turbans. Half a dozen British officials commanded them. The police Pretoria had been snuffed out by its stern atmosphere; we were face to
carried ... five-foot clubs tipped with steel. ... face with the realization that our life would be unredeemably grim. In
In complete silence, the Gandhi men drew up and halted a hun- Pretoria, we felt connected to our supporters and our families; on the
dred yards from the stockade. A picked column advanced from the island, we felt cut off and indeed we were. We had the consolation of
crowd, waded the ditches, and approached the barbed-wire being with each other, but that was the only consolation. My dismay
stockade.... Police officials ordered the marchers to disperse .... was quickly replaced by a sense that a new and different fight had
The column silently ignored the warning and slowly walked begun. 30
forward ..
Suddenly, at a word of command, scores of. , . police rushed After 27 years on Robben Island, Mandela did walk to triumph
upon the advancing marchers and rained blows on their heads with and freedom; but in 1962, when he was jailed, there was a good
their steel-shod dubs (lathis). Not one of the marchers even raised an chance he would end up dying there. It was a life sentence after
arm to fend off the blows. They went down like tenpins. From where all, and he knew it beforehand, The same was true of his many
I stood I heard the sickening whacks of the clubs on unprotected fellow prisoners, if not to the same degree.
skulls, These examples illustrate a simple point, widely understood by
... In two or three minutes the ground was quilted with bod-
activists in such struggles. Ex ante possibility of violence or coer-
ies . ... Although every one knew that within a few minutes he would
cion almost always accompanies ethnic or national resistance.
be beaten down, perhaps killed, I could detect no signs of wavering or
fear.... The marchers simply walked forward until struck down, Mobilization for ethnic or national protest cannot thus be equated
There were no outcries, only groans after they fell. with solving problems of economic or social coordinarion through
.. , I went back to the temporary hospital [0 examine the wounded. the ethnic bond, It is a special kind of collective action, for the
. . . I counted 320 injured, many still insensible with fractured skulls, costs of resistance or mobilization are often known to be high .
others writhing in agony.16 Although exact estimates are hard to produce, it is generally
agreed that in this century, many more people have died for a
Other examples of this kind of resolve can also be cired. nation or an ethnic group-presumed or actual-than for join-
Consider rhe civil-rights movement of the United States in the ing a supranational economic collectivity, such as the European
1960s, "In the Black community ... going to jail was a badge of Economic Community, the Association of Southeast Asian
dishonor, «27 And what kind of jails are we talking about? Nations, or the North American Free Trade Agreement,3!
Moreover, fighting for higher prices, subsidies, and wages, and
Freedom riders, by all accounts, had a miserable time in the jails, They
were crowded into small, filthy cells, forced to sleep on concrete
for more jobs, does not necessarily generate as much passion and
floors, fed unpalatable food, prevented from maintaining personal violence as does ethnic or nationalist mobilization. The masses
hygiene, intimidated, harassed, and sometimes beaten by unfriendly have often been much more willing to come out on the street for
guards. 18 ethnic issues than for economic ones.32 If they did not value
ethnicity, why would they respond so passionately to ethnic
As if these were small discomforts for black civil-rights activists, appeals?
we also have accounts of marches at night, even though "[ulnder For something to be manipulated by a leader when death,
cover of darkness, a violent response by the police or by local vig- injury, or incarceration is a clear possibility, it must be valued as
ilantes was almost assured. When civil-rights activists conducted a good by a critical mass of people, if not by aiL A purely instru-
a night march in Marion, state troopers attacked and beat them mental conception of ethnicity cannot explain why leaders mobi-
after the street lamps were intentionally blacked out."29 lize ethnic or national identities at all. The point is analogous to
Finally, similar behavior can be noted in South Africa's history, Jon Elster's famous objection to an instrumental conception of
A violent repression or a harsh jail sentence was a near certainty. norms: "Some argue that ... norms .. , ace tools of manipulation,
once Nelson Mandela and his colleagues decided frontally to used to dress up self-interest in a more acceptable garb, But this
challenge the apartheid regime on behalf of Mricans, In the end, cannot be true, , , . If some people successfully exploit norms for
Mandela himself and many of his colleagues were jailed in self-interested purposes, it can only be because others are willing
Robben Island. The harsh and grim prison conditions did not to let nocms take precedence over self-interest. "33
crush their spirit. The experience only clarified that-given the
objective of racial equality-the resolve to fighr the dominant
group, the Mrikaners, would have to weather such suffering. Epistemological Comforts of Home?
Mandela wrote: In the first available rational-choice work on ethnic conflict,
Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle explicitly recognized that
Robben Island was without question the harshest, most iron-fisted microfoundations of ethnic behavior were hard to provide in a
outpost in the South Mrican penal system .... The warders were strictly rational-choice framework. They argued:
white and overwhelmingly Afrikaans-speaking, and they demanded a
master+servant relationship. They ordered us to call them" baas," [AJ bothersome question remains .... Why ... are conflicts in [plu-
which we refused. The racial divide on Robben Island was absolute: ral] societies not organized along economic lines? Our answer is that
there were no black warders and no white prisoners .... Ulourneying politicians exerr control over the definition of alternatives, often rely-
to Robben Island was like going to another country. Its isolation made ing on ethnic appeals. But why this particular choice?
it not simply another prison, but a world of its own, far removed from .. , If ... the ethnic issue were a facade foisted upon an electorate
the one we had come from. The high spirits with which we left not receptive to those issues simply to suit the motives of strategically

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72 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

advantaged politicians. then one might expect successful political more intrinsic than instrumental with respect to ethnicity (her
recourse to be taken by the "losers." conscience is her problem); and the latter is easy in small groups
Although other issues may affect politics in plural societies, we assert but monumentally difficult in large groups, even when an insti-
the preeminence of ethnicity. We are not able to explain its genesis. A tutionalized regulation of individual behavior is devised. If the
satisfactory explanation of this problem awaits two developments: group action concerns my caste or tribe in a village or even a
1. a formal explanation of the formation, development and town, I may rationally coordinate: everyone knows me and I can
endurance of values and preferences, and be monitored. But if the group action is about an imagined eth-
2. a positive theory of political entrepreneurship. nic or national community-involving many villages, towns, and
, . . With these two developments, then we could more persuasively
states-I can escape detection if I cheat. Lacking the intimacy of
account for the preeminence of ethnicity in the plural society.34
small groups, how does one monitor an ethnic group or a nation-
ality? The Hardin proposal thus cannot be size independent. A
Three decades have passed since Rabushka and Shepsle wrote nation is not an intimately knowable, face-to-face community. It
their book. Do we now have an "explanation of the formation, is a large, imagined community.
development and endurance of values" in a rational-choice Second, why should ethnic or narional mobilization be con-
framework? ceptualized as a coordination game, whereas other kinds of mobi-
In the most ambitious, sophisticated. and erudite rational- lization-such as peasant37 or working-class mobilization 38-are
choice work on ethnic conflict so far, Russell Hardin takes up the more typical cases of collective action, crippled by free-rider prob-
challenge." He seeks to provide such micro foundations and also lems? Must the group in question have some specific qualities
use them to explain ethnic mobilization and conflict. His propos- that create "coordination" as the "central strategic problem," pre-
al is threefold. First, "self-interest can often be matched with group empting endemic free riding? Can we account for this difference
interest" instrumentally. Identification with the group may be ben- in a rational-choice framework, or is some other theory required
eficial for two reasons: because "those who identify strongly with to establish the difference? If the latter question is chosen to
the group may gain access to positions under the control of the explore why ethnic action is different from other group actions,
group" and because "the group provides a relatively secure and then it is potentially damaging for rational-choice theories, for it
comfortable environment." The identity between individual and may show that some kinds of preferences emerge in a nonrational
group interests. he argues, can only be "contingent." not "inher- framework.
ent." but it is enough to touch off ethnic mobilization. Second. Hardin has one such proposal about ethnicity: that it may pro-
explanation of ethnic mobilization can't be reduced to the problem vide "epistemological comfortS of home" or, put alternatively,
of collective action where it is rational to free ride. or to a prison- security of environment. This solution only re-states the problem.
ers' dilemma where it is rational to defect. In ethnic mobilization, Why does "ethnicity" provide a home? Why can't a trade union
"[tlhe central strategic problem is merely one of coordination." So or a political party? The Communist experiment was, inter alia,
as long as others in the group are cooperating. it is rational for me premised upon the belief that the party would supplant the false
to cooperate-for if all cooperate, the likelihood of the group gain- consciousness of ethnicity and nation. After decades of trying,
ing power (or group objectives) goes up tremendously. "[Plower that experiment failed, and ethnicity has re-emerged-frighten-
based in coordination is superadditive, it adds up to more than the ingly so in several places. Once we believe that ethniciry can pro-
sum of individual contributions to it." Third, all one needs to keep vide a home better than other groups can, we also accept that in
the coordination game going is a "charismatic leader," a "focus," a basic sense, the microfoundations of ethnicity are psychological,
and a mechanism through which information about others coop- not rational. 39
erating is provided. "Coordination power is ... a function of rein- Thus, whether or not I think that my interests and my group's
forcing expectations about the behavior of others."36 interests are different, the fundamental puzzle for instrumental
Hardin's proposal entails serious difficulties. First, even if I rationality remains as follows: why should I, behaving in a pure-
believe in group goals, contingently or inherently, it is not clear ly instrumental-rational way, participate in group action before it
why it is rational for me to cooperate when others cooperate with is reasonably clear to me that the group is likely to win? Consider
one another. For if they are cooperating, and if "coordination the structure of the problem diagrammatically (see Figure 1). At
power" is "superadditive," then my group is very likely to come time Tl, when my group is not in power, my personal welfare is
to power anyway and it is rational for me to take a free ride- at a low level (WI); I expect that at time T2, when my group is
unless, of course, someone is monitoring my actions and the in power, my welfare will rise to W2. The problem simply is that
nonparticipants will be excluded from the rewards of the group's at time TI, I don't know ex ante how far away T2 is, and I also
victory. Alternatively, my conscience could act as a monitor, giv- don't know how big the costs in the meantime will be. Depending
ing me a sense of guilt or shame for not participating in group on what the adversaries do, the sacrifice required could be low
action even though I believe that the group's interests are my (looking like 51) or high (52). It is not rational for me to join at
interests. Without these monitoring mechanisms, the situation time TI; I should let others join and when the movement or
does not have a unique optimum, but two optima: both free rid- mobilization is already substantial and very likely dose to T2, it
ing and participating could be rational. In a purely logical sense, will be rational for me to participate. 4o
Hardin's proposal thus requires monitoring of individual actions: To sum up, the microfoundations of the origins of ethnic mo-
internally or by others. The former entails an individual who is bilization are different from those that obtain once mobilization

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 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 73

Figure 1 For the scientific method can teach us nothing beyond how facts are
related to, and conditioned by, each other.... Yet it is equally clear
that knowledge of what is does not open the door directly to what
should be, ... Objective knowledge provides us with powerful instru-
ments for the achievement of certain ends, but the ultimate goal itself
W2
and the longing to reach it must come from another source .... Here
we face, therefore, the limits of the purely rational conception of our
existence ....
To make clear these fundamental ends and valuations, and to set
WELFARE them fast in the emotional life of the individual, seems to me precise-
ly the most important function 'which religion has to perform in the
WI SI social life of man ... Y

52
Einstein's reasoning may also help us understand why some of
the most distinguished scientists of the century have been greatly
religious. Seen this way, rationality and religion belong to two dif-
ferent realms of human experience-the former having little to
do with the ends of life." For those uninspired by religion and
Tl T2 TIME
some of its excesses, culture-a set of institutions and normative
practices we live by, some coming from ethnic or national tradi-
has already acquired a considerable following, success, and visi- tions-has been a source of such values. Culture replaces religion
bility. To explain why ethnicity is privileged by leaders as a mobi- in the agnostic or unbelieving homes.
lization strategy~ we must therefore look elsewhere. To make A rational-choice scholar may retort that culture does not exist
greater sense of the supply side of the story, we perhaps need an on its own; it is a creation of individuals. What appears as an
analysis of the demand side as well. inheritance today was created by individual acts in the past, mak-
ing it possible for analysts to explain the existence of culture
instrumentally. In a fundamental sense, this view cannot be cor-
Alternative Microfoundations rect. Culture may indeed have been created by individuals, bur
A search for alternatives must start with answering two questions:
each individual engaged in such creation was also acting in rela-
Why can't instrumental rationality in and of itself suffice as a
tion to an inherited set of practices. In order for an individual to
basis for human motivation? (Wbat, for example, is the role of
create, affirm, deny, or innovate a set of cultural practices-and a
culture or religion in human life?) And how and why does culture
good deal of that happens in everyday life-there has to be a pre-
or religion become a source of group conflict? Once we answer
existing set of normative practices in the framework of which the
these questions, the micro foundations of the nationalism of
creation, affirmation, denial, or innovation acquires meaning. A
resistance will become dear. My purpose is to show that nonin-
sentence or word ha.-';; no meaning until a language exists. Cultural
strumental considerations are highly important in the national-
choices are thus different from buying a car or a house on the one
ism of resistance, laced as they are with notions of self-respect and
hand and forming political strategies to defeat adversaries for
dignity, not with a narrowly defined self-interest.
political office on rhe other. Rational-choice theories may be
Why culture or religion? more applicable to marginal decisions, less to decisions about
Either instrumental rationality. 3...<; already stated, is a concept how people choose fundamental values'"
about the means and not about the ends, or the self-interest is Another clarification is necessary. Placing emphasis on a pre-
assumed to be the end of human action. In any case, a serious existing or inherited culture to explain ethnic behavior is
problem arises requiring a discussion of ends. sometimes seen as an endorsement of the "primordial" view of
Self-interest can certainly give us our immediate or intermedi- ethnicity. According to this view, ethnicity is an ascriptive given,
ate ends. but can it also provide the ultimate ends or values? existing for centuries and therefore stronger than modern or
Indeed, if seen as a foundation of human life or as its ultimate rational forms of human motivation or institutional designs.
goal, self-interest can promote, to paraphrase Hobbes, loneliness, Man, argues a leading exponent of the primordial view, is an
nastiness, brutishness. It is nOt clear that any regulatory frame- ethnic being, or a "national, not a rational animal. "45
work designed by human ingenuity can fully check the many acts The sense in which my account of alternative microfounda-
of nastiness if self-interest is turned into a supreme value. For this tions relies on culture must be distinguished from the primor-
reason, as well as for intrinsic moral or cultural reasons, human dial view. Volition in the realm of culture and identity is indeed
beings cannot live without notions of right and wrong, without possible. Culture, ethnicity, and the nation can be~and are-
notions that can guide them about how to relate to family, com- often "constructed." Peasants were turned into Frenchmen in
munity, and loved ones. 4! France;'6 in 1789 more than 50 percent of Frenchmen did not
Religion-not rationality or its most monumental expression, speak French at all, and "only 12-13 percent spoke it correct-
science-is traditionally considered to provide such values. Albert ly. ,,47 Over a period of roughly a century and a half, a British
Einstein argued forcefully: identity was created out of the English, Scottish, and Welsh

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74 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

identities." "We have made Italy," said Massimo d'Azeglio in a scale may accept their inferior sratus as given. A hierarchy based
legendary statement; "now we have to make Italians." Only 2.5 on birth can exist without causing group conflict.
percent of the population spoke Italian as an everyday language We need, therefore, to ask a historical question: when did
at the time of the Italian Unification. 49 And as for identities at human beings begin to question the idea of an ascriptive group
a level lower than the nation, some smaller castes in India, hierarchy? In a work that has attracted wide attention, Charles
responding to the imperatives of an evolving political democra- Taylor has made two compelling arguments. 57 First, in premod-
cy, came together in a process of fusion to form larger castes ern times, one's identity-as in, Who am I, and where am I
changing established cultural patterns and divisions of centuries coming from?-was given or fixed by one's place in the hierar-
thereby, while others went through a process of fission. 50 All of chical social structure. It was not negotiated. The rise of moder-
these identities were constructed, but the point to note is that nity has led to an increasing decay of traditional social hierar-
they were not constructed on a clean slate. The acts of creatioo, chies-ideationally andlot structurally. As a result, for the first
innovation, or denial drew their rationale, negative or positive, time in history a new individual motivation has arisen: a self-
from an existing set of values. Culture, in this sense) is embed- awareness of dignity. One does not take one's "station" as
ded in our life; it preexists as a framework of meaning, within inevitable. Second, the pursuit of dignity and self-respect is not
which human deliberation and rationality operate. It is not just monological, bur dialogical. The "dialogue" takes place in a
a privately underprovided public good, but an "irreducibly social context. Hermits may define dignity monologically, but
social good."51 the more general pursuits of dignity require recognition from
society. This is especially so because society is not a random
Why is culture or religion a source of conflict? collection of individuals; rather, it comes with a historical inher-
If culture and religion provide values, how can they lead to con- itance of perceptions and misperceptions. Our identity as mod-
flict? A simple answer would be that there are many such cultures ern human beings
and many religions, and their central tendencies dash. However,
is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecog-
as far as the nationalism of resistance is concerned, the issue is not
nirion of others, and so a person or groups of people can suffer real
cultural or religious diversity per se, but a relationship of domi-
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror
nance, subordination, and differential worth that often gets his-
back to them a confining, demeaning, or contemptible picture of
torically built into many group relations, if not all. themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can
Structurally speaking, groups in a society can be ranked or be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted,
unranked.52 The hierarchical nature of the former is manifestly and reduced mode of being. 58
dear: slavery in the United States and black-white relations in
South Africa during apartheid are among the best known exam- Thus, even if structural group hierarchy is absent, a discursive
ples. Similarly, in the Hindu caste system, the "lower" castes con- hierarchy, laced with "confining, demeaning, or contemptible"
stitute an overwhelming majority but the tiny "upper" castes pictures for some groups, may well exist. Crude illiberal prejudice
have enjoyed ritual superiority and most of the power until or hatred is, of course, an obvious source for such views. But the
recently. problem is much more complex. It is worth recalling that until
However, sometimes even if groups are structurally this century, even well-meaning liberals believed in group-based
unranked-in that a legal or deeply embedded ritual hierarchy notions of civility and barbarism. In one of the founding texts of
does not mark their interrelationship-domination or subordina- liberalism, John Stuart Mill argued:
tion could be discursive. 53 Some groups may argue that they are
the "sons of the soil," hence deserving of greater political, eco- Nobody can suppose that it is not beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque
of the French Navarre, to be brought into the current of ideas and
nomic, or cultural privileges. 54 In Malaysia, the Malays make this
feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people-to be a member
claim vis-a-vis the Chinese and rhe Indians; in Sri Lanka, many
of the French nationality ... than to sulk on his own rocks, the half·
Sinhalese do so with respect to the Tamils; Hindu nationalists in
savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit,
India would like the Hindus to have a higher status than the without participation or interest in the general movement of the
Muslims; and the followers of Le Pen would give more privileges world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish
to French Europeans than to the North African immigrants in Highlander, as members of the British narion.'i9
France. Those who came earlier to a land have often argued that
they are more entitled to political privileges or to a preeminent In the modern world, thus, fWO different notions of dignity
place in the national culture than those who came later. and worth have often been at odds: one stemming from the cul-
By itself, of course, a structural or discursive hierarchy does not turally inherited conceptions of groups as better or worse, and
engender ethnic or group conflict. Indeed, many from the disad- another arising out of a decline of social hierarchies and the rise
vantaged groups may opr for what M.N. Srinivas called of equality. The latter seeks to undermine the former by chal-
"Sanskritization"-i.e., the attempt on the part of the ritually lenging the inherited structure or discourse of group hierarchy.
subordinate Hindu castes to follow the life-styles of the upper The question of microfoundations-where ethnic or national
castes. 55 Elsewhere, Antonio Gramsci spoke of "hegemony" to preferences come from in the nationalism of resistance-can now
describe how the subaltern may share the world view of the rich be more precisely phrased. What are the implications of a histor-
and the powerful. 56 Those ascriptively placed lower on the social ically and culturally structured notion of ascriptive hierarchy for

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the individual-group interaction in modern times? How does an was not possible until the British left; it changed Nehru from a
individual feel group relations? man who was "more British than the British" to one "homespun"
An individual may end up defining a core of her identity in and capable of making the transition from a life of privilege and
terms of her group because she is defined as such by society, a def- luxuty to one of personal sacrifice for the sake of a nation.
inition over whose origins she has no control but one whose Indeed, so many Indians experienced the self-awareness of digni-
reordering will not take place unless efforts are made to compel ty that after the Amritsar massacre it became possible to launch a
society to change its recognition. The question is not simply one nationwide civil-disobedience movement.
of waiting for others to launch the effort and taking a free ride. Similarly, the American civil-rights movement in the 1960s
The individual would like to participate in the effort because she formed the assertive identity of a large number of African
can't live a "reduced mode of being": she would feel less of a Americans: "While the students in their neat suits and demure
human being, or not able to respect herself, if she did not partic- dresses sat-in, marched, demonstrated, sang and prayed, the police,
ipate. Her self-respect, her dignity, is involved. the sheriff's deputies and the Klan responded to nonviolence with
An account of the micro foundations of ethnic or national violence, meeting the doves of peace with the police dogs ofwar.,,62
resistance thus requires sensitivity to historically inherited atti- Elsewhere, barely a few years after the formation of Pakistan, the
tudes and power relations among many groups, if not all. By East Pakistanis realized that their linguistic identity was at stake in
starting with individuals and not the cultural or historical inher- a nation they joined for religious reasons. They were told that
itances and power relations within which individuals may be Urdu, the language of Muslim migrants from India, would be the
embedded, a typical rational-choice account misses much of what language of the new nation, even though East Pakistanis, consti-
motivates ethnic Of nationalist behavior. In the process, it is tuting a majority of the countty, spoke Bengali. A cultural cleavage
unable to account for some of the most important and persistent within the new nation was thus born, giving room to politics and
phenomena noted by students of ethnicity. Why, for example, do mobilization based on a linguistic identity. fu this politics unfold-
the minorities typically feel the group identity much more ed, the identity of the silent bystanders was also formed.
strongly than do the dominant groups? People, whether from the Third, as is implicit above, a conflict cannot take place unless
dominant or the subordinate group, are mere individuals in a we also factor in the behavior of the dominant groups. The dom-
purely instrumental framework. When Isaiah Berlin said that inant groups typically have three options: defend preexisting priv-
Jews tend to "have longer memories," that "they are aware of a ileges, with no adjustments made; incorporate the elite of the dis-
longer continuity as a community than any other which has sur- advantaged groups in the power structure; or renegotiate privi-
vived," and "geography" is what they historically lacked,60 he was lege, accepting some notion of fairness. To defend preexisting
making a statement about his community that was incompre- privileges is a case of prejudice; to incorporate the elite, one of
hensible in purely instrumental terms. Why keep memories? Why selective cooptation; to renegotiate privilege, one of fairness. In
should geography matter? Why not change identity, instead of no case, including the last, is conflict ruled out.
finding geography to match history? Structured patterns of dom- A defense of privilege or prejudice clearly spells trouble, once
inance and subordination and a history of suffering have custom- the ideological hegemony of group hierarchy is broken and a
arily shaped answers to these questions, not pure instrumental middle class capable of organizing the group develops among the
rationality. previously disadvantaged. Examples are legion. Depending on the
nature of the political system, such conflict may be relatively
Value Rationality and Ethnic Mobilization peaceful or violent. If the political system allows the freedom to
The explanation above explores only the micro foundations of organize, ethnic mobilization may dominate democratic politics
ethnic resistance. It does not account for ethnic mobilization. but conflict may also be politically resolved and violence over-
How are the microfoundations and ethnic mobilization related? come. However, if the political system is repressive, ethnic con-
Three mechanisms can be specified. flict may remain hidden or may not emerge in a routine way
First, a critical mass of individuals having a strong group iden- (erupting violently, for instance, when the state is weak).
tification is all that one needs to explain the origins of ethnic Selective cooptation may work if the elites so incorporated
mobilization; strong identification of all with the group is not continue to hold sway over the masses and are not outbid by
necessary. Value-rational micro foundations thus overcome the alternative leaders refusing to be co-opted. It may defuse ethnic
principal difficulty faced by a purely instrumental explanation, conflict or even resolve it through what Arend Lijphart calls a
which was unable to explain the origins of ethnic mobilization. consociational system. 63 Outbidding, however, is not uncommon
Second, depending on how the dominant groups and the state in ethnic conflicts. Consociationalism works under well-specified
respond to the critical mass, mobilization itself can be identity- institutional conditions. 64
forming for those who did not initially participate in it. Most interestingly, however, conflict can occur even when the
Hegemony may give way to an assertion of self-respect. In 1919, leaders of the dominant group renegotiate privilege. The problem
when thousands ofIndians (in defiance of a prohibition on polit- simply is that the question of what constitutes fairness has no
ical meetings) organized a protest meeting in Amritsar, India, and uniquely acceptable answer. Why should the members of this
a British general ordered a massacre to implement the law, a turn- generation pay for the inequities of the past, in which they did
ing point was reached in India's national movement. 61 The mas- not directly participate' How much should they pay, if they
sacre changed Gandhi, convincing him that India's self-respect must? For how long? Multiple answers exist; the outcomes are

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politically determined. On affirmative action, such struggles are ed, creating a "security dilemma" for individuals and making pre-
universal. emptive violence against neighbors of a different ethnic group an
exercise in personal security.66 Most ethnic conflicts do not reach
this last Hobbesian state of nature. It was typical of the former
Three Kinds of Ethnic and Nationalistic Yugoslavia in recent times; of massacres in Rwanda; and of the
Behavior border states of India, especially Punjab, during the co un tty's par-
Central to the alternative account I have presented above are
tition in 1947.
notions of hierarchy, dignity, and recognition. Goal-oriented
thinking exists in this alternative account, but it is defined with
Combining value rationality and instrumental rationality
respect to the values so specified, not independently of these val-
This is the category where a lot of ethnic conflict belongs. The
ues. This conception of strategic behavior is different from the
concept of rationality here can mean two things: seeing ethniciry
one in which ethnicity itself is seen as a means to an end. If we
as a means to a self-interested end, or else selecting appropriate
combine the two notions of rationality discussed above, we get
means to realize group goals or choosing between competing
three different kinds of ethnic and nationalistic behavior, which
group goals. Enough has already been said about the first; why
we should distinguish from one another.
might the second be necessary?
The pure case of value rationality The fact that my identity gets tied up with my group does not
Martyrdom-suicide bombing, in these times-is the pure form mean that I accept as right everything that the group (i.e., its
of value-rational behavior. In such cases, no cost (including leadership on behalf of the group) does. I may have a different
death) is considered too high by an ethnic partisan. If aimed at version of group objectives and may even try to convince my
enhancing group prospects, to kill may be a form of instrumen- group that my version is right. My identity may be tied up with
tal behavior-and likewise, being killed may result from some- my group, but my views may not be. Such intra-ethnic clashes on
one else behaving instrumentally. But to die is not instrumental- what is valuable and what means are appropriate to achieve those
ly rational for an individual, for whatever its benefits to the goals allow for a great deal of volition, intragroup strategizing,
group, the martyr will not be there to see his dreams fulfilled. and struggle. Indeed, if! have leadership ambition, I may even try
Such martyrdom, however, can be instrumentally beneficial for to retrieve my group's history purposively to show that I am his-
the group, for it can touch off strong emotions, raising the level torically more authentic than are my adversaries in the group,
of group consciousness. Indeed, collective martyrdom or martyr- while both my adversaries and I seek group betrerment. Selective
dom of an important leader of the group can be a tipping point retrieval of tradition is a standard strategy in nationalist struggles.
in group consciousness and mobilization. 65 Alternatively, people may try to change the form of protest.
It is possible to argue that religious martyrdom is, in fact, Sometimes, this means moving from nonviolent to violent means;
individually rational, for the motivations of the martyr extend to at other times, it simply entails exploring alternative nonviolent
life after death. Most religions have a notion of afterlife. This- strategies, as seen in the Indian freedom movement, of which the
worldly martyrdom can pave the way for other-worldly glory. Salt March was a component, and in the American civil-rights
But ethnic or national martyrdom, as opposed to religious movement. In many nationalist conflicts, however, even when the
martyrdom, has no such notion of afterlife. Its aim is collective ends are noble, the means are not. Violence is often used as an
benefit, pure and simple. Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers repeatedly pro- instrument for ethnic ends. Our moral objections to violence
duced suicide bombers to increase group cohesion and to target notwithstanding, it is undeniable that from the perspective of eth-
"enemies." In a number of national, or freedom, movements in nic and national partisans, violence can represent a combination
the developing world, there were many examples of men seeking of value rationality and instrumental rationality.
martyrdom or taking the risk of death. When asked by psychologist Sudhir Kakar why they killed
Given the significance of death in nationalism, martyrdom can members of the other community, the wrestlers involved in com-
also be instrumentally used by some-not, of course, by those who munal violence in the Indian city of Hyderabad argued that they
die. Ethnic partisans are known to have killed important figures of were defending the quam (nation). They stopped killing, they
their own communities-so as to put the blame of death on the said, when they had killed more than the wrestlers of the other
adversary and engineer in-group cohesion. This use of martyrdom community had killed. Indeed, after giving them tests to check
is instrumental-rational and must be distinguished from the lies, falsehood, and dissimulation, Kakar had to conclude---much
behavior of those seeking martyrdom. The latter is value-rational. to his emotional dismay but true to his professional craft-that in
psychological terms, the killers were "warriors," not "murderers. ,,67
The pure case of instrumental rationality Much of the dynamics and intensity of ethnic conflict cannot
From an individual perspective, the instrumental benefits of par- be explained unless we understand how decisions are made about
ticipating in nationalist mobilization are obvious only under two which sections of the population-women, children, and old
strict conditions: when nationalists are already dose to capturing people or the able-bodied men-are the targets of violence;
power and much can be gained (or losses cut) by joining the band- whether festivals and celebrations are disrupted; whether sacral-
wagon, and when law and order have broken down, ethnic ani- ized monuments and places of worship are attacked; whether
mosities have soured group relations, and even neighbors-oflong automatic weapons are used by a few or small weapons by a lot,
standing but belonging to a different ethnic group--can't be trust- although each method may kill as many people. We are in a world

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 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 77

requires a great deal of

Table 1 unpacking, A search for dig-
Pure Value- Pure Instrumental- Value- and Instrumental- nity and recognition may well
Rational Rational Rational define the motivation under-
Leaders yes yes yes lying the nationalism of resist-
ance, but other forms of
Masses yes yes yes
nationalistic behavior-such
OUTCOME origins yes; origins no; origins yes; as those witnessed in the
sustenance no sustenance possible suslenance yes
nationalism of exclusion or
when majority groups develop
a minority complex-may be
where considerable planning otten goes into the timing, type, and undergirded by motivations other than dignity and self-respect.
targets of violence, for symbolic violence is often central to eth- A pluralism of micro foundations is quite likely to be found as we
nic conflict. Much, if not all, of this strategic behavior is based on move further along this path of inquiry.
the group goals that ethnic or national partisans have. It will be
hard to prove that nationalists make such decisions on purely self-
interested grounds, without linking their strategies to the inter- References
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Table 1 summarizes the argument so far. The pure case of value sciences. In The Economic Approach to Politics, ed. Kristen
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how it is sustained. in contemporary Africa. Comparative Political Studies 6:4,
457-77.
Conclusions: Pluralizing - - - . 198\. Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley:
Microfoundations University of California Press.
Three conclusions follow. First, rational-choice theories are Berlin, Isaiah. 1982. Against the Current: Essays in the History
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tions, one has to pluralize the concept of rationality. A distinction York: Cambridge University Press.
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posed by Weber, will be a good starting point. The former sity. Kyklos 48:2, 193-200.
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University of California Press. Putnam's Sons.
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of California Press. Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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of California Press. Oxford University Press.
Kakar, Sudhir. 1996. Colors of Violence. Chicago: University Sen, Amartya. 1973. Behaviour and the concept of prefer-
of Chicago Press. ence. Economica 40:159, 241-59.
Kedourie, Elie. 1993. Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 4th, 1982. Rational fools. Choice, Welfore and Measure-
expanded ed. ment. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Kolakowski, Leszek. 1990. Modernity on Endless Tria£ trans. - - - . 1992. On Ethics and Economics. New York:
Stefan Czerniawski. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Blackwell.
Kundera, Milan. 1986. The Art of the Novel. trans. Linda Simon, Herbert. 1986. Rationality in psychology and eco-
Asher. New York: Gtove Press. nomics. In Rational Choice: The Contrasts between Psychol-
Laitin, David. 1986. Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Reli- ogy and Economics, eds. Robin Hogarth and Melvin Reder.
gious Change among the Yoruba. Chicago: University of Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Chicago Press. Srinivas, Mysore Narasimhachar. 1966. Social Change in
- - - . 1998. Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Modern India. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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parative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1993. Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on
Mandela, Nelson. 1994. Long Walk to Freedom. Boston: Canadian Federalism and Nationalism. Montreal: McGill-
Little, Brown. Queen's University Press.

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 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 79

1995, Irreducibly social goods, Philosophical Argu- Pribumi in Indonesia even raday). The microfoundations
ments, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, driving such behavior are complex, requiring painstaking
Taylor, Charles, 1994, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics investigation. It is rhrough cumulative steps that we will be
of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. able to develop an alternative theoty of where ethnic pref-
Taylor, Michael, 1993. Structure, culture and action in the erences come from. For some thoughtful psychological
explanation of social change. In Politics and Rationality, probings, see Horowitz 2001 and Peterson 2002.
eds. William James Booth, Patrick James, and Hudson 9 Horowitz 1984, 41-54.
MeadwelL New York: Cambridge University Press. 10 Gellner 1983, I.
T versky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1990a. Judgment 11 Sen 1982, 105. To sample the variety associated with ra-
under uncertainty. In Rationality in Action, ed. Paul tionality in philosophical discussions, also see Nozick
Moser. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1983, especially the chapter entitled "Instrumental Ratio-
- - - . 1990b. Rational choice and framing of decisions. nality and Its Limits," 133-81; Putnam 1981, especially
The Limits of Rationality, eds. Karen Cook and Margaret the chapter "Two Conceptions of Rationality"; and
Levi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Davidson 1963.
Varshney, Ashurash. 1995. Democracy, Development and the 12 Mention should also be made of the concept of rational-
Countryside. New York: Cambridge University Press. ity in psychology, sometimes called "bounded rationality."
- - - . 2002. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life. New Haven: See Tversky and Kahneman 1990a; Tversky and Kahne-
Yale University Press. man 1990b; and Simon 1986.
Weber, Eugene. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen. Stanford: 13 On whether the same instrumental rationality is applica-
Stanford University Press. ble to spheres beyond commercial behavior, see not only
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Inter- Sen 1982 (cited above), but also Coase 1978 and
pretive Sociology, eds. Claus Wittich and Guenther Roth. Buchanan 1995.
Berkeley: University of California Press. 14 Also see Almond 1991.
Weiner, Myron. 1978. Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic 15 Some of the leading scholars of rationality would not en-
Conflict in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press. tirely approve of such an analogy. Amartya Sen, while
Young, Crawford. 1983. The temple of ethnicity. World Poli- writing about behavior based on commitment as opposed
tics 35:4, 652-62. to self-interest, draws a distinction between preferences
and metapreferences. The former concept is basically what
Notes Paul Samuelson called "revealed preference," representing
1 Kundera 1986, 3-4. choices evident in market behavior, such as when we buy
2 Berlin 1982. 1. cars or foorwear; the latter speaks of the larger psycholog-
3 Ibid, 13. ical and cultural processes that undergird the actually ob-
4 The exchange was, of course, not entirely polite. Herder served market choices. See the discussion in Sen 1973, as
called Voltaire a "senile child." He also wrote a vehement well as Sen 1982; also see Hirschman 1985. Strictly for
poem (cited in Kedourie 1993, 53): the purposes of this paper, although not more generally,
this criticism can basically be viewed as a dispute over ap-
And You German alone, returning from abroad, propriate analogies. Whether or not value-rationality can
Wouldst greet your mother in French?
be seen as a deeper set of metapreferences generating ob-
ospew it out, before your door
served choices in behavior. the basic claim that it is dif-
Spew out the ugly slime of the Seine
Speak German, 0 you German.
ferent from instrumental rationality is not undermined by
an argument about metapreferences.
Kedourie agrees. See Kedourie 1993, especially chapters 3 16 For overviews of rational-choice models of politics. see Alr
and 4. and Shepsle 1990; Green and Shapiro 1994;
6 Weber 1978, volume 1, 24-5. Monroe 1991; and Booth et al. 1993.
7 For a recent statement of this distinction, see Feinberg 17 Olson 1965.
1997, 69-73. 18 Bates 1981.
8 Of course, all nationalisms, including the nationalism of 19 Critiques emerging from within the rational-choice para-
resistance, are to some extent exclusionary. Without the digm are vety helpful in understanding the limits of
notion of "us" and "them," nationalism does not work. rational-choice theories. Among the most thoughtful self-
However, despite not being entirely devoid of exclusion, critiques are Jon Elster 1989 and Michael Taylor 1993.
nationalism of resistance tends to define community in a Elster's argument is that rational-choice theory is inappli-
more inclusive way than does the nationalism of exclusion. cable in the following situations: (i) when multiple op-
For future analysis, the most difficult category-and a cate- rima exist, (2) when the choice set has incommensurable
goty different from the above rwo-is going to be "majori- options, (3) when no reliable probability estimates can be
ties feeling like a minority" (the Sinhalese in Sri bnka un- made, subjectively or objectively, because of insufficient
til the 1970s; the Malays in Malaysia until the 1970s; the evidence, and (4) when it is not even dear how much

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80 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

evidence should be collected before such judgments can tuty and throughout the twentieth. The contribution of
be made. what we may call the rational choice paradigm has, how-
20 For some reflections of the domain specificity of ever, not been large"(ix).
rational-choice arguments, see Munck 200 1. 36 Hardin 1995, 5, 36-70.
21 Morris Fiorina, a rational-choice scholar of American poli- 37 Popkin 1979.
tics, accepts that elite and mass politics have very differ- 38 Przeworski 1985.
ent implications for a rational-choice analysis: "Rational 39 Hardin's approach is abstract and philosophical. In a more
Choice Models are most useful where stakes are high and empirical vein, there is also Laitin 1998 on the formation
numbers low. . . . Thus in works on mass behavior I uti- of a new identity, "the Russian-Spealting Populations," in
lize minimalist notions of rationality ... whereas in four republics of the former Soviet Union: Kazakhstan,
works on elites I assume a higher order of rationality." Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. In theory, this work could
Fiorina 1995, 88. have answered the question posed above: how do people
22 There are two kinds of works on instrumental concep- develop, or maintain, ethnic or national preferences, espe-
tions of ethnicity. The works that follow the rational- cially when the costs of expressing those preferences are
choice method self-consciously include Rabushka and ex ante so high? Laitin's empirical approach, however, al-
Shepsle 1972, Hardin 1995, and Hechrer 2000. The idea lows him to focus only on the formation of new and
of the instrumental use of ethnicity, however, goes beyond pragmatic identities of (primarily) Russians in areas where
the rational-choice literature. It is implicit in much of the conflict did not take place. There is little variation on the
literature on ethnic conflict. See, e.g., Brass 1975 and dependent variable. As such, the empirical materials of
Bates 1974. Sometimes, Gellner 1983 is also seen as a Laitin are unable to answer questions raised above about
major instrumental text. Gellner's basic argument is that the nationalism of resistance. Had Laitin's focus included
indusrrialization led to nationalism in history. The "low" the Chechens, we would have learned much empirically
oral cultures, he argues, could not have produced the about the source of nationalistic preferences even in the
standardization necessary to run an industrial economy; face of high-cost conditions.
only "high" cultures with standardized modes of commu- 40 Indeed, even close to time T2, as argued earlier, so long
nication could have. I read Gellner more as a functional- as the benefits of group power are nonexcludable, I
ist than as an instrumentalist. For a clear statement of should not join for I will get the benefits anyway. Thus,
differences between functionalism and rational choice, see time T2 also has a problem of indeterminacy, requiring
Elster 1982. ethnic leaders to set up mechanisms to ensure that bene-
23 Schelling 1963, 54. fits are distributed according to participation. For the sake
24 Ibid, 74. of parsimony, however, let us assume that instrumental ra-
25 Unless, of course, the Mafia is involved in the transac- tionality at time T2 means participation.
tion. 41 This, of course, raises the question of whether "rational
26 Miller 1994, 250-3. This is not to say that demonstra- ethics" can exist and whether it can be embedded in soci-
tions do not often dissolve in the face of coercion. That, ety. See Sen 1992 and Harsanyi 1976.
however, is less surprising than the fact that so many eth- 42 Einstein 1982,41-2. Also see Kolakowski 1990, especially
nic movements persist despite coercion. "Modernity on Endless Trial" and "The Revenge of the
27 Raines 1977, 56. Sacred in Secular Culture."
28 Chong 1991, 85. 43 The conflict, Einstein adds, begins when rationality claims
29 Ibid, 25--{j. it can pronounce authoritatively upon the ends of human
30 Mandela 1994, 387. life and religion claims that it can explain empirical rela-
31 Gurr 1993 makes a statistical attempt. tionships.
32 For how economic and ethnic mobilizations can dramati- 44 Laitin 1986, 148-9, makes a roughly similar argument:
cally vary, see Varshney 1995 and 2002. "Rational choice [theory] ... is a theoty of marginal deci-
33 Elster 1989, 118. sions. It cannot tell us if ultimately butter is better than
34 Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, 64-5. Emphasis in the guns; it can tell us that at a certain point the production
original. of a small number of guns will cost us a whole lot of
35 fu Hardin 1995 was published, another collection of essays butter and at that point it is probably irrational to pro-
addressing this problem came out. See Breton et al. 1995. duce more guns. Within a political structure, individuals
The opening lines of this book are worth noting: "The lit- constantly make marginal decisions. Neo-Benthamite the-
erature on nationalism is enormous. Economists, historians, ories can give us a grasp on how individual political ac-
philosophers, political scientists, sociologists and other tors are likely to make choices within that structure.
scholars as well as lay observers and commentators have all Microeconomic theory cannot, however, handle long-term
brought their particular skills and methods to bear on the and non-marginal decisions. When market structures are
phenomenon which, it would be easy to argue, has domi- themselves threatened, and people must decide whether
nated human affairs for a good part of the nineteenth cen- to work within the new structure or hold on to the

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 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 81

old-without an opportunity for a marginal decision- although right unril the early decades of this century, the
microeconomic theory is not applicable." Also see Elster relationship was ranked. For how this happened, see Marx
1989, 40. 1998.
45 Connor 1994. The primordial view is often associated 54 Weiner 1978.
with Geertz and Connor. See Geertz 1963. This view was 55 Srinivas 1966.
fashionable in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the "instrumen- 56 Gramsci 1971.
tal" view arose as a reaction to the primordial view. For a 57 See Taylor 1994. Taylor is not only a leading political
review of the debate, see Young 1983. philosopher of our times, but also a political activist deal-
46 Weber 1976. ing with the politics of nationalism in Quebec. For his
47 Hobsbawm 1990, 61. Quebec-focused writings, see Taylor 1993.
48 Colley 1992. 58 Taylor 1994, 25.
49 Hobsbawm 1990, 60. 59 Mill 1990, 385-6.
50 Rudolph and Rudolph 1967. 60 Berlin 1982, 252.
51 Taylor 1995. 61 The massacre was ordered in a walled park that had only
52 Horowitz 1984, 22-36. one opening to the road, serving both as an exit and as
53 The implication here, it should be clarified, is not that an entrance. The general brought his forces in, closed the
ethnic groups are always ranked, either structurally or dis- exit-cum-entrance, and ordered his troops to shoot un-
cursively. Many unranked ethnic relationships in both armed men and women assembled for a peaceful protest
senses can, and do, exist. The Jews, Irish, and Italians to- meeting. The crowd could not leave the park, even as the
day have an unranked relationship with the WASPs in the bullets rained in.
United States; that was not true in the late nineteenth 62 Tarrow 1998, 130.
centuty. The relationship of the Parsis and Sikhs with the 63 Lijphart 1977.
majority Hindu community in twentieth-century India is 64 Horowitz 1987.
unranked, unlike India's caste system, which continues to 65 The significance of death in nationalism is brought out
be discursively, if not legally, ranked, although its ranking forcefully by Anderson 1983. The epigraph to this paper,
is being vigorously challenged in currenr politics. Another focusing on the idea of the tomb of unknown soldiers,
interesting example of a ranked relationship turning un- captures one of the basic ideas.
ranked comes from South Mrica. The English and 66 Posen 1993.
Afrikaners today are unranked with respect to each other, 67 Kakar 1996.

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 Part III
International Organizations and the
'Development Industry'
This page intentionally left blank
 [5]
From Resistance to Renewal:
The Third World, Social Movements, and
the Expansion of
International Institutions

Balakrishnan Rajagopal*

1. INTRODUCTION
Pragmatism is the credo of international institutions. It explains
why they come into being and how they evolve over time. Institutions
represent the concrete manifestations of the normative aspirations of
law in the international system. As such, their expansion is the expan-
sion of the domain of the international itself. The most significant as-
pects of twentieth-century international law are its institutionaliza-
tion, through international courts and bureaucracies, and its develop-
ment, from international economic law to human rights law. How has
this expansion occurred? What factors have propelled the institurion-
alization of global cosmopolitanism? What role, if any, has the Third
World l played in this expansion? And WhM r~n Wp forprell ~bOllt the
future?

* Assistant Professor of Law and Development, Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; S.].D. Candidate, Harvard Law School; LL.M., The
. American University, 1991; B.L., University of Madras, 1990. The author was formerly with the
United Nations Higb Commissioner for Human Rigbts in Cambodia. This Article is part of a
series of articles, recently published, tbat attempt to develop ways of rethinking the relationship
between international law and the Tbird World. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law
and the Development Encounter: Violence and Resistance at the Margins, 93 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC.
16 (1999) [hereinafter Rajagopal, Development' Encounter}; Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Loca#ng the
Third World in Cultural Geography, THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1 (1998-99) [hereinafter Ra-
jagopal, Locating the Third World}. I am grateful to Antony Anghie, Arturo Escobar, William
Fisher, James Gathii, Smitu Kothari, Celestine Nyamu, Diane Otto, David Kennedy, and Hani
Sayed for conversations, criticisms, and comments on the previous versions of this draft and the
ideas therein. I also appreciate the valuable editorial assistal1ce of Cameron Cohen, Mollie Wallis,
and the rest of the Journal team. Needless to say, responsibility for all errors is mine.
1. I deliberately use the term "Third World" rather than "developing countries" for reasons
rhar will become clear later in the Arricle; but it can be noted here that I do not use it to mean
the exdusivist, politico-territorial space of states, but rather, a contingent and shifting cultural-
territoriality which may encompass states and social movements. The boundaries that matter here
are not rhose of states, but of forms of life. In addition, I wish to avoid the teleology that is im-
plied in the term "developing." See Rajagopal, Locating the Third World, supra note * (developing
86 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

530 Harvard International Law Journal! Vo!' 41

These are large, ambitious questions, and it is not my intention to

answer them here in detail. Rather, I will attempt to examine a very
specific instance of recent international institutional expansion, roughly
between the late-1960s and the 1990s, to determine what factors pro-
pelled the expansion. This instance relates to the Bretton Woods Insti-
tutions (BWls), including the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). By examining these institutional expansions, I
hope to raise some fundamental questions about how international
institutional change is explained within the discipline of international
law, and whether such explanations take the "local" or the "subaltern"
seriously as agents of change. 2 Ignoring the role of the local as an agent
of institutional transformation is, I maintain, inseparable from the
hegemonic nature of international law as an elitist discipline.
The first set of questions that I shall raise concerns what I call the
functionalist explanation of international institutions. Stemming from
David Mitrany's work in the 1940s,3 this theory explains the emer-
gence of international institutions as a result of a pragmatic necessity
to serve concrete functions relating, for example, to trade, postal serv-
ices, or regulation of rivers. This explanation has remained theoreti-
cally dominant in international affairs for over fifty years. 4 The central
proposition of this theory is that institutions are born and expand due
to top-down policy decisions that correlate with the functional needs
of international society. This theory does not recognize grassroots

this understanding of the 'Third World" as it applies to international law and international
relations).
2. In pursuing this line of enquiry, I am influenced by the work of the Subaltern Studies Col-
lective. See SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES (Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak eds.,
1988). The central element of this critique is that the elitist historiography is constituted by
hidden cognitive failures, which are inseparable from domination, and that the agency of change
is located in the "subaltern." See Gayatri Chakravorry Spivak, Introduction to SELECTED SUBAL-
TERN STUDIES, supra, at 3, 6. In -this Article, I use the term "local" to mean social movements in
the way I have described below. See infra nore 9 and the accompanying text.
3. See DAVID MITRANY, THE PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1933); DAVID
MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1943).
4. One can distinguish at least twO other theoretical approaches to international institutions.
The first is the realist school beginning with Hans Morgenthau, which treats international insti-
tutions as instruments of state power. The second is the global cosmopolitan school, rooted in
Wilsonite sensibilities, that sees international institutions as the antithesis of state power. Many
of the lacrer also share the functionalist perspective in that they look at international institutions
as technical, problem-solving, apolitical inventions that provide a real alternative to arbitrary
state power. The latter predominate the international law field. For an example of the former, see
Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L 1. 260
(1940). For examples of the lacrer, see PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); Josef 1.
Kunz, The Changing Law of Nations, 51 AM. J. INT'L 1. 77 (1957); ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE
NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1964); WOLFGANG
FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); RICHARD FALK, THE
END OF'WORLD ORDER: ESSAYS ON NORMATIVE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1983); ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTER-
NATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 87

2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 531

groups, individuals, or social movements as agents of institutional

transformation or international legal history. I shall question this the-
ory on empirical and theoretical grounds, both for its accuracy and for
its political effects. My claim is not so much that functionalism fails as
a theory of international institutions in all circumstances-it may well
remain relevant in certain areas of international life such as the regula-
tion of postal services. Rather, I claim that functionalism is seriously
deficient in explaining the evolution of many important politically
charged international institutions such as the BWls. To the extent that
international legal scholarship continues to reiterate this apolitical and
technical image of the BWIs, it remains trapped in functionalism. 5
The second set of questions relates to the particular place of interna-
tional institutions vis-a.-vis the ThIrd World. In some ways, interna-
tional institutions and the Third World are like Siamese twins: One
can not even imagine them as separate from one another because de-
velopment, human rights, environmental, and other institutions oper-
ate mostly in the Third World. As the Third World decolonized and
entered international society in the middle of the century, international
institutions were truly becoming consolidated in a wave of pragma-
tism. Despite this temporal coincidence, leading accounts of interna-
tional institutions say nothing about the influence that the Third
World may have had on their evolution or vice versa. 6 In this view,
institutions evolve due to their own functionalist logic, while grand
politics of decolonization and developmtont takes place elsewhere. In-
deed, to the extent that the Third World -is discussed as an entity in
relation to institutions, it is criticized for politicizing them and pre-
venting their effective operation.? The failure of Third World resis-
tance to achieve its objectives-such as the New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO) proposals of the 1970s at the United Nations-is
explained away by the unrealistic radicalism of its proposals. s I propose
to question these suppositionsxegarding the role of the Third World
in the expansion and consolidadon of international institutions. I do
this by examining' key elements in the discourse of development,
which has been the central governing discourse of the Third World in
the post-World War II period, and by highlighting moments of local
resistance from the Third World that are not captured in traditional
international law narratives about the Third World.

5. See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw (3d ed. 1999) 523
("Both the IMF and the World Bank are supposed to be apolitical.").
6. See generally FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL
SETTING (2d ed. 1993); HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAw (1980).
7. This charge. was most common in the field of human rights. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Human
Rights at the United Nations, 1955-85: The Question o/Bias, 32 INT'L STUD. Q. 275 (1988).
8. See Thomas Franck, Lessons 0/ the Failure 0/ the NIEO, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVEL-
OPMENT 82 (Proceedings of the Canadian Council on International Law, 1986).
88 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

532 Harvard International Law Journal / Vo!. 41

It is my argument that the expansion and renewal of international

institutions cannot be understood in isolation from Third World resis-
tance. Indeed, I claim that social movements from the Third World
such as peasant rebellions, environmental movements, and human
rights movements, have propelled the expansion of international insti-
tutions since the late 1960s. In other words, the very architecture of
contemporary international law has been constituted by its continuous
evocation of and interaction with the category "Third World," which
has included not only states, but also these social movements. The in-
vocation of the "Third World masses," whether real or imaginary, was
essential to the expansion of international institutions.
In putting forth this claim, this Article departs in a number of
significant ways from extant analyses of international institutions.
First, it introduces social movements9 as a theoretical category in in-

9. The term "social movements" is not new in sociology and social theory. However, in recent
times, social movements research, particularly under the rubric of "new social movements," has
moved to the center of social theory. Roughly speaking, this literature can be divided into two
theoretical approaches. The first, known as Resource Mobilization theory, predominates the An-
glo-Saxon world and is primarily concerned with strategy, participation, organization, rationality,
etc. The second, known as the New Social Movements Approach, predominates Europe, Latin
America, and South Asia, and emphasizes tbe cultural and symbolic aspects of identity formations
as central to collective mobilizations. The latter is also heavily influenced by post-sttucturalism,
post-Marxism, and to some extent, post-modernism.
For recent works on social movements, see SON1A E. ALVAREZ BT AL., CULTURES OF POLI~
TICS/POLITICS OF CULTURES: RE-VISIONING LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1998);
KLAus EDER, THE NEW POLITICS OF CLASS: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS IN
ADVANCED SOCIETY (1993); THE MAKING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA: IDEN-
TITY, STRATEGY, AND DEMOCRACY (Arturo Escobar & Sonia E. Alvarez eds., 1992); NEW SOCIAL
l'MOVEIyfENTS TN TJ-fE SOUTH (Panna Wignar2ja ed., 1993); !-TE~r SOCIAL 1~OVEMENTS AND THE
STATE IN LATIN AMERICA (David Slater ed., 1985); ANTHONY OBERSCHALL, SOCIAL MOVE-
MENTS: IDEOLOGIES, INTERESTS, AND IDENTITIES (1993); GAIL OMVEDT, REINVENTING REVO-
LUTION: NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE SOCIALIST TRADITION IN INDIA (1993); SIDNEY G.
TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POLITICS
(1994); ALAIN TOURAINE, RETURN OF THE ACTOR: SOCIAL THEORY IN POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCI-
ETY (Myrna Godzich trans., University of Minnesota Press 1988) (1984).
International law has remained virtually isolated from this literature. One notable exception is
Richard Falk, The Global Promise of Social Movements: Explorations at the Edge of Time, 12 ALTERNA-
TIVES 173 (1987). Very recent critical international law scholarship, published after this Article
was written, has begun engaging the social movements literature. See Neil Stammers, Social
Movements and the Social Comtruction of Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 980 (1999). For a partial
attempt to engage this literature, see Diane Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations in the United
Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 107 (1996).
International relations theory has attempted to engage the rich theoretical issues emerging
from social movements research literature under the rubric of global civil society, networks, and
globalization, though it has not fully engaged the clllturaJ critique of the theories. See ROGER
BURBACH ET AL., GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: THE RISE OF POSTMODERN SOCIAL-~~
ISMS (1997); Paul Ghils, International Civil Society: International Non-Governmental Organizations in
the International System, 44 INT'L Soc. SCI. J. 417 (1992); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Reconstructing
World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society, 21 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 389 (1992);
Martin Shaw, Global Society and Global Responsibility: The Theoretical, Historical, and Political Limits
of "International Society," 21 MILLENIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 421 (1992); Kathryn Sikkink, Human
Rights, Principled Issue-Networks and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993); Peter
J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 89

2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 533

ternational law in order to enable an understanding of the complex

relationship between the Third World and international institutions.
This is important because the Third World that international institu-
tions deal with now is no longer the Third World of the post-
independence period. lo Indeed, the very meaning of "the Third World"
has undergone a radical change since the 1950s and 1960s, when it
meant only an agglomeration of newly independent states. Now, it
means a collection of peasant, environmental, and feminist move-
ments, and a host of others who are in global and regional alliances
with states, individuals, international institutions, and private groups.
It is this Third World from which international institutions such as
the BWIs are now facing opposition and resistance. As the recent col-
lapse of the WTO talks in Seattle shows, international institutions are
now openly confronted with mass resistance. l l But of equal importance
was the invocation of the "Third World masses" as the key driving l
force behind the expansion of the BWIs, even during the apogee of
Third World radicalism at the United Nations in the 1960s and
1970s. In other words, while the BWIs formally engaged the represen-

IllJtitutions, 18 THE WASH. Q. 45 (1995); Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and Global Civil
Society, 41 DISSENT 389 (1994).
In democratic and political theory, new research has made important and striking contribu-
tions, borrowing from radical social movement approaches. See DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE
(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996); ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY & SOCIALIST
STRATEGY (Winston Moore & Paul Cammack trans., 1985); THE MULTIVERSE OF DEMOCRACY:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KANJI KOTHARI (D. L. Sheth & Ashi' Nandy eds., 1996); Smiru Kothari;
Social Movements, Ecology, andJustice, in EARTHLY GoODS: ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE 154 (Fen O. Hampson & Judith Reppy eds., 1996).
Of all the specific disciplines, feminist srudies and environmental studies have gone the far-
thest in developing critiques in the social movements tradition, most of them in the context of
pursuing a critique of development. See THE CHALLENGE OF LOCAL FEMINISMS (Amrira Basu ed.,
1995); RAMACHANDRA GUHA, THE UNQUIET WOODS: ECOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PEASANT
R.ESISTANCE IN THE HIMALAYA (1989); OMVEDT, supra, at 127-49; TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DE-
VELOPMENT? STRUGGLING OVER INDIA'S NARMADA RIVER (William F. Fisher ed., 1995) (here-
inafter TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?); Antje Linkenbach, Ecological Movements and the
Critique of Development: Agents and Interpreters, 39 THESIS ELEVEN 63-85 (1994); Harsh Sethi,
Survival and Democracy: Ecological Struggles in India, in NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTH,
supra, at 122; Nancy Sternbach et aI., Feminisms in Latin America, in THE MAKING OF SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA: IDENTITY, STRATEGY, AND DEMOCRACY, supra, at 207-39.
Of most interest is a recent stream of literature on what I would call critical development the-
ory, which builds on radical social movement critiques in the area of development scudies. See
. THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO KNOWLEDGE AS POWER (Wolfgang Sachs ed.,
1992); ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF
THE THIRD WORLD (1995); THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER (Majid Rahnema & Victoria
Bawtree eds., 1997); Tariq Banuri, Development and the Politics ofKnfJWledge: A Critical Interpretation
0/ the Social Role of Modernization Theories in the Development 0/ the Third World, in DOMINATING
KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE, AND RESISTANCE 29 (Frederique Apffel-Marglin &
Stephen A. Marglin eds., 1990).
10. For a discussion and critique of existing notions of the Third World in international law,
see Rajagopal, Locating the Third World, supra note *.
11. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Taking Seattle Resistance Seriously, THE HINDU, Dec. II, 1999,
at 10.
90 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

534 Harvard International Law Journal I Vol. 41

tatives of the Third World States, they were also simultaneously en-
gaging the "Third World masses," invoking the concept as if it were a
totem, exoticizing it, responding to it, and being shaped by it. It is
this elusive "Third World" that I seek to capture in this Article.
Second, I propose that the architecture of modern international. law
has been ineluctably shaped by popular, grassroots resistance from the
Third World. This contrasts with traditional accounts of the birth of
international institutions that emphasize the role of leading individu-
als,12 or states, or simply functional needs that propelled institutional
behavior. If the account offered in this Article is correct, a number of
important implications follow. The Eurocentric history13 of interna-
tional institutions-and therefore of international law-must be re-
written to reflect accurately the role played by various subaltern 14
groups. Indeed, recent historical work by various scholars has already
begun this process. For example, David Kennedy has demonstrated the
role that women's peace movements played in the creation of the
League of Nations and their subsequent exclusion from it.1 5 On the
other hand, an extreme anti-imperialistic critique of international in-
stitutions like the BWIs should also reconsider the role they play in
receiving, encouraging, countering, and co-opting popular resistance
of various kinds.
Third, reassessing the relationship between resistance and institu-
tional change can also serve to lessen some of the bias .in international
law against popular resistance as such.LQ. particular, I am interested in
how one might de-elitize inrernationallaw by writing resistance into it,
to make it recognize subaltern voices. As is well known, international
law has never been concerned primarily with mass protest or social
movements, except in the context of self-determination and the forma-
tion of states. 16 It has treated all other popular protests and movements
as outside the state and, therefore, as illegitimate and unruly. This di-
vision has been based on a liberal conception of politics, which sharply
distinguishes between routine institutional politics and other extra-

12. The most &mous example of this is perhaps the role played by].M. Keynes and H.D.
White in the fotmation of the BWIs. See generally KENNETH DAM, RULES OF THE GAME: RE-
FORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1982).
13. For an incisive, early discussion of Eurocentricity in international law, see Upendra Baxi,
Some Remarks on Eurocentrism and the Law of Natiom, in ASIAN STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LAw 3 (R.P. Anand ed., 1972). For a more recent account, see James
Thuo Gathii, Review Essay: Eurocentricity and International Law, 9 EUR.]. INT'L 1. 184 (1998).
14. The term "subaltern" is borrowed from the scholarship of postcolonial theory. See supra
note 2 and accompanying text; Gayatri C. Spivak, Can the Subaltern SPeak?, in MARxISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988).
15. See David Kennedy, The Move to Imtitutions, 8 CARDOZO 1. REV. 841, 878 (1987).
16. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL
(1995); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1979); CHRIS-
TOPHER QUAYE, LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991).
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 91

2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 535

institutional forms of protest.1 7 While there may have been some pre-
vious justification for this attitude, this model of politics bears no re-
semblance to reality in an increasingly cosmopolitan world of informa-
tion flows, economic grids, and NGO networks, and stands heavily
criticized in the social sciences 18 and the law. 19 Due to its liberal con-
ception of politics and its inability or unwillingness to factor in the
impact of collective movements and forms of identity struggles other
than nationalism, international law has remained strangely artificial
and narrow. The approach I propose in this Article offers one way of
overcoming this difficulty.
This attempt to compel international law to take Third World resis-
tance seriously could be misinterpreted easily as a standard liberal ar-
gument that calls for the replacement of the statist paradigm with
purportedly new paradigms such as civil society; that is, that the state
is being marginalized or even supplanted by these new actors. 20 It is
not my intention in this Article to make such an argument. Rather, I
simply assert that many forms of extra-institutional resistance gener-
ated in the Third World remain invisible to international law, even
though its own architecture is a product of an intense and ambivalent
interaction with that resistance.
In this Article, I intend to introduce the notion of social movements
in international law as a first step toward rethinking the place of the
Third World in international law. In particular, I hope this analysis
will contribute toward a possible "Third World Approach to Interna-
tional Law" (rW-AIL), 'as part of an emerging genre uf new schular-
ship.21 While I do not elaborate on the theoretical similarities and con-

17. See STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND THEORY 5 (Charles
Bright & Susan Harding eds., 1984).
18. See id.
19. See MARITI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM ApOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 52-131 (1989); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE &
POLITICS (1975).
20. Much of recent international relations theory is in this vein, focusing on civil society. See
sources cited supra note 4. In international law, see NGOs, THE U.N. AND GLOBAL GOVERN-
ANCE (Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996); 1. Ali Khan, THE EXTINCTION OF NA-
TION-STATES: A WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS (1996); Richard Falk, LAW IN AN EMERGING
GLOBAL VILLAGE: A POST-WESTPHALIAN· PERSPECTIVE (1998); Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries
ofPartidpatiun: NGGj and International CiJvcrr;ance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L 1. 183 (1997); Conference on
Changing Notions of Sovereignty and the Role of Private Actors in International Law, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L
1. & POL'Y 1 (993); Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. 1. REV. 1 (1993);
Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International
Law?,4 EUR. J. INT'L 1. 447 (993); Symposium, The Decline of the Nation State and Its Effects on
Constitutional and International Economic Law, 18 CARDOZO 1. REV. 903 (1996). But Jee Oscar
Schachter, Decline of the Nation State and Its Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 22 (1997) (concluding that the state is unlikely to disappear soon).
21. I loosely identify this new scholarship with the emerging intellectual identity of TWAlL,
which is challenging the statist, elitist, colonialist, Eurocentric, and masculine foundations of
international law. See TWAIL Mission Statement, Conference on New Approaches to Third World
Legal Studies, Mar. 7-8, 1997, Harvard Law Schoo!. Of course, this joins an on-going genre of
92 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

536 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 41

tradictions between this new international law literature and the lit-
erature on social movements here, I will briefly state some caveats to
delineate more precisely the scope of my inquiry in this Article. First, I
do not attempt to present a systematic ethnography of all social
movements that have ever propelled the institutional evolution of the
BWIs. The focus in this Article is only on the most significant move-
ments in some notable areas of institutional expansion, such as in pov-
erty alleviation and environmental protection. Second, without pre-
suming to speak on behalf of the peasants, environmentalists, women,
and other individuals who were active participants in these social
movements, I have attempted to consttuct a more textured and com-
plex narrative about patterns of institutional change in international
law. It may be political to thus represent the Other, but it is no less
political to maintain silence about the Other. Third, there is also a
danger of romanticizing the local, and constructing enlightenment-
style progress narratives about movements as the grand successors of
states. I do not intend to present social movements in these terms; in-
deed, what makes them interesting is precisely the context-specific,
shifting, and contingent aspects of each movement as it has engaged
the global space occupied by the BWIs. This sets such movements
apart from the reductionist and totalizing narratives of international
law. Fourth, focusing attention on "new" identities, such as the envi-
ronment, is not meant to suggest that the "old" identities based on
class or nation are now irrelevant. Particularly during this era of glob-
alization, preserving local spaces is increasingly dependent on notions
of sovereig,nty, which remains a cardinal rloctrine. in ·international
law. 22 However, this Article rests on the conviction that traditional
understandings of sovereignty are no longer adequate for the defense of
local spaces, and that an understanding of the role of social movements
in international law is imperative to reverse the current bias which
favors the global over the local. Finally, the fact remains that various
social movements organized around multiple identities such as gender,
environment, ethnicity,and class are the most potent popular mobili-
zations in the world today, and the question is in what ways interna-

scholarship in the Third World tradition. Scholars in this genre, both young and well-
established, include: Helena Alviat, Anthony Anghie, Upendra Baxi, Lan Cao, B.S. Chimni,
James Gathii, Yash Ghai, Ruth Gotdon, Shadrack Gutta, Hope Lewis, Tayyab Mahmoud, Makau
Wa Mutua, Vasuki Nesiah, Celestine Nyamu, Liliana Obregon, Joe Oloka-Onyango, Diane Otto,
Neil Stammers, Kerry Rittich, Hani Sayed, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Amr Shalakany, and Issa
Shivji. For recenr attempts in this genre, see Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World
Voices in International Legal Discourse, 16 WIS. INT'L L. J. 353 (1998); Rajagopal, Locating the Third
World, supra note *.
22. For importanr recent discussions of sovereignty in inrernational law, see David Kennedy,
Background Noise?: The Underlying Politics 01 Global Governance, HARV. INT'L REV., Summer 1999,
at 52 (1999); Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 599 (1998); Oscar
Schachter, supra note 20.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 93

2000 I Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 537

tional law has shaped and been shaped by these movements. Telling
their story is a simple process of narrating a "history from below."23
The period since the late 1960s offers a perfect opportunity to ex-
amine critically the complex relationship between Third World popu-
lar resistance and institutional change in international law. This is due
to the level of institutional change that has occurred and the emer-
gence of Third World resistance as a significant factor during that pe-
riod. In the following pages, I discuss this complex relationship in de-
tail with respect to the BWls. In Part II, I examine the changes that
the BWls have undergone as a result of their encounter with Third
World resistance. I focus on the emergence of poverty alleviation and
environmental protection agendas at the World Bank and the condi-
tionality instrument at the IMF as part of the development discourse.
In this section, I argue that the "new" agenda of the BWls-poverty
alleviation, environmental protection, etc.-resulted from a complex
and ambivalent urge to deal with Third World resistance movements.
I also offer two specific examples of social movements from Brazil
(Polonoroeste) and India (Narmada) that have transformed the World
Bank's environmental agenda. The last section draws some possible
conclusions from the arguments advanced.

II. WRITING RESISTANCE:

BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS AND THE EVOLUTION
OF THEIR "NEW" DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
International lawyers who focus upon international economic law as
well ~s internati~nal institutions readily conc~de the importance of the
BWls to the success of their respective disciplines. 24 While the
GATT/WTO mechanisms constitute an important segment of the in-
stitutional framework of international economic law, the BWls are
better known and have historically wielded much more influence over
the economic and financial policies of Third World countries. In par-
ticular, due to their enormous resources, considerable intellectual
power, and the resultant influence they have over the national policies
of developing countries, they are also more "sexy" and constitute fa-

23. I borrow this phrase from HISTORY FROM BELOW: STUDIES IN POPULAR PROTEST AND
POPULAR IDEOLOGY IN HONOUR OF GEORGE RUDE (Frederick Krantz ed., 1985).
24. As a leading textbook on international economic law states, "to a great extent, contempo-
rary international economic interdependence can be attributed to the success of the institutions
put in place just after World War II, what we call in this book the Bretton Woods System." JOHN
H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MA-
TERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1 (3d ed. 1995). By BWIs, I mean the World Bank group of institutions
and the IMF. The World Bank group consists of: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Development Asso-
ciation (IDA), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Center
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
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538 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 41

vorite targets of media and academic critiques. 25 Indeed, for many

Third World states, their historical relationships with the BWIs have
been not only more significant, bur also more problematic than their
relationships with other organizations. This is partly due to the role of
these institutions as gate-keepers to the international economic sys-
tem, including access to Western capital. It is also due to the far-
reaching power of these institutions that extends into most domains of
human activity in the Third World, including economic and social
policy, urban and rural development, and even the very structure of the
state. Furthermore, due to their focus on issues of justice-mainly
anti-poverty programs-the BWIs figure inevitably in radical Third
World critiques of the international economic order.26
Yet, it is not automatically obvious why or how these instirutions
became so important and powe'rful. Their origins do not reveal much
concern with either development in the Third World27 or sustainability
and equitability; both of which concern the BWls greatly today.2 s The
World Bank Articles of Agreement, for example, do not refer to pov-
erty, equity, or the environment, and the IMF traditionally concerned
itself only with balance of payments deficits-and still does to a large
degree. 29 How then did these institutions acquire a "new" character, a

25. Indeed, there has been a veritable explosion of literature on the World Bank, while the
IMF has received somewhat less attention. The following works are merely a sample of this wide-
ranging pbenomenon: ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE (Giovanni A. Cornia et _at. eds.,
1987); ReSIN BROAD, "Ui-iEQUAL AL.LIANCE: THE WORLD BANK, THE' INTERNATIONAL MONE-
TARY FUND AND THE PHILIPPINES (1988); CATHERINE CAUFIELD, MASTERS OF ILLUSIONS: THE
WORLD BANK AND THE POVERTY OF NATIONS (1996); NICHOLAS HILDYARD, THE WORLD
BANK AND THE STATE: A RECIPE FOR CHANGE (1997); ToNY KILLlCK, THE IMF AND STABILI-
SATION: DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCES (1984); PAUL J. NELSON, THE WORLD BANK
AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE LIMITS OF ApOLITICAL DEVEWPMENT
(1995); CHERYL PAYER, THE DEBT TRAp: THE IMF AND THE THIRD WORLD (1974); CHERYL
PAYER, THE WORLD BANK: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1982). Part of the reason for this explosion is
tbat the BWIs have released much more information about their internal workings-never full or
adequate information, but some information nevertheless-tban the more secretive GATTIWTO,
or, most importantly, than the private. financial enterprises behind the BWIs. I thank Devesh
Kapur for illuminating conversations on this topic.
26. See generally MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR-
DER (1979); B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEM-
PORARY ApPROACHES (1993); B.S, Chimni, Marxism and International Law: A Contemporary
Analysis, EcoN. & POL. WKLY., Feb, 6, 1999, at 337.
27. Gn the origins, see DAM, supra note 12; DEVESH KApUR ET AL., 1 THE WORLD BANK: ITS
FIRST HALF CENTURY (1997) [hereinafter 1 KAPUR ET AL.l.
28. See Operational Directive 4.15: Poverty Reduction (1992), THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL
MANUAL 2 (Dec. 1992), cited in 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 51 [hereinafter Operational
Directive 4.15J (stating that "sustainable poverty reduction is the Bank's overarching objective"),
29, See International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement, art. I(v) and art. V(3Xa); see aho
Decision of the Executive Board, No.71-2 (1946), compiled in SELECTED DECISIONS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 55 (May 31, 1992) (interpreting the
IMF Articles of Agreement to mean that "authoriry to use the resources of the Fund is limited to
.. , giv[ing] temporary assistance in financing balance of payments deficits on [a member coun-
try's] current account for monetary stabilization operations").
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2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 539

character that has made them all-powerful and yet vulnerable to cri-
tique and response?
I believe the BWIs have acquired these "new concerns" in the course
of their interaction with the Third World, especially since the 1970s,
Still, as indicated earlier, the character of this interaction is different
from the interaction-however limited-with the Third World of the
1950s and 1960s, Unlike then, the Third World that these institu-
tions encountered in the 1970s was not just an agglomeration of states
at the United Nations, but an effervescent and troublesome cauldron
of peasants, women, environmentalists, human rights activists, indige-
nous people, religious activists, and other individuals that challenged
the political and economic orders of the time, In particular, the late
1960s and 1970s witnessed a series of popular movements-both in
the traditional Marxist sense and in the sense of "new social move-
ments"-that put the issues of equity and justice squarely on the po-
litical agendas of ruling elites. 3o Both along the lines of class (Marxist~
and identity (environment, ethnicity, feminist, and radical low-caste),
the BWls engaged popular resistance by employing a series of meas- J

ures that contributed to those movements' agendas.

Unlike the modernizing nationalist elites of the immediate post~
World War II period, the activists and ordinary people who partici-
pated in popular organizing in the 1970s were concerned about the
social and human costs of development that had been unleashed in the
Third World because they themselves were the victims of that process.
In their view, the root of misery in the Third World was not the failure
wJeliver de,.rehpmen<:; !:2ther, it was the very proces~ of delivering
development thar made them miserable. 3l I suggest that the BWIs'
new turn to poverty, environment, and equity in the 1970s, which
continues with much more vigor today, was necessitated by a complex
and ambivalent alliance with and in opposition to these popular
movements.3 2 In other words, the BWIs did not come to occupy the
positions that they do today either as a result of a functionalist logic to
solve problems, or as a result of a gradual learning process, but as a
consequence of a historically contingent and complex interaction with

30. For a discussion, see OMVEDT, supra note 9, Part II; Fernando Calder6n et aI., Social Move-
ments: Actors, Theories, Expectations, in THE MAKING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT.S IN LATIN AMERICA:
IDENTITY, STRATEGY, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 19.
31. For an extended discussion of this point and the impact this has on how we read First
World and Third World engagement with international law, see Rajagopal, Development Encounter,
supra note *.
32. There may be many factors that made it particularly easy for such an alliance to work. One
could mention the Cold War imperative to design a security policy that would encompass social
development as a safety measure, as in the Alliance for Progress in Latin America. One could also
examine the role played by charismatic leaders such as Robert McNamara at the World Bank
during the 1970s. I focus here only on the gradual process by which the BWIs began relating to
grassroots movements and thereby acquired their "new character."
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540 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 41

popular resistance to development in the Third World. It is in this

interaction that these institutions have invented and re-invented them-
selves as apparatus for the management of social reality in the Third
World.

A. Introduction: Beyond Benevolent Liberalism and Denunciatory Radicalism

There have been basically two kinds of critiques of the BWIs. The
first of these, which may be termed "liberal," essentially admits the
beneficent character of development and the role of these institutions
in the development process, which is defined as the collective effort to
eradicate poverty and raise standards of living. 33 The writers adopting
this position may concede that sometimes these institutions do not
achieve their objectives, but that is all the more reason to reform and
improve them. Using a domestic analogy, the problem for these writers
is similar to the capture of the state by reactionary interests: The BWIs
remain undemocratic and unrepresentative since they have been cap-
tured by only Western interests. To the extent that the purpose of
these critiques is to make these institutions perform better, much of
this literature is policy-oriented and prescriptive.
A second line of critique of the BWIs draws from radical neo-
Marxist and dependency theories. 34 According to this critique, capi-
talism is a reactionary force in the Third World and therefore the cause
of poverty, not a cure for it. Given this premise, these critics view the
BWIs as mechanisms that enable exploitation of the periphery by the
core, and RWT development intervention as the result of the-logic of
capital.
While both of these critiques have served important purposes, they
nevertheless appear to lack explanatory power. The liberal critique is
politically naiVe since it assumes that BWI development intervention
occurs in a class-neutral manner-in other words, during intervention,
class relations are simply reproduced and not made worse. However,
this does not explain either the popular resistance (if such intervention
is so beneficent, why does it encounter such opposition) or the consis-
tent failure to achieve its goals (such as the reduction of poverty). On

33. See generally BED)AOTJl, supra note 26; GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD
POVERTY (1970); GUNNAR MYRDAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND UNDERDEVELOPED REGIONS
(1957); Oscar Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1 (1976).
34. See PAYER, WORLD BANK, supra note 25; Gavin Williams, The World Bank and the Peasant
Problem, in RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TROPICAL AFRICA (Judith Heyer et al. eds., 1981). For an
incisive deployment of dependency theory critique to Western law, see David Greenberg, Law and
Development in Light of Dependency Theory, 3 RES. IN L. & Soc. 129, 152 (1980). A classic state-
ment of dependency theory is Andre Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 105 (Kenneth P. Jameson &
Charles K. Wilber eds., 6th ed. 1996).
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2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 541

the other hand, the dependency critique assumes too much: that every
intervention by the BWIs is a core-periphery relation that mechani-
cally reproduces unjust capitalistic relations between the West and the
Third World, This overkill leads dependency critiques to policy pa-
ralysis,35 as well as to a homogenizing tendency that ignores the actual
process of resistance to development by different actors such as women
or indigenous people (since the class character of the struggle has been
assumed already) and the resultant heterogeneity of voices, Neither
approach seems satisfactory for these and other reasons,36
The approach I adopt will differ from both of these critiques, In-
stead of assuming that the BWls are basically good or bad, or asking if
they succeed or fail in reducing poverty, I am interested in exploring
the interaction between the BWI interventions and the Third World
resistance it has provoked, It is my suggestion that this process of re-
sistance (by the Third World) and response (by institutions) is an es-
sential part of the way in which these institutions have become the
apparatus of management and control of social reality in the Third
World, In this analysis, it matters less whether these institutions are_
successes or failures; rather, what is important is that such an apparatus'
may, as James Ferguson elegantly puts it, "do what it does, not at the
bidding of some knowing and powerful subject who is making it all
happen, but behind the backs of or against the wills of even the most
powerful actors. "37 The outcomes of these interventions are instrument
effects that are not intended or even recognized, but are nevertheless
effective for being subjectless. 38 These authorless strategies, in a Fou-
cauldian sense,39 reproduce the discursive terrain on which these insti- '
tutions interact with the Third World.

35. Though I should note that even these critiques never abandon their faith in the idea of in-
ternational institutions per Je; just in the BWIs.
36. Otber reasons include at least two types of critiques; first, a postcolonial legitimacy cri-
tique that lfisists on the historical continuity between colonial and development interventions
and sees the BWls as essential elements in that continuity, and therefore illegitimate. See Esco-
BAR, supra note 9. I liberally rely on the insights of this critique in this Article. Second, a demo-
cratic deficit critique, from the left and the right, that challenges the BWls (and now the WTO
as well) not simply because they are tools of capitalist domination, but because of a lack of ac-
countability to the people. See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGH-
BOURHOOD 341-44 (1995) (proposing a right of petition to civil society members); Public Citizen
Global Trade Watch (visited Apr. 12, 2000) <http://www.tradewatch.org>; International Forum on
Globalization (visited Apr. l2, 2000) <http://www.ifg.org>; Alliance for Democracy (visited Apt.
12,2000) <http://www.afd-online.org>. The most extensive treatment of legitimacy of interna-
tional law and institutions is in the original and important work of Thomas Franck: Thpmas M.
Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System.' General Cours, on Public Interna-
tional Law, 240 RECUEIL DES COURS 13 (1993); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITI-
MACY AMONG NATIONS (990); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM.
J. INT'L L. 705 (198S).
37. JAMES FERGUSON, THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: "DEVELOPMENT," DEPOLlTlZATION,
AND BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO IS (1990).
3S. Id at 19.
39. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
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542 Harvard International Law Journal! Vol. 41

B. Cold War and the "Other" Third World Resistance

I begin with the role the BWIs played in furthering the Cold War
objective of containing Third World mass radicalism since that role is
essential for understanding the later emergence of poverty alleviation
programs. It is often forgotten that during the few years after the es-
tablishment of the BWIs, their lending focus was substantially on de-
veloped countries such as Japan and Australia (see Table 1 below).
Thus, from January 1949 to the approval of the first credit of the In-
ternational Development Association (IDA) in April 1961, the World
Bank lent these countries $1. 7 billion, or one-third of a total $5.1 billion.
Australia ($317 million by June 1961), Japan ($447 million), Norway
($120 million), Austria ($101 million), Finland ($102 million), France
($168 million), and Italy ($P9 million) all received World Bank
funding for reconstruction and development. 4o This situation contin-
ued until the establishment of the IDA in 1961, even though several
large loans had been made to India and latin America. 41 At the end of
this key period from 1947 to 1961, which also witnessed the height of
the Cold War, it was becoming obvious to the West that it was "losing
the poor," and that explicit programs had to be invented that would
contain the rebellion from the bottom. 42 This Cold War imperative
had a major impact on the evolution of the BWIs, for now there was a
security rationale to their developmental work.43 In particular, the
World Bank moved from its reconstruction phase to its development
phase as the Cold War intensified. As Bank President Eugene Black
characterized it while speaking before the Anrmal General Meeting in
1956, though "originally concerned solely as a financial institution,"
the Bank "has evolved into a development agency which uses its
financial resources as but one means of helping its members. "44
This technique of combining security and development was not en-
tirely new; colonial regimes had perfected it in their handling of anti-
colonial nationalist movements by designing welfarescheines for the
protesting natives. 45 The "dual mandate," articulated by colonial ad-
ministrators like Sir Frederic lugard was based on the idea that the

(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1978); MICHEL FOUCAULT,
POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 (Colin
Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., Pantheon Books 1980).
40. See 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 93.
41. See id.
42. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. This led to an invention of social develop-
ment as a substitute for economic development in U.N. practice. For a discussion, see Gustavo
Esteva, Development, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO KNOWLEDGE AS POWER,
supra note 9, at 13.
43. 1. refer here only to the international aspects of the security dimension; development, of
course, also had a domestic security dimension.
44. Cited in 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 88.
45. See SIR FREDERIC LUGARD, DUAL MANDATE IN BRITISH TR.oPICAL AFRICA chs. 1, 31 (1922).
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 99

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native had to be cared for, not simply exploited. 46 As one colonial gov-
ernor said as early as 1937, "the exploitation theory . .. is dead, and the
development theory has taken its place. "47 In this view, caring for the wel-
fare of the natives was a crucial aspect of colonial dominance. Welfare
spending was becoming necessary to achieve the dual purposes of sus-
taining production by fully constituting the homo oeconomicus in the
Third World, and containing dissatisfaction and rebellion from the
masses.
The Cold War reinforced this historically crucial link between secu-
rity and development, and had a major impact on the evolution and
expansion of the BWls, especially the World Bank. Looked at this way,
these international institutions are neither simply benevolent vehicles
for development, nor ineluctably. exploitative mechanisms of global
capitalism; but rather, a terrain on which multiple ideological and
other forces intersected, thus producing the expansion and reproduc-
tion of these very institutions.

Table One
World Bank Development Lending (Planned and Actual)
Before the IDA (in Billions of $US)48

Recipient of Development loan Gross Commitments Net lending (actual

(planned funding) disbursement)

1948-61 1956-61 1948-61

More developed countries 1.7 0.9 1.1

Colonies 0.5 0.3 0.4
less developed countries 2.9 1.7 2.3
Power/transportation 2.4 1.4 2.0
Agriculture/irrigation 0.1 0.1 0.1

Total development loans 5.1 2.9 3.8

The Cold War-generated link between security and development '

was borne out by the superpower rivalry over the Third World for po-
litical and economic allegiance. John Foster Dulles stated in 1956 that
there was "a contest in the field of development of underdeveloped
countries .... Defeat ... could be as disastrous as defeat in the arms

46. See id.

47. Bernard Bourdillon, The African Producer in Nigeria, WEST AFRICA, Jan. 30, 1937, at 75,
cited in 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 96 n.35 (emphasis mine).
48. WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 1961, cited in 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, ar 86, tbl.
3-1.
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race. "49 This was based on the evolution of events since the 1955
Bandung Conference, which had itself thrown the notion of Commu-
nist containment out of focus by offering a third identity, beyond the
East and the West, for the non-Western world. 50 Nationalist and leftist
coups occurred during the 1950s in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, and with
the take-over of Cuba by Fidel Castro in 1959, the Western world, led
by the United States, undertook frenzied efforts to contain Commu-
nism. This had an immediate impact on how development was con-
ceived and deployed in the Third World. For instance, the United
States, in order to justifY its new foreign assistance rationale-and
thus, its security rationale-with respect to Latin America, "demoted"
and re-classified the region from its pre-war status as a region with
"advanced" economies to an "underdeveloped area."51 High U.S. bilat-
eral assistance during the 'period from 1949 to 1961 reflected this pri-
ority: It averaged $1.8 billion on soft terms, some four to five times
that of World Bank lending during the same time. 52
This marriage of security and development was reflected in the aca-
demic discourse as well as in the practice of the BWls. The academic
discourse, constituting the mainstay of development, acknowledged its
Cold War origins openly. As a university textbook on development
economics began, "the Cold War is not going very well for the West-
ern world. Soviet or Chinese influence is infiltrating into many of the
undeveloped countries, in Asia, Mrica, and Latin America."53 Barbara
Ward, arguing for more development assistance, pointed out that "we
should realize soberly that the worldwide struggle is not necessarily
'going our way."'54 The centers of academic discourse were also equally
caught up in the logic of the Cold War. The MIT Center for Interna-
tional Studies initiated much of the development thinking under Paul
Rosenstein-Rodan and received financing from the CIA; in addition,
"Harvard social scientists were deeply involved in Pakistan,"55

49. Cited in CHRONICLE OF THE 20TH CENTURY 776 (Clifton Daniel ed., 1992).
50. On the Bandung Conference, see A. ApPADORAI, THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE (1955);
GEORGE KAHIN, THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE (1956); CARLOS ROMULO, THE MEANING
OF BANDUNG (1956); RICHARD WRIGHT, THE COLOR CURTAIN (1956).
51. 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 143 (quoting the National Secutity Council in 1959 as
determining that "Latin America ... must be dealt with primarily as an underdeveloped area").
52. See 1 KApUR ET AL., supra nore 27, at 90-91. The security-development alignment was
more readily conceded in bilateral assistance. As Robert Packenham notes: "At no time was all
economic and technical assistance principally used for developmental ends; during . ::inost of
the fifties and the latter half of (the} sixties ... security ends were dominant." ROBERT PACKEN-
HAM, LIBERAL AMERICA AND THE THIRD WORLD xix (1973), cited in 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note
27, at 149 n.28.
53. STEPHEN ENKE, ECONOMICS FOR DEVELOPMENT vii (1963), cited in 1 KApUR ET AL., su-
pra note 27, at 144 n.l0.
54. BARBARA WARD, THE RICH NATIONS AND THE POOR NATIONS (1962), cited in 1 KApUR
ET AL., supra note 27, at 144 n.l0.
55. 1 KApUR ET AL., JUpra note 27, at 148 n.24. President Kennedy relied on both Harvard
and MIT to form his foreign policy staff. See id.
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In the practice of the World Bank, the security dimension of devel-

opment began to have a major impact, Thus, Nicaragua, a nation of
one million inhabitants, received ten World Bank loans between 1951
and 1960 because of the close connection between the U.S. military
and covert operations in the region, and the ruling Somoza family. 56 By
contrast, Guatemala, with three times the population, did not receive a
loan until the overthrow of its supposedly communist regime in 1955.57
This coincided with the then U.S. preference for hard regimes over
liberal ones. As George Kennan said in 1950, "[i}t is better to have a
strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent
and relaxed and penetrated by Communists."58
In addition to being used to fund anticommunist actions in the
Third World, the Bank was also deeply affected in its internal work-
ings by the political strategies that were adopted by the United States
to fight the Cold War. This is evident on at least two important fronts.
First, under political influence, the lending portfolio of the Bank be-
gan to shift from a legalistic, cautious, and Wall Street oriented ap-
proach to project lending, to a more political and ad hoc approach to
program lending. 59 The quasi-official history of the World Bank traces
the shift from project lending to program lending quite well. 60 With
the establishment of the IDA in 1961, and the expansion of the Bank's
lending to poverty alleviation in the 1970s, the shift from project to
program lending became complete, thereby expanding the reach and
scope of the Bank's activities immeasurably. The next section will
analyze this shift and the corresponding expansion.
The second level at which the Bank was internally affected by the
political necessities of the Cold War was in its sectoral allocation. As
can be seen from Table 1 above, eighty-three percent of the lending
until 1961 for developing countries was for power and transportation
projects. Agriculture and social sector activities, such as health and
education, were neglected. This lending portfolio was based on a bi-
ased understanding of development as capital accumulation and physi-
cal modernization, as opposed to human development. This not only

56. See id. at 103.

57. Seeid.
58. Quoted in JAMES CHACE, ENDLESS WAR: How WE GOT INVOLVED IN CENTRAL AMERICA
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE (1984), cited in 1 KApUR ET AL.,SUpra nore 27, ar 103 n.59.
59. This meant for example, rhat the Bank could fund a specific project such as the construc-
tion of a road, while it could nor fund broad social or economic programs dealing with health or
education. The World Bank's Articles of Agreement originally committed it to lend primarily for
specific projects. in order to convince Wall Street that the Bank's investment would be responsible
and could be monitored easily through hard evidence of project fulfillment. See International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Articles of Agreement, art. III, sec. 4(vii)
("Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in special circumstances, be for the purpose
of specific projects of reconstruction or development:"). For a discussion of the Wall Street con-
nection to rhe projecr approach ro lending, see 1 KAPUR ET AL., supra note 27, ar 88-90, 120-21.
60. See 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, chs. 3,4.
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reflected the dominant thinking toward development at that time,

which emphasized investment in infrastructure rather than human
beings, but it also followed from the Bank's status as a conservative
institution, dependent upon Wall Street for its financing, which placed
it in a much harder position to justify unproductive or fuzzy invest-
ments like education or even urban water supply.61 Agriculture fared
worse: Only three percent of all development lending to developing
countries through 1961 was for agriculture. 62 This was mainly due to
the Bank's wish to remain attractive to Wall Street financing. In the
end, with the establishment of the IDA and the expansion into poverty
alleviation, the Bank's sectoral allocation expanded dramatically to
embrace health, education, rural development, and agriculture. While
this changed focus has not actually reduced poverty, improved health,
or made agriculture more efficient as much as had been intended,63 the
instrument eJfects64 of the change have involved a dramatic expansion of
the BWls into every conceivable sphere of human activity in the Third
World. Quite apart from whether they actually achieve their intended
goals, the interventions carried out by the BWIs acquire an internal
logic in their own right. This expansion of the domain of their activi-
ties could not have occurred without the security dimension provided
by the Cold War as a response to the mass peasant and anti-colonial
movements in the Third World. However, this obvious trend receives
scant acknowledgement in historiographies of the BWIs in interna-
tionallaw.

61. For a discussion, see id. at 109-11. In addition, a certain teleology also crept in that
judged projects by whether they were appropriate for a patticular country at its given scale of
development when compared with Western countries at similar stages of development. Thus,
World Bank President Robert Garner once questioned the need for urban watet supply in devel-
oping countries: "[WJhen I was brought up in Mississippi ... we didn't have watet in our
house." Interview by David Sommers with Robert Garner, President, World Bank (July 18,
1985), cited in 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 110-11.
62. See 1 KApUR ET AL., supra nOte 27, at 112. In taking this path, the Bank differed from
U.S. bilateral assistance during the same period, which focused on agriculture, health, and educa-
tion, presumably free of Wall Street financing compulsions. See id.
63. As an official publication of the U.N. conceded a decade after the establishment of the
IDA, "[rJhe fact that development either leaves behind, or in some ways even creates, large areas
of poverty, stagnation, marginality and actual exclusion from economic and social progress is too
obvious and too urgent to be overlooked." Report of the Meeting of Experts on Social Policy and
Planning, International Social Development Review, No.3, at 4,5, U.N. Doc. EICN.51455 and
Corr. 1 (1971). For an analysis of how poverty and exclusion remain enormous obstacles despite
development interventions, especially in the context of globalization and the East Asian economic
crisis, see GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE (Human Development Report, UNDP, 1999).
64. See supra notes 37-39 and the accompanying text.
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C. The "Discovery" of Poverty and the Establishment of the IDA:

Rejuvenating the BWIs
As already noted, the Articles of Agreement of the BWIs do not re-
fer to poverty or justice explicitly, Yet, in 1991, the World Bank de-
clared in an Operational Directive that "sustainable poverty reduction
is the Bank's overarching objective,"65 This new faith was not the re-
sult of a smooth evolution toward rational objectives that resulted
from a learning process, though the Bank itself has recently portrayed
it as such.

In the 1960s ... the Bank focused on economic growth as the key
to poverty reduction. During the 1970s, attention shifted first to
redistribution with growth and later to satisfaction of basic human
needs. In the early 1980s policy-based adjustment lending over-
shadowed the Bank's poverty reduction objectives .... [This)
eventually enabled the Bank to address more effectively the rela-
tionship between poverty and the policy environment. In 1987
and 1988, the primacy of the Bank's poverty reduction objective
was reemphasized in task force reports . . . . [The importance of
poverty reduction was bolstered by later reports that) contributed
to a futther reaffirmation of the Bank's commitment to poverty
reduction as its fundamental objective. 66

This account is, of course, antiseptic and neat. In contrast, as can be

Seell from\:l",: J.~scu&sion in the previous seClion, the Bank's mandate
was an explicitly political one that was gradually crafted in complex
struggles: between the two Cold War power blocs, between the Third
World and the West, between leftist and reactionary politics, between
peasant rebellions and authoritarian governments, between mass
movements and elite manipulation, between colonial and anti-colonial
. forces, and between multiple conceptions of development. Still, it is
important to focus on the process by which poverty came to constitute
the governing logic or the episteme of development: the BWls. This is
because it is in the course of "discovering" poverty that the BWIs, par-
ticularly the Bank, discovered themselves as international institutions.
In other words, if the Cold War provided a security dimension to the constitu-
tion of the BWIs as development institutions, the objective of poverty reduction
provided the moral, the humanitarian dimension.

65. OPerational Directive 4.15, supra note 28, at 51.

66. 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 51-52 (quoting Lewis Preston's OPerational Directive
4.15 (see supra note 28)) (emphasis by KAPUR ET AL.).
104 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

548 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 41

1. "Discovering" Poverty:
Engaging the "Poor, Dark, and Hungry Masses"
In order to grasp the process that led to the crowning of the BWIs
as poverty-reducers, one must analyze the establishment of the IDA in
1961, for it was the first major international institutional milestone in
the turn to poverty as an international objective, and to the "poor,
dark, and hungry masses" of the Third World as the target group of
international interventions. There were several factors which were re-
sponsible for this turn. First, there was a realization that in the Cold
War-driven competition for allegiance of ,regimes, it was essential to
promote intra-country redistribution to pacify the masses that were
becoming restive due to rising anti-colonialism and nationalism. In-
deed, it was a commonplace in development thinking in the late 1950s
and early 1960s that poor countries would succumb to Communism if
they were not rescued from poverty.67 Aid began to be seen as a way of
rescue. The importance of redistribution as a policy goal of foreign
assistance in order to pacify the masses was clearly spelled out, for ex-
ample, by Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon while speaking to
the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the aftermath of Fidel
Castro's victory: "While there has been a steady rise in national in-
comes throughout [Latin America}, millions of underprivileged have
not benefited."68
Second, there was also an awareness that traditional foreign lending
was too focused on accumulation of capital (mainly through infrastruc-
ture and power projects) and too little on so-called social lending.. Thi~.
';"';:1$ true not only due to the fact that Wall Stn!et fi~~nciers considered

social lending unproductive and fuzzy,69 but also because social lend-
ing seemed too political and therefore violative of the principle of non-
intervention in international law and relations. The BWls provided a
way around this impasse. This rationale was articulated by President
Eisenhower with regard to the establishment of the Inter-American
Development Bank in 1959:

Traditional unilateral aid was sustaining a prevailing social order

which was unjust to. the masses of the people, but we could do
nothing directly about this without violating the policy of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. The creation
of the new bank changed this, for now the Americas had a multi-
national instrument, secure against control by anyone country, for

67. See ESCOBAR, Jupra note 9, at 34.

68. MILTON S. EISENHOWER, THE WINE IS BITTER: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN
AMERICA 249 (1965), cited in 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 142 (Kaput's brackets}. As
President Kennedy and President Johnson's Secretary of the Treasury between 1961 to 1965,
Dillon had a major impact on the creation of the IDA. See id. at 142 n.6.
69. See Jupra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 549

bettering the life of people throughout the Americas; if this in-

strument insisted upon social reform as a condition of extending develop-
ment credit, it could scarcely be charged with "intervention. "70

The expansion of the BWls into poverty-focused lending fit perfectly

with this reasoning.
Third-and connected to the first two---:-the World Bank itself was
clearly realizing the politically quiescent effect that its loans were'
having on Third World peoples. Though this could not be articulated
as an economic rationale to justify social lending, the Bank was never-
theless widely aware of and influenced by this in lending to Third
World countries. Thus, in discussing a proposed IDA loan to Ecuador
in June 1961, a member of the Loan Committee stated: "Colonialism
is certainly bad in Ecuador ... even ... worse than in the Far East.
Something violent is going to happen ... I think that our projects do serve
to relieve internal pressures . .. I agree that we might consider more IDA money
because of these political risks. "71
Fourth, the discovery of so-called underdevelopment as a domain of
intervention in the 1950s had put poverty squarely on the interna-
tional agenda. Before World War II, the poverty of the natives was
taken as natural because they were seen to lack the capacity for science
and technology and the will to economic progress.72 On the other
hand, the poor in the West had been subjected to a series of poor laws
since the medieval period, but more intensely since the nineteenth
century.7 3 In this new conception, the poor were seen to lack in par-
ticular social domains, whi'ch called for lcdmical interventions in edu-
cation, health, hygiene, morality, savings, and so on. Relying on a
negative conception of deficiency, this new approach to the poor.
defined them in terms of what they were not, instead of simply describJ
ing them for what they really were. This negative conception enabled the
initial deployment of an economic sense of poverty to all social do-
mains, but it soon transformed into a cultural, political, and psycho-
logical sense of poverty as well: The native was seen pathologically
lacking in simply all social domains.7 4 Consequently, the discourse of
poverty became a series of interventions that acquired multiple dimen-
sions-medical, economic, social, legal, and political. The ensemble of
interventions to manage the poor have been termed as the domain of

70. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, WAGING PEACE, 1956-61: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 516,
quoted in 1 KAPUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 155 (emphasis mine).
71. Mr. Aldewereld in Rough Notes of Staff Loan Committee Meeting 1-4, lI\RD Doc.
SLClM/6124 (June 14, 1961), cited in 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 166 (emphasis mine).
72. See ESCOBAR, supra note 9, at 22.
73. For an analysis of poverty generally, see Majid Rahnema, Global Poverty: A Pauperizing
Myth, 24 lNTERCULTURE 4 (1991). For a brilliant analysis of the poverty idea, see Wolfgang
Sachs, The Archaeology of the DtWelopment Idea, 23 INTERCULTURE 1 (1990).
74. See ESCOBAR, supra note 9, at 21-24.
106 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

550 Harvard International Law Journal / Vo!. 41

the social by scholars,?5 This new approach ro the poor differed from
older Western approaches that celebrated the honor of voluntary pov-
erty-e.g., medieval Franciscan orders-and paralleled many non-
Western approaches to the poor, such as in India,?6
This process of discovering poverty intensified during the troubled
inter-war period, particularly in Britain and the United States, due to
Keynesianism and the New Deal, respectively. These processes-
reflected in the discovery of both the social, by U.S. and French legal
realists,77 and the "new international law," by inter-war lawyers such as
Alejandro Alvarez 78-prepared the groundwork for a more intense
engagement with the poor masses. Finally, a very important factor re-
sponsible for the evolution of the poverty discourse, with its focus
upon Third World peoples, was the inter-war experience of colonialism
and the mandate system of the League of Nations, both of which at-
tempted to construct a new, so-called humanitarian approach to the
rule of natives, moving away (rhetorically at least) from exploitative
colonialism,79 This experience provided institutional continuity to the
"rule of the natives" after World War II when many colonial adminis-
trators joined the World Bank. 8o
However, the internationalization of the social domain did not occur
ih a true sense until after World War II, following the establishment of
the BWls. The World Bank, for example, invented "per capita in-
come" as a tool to compare countries in 1948. As a result, they magi-
cally converted almost two-thirds of the world's population into the

75. Id. at 23.

76. For an interesting discussion of the comparative dimensions of poverty across cultures, see
Majid Rahnema, Poverty, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO KNOWLEDGE AS
POWER, supra note 9, at 158. In India, the Gandhian tradition has managed to maintain this
holistic approach throughout the 20th century.
77. For an excellent account of U.S.-French comparative legal experiences with legal realism,
see Marie-Claire Belleau, "Les Juristes Inquiets": Critical Currents of Legal Thought in France at
the End of the Nineteenth Century (1990) (unpublished S.].D. dissertation, Harvard Law
School). For a sophisticated discussion of the use of thi social in Egyptian private law and its rela-
tionship to U.S.-French private law theory, see Amr Shalakany, The Analytics of the "Social" in
Private Law Theory: A Comparative Study (2000) (unpublished draft of S.] .D. Dissertation,
Harvard Law School).
78. Alejandro Alvarez, The New International Law, 15 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCI-
ETY 35 (Apr. 16, 1929).
79. I have developed this argument extensively in my upcoming Harvard S.] .D. thesis. For an
inspirational account of the mandate system in its relationship to sovereignty doctrine and colo-
nialism, see Anthony Anghie, Creating the Nation State: Colonialism and the Making of Interna-
tional Law, ch. 5 (1995) (unpublished S.].D. thesis, Harvard Law School). For important and
original contributions by Anthony Anghie that develop the basic idea of the relationship between
colonialism and international law, see Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Srwereignty and
Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.]. 5 (1999); Antony Anghie,
Francisco de Vitltl"ia and the Colonial Origins 0/ International Law, 5 SOCIAL AND LEGAL STUDIES 321
(1996); Antony Anghie, "The Heart 0/ my Home": Colonialism, Environmental Damage and the Nauru
Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L.]. 445 (1993).
80. See 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 54.
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2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 551

"poor" because their annual per capita income was less than $100,81
Along with the invention of the notion of Third World as a terrain of
intervention .in the 1950s,82 the discovery of poverty emerged as a
working principle of the process whereby the domain of interaction
between the West and the non-West was defined,83 The institutional
grid that made this process possible was the complex network of inter-
national institutions exemplified by the BWls, but including the eco-
nomic, political and security institutions of the post-World War II era,
These institutions, beginning with the mandate system of the League,
had begun adopting the poverty and welfare discourse well before the
much-touted turn of the World Bank toward poverty-alleviation in the
1970s,84 which had the effect of consolidating and quickening the in-
ternationalization of the social domain,
As a result, it must be recognized that contrary to popular view-
points, the BWls were neither benevolent do-gooders nor mechanistic
tools in the hands of global capital opposed to social justice and equity,
Rather, they constituted a complex space in which power, justice, secu-
rity, and humanitarianism functioned in contradictory and comple-
mentary ways, Indeed, these phenomena could not exist without each
other, As Karl Polanyi has perceptively remarked with regard to the
rise of capitalism in the West, "(p}auperism, political economy, and
the discovery of society were closely interwoven,"85 By analogy, I sug-
gest poverty, political economy, and the discovery of international in-
stitutions as sites where relations between the West and the non-West
are constructed, are inseparable,

2, Institutionalizing Poverty Discourse:

The IDA and the Development Apparatus
The invention of poverty discourse during the first decade following
World War II began to impact tangibly on international institutions,
This was inevitable, because the moral justification provided by the
poverty discourse and the security justification provided by the Cold
War created a powerful momentum toward greater international insti-
tutionalization, These forces became evident as new institutions were
rapidly established in the late 1950s and early 1960s, In addition, the
changed focus of international institutions began to generate new con-
ceptual apparatus in many disciplines, including international law;

81. Id. at 83. See also ESCOBAR, supra note 9, at 23-24 (noting that comparative statistical op-
erations had been carried out only since 1940).
82. See generally Rajagopal, Locating the Third World, supra note *.
83. See ESCOBAR, supra note 9, at 31.
84. The most famous event that marked this turn was Bank President McNamara's speech to
the Board of Governors of the Bank in Nairobi on September 24,1973.
85. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 85 (9th prtg. 1968).
108 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

552 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 41

which attempted to take account of their new social character. S6 The

BWIs were inevitably affected by these processes.
The establishment of the IDA in 1961 marked the most significant
moment in the institutional expansion of the BWIs toward a poverty-
focused approach. As discussed earlier, the Bank resisted turning di-
rectly to social lending because it sought to preserve its commitment
to project-based lending, and preserve its financial image to its Wall
Street financiers. As a result, upon the initiative of the United States, a
new institution, the IDA, was established under the umbrella of the
Bank with the explicit mandate of assisting the "less developed coun-
tries."87 This marked a decisive turn in the ongoing relationship of
development and intervention between the BWIs and "Third World
masses" in at least two ways, both of which had a significant impact on
international institutions. First, development would henceforth ac-
quire a "morally discriminat9ry sense" whereby it would equal pov-
erty-alleviation in developing countries. ss As a result, international
institutions began to acquire an aura of legitimacy, which continues to
this day, that derived from their supposedly beneficent contribution to
poverty-alleviation. Second, the formation of the IDA also coincided
with and led to the establishment of dozens of additional development
institutions, both multilateral and domestic, that today constitute the
institutional framework of international economic relations.
The establishment of the IDA had profound effects on the character
of the Bank as an institution on several levels. This was nowhere more
evident than in its new character as a first-world institution lending
primarily to poor Third World countries. As shown in Table 2 below,
. total Bank lending to hieh incomp cocmtries such as Australi~ or Japan
"dropped from 43 percent of commitments in the 1950s to 21 percent
over 1961-69, and to only seven percent during 1968 and 1969."89 By
contrast, one third of all lending during the 1960s was allocated to
India and Pakistan, two of the world's poorest countries. 90 In addition,
~he number of low-income borrowers ballooned following decoloniza-
tion in Mrica. Henceforth, the Bank would truly become an interna-
tional institution, mediating the contentious relationship betwee.n the
West and the non-West while occupying its own (expanding) space.
The Bank also began to diversify its sectoral allocation to include agri-
culture, education, and other social sectors. For example, loans to agri-
culture rose from two percent of pre-IDA lending to eleven percent

86. See generally Rajagopal, Development Encounter, supra note *.

87. See generally 1 KAPUR ET Aj.., supra note 27, chs. 4, 17. This purpose distinguished the IDA
from the tetms of the IBRD Articles of Agreement, which treated all member States as equals.
88. See id. at 140.
89. Id. at 139.
90. See id.
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2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 553

during the 1960s and reached twenty percent during the last two years
of the decade,91

Table 2
IBRD and IDA Lending, 1961-69 (Millions of $US)92

Borrower Number of IDA IBRD Total

Borrowers

Total (all income) 93 2217 7219 9436

High income 16 15 1644 1659

Middle and low income 77 2201 5575 7776
Middle income 43 354 4113 4467
Low income 34 1847 1462 3309
India 1 1044 405 1449
Pakistan 1 413 375 788
Power!transportation 68 852 3593 4445
Agriculture! education! 49 604 941 1545
water

However, the establishment of the IDA and the turn to social lend-
ing was not easy, As a BWI, the IDA was still bound to restrict fund-
ing to specific projects "except in special circumstances,"93 Except for
the window provided by such circumstances, the Accompanying Re-
port
- of the
.
Executive
. .
Directors, which was used to interpret the Arti-
cles of Agreement of the IDA, stated that "specific projects" must in-
clude "a railway program, an agricultural credit program, or a group of
related projects forming part of a developmental program,"94 While
this expanded definition of "specific projects" enabled the Bank to lend
for social projects and further weakened the distinction between proj-
ect and program lending, it also carefully avoided mentioning so-
called social projects by name, for fear of tarnishing its Wall Street-
friendly image,95
The new course charted by the Bank after IDA's establishment
was-not surprisingly-intricately bound to the Cold War strategy of
the United States for containing Third World Communism. The IDA
made several loans to U.S.-friendly regimes that were clearly moti-

91. See infra Table 2. See also 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 141.
92. 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 140, tbl. 4-1.
93. 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 159.
94. IDA, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT AND ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DI-
RECTORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, Art. V
§ l(b) 1\1\13-15 (1960), cited in 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 159.
95. See 1 KApUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 159.
110 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

554 Harvard International Law Journal I Vol. 41

vated by the desire to contain irate domestic populations and render

them quiescent. For instance, a loan was approved for a water supply
project for King Hussein's Jordan in October 1960 to save his regime
from leftist and nationalist forces even before the IDA had opened for
business. 96 In the aftermath of Fidel Castro's revolution, several loans
were also made available for projects in Latin American countries such
as Chile, Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Paraguay.97
President Eisenhower even claimed after the Latin American revolts
that "constantly before us was the question of what could be done
about the revolutionary ferment in the world . . . . We needed new
policies that would reach the seat of the trouble, the seething unrest of
the people. "98
These new policies were beginning to have a global impact inde-
pendent of expanded Bank funding. This manifested itself concretely
through the creation of a large number of development institutions-
multilateral, regional and domestic. The first wave of institution-
building occurred between 1945 and 1950 and included the BWls,
most U..N. agencies (such as UNESCO (UN Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion), UNICEF (UN Children's Fund), WHO (World Health Organi-
zation), ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific) and ECLA (Economic and Social Commission for Latin Amer-
ica» and bilateral aid agencies in the United States, Britain, and
France. 99
The second wave occurred between 1958 and 1962 and included
bilateral development agencies (such as the Canadian International
Df'vel('pmem Agency (CIDA), Ministries of Cooperation in France and
Germany, and development agencies in Japan, Switzerland, Belgium,
Denmark, and Norway), regional agencies (such as the Eutopean In-
vestment Bank, including its European Development Fund, the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with
its Development Assistance Committee, the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (IADB), the Alliance for Progress, African Development
Bank in 1964, and the Asian Development Bank in 1966), multilat-
eral agencies (such as the U.N. Economic Commission for Mrica
(ECA) , the Special U.N. Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED),
the IDA, and the International Finance Cooperation (IFC) in 1956),
and country-specific aid efforts such as the India Aid Consortium. IOO

96. See id. at 162.

97. See id. at 163.
98. EISENHOWER, supra note 70, at 530, 537.
99. See 1 KAPUR ET AL., supra note 27, at 150-51. The United States had the largest aid pro-
gram, which was administered through agencies such as the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) and the Export-Import Bank. See id.
100. Seeid. at 152.
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2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 555

With the birth of UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Develop-

ment), UNDP (UN Development Program), and UNCLOS (UN Con-
ference on Law of the Sea) in the 1960s and 1970s, and MIGA in the
1980s, the international institutionalization of the social domain was
complete,101 Without the moral, security, and material opportunities
provided by "Third World masses," this institutionalization could
never have been completed,
In the coming decades, these international institutions gradually
formed the grid for the smooth operation of the world economic and
political system, based on the idea of development, This idea, as we
have seen, was not merely a rational response to the problems of the
Third World, but a specific exercise of power that was constituted in
the complex struggle between the West and the non-West, and whose
most concrete manifestations were to be found in international institu-
tions such as the BWls, The instrument effect of this specific exercise of
power was, I have argued, the expansion of the BWls, In this view, the
development apparatus is not a machine for the elimination of poverty,
which incidentally leads to increasing international bureaucracy; rather,
development is principally a machine for expanding the bureaucratiza-
tion of the international sphere, which takes poverty as its incidental
point of entry,102 As Arturo Escobar has noted about development dis-
course, "the forms of power that have appeared act not so much by
repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled
knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization
8£ social a~tic!l."103 The BWIs, especially the Bank, exemplified this
form of power,

D. "Greening the Bank"104_A New Frontier for Expansion

As the BWls entered the 1970s, a whole new discourse was taking
shape in the international arena: environmentally sustainable develop-
ment. This discourse had emerged after decades of grassroots activism
in the West, beginning with the protests against big dams in the
United States in the 1950s, the pollution resulting from industrial and
urban expansion in the 1960s, and Malthusian fears of a "population
bomb" in the 19705. 105 The earliest concrete expression of this trend
was the "limits to growth" theory advanced by the Club of Rome in

101. See id. at 2, 13-14, 26.

102. In this, I echo James Fetguson, supra note 37, at 255.
103. ESCOBAR, supra note 9, at 53.
104. Robert Wade, Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970-1995, in 2 THE
WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY 611 (Devesh Kaput et al. eds., 1997).
105. See Wolfgang Sachs, Environment, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO
KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, supra note 9, at 27 (stating that articles on the environment in THE
NEW YORK TIMES skyrocketed from about 150 in 1960 to about 1,700 in 1970).
112 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

556 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 41

1972,106 which questioned the basic postulate of development: that

economic growth could be infinite. In its place, the Club postulated
that due to the finite resources available in an interdependent world,
economic growth, and therefore development, had certain limits that
could never be exceeded. The momentum provided by the Western
environmental movements led to the 1972 Stockholm Conference,
which marked the birth of the modern environmental legal frame-
work. 107 Since then, sustainable development has firmly anchored itself
in development discourse and has led to a virtual explosion of legal and
political texts for the protection of the environment and the biosphere,
ending most recently with the Rio Declaration in 1995.108 More im-
portantly, the environment has emerged as perhaps the "hottest" ter-
rain in the complex struggles between the BWls and the Third World,
with the former being accused of causing environmental disasters in
the latter. 109
The BWIs were at the'intellectual forefront of the new environ-
mental movement, starting from the appointment of an environmental
advisor to the World Bank in 1970 to the gradual recognition of envi-
ronmental sustainability as a core objective for lending in addition to
the usual objectives of economic growth and poverty reduction. 110 The
BWIs themselves portray their turn to environment as the result of a
rational learning, in which these new objectives were integrated into
development. As Ibrahim Shihata, the Bank's general counsel, has
stated, the change is the result of the staff and management's own "in-
creasing understanding of the relationship between environmental pro-
tection and development."lll This Article will demonstrate that the
reality was far more complex. Two distinct phenomena need to be un-
derstood in order 'to fully appreciate the complex interaction between
the growth of environmental consciousness, including grassroots ac-
tivism in the First and Third Worlds, and the BWIs' own institutional
evolution.
The first of these phenomena concerns the political economy of the
sustainable development discourse and the impact it had on the new
orientation of the BWls. In this section, I suggest that the discourse of
sustainable development provided a new set of justifications for the
BWIs to expand their reach and power over the "poor, dark, and hun-

106. See generally D.H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972).
107. It was in Stockholm that NGOs first staged their own counter-conference on alternative
paths to development. See Sachs, supra note 105, at 28. See generally Wade, supra note 104.
108. On the Rio declaration, see generally Ileana Porras, The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for
International Cooperation, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAw 20 (Philippe Sands ed., 1994).
109. See generally BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH (1994).
110. See generally Wade, supra note 104. The Bank was the first development agency to appoint
an environmental adviser. See id.
Ill. IBRAHIM SHIHATA, 2 THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 184 (1995).
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2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 557

gry masses" of the Third World. The second phenomenon relates to

the smooth, progressivist narrative that the BWIs themselves offer to
explain their turn to the environment, exemplified by Shihata's re-
marks above. Here I suggest that any changes that occurred in the
BWIs in the field of environment have occurred mostly through an
intense and ambivalent engagement by the BWls with the grassroots
political pressure applied by different social movements in the West
and the Third World. In other words, the constitution of a new dis-
course of sustainable development and the concomitant expansion of
the BWls was not a one-sided process; rather, it was actively promoted
and resisted by many grassroots movements around the world. I focus
on and briefly discuss two key moments in this evolution. Before that,
a brief account must be given of the factors that were responsible for
the constitution of the environment as a terrain of intervention by the
BWIs.

1. The Birth of the New Discourse and the Reaction of the BWIs
Several factors were responsible for the "discovery" of the environ-
ment as a new domain for social intervention in the Third World.
First, in development discourse, the focus on agriculture as part of an
overall Cold War strategy of containing mass peasant radicalism had
already led to new discursive strategies such as the Green Revolution
and Integrated Rural Development. 112 The "discovery" of the envi-
ronment fit this pattern of evolution. Second, by 1970, it was becom-
ing obvioll~ that dev~lorment was tunning out oflegitimacy duetc its
high social, human, and environmental costs. A new justification was
needed to recover "the moral initiative" of international governance, as
Wilfred Jenks put it in a different but related context. ll3 The sphere of
the environment perfectly suited that need. Further, by treating envi-
ronmental problems as technical ones that should be managed by pro-
fessionals, the environmental discourse revived the necessity for re-
gional and sectoral planning, which had become discredited along with
its sibling, development.ll 4 Third, by 1970, many Western countries
had also suffered an internal "legitimation crisis"115 that sprang from

112. See ESCOBAR, supra note 9, ch. 5.

113. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 246-48 (1958) (describing how the
incorporation of welfare aspects into international law is needed to recover the moral initiative
lost by the West due to colonial rule). For a discussion of Wilfred Jenks' scholarship in terms of
how post-War international lawyers received development discourse, see Rajagopal, Development
Encounter, supra note *.
114. See Sachs, supra note 105, at 26. The 1987 Brundtland Commission Report stated in its
opening paragraph: "This new reality, from which there is no escape, must be recognized--and
managed." WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
I (1987) (emphasis mine).
115. See JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1973); see also Jurgen Habermas, New So-
cial Movements, 49 ThLOS 33 (981).
114 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

558 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 41

spontaneous grassroots challenges to the legitimacy of the post-

industrial state. These challenges ranged from civil rights and feminist
movements in the United States, to student movements in France, to
environmental movements in West Germany. For many of these activ-
ists, the discourse of environment provided a new grammar of politics,
a new way of understanding the world, that would not be bound by
the limitations of liberalism or the excesses of Marxist-Leninism. 116
Fourth, by the early 1970s, in many Third World countries such as
India and Brazil, many had similarly become disenchanted with the
supposedly beneficent effects of both development and nation-
building. l17 These sensibilities were beginning to become apparent in
grassroots environmental movements such as the Chipko movement in
Northern India. liB This birth· of imagining alternatives to the post-
colonial state found the realm of the environment fertile ground for
the articulation of these lliternatives.
As a result of these factors, environmental discourse began impact-
ing the practices of the BWIs.1 19 First, Bank President Robert
McNamara created the post of environmental adviser in the Bank in
1970,120 making it the first development institution, multilateral or
bilateral, to create such a post. Second, the Bank played a ctucial role
in the 1972 Stockholm Conference: The Bank's environmental advisor,
James Lee, was a key figure in the preparatory meetings; and a senior
Bank official, Mahbub ul Hag,121 was the author of the Founex report,
which became the basis for the Declaration, Principles, and Recom-
mendations of the Conference. UI Hag also played a key role in per-
suading developing countries not to withdraw from the conference.
Finally, McNamara also e5tabEshe::! the intd:eci-ual leadership of the
Bank through key speeches at the Conference, though he focused more
on developed countries. He stated with passion that U[t}he evidence is
now overwhelming that roughly a century of rapid economic expan-
sion has gradually contributed to a cumulatively monstrous assault on the
quality of life in the developed countries."122 '.

116. See, e.g., Habermas, New Social MlWements, supra note 115, at 34-35.
117. See, e.g., Rajni Kothari, Masses, Classes and the State, in NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE
SOUTH, supra note 9; Sethi, supra riote 9; see also Mahmood Mamdani et aI., Social Mavements and
Democracy in Africa, in NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTH, supra liote 9, at 101.
l1S. For a discussion, see OMVEDT, supra note 9, ch. 6, and Sethi, supra note 9.
119. The environment discourse had a direct effect on the proliferation of other international
institutions, starting w;rh UNEP and continuing with the various treaty monitoring mech~nisms
and the Global Environmental Facility. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1998), ch. 8.
120. See Wade, supra note 104, at 61S.
121. Mahbub ul Hag went on to become a major intellectual force behind the reshaping of the
U.N.'s development thinking, specifically behind the Human Development Reports of the
UNDP.
122. Robert McNamara, Speech to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, in THE McNAMARA YEARS AT THE WORLD BANK 196 (Robert S. McNamara ed., 19S1),
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 115

2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 559

Still, these changes were cosmetic and the BWls remained oblivious
to environmental concerns until the mid-1980s, For example, only one
annual report between 1974 and 1985 had a separate section on the
Bank's environmental work. 123 The question naturally arises: Why did
the Bank show such indifference and begin changing after 1985? The
reasons are complex, but they can be broadly reduced to two sets of
factors. First, despite the early rhetoric, the Bank never took environ-
mental concerns seriously except as a public relations tactic to '''turn
around' external criticisms."124 This occutred because the continuing
and unresolved contradictions between the logic of development and
the logic of environment persisted and were not resolved, purportedly,
until the 1987 Brundtland Commission report. Second, the Bank be-
gan changing only after encountering grassroots resistance from many
environmental and social movements in the West and the Third World
during the 1980s. These factors must be examined in detail.
First, contradictions between environment and development contin-
ued to persist at several levels throughout the 1970s and mid-1980s.
The one critical contradiction was between the logic of economic
growth, which is based on infinite economic exploitation of both labor
and resoutces, and the logic of environment, which is premised on in-
herent limits to growth. Although the language of sustainability made
a valiant effort to resolve this contradiction, it has never quite suc-
ceeded in theory or practice. A second contradiction could be found in
the relationship between environment and poverty alleviation. Through-
out the 1970s, developing countries assumed that the environment
was inimical to' th~ alleviati~n of poverty, which provided the moral
leitmotif for the postcolonial state. 125 The most notable example of
this attitude was Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's remark at the 1972
Stockholm Conference that poverty was the world's worst polluter. 126
This idea was built upon the notion that environmental concerns, such
as pollution, related to quality of life were appropriate only in wealthy
Western societies, and therefore poor industrializing societies could
not afford such luxuries. This attitude was reflected among interna-
tionallawyers as well, such as R.P. Anand,127 who favored developmen-
tal concerns over environmental ones.

cited in Wade, supra note 'lOtl,'at 620 (emphasis added by Wade).

123. See Wade, supra note 104, at 624.
124. [d. at 621.
125. See Sachs, supra note 105, at 29.
126. For an account of the views of various developing countries at the Stockholm Conference,
see Louis Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 fuRY. INT'L 1.]. 423
(1973). As the U.N. General Assembly declared prior to the Conference, "no environmental
policy should affect the present or future development possibilities of the developing countries."
G.A. Res. 2849, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29. at 70, U.N. Doc. N2849 (1972).
127. See, e.g" R.P. Anand, Development and Environment: The Case of the Developing Countries, 24
INDIAN J. INT'L 1. 1 (1980).
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560 Harvard International Law Journal I Vol. 41

This contradiction was significantly resolved at a rhetorical level in

1987 by the Brundtland Commission Report which stated: "Poverty
reduces people's capacity to use resources in a sustainable manner; it
intensifies pressure on the environment .... A necessary but not
sufficient condition for the elimination of absolute poverty is a rela-
tively rapid rise in per capita incomes in the Third World."l2s Thus
the contradiction was resolved in favor of development by preserving
the need for economic growth so long as it was sustainable. The net
effect of this report was to consolidate the discourse of sustainability,
which provided yet another "lease on life" for the concept of develop-
ment. Indeed, the discourse of sustainability provided a new, more
intrusive set of reasons for managing the masses of the Third World:
(a) the poor, not the rich alone, can damage the environment due to
their unsustainable practices, and therefore poverty is environmentally
unsustainable; (b) for this reason, they need to be managed to ensure
that their practices are sustainable; (c) since the ultimate way to reduce
unsustainable practices of the poor is to make the poor richer, the heart
of the strategy must be economic growth. Thus, the development
rhetoric completed a full cycle, and practices that had been discredited
became resuscitated under the new banner of sustainable development.
Indeed, the Brundtland report marked the beginning of global
"ecocracy," which adroitly resolved the tension between continuous
development and environment that formed the core of the more radical
1970s critique of "limits to growth."129 The ecodevelopmentalist vi-
sion that was expressed in the report. reprodllced central aspects of the
development discoutse, including basic needs, population, resources,
technology, and food security. More importantly, it articulated a notion
of sustainable development that viewed poverty as an environmental
problem and the poor as irrational peasant masses who destroy their
forests and indulge in supposedly unsustainable practices like swidden
("slash and burn") agriculture. 130 This shifted the visibility and blame
away from the large industrial polluters in both the West and the
Third World, as well as from the exploitative and predatory aspects of
developmentalist ideology. Even more importantly, this analysis en-
abled the reconstitution and expansion of the BWIs with special refer-
ence to and invocation of the presumably irrational masses of the Third
World. This Other had simply become indispensable to the very
definition and existence of the international sphere.
As a result, ecology and economics are now seen as closely related (as
they are etymologically), and "sound ecology is good economics," as

128. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 114, at 49-50.
129. See ESCOBAR, supra note 9, at 193.
130. See id at 195.
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2000 ! Third Worl~ Social Movements, & International Institutions 561

World Bank President Barber Conable put it.l31 Ecology has become a
higher form of efficiency, while environmental planning has occupied a
central place in development. However, the old tensions and contradic-
tions persist and can be seen in the 1992 Rio Declaration, between the
"right to development" (principle 3) and "sustainable development"
(principle 4), or in defining poverty alleviation as a requirement of
sustainable development (principle 5).132

2. Grassroots Resistance and the Expansion of the BWIs

Since the mid-1980s the Bank has grown exponentially in the field
of environment (see Table 3 below). The number of environmental spe-
cialists employed by the Bank grew from just five in the mid-1980s to
300 a decade later. 133 Budgetary resources for environment rose at
ninety percent a year in the same period while agriculture and forestry
resources shrank at one percent a year. 134 Mter 1987, environmental
clearance procedures became mandatory and a new portfolio of envi-
ronmental projects was begun. 135 This tremendous increase in size and
activity from the mid-1980s was not accidentaL It coincided with per-
haps the most intense engagement between grassroots groups and any
international organization. From the late 1970s and accelerating through
the mid-1980s, many Western and Third World environmental and
social movements began targeting the World Bank as an egregious
violator of the environment and destroyer of livelihoods.
The impact of outside grassroots pressure on internal reform of the,
Balik was rarely conceded vpenly, lest it be thought that the Bank was
giving in to political or other extra-financial demands by non-state
actors with whom it did not traditionally deaL But the activism from
below was making an impact. For instance, the Bank's environmental
adviser stated with respect to the formulation of a tribal rights policy
in the early 1980s:

There were a number of outside groups who were quite vociferous

... in bringing this to our attention ... groups like Amnesty In-
ternational, the Harvard group of Cultural Survival ... and oth-
ers. They were quick to chastise us and rightly so. And so ... my
office moved out in front on this and ... began to fashion ... a
tribal policy for the Ba?k. 136

131. Id. at 197.

132. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CN.151/5/Rev.l
(1992).
133. See Wade, supra note 104, at 611-12.
134. See id.
135. Seeid.
136. Interview with James Lee, public health specialist and environmental advisor, in WORLD
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As a result, the Bank adopted several important measures before the

mid-1980s, such as a policy for involuntary resettlement of project-
affected persons (1980), a policy on the treatment of indigenous peo-
ples (1982), and a new Operational Manual Statement setting out
guidelines for the environmental review of projects (1984).1 37 Never-
theless, it was not until the engagement with grassroots resistance in
the Third World that the Bank began to reorient itself and expand in
new directions. There were two such key moments of engagement be-
tween grassroots resistance and the Bank that had a decisive impact on
the Bank's evolution toward the discourse of sustainable development.

Table 3
Indicators of the Bank's Environmental Work, 1975-95138

Indicator 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

1. Staff 2 106 162

(270) (300)

2. Lending with environmental n.S. n.s. 15 180 990

goals (in millions $US)

3. Bank reports
Environment 13 46 57 196 408
Poverty 16 57 16 95 210

Total Bank reports (any topic) 635 968 1238 1593 1760

a. Polonoroeste
The first of these moments arose from the Polo noroeste project in
Brazil between 1979 and 1989. The principal objective of this project
was to pave a 1500-kilometer highway from Brazil's densely populated
south-central region into the sparsely populated northwest Amazon. 139
The ptoject was a mammoth and comprehensive effort at regional
planning with plans for feeder roads, new settlements, provision for
health care, and the creation of ecological and Amerindian reserves. 140
The affected area was as large as California or Great Britain. The World

BAbiK ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM 3-4 (Apr. 4, 1985), cited in Wade, supra note 104, at 630 (ellip-
ses inserted by Wade).
137. See Wade, supra note 104, at 630, 634.
138. See Wade, supra note 104, at 612, tbl. 13-1 (n.s. = not significant; figures in parentheses
account for work on the environment performed by Bank employees formally outside the envi-
ronment department).
139. See id. at 637.
140. See id.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 119

2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 563

Bank, which was the only non-Brazilian source of finance, approved

five loans for this project, totaling $457 million, between 1981 and
1983,141
Despite some reservations held by Bank insiders, this project was
fully supported because the Bank under McNamara saw it as an his-
toric project that not only conquered the "world's last frontier" bur
also had poverty alleviation as its principal rationale,l42 Nevertheless,
the Bank was aware all along that given the sensitivity of the issues
involved, such as the protection of Amerindians, "control would be
difficult and bad publicity unavoidable. This would remain a high-risk
project, but one worth doing."143 It was not explicitly discussed for
whom it was "worth doing" and who was to bear the "high risks" be-
cause everyone knew that the real risks would be borne by the victims
of the project and not by the Bank. While the construction of the
highway was actually completed, the remaining parts of the project
lagged far behind scheduled completion. There were additional prob-
lems created by the influx of new settlers and the consequent threat to
the ecology and the local Amerindians. 144 As the environmental and
human costs of the project mounted, the Bank attempted to evaluate
and deal with the project internally, but it was hampered by its bu-
reaucracy, which misled the Board with false assurances of satisfactory
implementation of the project. 145
In the meantime, the real pressures were mounting, not only from
NGO accounts of the catastrophic impact of the project on ecology
and Amerindians,146 bur also from increasing attention from environ-
ment-friendly members" of the U.S. Congress. 147 Surely, the latter were
not solely motivated by the plight of Amerindians to criticize the
World Bank-domestic political considerations were inseparable from
their actions. This created novel legal problems for the Bank, because
it was thought that it was constitutionally bound by its Articles of
Agreement to deal only with finance ministries of executive branches,
and not with legislative branches or NGOS.148 For example, in one

141. Seeid.
142. See id. at 638-39.
143. Minutes of Loan Committee Meeting to Consider the Northwest Region Development
Program and First-Stage Project (Apr. 15, 1981) cited in Wade, supra note 104, at 644.
144. On the problems creatEd by the project, see DAVID MAYBURy-LEWIS ET AL., IN THE
PATH OF POLONOROESTE: ENDANGERED PEOPLES OF WESTERN BRAZIL (1981); Gilio Brunelli,
Warfare in Polonoroeste, CULTURAL SURVIVAL QUARTERLY, Summer 1986, at 37.
145. See Wade, supra note 104, at 649-50. The Bank also suspended a disbursement after a
critical mid-term review in 1985.
146. See Jose Lutzenberger, The World Bank's Polonoroeste Project-A Social And Environmental
Catastrophe, 15 ECOLOGIST 69 (1985); B. Rich et aI., The Polonoroeste Project, 15 ECOLOGIST 78
(1985); Eric Eckholm, World Bank Is Urged to Halt Aid to Brazil for Amazon Settlement, N.Y.
TlMEs,Oct.l7,1984,atAl7.
147. See Wade, supra note 104, at 652.
148. See IBRD, supra note 59, Art. III, § 2.
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instance, after receiving a critical 1984 report from U.S.-based NGOs

about the project, the Bank responded with a rather dismissive letter.
Upon receipt of the letter, Senator Robert Kasten, Jr., a conservative
Republican senator from Wisconsin and the Chair of the Senate Ap-
propriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, challenged the
Bank. This situation introduced the question of whether the Bank
should legally respond to an individual legislator from one of its
member countries or insist on dealing only with the Treasury depart-
ment, which represents the executive. Ibrahim Shihata, the Bank's
general counsel, advised Bank President Clausen to not deal directly
with individual legislators, since the Articles of Agreement expressly
dictated relations solely with executive agencies of member states.!49
This episode reveals the explanatory limitations of, both, extreme anti-
imperialistic critiques of the BWIs (which portray the BWIs as simply
tools of capitalist domination), as well as liberal critiques (which decry
the capture of the BWIs by'the West). In this instance, the Bank re-
sisted pressure from the U.S. Senator, but for reasons that came across
to NGOs as unaccountable. More importantly, Western interventions
cross-sected in complex ways with the local politics of Third World
social JIlovements and the global politics of Western NGOs, which
often adroitly exploited these interventions strategically to promote
their own objectives. Dismissing these interventions under the banner
of sovereignty, and dismissing Third World social movements for not
being authentic enough, results in the silencing of heterogeneous
voices emerging from the Third World.
In the end, the concerted efforts carried out against the Polonoroeste
project by U.S. media, the U.S. Congress, and NGOs worldwide forced
the Bank to respond.I 50 The concrete result was the expansion of the
Bank. A new Central Environmental Department and four regional
environmental divisions were created, and environmental clearance
procedures became mandatory for all projects.!5! This did not mean,
however, that the Bank was departing from its traditional role as a de-
velopment institution. As President Barber Conable remarked in a
1987 address to the World Resources Institute, "[t}he added staff will
help define policy and deyelop initiatives to promote growth and environ-
mental protection together. They will work to ensure that environmental

149. See Wade, iupra [,ote 104, at 665.

150. Othet political developments provided additional leverage. In Brazil, the first civilian
government in 20 yeats had taken over in 1985 and had a more flexible attitude toward the proj-
ecr. Furthermore, in order for the Baker Plan to respond to the Latin American debt crisis, the
U.S. Congress had to approve any increase in capital contribution by the United States to the
IBRD. This provided a strong incentive for the Bank to compromise with the U.S. Congress,
which saw the Bank in dire need of environmental reform. See id. at 668.
151. See id. at 674.
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2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 565

awareness is integral to all the Bank's activities."152 Thus, grappling

with the resistance generated by a broad coalition of Western NGOs
and Amerindians, resulted in expanding the activity sphere of the
Bank into the new arena of sustainable development as part of the
broader process of problematization of global survival. 153

b. Narmada
The second key moment in the institutional evolution of the BWls
in the area of sustainable development concerns the Narmada Valley
Project. 154 As a result of the political momentum created by NGOs
and public opposition to this project, the Bank was transformed as an
institution at three levels. First, the Bank appointed a quasi-independent
inspection panel in September 1993;155 in effect, this was the first such
institutional body created to allow 'individuals to bring legal actions
against an international institution. Project-affected persons could
complain of the Bank's noncompliance with its own operational poli-
cies. Second, the Bank both completed the mainstreaming of the envi-
ronment into its development discourse-which was exemplified by its
1992 annual report on Environment and Development and its role in
the 1992 UNCED (UN Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment) Earth Summit and the subsequent establishment of the GEF
(Global Environmental Facility)--and ironed out its problematic rela-
tionship with NGOs, who henceforth became partners in develop-
ment. Third, through participation in the World Commission on
Dams during the duration of the Narmada Project,156 the Ballk has

152. Id. at 673-74 (emphasis added by Wade).

153. See ESCOBAR, supra note 9, at 194.
154. On the controversies surrounding the Narmada Valley project, see TOWARDS SUSTAIN-
ABLE DEVELOPMENT?, supra note 9; AMITA BAVISKAR, IN THE BELLY OF THE RIVER: TRIBAL
CONFLICTS OVER DEVELOPMENT IN THE NARMADA VALLEY (1995); CLAUDE ALVARES &
'RAMESH BILLOREY, DAMMING THE NARMADA (1988); 9 LOKAYAN BULLETIN, Special Issue on
Dams on the River Narmada (1991).
155. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, Res. 93-10, International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, Res. 93-6, International Development Association, Sep-
tember 22, 1993. The Panel consists of three semi-independent commissioners and has received
twelve complaints since 1994 relating to violations of the World Bank's own policies by the
Bank. For a discussion, see IBRAHIM SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL (1994);
Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank
Inspection PanP/, 34 VA. J. INT'L 1. 553 (1993); Daniel D. Bradlow & Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte,
The World Bank'! New Inspection Panel: A Constructive Step in the Trans/ormation of the International'
Legal Order, 54 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L 1. 392 (1994).
156. Established in 1998, the Commission consists of 12 members drawn solely from interna-
tional institutions, the private sector, NGOs, and social movements. It will submit its final report
in June 2000 on the ecological, financial, operational, human, and social viability of large dams.
The report is expected to have a major impact on the World Bank Group's funding for large dams
in developing countries, which has become a lightning rod for btoad-based resistance movements
against development in such countries, as exemplified by the anti-Narmada movement. For more
on the World Commission on Dams, see World Commission on Dams (visited Apr. 11, 2000)
<http://www.dams.org> .
122 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

566 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 41

shown its ability to weather radical criticisms through time-tested

bureaucratic devices, though the impact of the Commission's findings
(whatever they may be) remains highly unpredictable and contingent
on the complex interaction between mass resistance, member states,
financial interests, and the Bank.
The Narmada Valley project is a development scheme to harness the
Narmada river, one of the longest and most unexploited in India, for
hydropower, drinking water, and irrigation. According to original
plans, some 30 major, l35 medium, 3000 minor, and thousands of
smaller dams would be built along the river, which runs through three
states in central and western India. l )7 Of truly garganruan proportions,
the largest dam, Sardar Sarovar, would alone potentially affect 25-
40 million people, whereas the canal to be built would have displaced
68,000 households. 158 This human casualty would compound the al-
ready considerable environmental costs to a fertile valley boasting a
wide variety of fauna and flora. Given the large number of people af-
fected by the project, resettlement rather than environment became
the focal point of the national and international campaigns against the
project. Conceived in the spirit of post-independence nation-building,
the Narmada dams were truly imagined as "temples of India," as Ne-
hru described them. Several factors ensured that Narmada would be-
come a cause celebre that would playa crucial role in the evolution of the
Bank as a BWI, as well as in the evolution of sustainable development
discourse.
First, a rising environmental consciousness among India's discon-
tented urban middle classes and lower rural classes, which had been
coalescing in social movements throughout the country since the early
1970s, made Narmada a symbolic struggle that raised basic questions
abour India's political and economic structures and the place of the
most vulnerable persons within them. This consciousness was reflected
in several vigorous social movements with a strong environmental fo-
cus throughout India in the 1970s, such as the Jharkhand Mukti Mor-
cha (in the forested hilly areas of South Bihar), the Chipko movement
(in the Himalayan foothills of Uttar Pradesh), the National Fishwork-
ers' Federation (in Kerela), the Silent Valley movement (in Kerela), and
peoples' science movements (in Kerela, Uttar Pradesh, and Tamil
Nadu) and in the establishment of NGOs devoted to environmental
issues such as the Center for Science and Environment in New
Delhi. 159 The remarkable aspect of these movements was that they cut.,

157. See Wade, supra note 104, at 687-88; see also TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?,
supra note 9.
158. See Wade, supra note 104, at 688. The project also promised to irrigate 1.8 million hec-
tares in Gujarat and 75,000 in Rajasthan, generate power for three states, provide irrigation to
2.5 million villagers and drinking water to 29.5 million. See OMVEDT, supra note 9, at 267-68.
159. For a detailed discussion of the emergence of environmental movements in India, see
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2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions '567

right across class lines, and included a broad coalition of peasants, tri-
bals, women, farmers, middle-class consumers, and radical intellectu-
als,160 The struggle over Narmada thus tapped into an impressive na-
tional environmental movement,
Second, for the international NGOs, the struggle over the Polonoro-
este project had begun tapering off by 1987, and they gladly latched
onto the Narmada project to continue their campaign against the
BWIs' social and environmental record,161 As Lori Udall has put it, for
these activists "Narmada had become a symbol of a highly destructive
development model and the 'test case' of the Bank's willingness and
capacity to address the environmental and social impacts of its proj-
ects."162 Third, the U.S. Congress and several legislatures of Western
countries began to show a large interest in environmental issues and
the Narmada struggle was the perfect opportunity to engage in a low-
risk environmental struggle in the Third World. Fourth, as the envi-
ronment went mainstream, the Bank, like academia arid governments
around the world, gradually altered its attitude toward the environ-
ment.
In addition to the human and environmental costs of the project,
there were other complicating factors that threatened the design and
implementation of the project. For instance, the project stretched over
three states, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Gujarat, all of which
had different political and economic stakes in the project and therefore
were unwilling to work together during most of the project. Gujarat,
inland and dry, had the maximum interest in the project because of its
.' potential to provide irrigation and drinking water. Madhya Pradesh
. had scant interest in the project because it stood to gain little, but
most of the project-affected people-more than eighty percent of the
24'5 villages to be flooded-resided in Madhya Pradesh. Similarly, Ma-
harashtra had very little interest in the project. 163 Since these states
had authority over water resources under India's federal constirutional
structure, the central government could not exercise much influence
over the states, thereby complicating the World Bank's job. Moreover,

OMVEDT, supra note 9, at 127-49.

160. See OMVEDT, supra note 9, chs. 9-11.
161. The role played by Western NGOs is an important factor in the success or failure (how-
ever they are defined) of many local social movements. A social movement perspective focuses on
the intersections between these cross-cultural mobilizations, in terms of how the objectives of
different actors in a movement are achieved in the politico-cultural spaces produced by their
interactions. This has the advantage of not treating the entire West as being incapable of moral
solidarity with local social movements. Such a morally righteous approach simply fails in ex-
planatory power. For an example of the kind of social movement theorizing indicated here, see
Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash, GRASSROOTS POST-MODERNISM: REMAKING THE SOIL
OF CULTURES (1998) ch. 2.
162. Lori Udall, The International Narmada Campaign: A Case Study of Sustained Advocacy, in
TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?, supra note 9, at 201.
163. See Wade, supra note 104, at 688-89.
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since 1987 the Bank itself was in the middle of a serious internal re-
structuring and was thus internally paralyzed with respect to the proj-
ect. The high rurnover of managers meant that project personnel had
little time to familiarize themselves with the project before they
moved on to other projects. 164
India approached the World Bank for help in 1978, though the
scheme had been on the table of the national planners for decades. The
Bank prepared the first-stage project between 1979 and 1983, ap-
praised it in 1983 and 1984, and approved a loan and credit for the
project in 1985 of $450 million. As the project evolved, grassroots
opposition to it also increased beginning in the late 1970s and acceler-
ating in the 1980s, assisted by the liberal democratic processes ofIndia
including a free press, civil liberties, and an independent judiciary. The
opposition was led by several groups,165 the most prominent of which
was the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), or Save the Narmada, (a
national coalition of human rights and environmental groups, project-
affected people, academics, and scientists), at the local level and the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), an NGO in Washington, D.C.1 66
When the Bank in 1992 compiled an independent re"iew under the
chairmanship of Bradford Morse, known as the Morse Commission, the
Narmada project had acquired a reputation as perhaps the most noto-
rious of Bank-financed ecological and human disasters. The report of
the Commission 167 found that the Bank's own directives on resettle-
ment and environment had not been followed, and it recommended
that the Bank back off from the project. The Indian government sub-
sequently requested in March 1993 that project disbursements halt
when it became clear that the Bank would cancel further disburse-
ments. The Bank withdrew from the project but the 'construction of
the dams continues with government and private sector furiding, and
the grassroots opposition also continues through intense civil disobedi-
ence. Nevertheless, the Narmada project has had a lasting impact on
the Bank-the Inspection Panel was created in 1993, and a new in-
formation policy was approved in August 1993, making the publica-
tion of Bank documents easier, and thus the Bank more accessible. 16B

164. See id. at 697-98.

165. There are groups and NGOs that do not oppose the dams as such, but strive to obtain
better rehabilitation packages for those ousted. Prominent among them is Arch-Vahini, an NGO
in Guj"rat. See William F. Fisher, Development and Resistance in the Narmada Valley, in TOWARDS
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?, supra note 9, at 3, 21-26; Anil Patel, What Do the Narmada Valley
Tribals Want?, in TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT', supra note 9, at 179.
166. See William F. Fisher, Development and Resistance in the Narmada Valley, in TOWARDS Sus-
TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?, supra note 9, at 3, 43 n.24.
167. BRADFORD MORSE & THOMAS R. BERGER, SARDAR SAROVAR: REPORT OF THE INDE-
PENDENT REVIEW (1992).
168. See Wade, supra note 104, at 727.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 125

2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 569

The massive public resistance to the Bank that has emerged in the
last two decades has been unprecedented, No other international insti-
tution-with the exception of the WTO after the collapse of the Seat-
tle talks last year-has had to grapple directly with such intense
popular resistance in recent years, though as I have suggested, en-
gagement with "Third World masses" is a fairly constant feature of the
evolution of international institutions since the mandate system. The
engagement with the "poor, dark, and hungry masses" of the Third
World has been key to the expansion and proliferation of these institu-
tions and has occurred by converting the substance of criticisms lev~
eled by social movements into opportunities for the construction and
deployment of knowledge in general. I have argued that such engage-
ment is a fairly standard character of international institutions. 169 As
Foucault said about the clinic, "[s}ince disease can be cured only if
others intervene with their knowledge, their resources, their pity, since
a patient can be cuted only in society, it is just that the illnesses of
some should be transformed into the experience of others ... [w}hat is
benevolence towards the poor is transformed into knowledge that is
applicable to the rich."170 The BWIs reveal, as few international insti-
tutions do, how benevolence toward the poor is transformed into knowl-
edge and self-proliferation of the international.

E. Conditionality and the Transformation of the IMP

Despite the fact that one associates words like surveillance, struc-
tenl adjustment, and conditionality with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), these words have only existed in the IMF vocabulary since
the late 19705 and early 1980s.171 In fact, for a substantial part of its

169. I owe an intellectual debt to David Kennedy for steering me toward this sensibility. See
Kennedy, supra nare 15, for a pioneering elaboration on this idea.
170. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC 84 (A.M. Sheridan trans., Tavistock
Publications 1976) (1963).
171. See M.G. DE VRIES, THE IMF IN A CHANGING WORLD 1945-1985 (1986); MANUEL
GUITIAN, IMF, THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, PAMPHLET No. 46 (1992); A.W. HOOKE, IMF, THE INTERNATIONAL MONE-
TARY FUND: ITS EVOLUTION, ORGANIZATION, AND ACTIVITIES, PAMPHLET No. 37 (1982); Rob-
ert Barnett, Exchange Rate Arrangements in the International Monetary Fund: The Fund as Lawgiver,
Adviser, and Enforcer, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMPo L.]. 77 (1993). On the IMF and the developing
countries, see Joseph Gold, "To Contribute Thereby to ... D",'elopmcnt ... ": ilspects of the Relations of
the International Monetary Fund with Its Developing Members, 10 COLUM. ]. ThANSNAT'L L. 267
(1971). Indeed, most of the recent literature on the IMF concerns its telations with the Third
World, especially in regard to the debt crisis of the 1980s and the subsequent structural adjust-
ment programs (SAPs), conditionalities, and their social and political impact. A sample would
include, ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 25; BROAD, supra note 25; MANUEL
GUITIAN, IMF, FUND CONDITIONALITY: EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, PAMPHLET
No. 38 (1981) [hereinafter GUlTIAN, FUND CONDITIONALITY]; JOSEPH GOLD, IMF, CONDI-
TIONALITY, PAMPHLET No. 31 (1979) [hereinafter GOLD, CONDITIONALITY}; IMF CONDITION-
ALITY (John Williamson ed., 1983); PAYER, THE DEBT TRAp, supra note 25; Lorry Conrad, The
Legal Nature and Social Effects of IMP Stand-by Arrangements, 7 WIS. INT'L L.]. 407 (1989); Harold
126 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

570 Harvard International Law Journal / Vo!' 41

existence, the IMF had little significant involvement in the Third

World. During its first two decades, the IMF used more than half of its
resources to deal with the balance of payments difficulties of industri-
alized countries. l72 For instance, the conclusion of the General Agree-
ments to Borrow (GAB) in 1962 anticipated possible large scale IMF
assistance to the United States, which would not have been allowed
under the regular quotas. 173 Indeed, as late as November 1978, even
the United States drew on its reserve tranche in the IMF as part of a
stabilization exercisey4 In short, the IMF is legally and functionally
empowered to lend to all member states, unlike the World Bank,
which focuses upon developing and transitional countries.
Yet, in the decade between 1978 (when the second amendment of
the IMF Articles of Agreement was adopted) and 1989 (when the debt
crisis had been weathered), the IMF has fashioned a new identity for
itself. 175 First, the IMF has become a lender to primarily the Third
World, leaving the West to the capital markets and regional regulatory
arrangements. The IMF has thus come to occupy a crucial position in
the production and reproduction of power relations between the West
and the Third World. Second, economic growth is now recognized as
an objective of the IMF even though it is not mentioned in its Articles
as a purpose.1 76 It is clearly not accidental that growth became ac-
cepted as one of the IMP's purposes at exactly the same moment that
the Third World emerged as its main clientele; rather, this resulted
from intense political engagement with the Third World. Third, the
IMP's surveillance role under Article Four of its Articles dramatically
expanded through new policy tools of intervention in the form. of son-
ditionaiity, which have been tmplemented through the Structural Ad-

James, From Grandmotherlineu to Governance: The Evolution of IMF Conditionality, 35 FIN. & DEY.
44 (December 1998); Manuel Pastor Jr., The Effects of IMF Programs in the Third World: Debate and
Evidence from Latin America, 15 WORLD DEY. 249 (1987). For an earlier critique of the IMF that
touches on many of the themes developed in this Article, see Balaktishnan Rajagopal, Crossing the
Rubicon: Synthesizing the Soft International Law of the IMF and Human Rights, 11 B.U. INT'L L.]. 81
(1993). See also Daniel Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF and Human Rights, 6 ThANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1996).
172. See Jacques Polak, The Changing Nature ofIMF Conditionality, 184 ESSAYS IN INT'L FIN. 1
(Sept. 1991).
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. This new identity was also crucially shaped by the decision of the United States to re-
move itself from the gold standard in 1971, the emergence of international capital markets in the·
1.970s and the subsequent loss of a role for the IMF as a clearinghouse of Western finance, and the
debt crisis of Latin American and African couneries in the 1980s. I do not discuss these factors at
length here due to lack of space; these factors do not detract from my overall thesis about the new
institutional identity of the IMF. Even if the IMF was looking for new pastures after the "loss" of
the West in the 1970s, it does not explain the intensity and the direction of its growth. Such an
explanation is located in the IMF's embrace of the popular energy unleashed by Third World
social movements.
176. See Polak, supra note 172, at 17.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 127

2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & InternationaL Institutions 571

justment Facility (SAF), Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility

(ESAF), and now through High Impact Adjustment Lending (HIAL),177
In this new capacity, structural adjustment and conditionality have
come to be seen as poverty alleviation tools,178 though the IMF is not
legally required to pursue that goaL Indeed, the IMF has now com-
pletely embraced the poverty alleviation dis~ourse, as the World Bank,
and has renamed the ESAF as the new Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF),179 This effort, as the IMF puts it, "aims at making
poverty reduction efforts among low-income members a key and more
explicit element of a renewed growth-oriented economic strategy,"180
This discovery by the IMF of poverty as a domain of intervention coin-
cides with a new focus on debt relief, for example in the Highly In-
debted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC)181, to enable eligible countries
to reduce their external debt burden to levels, that "will comfortably
enable them to service their debt through export eatnings, aid, and
capital inflows."182 Thus, the IMF has also come to engage the masses
of the Third World in the process of expanding its domain of activi-
ties. Fourth, the IMF has embraced so-called non-economic concerns
such as poverty alleviation, income distribution, environmental protec-
tion, reduction of military expenditure and anti-corruption, though it
rationalizes them in terms of their impact on balance of payments.l 83
The catch-all phrase that has been used to denote this tectonic shift has
been that of "good governance."184

177. These faciliries ace in addition to the others such as the Oil Financing Facility, the Com-
pensatoty Financing Facility, the Supplementary Financing Facility, and the Extended Fund
Facility. See Rajagopal, supra note 171, at 91.
178. See generally, e.g., JOSLIN LANDELL-MILLS, IMF, HELPING THE POOR: THE IMF's NEW
FACILITIES FOR STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT (1988).
179. See Communique of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the Interna-
tional Monetaty Fund, Sept. 26, 1999 (visited Apr. 11,2000) <http://www.imf.org/externallnp/
cm/1999/092699A.HTM>. The changes to the ESAF Trusr Insrrument to rename rhe facility
and redefine its purpose were agreed to by the Board on October 21, 1999, and became effective
on November 22,1999. See EBS/99/193 (10/14/99) and Supplement 1 (11122/99).
180. The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)--Operational Issues, Prepared by
rhe Policy Development and Review Department in consultation with the Area Departments,
Fiscal Affairs Depactment, and the staff of the World Bank, December 13, 1999 (visited Apr. 5,
2000) <http://www. imf.orgl externallnp/pdrlprsp/poverry2.h rm# I) > .
181. See DAVID ANDREWS ET AL., DEET RELIEF FOR Low-INCOME COUNTRIES: THE EN-
HANCED HIPC INITIATIVE, PAMPHLET No. 51 (2000).
182. Debt Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), September 5, 1999
(visited Apr. 11, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipclhipc.htm#hipcl)>.
183. See Polak, supra note 172, at 24-33.
184. IMF, GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE IMP's ROLE (1997); OECD, PARTICIPATORY DEVELOP-
MENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (1995); UNDP, GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DE-
VELOPMENT (1997); UNDP, RECONCEPTUALIZlNG GoVERNANCE (1997); WORLD BANK, Gov-
ERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE (1994). See also James Thuo Gathii, Empowering
the Weak, Protecting the Powerful: A Critique of Good Governance Proposals (1999) (unpub-
lished S.].D. Thesis, Harvard Law School, on file with Harvard Law School Libraty).
128 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

572 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 41

This sea change in the institutional identity of the IMF has not oc-
curred automatically as a result of a smooth learning process, nor has it
connoted the IMP's complete embracing of non-economic concerns in
any real way in its policies and programs. However, the very real changes
in its institutional practices in the last two decades have occurred only because
the IMF has embraced political, non-economic, and social concerns. As the
IMF Executive Board stated in its new 1997 guidelines, it is now "le-
gitimate to seek information about the political situation in member
countries as an essential element in judging the prospects for policy
implementation."185 Despite frequent avowal that it is excluded from
considering political and other non-economic considerations under its
Articles,186 the IMF has nevertheless formed a complex and ambivalent
alliance with the forces that generate such concerns in the Third
World, expanding its own institutional domain in the process. The
IMP does not encounter popular movements at the local level because
of its mode of financing, whichJocuses on policy financing rather than
project-lending like the World Bank; nevertheless, it has not been pre-
vented from evoking the social as a central part of its policy interven-
tion. The forces that generate the social are primarily the Third World
countries that were flexing their new economic and political muscle in
the United Nations in the 1970s in the form of the demands for a New
International Economic Order (NIEO), grassroots poor people's agita-
tions against the IMP-imposed SAPs in the 1980s, and the environ-
mental and human rights movements of the late 1980s and 1990s. At
each of these stages, the IMP has acquired new words in its vocabulary
that have gradually transformed its character and expanded the range
and magnitude of its power vis-a.-vis the Third World.

1. Engaging the Third World: Toward Development

The IMP's transformation from a short-term monetary institution
into a long-term financial/development institution over the last two
decades has been the most significant and visible aspect of the chang-
ing natute of its relations with the Third World. 187 The principal pur-
pose of the IMP under its Articles is to provide short-term financial
assistance to member states who experience balance of payments defi-
citS. 18S This emphasis on short-term financing and balance of payments

185. James, supra note 171, at 46.

186. As Harold James has noted, in its August 1997 guidelines to staff, the IMF Executive
Board indicated that the IMF's judgments should not be influenced "by the nature of the political
regime of a country" and that "the IMF should not act on behalf of a member country in
influencing another country's political orientation or behavior." Quoted in id. This schizophrenia
about politics has become quite usual in functional organizations such as the IMF.
187. See Pastor, supra note 171, at 251; see also Rajagopal, supra note 171, at 91.
188. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 28, 1945, art. 1(v),2
U.N.T.S. 39,40.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 129

2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 573

deficits originally distinguished the IMF from the World Bank, which
was to provide medium- to long-term financing for development, 189
The single-minded attack on balance of payments deficits also meant
that the IMF did not have to pay attention to economic growth and
could advocate deflationary, anti-populist policies that had a serious
impact on the poor through the elimination of food subsidies and
welfare services,190 This narrow monetarist approach, which made the
attack on balance of payments an end in itself, was subject to much
criticism since it seemed to neglect other objectives of the IMF.191 As
Sidney Dell noted, "this is a distortion of IMF priorities, of the priori-
ties of article 55 of the U.N. Chaner, and of the International Devel-
opment Strategy drawn up under that Chaner."I92
The IMF viewed such critiques as directed toward growth issues as
opposed to the IMF itself. 193 It sought to mitigate the critiques by
providing resources over a longer period of time with lower condition-
alities and by arguing that its programs do not slow down growth. 194
However, this mitigation has proved insufficient and over time the
IMF has conceded that growth is in fact at the heart of its purposes. As
Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director of the IMF stated in 1990:
"Our prime objective is growth. In my view, there is no longer any
ambiguity about this. It is toward growth that our programs and their
Conditionality are aimed. It is with a view toward growth that we
carry out our special responsibility of helping to correct balance of
payments disequilibria."195 This convergence on growth has expanded
in recent years to include non-monetary dimensions that reveal the
IftlF'~ new donfain of power. As Camclessus Werii: Vii to explain, what
he had in mind was "high quality growth rather than flash-in-the-pan
growth fueled by inflation and excessive borrowing, or growth at the
expense of the poor or the environment, or growth run by the state."I96
Thus, the IMF has come around to accepting a notion of growth that
bears great resemblance to the World Bank's notion of development.
While significant differences continue to remain between the two in-
stitutions in regard to institutional philosophy, objectives, and tactics,
it is undeniable that the IMF has acquired its new identity as a result
of its engagement with the issues generated substantially by the same
mass social movements of the Third World that have profoundly im-

1B9. See GoLD, CONDITIONALITY, supra note 171, at lB.

190. See generally Rajagopal, supra note 171, at 90.
191. For different strands of the critique, see Pastor, supra note 171, at 250-54.
192. Sidney Dell, Stabilization: The Political Economy of Overkill, in IMF CONDITIONALITY, supra
note 171, at 18.
193. See Pastor, supra note 171, at 251.
194. See id.
195. Quoted in Polak, JUpra note 172, at 19.
196. Quoted in id.
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574 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 41

pacted the World Bank. These issues have spurred the IMF to embrace
the social as a new discursive terrain of development represented as
growth.

2. The New Face of Conditionality

The main policy tool developed by the IMF to carry out its new
mandate is conditionality. Quite simply, conditionality means that t~e
resources provided by the IMF will be conditioned on certain policy
measures that the member state must carry out as part of the IMF-
approved stabilization program. 197 Originally, conditionalities related
mostly to appropriate macroeconomic reforms and policy measures
necessary to stabilize the economy. In the last decade or so, develop-
ment and human rights advocates, environmental NGOs, and social
movements have debated the appropriate attitude concerning IMF-
imposed conditionalities. Should they be opposed or supported?
Should the conditionalities target morally or socially just goals, such as
basic needs, environmental protection, or even human rights?198 How
can the IMF impose such conditionalities without violating its Arti-
cles, which prevent it from considering non-economic factors in its
decisions? At what level of commitment will a member state have to
carry out these non-economic conditionalities, and to what extent is it
realistic to expect such reforms to work even if the ruling elites actu-
ally express commitment? The debate about conditionality therefore
lies at the faultline between many opposing dualities: between a
financial and a social or political approach; between project and policy
lending; and between national ownership and international responsi-.
uiHty. These dualities have framed the terms u~der ~whi~h the debate
about conditionality is conducted and have thereby determined the
outer limits of the politics of knowledge production by the IMF.
With respect to the BWIs, concrete results of this debate may be
found at several levels. First, though it is fairly readily conceded that
conditionalities fail more often than they succeed, the BWIs and sev-
eral NGOs continue to insist on their value. For instance, both the
World Bank and the IMF have in recent srudies determined that using
conditionality to indu~e policy changes is extremely difficult. 199 Nev-

197. See GOLD, CONDITIONALITY, supra note 171; GUITIAN, FUND CONDITIONALITY, supra
note 171. Not all IMF resources are conditional on stabilization programs; a country can nor-
mally use IMF resources unconditionally up to ics own quota. See Articles of Agreemerit of the
Internacional Monetary Fund, arts. V(6), XXX(c), supra note 188.
198. On basic needs conditionality, see Richard Gerster, The IMF and Basic Needs Conditional-
ity, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 497 (1982). On human rights conditionality, see Rajagopal, supra
note 171, at 104-06. On the evolution ofIMF conditionality, see James, supra note 171.
199. See IMF, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1997) and WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FI-
NANCE (1998) revif:Wed by ANGELA WOOD, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT ET AL., PERESTROIKA OF
AID? NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONDITIONALITY 5 (1999).
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 131

2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 575

ertheless, both the BWIs and the NGOs cannot do without condition-
alities: The former need them to justify the loans and the continuing
allocation from member states-that is, to justify their very exis-
tence-while the latter need them to influence the behavior of Third
World states that are usually the targets of their benevolent interven-
tions, As has been recently suggested, "since the mid-eighties, lending
has often been justified in terms of the benefits of the policies adopted
as the result of conditionality clauses. The policies have become the
projects, with investment in economic infrastructure replacing invest-
ment in physical infrastructure. Loans are justified by the policy changes
instead of vice versa."200 Conditionality, then, has emerged as a crucial
element in the expansion and proliferation of the BWIs.
Second, the tensions between the failures of conditionalities on the
one hand, and the pressures to make them more "social" on the other,
have provided the BWIs with the opportunity to generate new terms
in the discourse of development that signify the changing aspects of
their relationship with the Third World. Two terms are of particular
importance: ownership and selectivity.20l Ownership is derived from
the idea that conditionalities cannot succeed unless they are owned by
the target government, such that recipient ownership of programs be-
comes an important factor in their implementation. 202 The new notion
of ownership evokes powerful images of property and democracy. It is
nevertheless a meaningless concept in the end because the real question
concerns whose ownership is involved-that of the state or the local
. community? Civen the IMF~focus on either the state or the market, it
is extremely unlikely that the concept of ownership will be interpreted
in a broad manner to enable the most vulnerable people to defend their
life spaces under this banner. However, as long as these questions re-
main unresolved, the social costs that are exacted in the name of condi-
tionality will continue to be resisted by those who lose out .
. Selectivity is the idea that donors should be more discriminating
about the governments they are willing to support. 203 The criteria for
such discrimination are by no means self-evident but are supposed to
include a good policy environment and a clean government that has
not engaged in massive repression, such as the Burmese Junta. 204 These
criteria are in the end contradictory or self-defeating. It is the absence
of good policy that leads to the financial crisis that calls for condition-
ality-based intervention in the first place; therefore, a good policy envi-
ronment could not be a criterion for positive discrimination. Besides,

200. R. Hopkins et aL, The World Bank and Conditionality, 9 J INT'L DEV. 507 (1997) (em-
phasis mine) cited in WOOD, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT ET AL., supra note 199, at 4.
201. See ANGELA WOOD, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT ET AL., supra note 199,passim.
202. See id. at 21.
203. See id. at 22.
204. See id. at 34.
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576 Harvard International Law Journal I Vol. 41

this criterion fixes the threshold for positive discrimination at an un-

reasonably low level, by suggesting that only Burmese Junta-like re-
gimes should not be supported. In fact, there are several levels of re-
pression that matter equally to those who are being repressed, for ex-
ample the repression of labor movements in the East Asian "Tiger"
economies. By delegitimizing one level of repression, this criterion
allows the normalization of supposedly lesser forms of repression.
Thus, the invention of these new terms of discourse ultimately has
resulted in the reconstitution of the terrain of intervention that has
itself remained the same: the Third World with its "poor, hungry,
dark, and repressed masses." Conditionality has become the discursive
terrain for the deployment of all the authorless strategies 205 by the BWIs
for constituting and reconstituting the Third World, and in that proc-
ess, themselves.

F. A Summing Up
In this Article, I have argued for an understanding of the BWIs as
Foucauldian "complete and austere institutions .. 206 that have had a
complex relationship with Third World resistance. This resistance has
been exhibited in environmental and various other social movements
during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. My basic contention has been
that it is the processes by which the BWIs have dealt with that resis-
tance, and not so much the resistance itself, that have revealed the cen-
trality of the resistance to the formation of the BWIs' changing insti-
tution:!!· agendas. In particular, the invention of poverty and the envi-
roment as terrains of intervention show how the resistance of the Third
World feeds the proliferation and expansion of the BWIs and how si-
multaneously in that process, Third World resistance itself gets mod-
erated and acted upon. This dialectic between resistance and institu-
tional change is hardly acknowledged by the BWIs, who see their
evolution as being governed purely by the laws of economics, finance,
or their Articles of Agreement. It matters less that poverty alleviation
programs never alleviate poverty or that conditionalities never achieve
their policy goals. Rather, these specific interventions have their in-
strument effects that redound to the authority and expansion of interna-
tional institutions.

III. REFLECTIONS ON A CONCLUSION

International institutions have unprecedented authority over differ-
ent parts of the globe in the current era of cosmopolitanism. From ad-
ministering Kosovo to taking over East Timor, to restructuring entire

205. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

206. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 39.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 133

2000 / Third World, Social Movements, & International Institutions 577

governance institutions of Third World countries, the ambit and range

of institutions are unparalleled, With that increase in duties, however,
come responsibilities, both ethical and legal, not only to listen and
respond to the voices of the subalterns, but also to know the limits of
cosmopolitanism as a cure-all,207 The latter is important to bear in
mind because those in international legal circles often believe that a
shift in power from the sovereign to international institutions is per se
progressive and can only serve the interests of those who live under the
sovereign better. This "move to empire"208 is perhaps inevitable in a
profession that has been built on overcoming the legacies of absolute
sovereignty, But to replace absolute sovereigns with absolute supra-
sovereigns in the form of institutions, is hardly the solution, More im-
portantly, international institutions are not autonomous from the local
pressures that generate circumstances for institutional interventions.
Rather, they are themselves constituted through a complex and am-
bivalent relationship with the local, increasingly manifested in the
form of social movements in the Third World. This Article has exam-
ined this process in the case of the BWls. Substantial empirical and
historical work remains to be done on the relationship of these and
other institutions with Third World social movements, through care-
ful institutional ethnographies.
The telling of this relationship of international law to its "base"--of
global institutions and norms to the actions taken and struggles
bllflChpcl by ordinary pecpl.:>-isthe task of intt:marional iaw'yers: Yet,
as I have noted, international law's story telling about its own forma-
tion remains a highly elitist one that entirely overlooks the role played
by non-Western, non-elitist individuals and groups. I have questioned
the political effect of such elitist historiographies in maintaining
mechanisms of epistemological exclusion, and tried to address this
disciplinary blindspot through a detailed examination of the specific
stages through which the BWlshave evolved during the post-World
War II period. This examination shows that the evolution of the BWls
is the result of an ambivalent urge to engage and contain the popular
energy unleashed by social movements of various kinds emanating
from the Third World; and not the result of functionalist imperatives
or the geniuses of international institutional design.
Yet, this does not lead to the dismissal of international institutions
as important actors in international law. On the contrary, by being
closely interwoven with local social movements that generate pressures

207. For an incisive critique of the cosmopolitan sensibility, see Kennedy, supra note 22.
208. For an important analysis of the relationship between colonialism, empire, and the poli-
tics of storytelling about the evolution of international law, see Nathaniel Berman, In the Wake of
Empire, Gratius Lecture at the American Society of International Law, 93d Annual Proceedings,
reprinted in 14 AM. U. J. INT'L L. 1515 (1999).
134 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

578 Harvard International Law Journal/Vol. 41

for change, international institutions may yet have the potential to

contribute to that change. The World Bank's turn to poverty allevia-
tion and environmental protection, while imperfect and the result of
external pressures mounted by social movements, and the assumption
of democratic duties by the United Nations, have assisted local, social,
and democratic change by creating and supporting political space for
such claims to be made. A number of recent examples suggests this
two-way relationship between social movements and international in-
stitutions: (a) The World Bank Complaints Panel and the Narmada
and Polonoroeste struggles; (b) The World Commission on Dams and
many other developmental struggles for survival against the onslaught
of development in the Third World; (c) the Mine Ban Treaty and the
effective advocacy for it by an international social movement of grass-
roots groups and NGOs; (d) the antinuclear campaign, and the role it
played in triggering the 1996 advisory opinion rendered by the Inter-
national Court of Justice.· I do not mean that this two-way process her-
alds a new era in international relations or is always unambiguously
good. My purpose here is simply to tell a very different and a distinctly
non-Western story about international institutions, and raise some
questions about the politics of story telling in international law, which
has excluded the role of social movements so far.
The arrival of social movements in international law does not mean
that the state has become an insignificant actor in the Third World or
international law. Far from it. The state remains a powerful and impor-
tant site of ideological and political contestations in most Third World
countries and an important source of strength and defense in interna-
tional law. However, it is undeniable that the natur~ of Third World
resistance has undergone a radical tr~nsformation due to the emergence
of local social movements as independent actors. The response by in-
ternational institutions to this resistance has reflected the importance
of this change by engaging the multiple sites where the Third World
is located for these institutions. Clearly, a new form of politics, a new
form of power organization, and new methods of expressing resistance
are emerging from the grassroots and are only Hkely to intensify in the
coming millennium. It is important for the discipline of international
law to rethink its categories and learn how to take the local more seri-
ously in its problematic and contested relationship with the Third
World.
 [6]

Colossus of Memnon, Upper Egypt. Tordai

O pen almost any study of Egypt produced by an

American or an international development agency
and you are likely to find it starting with the same
simple image. The question of Egypt's economic development
The visual simplicity of the image, spread out like a map
before the reader's eye, combines with the arithmetical cer-
tainty of population figures, surface areas and growth rates to
lay down the logic ofthe analysis to follow: "One of the world's
is almost invariably introduced as a problem of geography oldest agricultural economies," a report written for the US
versus demography, pictured by describing the narrow valley Agency for International Development (USAID) begins,
of the Nile River, surrounded by desert, crowded with rapidly Egypt depends upon the fruits of the narrow ribbon of cultivated
multiplying millions of inhabitants. land adjacent to the Nile and to that river's rich fan-shaped delta.
A 1980 World Bank report on Egypt provides a typical For more than 5,000 years agriculture has sustained Egypt. During
the first half of this century, however, ... the growth of agriculture
example. "The geographical and demographic characteristics failed to keep up with the needs of a population which doubled,
of Egypt delineate its basic economic problem," the book then nearly tripled. It is a matter of simple arithmetic ... 2
begins.
The popularity of this image of space and numbers is summed
Although the country contains about 386,000 square miles,
... only a narrow strip in the Nile Valley and its Delta is usable.
up in the World Bank report. "These two themes-the rela-
This area of 15,000 square miles-less than 4 percent of the land- tively fixed amount of usable land and the rapid growth of the
is but an elongated oasis in the midst of desert. Without the Nile, population-will be seen as leitmotivs in the discussion of
which flows through Egypt for about a thousand miles without Egypt's economic problems."3
being joined by a single tributary, the country would be part of the
Sahara. Crammed into the habitable area is 98 percent of the Fields of analysis often develop a convention for introduc-
population, ...The population has been growing rapidly and is ing their object. Such tropes come to seem too obvious and
estimated to have doubled since 1947,1 straightforward to question. The somewhat poetic imagery
favored by writers on Egyptian development seldom lasts
Tim Mitchell, an editor of this magazine, teaches in the Department of Politics at beyond the opening paragraph, and the text moves quickly on
New York University. This paper is a shorter version of chapter 3 of Misr al-
Amrikiya (Cairo; Dar Sina, 1991) [in Arabic}. He would like to thank Karen Pfeifer, to the serious business of social or economic argument. Yet
Marsha Pripstein and Yahya Sadowski for comments on an earlkr draft. the visual imagery of an opening paragraph can establish the
136 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

entire relationship between the textual analysis and its object. Too Many People?
Objects of analysis do not occur as natural phenomena, but
are partly constructed by the discourse that describes them. We can start with the basic image of overpopulation and land
The more natural the object appears, the less obvious this shortage. Whenever you hear the word "overpopulation,"
discursive construction will be. Susan George suggests, "you should reach, if not for your
The description that invariably begins studies of Egypt's revolver, at least for your calculator."· It is seldom clear, as she
economic development constructs its object in two respects. points out, to what the prefix "over" refers. What is the norm
In the first place, the topographic image of the river, the desert or the comparison to which it relates? "Egypt has the largest
surrounding it, and the population jammed within its banks population ... in the Middle East," notes the World Bank's
defines the object to be analyzed in terms of the tangible limits report, Trends in Developing Economies. "Its 52 million
of nature, physical space and human reproduction. These people are crowded into the Nile delta and valley. .. with a
apparently natural boundaries shape the kinds of solutions density higher than that of Bangladesh or Indonesia. "5 Why
that will follow: improved management of resources, and Bangladesh and Indonesia? The World Bank might equally
technology to overcome their natural limits. Yet the apparent have mentioned Belgium, say, or South Korea, where popula-
naturalness of this imagery is misleading. The assumptions tion densities are respectively three and four times higher
and figures on which it is based can be examined and reinter- than Indonesia-but where the comparison would have a less
preted to reveal a very different picture. The limits of this negative implication.
alternative picture are not those of geography and nature but It is true that Egypt's level of agricultural population per
of powerlessness and social inequality. The solutions that hectare of arable land is similar to that of Bangladesh, and
follow are 'not just technological and managerial, but social about double that of Indonesia.· But Egyptian agricultural
and political. output per hectare is more than three times that of both
In the second place, the naturalness of the topographic Bangladesh and Indonesia.' So it is not clear that Egypt is
image sets up the object of development as just that-an overpopulated in relation to either of these countries.
object, out there, not a part of the study but external to it. The Perhaps it would be more realistic to gauge Egypt's land
discourse of international development constitutes itself in shortage by comparing it not with poorer countries but with
this way as an expertise and intelligence that stands com- places that have a similar total population and per capita
p
ete
y apart from the country and the people it describes. GNp, combined with far greater areas of cultivated land. The
Much of this intelligence is generated inside organizations Philippines and Thailand are the two closest examples in
such as the World Bank and USAID, which play powerful population size and GNP, and have cultivated areas respec-
economic and political roles within countries like Egypt. tively three times and eight times that of Egypt.· Yet despite
International development has a special need to overlook this the enormous difference in usable land, Egyptian agricultural
internal involvement in the places and problems it analyzes, output per worker is perhaps 8 percent higher than that of the
and to present itself instead as an external intelligence that Philippines and 73 percent higher than that of Thailand.'
stands outside the objects it describes. The geographical Despite the visual power of the image of 50 million Egyp-
realism with which Egypt is so often introduced helps estab- tians crowded into the valley of the Nile, then, there is no
lish this deceptively simple relationship. prima facie evidence for the assumption that this population

Middle East Report • March-April 1991 19

 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 137

is too large for its cultivable area. Perhaps it might be argued

in more general terms that the world's population exceeds
some "equilibrium" in relation to its resources.lO In that case,
however, there is no reason to single out Egyptians. On the
contrary, Egyptians make very modest demands on the
world's resources compared with inhabitants of Western Eu-
rope, Japan and North America. One inhabitant of the United
Kingdom, for example, requires more of the world's energy per
year than six Egyptians, and one American is more expensive
in energy terms than a dozen Egyptians.l1 So it can hardly be
the latter who are threatening the world's limited resources.
Perhaps having 50 million inhabitants does not, after all,
make Egypt "overpopulated." Development experts might
still insist that the problem is not the size of Egypt's popula-
tion but the rate at which it is growing. A US Department of
Agriculture report asserts that the country's "exploding popu-
lation is the most serious problem facing Egypt today."I2 The
rapid growth in population appears to have outstripped the
country's ability to feed itself, and since 1974 Egypt has been a
net importer of agricultural commodities. Food today ac-
counts for about a quarter of Egypt's merchandise imports, a
higher proportion than for all except one of the world's 78
middle-income and high-income countries (for whom, on
average, food accounts for only 10 percent of imports).!' It
would appear from these figures that the case for an imbalance
between population figures and agricultural resources has
been established after all.

Not Enough Food?

The Nile, Upper Egypt. Tordai
But before accepting this conclusion we should reach, once
again, for the calculator. Between 1965 and 1980, according to
World Bank tables, the population of Egypt grew at an annual
rate of 2.2 percent. Yet during the same period, the World
Bank also shows, agricultural production grew at the even
faster rate of 2.7 percent a year. During the 1980s, when the
population growth rate increased to 2.7 percent a year, agricul-
tural growth continued to keep ahead.!' In 1987, food produc-
tion per capita was 11 percent higher than at the beginning of
the decade.!5 So it is not true that the population has been
growing faster than the country's ability to feed itself.
Then why has the country had to import ever increasing
amounts of food? Let's look at the kinds of food being eaten,
and at who gets to eat it.
Official statistics suggest that Egyptians consume relatively
large amounts of food. Although Egypt falls near the bottom of
the World Bank list of middle-income countries, the country's
daily calorie supply per capita is estimated to be higher than
all except four of the other middle-income countries, and
indeed higher than a majority of the world's high-income
countries as well.16 The daily protein supply per capita also far
exceeds the level of most middle-income countries and rivals
that of many high-income countries,l7
Despite these figures, Egyptians suffer from high levels of
malnutrition. A 1979 study by the Massachusetts Institute of
Map shows land use in Egypt: Intensive permanent cultivation in oases and most of Technology and Cairo University found that in Lower Egypt
the Nile valley and delta; grazing along the Mediterranean coast. 83 percent of children up to five years old were malnourished,

20 Middle East Report • March-April 1991

138 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

including 27 percent suffering from third-degree (severe) consumption; human consumption of maize (com) and other
malnourishment. A study of anemia (probably caused by the coarse grains (barley, sorghum) dropped from 53 percent of
interaction of malnutrition and infection) in Cairo found the domestic production in 1966 to 6 percent in 1988.27 Human
condition in 80 percent of children under two years old and in supplies were made up with imports, largely of wheat for bread
90 percent of pregnant women,18 Clearly the high figures for making. So it appears as though the imports were required
calorie and protein supply per capita do not reflect actual food because people needed more bread. USAID has supported the
consumption of very many Egyptians. massive shift to meat consumption among the better off since
What the calorie supply figures probably reflect is high 1975 by financing over $3 billion worth of Egyptian grain
levels of food consumption among the better off, a shift in purchases from the United States. Yet the agency claims that
what they consume towards more expensive foods, especially the purpose of these subsidies has been "to help the poor.""
meat, and a significant diversion of food supplies from Subsidized American loans have financed only a part of the
humans to animals. Jean-Jacques Dethier notes that "the grain imports. The rest have required further borrowing,
aggregate income elasticity of demand for food is extremely contributing to a total external debt that by the end of 1988
high in Egypt."" In other words, there is an extremely high reached $50 billion, equivalent to 142.5 percent of the coun-
variation in the value of the food consumed by the rich and try's GNP or five times the value of its exports of goods and
that consumed by the poor. services." Egypt now requires large loans just to keep up
The 1974-75 consumer budget survey showed that among interest payments on its earlier loans. As a condition of this
the urban population, the richest 27 percent consumed almost refinancing, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
four times as much meat, poultry and eggs per year as the USAID insist on a further shift towards export crops, away
poorest 27 percent.20 In the subsequent oil-boom years, in- from staple foods, to produce more hard currency to payoff
come growth, together with massive US and Egyptian govern- the debts.
ment subsidies, encouraged a broader switch from legumes The transformation in food consumption habits has af-
and maize (com) to less healthy diets of wheat and meat fected not only agricultural imports and the balance of pay-
products. From 1970 to 1980, while crop production grew in ments but also domestic agriculture. It is no longer accurate to
real value by 17 percent, livestock production grew almost write that Egyptian capitalist agriculture "still is to a large
twice as much, by 32 percent.2l In the following seven years, extent the cultivation of cotton."30 In terms of the commit-
crop production grew by 10 percent, but livestock production ment of land and labor the priority is now the production of
by almost 50 percent. 22 To produce one kilogram of red meat meat, poultry and dairy products. Cotton, a year-long crop,
requires 10 kilograms of cereals." Feeding these animals has today occupies only about one million of Egypt's six million
required an enormous and costly diversion of staple food feddans (acres). * The other major year-round industrial crop,
supplies from human to animal consumption. Protein in the sugar cane, occupies a little over a quarter of a million feddans.
form of animal products costs Egyptians in real terms (dis- Of the remaining four and three-quarter million feddans, more
counting subsidies) about 10 times the price of eating it in the than half is used to grow animal fodder-principally Egyptian
form of beans and lentils." clover (berseem) in the winter and maize and sorghum in the
summer and autumn." As a result, Egypt now grows more
food for animals than for humans.
Fodder for Peace The shift to the production of meat and other animal
products has two principal causes. First, as Ikram puts it,
This switch to meat consumption, rather than the increase in "effective demand has been modified by a change in income
population, has required the dramatic increase in food im- distribution."" In other words, the growing disparity in in-
ports, particularly of grains. Between 1966 and 1988, the come between rich and poor has enabled the better off to
population of Egypt grew by 75 percent. In the same period, divert the country's resources from the production of staples
the domestic production of grains increased by 77 percent, but to the production of luxury items. Second, the Egyptian
total Egyptian grain consumption increased by 148 percent." government, supported by large American loans, has encour-
From 1974 onwards, Egypt began to import enormous and aged this diversion by subsidizing the import of staples for
ever increasing quantities of grain, becoming the world's third consumers, heavily taxing the production of staples by farm-
largest importer after Japan and China. A small proportion of ers, and subsidizing the production of meat, poultry and dairy
the increase in imports reflects an increase in per capita products.33 Livestock raising is particularly concentrated on
human consumption, which grew by 12 percent in this 22-year large farms, those over 10 feddans, where there are three to
period. The bulk of the new imports was required to cover the four times as many cattle per feddan as on farms of 1 to 10
increasing use of grains to feed animals. Grain imports grew feddans.34 Yet as a result of government food policy even the
by 5.9 million metric tons between 1966 and 1988; non-food smallest farmers have been forced to shift from self-provision-
consumption of grains (mostly animal feed, but also seed use ing to the production of animal products and to rely increas-
and wastage) grew by 5.3 million tons, or 268 percent.'" ingly on subsidized imported flour for their staple diet.
The massive dependence on grain imports since 1974 owes The image of a vast, overbreeding population packed within
not to population growth, but to a shift to meat consumption.
Rather than importing animal feed directly, though, Egypt
has diverted domestic production from human to animal '" One feddan = 1.038 acres or 0.420 hectares.

Middle East Report • March-April 1991 21

 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 139

analyses of Egyptian economic development to move very

Figure 1: Grain Supply & Consumption quickly past the problem of access to land. With so many
Egypt, 1966-1988 people occupying so little space, the problem appears to be
Metric tons (millions)
already explained. "The present picture is not bright," con-
20 cludes a 1976 study for USAID discussing the "Economic
Human Consumption Non-food Uae Oomeltic produotion Status of the Farmer," "mainly because there is just not
enough land to go around."
15
The average size of a holding is two feddans, 94 percent of all
owners have less than 5 feddans each, and only 0.2 percent have at
least 50 feddans each}7
10
This picture of a countryside made up of millions of tiny
parcels of land persuades us once again that if Egyptian
farmers are finding things difficult, it is because there are just
o too many of them for the space available. We should ignore
the image and check the figures. First of all, holdings of less
than 5 feddans are not as small as they may seem. With
o Egypt's fertile soils, year-round sunshine and permanently
1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986
available irrigation water, the country is like a vast open -air
Source: Oalculated from USAIO. 1989. greenhouse; high yields can be obtained from two or even
three crops a year. A 5-feddan holding, in other words,
produces between 10 and 15 feddans of crops a year. In fact, 5
a limited agricultural area is therefore quite misleading, feddans is reckoned to be the maximum area a family of 5 can
Egypt's food problem is the result not of too many people cultivate on its own, working full time, without hired labor.38
occupying too little land, but of the power of a certain part of The minimum farm size required for such a family to feed
that population, supported by the prevailing domestic and itself, assuming an annual consumption of 250 kilograms of
international regime, to shift the country's resources from grains (or equivalent) per head and a state tax of 30 percent of
staple foods to more expensive items of consumption, production, was estimated in 1982 to be 0.8 feddan, or just
Population growth rates of over 2,5 percent a year, some over 19 qirats (1 feddan ~ 24 qirat).39 Given the increase in
might argue, are nevertheless still very high, Surely it would be yields since then, the minimum area required by 1988 would
better to produce fewer children and more buffaloes, cows and be only 0.625 feddan, or 15 qirats.
chickens-as in fact a recent family planning proposal has The USAID report mentioned that 94 percent of landhold-
suggested (see cartoon). Such a proposal would probably seem ings were of less than 5 feddans. What it failed to mention is
reasonable to an upper-class or middle-class family in Cairo, that the remaining 6 percent of landholders, with holdings
and indeed the birth rate among such families is much lower. from 5 feddans up to the legal limit of 50 feddans per
But to a rural family, in a social world where daughters leave individual or 100 feddans per family with dependent children,
their parents' family at marriage to join their husband's controlled 33 percent of the country's agricultural area." Since
household and where there is virtually no system of social the mid-1970s these large landholdings have increased in
security to support parents when they become too old or sick number; by 1982 they represented 10 percent of holdings and
to work, to desire a minimum of two surviving male children is controlled 47.5 percent of the country's cultivated area."
not excessive. In rural Upper Egypt, the poorest part of the These official figures underrepresent the concentration of
country, women give birth to an average of 7.5 children but see landholding, for they are based on village land registers.
on average almost one in three of their children die in Actual studies of landholding in individual villages frequently
childhood (2.7 out of the 7.5)." Boys, moreover, have a higher reveal a much greater concentration of ownership, with the
infant mortality rate than girls.'" largest farms being registered under several different names to
These women are unlikely to explain their economic prob- stay within the legal limit.42 The official limits also do not
lems as deriving from population growth, as does the World apply to the large holdings of agribusiness corporations.
Bank. Far more relevant, perhaps, is their meager share of Bechtel International Agribusiness Division, for example,
local, national and global resources, and the political and manages a 1O,000-feddan estate in Nubariyya owned by a Gulf
economic powerlessness that prevents them from altering this investor." The Delta Sugar Company, 50.3 percent owned by
condition. Any discussion of their situation would have to the Egyptian state sugar company and 49.7 percent by a group
start from this condition of powerlessness. of Egyptian and international banks, owns a 40,000-feddan
estate pn irrigated land in the north-central Delta.«
The official limit of 50 to 100 feddans should be compared
The Land Question with the limit of around 7 feddans (3 hectares) achieved in the
early 1950s by the land reform programs of Taiwan and South
The image of a narrow strip of fertile land crammed with so Korea. In Korea, less than 20 percent of the land in 1975 was
many millions of inhabitants enables most contemporary held in farms of 2 hectares or more (approximately 5 feddans),

22 Middle East Report • March-April 1991

140 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

while in Egypt almost half the land (47.5 percent) is in

holdings above this limit." On the other hand, almost one
third of landholders in Egypt (32.3 percent) have holdings
under one feddan, amounting to only 6 percent of the agricul-
tural area.'" A significant but unmeasured proportion of the
agricultural work force, which totalled 4.3 million workers in
1985," still remains without any land at all.
If Egypt were to carry out land reform measures comparable
to those of South Korea and Taiwan, the problem of
landlessness and near landlessness would be eliminated. By
placing the ceiling on landholding at 3 feddans (almost 5 times
the minimum required to support a family), at least 2.6
million feddans of land would be available for redistribution.'"
If distributed to the landless and near landless, no agricultural
household in Egypt would have less than the 15 qirats re-
quired to feed itself. Total agricultural production might also
increase, as there is evidence that small farmers produce larger
yields per feddan than large farmers .•9
The discussion of land holding usually ignores the large
proportion of land held in amounts over 5 feddans, and refers
to such holdings as merely "medium" sized. Only holders of
more than 50 feddans are labelled as "large" landowners. This
50 feddan threshold, incorporated into the 1969 land reform
law, was the definition of "large" landowner formulated in
1894 by the British Consul-General in Egypt, Lord Cromer, in
accordance with British political and fiscal interests. 5o It takes
no account of the contemporary interests of most Egyptian
farmers. Nor does its continued use reflect the fact that crop
yields have increased by a factor of 4.5 over the last 100
Egyptian man and boy. KhaledGowai!y
years." A 50 feddan farm today produces as much output as a
225 feddan farm of the 1890s, or perhaps a 500 feddan farm if
one takes into account the spread of perennial irrigation and
the introduction of double and triple cropping.
The question of additional land reform is simply never
raised in studies of the obstacles to Egypt's further economic
development. Thanks to the powerful image of millions of
Egyptian peasants squeezed into a narrow river valley, we
accept the assumption that holdings are already as small as is
practicable, and move quickly on to other sorts of solutions.

Development Industry Solutions

Once the problems Egypt faces are defined as "natural" rather
than political, questions of social inequality and powerlessness
disappear into the background. The analysis can then focus
instead on how to overcome these "natural" limits of geogra-
phy and demography.
The international development industry proposes and
funds two complementary sets of methods for the solution of
Egypt's problems, the technological and the managerial. The
productive limits set by nature, in other words, will be over-
come by the forces of technology, while existing natural
resources will be made more productive by more efficient
management-in particular by dismantling the bureaucracy
of the Egyptian state.
The geographical determinism of the image of the River Family Planning Center: "Can I give you these kids in exchange for a cow?!"
Nile and its inhabitants often introduces a certain construc- Anwar Amin/Ai- Wold (Cairo)

Middle East Report • March-April 1991 23

 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 141

At the Pyramids. Hannes Waltrafen

tion of history implying an agricultural order that remains in Ignoring such developments creates the impression that the
essential ways unchanged since antiquity. Only recently, it Nile Valley poverty that exists today is the "traditional"
seems, has this ancient world discovered the West-or its poverty of a peasantry that has not yet or has only recently
synonym, "the 20th century." "The Nile Delta and its lifeline, joined the "20th century" -rather than very much a product
the Nile River Valley extending southward some 600 miles," of the political and economic forces of this century.
began the 1976 US Department of Agriculture (USDA) re- This image of a traditional rural world implies a system of
port, "is one of the oldest agricultural areas of the world, agriculture that is static, and cannot change itself. If Egypt "is
having been under continuous cultivation for at least 5,000 to fully enter the modern world,"'" the impetus and the means
years ... " must come from outside. These external forces must carry out
With this in mind we are ready to accept a few lines further a "qualitative transformation" of Egyptian agriculture. 57 New
down the strange idea that, "In many respects, Egypt entered capital investment, new irrigation methods, improved seed
the twentieth century after the 1952 Revolution."" A 1977 varieties, mechanization, and the switch to export crops such
USAID report baldly states that "The transformation of the as vegetables and cut flowers to bring in the foreign capital
Egyptian village started twenty-five years ago with the agrar- required to finance such technologies-these are the principal
ian reform measures."53 means to achieve this transformation.
The implication of these statementa and images-that until The Agricultural Mechanization Project, funded by USAID
the latter half of the 20th century life in the Nile Valley had in Egypt between 1979 and 1987, used just this image of a
remained essentially unchanged for centuries if not millen- "traditional" agricultural system to justif'y technological solu-
nia-is, of course, highly misleading. 54 It ignores hundreds of tions to the problems of rural Egypt. The project's stated aim
years of far-reaching economic and political changes, such as was to encourage the mechanization of Egyptian farming by
the growth in the Middle Ages and subsequent decline of a purchasing equipment from the United States for field trials
network of world trade passing through the Nile Valley. The and demonstration programs in Egypt, financing the con-
consolidation in the 19th century of a system of export- struction of service centers for the machinery, and sending
oriented agricultural production based on the new institution Egyptians to the United States and other countries for train-
of private landownership involved transformations in Egyp- ing in "the techniques of technology transfer."58 The contract
tian villages arguably at least as important as that of 1952.55 for this $38 million project was awarded to Louis Berger

24 Middle East Report • March-Aprtl 1991

142 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Baghdad Cafe, Cairo suburb. FOllSd Elkoury

International Inc. of East Orange, New Jersey. In their Final resembling Schultz's description. Certainly no such system
Report, the contractors introduced the "underlying philoso- has existed in Egypt in recent historical memory, still less in
phy" of the mechanization program: the 1980s when Louis Berger Inc. arrived there from New
To ensure that the project serves the purposes of development, it is Jersey. What is missing most of all from Schultz's account of
necessary to relate mechanization to development theory so that individual farmers making rational decisions to maximize
mechanization does not conflict with, but rather is supportive of, their income is any concept of social and economic inequality.
development objectives.59
For example, poor farmers in Egypt usually cannot afford
To this end, they drew on the ideas of T.W. Schultz, whose sufficient fertilizers for their crops and get lower yields as a
Transforming Traditional Agriculture was an early classic of result. The most "efficient" allocation of resources in
economic development theory. Schultz argued that farmers in Schultz's terms, as Polly Hill points out, would allocate no
"traditional" agriculture make efficient use of their resources land at all to the poorest farmers."
within the limits ofthe expertise and technology available to Despite the lack of firm evidence for Schultz's rather dated
them. Through long years of trial and error, he claimed, they argument, it supplies the "philosophy" to justify US funding
have eliminated inefficiencies and wastage and reached "a for the mechanization of Egyptian agriculture. Mechanization
particular type of equilibrium" in which the agricultural has also been heavily funded by the World Bank and by the
economy is "incapable of growth except at high cost." Only Japanese Agency for International Cooperation."" These ex-
massive inputs of new technology and capital from outside ternal funds required large additional contributions from the
this equilibrium can enable the farmer "to transform the Egyptian government, which was already providing farmers
traditional agriculture of his forebears."60 "In other words," with subsidized loans and fuel. Consultants hired by USAID
Louis Berger Inc. explain, claimed that this "high-payotr' solution to Egypt's problems
the continued investment in traditional inputs will produce very would shorten the interval between crops and increase crop
little in terms of an additional income stream. Consequently, the yields by as much as 55 percent." This claim contradicted
transformation from traditional agriculture is an investment prob- evidence from other countries, which suggested that higher
lem dependent on a flow of new high-payoff inputs: the inputs of crop yields occur with mechanization only in exceptional
scientific agriculture.61
cases, and certainly not under conditions of intensive land use
There has probably never been a "traditional" agriculture as in Egypt. 65 It also contradicted existing experience in Egypt

Middle East Report • March-April 1991 25

 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 143

labor was reduced once again and the inequalities between

agricultural laborers and landowners were kept in place. It is
these inequalities that mechanization and other "high-pay-
off" inputs consolidate, and that accounts of the Nile Valley
and the need to transform its "traditional" agriculture keep
from view.

Inequality and the State

There is a second dimension to rural inequality in Egypt, and
a second aspect to the historical image of the Nile Valley that
tends to naturalize it. The rural poor have suffered not only
from local inequalities in distribution of land and other
resources, but also from the inequality of central government
policies that transfer wealth from the rural population to the
state. The state has come to play a major role not just in
maintaining inequality but in producing it. This is a political
question: whom does the state represent and who benefits
from the wealth it appropriates? International development
depoliticizes this issue and transforms it into a question of
proper resource management. The solutions that follow are
those that are supposed to increase efficiency: decentralizing
the state and transferring some of its powers to the "market."
Before the 1952 revolution, large landowners extracted
wealth from the farming population and transferred it else-
where. Since 1952, although significant landholding inequal-
ities have continued, the majority of farmers have come
directly under the control of the central government and have
been subject to its compulsory cropping requirements, requisi-
Sugarcane cutter, Upper Egypt. Mary Cross
tions and price policies. Even if one takes into account state
investment in irrigation and subsidies of farm inputs, Dethier
where, as Alan Richards reported, "there is no evidence that has calculated, the net effect of government policies between
tractor farms have higher yields or cropping intensities than 1960 and 1985 was to appropriate 35 percent of agricultural
unmechanized farms."" A subsequent study showed that GDP.'o
indeed no increase in yields had occurred." Small farmers, moreover, have suffered more than larger
The demand for mechanization had grown among large landowners, who have had greater opportunity to invest in
landowners in the later 1970s due to a supposed shortage of more profitable areas such as fruit, vegetable and dairy farm-
agricultural labor which lasted into the early 1980s. This ing. Since the mid-1970s, and particularly in the late 1980s,
"shortage" took the form of a temporary rise in the wages of the compulsory cropping and price fixing policies have been
male agricultural laborers, particularly in regions close to large gradually altered to reduce the disadvantages to the rural
cities, caused by the higher wages available for urban con- population. But the changes have been carried out in a way
struction work during the building boom of that period and by that benefits primarily larger landowners. Smallholders con-
labor migration to the Gulf.'" Agricultural wages, having tinue to be disproportionately involved in cotton, rice and
averaged only one third of the average real wage for all sugar cane production, where fixed prices and compulsory
economic sectors during the first half of the 1970s,69 for a deliveries to the state have been retained.
while began to catch up with urban wages. Large farmers, This system of appropriating wealth from the countryside
given the artificially low prices they received for their crops, needs to be examined as a political process, in which state
were unable or unwilling to pay the higher wages. The true policies have reflected a complex of dominant (although not
cause of the labor "shortage," in other words, was the unequal always coherent) social interests-those of the state bourgeoi-
distribution of land into large farms requiring hired labor, and sie, the state-supported private sector, and larger rural land-
the low agricultural prices imposed by the state. Rather than owners. The image of the Nile valley, its population, and a
addressing these problems, the state, large farmers and inter- 5,000 year old agriculture makes it possible to ascribe this
national development agencies turned to the "high-payoff" appropriation instead to a "tradition" of "strong central
program of mechanization. The high-payoffs did not increase government" determined by the geography of the Nile Valley
yields, but did bring higher profits to the new machine owners and stretching back to Pharaonic times. Thus the coordinator
and their foreign manufacturers. The demand for rural male of a USAID-funded program at Eastern Kentucky University

26 Middle East Report • March-April 1991

144 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

providing management training to Egyptian local government

officials explains:
For centuries Egypt has been governed as a political system with a
highly centralized decisionmaking process. Although there have
been a few minor exceptions, this statement is valid for the period
since the unification of Upper and Lower Egypt was accomplished
late in the fourth millennium B.C.-i.e. for at least the past 5
thousand years. 71

Drawing on familiar imagery, the author goes on to explain

this centralized power in geographical and demographic
terms:
Integral to the question of administrative structure of the Arab
Republic of Egypt is its principal social and economic problem~
over-population-and the Nile river. Although the land mass area
of the ARE includes 386,000 square miles. over 96 percent of the
population resides on the 4 percent of the land area adjacent to the
Nile valley and its delta.72

Depoliticized in this way, the state's role in agriculture ceases

to be a question of power and control over people's resources
and lives. It becomes instead a problem of management. The
intervention of the state has resulted in "disequilibrium."
Some natural balance between forces of agricultural supply
and demand ("the market") has to be restored by processes of
"readjustment."73
To restore this equilibrium, USAID has tried to promote in
rural Egypt a gradual dismantling of the role of the state,
under the slogans of "decentralization" and "privatization."
By increasing the role of local officials and involving elected
village councils, USAID claims to be encouraging "democracy
and pluralism."74
To weaken the power of the central bureaucracy might be a
Cooperative mechanical harvesting. K Chemush/World Bank
positive step for rural Egyptians; the actual political outcome
will depend on the distribution of resources and power at the
provincial, district and village levels to which authority and In other words, when it transfers resources to an existing
funds are transferred. Local government or the private sector system of inequality, "decentralization" is liable to reinforce
is not necessarily more democratic, or even more efficient,
that inequality. The profits go to large farmers and local state
than the central government. Popular village councils, if they officials and the poor receive, at best, only certain opportuni-
have any role at all, are frequently controlled by powerful ties for wage labor. The USAID report acknowledges that "the
village landowners and local officials. Decentralization may do better off, the more educated and expert officials benefit more
no more than shift exploitation from one agency to another. than ordinary villagers," but argues that this is "developmen-
A review of decentralization projects in eight different tally advisable." The relationship between rural capitalists
villages found that funds had gone to improvements in infra- and wage earners should not be called exploitation, the report
structure and to income-producing projects such as milk says, but is termed instead "differential advantage," meaning
refrigeration units, animal husbandry, poultry, bee and silk- "the variable ability of individuals or groups to make better
worm raising, date packaging, olive canning, carpentry and use and reap greater benefits than others from available
furniture making, and the purchase of trucks, tractors and opportunities."77 A sure way to "reap greater benefits" from
taxis. The report, written for USAID, notes that "naturally, an investment, of course, is to pay lower wages to those one
not all villagers have savings that enable them to invest" in employs. This "ability" is based on a distribution of land that
these projects; the profits accrued to those in "middle to upper leaves many villagers with no resources besides their labor, on
bracket income groups more than poor folks."" An olive the absence of a set minimum wage, and on a system of
pickling and canning project in a village in Fayyum, for patronage, policing and surveillance in rural Egypt that pre-
example, provided employment for 200 villagers but served vents "poor folks" from protesting or organizing to change
the marketing needs of just five wealthy farmers, for only
their condition.
wealthy farmers can afford to grow olive trees. Likewise,
only the wealthy villagers can hope to raise bees, because the
economic success of such an enterprise requires raising at least 20
beehives, which is a large investment. Village officials such as
Object of Development
agronomists often enter into partnership with such farmers and
undertake such projects on their own.76 A final aspect of the geographical image of the Nile Valley is

Middle East Report • March-April 1991 27

 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 145

Egyptian village. Hannes Wallrafen

the way it removes from sight the participation of develop- identity of a population, an economy. a language or a culture is
ment agencies in the dynamics of Egyptian political and an entity that has to be continually reinvented against the
economic life, force of these transnational relations and movements.
By portraying the country and its problems as a picture, laidThe apparent concreteness of a modern nation state like
Egypt. its appearance as a discrete object. is the result of
out before the mind's eye like a map, the image presents Egypt
recent methods of organizing social practice and representing
itself as something naturaL The particular extent of space and
population denoted by the name "Egypt" is represented as an it: the construction of frontiers on roads and at airports; the
empirical object, Development literature reproduces the con- attempt to control movements of people and goods across
them; the production of maps and history books for schools;
vention that Egypt exists as a sort of free-standing unit, lined
up in physical space alongside a series of similar units. Thethe deployment of mass armies and the indoctrination of
workings of this unit-its economic functions, social interac-those conscripted into them; the representation of the nation-
tions, and political processes-are understood as internal state in news broadcasts, international sports events and
mechanisms. They constitute the unit's inside. to be distin- tourist literature, the establishment of a national currency
guished from economic and political forces that may affect itand language; and. not least, the discourse of "country stud-
from outside. ies" and national statistics of the American-based interna-
tional development industry.
This convention of imagining countries as empirical objects
is seldom recognized for what it is-a convention. The rela- These essentially practical arrangements of language. imag-
tions, forces and movements that have shaped people's lives ery, space and movement are mostly of very recent origin. We
tend to think of them as processes that merely mark out and
over the last several hundred years have never, in fact, been
represent the nation-state. as though the nation-state itself
confined within the limits of nation-states. or respected their
borders. The value of what people produce. the cost of what had some prior reality. In fact, the nation-state is an effect of
they consume, and the purchasing power of their currency all these everyday forms of regulation and representation.
depend on global relationships of exchange. Movements of conjured up by them in the appearance of an empirical object.
people and cultural commodities form international flows of The geographical imagery of the Nile and its inhabitants that
tourists, television programs, information, migrant workers, introduces so many studies of Egyptian development invokes
refugees. technologies and fashions. The strictly "national" and reproduces this effect.

28 Middle East Report • March-April 1991

146 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Model Answers
There are two consequences of the way development econom-
ics takes for granted the nation-state as its object. The first is
the illusion of the "model." Portrayed as a free-standing
entity, rather than as a position within a larger arrangement
of transnational economic and political forces, a particular
nation-state appears to be a functional unit-something akin
to a car, say, or a television set-that can be compared with
and used as a model for improving other such units. This
supposed comparability is emphasized by the annual volumes
of statistics produced by international development agencies.
Economic features of one state appear to be neatly transfer-
able to other states, regardless of their different position in
larger economic and historical networks.
In Egypt's case, agencies like the IMF and USAID promote
the growth of exports as the solution to the country's eco-
nomic problems. Egypt is to develop the export of winter
vegetables and cut flowers to markets in Europe and the
Persian Gulf, along with textiles and possibly other light
manufactured goods, in order to earn the hard currency to
keep up interest payments on its foreign debts. The idea is
that Egypt and similar countries should follow the path of the
so-called economic miracles of East Asia-Singapore, Hong
Kong, Taiwan and South Korea.
This notion that solutions from East Asia provide a model
for other Third World states is curious. 78 Egypt's merchandise
exports in 1987 amounted to less than one-fifth of one percent
of world trade. More than two-thirds of this merchandise
consisted of oil, the supply of which will decline in coming
decades. To match the per capita level of exports of Singapore, Sugar cane harvest, Upper Egypt. Tim Mitchell

Egypt would have to expand its exports to capture 23 percent

of world trade-or significantly more than the merchandise
exports of Japan and the United States combined." Even the
far more modest goal of matching South Korea, whose exports
were worth $1,120 per capita in 1987, would require Egypt to
capture a massive 2.35 percent of world trade. This would
involve a 40-fold increase in non-oil exports, from the present
annual level of about $1.25 billion to more than $52 billion.so
There is no evidence that Europe's demand for airlifted
shipments of Egyptian cut flowers and winter tomatoes might
grow by even a fraction of this amount. In the absence of the
kind of far-reaching land reform carried out in South Korea,
there is also no evidence that such export policies would be of
any benefit to the landless and near-landless majority of rural
Egypt. Finally, this export-oriented solution is supposed to
occur in a period of economic retrenchment-and in a period
when half a dozen large Third World economies are adopting
similar remedies and competing for the same market.81

Agencies Above and Outside

There is a second consequence of the way the imagery of the
Nile Valley and its people constitute Egypt as a self-contained
object. The geographical metaphor that introduces the reports
of an organization like USAID in Cairo evokes an entity "out
there." The organization itself, the metaphor suggests, is not Imported cheese. . no cheese. Mohieddine al-Labbad

Middle East Report • March-April 1991 29

 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 147

Cairo vendor. Hannes Wallrafen

an aspect of this object. It stands above the map of Egypt to these funds were local government officials, state agricultural
measure and make plans. USAID is not marked, so to speak, engineers, and other members of the state apparatus. The
on the map. other main beneficiaries, wealthy farmers, often entered into
Development discourse thus practices a self-deception- partnership with such officials.83 Far from encouraging a
what Partha Chatterjee calls "a necessary self-deception, for "private sector" in opposition to the state, such programs
without it it could not constitute itself."" A discourse of make the state an even more powerful source of funds and site
rational planning, to plan effectively, must grasp the object of of patronage. The new accumulations of wealth are never
its planning in its entirety. It must represent on the plans it more than semi-private, for they are parasitic on this
draws up every significant aspect of the reality with which it is strengthened state structure.
dealing. A miscalculation or omission may cause the missing This is not simply some fault in the design or execution of
factor to disrupt the execution of the plan. Its calculations the programs. USAID itself is a state agency, a part of the
must even include the political forces that will affect the "public sector." By its very presence within the Egyptian
process of execution itself. public sector it strengthens the wealth and patronage re-
This calculation has a limit, which is where the self- sources of the state. USAID is thus part of the problem it
deception is required. As Chatterjee points out, the political wishes to eradicate. Yet because the discourse of development
forces which rational planning must calculate affect not only must present itself as a rational, disinterested intelligence
the execution of plans but the planning agency itself. An existing outside its object, USAID cannot diagnose itself as an
organization like USAID, which must imagine itself as a integral aspect of the problem.
rational consciousness standing outside the country, is in fact
a central element in configurations of power within the coun- Subsidized Deception
try. Yet as a discourse of external rationality, the literature of
development can never describe its own place in this configu- This difficulty reflects a much larger deception. The prevail-
ration of power. ing wisdom of organizations like the World Bank, the IMF
Consider the case of USAID's decentralization program, and USAID is that the problems of a country such as Egypt
designed to reduce the role of the state and encourage "democ- stem from the restrictions placed on the initiative and free-
racy and pluralism" by channeling funds to private initiatives dom of the private sector."' The program of "structural adjust-
at the village and district level. Yet the report from which I ment" these organizations have attempted to impose on
quoted suggested tbat among the principal beneficiaries of Egypt aims to dismantle the system of state subsidies and

30 Middle East Report • March-April 1991

148 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Cairo market. Claudia Flores

controls. Prices Egyptians pay to consume, or receive for trade.86 Squeezed by these monopolies on both ends, inputs
producing, food, fuel and other goods, are to reflect prices in and marketing, American farmers have found themselves
the international market. having to grow ever larger quantities of crops merely to
Yet it hardly needs pointing out that world prices for many survive, investing constantly in new technologies and getting
major commodities are determined not by the free interplay of increasingly into debt.
"private" market forces but by the monopolies or oligopolies To mitigate the system's effects, the state has instituted
organized by states and multinational corporations. Oil prices massive subsidies-the price supports and crop controls of the
are determined by the ability of producer states to coordinate New Deal programs, the subsidized exports of the post-war
quotas and price levels. The price of raw sugar (a major Marshall Plan, the Public Law 480 program (which financed
Egyptian industrial crop), whose volatility is more than twice up to 58 percent of US grain exports during the 1950s and
that of any other commodity monitored by the World Bank, is 1960s), and President Nixon's 1972 New Economic Policy
determined largely by US and other government price support (which further subsidized exports and boosted prices by pay-
programs. Only about 14 percent of world production is freely ing farmers to take 62 million acres out of production, an area
traded on the market.55 The international market for alumi· equal to ten times the total cultivated area of Egypt). As a
num, one of the major heavy industries in Egypt, also operates result of these policies, by 1982 American grain was being sold
under extensive state controls. at prices 40 percent below estimated average production costs,
Perhaps the most significant example is the world grain and keeping farmers afloat was costing $12 billion a year in
market. One of the arguments against Egypt producing the state subsidies. Despite the low producer prices, moreover,
staple foods it needs is that it cannot compete in the world consumer prices remain so high that 40 million Americans
market against the low grain prices of US farmers. Yet these require government subsidies to purchase food, costing a
prices are the product of subsidies and market controls. further $20 billion to $24 billion a year in Federal funds. 87
American agriculture, operating under an imperative of con- Government export subsidies pay for middle- and upper-class
stant growth, has come to be dominated by giant corporations consumers in non-Western countries to shift to a meat-
that supply the inputs to farming and process and market its centered diet and thus expand the market for American feed
products. Over three-quarters of the American farm supply grains. The largest site in the world to be incorporated into
industry is controlled by just four firms. Six corporations, all this system of state-subsidized American farming has been
but one of them privately owned, control 95 percent of US Egypt. The arm of the state that has organized this incorpora-
wheat and corn exports and 85 percent of total world grain tion is USAID.

Middle East Report • March-April 1991 31

 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 149

The self-deception of USAID discourse is not just that it denied it was happening-but continued the practice. The
sets up an object called Egypt in which it cannot recognize its law, a USAID lawyer later admitted, "was an academic ques-
own internal role. It is that this supposed object is caught up tion, since actual CT [Cash Transfer] expenditures were
in a much larger configuration of power, a network of monop- untraceable."91 So a total of $8.7 billion, or 58 percent of all US
olies and subsidies misleadingly named the "world market," of economic assistance, has been spent directly in the United
which USAID itself is but a subsidiary arm. An agency States rather than on development projects in Egypt, and
devoting itself to the cause of dismantling subsidies and most of this "American aid" in fact represents money paid by
promoting the "private" sector is itself an element in the most Egypt to America.
powerful system of state subsidy in the world. The remaining 42 percent of US economic assistance funds
Almost every penny of the $15 billion budget for "Economic to Egypt, totalling $6.3 billion, were earmarked for develop-
Assistance" to Egypt since AID operations began there in ment projects within the country (Figure 3). Yet the entire
1974-75 (Figure 2) has actually been allocated to US corpora- amount, as far as one can tell, has been spent in the US, or on
tions. Just over half the total represents money spent by American contractors in Egypt-corporations like General
Egypt to purchase American goods: the PL480 Food Aid Electric, Westinghouse, Bechtel, Ferguson International, Cat-
program and the Commodity Import Program, totalling about erpillar, John Deere and International Harvester. And hun-
$7.7 billion up to 1989, enable Egypt to purchase grain, other dreds of millions of dollars went to American universities and
agricultural commodities, agricultural and industrial equip- research institutes to provide training in agricultural sciences,
ment, and other US imports. 88 About halfthe commodities are management and technology transfer."
paid for in dollars, with the US providing low-interest long- Many of these projects have also required local payments
term credit. The other half are paid for immediately or on within Egypt in Egyptian pounds. In 1988 such local imple-
short-term credit, in Egyptian pounds." mentation costs were said to amount to about LE200 million
A further $1 billion of the total aid is also paid directly to (LE = Egyptian pounds) annually, equivalent then to just
the US, by the US government itself, in the form of so-called over $100 million, or about 10 percent of annual US dollar aid
Cash Transfers used to keep up payments on Egypt's military for development projects." Such payments are not made from
debt. United States law stipulates that all aid except food US dollar funds, Local currency funds, paid by the Egyptian
must be stopped to a country that falls more than a year government to purchase American imports under the Com-
behind in military debt repayments, as Egypt began to do in modity Import Program, are used by USAID in Cairo to pay
the winter of 1983-84. The US government responded to this for all local costs.
threatened collapse of the entire system of subsidies to its own
private sector by converting all subsequent military loans to Policy Leverage
grants, allocating the bulk of those grants for progress pay-
ments to itself on earlier Egyptian arms purchases,90 and Many millions of Egyptians, needless to say, have benefited
instructing USAID in the meantime to circumvent the law by from this economic assistance, at least in the short term. The
setting aside about $100 million a year from economic devel- supply of power stations, sewage networks, telephone ex-
opment funds as Cash Transfers, to be deposited in the changes, drinking-water plants, irrigation systems and nu-
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and then returned to merous other basic infrastructure projects and services has
Washington as Egypt's monthly interest payments on its improved the deteriorated physical fabric of the Egyptian
military debt. When Congress discovered this illegal diversion economy. At the same time, these benefits have come at the
of economic development funds for military purposes, USAID price of a dependence on imports of American food, machin-

Figure 2: US Economic Aid to Egypt Figure 3: Projects by Sector

F Y 1975-1989 FY 1975-89

Total ' $ 14.982 million Total ' $6.282 million

Weter/S ewerage
Commodity Import 24%
2g~ Agricu lture
12%
Infrast ructure
Science /Technology 10%
5%
Projects
42%
Local Governme nt
13~ EnerQY
PubliC L aw 480 18%
22%
Human ~esourcee
Cash Tra.ns fer 11% Industry
7% 8%

Source; USAtD/C8iro SOUlCS; USAJO/Calro, 1989.

32 Middle East Report • March-April 1991

150 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

ery and technology. In the 1980s the US became the largest

supplier of Egyptian imports. This dependence, and the levels
of debt that goes with it, has given the United States a
powerful position of influence within the Egyptian state.
USAID conducts what it tenns "cabinet-level dialogue" on
macroeconomic policy with the Egyptian government. At
times, USAID reports, when this "dialogue" has not been
"completely successful" -meaning that the Egyptian govern-
ment has rejected or delayed implementing American de-
mands-"annual releases of funds have been delayed."" Ac-
quiring at every level of the Egyptian bureaucracy this sort of
"policy leverage," as it is called, has now become the principal
criterion according to which USAID development projects in
Egypt are evaluated. 95 And all this is achieved by a program
whose larger effect is to provide vast subsidies to the so-called
private sector in the United States-both directly by the
purchase of billions of dollars of its products and indirectly by
converting Egypt into a future US market.
Thus USAID operates as a fonn of state support to the
American private sector, while working in Egypt to dismantle
state supports. None of this is explained in the discourse of
USAID itself, which pretends to stand outside Egyptian Barley harvest, Western Desert. Lila Abu-LughodiAnthro-Phoro
politics, conducting merely a "dialogue" at the rational, de-
tached level of "policy." Yet there is even more that is missing ished and marginalized Third World economy.""
from the discourse of development on Egypt. The $15 billion Despite its massive presence in the Egyptian economy, the
of AID spending analyzed just above covers only about one large proportion of government funds it consumes, and its
half of US aid to Egypt. A roughly equal amount takes the even larger proportion of total US support, the military
form of economic assistance to the Egyptian military-largely receives almost no attention in the literature of organizations
grants to purchase American weapons. Since 1985 alone, like USAID and the World Bank. Given the supposed objec-
military aid to Egypt has provided a further $7.7 billion of tives of developing the private sector and pluralism, the
subsidies to US industry. silence of this discourse is astonishing. A systematic inquiry
The Egyptian military, with the support of US funds, has into the economy and power of the Egyptian military would
developed into a major presence within the country's econ- reveal its relations to US military industries, to the system of
omy. Its anns industries, which receive state subsidies but state subsidies on which those industries depend, and thus to
whose income goes into military rather than national ac- the larger object of American aid programs. In the same way, a
counts, comprise the country's largest manufacturing sector, proper analysis of Egyptian agriculture, examining the causes
producing exports estimated to be worth about three times the of the shift to meat production and the resulting shortages of
total of all other non-textile manufactures. 96 food and growing indebtedness, would reveal the connections
The army has also moved into civilian manufacturing, between these events and the crisis of American farming and
symbolized by the deal it negotiated with General Motors in the remedy of subsidized food exports. Such analyses would
1986 to manufacture passenger cars. Under pressure from the serve as a reminder that the discourse of development is
US Embassy, AID pledged $200 million from its aid budget to situated within, not outside, such global relationships.
subsidize this project.97 Agriculture is another sector in which That is the reason for the silence. Development discourse
the military has become a dominant presence, through the wishes to present itself as a detached center of rationality and
acquisition of reclaimed land and the development of food intelligence. The relationship between West and non-West
processing industries, particularly in meat, fruit and vegeta- will be constructed in these terms. The West possesses the
b
es. Its Food Security Division represents by far the largest expertise, teclmology and management skills that the non-
agro-industrial complex in the country, producing in 1985-86 West is lacking. This lack is what has caused the problems of
LE488 million worth of food, or almost one-fifth of the total the non-West. Questions of power and inequality, whether on
value of Egyptian food production. 98 The military has also the global level of international grain markets, state subsidies
played a major role in constructing bridges, roads, telephone and the arms trade, or the more local level of landholding, food
systems and other infrastructure projects. All these activities supplies and income distribution, will nowhere be discussed.
have provided plentiful opportunities for patronage and per- To remain silent on such questions, in which its own existence
sonal profit-making. Together with the construction of its is involved, development discourse needs an object that ap-
own housing, hospitals, shops, resorts and elite training col- pears to stand outside itself. What more natural object could
leges, such developments have transfonned the military into there be, for such a purpose, than the image of a narrow river
what Springborg calls "an almost entirely autonomous en- valley, hemmed in by the desert, crowded with rapidly multi-
clave of middle-class modernity in an increasingly impover- plying millions of inhabitants? •

Middle East Report • March-April 1991 33

 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 151
misr," (Cairo: Public Affairs Office, USAlDjCairo, 1989). 58 Status Report: United States Economic Assistance to
Footnotes 29 Economist Intelligence Unit, Egypt: Country' Report, No.1, Egypt (Public Affairs Office, USAIDjCairo, 1989), p. 60.
1 Khalid Ikram, Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of 1990 (London, 1990), p. 20. 59 Louis Berger International Inc., Agricultural Mechaniza-
I'ransition (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Uni- 30 Georg Stauth, "Capitalist Farming and Small Peasant tion Project: Final Report (East Orange, New Jersey: Louis
{ersity Press, fur the World Bank, 1980), p. 3. Households in Egypt," in Kathy Glavanis and Pandeli Berger International, Inc., 1985), p. 2-1.
~ Pamela R. Johnson, et aI., ElJ)pt: The Egyptian American Glavanis, eds, The Rural Middle East: Peasant Lives and 60 ToW. Schultz, Transforming Traditwnal Agriculture (New
Rumlimprovement Service, a Point Four Project, 1952-63, Modes of Production (London: Zed Press and Birzeit Univer- Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 23, 29.
:\ID Project Impact Evaluation No. 43 (WashingtQn DC; sity, 1989), p. 122.
61 Berger International, p. 2-1.
A.gency For International Development, 1983). 31 USAID, Agricultural Data Base.
62 Schultz intended his stress on the rationality of peasant
3 Ikram, p. 3. 32 Ikram, p. 175. agriculture as an argument against the prevailing view that
" Susan George, "Conscience 'pianetaire' et 'trop nornbreult' 33 See Dethier, pp. 246-65. blamed low productivity on the fatalism of peasants and their
pauvres," Le Mande Diplomatique, May 1990, p. 18. ignorance of markets. Nevertheless, the absence of any concept
34 Simon Commander, The State and Agricultural Develop- of inequality made his work the foundation for the view, still
5 World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies 1989 (Wash- ment in Egypt Since 1973 (London: Ithaca Press, 1987), p. 80, prevailing, that technology is a panacea for the problema of
ington DC, 1989), p. 129. table 4-13. IUral poverty. pony Hill, Development EconomicH on Trial-
B Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 35 Allen C. Kelley, Atef M. Khalifa and M. Nabil el- The Anthropological Case for a Prosecution (Cambridge: Cam-
(FAO), The State of Food and Agriculture (Rome, 1989), Khorazaty, Population and Development in Rural E[J)pt, bridge University Press, 1986), pp. 25-26.
Annex table 12b. Duke Press Policy Studies: Studies in Social and Economic 63 Commander, p. 233.
7 Inter-Country ComparisorlS of Agricultural Production Ag- Demography (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982), p. 9.
64 ERA 2000 Inc., Further Mechanization of Egyptian Agri-
gregates, FAO Economic and Social Development Paper 6l. 36 The number of children who die in infancy (the first 12 culture (New York, 1979).
(Rome, 1986), table 5,7, p. 6. months) in rural Upper Egypt is estimated to be 1.51 per
thousand (compared to 85 per thousand in urban governor- 65 Hans Binswager, "Agricultural Mechanization: A Compar-
8 FAD, Yearbook 1987: Production, VoL 41 (Rome: FAD, ative Historical Analysis," World Bank Research Observer, 1,1
1988), table 1. ates); for boys the rate rises to 171 per thousand. Central
Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, Population (1986) pp. 30-32.
9 FAO, Inter·Country Comparisons . .. , table 5.6, p. 34. Studies and Research Center, Maternal Health and Infant 66 Alan Richards, "Egypt's Agriculture in Trouble," MERIP
10 See also George, p. 19. Mortality in Egypt (Cairo: CAPMASjPSRC, 1987), pp. 3, 46 Reports, #84 (January 1980), p. 11.
and 49.
11 World Bank, World Development Report 1989 (New York: 67 Winrock InternationaL Policy Guidelines for Agricultural
Oxford University Press, 1989), table 5. 37 USDA, Egypt: Major Constraints to Increasing Agricul- Mechanization in Egypt (1986), p. 41.
tural Productivity, Foreign Economic Report No. 120 (WaJih-
12 US Department of Agriculture (USDA), Egypt: Major ington DC: Department of Agriculture, 1976), p. 172. 68 Commander, pp. 162-66.
Constraints to Increasing Agricultural Productivity, Foreign 69 Ikram. p. 211.
Economic Report No. 120 (Washington DC, 1976). Despite the 38 Thierry Ruf, Histoire contemporaine de J'agriculture egyp-
seriousness with which it views the problem of population tienne: Essai de synthese (Bondy, France: Editions de 70 Dethier, p. 220.
growth. USAID has devoted only 1 percent of its total Eco- I'Orstom, 1988), p. 236.
71 J. Allen Singleton, "The Training of Local Development
nomic Assistance since 1975 to population programs. Status 39 Ruf, pp. 214, 220, 236. Fund Officials and the Decentralization Process in Egypt:
Report: United States Economic Assistance to Eg)pt (Public (Paper presented to the Conference on Organizational Policy
Affairs Office, USAIDjCairo, 1989), pp. 105·8. 40 Mohaya A. Zaytoun, "Income Distribution in Egyptian
Agriculture and its Main Determinants," in Gouda Abdel- and Development, University of Louisville, Louisville, Ken-
13 World Development Report 1989, table 15. These figures Khalek and Robert Tignor. eds., The Political Economy of tucky. Mimeo. 1983), p.l.
exclude non·reporting non-member countries-the Soviet Income Distribution in Egypt (New York: Holmes and Meier, 72 Ibid., p. 2.
Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, five non- 1982), p. 277.
European Soviet allies, and Albania (pp. 232-3). 73Ikram.
41 Robert Springborg, "Rolling Back Egypt's Agrarian Re-
14 World Development Report 1989, tables 2, 4 and 26. form," Middle East Report #166 (Sept-Oct 1990). p. 29. 74 USAID, Status Report, p. 37.
15 FAO, Yearbook 1987: Production. 42 For examples, see Timothy Mitchell, "The Representation 75 Harik, p. 22.
16 World Development Re[XJrt 1989, table 28. of Rural Violence in Writings On Political Development: The 76 Ibid.
Case of Nasserist Egypt," in John Waterbury and Farhad
17 FAD, Yearbook 1988: Production, Vol. 42 (Rome, 1989), Kazemi, eds., Peasants and Politics in the Modem History of 77 Ibid.
table 107. the Middle East (Gainseville, FL: University Presses of Flor- 78 See also George, pp. 18·19.
18 A.s. Nockrashy, Osman Galal and Jay Davenport, More ida,I991).
79 Calculated from World Development Re[XJrt, 1989, table 14.
and Better Food: An Egyptian DenwnHtration Project (Wash- 43 Springborg. "Rolling Back," p. 29.
ington DC: National Resear<:h Council, c.1987), pp. 30-32. 80 Calculated from World Development Report, 1989, tables
44 International Finance Corporation, Report and Recom- 14 and 16. These figures are intended to indicate the scale of
19 Jean-Jacques Dethier, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agricul- mendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a the problem rather than the details of an export-led program,
tural Pricing Policies in Egypt, Vol. 1, The Country Study. Proposed Investment in Delta Sugar Company SAE, Arab which would attempt to spread growth over many years.
World Bank Comparative Studies: The Political Economy of Republic of Egypt (Washington DC, 1983).
Agricultural Pricing Policy (Washington, DC, 1989), p. 20. 81 Inna Adelman's economic modelling suggests. in fact, that
45 Eddy Lee, "Egalitarian Peasant Fanning and Rural Devel- in the current situation of depressed world trade an alternative
20 Calculated from Ikram, tables 4-5 and 4-6. opment: The Case of South Korea," World Development policy of transferring wealth to medium and small farmers (via
21 Dethier, p. 19. 7(1979), p. 510; Springborg, "Rolling Back," p. 29. land reform, infrastructural investment, and higher producer
46 Springborg, "Rolling Back," p. 29 prices) to stimulate rural employment and consumption would
22 FAO, Yearbaok 1987: Production. result in higher rates of growth and larger exports than export-
23 Ikram, p. 195. 47 Dethier, p. 5. led policies. It would also produce a substantial redistribution
48 Calculated from Springborg, "Rolling Back." table 1. of income from rich to poor. Irma Adelman, "Beyond Export-
24 Ibrahim Soliman and Shahla Shapouri, The Impact of Led Growth." World Development, 12.9 (1984), pp. 937-49.
Wheat Price Policy Change on Nutritional Status in Egypt 49 This has been argued at length in the case of India. In
(Washingron DC: USDA International Economics Division, Egypt, Commander's study of three Delta villages initially 82 Partha Chatterjee, "Development Planning and the Indian
Economic Research Service, Staff Report No. AGES831129, found no clear relationship between farm size and crop yields State," (Calcutta: Center for Studies in Social Science, mimeo,
1984), table 13, p. 21; calculated from FAO, Trade Yearbook (p. 175). However, the average land value of larger farms was 1989), p. 10.
(Rome, 1981). about a third higher than for the smallest farms, suggesting 83 Harik, p. 24.
25 These figures cover wheat, maize, barley and sorghum but higher quality and more productive land. Taking this feature
into account, "small farm yields were generally superior or at 84 See also Zaki La"idi, Enquete sur la Banque Mondiale
exclude rice. Rice production has remained at about the same (Paris: Fayard, 1989).
level since the mid-I960s. Per capita C{lnsumption has been least equal to those registered by the larger enterprises" (p.
maintained by reducing exports. Agricultural Data Base 176). 85 International Finance Corporation, 1983.
(Cairo: Office of Agricultural Credit and Economics, USAIDj 50 See also Peter Gran, "Modem Trends in Egyptian Histori- 86 James Wessel with Mort Hantman, Trading the Future:
Cairo, 1989), p. 221. ography: A Review Article," International Journal of Middle Farm EX[XJrts and the Concentration of Economic Power in
26 Calcu1ated from USAID, Agricultural Data Base, pp. 209, East Studies, 9,3(1978), p. 370. Our Food System (San Francisco: Institute for Food and
224. These figures are represented in Figure 1. The figures for 51 Ruf, p. 214; USAID, Agricultural Data Base, p. 224. Development Policy, 1983), pp. 91-3.
wheat consumption are based on the estimate that animals 87 Ibid; New York Times, August 20, 1990, p. A12.
consume 18 percent of domestic production, and that this 52 USDA, Egypt: M1jor Constraints, p. 1.
proportion has not increased since 1966 despite the large rise in 53 Iliya Harik, "Decentralization and Development in Rural 88 The only exception that did not require a purchase was PL
fodder prices and the relative decrease in the price of imported Egypt: A Description and Assessment," Prepared for USAID, 480 Title II aid, which provided free milk and grain products
flour. Some sources suggest that 80 percent of domestic wheat Egypt, (mimeo, 1977), p. 1. estimated to be worth $179 million (about 5 percent ofPL480
is used as fodder. (Economist Intelligence Unit, Egypt: Country aid and 1 percent of total US economic aid) to voluntary child
Report, No.4, London, 1989, p. 13.) Ifso, then per capita food 54 Timothy Mitchell, "The Invention and Reinvention of the feeding programs in Egypt. The program was canceled after FY
consumption of grains dropped by 10 percent between 1966 and Egyptian Peasant," International Journal of Middle East 1989.
1988, and non-food usage increased by 357 percent to over 9 Studies, 22,2 (1990), pp. 129-50.
89 The major hard-currency purchase has been the PL 480
million tons-surpassing the 7.45 million tons fed to humans. 55 See also Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Cambridge: Title I food program, amounting to $2,870 million between
27 Calculated from USAID, Agricultural Data Base, p. 209. Cambridge University Press, 1988). 1975 and 1989. PL 480 Title III (canceled after FY 1983)
56 USDA, Egypt: Major Constraints, p. 25. provided an additional $72 million of food, primarily wheat,
28 "Common Misconceptions about USAID in Egyptj
Mafahim khati'a 'an barnamij al-musa'idat al-amrikiya Ii- 57 Ikram, p. 5. See Footnotes, page 36

34 Middle East Report • March-April 1991

152 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Footnotes, from page 34

purchased in Egyptian pounds. The Commodity Import Pro-
gram (eIP) provided$3.6 billion worth of imports purchased in
Egyptian pounds and aoout $700 million in dollars. Agricul-
tural commodities and equipment represented one-third of eIP
pUl'Chases. USAID, Status Report, p. 1·8, figure 3.
90 US Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Sub-
committee on Europe and the Middle East. ForeignAssistance
Legislation for Fiscal Year 1985 (Part 3): Economic and Mili-
tory Aid Programs in Europe and the Middle East. 98th
Congress, second session. February-March 1984, p. 50s.
91 US Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Sub-
committee on Europe and the Middle East. Hearings on
Agency for International Development Policy on the Use of
Ca8h 'I'ramler: The Case of Egypt. tOOth Congress, second
session. December 10, 1987. p. 78. A cable leaked to the
WashingtonPOlit (February 3, 1984) recorded a conversation in
Cairo in which the visiting head of USAID asked a high
Egyptian official "if the $103 million [cash transfer] would be
sufficient to enable the GOE [GovemmentofEgypt] to meet its
FMS (Foreign Military Sales] debt servicing obligations
through the elections." Despite repeated Congressional re-
quests, USAID produced no accounting of how the Cash
Tr/lll8fers were actually spent. See US Congress, Foreign Assis-
tance Legislationfor Fiscal Year 1985 (Part 3), pp. 119-22, 149-
52; and Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1986·
87 (Part 3): Economic and Military Aid Programs in Europe
and the Middle East. 99th Congress, first session. February-
March 1985, pp.175-78. In 1987, new Congressional account·
ing requirements were finally imposed, which immediately
reveaIed that the Cash Transfers to Egypt were being used
entirely to pay FMS debts. The administration now reversed
itself and argued that such military use of economic aid was
legal, on the grounds that (i) military debts, once incurred,
became an "economic" and not a "military" question, and (ii)
in the case of Israel, Congress had routinely since 1979 repaid
the US Treasury Israel's annual military debt out of economic
assistance funds.
92 USAID, Status Report.
93 USAID, Annual Budget Submission, FY 1990: Egypt
(Washington DC: USAID 1988), Main Volume, p. 21.
94 USAID, Status Report, p. 8.
95 Robert Springborg, Mubarok's Egypt: Fragmentation of the
Political Order (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1989), pp. 258-9.
96 Ibid., p. 111. See also the essays collected in Ahmad
Abdullah, ed, Al-Jaysh wa-l-dimuqratiya fi Misr (Cairo: Dar
Sina li·I·Nashr, 1990).
97 Springborg, Mubarok's Egypt, p. 110.
98 Ibid., p. 113.
99 Ibid., p. 107.

36 Middle East Report • March-April 1991

 Part IV
State-Building and Democratization
This page intentionally left blank
 [7]
WHAT DEMOCRACY IS
. AND IS NOT
Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl

Philippe C. Schmitter is professor of political science and director of the

Center for European Studies at Stanford University. Terry Lynn Karl is
associate professor of political science and director of the Center for
Latin American Studies at the same institution. The original, longer
version of this essay was written at the request of the United States
Agency for International Development, which is not responsible for its
content.

For some time, the word democracy has been circulating as a debased
currency in the political marketplace. Politicians with a wide range of
convictions and practices strove to appropriate the label and attach it to
their actions. Scholars, conversely, hesitated to use it-without adding
qualifying adjectives-because of the ambiguity that surrounds it. The
distinguished American political theorist Robert Dahl even tried to
introduce a new term, "polyarchy," in its stead in the (vain) hope of
gaining a greater measure of conceptual precision. But for better or
worse, we are "stuck" with democracy as the catchword of contemporary
political discourse. It is the word that resonates in people's minds and
springs from their lips as they struggle for freedom and a better way of
life; it is the word whose meaning we must discern if it is to be of any
use in guiding political analysis and practice.
The wave of transitions away from autocratic rule that began with
Portugal's "Revolution of the Carnations" in 1974 and seems to have
crested with the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe
in 1989 has produced a welcome convergence towards a common
definition of democracy.' Everywhere there has been a silent
abandonment of dubious adjectives like "popular," "guided," "bourgeois,"
and "formal" to modify ·'democracy." At the same time, a remarkable
consensus has emerged concerning the minimal conditions that polities
must meet in order to merit the prestigious appellation of "democratic."
Moreover. a number of international organizations now monitor how well
156 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

76 Journal of Democracy

these standards are met; indeed, some countries even consider them when
formulating foreign policy.2

What Democracy Is

Let us begin by broadly defining democracy and the generic concepts

that distinguish it as a unique system for organizing relations between
rulers and the ruled. We will then briefly review procedures, the rules
and arrangements that are needed if democracy is to endure. Finally, we
will discuss two operative principles that make democracy work. They
are not expressly included among the generic concepts or formal
procedures, but the prospect for democracy is grim if their underlying
conditioning effects are not present.
One of the major themes of this essay is that democracy does not
consist of a single unique set of institutions. There are many types of
democracy, and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of
effects. The specific form democracy takes is contingent upon a
country's socioeconomic conditions as well as its entrenched state
structures and policy practices.
Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers
are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens,
acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected
representatives. 3
A regime or system of governance is an ensemble of patterns that
determines the methods of access to the principal public offices; the
characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access;
the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are
followed in the making of publicly binding decisions. To work properly,
the ensemble must be institutionalized-that is to say, the various
patterns must be habitually known, practiced, and accepted by most, if
not all, actors. Increasingly, the preferred mechanism of
institutionalization is a written body of laws undergirded by a written
constitution, though many enduring political norms can have an informal,
prudential, or traditional basis.4
For the sake of economy and comparison, these forms, characteristics,
and rules are usually bundled together and given a generic label.
Democratic is one; others are autocratic, authoritarian, despotic,
dictatorial, tyrannical, totalitarian, absolutist, traditional, monarchic,
oligarchic, plutocratic, aristocratic, and sultanistic. 5 Each of these regime
forms may in tum be broken down into SUbtypes.
Like all regimes, democracies depend upon the presence of rulers,
persons who occupy specialized authority roles and can give legitimate
commands to others. What distinguishes democratic rulers from
nondemocratic ones are the norms that condition how the former come
to power and the practices that hold them accountable for their actions.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 157

Schmitter & Karl 77

The public realm encompasses the making of collective norms and

choices that are binding on the society and backed by state coercion, Its
content can vary a great deal across democracies, depending upon
preexisting distinctions between the public and the private, state and
society, legitimate coercion and voluntary exchange, and collective needs
and individual preferences. The liberal conception of democracy
advocates circumscribing the public realm as narrowly as possible, while
the socialist or social-democratic approach would extend that realm
through regulation, subsidization, and, in some cases, collective
ownership of property. Neither is intrinsically more democratic than the
other-just differently democratic. This implies that measures aimed at
"developing the private sector" are no more democratic than those aimed
at "developing the public sector." Both, if carried to extremes, could
undermine the practice of democracy, the former by destroying the basis
for satisfying collective needs and exercising legitimate authority; the
latter by destroying the basis for satisfying individual preferences and
controlling illegitimate government actions. Differences of opinion over
the optimal mix of the two provide much of the substantive content of
political conflict within established democracies.
Citizens are the most distinctive element in democracies. All regimes
have rulers and a public realm, but only to the extent that they are
democratic do they have citizens. Historically, severe restrictions on
citizenship were imposed in most emerging or partial democracies
according to criteria of age, gender, class, race, literacy, property
ownership, tax-paying status, and so on. Only a small part of the total
population was eligible to vote or run for office. Only restricted social
categories were allowed to form, join, or support political associations.
After protracted struggle-in some cases involving violent domestic
upheaval or international war-most of these restrictions were lifted.
Today, the criteria for inclusion are fairly standard. All native-born adults
are eligible, although somewhat higher age limits may still be imposed
upon candidates for certain offices. Unlike the early American and
European democracies of the nineteenth century, none of the recent
democracies in southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, or Eastern Europe
has even attempted to impose formal restrictions on the franchise or
eligibility to office. When it comes to informal restrictions on the
effective exercise of citizenship rights, however, the story can be quite
different. This explains the central importance (discussed below) of
procedures.
Competition has not always been considered an essential defining
condition of democracy. "Classic" democracies presumed decision making
based on direct participation leading to consensus. The assembled
citizenry was expected to agree on a common course of action after
listening to the alternatives and weighing their respective merits and
demerits. A tradition of hostility to "faction," and "particular interests"
158 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology. Volume Three

78 Journal of Democracy

persists in democratic thought, but at least since The Federalist Papers

it has become widely accepted that competition among factions is a
necessary evil in democracies that operate on a more-than-Iocal scale.
Since, as James Madison argued, "the latent causes of faction are sown
into the nature of man," and the possible
remedies for "the mischief of faction" are
"However central worse than the disease, the best course is to
to democracy, recognize them and to attempt to control
elections occur their effects. 6 Yet while democrats may
intermittently and agree on the inevitability of· factions, they
only allow citizens tend to disagree about the best forms and
to choose between rules for governing factional competition.
the highly Indeed, differences over the preferred
aggregated modes and boundaries of competition
alternatives contribute - most to distinguishing one
offered by political subtype of democracy from another.
parties ..." The most popular definition of
democracy equates it with regular ejections,
fairly conducted and honestly counted.
Some even consider the mere fact of elections--even ones from which
specific parties or candidates are excluded, or in which substantial
portions of the population cannot freely participate-as a sufficient
condition for the existence of democracy. This fallacy has been called
"electoralism" or "the faith that merely holding elections will channel
political action into peaceful contests among elites and accord public
legitimacy to the winners"-no matter how they are conducted or what
else constrains those who win them. 7 However central to democracy,
elections occur intermittently and only allow citizens to choose between
the highly aggregated alternatives offered by political parties, which can,
especially in the early stages of a democratic transition, proliferate in a
bewildering variety. During the intervals between elections, citizens can
seek to influence public policy through a wide variety of other
intermediaries: interest associations, social movements, locality groupings,
clientelistic arrangements, and so forth. Modern democracy, in other
words. offers a variety of competitive processes and channels for the
expression of interests and values--associational as well as partisan.
functional as well as territorial. collective as well as individual. All are
integral to its practice.
Another commonly accepted image of democracy identifies it with
majority rule. Any governing body that makes decisions by combining
the votes of more than half of those eligible and present is said to be
democratic, whether that majority emerges within an electorate, a
parliament, a committee, a city council. or a party caucus. For
exceptional purposes (e.g., amending the constitution or expelling a
member). "qualified majorities" of more than 50 percent may be
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 159

Schmitter & Karl 79

required, but few would deny that democracy must involve some means
of aggregating the equal preferences of individuals,
A problem arises, however, when numbers meet intensities, What
happens when a properly assembled majority (especially a stable, self-
perpetuating one) regularly makes decisions that harm some minority
(especially a threatened cultural or ethnic group)? In these circumstances,
successful democracies tend to qualify the central principle of majority
rule in order to protect minority rights, Such qualifications can take the
form of constitutional provisions that place certain matters beyond the
reach of majorities (bills of rights); requirements for concurrent majorities
in several different constituencies (confederalism); guarantees securing the
autonomy of local or regional governments against the demands of the
central authority (federalism); grand coalition governments that
incorporate all parties (consociationalism); or the negotiation of social
pacts between major social groups like business and labor
(neocorporatism), The most common and effective way of protecting
minorities, however, lies in the everyday operation of interest associations
and social movements, These reflect (some would say, amplify) the
different intensities of preference that exist in the popUlation and bring
them to bear on democratically elected decision makers. Another way
of putting this intrinsic tension between numbers and intensities would
be to say that "in modem democracies, votes may be counted, but
influences alone are weighted."
Cooperation has always been a central feature of democracy. Actors
must voluntarily make collective decisions binding on the polity as a
whole. They must cooperate in order to compete. They must be capable
of acting collectively through parties, associations, and movements in
order to select candidates, articulate preferences, petition authorities, and
influence policies. .
But democracy's freedoms should also encourage citizens to deliberate
among themselves, to discover their common needs, and to resolve their
differences without relying on some supreme central authority. Classical
democracy emphasized these qualities, and they are by no means extinct,
despite repeated efforts by contemporary theorists to stress the analogy
with behavior in the economic marketplace and to reduce all of
democracy's operations to competitive interest maximization. Alexis de
Tocqueville best described the importance of independent groups for
democracy in his Democracy in America, a work which remains a major
source of inspiration for all those who persist in viewing democracy as
something more than a struggle for election and re-election among
competing candidates. 8
In contemporary political discourse, this phenomenon of cooperation
and deliberation via autonomous group activity goes under the rubric of
"civil society." The diverse units of social identity and interest, by
remaining independent of the state (and perhaps even of parties), not
160 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology. Volume Three

80 Journal of Democracy

only can restrain the arbitrary actions of rulers, but can also contribute
to forming better citizens who are more aware of the preferences of
others, more self-confident in their actions, and more civic-minded in
their willingness to sacrifice for the common good. At its best, civil
society provides an intermediate layer of governance between the
individual and the state that is capable of resolving conflicts and
controlling the behavior of members without public coercion. Rather
than overloading decision makers with increased demands and making
the system ungovernable,9 a viable civil society can mitigate conflicts
and improve the quality of citizenship-without relying exclusively on
the privatism of the marketplace.
Representatives-whether directly or indirectly elected---do most of the
real work in modern democracies. Most are professional politicians who
orient their careers around the desire to fill key offices. It is doubtful
that any democracy could survive without such people. The central
question, therefore, is not whether or not there will be a political elite
or even a professional political class, but how these representatives are
chosen and then held accountable for their actions.
As noted above, there are many channels of representation in modern
democracy. The electoral one, based on territorial constituencies, is the
most visible and public. It culminates in a parliament or a presidency
that is periodically accountable to the citizenry as a whole. Yet the sheer
growth of government (in large part as a byproduct of popular demand)
has increased the number, variety, and power of agencies charged with
making public decisions and not subject to elections. Around these
agencies there has developed a vast apparatus of specialized
representation based largely on functional interests, not territorial
constituencies. These interest associations, and not political parties, have
become the primary expression of civil society in most stable
democracies, supplemented by the more sporadic interventions of social
movements.
The new and fragile democracies that have sprung up since 1974
must live in "compressed time." They will not resemble the European
democracies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and they
cannot expect to acquire the multiple channels of representation in
gradual historical progression as did most of their predecessors. A
bewildering array of parties, interests, and movements will all
simultaneously seek political influence in them, creating challenges to the
polity that did not exist in earlier processes of democratization.

Procedures that Make Democracy Possible

The defining components of democracy are necessarily abstract, and

may give rise to a considerable variety of institutions and SUbtypes of
democracy. For democracy to thrive, however. specific procedural norms
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 161

Schmitter & Karl 81

must be followed and civic rights must be respected, Any polity that
fails to impose such restrictions upon itself, that fails to follow the "rule
of law" with regard to its own procedures, should not be considered
democratic. These procedures alone do not define democracy, but their
presence is indispensable to its persistence. In essence, they are necessary
but not sufficient conditions for its existence.
Robert Dahl has offered the most generally accepted listing of what
he terms the "procedural minimal" conditions that must be present for
modern political democracy (or as he puts it, "polyarchy") to exist:
1) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally
vested in elected officials.
2) Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted
elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
3) Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of
officials.
4) Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in
the government. . . .
5) Citizens have a right to express themselves without the'danger of
severe punishment on political matters broadly defined ....
6) Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information.
Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by
law.
7) . . . Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent
associations or organizations, including independent political parties and
interest groups. 10
These seven conditions seem to capture the essence of procedural
democracy for many theorists, but we propose to add two others. The
first might be thought of as a further refinement of item (1), while the
second might be called an implicit prior condition to all seven of the
above.
8) Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their
constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding (albeit
informal) opposition from unelected officials. Democracy is in jeopardy
if military officers, entrenched civil servants, or state managers retain the
capacity to act independently of elected civilians or even veto decisions
made by the people's representatives. Without this additional caveat, the
militarized polities of contemporary Central America, where civilian
control over the military does not exist, might be classified by many
scholars as democracies, just as they have been (with the exception of
Sandinista Nicaragua) by U.S. policy makers. The caveat thus guards
against what we earlier called "electoralism"-the tendency to focus on
the holding of elections while ignoring other political realities.
9) The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act
independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political
system. Dahl and other contemporary democratic theorists probably took
162 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

82 Journal of Democracy

this condition for granted since they referred to formally sovereign

nation-states. However, with the development of blocs, alliances, spheres
of influence, and a variety of "neocolonial" arrangements, the question
of autonomy has been a salient one. Is a system really democratic if its
elected officials are unable to make binding decisions without the
approval of actors outside their territorial domain? This is significant
even if the outsiders are themselves democratically constituted and if the
insiders are relatively free to alter or even end the encompassing
arrangement (as in Puerto Rico), but it becomes especially critical if
neither condition obtains (as in the Baltic states).

Principles that Make Democracy Feasible

Lists of component processes and procedural norms help us to specify

what democracy is, but they do not tell us much about how it actually
functions. The simplest answer is "by the consent of the people"; the
more complex one is "by the contingent consent of politicians acting
under conditions of bounded uncertainty."
In a democracy, representatives must at least informally agree that
those who win greater electoral support or influence over policy will not
use their temporary superiority to bar the losers from taking office or
exerting influence in the future, and that in exchange for this opportunity
to keep competing for power and place, momentary losers will respect
the winners' right to make binding decisions. Citizens are expected to
obey the decisions ensuing from such a process of competition, provided
its outcome remains contingent upon their collective preferences as
expressed through fair and regular elections or open and repeated
negotiations.
The challenge is not so much to find a set of goals that command
widespread consensus as to find a set of rules that embody contingent
consent. The precise shape of this "democratic bargain," to use Dahl's
expression,lI can vary a good deal from society to society. It depends on
social cleavages and such subjective factors as mutual trust, the standard
of fairness, and the willingness to compromise. It may even be
compatible with a great deal of dissensus on substantive policy issues.
All democracies involve a degree of uncertainty about who will be
elected and what- policies they will pursue. Even- in those polities where
one party persists in winning elections or one policy is consistently
implemented, the possibility of change through independent collective
action still exists, as in Italy, Japan, and the Scandinavian social
democracies. If it does not, the system is not democratic, as in Mexico,
Senegal, or Indonesia.
But the uncertainty embedded in the core of all democracies is
bounded. Not just any actor can get into the competition and raise any
issue he or she pleases-there are previously established rules that must
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 163

Schmitter & Karl 83

be respected. Not just any policy can be adopted-there are conditions

that must be met. Democracy institutionalizes "normal," limited political
uncertainty. These boundaries vary from country to country.
Constitutional guarantees of property, privacy, expression, and other
rights are a part of this, but the most effectiye boundaries are generated
by competition among interest groups and cooperation within civil
society. Whatever the rhetoric (and some polities appear to offer their
citizens more dramatic alternatives than others), once the rules of
contingent consent have been agreed upon, the actual variation is likely
to stay within a predictable and generally accepted range.
This emphasis on operative guidelines contrasts with a highly
persistent, but misleading theme in recent literature on
democracy~namely, the emphasis upon "civic culture." The principles
we have suggested here rest on rules of prudence, not on deeply
ingrained habits of tolerance, moderation, mutual respect, fair play,
readiness to compromise, or trust in public authorities. Waiting for such
habits to sink deep and lasting roots implies a very slow process of
regime consolidation---one that takes generations-and it would probably
condemn most contemporary experiences ex hypothesi to failure. Our
assertion is that contingent consent and bounded uncertainty can emerge
from the interaction between antagonistic and mutually suspicious actors
and that the far more benevolent and ingrained norms of a civic culture
are better thought of as a product and not a producer of democracy,

How Democracies Differ

Several concepts have been deliberately excluded from our generic

definition of democracy, despite the fact that they have been frequently
associated with it in both everyday practice and scholarly work. They
are, nevertheless, especially important when it comes to distinguishing
subtypes of democracy. Since no single set of actual institutions,
practices, or values embodies democracy, polities moving away from
authori.tarian rule can mix different components to produce different
democracies, It is important to recognize that these do not define points
along a single continuum of improving performance, but a matrix of
potential combinations that are differently democratic,
I) Consensus: All citizens may not agree on the substantive goals of
political action or on the role of the state (although if they did, it would
certainly make governing democracies much easier).
2) Participation: All citizens may not take an active and equal part
in politics. although it must be legally possible for them to do so,
3) Access: Rulers may not weigh equally the preferences of all who
come before them, although citizenship implies that individuals and
groups should have an equal opportunity to express their preferences if
they choose to do so.
164 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

84 Journal of Democracy

4) Responsiveness: Rulers may not always follow the course of action

preferred by the citizenry. But when they deviate from such a policy, say
on grounds of "reason of state" or "overriding national interest," they
must ultimately be held accountable for their actions through regular and
fair processes.
5) Majority rule: Positions may not be allocated or rules may not be
decided solely on the basis of assembling the most votes, although
deviations from this principle usually must be explicitly defended and
previously approved.
6) Parliamentary sovereignty: The legislature may not be the only
body that can make rules or even the one with final authority in
deciding which laws are binding, although where executive, judicial, or
other public bodies make that ultimate choice, they too must be
accountable for their actions.
7) Party government: Rulers may not be nominated, promoted, and
disciplined in their activities by well-organized and programmatically
coherent political parties, although where they are not, it may prove
more difficult to form an effective government.
8) Pluralism: The political process may not be based on a multiplicity
of overlapping, voluntaristic, and autonomous private groups. However, .
where there are monopolies of representation, hierarchies of association,
and obligatory memberships, it is likely that the interests involved will
be more closely linked to the state and the separation between the public
and private spheres of action will be much less distinct.
9) Federalism: The territorial division of authority may not invo·lve
multiple levels and local autonomies, least of all ones enshrined in a
constitutional document, although some dispersal of power across
territorial and/or functional units is characteristic of all democracies.
10) Presidentialism: The chief executive officer may not be a single
person and he or she may not be directly elected by the citizenry as a
whole, although some concentration of authority is present in all
democracies, even if it is exercised collectively and only held indirectly
accountable to the electorate.
11) Checks and Balances: It is not necessary that the different
branches of government be systematically pitted against one another,
although governments by assembly, by executive concentration, by
judicial command, or even by dictatorial fiat (as in time of war) must be
ultimately accountable to the citizenry as a whole.
While each of the above has been named as an essential component
of democracy, they should instead be seen either as indicators of this or
that type of democracy, or else as useful standards for evaluating the
performance of particular regimes. To include them as part of the generic
definition of democracy itself would be to mistake the American polity
for the universal model of democratic governance. Indeed, the
parliamentary, consociational, unitary, corporatist, and concentrated
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 165

Schmitter & Karl 85

arrangements of continental Europe may have some unique virtues for

guiding polities through the uncertain transition from autocratic to
democratic rule. 12

What Democracy Is Not

We have attempted to convey the general meaning of modern

democracy without identifying it with some particular set of rules and
institutions or restricting it to some specific culture or level of
development. We have also argued that it cannot be reduced to the
regular holding of elections or equated with a particular notion of the
role of the state, but we have not said much more about what democracy
is not or about what democracy may not be capable of producing.
There is an understandable temptation to load too many expectations
on this concept and to imagine that by attaining democracy, a society
will have resolved all of its political, social, economic, administrative,
and cultural problems. Unfortunately, "all good things do not necessarily
go together."
First, democracies are not necessarily more efficient economically than
other fonns of government. Their rates of aggregate growth, savings, and
investment may be no better than those of nondemocracies. This is
especially likely during the transition, when propertied groups and
administrative elites may respond to real or imagined threats to the
"rights" they enjoyed under authoritarian rule by initiating capital flight,
disinvestment, or sabotage. In time, depending upon the type of
democracy, benevolent long-tenn effects upon income distribution,
aggregate demand, education, productivity, and creativity may eventually.
combine to improve economic and social perfonnance, but it is certainly
too much to expect that these improvements will occur
immediately-much less that they will be defining characteristics of
democratization.
Second, democracies are not necessarily more efficient
administratively. Their capacity to make decisions may even be slower
than that of the regimes they replace, if only because more actors must
be consulted. The costs of getting things done may be higher, if only
because "payoffs" have to be made to a wider and more resourceful set
of clients (although one should never underestimate the degree of
corruption to be found within autocracies). Popular satisfaction with the
new democratic government's perfonnance may not even seem greater,
if only because necessary compromises often please no one completely,
and because the losers are free to complain.
Third, democracies are not likely to appear more orderly, consensual,
stable, or governable than the autocracies they replace. This is partly a
byproduct of democratic freedom of expression, but it is also a reflection
of the likelihood of continuing disagreement over new rules and
166 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

86 Journal of Democracy

institutions. These products of imposition or compromise are often

initially quite ambiguous in nature and uncertain in effect until actors
have learned how to use them. What is more, they come in the aftermath
of serious struggles motivated by high ideals. Groups and individuals
with recently acquired autonomy will test
certain rules, protest against the actions of
"...democracies certain institutions, and insist on
will have renegotiating their part of the bargain. Thus
more open the presence of antisystem parties should
societies and be neither surprising nor seen as a failure
polities than the of democratic consolidation. What counts is
autocracies whether such parties are willing, however
they replace, but reluctantly, to play by the general rules of
not necessarily bounded uncertainty and contingent consent.
more open Governability is a challenge for all
economies." regimes, not just democratic ones. Given
the political exhaustion and loss of
legitimacy that have befallen autocracies
from sultanistic Paraguay to totalitarian Albania, it may seem that only
democracies can now be expected to govern effectively and legitimately.
Experience has shown, however, that democracies too can lose the ability
to govern. Mass publics can become disenchanted with their performance.
Even more threatening is the temptation for leaders to fiddle with
procedures and ultimately undermine the principles of contingent consent
and bounded uncertainty. Perhaps the most critical moment comes once
the politicians begin to settle into the more predictable roles and relations
of a consolidated democracy. Many will find their expectations frustrated;
some will discover that the new rules of competition put them at a
disadvantage; a few may even feel that their vital interests are threatened
by popular majorities.
Finally, democracies will have more open societies and polities than
. the autocracies they replace, but not necessarily more open economies.
Many of today's most successful and well-established democracies have
historically resorted to protectionism and closed borders, and have relied
extensively upon public institutions to promote economic development.
While the long-term compatibility between democracy and capitalism
does not seem to be in doubt, despite their continuous tension, it is not
clear whether the promotion of such liberal economic goals as the right
of individuals to own property and retain profits, the clearing function
of markets, the private settlement of disputes, the freedom to produce
without government regulation, or the privatization of state-owned
enterprises necessarily furthers the consolidation of democracy. After all,
democracies do need to levy taxes and regulate certain transactions,
especially where private monopolies and oligopolies exist. Citizens or
their representatives may decide that it is desirable to protect the rights
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 167

Schmitter & Karl 87

of collectivities from encroachment by individuals, especially propertied

ones, and they may choose to set aside certain forms of property for
public or cooperative ownership, In short, notions of economic liberty
that are currently put forward in neoliberal economic models are not
synonymous with political freedom-and may even impede it.
Democratization will not necessarily bring in its wake economic
growth, social peace, administrative efficiency, political harmony, free
markets, or "the end of ideology," Least of all will it bring about "the
end of history," No doubt some of these qualities could make the
consolidation of democracy easier, but they are neither prerequisites for
it nor immediate products of it. Instead, what we should be hoping for
is the emergence of political institutions that can peacefully compete to
form governments and influence public policy, that can channel social
and economic conflicts through regular procedures, and that have
sufficient linkages to civil society to represent their constituencies and
commit them to collective courses of action. Some types of democracies,
especially in developing countries, have been unable to fulfill this
promise, perhaps due to the circumstances of their transition from
authoritarian rule. 13 The democratic wager is that such a regime, once
established, will not only persist by reproducing itself within its initial
confining conditions, but will eventually expand beyond them.14 Unlike
authoritarian regimes, democracies have the capacity to modify their rules
and institutions consensually in response to changing circumstances. They
may not immediately produce all the goods mentioned above, but they
stand a better chance of eventually doing so than do autocracies.

NOTES
L For a comparative analysis of the recent regime changes in southern Europe and
Latin America, see Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead,
eds" Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986). For another compilation that adopts a more structural approach see Larry
Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing
Countries, vols. 2, 3, and 4 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989).
2. Numerous attempts have been made to codify and quantify the existence of
democracy across political systems. The best known is probably Freedom House's
Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, published since 1973 by
Greenwood Press and since 1988 by University Press of America. Also see Charles
Humana, World Human Rights Guide (New York: Facts on File, 1986).
3. The definition most commonly used by American social scientists is that of Joseph
Schumpeter: "that institutional arrangement for aniving at political decisions to which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's
vote" Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen and Unwin. 1943),
269. We accept certain aspects of the classical procedural approach to modem democracy.
but differ primarily in our emphasis on the accountability of rulers to citizens and the
relevance of mechanisms of competition other than elections.
4. Not only do some countries practice a stable form of democracy without a formal
constitution (e.g., Great Britain and Israel), but even more countries have constitutions and
168 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

88 Journal of Democracy

legal codes that offer no guarantee of reliable practice. On paper, Stalin's 1936
constitution for the USSR was a virtual model of democratic rights and entitlements.
5. For the most valiant attempt to make some sense out of this thicket of distinctions,
see Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in Handbook of Political Science,
eds. Fred 1. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addision Wesley, 1975),
175-411.
6. "Publius" (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison), The Federalist
Papers (New York: Anchor Books, 1961). The quote is from Number 10.
7. See Terry Karl, "Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in El
Salvador," in Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985, eds. Paul Drake
and Eduardo Silva (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, Center for
US/Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1986), 9-36.
8. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2 vols. (New York: Vintage Books,
1945).
9. This fear of overloaded government and the imminent collapse of democracy is well
reflected in the work of Samuel P. Huntington during the 1970s. See especially Michel
Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (New York:
New York University Press, 1975). For Huntington's (revised) thoughts about the prospects
for democracy, see his "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," Political Science'
Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984): 193-218.
10. Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1982), 11.
11. Robert Dahl, After the Revolution: Authority in a Good Society (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1970).
12. See Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy 1 (Winter
1990): 51-69, and the ensuing discussion by Donald Horowitz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and
Juan Linz in Journal of Democracy 1 (Fall 1990): 73-91.
13. Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative
Politics 23 (October 1990): 1-23.
14. Otto Kirchheiiner, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs,"
American Political SCience Review 59 (1965): 964-974.
 [8]
THE END OF THE
TRANSITION PARADIGM
Thomas Carothers

Thomas Carothers is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endow-

ment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. He is the author of
many works on democracy promotion, including Aiding Democracy
Abroad: The Learning Curve (1999), and is the coeditor with Marina
Ottaway of Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion
(2000).

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, trends in seven different

regions converged to change the political landscape of the world: I) the
fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in the mid-
1970s; 2) the replacement of military dictatorships by elected civilian
governments across Latin America from the late 1970s through the late
1980s; 3) the decline of authoritarian rule in parts of East and South
Asia starting in the mid-1980s; 4) the collapse of communist regimes in
Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s; 5) the breakup of the Soviet
Union and the establishment of 15 post-Soviet republics in 1991; 6) the
decline of one-party regimes in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa in the
first half of the 1990s; and 7) a weak but recognizable liberalizing trend
in some Middle Eastern countries in the 1990s.
The causes, shape, and pace of these different trends varied con-
siderably. But they shared a dominant characteristic-simultaneous
movement in at least several countries in each region away from dic-
tatorial rule toward more liberal and often more democratic governance.
And though differing in many ways, these trends influenced and to some
extent built on one another. As a result, they were considered by many
observers, especially in the West;.as component parts of a larger whole,
a global democratic trend that thanks to Samuel Huntington has widely
come to be known as the "third wave" of democracy. I
This striking tide of political change was seized upon with enthusiasm
by the U.S. government and the broader U.S. foreign policy community.
As early as the mid-1980s, President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State
170 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

6 iOllmai of Democracy

George Shultz, and other high-level U.S. officials were referring regularly
to "the worldwide democratic revolution." During the 1980s, an active
array of governmental, quasi-governmental, and nongovernmental
organizations devoted to promoting democracy abroad sprang into being.
This new democracy-promotion community had a pressing need for an
analytic framework to conceptualize and'respond to the ongoing political
events. Confronted with the initial parts of the third wave-democ-
ratization in Southern Europe, Latin America, and a few countries in
Asia (especially the Philippines)-the U.S. democracy community rapid-
ly embraced an analytic model of democratic transition. It was derived
principally from their own interpretation of the patterns of democratic
change taking place, but also to a lesser extent from the early works of
the emergent academic field of "transitology," above all the seminal
work of Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter."
As the third wave spread to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, sub-
Saharan Africa, and elsewhere in the 1990s, democracy promoters
extended this model as a universal paradigm for understanding democ-
ratization. It became ubiquitous in U.S. policy circles as a way of talking
about, thinking about, and designing interventions in processes of
political change around the world. And it stayed remarkably constant
despite many variations in those patterns of political change and a stream
of increasingly diverse scholarly views about the course and nature of
democratic transitions. 1
The transition paradigm has been somewhat useful during a time of
momentous and often surprising political upheaval in the world. But it
is increasingly clear that reality is no longer conforming to the model.
Many countries that policy makers and aid practitioners persist in calling
"transitional" are not in transition to democracy, and of the democratic
transitions that are under way, more than a few are not following the
model. Sticking with the paradigm beyond its useful life is retarding
evolution in the field of democratic assistance and is leading policy
makers astray in other ways. It is time to recognize that the transition
paradigm has outlived its usefulness and to look for a better lens.

Core Assumptions
Five core assumptions define the transition paradigm. The first, which
is an umbrella for all the others, is that any country moving away from
dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward
democracy. Especially in the first half of the 1990s, when political change
accelerated in many regions, numerous policy makers and aid prac-
titioners reflexively labeled any formerly authoritarian country that was
attempting some political liberalization as a "transitional country." The
set of "transitional countries" swelled dramatically, and nearly 100
countries (approximately 20 in Latin America, 25 in Eastern Europe
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 171

Thomas Carothers 7

and the former Soviet Union, 30 in sub-Saharan Africa, 10 in Asia, and

5 in the Middle East) were thrown into the conceptual pot of the transition
paradigm, Once so labeled, their political life was automatically analyzed
in terms of their movement toward or away from democracy, and they
were held up to the implicit expectations of the paradigm, as detailed
below. To cite just one especially astonishing example, the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) continues to describe the
Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), a strife-wracked country
undergoing a turgid, often opaque, and rarely very democratic process
of political change, as a country in "transition to a democratic, free market
society."4
The second assumption is that democratization tends to unfold in a
set sequence of stages. First there occurs the opening, a period of
democratic ferment and political liberalization in which cracks appear
in the ruling dictatorial regime, with the most prominent fault line being
that between hardliners and softEners. There follows the breakthrough-
the collapse of the regime and the rapid emergence of a new, democratic
system, with the coming to power of a new government through national
elections and the establishment of a democratic institutional structure,
often through the promulgation of a new constitution. After the transition
comes consolidation, a slow but purposeful process in which democratic
forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of
state institutions, the regularization of elections, the strengthening of
civil society, and the overall habituation of the society to the new
democratic "rules of the game."5
Democracy activists admit that it is not inevitable that transitional
countries will move steadily on this assumed path from opening and
breakthrough to consolidation. Transitional countries, they say, can and
do go backward or stagnate as well as move forward along the path. Yet
even the deviations from the assumed sequence that they are willing to
acknowledge are defined in terms of the path itself. The options are all
cast in terms of the speed and direction with which countries move on
the path, not in terms of movement that does not conform with the path
at all. And at least in the peak years of the third wave, many democracy
enthusiasts clearly believed that, while the success of the dozens of new
transitions was not assured, democratization was in some important sense
a natural process, one that was likely to flourish once the initial break-
through occurred. No small amount of democratic teleology is implicit
in the transition paradigm, no matter how much its adherents have denied
it. 6
Related to the idea of a core' sequence of democratization is the third
assumption-the belief in the determinative importance of elections.
Democracy promoters have not been guilty-as critics often charge-
of believing that elections equal democracy. For years they have
advocated and pursued a much broader range of assistance programs
172 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

8 Journal of Democracy

than just elections-focused efforts. Nevertheless, they have tended to

hold very high expectations for what the establishment of regular,
genuine elections will do for democratization. Not only will elections
give new postdictatorial government~ democratic legitimacy, they
believe, but the elections will serve to broaden and deepen political
participation and the democratic accountability of the state to its citizens.
In other words, it has been assumed that in attempted transitions to
democracy, elections will be not just a foundation stone but a key
generator over time of further democratic reforms.
A fourth assumption is that the underlying conditions in transitional
countries-their economic level, political history, institutional legacies,
ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, or other "structural" features-
will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the
transition process. A remarkable characteristic of the early period of the
third wave was that democracy seemed to be breaking out in the most
unlikely and unexpected places, whether Mongolia, Albania, or
Mauritania. All that seemed to be necessary for democratization was a
decision by a country'spolitical elites to move toward democracy and
an ability on the part of those elites to fend off the contrary actions of
remaining antidemocratic forces.
The dynamism and remarkable scope of the third wave buried old,
deterministic, and often culturally noxious assumptions about democracy,
such as that only countries with an American-style middle class or a
heritage of Protestant individualism could become democratic. For policy
makers and aid practitioners this new outlook was a break from the long-
standing Cold War mindset that most countries in the developing world
were "not ready for democracy," a mindset that dovetailed with U.S.
policies of propping up anticommunist dictators around the world. Some
of the early works in transitology also reflected the "no preconditions"
view of democratization, a shift within the academic literature that had
begun in 1970 with Dankwart Rustow' s seminal article, "Transitions to
Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model."7 For both the scholarly and
policy communities, the new "no preconditions" outlook was a
gratifyingly optimistic, even liberating view that translated easily across
borders as the encouraging message that, when it comes to democracy,
"anyone can do it."
Fifth, the transition paradigm rests on the assumption that the
democratic transitions making up the third wave are being built on
coherent, functioning states. The process of democratization is assumed
to include some redesign of state institutions-such as the creation of
new electoral institutions, parliamentary reform, and judicial reform-
but as a modification of already functioning states. 8 As they arrived at
their frameworks for understanding democratization, democracy aid
practitioners did not give significant attention to the challenge of a society
trying to democratize while it is grappling with the reality of building a
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 173

Thomas Carothers 9

state from scratch or coping with an existent but largely nonfunctional

state. This did not appear to be an issue in Southern Europe or Latin
America, the two regions that served as the experiential basis for the
formation of the transition paradigm. To the extent that democracy
promoters did consider the possibility of state-building as part of the
transition process, they assumed that democracy-building and state-
building would be mutually reinforcing endeavors or even two sides of
the same coin.

Into the Gray Zone

We turn then from the underlying assumptions of the paradigm to the
record of experience. Efforts to assess the progress of the third wave are
sometimes rejected as premature. Democracy is not built in a day,
democracy activists assert, and it is too early to reach judgments about
the results of the dozens of democratic transitions launched in the last
two decades. Although it is certainly true that the current political
situations of the "transitional countries" are not set in stone, enough
time has elapsed to shed significant light on how the transition paradigm
is holding up.
Of the nearly 100 countries considered as "transitional" in recent
years, only a relatively small number-probably fewer than 20-are
clearly en route to becoming successful, well-functioning democracies
or at least have made some democratic progress and still enjoy a positive
dynamic of democratization. 9 The leaders of the group are found
primarily in Central Europe and the Baltic region-Poland, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia-though there are a few in
South America and East Asia, notably Chile, Uruguay, and Taiwan.
Those that have made somewhat less progress but appear to be still
advancing include Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Mexico, Brazil, Ghana,
the Philippines, and South Korea.
By far the majority of third-wave countries have not achieved
relatively well-functioning democracy or do not seem to be deepening
or advancing whatever democratic progress they have made. In a small
number of countries, initial political openings have clearly failed and
authoritarian regimes have resolidified, as in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Belarus, and Togo. Most of the "transitional countries," however, are
neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy. They have
entered a political gray zone. 10 They have some attributes of democratic
political life, including at least limited political space for opposition
parties and independent civil ~ociety, as well as regular elections and
democratic constitutions. Yet they suffer from serious democratic
deficits, often including poor representation of citizens' interests, low
levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the
law by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy. very low
174 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

10 Journal of Democracy

levels of public confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor

institutional performance by the state.
As the number of countries falling in between outright dictatorship
and well-established liberal democracy has swollen, political analysts
have proffered an array of "qualified democracy" terms to characterize
them, including semi-democracy, formal democracy, electoral
democracy, fac;ade democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak democracy,
partial democracy, illiberal democracy, and virtual democracy. II Some
of these terms, such as "fac;ade democracy" and "pseudo-democracy,"
apply only to a fairly specific subset of gray-zone cases. Other terms,
such as "weak democracy" and "partial democracy," are intended to have
much broader applicability. Useful though these terms can be, especially
when rooted in probing analysis such as 0' Donnell's work on "delegative
democracy," they share a significant liability: By describing countries
in the gray zone as types of democracies, analysts are in effect trying to
apply the transition paradigm to the very countries whose political
evolution is calling that paradigm into question. 12 Most of the "qualified
democracy" terms are used to characterize countries as being stuck
somewhere on the assumed democratization sequence, usually at the start
of the consolidation phase.
The diversity of political patterns within the gray zone is vast. Many
possible subtypes or subcategories could potentially be posited, and much
work remains to be done to assess the nature of gray-zone politics. As a
first analytic step, two broad political syndromes can be seen to be
common in the gray zone. They are not rigidly delineated political-system
types but rather political patterns that have become regular and somewhat
entrenched. Though they have some characteristics in common, they
differ in crucial ways and basically are mutually exclusive.
The first syndrome is feckless pluralism. Countries whose political
life is marked by feckless pluralism tend to have significant amounts of
political freedom, regular elections, and alternation of power between
genuinely different political groupings. Despite these positive features,
however, democracy remains shallow and troubled. Political partici-
pation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting.
Political elites from all the major parties or groupings are widely per-
ceived as corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective. The alternation of
power seems only to trade the country's problems back and forth from
one hapless side to the other. Political elites from all the major parties
are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest, and not serious
about working for their country. The public is seriously disaffected from
politics, and while it may still cling to a belief in the ideal of democracy,
it is extremely unhappy about the political life of the country. Overall,
politics is widely seen as a stale, corrupt, elite-dominated domain that
delivers little good to the country and commands equally little respect.
And the state remains persistently weak. Economic policy is often poorly
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 175

Thomas Carothers II

conceived and executed, and economic performance is frequently bad

or even calamitous. Social and political reforms are similarly tenuous,
and successive governments are unable to make headway on most of
the major problems facing the country, from crime and corruption to
health, education, and public welfare generally.
Feckless pluralism is most common in Latin America, a region where
most countries entered their attempted democratic transitions with
diverse political parties already in place yet also with a deep legacy of
persistently poor performance of state institutions. Nicaragua, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Panama, Honduras, and Bolivia all fall into this category,
as did Venezuela in the decade prior to the election of Hugo Chavez.
Argentina and Brazil hover uneasily at its edge. In the postcommunist
world, Moldova, Bosnia, Albania, and Ukraine have at least some
significant signs of the syndrome, with Romania and Bulgaria teetering
on its edge. Nepal is a clear example in Asia; Bangladesh, Mongolia,
and Thailand may also qualify. In sub-Saharan Africa, a few states, such
as Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone, may be cases of
feckless pluralism, though alternation of power remains rare generally
in that region.
There are many variations of feckless pluralism. In some cases, the
parties that alternate power between them are divided by paralyzing
acrimony and devote their time out of power to preventing the other
party from accomplishing anything at all, as in Bangladesh. In other
cases, the main competing groups end up colluding, formally or
informally, rendering the alternation of power unhelpful in a different
manner, as happened in Nicaragua in the late 1990s. In some countries
afflicted with feckless pluralism, the political competition is between
deeply entrenched parties that essentially operate as patronage networks
and seem never to renovate themselves, as in Argentina or Nepal. In
others, the alternation of power occurs between constantly shifting
political groupings, short-lived parties led by charismatic individuals
or temporary alliances in search of a political identity, as in Guatemala
or Ukraine. These varied cases nonetheless share a common condition
that seems at the root of feckless pluralism-the whole class of political
elites, though plural and competitive, are profoundly cut off from the
citizenry, rendering political life an ultimately hollow, unproductive
exercise.

Dominant-Power Politics
The most comm9n other political syndrome in the gray zone is
dominant-power politics. Countries with this syndrome have limited but
still real political space, some political contestation by opposition groups,
and at least most of the basic institutional forms of democracy. Yet one
political grouping-whether it is a movement, a party, an extended
176 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

12 JOllmal of'Democracy

family, or a single leader-dominates the system in such a way that

there appears to be little prospect of alternation of power in the
foreseeable future.
Unlike in countries beset with feckless pluralism, a key political
problem in dominant-power countries is the blurring of the line between
the state and the ruling party (or ruling politicaf.forces). The state's
main assets-that is to say, the state as a source of money, jobs, public
information (via state media), and police power-are gradually put in
the direct service of the ruling party. Whereas in feckless pluralism
judiciaries are often somewhat independent, the judiciary in dominant-
power countries is typically cowed, as part of the one-sided grip on
power. And while elections in feckless-pluralist countries are often quite
free and fair, the typical pattern in dominant-power countries is one of
dubious but not outright fraudulent elections in which the ruling group
tries to put on a good-enough electoral show to gain the approval of the
international community while quietly tilting the electoral playing field
far enough in its own favor to ensure victory.
As in feckless-pluralist systems, the citizens of dominant-power
systems tend to be disaffected from politics and cut off from significant
political participation beyond voting. Since there is no alternation of
power, however, they are less apt to evince the "a pox on all your houses"
political outlook pervasive in feckless-pluralist systems. Yet those
opposition political parties that do exist generally are hard put to gain
much public credibility due to their perennial status as outsiders to the
main halls of power. Whatever energies and hopes for effective
opposition to the regime remain often reside in civil society groups,
usually a loose collection of advocacy NGOs and independent media
(often funded by Western donors) that skirmish with the government on
human rights, the environment, corruption, and other issues of public
interest.
The state tends to be as weak and poorly performing in dominant-
power countries as in feckless-pluralist countries, though the problem
is often a bureaucracy decaying under the stagnancy of de facto one-
party rule rather than the disorganized, unstable nature of state
management (such as the constant turnover of ministers) typical of
feckless pluralism. The long hold on power by one political group usually
produces large-scale corruption and crony capitalism. Due to the
existence of some political openness in these systems, the leaders do
often feel some pressure from the public about corruption and other
abuses of state power. They even may periodically declare their intention
to root out corruption and strengthen the rule of law. But their deep-
seated intolerance for anything more than limited opposition and the
basic political configuration over which they preside breed the very
problems they publicly commit themselves to tackling.
Dominant-power systems are prevalent in three regions. In sub-
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 177

Thomas Carothers 13

Saharan Africa, the widely hailed wave of democratization that washed

over the region in the early 1990s has ended up producing many
dominant-power systems, In some cases, one-party states liberalized yet
ended up permitting only very limited processes of political opening, as
in Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Gabon, Kenya,
and Mauritania. In a few cases, old regimes were defeated or collapsed,
yet the new regimes have ended up in dominant-party structures, as in
Zambia in the 1990s, or the forces previously shunted aside have
reclaimed power, as in Congo (Brazzaville).
Dominant-power systems are found in the former Soviet Union as
well. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan fall
in this category. The other Central Asian republics and Belarus are better
understood as out-and-out authoritarian systems. The liberalization trend
that arose in the Middle East in the mid-1980s and has unfolded in fits
and starts ever since has moved some countries out of the authoritarian
camp into the dominant-power category. These include Morocco, Jordan,
Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Yemen. Dominant-power systems are scarce
outside of these three regions. In Asia, Malaysia and Cambodia count
as examples. In Latin America, Paraguay may be one case, and Venezuela
is likely headed toward becoming a second.
Dominant-power systems vary in their degree of freedom and their
political direction. Some have very limited political space and are close
to being dictatorships. Others allow much more freedom, albeit still with
limits. A few "transitional countries," including the important cases of
South Africa and Russia, fall just to the side of this syndrome. They
have a fair amount of political freedom and have held competitive
elections of some legitimacy (though sharp debate on that issue exists
with regard to Russia). Yet they are ruled by political forces that appear
to have a long-term hold on power (if one considers the shift from Yeltsin
to Putin more as a political transfer than an alternation of power), and it
is hard to imagine any of the existing opposition parties coming to power
for many years to come. If they maintain real political freedom and open
competition for power, they may join the ranks of cases, such as Italy
and Japan (prior to the 1990s) and Botswana, of longtime democratic
rule by one party. Yet due to the tenuousness of their new democratic
institutions, they face the danger of slippage toward the dominant-power
syndrome.
As political syndromes, both feckless pluralism and dominant-power
politics have some stability. Once in them, countries do not move out of
them easily. Feckless'pluralism achieves its own dysfunctional
equilibrium-the passing of power back and forth between competing
elites who are largely isolated from the citizenry but willing to play by
widely accepted rules. Dominant-power politics also often achieves a
kind of stasis, with the ruling group able to keep political opposition on
the ropes while permitting enough political openness to alleviate pressure
178 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

14 Journal of Democracy

from the public. They are by no means permanent political configu-

rations; no political configuration lasts forever. Countries can and do
move out of them--either from one to the other or out of either toward
liberal democracy or dictatorship. For a time in the 1990s, Ukraine
seemed stuck in dominant-power politics but may be.shifting to some-
thing more like feckless pluralism. Senegal was previously a clear case
of dominant-power politics but, with the opposition victory in the 2000
elections, may be moving toward either liberal democracy or feckless
pluralism.
Although many countries in the gray zone have ended up as examples
of either feckless pluralism or dominant-power politics, not all have. A
small number of "transitional countries" have moved away from
authoritarian rule only in the last several years, and their political trajec-
tory is as yet unclear. Indonesia, Nigeria, Serbia, and Croatia are four
prominent examples of this type. Some countries that experienced
political openings in the 1980s or 1990s have been so wracked by civil
conflict that their political systems are too unstable or incoherent to pin
down easily, though they are definitely not on a path of democratization.
The Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia
all represent this situation.

The Crash of Assumptions

Taken together, the political trajectories of most third-wave countries
call into serious doubt the transition paradigm. This is apparent if we
revisit the major assumptions underlying the paradigm in light of the
above analysis.
First, the almost automatic assumption of democracy promoters during
the peak years of the third wave that any country moving away from
dictatorship was "in transition to democracy" has often been inaccurate
and misleading. Some of those countries have hardly democratized at
all. Many have taken on a smattering of democratic features but show
few signs of democratizing much further and are certainly not following
any predictable democratization script. The most common political
patterns to date among the "transitional countries"-feckless pluralism
and dominant-power politics-include elements of democracy but should
be understood as alternative directions, not way stations to liberal
democracy. The persistence in official U.S. democracy-promotion circles
of using transitional language to characterize countries that in no way
conform to any democratization paradigm borders in some case on the
surreal-including not just the case of Congo cited above but many
others, such as Moldova ("Moldova's democratic transition continues
to progress steadily"), Zambia ("Zambia is ... moving steadily toward
... the creation of a viable multiparty democracy"), Cambodia ("policy
successes in Cambodia towards democracy and improved governance
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 179

Thomas Carothers 15

within the past 18 months are numerous"), and Guinea ("Guinea has
made significant strides toward building a democratic society")Y The
continued use of the transition paradigm constitutes a dangerous habit
of trying to impose a simplistic and often incorrect conceptual order on
an empirical tableau of considerable complexity.
Second, not only is the general label and concept of "transitional
country" unhelpful, but the assumed sequence of stages of democrati-
zation is defied by the record of experience. Some of the most encour-
aging cases of democratization in recent years-such as Taiwan, South
Korea, and Mexico-did not go through the paradigmatic process of
democratic breakthrough followed rapidly by national elections and a
new democratic institutional framework. Their political evolutions were
defined by an almost opposite phenomenon-extremely gradual, incre-
mental processes of liberalization with an organized political opposition
(not softliners in the regime) pushing for change across successive
elections and finally winning. And in many of the countries that did go
through some version of what appeared to be a democratic breakthrough,
the assumed sequence of changes-first settling constitutive issues then
working through second-order reforms-has not held. Constitutive issues
have reemerged at unpredictable times, upending what are supposed to
be later stages of transition, as in the recent political crises in Ecuador,
the Central African Republic, and Chad.
Moreover, the various assumed component processes of consoli-
dation-political party development, civil society strengthening, judicial
reform, and media development-almost never conform to the techno-
cratic ideal of rational sequences on which the indicator frameworks
and strategic objectives of democracy promoters are built. Instead they
are chaotic processes of change that go backwards and sideways as much
as forward, and do not do so in any regular manner.
The third assumption of the transition paradigm-the notion that
achieving regular, genuine elections will not only confer democratic
legitimacy on new governments but continuously deepen political
participation and democratic accountability-has often come up short.
In many "transitional countries," reasonably regular, genuine elections
are held but political participation beyond voting remains shallow and
governmental accountability is weak. The wide gulf between political
elites and citizens in many of these countries turns out to be rooted in
structural conditions, such as the concentration of wealth or certain
sociocultural traditions, that elections themselves do not overcome. It is
also striking how often electoral competition does little to stimulate the
renovation or development of political parties in many gray-zone
countries. Such profound pathologies as highly personalistic parties,
transient and shifting parties, or stagnant patronage-based politics appear
to be able to coexist for sustained periods with at least somewhat legiti-
mate processes of political pluralism and competition.
180 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

16 JOlll'l1ai of Democracy

These disappointments certainly do not mean that elections are

pointless in such countries or that the international community should
not continue to push for free and fair elections. But greatly reduced
expectations are in order as to what elections will accomplish as genera-
tors of deep-reaching democratic change. Nepal is a telling example in
this regard. Since 1990, Nepal has held many multiparty elections and
experienced frequent alternation of power. Yet the Nepalese public
remains highly disaffected from the political system and there is little
real sense of democratic accountability.
Fourth, ever since "preconditions for democracy" were enthusi-
astically banished in the heady early days of the third wave, a contrary
reality-the fact that various structural conditions clearly weigh heavily
in shaping political outcomes-has been working its way back in. Look-
ing at the more successful recent cases of democratization, for example,
which tend to be found in Central Europe, the Southern Cone, or East
Asia, it is clear that relative economic wealth, as well as past experience
with political pluralism, contributes to the chances for democratic suc-
cess. And looking comparatively within regions, whether in the former
communist world or sub-Saharan Africa, it is evident that the specific
institutional legacies from predecessor regimes strongly affect the
outcomes of attempted transitions.
During the 1990s, a number of scholars began challenging the "no
preconditions" line, with analyses of the roles that economic wealth,
institutional legacies, social class, and other structural factors play in
attempted democratic transitions. 14 Yet it has been hard for the democracy-
promotion community to take this work on board. Democracy promo-
ters are strongly wedded to their focus on political processes and
institutions. They have been concerned that trying to blend that focus
with economic or sociocultural perspectives might lead to the dilution or
reduction of democracy assistance. And having set up as organizations
with an exclusively political perspective, it is hard for democracy-
promotion groups to include other kinds of expertise or approaches.
Fifth, state-building has been a much larger and more problematic
issue than originally envisaged in the transition paradigm. Contrary to
the early assumptions of democracy-aid practitioners, many third-wave
countries have faced fundamental state-building challenges. Approxi-
mately 20 countries in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia
have had to build national state institutions where none existed before.
Throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa, the liberalizing political wave
of the 1990s ran squarely into the sobering reality of devastatingly weak
states. In many parts of Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia,
political change was carried out in the context of stable state structures,
but the erratic performance of those states complicated every step.
Where state-building from scratch had to be carried out, the core
impulses and interests of powerholders-such as locking in access to
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 181

Thomas Carothers 17

power and resources as quickly as possible-ran directly contrary to

what democracy-building would have required. In countries with existing
but extremely weak states, the democracy-building efforts funded by
donors usually neglected the issue of state-building. With their frequent
emphasis on diffusing power and weakening the relative power of the
executive branch-by strengthening the legislative and judicial branches
of government, encouraging decentralization, and building civil
society-they were more about the redistribution of state power than
about state-building. The programs that democracy promoters have
directed at governance have tended to be minor technocratic efforts,
such as training ministerial staff or aiding cabinet offices, rather than
major efforts at bolstering state capacity.

Letting Go
It is time for the democracy-promotion community to discard the
transition paradigm. Analyzing the record of experience in the many
countries that democracy activists have been labeling "transitional
countries," it is evident that it is no longer appropriate to assume:
• that most of these countries are actually in a transition to democracy;
• that countries moving away from authoritarianism tend to follow a
three-part process of democratization consisting of opening, break-
through, and consolidation;
• that the establishment of regular, genuine elections will not only
give new governments democratic legitimacy but foster a longer term
deepening of democratic participation and accountability;
• that a country's chances for successfully democratizing depend
primarily on the political intentions .and actions of its political elites
without significant influence from underlying economic, social, and
institutional conditions and legacies;
• that state-building is a secondary challenge to democracy-building
and largely compatible with it.
It is hard to let go of the transitional paradigm, both for the conceptual
order and for the hopeful vision it provides. Giving it up constitutes a
major break, but not a total one. It does not mean denying that important
democratic reforms have occurred in many countries in the past two
decades. It does not mean that countries in the gray zone are doomed
never to achieve well-functioning liberal democracy. It does not mean
that free and fair elections in "transitional countries" are futile or not
worth supporting. It does not mean that the United States and other
international actors should abandon efforts to promote democracy in
the world (if anything, it implies that, given how difficult democratization
is, efforts to promote it should be redoubled).
It does mean, however, that democracy promoters should approach
their work with some very different assumptions. They should start by
182 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

18 Jourl/al o{ Democracy

assuming that what is often thought of as an uneasy, precarious middle

ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is
actually the most common political condition today of countries in the
developing world and the postcom-
munist world. It is not an exceptional
category to be defined only in terms
What is often thought of of its not being one thing or the
as an uneasy, precarious other; it is a state of normality for
middle ground between many societies, for better or worse.
full-fledged democracy The seemingly continual surprise and
and outright dictatorship disappointment that Western political
is actually the most analysts express over the very fre:
common political quent falling short of democracy in
condition today of "transitional countries" should be
replaced with realistic expectations
countries in the
about the likely patterns of political
developing world and the life in these countries.
postcommunist world. Aid practitioners and policy makers
looking at politics in a country that
has recently moved away from
authoritarianism should not start by asking, "How is its democratic
transition going?" They should instead formulate a more open-ended
query, "What is happening politically?" Insisting on the former approach
leads to optimistic assumptions that often shunt the analysis down a
blind alley. To take one example, during the 1990s, Western policy
makers habitually analyzed Georgia's post-1991 political evolution as
a democratic transition, highlighting the many formal achievements, and
holding up a basically positive image of the country. Then suddenly, at
the end of the decade, the essential hollowness of Georgia's "democratic
transition" became too apparent to ignore, and Georgia is now suddenly
talked about as a country in serious risk of state failure or deep socio-
political crisis. 15
A whole generation of democracy aid is based on the transition
paradigm, above all the typical emphasis on an institutional "checklist"
as a basis for creating programs, and the creation of nearly standard
portfolios of aid projects consisting of the same diffuse set of efforts all
over-some judicial reform, parliamentary strengthening, civil society
assistance, media work, political party development, civic education,
and electoral programs. Much of the democracy aid based on this
paradigm is exhausted. Where the paradigm fits well~in the small
number of clearly successful transitions-the aid is not much needed.
Where democracy aid is needed most, in many of the gray-zone countries,
the paradigm fits poorly.
Democracy promoters need to focus in on the key political patterns
of each country in which they intervene, rather than trying to do a little
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 183

Thomas Carothers 19

of everything according to a template of ideal institutional forms, Where

feckless pluralism reigns, this means giving concentrated attention to
two interrelated issues: how to improve the variety and quality of the
main political actors in the society and how to begin to bridge the gulf
between the citizenry and the formal political system, Much greater
attention to political party development should be a major part of the
response, with special attention to encouraging new entrants into the
political party scene, changing the rules and incentive systems that shape
the current party structures, and fostering strong connections between
parties and civil society groups (rather than encouraging civil society
groups to stay away from partisan politics),
In dominant-power systems, democracy promoters should devote
significant attention to the challenge of helping to encourage the growth
of alternative centers of power, Merely helping finance the proliferation
of nongovernmental organizations is an inadequate approach to this
challenge, Again, political party development must be a top agenda item,
especially through measures aimed at changing the way political parties
are financed, It should include efforts to examine how the over-
concentration of economic power (a standard feature of dominant-power
systems) can be reduced as well as measures that call attention to and
work against the blurring of the line between the ruling party and the
state,
In other types of gray-zone countries, democracy promoters will need
to settle on other approaches. The message for all gray-zone countries,
however, is the same-falling back on a smorgasbord of democracy
programs based on the vague assumption that they all contribute to some
assumed process of consolidation is not good enough. Democracy aid
must proceed from a penetrating analysis of the particular core syndrome
that defines the political life of the country in question, and how aid
interventions can change that syndrome.
Moving beyond the transition paradigm also means getting serious
about bridging the longstanding divide between aid programs directed
at democracy-building and those focused on social and economic
development. USAID has initiated some work on this topic but has only
scratched the surface of what could become a major synthesis of disparate
domains in the aid world. One example of a topic that merits the
combined attention of economic aid providers and democracy promoters
is privatization programs. These programs have major implications for
how power is distributed in a society, how ruling political forces can
entrench themselves, and how,the public participates in major policy
decisions. Democracy promoters need to take a serious interest in these
reform efforts and learn to make a credible case to economists that they
should have a place at the table when such programs are being planned.
The same is true for any number of areas of socioeconomic reform that
tend to be a major focus of economic aid providers and that have
184 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

20 JOllrnal of Democracy

potentially significant effects on the underlying sociopolitical domain,

including pension reform, labor law reform, antitrust policy, banking
reform, and tax reform. The onus is on democracy-aid providers to
develop a broader conception of democracy work and to show that they
have something to contribute on the .~ain stage of the development-
assistance world.
These are only provisional ideas. Many other "next generation"
challenges remain to be identified. The core point, however, is plain:
The transition paradigm was a product of a certain time-the heady early
days of the third wave-and that time has now passed. It is necessary
for democracy activists to move on to new frameworks, new debates,
and perhaps eventually a new paradigm of political change-one suited
to the landscape of today, not the lingering hopes of an earlier era.

NOTES
The author would like to thank Jeffrey Krutz for his research assistance relating to this
article and Daniel Brumberg, Charles King, Michael McFauL Marina Ottaway, Chris
Sabatini, and Michael Shifter for their comments on the first draft.

I. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democrati:ation in the Late Twentieth

Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

2. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian

Rule: Telltative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986).

3. Ruth Collier argues that a similar transition paradigm has prevailed in the scholarly
writing on democratization. "The 'transitions literature,' as this current work has come
to be known, has as its best representative the founding essay by O'Donnell and Schmitter
(1986), which established a framework that is implicitly or explicitly followed in most
other contributions." Ruth Berins Collier, Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class
and Elites in Western Europe and South America (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), 5.

4. "Building Democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo," www.usaid.gm·!

democracy!afr!congo.html. Here and elsewhere in this article, I cite USAlD documents
because they are the most readily available practitioners' statements of guidelines and
political assessments, but I believe that my analysis applies equally well to most other
democracy-promotion organizations in the United States and abroad.

5. The conception of democratization as a predictable, sequential process of

incremental steps is vividly exemplified in USAID's "managing for results" assessment
system. See Handbook of Democracy alld Governallce Program Illdicators (Washington,
D.C.: USAID, August 1998).

6. Guillermo O'Donnell argues that the concept of democratic consolidation has

teleological qualities, in "Illusions About Consolidation," Journal of Democracy 7 (April
1996): 34-51. A response to O'Donnell's charge is found in Richard Gunther, P. Niki-
foros Diamandouros, and Hans-Jilrgen Puhle, "O'Donnell's 'Illusions': A Rejoinder,"
Journal of Democracy 7 (October 1996): 151-59.

7. See, for example, Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay 011

Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Dankwart
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 185

Thomas Carothers 21

Rustow's article "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Comparative Model," originally

appeared in Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970): 337-63.

8. USAID's current listing of the types of governance programs in its democracy-

assistance portfolio, for example, contains no examples of work on fundamental state-
building. See "Agency Objectives: Governance," 11lww.usaid.govldemocracylgov.html.

9. An insightful account of the state of the third wave is found in Larry Diamond,
"Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 20-37.

10. Larry Diamond uses the term "twilight zone" to refer to a sizeable but smaller
set of countries-electoral democracies that are in a zone of "persistence without
legitimation or institutionalization," in Developing Democracy: Taward Consolidation
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 22.

I J. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual

Innovation in Comparative Research," World Politics 49 (April 1997): 430-5 l.

12. Guillermo O'Donnell. "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5

(January 1994): 55-69.

13. These quotes are all taken from the country descriptions in the democracy-
building section of the USAID website, www.usaid.govldemocracy.html.

14. See, for example. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic
Experiments in Afi-ica: Regime Transitions il1 Comparative Perspective (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997): Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design
and Destruction of Socialism and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999): Ruth Collier, Paths Toward Democracy: Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Eve1yne Huber
Stephens, and John D. Stephens, CapiTaliST Developmel1l and Democracy (Chicago:
Chicago University Press. 1992); Adam Przeworksi, Democracy and the Market:
Political and Economic Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Adam Przeworksi and Fernando Limongi,
"Political Regimes and Economic Growth," JOlfmal of Economic Perspectives 7 (Summer
1993): 5 J-69.

15. See Charles King, "Potemkin Democracy," The National Il1Ierest 64 (Summer
2001): 93-104.
This page intentionally left blank
 [9]
ILLUSIONS ABOUT
CONSOLIDATION
Guillermo O'Donnell

Guillermo O'Donnell is Helen Kellogg Professor of Government and

International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. An earlier version
of this essay was first presented at a conference on "Consolidating
Third Wave Democracies: Trends and Challenges," held on 27-30
August 1995 in Taipei, Taiwan, under the auspices of the Institute for
National Policy Research of Taipei and the International Forum for
Democratic Studies of Washington, D.C.

Democracies used to be few in number, and most were located in the

northwestern quarter of the world. Over the last two decades, however,
many countries have rid themselves of authoritarian regimes. There are
many variations among these countries. Some of them have reverted to
new brands of authoritarianism (even if from time to time they hold
elections), while others have clearly embraced democracy. Still others
seem to inhabit a gray area; they bear a family resemblance to the old
established democracies, but either lack or only precariously possess
some of their key attributes. The bulk of the contemporary scholarly
literature tells us that these "incomplete" democracies are failing to
become consolidated, or institutionalized.
This poses two tasks. One is to establish a cutoff point that separates
alI democracies from all nondemocracies. This point's location depends
on the questions we ask, and so is always arbitrary. Many definitions
of democracy have been offered. I The one that I find particularly useful
is Robert Dahl's concept of "polyarchy." Once a reasonably we 1I-
delimited set of democracies is obtained, the second task is to examine
the criteria that a given stream of the literature uses for comparing cases
within this set. If the criteria are found wanting, the next step is to
propose alternative concepts for these comparisons. This is what I
attempt here, albeit in preliminary and schematic fashion.
Contemporary Latin America is my empirical referent, although my
discussion probably also applies to various newly democratized countries
188 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Guillermo O'Donnell 35

in other parts of the world. The main argument is that, contrary to what
most of current scholarship holds, the problem with many new poly-
archies is not that they lack institutionalization. Rather, the way in
which political scientists usually conceptualize some institutions prevents
us from recognizing that these polyarchies actually have two extremely
important institutions. One is highly formalized, but intermittent: elec-
tions. The other is informal, permanent, and pervasive: particularism (or
clientelism, broadly defined). An important fact is that, in contrast to
previous periods of authoritarian rule, particularism now exists in uneasy
tension with the formal rules and institutions of what I call the "full
institutional package" of polyarchy. These arguments open up a series
of issues that in future publications I will analyze with the detail and
nuance they deserve. My purpose at present is to furnish some elements
of what I believe are needed revisions in the conceptual and comparative
agenda for the study of all existing polyarchies, especially those that are
informally institutionalized. 2
Polyarchy, as defined by Dahl, has seven attributes: 1) elected
officials; 2) free and fair elections; 3) inclusive suffrage; 4) the right to
run for office; 5) freedom of expression; 6) alternative information; and
7) associational autonomy.3 Attributes 1 to 4 tell us that a basic aspect
of polyarchy is that elections are inclusive, fair, and competitive.
Attributes 5 to 7 refer to political and social freedoms that are
minimally necessary not only during but also between elections as a
condition for elections to be fair and competitive. According to these
criteria, some countries of Latin America currently are not polyarchies:
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Mexico have recently held elections,
but these were marred by serious irregularities before, during, and after
the voting.
Other attributes need to be added to Dahl's list. One is that elected
(and some appointed) officials should not be arbitrarily terminated before
the end of their constitutionally mandated terms (Peru's Alberto Fujimori
and Russia's Boris Yeltsin may have been elected in fair elections, but
they abolished polyarchy when they forcefully closed their countries'
congresses and fired their supreme courts). A second addition is that the
elected authorities should not be subject to severe constraints, vetoes, or
exclusion from certain policy domains by other, nonelected actors, espe-
cially the armed forces. 4 In this sense, Guatemala and Paraguay, as well
as probably EI Salvador and Honduras, do not qualify as polyarchies. 5
Chile is an odd case, where restrictions of this sort are part of a
constitution inherited frQm the authoritarian regime. But Chile clearly
meets Dahl's seven criteria of polyarchy. Peru is another doubtful case,
since the 1995 presidential elections were not untarnished, and the armed
forces retain tutelary powers over various policy areas. Third, there
should be an uncontested national territory that clearly defines the voting
population. 6 Finally, an appropriate definition of polyarchy should also
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 189

36 Journal of Democracy

include an intertemporal dimension: the generalized expectation that a

fair electoral process and its surrounding freedoms will continue into an
indefinite future,
These criteria leave us with the three polyarchies-Colombia, Costa
Rica, and Venezuela-whose origins date from before the wave of
democratization that began in the mid-1970s, and with nine others that
resulted from this wave: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua,
Panama, Uruguay and, with the caveats noted, Chile and Peru. Only in
the oldest Latin American polyarchy (Costa Rica) and in two cases of
redemocratization (Chile and Uruguay) do the executive branch,
congress, parties, and the judiciary function in a manner that is
reasonably close to their formal institutional rules, making them effective
institutional knots in the flow of political power and policy. Colombia
and Venezuela used to function like this, but do so no longer. These
two countries, jointly with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicara-
gua, Panama, and Peru-a set that includes a large majority of the Latin
American population and GNP-function in ways that current democratic
theory has ill prepared us to understand.
We must go back to the definition of polyarchy. This definition,
precise in regard to elections (attributes 1 to 4) and rather generic about
contextual freedoms (attributes 5 to 7), is mute with respect to
institutional features such as parliamentarism or presidentialism,
centralism or federalism, majoritarianism or consensualism, and the
presence or absence of a written constitution and judicial review. Also,
the definition of polyarchy is silent about important but elusive themes
such as if, how, and to what degree governments are responsive or
accountable to citizens between elections, and the degree to which the
rule of law extends over the country's geographic and social terrain. 7
These silences are appropriate: the definition of polyarchy, let us recall,
establishes a crucial cutoff point-one that separates cases where there
exist inclusive, fair, and competitive elections and basic accompanying
freedoms from all others, including not only unabashed authoritarian
regimes but also countries that hold elections but lack some of the
characteristics that jointly define polyarchy.
Among polyarchies, however, there are many vanatlons. These
differences are empirical, but they can also be normatively evaluated,
and their likely effect on the survival prospects of each polyarchy may
eventually be assessed. These are important issues that merit some
conceptual clarification.
By definition, all the Latin American cases that I have labeled poly-
archies are such because of a simple but crucial fact: elections are
institutionalized. By an institution I mean a regularized pattern of
interaction that is known, practiced, and accepted (if not necessarily
approved) by actors who expect to continue interacting under the rules
sanctioned and backed by that pattern. 8 Institutions are typically taken
190 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Guillermo O'Donnell 37

for granted, in their existence and continuity, by the actors who interact
with and through them. Institutions are "there," usually unquestioned
regulators of expectations and behavior. Sometimes, institutions become
complex organizations: they are supposed to operate under highly
formalized and explicit rules, and materialize in buildings, rituals, and
officials. These are the institutions on which both "prebehavioral" and
most of contemporary neo-institutionalist political science focus. An
unusual characteristic of elections qua institutions is that they are highly
formalized by detailed and explicit rules, but function intermittently and
do not always have a permanent organizational embodiment.
In all polyarchies, old and new, elections are institutionalized, both
in themselves and in the reasonable9 effectiveness of the surrounding
conditions of freedom of expression, access to alternative information,
and associational autonomy. Leaders and voters take for granted that in
the future inclusive, fair, and competitive elections will take place as
legally scheduled, voters will be properly registered and free from
physical coercion, and their votes will be counted fairly. It is also taken
for granted that the winners will take office, and will not have their
terms arbitrarily terminated. Furthermore, for this electoral process to
exist, freedom of opinion and of association (including the freedom to
form political parties) and an uncensored media must also exist.
Countries where elections do not have these characteristics do not
qualify as polyarchies. 1o
Most students of democratization agree that many of the new
polyarchies are at best poorly institutionalized. Few seem to have
institutionalized anything but elections, at least in terms of what one
would expect from looking at older polyarchies. But appearances can be
misleading, since other institutions may exist, even though they may not
be the ones that most of us would prefer or easily recognize.

Theories of "Consolidation"

When elections and their surrounding freedoms are institutionalized,

it might be said that polyarchy (or political democracy) is "consoli-
dated," i.e., likely to endure. This, jointly with the proviso of absence
of veto powers over elected authorities, is the influential definition of
"democratic consolidation" offered by Juan J. Linz, who calls it a state
of affairs "in which none of the major political actors, parties, or
organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any
alternative to democratic processes to gain power, and ... no political
institution or group has a claim to veto the action of democratically
elected decision makers .... To put it simply, democracy must be seen
as the 'only game in town.",11 This minimalist definition has important
advantages. Still, I see little analytical gain in attaching the term
"consolidated" to something that will probably though not certainly
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38 Journal of Democracy

endure-"democracy" and "consolidation" are terms too polysemic to

make a good pair.
Other authors offer more expanded definitions of democratic
consolidation, many of them centered on the achievement of a high
degree of "institutionalization,"12 Usually these definitions do not see
elections as an institution,13 They focus on complex organizations,
basically the executive, parties, congress, and sometimes the judiciary.
Many valuable studies have been conducted from this point of view. By
the very logic of their assessment of many new polyarchies as noninsti-
tutionalized, however, these studies presuppose, as their comparative
yardstick, a generic and somewhat idealized view of the old polyarchies.
The meaning of such a yardstick perplexes me: often it is unclear
whether it is something like an average of characteristics observed
within the set of old polyarchies, or an ideal type generated from some
of these characteristics, or a generalization to the whole set of the
characteristics of some of its members, or a normative statement of
preferred traits. Furthermore, this mode of reasoning carries a strong
teleological flavor. Cases that have not "arrived" at full institution-
alization, or that do not seem to be moving in this direction, are seen
as stunted, frozen, protractedly unconsolidated, and the like. Such a view
presupposes that there are, or should be, factors working in favor of
increased consolidation or institutionalization, but that countervailing
"obstacles" stymie a process of change that otherwise would operate
unfettered. 14 That some of these polyarchies have been in a state of
"protracted unconsolidation"15 for some 20 years suggests that there is
something extremely odd about this kind of thinking.
A recently published book on democratic consolidation in Southern
Europe is a case in point. 16 This is the first in a series of five volumes,
resulting from an eight-year project that involved, as coauthors and
discussants, many of the most active and distinguished students of
democratization. The introduction (pp. 1-32) and the conclusions (pp.
389-413) by the coeditors and codirectors of the project offer an
impressively learned distillation of these extensive scholarly exchanges.
These texts are also paradigmatic of the views that I am criticizing. The
editors use the concept of "trajectories of democratic transitions and
consolidations," with which, even though they warn that it "should in
no way be understood as implying a deterministic conceptual bias," they
intend to "capture and highlight the particular combination and interplay
of freedom and constraint at each successive stage of the democrati-
zation process" (p. xvi, emphasis added). Further on, they state, "We
regard continued movement towards the ideal type of democratic
consolidation as very significant" (p. 9, emphasis added). Consistent with
this view, most of Latin America-in contrast to Southern European
countries that the authors say became consolidated democracies in part
because they "leap-frogged" democratization and developmental stages-
192 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Guillermo O'Donnell 39

is seen as "still struggling with transitional problems of varying, and

often major, magnitude and intensity" (p. xiv-xvi, emphasis added). An
exception is Chile, where the transition is "moving towards consolida-
tion" (p. 19, emphasis added), and "seems to be well on its way to
successful completion" (p. 389, emphasis added). The Southern European
countries, after achieving consolidation, are said to be entering yet
another stage of "democratic persistence," which is the "end product of
a long democratization process" (p. xiii, passim).
One way or the other, polyarchies that are seen as unconsolidated,
noninstitutionalized, or poorly institutionalized are defined negatively, for
what they lack: the type and degree of institutionalization presumably
achieved by old polyarchies. Yet negative definitions shift attention away
from building typologies of polyarchies on the basis of the specific,
positively described traits of each type. 17 Such typologies are needed,
among other purposes, for assessing each type's likelihood of endurance,
for exploring its patterns of change, and for clarifying the various
dimensions on which issues of quality and performance of polyarchy
may be discussed and researched.
There is no theory that would tell us why and how the new
polyarchies that have institutionalized elections will "complete" their
institutional set, or otherwise become "consolidated." All we can say at
present is that, as long as elections are institutionalized, polyarchies are
likely to endure. We can add the hypothesis that this likelihood is
greater for polyarchies that are formally institutionalized. But this
proposition is not terribly interesting unless we take into account other
factors that most likely have strong independent effects on the survival
chances of polyarchies. 18 Consequently, calling some polyarchies
"consolidated" or "highly institutionalized" may be no more than saying
that they are institutionalized in ways that one expects and of which one
approves. Without a theory of how and why this may happen, it is at
best premature to expect that newer polyarchies will or should become
"consolidated" or "highly institutionalized." In any event, such a theory
can only be elaborated on the basis of a positive description of the main
traits of the pertinent cases.

The Importance of Informal Rules

Polyarchy is the happy result of centuries-long processes, mostly in

countries in the global Northwest. In spite of many variations among
these countries, polyarchy is embodied in an institutional package: a set
of rules and institutions (many of them complex organizations) that is
explicitly formalized' in constitutions and auxiliary legislation. Rules are
supposed to guide how individuals in institutions, and individuals
interacting with institutions, behave. The extent to which behavior and
expectations hew to or deviate from formal rules is difficult to gauge
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 193

40 Journal of Democracy

empirically, But when the fit is reasonably close, formal rules simplify
our task; they are good predictors of behavior and expectations. In this
case, one may conclude that all or most of the formal rules and
institutions of polyarchy are fully, or close to fully, institutionalized,19
When the fit is loose or practically nonexistent, we are confronted with
the double task of describing actual behavior and discovering the
(usually informal) rules that behavior and expectations do follow, Actors
are as rational in these settings as in highly formalized ones, but the
contours of their rationality cannot be traced without knowing the actual
rules, and the common knowledge of these rules, that they follow, One
may define this situation negatively, emphasizing the lack of fit between
formal rules and observed behavior. As anthropologists have long
known, however, this is no substitute for studying the actual rules that
are being followed; nor does it authorize the assumption that somehow
there is a tendency toward increasing compliance with formal rules. This
is especially true when informal rules are widely shared and deeply
rooted; in this case, it may be said that these rules (rather than the
formal ones) are highly institutionalized. 20
To some extent this also happens in the old polyarchies. The various
laments, from all parts of the ideological spectrum, about the decay of
democracy in these countries are largely a consequence of the visible
and apparently increasing gap between formal rules and the behavior of
all sorts of political actors. But the gap is even larger in many new
polyarchies, where the formal rules about how political institutions are
supposed to work are often poor guides to what actually happens.
Many new polyarchies do not lack institutionalization, but a fixation
on highly formalized and complex organizations prevents us from seeing
an extremely influential, informal, and sometimes concealed institution:
clientelism and, more generally, particularism. For brevity'S sake, I will
put details and nuances aside21 and use these terms to refer broadly to
various sorts of non universalistic relationships, ranging from hierarchical
particularistic exchanges, patronage, nepotism, and favors to actions that,
under the formal rules of the institutional package of polyarchy, would
be considered corrupt. 22
Particularism-like its counterparts, neopatrimonial 23 and delegative
conceptions and practices of rule-is antagonistic to one of the main
aspects of the full institutional package of polyarchy: the behavioral,
legal, and normative distinction between a public and a private sphere.
This distinction is an important aspect of the formal institutionalization
of polyarchy. Individuals performing roles in political and state
institutions are supposed to be guided not by particularistic motives but
by universalistic orientations to some version of the public good. The
boundaries between the public and the private are often blurred in the
old polyarchies, but the very notion of the boundary is broadly accepted
and, often, vigorously asserted when it seems breached by public
194 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Guillermo O'Donnell 41

officials acting from particularistic motives. Where particularism is

pervasive, this notion is weaker, less widely held, and seldom enforced.
But polyarchy matters, even in the institutional spheres that, against
their formal rules, are dominated by particularism. In congress, the
judiciary, and some actions of the executive, rituals and discourses are
performed as if the formal rules were the main guides of behavior. The
consequences are twofold. On one side, by paying tribute to the formal
rules, these rituals and discourses encourage demands that these rules be
truly followed and that public-oriented governmental behavior prevail.
On the other side, the blatant hypocrisy of many of these rituals and
discourses breeds cynicism about the institutions of polyarchy, their
incumbents, and "politicians" in general. As long as this second
consequence is highly visible, particularism is taken for granted, and
practiced as the main way of gaining and wielding political power. In
such polyarchies, particularism is an important part of the regime. 24
Polyarchies are regimes, but not all polyarchies are the same kind of
regime.
Here we see the ambiguity of the assertion made by Juan J. Linz,
Adam Przeworskj/s and others who argue that consolidation occurs
when democracy becomes "the only game in town." It is clear that these
authors are refeFJing to the formal rules of polyarchy. More generally,
even though they may not refer to "institutionalization," authors who
limit themselves to the term "consolidation" also assert, more or less
implicitly, the same close fit between formal rules and actual behavior. 26
For example, Przeworski argues that democratic consolidation occurs
"when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions."
But this does not preclude the possibility that the games played "inside"
the democratic institutions are different from the ones dictated by their
formal rules. Przeworski also states: "To put it somewhat more
technically, democracy is consolidated when compliance-acting within
the institutional framework-constitutes the equilibrium of the decentral-
ized strategies of all the relevant forces.'027 Clearly, Przeworski is
assuming that there is only one equilibrium, the one generated by a
close fit between formal rules and behavior. Yet however inferior they
may be in terms of performances and outcomes that we value, the
situations that I am describing may constitute an equilibrium, toO.28

A Theoretical Limbo

If the main criterion for democratic consolidation or institution-

alization is more or less explicitly a reasonably close fit between formal
rules and actual behavior, then what of countries such as Italy, Japan,
and India? These are long-enduring polyarchies where, by all indications,
various forms of particularism are rampant. Yet these cases do not
appear problematic in the literature I am discussing. That they are listed
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42 Journal of Democracy

as "consolidated" (or, at least, not listed as "unconsolidated") suggests

the strength-and the inconsistency---of this view, It attaches the label
"consolidated" to cases that clearly do not fit its arguments but that
have endured for a significantly longer period than the new polyarchies
have so far. This is a typical paradigmatic anomaly, It deals with these
cases by relegating them to a theoretical limbo,29 as if, because they are
somehow considered to be "consolidated," the big gaps between their
formal rules and behavior were irrelevant This is a pity, because
variations that are theoretically and empirically important for the study
of the whole set of existing polyarchies are thereby obscured.
Another confusing issue is raised by the requirement of "legitimacy"
that some definitions of consolidation add. Who must accept formal
democratic rules, and how deep must this acceptance run? Here, the
literature oscillates between holding that only certain leaders need adhere
to democratic principles and arguing that most of the country's people
should be democrats, and between requiring normative acceptance of
these principles and resting content with a mere perception that there is
no feasible alternative to democracy. The scope of this adherence is also
problematic: Is it enough that it refers to the formal institutions of the
regime, or should it extend to other areas, such as a broadly shared
democratic political culture?
Given these conceptual quandaries, it is not surprising that if is
impossible clearly to specify when a democracy has become "con-
solidated." To illustrate this point, consider the "tests" of democratic
consolidation that Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle propose. These
tests supposedly help them to differentiate the consolidated Southern
European cases from the unconsolidated Latin American, as well as East
European and Asian, ones. The indicators that "may constitute evidence
that a regime is consolidated" are: 1) "alternation in power between
former rivals";30 2) "continued widespread support and stability during
times of extreme economic hardship"; 3) "successful defeat and
punishment of a handful of strategically placed rebels"; 4) "regime
stability in the face of a radical restructuring of the party system"; and
5) "the absence of a politically significant antisystem party or social
movement" (pp. 12-13).
With respect to Latin America, it bears commenting in relation to
each of these points that: 1) alternations in government through peaceful
electoral processes have occurred in Latin America as frequently as in
Southern Europe; 2) in the former, support for regime stability has
persisted-in Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia, among other coun-
tries-even in the face of far more acute recessions than Southern
Europe has seen, and in the midst of quadruple-digit inflation; 3) the
record of punishment is poor, albeit with important exceptions in both
regions; 4) even when thinking about Italy today, it is hard to imagine
party-system restructurings more radical than the ones that occurred in
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Guillermo O'Donnell 43

Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador; and 5) "antisystem" political parties are as

absent from the Latin American as from the Southern European
polyarchies. The indicators of democratic consolidation invoked by these
authors (and shared by many others) suffer from extreme ambiguity.3]
Finally, one might note that their argument points toward a reductio ad
absurdum, for one could in following its logic argue that Latin
America's polyarchies are actually "more consolidated" because they
have endured more "severe tests" (p. 12) than their Southern European
counterparts.

Polyarchies, Particularism, and Accountability

It almost goes without saying that all actual cases exhibit various
combinations of universalism and particularism across various relevant
dimensions. This observation, however, should not lead to the Procrus-
tean solution of lumping all cases together; differences in the degree to
which each case· approximates either pole may justify their separate
classification and analysis. Of course, one may for various reasons prefer
a political process that adheres quite closely to the formal rules of the
full institutional package of polyarchy. Yet there exist polyarchies-some
of them as old as Italy, India, and Japan, or in Latin America,
Colombia, and Venezuela-that endure even though they do not function
as their formal rules dictate. To understand these cases we need to know
what games are really being played, and under what rules.
~ In many countries of the global East and South, there is an old and
deep split between the pays reel and the pays legal. Today, with many
of these countries claiming to be democracies and adopting a constitu-
tional framework, the persistence and high visibility of this split may not
threaten the survival of their polyarchies-but neither does it facilitate
overcoming the split. Institutions are resilient, especially when they have
deep historical roots; particularism is no exception. Particularism is a
permanent feature of human society; only recently, and only in some
places and institutional sites, has it been tempered by universalistic
norms and rules. In many new polyarchies, particularism vigorously
inhabits most formal political institutions, yet the incumbency of top
government posts is decided by the universalistic process of fairly
counting each vote as one. This may sound paradoxical but it is not; it
means that these are polyarchies, but they are neither the ones that the
theory of democracy had in mind as it grew out of reflection on the
political regimes of the global Northwest, nor what many studies of
democratization assume that a democracy should be or become.
That some polyarchies are informally institutionalized has important
consequences. Here I want to stress one that is closely related to the
blurring of the boundary between the private and the public spheres:
accountability, a crucial aspect of formally institutionalized polyarchy, is
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44 Journal of Democracy

seriously hindered. To be sure, the institutionalization of elections means

that retrospective electoral accountability exists, and a reasonably free
press and various active segments of society see to it that some
egregiously unlawful acts of government are exposed (if seldom
punished). Polyarchy, even if not formally institutionalized, marks a huge
improvement over authoritarian regimes of all kinds. What is largely
lacking, however, is another dimension of accountability, which I call
"horizontal." By this I mean the controls that state agencies are
supposed to exercise over other state agencies. All formally institution-
alized polyarchies include various agencies endowed with legally defined
authority to sanction unlawful or otherwise inappropriate actions by other
state agents. This is an often-overlooked expression of the rule of law
in one of the areas where it is hardest to implant, i.e., over state agents,
especially high-ranking officials. The basic idea is that formal institutions
have well-defined, legally established boundaries that delimit the proper
exercise of their authority, and that there are state agencies empowered
to control and redress trespasses of these boundaries by any official or
agency. These boundaries are closely related to the private-public
boundary, in that those who perform public roles are supposed to follow
universalistic and public-oriented rules, rather than their own particular
interests. Even though its actual functioning is far from perfect, this
network of boundaries and accountabilities is an important part of the
formal institutionalization of the full package of polyarchy.32
By contrast, little horizontal accountability exists in most new
polyarchies. Furthermore, in many of them the.! executive makes
strenuous, and often successful, efforts to erode whatever horizontal
accountability does exist. The combination of institutionalized elections,
particularism as a dominant political institution, and a big gap between
the formal rules and the way most political institutions actually work
makes for a strong affinity with delegative, not representative, notions
of political authority. By this I mean a caesaristic, ph~biscitarian
executive that once elected sees itself as empowered to govern the
country as it deems fit. Reinforced by the urgencies of severe socio-
economic crises and consonant with old volkisch, nonindividualistic
conceptions of politics, delegative practices strive headlong against
formal political institutionalization; congress, the judiciary, and various
state agencies of control are seen as hindrances placed in the way of the
proper discharge of the tasks that the voters have delegated to the
executive. The executive's efforts to weaken these institutions, invade
their legal authority, and lower their prestige are a logical corollary of
this view. 33 On the other hand, as Max Weber warned, institutions
deprived of real power and responsibility tend to act in ways that seem
to confirm the reasons adduced for this deprivation. In the cases that
concern us here, particularism becomes even more rampant in congress
and parties, courts ostensively fail to administer justice, and agencies of
198 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Guillermo O'Donnell 45

control are eliminated or reduced to passivity, This context encourages

the further erosion of legally established authority, renders the boundary
between public and private even more tenuous, and creates enormous
temptations for corruption.
In this sea of particularism and blurred boundaries, why does the
universalistic process of fair and competitive elections survive? Govern-
ments willing to tamper with laws are hardly solid guarantors of the
integrity of electoral processes. Part of the answer, at least with respect
to elections to top national positions, is close international attention and
wide reporting abroad of electoral irregularities. Fair elections are the
main, if not the only, characteristic that certifies countries as democratic
before other governments and international opinion. Nowadays this
certification has important advantages for countries and for those who
govern them. Within the country, elections are a moment when
something similar to horizontal accountability operates: parties other than
the one in government are present at the polling places, sharing an
interest in preventing fraud. Elections create a sharp focus on political
matters and on the symbols and rituals that surround the act of voting.
At this moment, the citizens' sense of basic fairness manifests itself with
special intknsity. Violations are likely to be immediately reported. Faced
with the protests that might ensue and their repercussions in the
international media, and considering the further damage that would come
from trying to impose obviously tainted results, most governments are
willing to run the risks inherent in fair and competitive elections.
Pervasive particularism, delegative rule, and weak horizontal
accountability have at least two serious drawbacks. The first is that the
generalized lack of control enables old authoritarian practices to reassert
themselves. 34 The second is that, in countries that inaugurated polyarchy
under conditions of sharp and increasing inequality, the making and
implementation of policy becomes further biased in favor of highly
organized and economically powerful interests.
In the countries that occupy us here, the more properly political,
democratic freedoms are effective: uncoerced voting; freedom of opinion,
movement, and association; and others already listed. But for large
sections of the population, basic liberal freedoms are denied or
recurrently trampled. The rights of battered women to sue their husbands
and of peasants to obtain a fair trial against their landlords, the
inviolability of domiciles in poor neighborhoods, and in general the right
of the poor and various minorities to decent treatment and fair access
to public agencies and courts are often denied. The effectiveness of the
whole ensemble of rights;. democratic and liberal, makes for full civil
and political citizenship. In many of the new polyarchies, individuals are
citizens only in relation to the one institution that functions in a manner
close to what its formal rules prescribe--elections. As for full citizen-
ship, only the members of a privileged minority enjoy it. 3s Formally
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 199

46 Journal of Democracy

institutionalized polyarchies exhibit various mixes of democracy,

liberalism, and republicanism (understood as a view that concurs with
liberalism in tracing a clear public-private distinction, but that adds an
ennobling and personally demanding conception of participation in the
public sphere), Informally institutionalized polyarchies are democratic, in
the sense just defined; when they add, as they often do, the plebis-
citarian component of delegative rule, they are also strongly majoritarian,
But their liberal and republican components are extremely weak.

Freeing Ourselves from Some Illusions

I have rapidly covered complicated terrain. 36 Lest there be any

misunderstanding, let me insist that I, too, prefer situations that get close
to real observance of the formal rules of polyarchy, a citizenry that
firmly approves democratic procedures and values, fair application of the
law in all social and geographical locations, and low inequality.
Precisely because of this preference, I have argued for the need to
improve our conceptual tools in the complex task of studying and
comparing the whole set of existing polyarchies. It is through a
nonteleological and, indeed, nonethnocentric, positive analysis of the
main traits of these polyarchies that we scholars can contribute to their
much-needed improvement. This is especially true of the polyarchies that
are institutionalized in ways we dislike and often overlook, even if they
do not-and some of them may never--closely resemble the "consoli-
dated democracies" of the Northwest.
For this purpose, we must begin by freeing ourselves from some
illusions. As an author who has committed most of the mistakes I
criticize here, I suspect that we students of democratization are still
swayed by the mood of the times that many countries have more or less
recently passed through. We believe that democracy, even in the rather
modest guise of polyarchy, is vastly preferable to the assortment of
authoritarian regimes that it has replaced. We shared in the joy when
those regimes gave way, and some of us participated in these historic
events. These were moments of huge enthusiasm and hope. Multitudes
demanded democracy, and international opinion supported them. The
demand for democracy had many meanings, but in all cases it had a
powerful common denominator: "Never Again!,,}7 Whatever confused,
utopian, or limited ideas anyone held concerning democracy, it was clear
that it meant getting rid of the despots once and for all. Democracy,
even if--Dr perhaps precisely because-it had so many different
meanings attached to it, was the central mobilizing demand that had to
be achieved and preserved forever. Somehow, it was felt, this democracy
would soon come to resemble the sort of democracy found in admired
countries of the Northwest-admired for their long-enduring regimes and
for their wealth, and because both things seemed to go together. As in
200 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Guillermo O'Donnell 47

these countries, after the transition democracy was to be stabilized, or

consolidated; the Northwest was seen as the endpoint of a trajectory that
would be largely traversed by getting rid of the authoritarian rulers. This
illusion was extremely useful during the hard and uncertain times of the
transition. Its residue is still strong enough to make democracy and
consolidation powerful, and consequently pragmatically valid, terms of
political discourse. 38 Their analytical cogency is another matter.
On the other hand, because the values that inspired the demands for
democracy are as important as ever, the present text is an effort toward
opening more disciplined avenues for the study of a topic-and a
concem-I share with most of the authors that I have discussed: the
quality, in some cases rather dismal, of the social life that is interwoven
with the workings of various types of polyarchy. How this quality might
be improved depends in part on how realistically we understand the past
and present situation of each case.

NOTES
For their comments on an earlier version of this text, I am grateful to Michael Coppedge,
Gabriela Ippolito-O'Donnell, Scott Mainwaring, Sebastian Mazzuca, Peter Moody, Gerardo
Munck, and Adam Przeworski.
1. Reflecting the lack of clearly established criteria in the literature, David Collier and
Steven Levitsky have inventoried and interestingly discussed the more than one hundred
qualifiers that have been attached to the term "democracy." Many such qualifiers are
intended to indicate that the respective cases are in some sense lacking the full attributes
of democracy as defined by each author. See Collier and Levitsky, "Democracy 'With
Adjectives': Finding Conceptual Order in Recent Comparative Research" (unpub!. ms.,
University of California-Berkeley, Political Science Department, 1995).
2. I have tried unsuccessfully to find terms appropriate to what the literature refers to
as highly versus noninstitutionalized (or poorly institutionalized), or as consolidated versus
unconsolidated democracies, with most of the old polyarchies belonging to the first terms
of these pairs, and most of the new ones to the second. For reasons that will be clear
below, I have opted for labeling the first group "formally institutionalized" and the second
"informally institutionalized," but not without misgivings: in the first set of countries, many
things happen outside formally prescribed institutional rules, while the second set includes
one highly formalized institution, elections.
3. This list is from Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1989), 221; the reader may want to examine further details of these
attributes, discussed by Dahl in this book.
4. See, especially, J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional
Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo
O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New
South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1992), 57-104; and Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What
Democracy Is. . and Is NOt," Journal of Democracy 2 (Summer 1991): 75-88.
5. See Terry Lynn Karl, "The Hybrid Regimes of Central America," Journal of
Democracy 6 (July 1995): 73-86; and "Imposing Consent? Electoralism vs. Democratiza-
tion in EI Salvador," in Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds., Elections and Democratization
in Latin America, 1980-85 (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies,
1986), 9-36.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 201

48 Journal of Democracy

6. See, especially, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition
and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Postcommunist Europe
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming); and Philippe Schmitter, "Dangers
and Dilemmas of Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5 (April 1994): 57-74.

7. For a useful listing of these institutional variations, see· Schmitter and Karl, "What
Democracy Is ... and Is Not."

8. For a more-detailed discussion of institutions, see my "Delegative Democracy,"

Journal of Democracy 5 (January 1994): 56-69.

9. The term "reasonable" is admittedly ambiguous. Nowhere are these freedoms

completely uncurtailed, if by nothing else than the political consequences of social
inequality. By "reasonable" I mean that there are neither de jure prohibitions on these
freedoms nor systematic and usually successful efforts by the government or private actors
to annul them.
10. On the other hand, elections can be made more authentically competitive by, say,
measures that diminish the advantages of incumbents or of economically powerful parties.
These are, of course, important issues. But the point I want to make at the moment is that
these differences obtain among countries that already qualify as polyarchies.
11. Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," Washington Quarterly 13 (1990): 156.
The assertion about "the only game in town" entails some ambiguities that I discllss
below.
12. Even though most definitions of democratic consolidation are centered around
"institutionalization" (whether explicitly or implicitly, by asserting acceptance or approval
of democratic institutions and their fonmal rules), they offer a wide variety of additional
criteria. My own count in a recent review of the literature is twelve; see Doh Chull Shin,
"On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory
and Research," World Politics 47 (October 1994): 135-70.
13. Even though he does not use this language, an exception is the definition of
democratic consolidation offered by J. Samuel Valenzuela, which is centered in what I call
here the institutionalization of elections and the absence of veto powers; see his
"Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings," 69.
14. It is high time for self-criticism. The tenm "stunted" I used jointly with Scott
Mainwaring and J. Samuel Valenzuela in the introduction to our Issues ill Democratic
Consolidation, 11. Furthermore, in my chapter in the same volume (pp. 17-56), I offer a
nonminimalist definition of democratic consolidation, and propose the concept of a "second
transition," from a democratically elected government to a consolidated democratic regime.
These concepts partake of the teleology I criticize here. This teleological view is
homologous to the one used by many modernization studies in the 1950s and 1960s; it
was abundantly, but evidently not decisively, criticized at the time. For a critique of the
concept of "democratic consolidation" that is convergent with mine, see Ben Ross
Schneider, "Democratic Consolidations: Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping
Arguments," Latin American Research Review 30 (1995): 215-34; Schneider concludes by
warning against "the fallacy of excessive universalism" (p. 231).
15. Philippe C. Schmitter with Terry Lynn Karl, "The Conceptual Travels of
Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?"
Slavic Review 63 (Spring 1994): 173-85.
16. Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds., The
Politics of Democratic COllsolidation: Southern Europe ill Comparative Perspective
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
17. We should remember that several typologies have been proposed for fonmally
institutionalized polyarchies; see, especially, Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of
Majoritarian alld Consensus Government ill Twenty-one Countries (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1984). This work has been extremely useful in advancing knowledge
202 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Guillermo O'Donnell 49

about these polyarchies, which underscores the need for similar efforts on the now greatly
expanded whole set of polyarchies. For an attempt in this direction see Carlos Acuna and
William Smith, "Future Politico-Economic Scenarios for Latin America," in William Smith,
Carlos Acuna, and Eduardo Gamarra, eds., Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in
Latin America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1993), 1-28.
18. Adam Przeworski and his collaborators found that higher economic development
and a parliamentary regime increase the average survival rate of polyarchies. These are
important findings, but the authors have not tested the impacts of socioeconomic inequality
and of the kind of informal institutionalization that I discuss below. Pending further
research, it is impossible to assess the causal direction and weight of all these variables.
I suspect that high socioeconomic inequality has a close relationship with informal
institutionalization. But we do not know if either or both, directly or indirectly, affect the
chances of survival of polyarchy, or if they might cancel the effect of economic
development that Przeworski et al. found. See Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi,
"Modernization: Theories and Facts" (Working Paper No.4, Chicago Center for
Democracy, University of Chicago, November 1994); and Adam Przeworski, Michael
Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies
Endure?" Journal of Democracy 7 (January 1996): 39-55.
19. A topic that does not concern me here is the extent to which formal rules are
institutionalized across various old polyarchies and, within them, across various issue areas,
though the variations seem quite important on both counts.
20. The lore of many countries is filled with jokes about the naive foreigner or the
native sucker who gets in trouble by following the formal rules of a given situation. I
have explored some of these issues with reference to Brazil and Argentina in "Democracia
en la Argentina: Micro y Macro" (Working Paper No.2, Notre Dame, Kellogg Institute,
1983); "Y a mf que me importa? Notas Sobre Sociabilidad y Polftica en Argentina y
Brasil" (Working Paper No.9, Notre Dame, Kellogg Institute, 1984); and "Micro-Escenas
de la Privatizaci6n de 10 Publico en Brasil" (Working Paper No. 21, with commentaries
by Roberto DaMatta and J. Samuel Valenzuela, Notre Dame, Kellogg Institute, 1989).
21. For the purposes of the generic argument presented in this essay, and not without
hesitation because of its vagueness, from now on I will use the term "particularism" to
refer to these phenomena. On the contemporary relevance of c1ientelism, see Luis Roniger
and Ayse Gunes-Ayata, eds., Democracy, Clienteiism, and Civil Society (Boulder, Co.:
Lynne Rienner, 1994). For studies focused on Latin America that are germane to my
argument, see especially Roberto DaMatta, A Case e a Rua: Espaco, Cidadania, Mulher
e Morte no Brasil (Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1985); Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult
Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship," World Politics 46 (January 1994): 151-84;
Francis Hagopian, "The Compromised Transition: The Political Class in the Brazilian
Transition," in Mainwaring et aI., Issues in Democratic Consolidation, 243-93; and Scott
Mainwaring, "Brazilian Party Underdevelopment in Comparative Perspective," Political
Science Quarterly 107 (Winter 1992-93): 677-707. These and other studies show that
particularism and its concomitants are not ignored by good field researchers. But, attesting
to the paradigmatic force of the prevalent views on democratization, in this literature the
rich data and findings emerging from such case studies are not conceptually processed as
an intrinsic part of the problematique of democratization, or are seen as just "obstacles"
interposed in the way of its presumed direction of change.
22. Particularistic relationships can be found in formally institutionalized polyarchies,
of course. I am pointing here to differences of degree that seem large enough to require
conceptual recognition. One important indication of these differences is the extraordinary
leniency with which, iT! informally institutionalized polyarchies, political leaders, most of
public opinion, and even courts treat situations that in the other polyarchies would be
considered as entailing very severe conflicts of interest.
23. For a discussion of neopatrimonialism, see my "Transitions, Continuities, and
Paradoxes," in Mainwaring et aI., Issues in Democratic Consolidation, 17-56. An
interesting recent discussion of neopatrimonialism is Jonathan Hartlyn's "Crisis-Ridden
Elections (Again) in the Dominican Republic: Neopatrimonialism, Presidentialism, and
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 203

50 Journal of Democracy

Weak Electoral Oversight," Journal of lnteramerican and World Affairs 34 (Winter 1994):
91-144,
24. By "regime" I mean "the set of effectively prevailing patterns (not necessarily
legally formalized) that establish the modalities of recruitment and access to governmental
roles, and the permissible resources that form the basis for expectations of access to such
roles," as defined in my Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in
Comparative Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 6.
25. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in
Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
26. See, among many others that could be cited (some transcribed in Shin, "On the
Third Wave of Democratization"), the definition of democratic consolidation proposed by
Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle in Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 3: "the
achievement of substantial attitudinal support for and behavioral compliance with the new
democratic institutions and the rules which they establish." A broader but equivalent
definition is offered four pages later.
27. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 26.
28. In another influential discussion, Philippe C. Schmitter, although he does not use
this language, expresses a similar view of democratic consolidation; see his "Dangers and
Dilemmas of Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5 (April 1994): 56--74. Schmitter begins
by asserting, "In South America, Eastern Europe, and Asia the specter haunting the
transitIOn is .. nonconsolidation .... These countries are 'doomed' to remain democratic
almost by default." He acknowledges that the attributes of polyarchy may hold in these
countries-but these "patterns never quite crystallize" (pp. 60--61). To say that democracy
exists "almost by default" (i.e., is negatively defined) and is not "crystallized" (i.e., not
formally institutionalized) is another way of stating the generalized view that I am
discussing.
29. An exception is Gunther et aI., Politics of Democratic Consolidation, where Italy
is one of the four cases studied. But the way they deal with recent events in Italy is
exemplary of the conceptual problems I am discussing. They assert that in Italy "several
important partial regimes ... were challenged, became deconsolidated, and entered into
a significant process of restructuring beginning in 1991" (p. 19). On the same page, the
reader learns that these partial regimes include nothing less than "the electoral system, the
party system, and the structure of the state itself." (Added to this list later on is "the basic
nature of executive-legislative relations" [po 394].) Yet the "Italian democracy remains
strong and resilient"-after practically every important aspect of its regime, and even of
the state, became "deconsolidated" (p. 412). If the authors mean that, in spite of a severe
crisis, the Italian polyarchy is likely to endure, I agree.
30. Actually, the authors are ambiguous about this first "test." Just before articulating
their list of tests with this one at its head, they assert that they "reject [peaceful alternation
in government between parties that were once bitterly opposed] as a prerequisite for
regarding a regime as consolidated." See Gunther et aI., Politics of Democratic
Consolidation, 12 (emphasis added).
31. In the text on which I am commenting, the problem is further compounded by the
use of categories such as "partial consolidation" and "sufficient consolidation" (which the
authors say preceded "full consolidation" in some Southern European cases). They even
speak of a stage of "democratic persistence" that is supposed to follow the achievement
of "full [democratic] consolidation."
32. I may have sounded naive in my earlier comments about how individuals
performing public roles are supposed to be guided by universalistic orientations to some
version of the public good. Now I can add that, as the authors of the Federalist Papers
knew, this is not only, or even mostly, a matter of the subjective intentions of these
individuals. It is to a large extent contingent on institutional arrangements of control and
accountability, and on expectations built around these arrangements, that furnish incentives
(including the threats of severe sanctions and public discredit) for that kind of behavior.
204 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Guillermo O'Donnell 51

That these incentives are often insufficient should not be allowed to blur the difference
with cases where the institutional arrangements are nonexistent or ineffective; these
situations freely invite the enormous temptations that always come with holding political
power. I wish to thank Adam przeworski and Michael Coppedge for raising this point in
private communications.
33. The reader has surely noticed that I am referring to countries that have
presidentialist regimes and that, consequently, I am glossing over the arguments, initiated
by Juan J. Linz and followed up by a number of other scholars, about the advantages of
parliamentarism over the presidentialist regimes that characterize Latin America. Although
these arguments convince me in the abstract, because of the very characteristics I am
depicting I am skeptical about the practical consequences of attempting to implant
parliamentarism in these countries.
34. For analyses of some of these situations, see Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, "The Legacy
of Authoritarianism in Democratic Brazil," in Stuart S. Nagel, ed., Latin American
Development and Public Policy (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), 237-53; and Martha K.
Huggins, ed., Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on Extralegal
Violence (New York: Praeger, 1991). See also the worrisome analysis, based on Freedom
House data, that Larry Diamond presents in his "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees,
Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation," in Tom Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty:
Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1995). In recent years, the Freedom House indices reveal, more Latin American
countries have regressed rather than advanced. For a discussion of various aspects of the
resulting obliteration of the rule of law and weakening of citizenship, see Guillermo
O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin
American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries," World Development 21
(1993): 1355-{j9.
35. There is a huge adjacent theme that I will not discuss here: the linkage of these
problems with widespread poverty and, even more, with deep inequalities of various sorts.
36. Obviously, we need analyses that are more nuanced, comprehensive, and dynamic
than the one that I have undertaken here. My own list of topics meriting much further
study includes: the opportunities that may be entailed by demands for more universalistic
and public-oriented governmental behavior; the odd coexistence of pervasive particularism
with highly technocratic modes of decision making in economic policy; the effects of
international demands (especially regarding corruption and uncertainty in legislation and
adjudication) that the behavior of public officials should conform more closely to the
formal rules; and the disaggregation of various kinds and institutional sites of clientelism
and particularism. Another major issue that I overlook here, raised by Larry Diamond in
a personal communication, is locating the point at which violations of liberal rights should
be construed as cancelling, or making ineffective, the political freedoms surrounding
eJections. Finally, Philippe C. Schmitter makes an argument worth exploring when he urges
that polyarchies be disaggregated into various "partial regimes"; most of these would surely
look quite different when comparing formally versus informally institutionalized cases. See
Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups,"
American Behavioral Scientist 35 (March-June 1992): 422-49.
37. This is the title of the reports of the commissions that investigated human rights
violations in Argentina and Brazil. For further discussion of what I call a dominant
antiauthoritarian mood in the transitions, see my "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,"
in Mainwaring et aI., Issues in Democratic Consolidation, 17-56; and Nancy Bermeo,
"Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship," Comparative Politics 24 (April 1992):
273-91.
38. Symptomatically illustrating the residues of the language and the hopes of the
transition as well as the mutual influences between political and academic discourses, on
several occasions the governments of the countries that I know more closely (Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay) triumphantly proclaimed that their democracies had become
"consolidated."
 Part V
Post-Communism
This page intentionally left blank
 [10]
Nationalism and Politics
in Eastern Europe
Ernest Gellner

In Eastern Europe, nationalism has since r8r5 passed through five

stages:
Stage 1
At the Congress of Vienna in r815, the whole of Eastern Europe was
divided between three empires. Previous little statelets, survivors of
medieval fragmentation, were absorbed into the three large units. Life
was greatly simplified for the political map-makers: henceforth they
would need only three colours to accomplish their task.

The three empires were largely indifferent to the national principle.

Each of them was based on a dynasty and on identification with a
religion: Sunni Islam, Counter-Reformation Catholicism and Ortho-
dox Christianity respectively. Faith and dynasty were held to be natu-
ral, adequate and appropriate foundations of political order. Each of
the three empires was ethnically very diversified, but virtually none
held this to constitute an obstacle to political viability. Many of the
culturally and linguistically distinct proto-ethnic groups were barely
conscious of themselves as ethnic groups. For instance, in Sarajevo, if
someone was referred to as a 'Turk', this did not mean that he spoke
or even knew a Turkic tongue or that his ancestors had come from
central Asia via Anatolia; it simply meant that he was Muslim, and
was perfectly compatible with being of Slav speech and indigenous
ancestry. By contrast, at present, what is in effect an ethnic group,
defined by a shared Slav-Muslim cultural background (but no longer
associated with proper adherence to a faith), calls itself Muslim, and it
secured the recognition of this expression as an acceptable category
for official purposes such as the census. Just as a gentleman was not a
man who knew Greek and Latin, but one who had at least forgotten
these languages, so a 'Muslim' is no longer a man who believes that
there is no God but God and that Mohammed is His Prophet, but one
who has at least lost that faith. The irony is that in the days when re-
ligion really mattered socially, an ethnic term was used to define the
community of believers; nowadays, when it is ethnicity that matters, a
religious term is used to define an ethnic community.

Many of the groups possessed a base in the social structure rather

than in territory: rhey were associated with a distinct social and
208 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

economic function rather than with some piece of land, Those cultural
groups that were linked to the land were nevertheless linked co it in an
incredibly complex patchwork, rather than in neat compact blocks.
The important thing is that when the masters of Europe assembled in
Vienna in 1815 and carved up the political real estate in cotal disregard
of ethnicity, this was deemed perfectly normal. No wave of protest
swept Europe. The sacred right of Ruritanians to self-determination,
to their own cultural home and political roof, was ignored, without
arousing much or any indignation on the part of either Ruritanians or
anyone else. Most Ruritanians did not even notice, and were hardly
aware of being Ruritanians.

Stage 2
Soon, all this was co change. The nineteenth century rapidly became a
century of nationalist irredentism. The nationalist principle, pro-
claiming that the legitimate foundation for the state was the nation,
acquired ever more passionate and committed adherents. In Eastern
Europe, the Magyars more or less succeeded and the Poles did not;
various Balkan ethnicities benefited from the weaknesses of the
Ottoman empire and secured diverse degrees of independence; in
central Europe, the Italians and the Germans achieved unification.

Why this change of mood? Why did something which seemed accep-
table and even natural in 1815 lose its legitimacy in the course of the
century? From inside the nationalist vision the answer is simple: the
nations had not been dead, they had merely been dormant. Thanks
are due co devoted Awakeners, intellectuals eager to revive ancient
political and cultural glories, or alternatively to codify the tongues and
cultures of 'un-historic' nations, which had not previously boasted
either a state or a court literature. The latter might be devoid of past
glories; but the Awakeners were willing to invent them or seek new
ones. The Awakeners worked hard, and the Sleeping Beaury nations
in the end responded with passion to their kiss. Wide awake at last,
they claimed their legitimate rights. In the light of Hegel's observation
that nations only enter history when they acquire their own state, they
insisted on securing their place on the historic stage. If denied it-and
of course the old power-holders did not abdicate simply on request-
they often reached for the gun.

Those who are not in sympathy with the new nationalist politics often
accept its own image of itself, and merely invert the valuation without
changing the picture. The most widely held theory of nationalism is, I
suspect, the one that believes it co be not merely the reawakening of
cultures, but the re-emergence of atavistic instincts of Blut und Boden
in the human breast. Ever latent but long restrained by religious faith
or other faccors, the loosening of bonds allowed the barely restrained
monster to re·emerge. The Enlightenment ideals of reason and frater·
niry, or the merely superficial, instrumental links of a market Gesell·
schaft, were coo abstract, coo bloodless, coo cerebral co compete with
libidinous and turbulent Dark Gods. Much Romantic nineteenth-
century literature gave great encouragement to such a picture of man
and so in a way endorsed its political implications. It receives further
128
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 209

confirmation from Darwinism, which after all teaches that man is a

beast. From this it would seem to follow that you cannot expect too
high, and above all too rational, a standard of political behaviour
from him. Realistic politics must adapt itself to its clientele, and if
society is really a herd, we'd better adjust both its authority structure
and its symbolism to this fact.

Other critics of nationalism (for instance, Elie Kedourie) adopted a

different view: nationalism was instilled by European ideology, per-
verting hitherto perfectly sound political systems. Marxists adopted a
different explanation still: nationalism was a cunning, often conscious
distraction of populations from the real underlying conflict between
classes, the obfuscation perpetrated in the interest of ruling classes,
having much to fear from class·consciousness, and much to gain from
the encouragement of a spurious national consciousness.

None of these theories seems to me remotely acceptable. Nineteenth-

and twentieth-century man is not more susceptible to the Call of the
Blood than his predecessor: being better fed, more comfortable, more
sedentary and pacific in his daily life (spent in an office or at the con-
trols of a machine, not in a struggle with nature), he may even be a
little less prone to atavism than his less educated, less urbanized, less
domesticated grandfather. As for ideology, on its own I very much
doubt whether it has such power to transform the political and moral
climate. And it is very hard to explain the persistent and repeated
victory of national over class consciousness as simply the result of
astonishing cunning on the part of rulers. They do not otherwise dis·
play such amazing control over the human material they rule.

What then? The appeal of the nationalist principle-One Culture,

One State-seems to me an inescapable corollary of the new socio-
economic order, carried along by industrialism, and even by the
shadow that industrialism casts ahead of itself. Agrarian society has
an intricate and fairly stable structure, and culture-styles of speech,
dress, consumption, ritual, and so forth-is not at all a suitable poli-
tical principle within it. Its characteristic political units are either
local communities, which seldom exhaust the culture they use (they
generally share it with other similar communities), or empires that go
far beyond the limits of anyone culture. The former have neither the
inclination nor the means to expand to the limit of their culture; the
latter have no motive to remain within them (they are interested in the
surplus and the obedience of their subjects, not in their folklore).

All this changes with modernity and industrialism. A fairly stable but
intricate social structure is replaced by a mobile, anonymous mass
society. In it, work ceases to be physical and becomes semantic:
'work' becomes the manipulation of people, messages, and not of
things.

Work now presupposes the capacity to communicate in a context-free

manner with anonymous strangers. Hence, it presupposes formal
education, which alone can confer literacy and other required skills.
Life and work also becomes one long series of encounters with
210 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

pervasive economic and political bureaucracies. Participation and

effective citizenship and employability and dignity all depend on
possessing mastery of the literate High Culture that is also the chosen
idiom of the political unit in which one lives. To achieve such full citi-
zenship, one must either assimilate into the dominant High Culture,
or change the political boundaries so as to ensure that one's own
culture becomes the defining one in the newly emerging unit.

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europeans have adopted each of

these strategies, sometimes in succession. Note that industrial society
is the first society ever in which a formalized, codified, education-
transmitted, context-free culture ceases to be the privilege and accom-
plishment of a minority of scribes, and becomes the pervasive style of
an entire society. Political units cease to be Protectors of a Faith and
become Protectors of a Culture. That, and not atavism, or the cunning
of either ideologies or rulers, is the secret of the new force of nation-
alism. High Culture matters, matters desperately, for everyone. Real
citizenship depends no longer on access to the rites of the city or its
sub-units, but on mastery of an ethnicity-defining High (that is,
codified, script-endowed, education-transmitted) Culture, and on
acceptability by that culture, in terms of the stereotype it has, and
enforces, concerning what a member should be like.

Siage 3
By 1918, nationalism was triumphant. The three religious empires
which had carved up Eastern Europe in 1815 were all sprawling in the
dust. One of them, the Tsarist, admittedly recovered under new polit-
ical and ideological management soon after, but let us leave aside, for
a moment, that atypical line of development. On the territory of the
other two erstwhile empires, nationalism was victorious, but its vic-
tory was somewhat Pyrrhic. The new units invoked the nation as their
legitimating principle, but they were as haunted by ethnic diversity
and hence conflict as their imperial predecessors had been. The com-
plexity of the ethnic map ensured this. In some ways, the predicament
of the successor states was worse: they were smaller and hence weaker,
and their minorities included many members of the previously domi-
nant cultural groups, the people who spoke the language, and more or
less shared the culture, of the erstwhile imperial centre. These did not
relish their new demotion, and could count on the support of their
linguistic or cultural brethren across the border.

The combination of weakness, fragmentation and ethnic tension

proved their undoing. They fell like ninepins to Hitler. Some resisted,
some resisted perfunctorily, and some did not resist at all. It made
relatively little difference to the speed of their subjugation.

Stage 4
Throughout the 1940s, the ethnic complexity of Eastern Europe was in
many places considerably simplified, first by Hitler and then by
Stalin. The method of peaceful assimilation had done something in
the past to further ethnic homogenization, but it was now sup-
plemented by more brutal methods, notably genocide and forcible
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 211

transplantation of populations, There had been some earlier experi-

ments in this direction, notably in the genocide of Armenians and the
Greek-Turkish exchange of population after the war at the beginning
of the twenties, but it was the forties which were par excellence the
period of ethnic mass murder and exile, In consequence, certain pre-
viously plural societies became incomparably more homogeneous:
Poland, the Czech lands, Byelorussia. Others did not 'benefit' from
the crimes of Hider and Stalin so much, and ethnic tensions contin-
ued to fester.

Stage 5
Stage Five is not, as far as Eastern Europe is concerned, a historical
fact. It is more in the nature of a hope, a wish-fulfilment, though some
grounds for believing at least in its possibility do exist, both .on the
ground and in theoretical considerations. Stage Five, if it comes, or if
in some places it is already beginning to appear, has a number of ben-
ign characteristics. It is marked by the greater and better diffused
affluence of later industrialism. This means that hostility between cul-
turally distinct groups is not exacerbated so much by jealousy and by
the humiliation of a poverty visibly and consciously associated with
ethnic status and treated as 'backwardness'. More advanced indus-
trialism also more effectively modifies the occupational structure and
standardizes cultures, so that their mutual differences become, at least
in some measure, merely phonetic rather than semantic: they do simi-
lar things and have similar concepts, even if they use different words.
The thesis of the standardization of industrial cultures is far from fully
established, and is in many ways questionable (consider the industrial
countries of the Far East); but for all that, when it comes to societies
that in some measure share similar backgrounds and have long been
neighbours, there is something in it. Economic and cultural conver-
gence joindy diminish ethnic hostilities: late industrial man, like his
immediate predecessor, early industrial man, still finds his identity in
a literate culture rather than anything else, but his literate culture no
longer differs quite so much from that of his ethnic neighbour. Above
all, whatever cultural differences there still are, they no longer receive
quite so much reinforcement from the fact that men on either side of
the boundary may be at quite different points in the process of
initiation into industrial civilization. (That feature still occurs in the
relationship between an advanced host culture and Gastarbeiter, and of
course aggravates or causes the tension between hosts and migrants.)

This relatively benign condition is at least approximated in parts of

Western Europe, allowing for exceptions such as Ulster or Basque-
land. It is not easy at present to imagine a war between Western Euro-
pean countries over an issue of territory. A condition is conceivable,
and seems to be approaching, which could be described as federali-
zation and cantonalization; as long as each major culture is endowed
with its home base, guaranteeing its perpetuation, it no longer insists
either on full independence or on the convergence of ethnic and politi-
cal boundaries. This, at any rate, is the desirable end point of the
development which, under industrialism, has transformed the rela-
tionship between culture and polity. After the storm, a relative calm.
212 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

A New Secular Ideocracy

So much for a relatively abstract model of the evolution of ethnic-

political interrelations between 1815 and the present. At this point, a
very major factual point must be introduced, one hitherto largely ig·
nored in the argument, mainly because it in no ways flows from the
premisses on which the model was built. In 1815, three empires divided
Eastern Europe between themselves. Two of them (or rather, the terri-
tories they occupied and the populations they governed) followed the
trajectory specified in my argument. But the third one did not.

Tsarist Russia did indeed collapse and disintegrate. In the modern

world its ideological cement proved no sturdier than that of its Otto-
man and Habsburg rivals. On Russian churches the orthodox cross is
superimposed on a crescent at the base of the cross, a symbolism
sometimes explained as marking the triumph of orthodox Christianity
over Islam. But when many of the churches tumbled under the Bolshe·
viks, the cross was brought down with the crescent.

Tsarist Russia was replaced by a new secular ideocracy, with a vibrant

faith ruthlessly imposed, and though 'all the Russias' had followed
through Stages One and Two, Stage Three was aborted: the Caucasus
was reconquered by the Red Army in the early twenties, central Asia
pacified and the Basmachis guerrillas destroyed by the thirties, the
Baltic retaken in 1940 and 1944-45, and much of Eastern Europe, well
beyond the line ever controlled by the tsars, brought under effective
indirect rule.

The new secular ideocracy was strong enough to suppress the irreden-
tist nationalism, as long as it retained faith in itself and the determina-
tion to use all means required to retain control. After 1985, peres-
troika was born out of a loss of faith in the economic methods of
Communism, and the renunciation of the use of ruthless force was in
part an ingredient of the recipe for the hoped-for economic revival,
and in part a price for the retention of Western good will, which
turned out to be essential for the new experiment. So came the end of
determined repression-coercion is still used on occasion, but only
reluctantly and under provocation and with political restraint. Under
these new rules of the game, what happens to the ethnic situation?

One can formulate the question, but one cannot yet answer it. The
evidence so far shows lurches towards each of those stages which this
part of Eastern Europe, under Communism, had missed out: the stage
of ethnic irredentism, that of murderous violence, and that of some
striving for that final and more peaceful solution, the federal-cantonal
Common Home, which avoids the murderousness and brutality of the
penultimate stage.

History does not altogether repeat itself. Marx had said that it repeats
itself in so far as what was a ttagedy the first time returns as farce the
second time round. One ought not trust this aphorism too much.
There is no guarantee at all that what was tragedy the first time will
not also be a real tragedy the second time.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 213

But the circumstances are not altogether identical. First of all there is
the desire by people of good will and sense to avoid the repetition of
,i
genocide and forcible transplantation. Any l'outrance application of
the national principle, requiring a convergence of ethnic and political
boundaries, would inevitably involve such barbarism: the ethnic pat-
terns of many parts of the Soviet Union are so complex as to ensure
that there is no sweetly reasonable way of implementing that prin-
ciple. Its application must be modified and accompanied by many
compromises.

The political reaffirmation of ethnic identity is also being played out

in new, indeed completely original, and historically unprecedented
circumstances. Civil society had been crushed and atomized by Bol-
shevik centralism, by the fusion of all social hierarchy and organiza-
tion-political, economic, ideological-in a single nomenklatura, a
unique pyramid. It is true that, in the painful revival of civil society,
it quickly became obvious that ethnic associations can be revived far
more quickly and effectively than any others. The new political parties
tend to be relatively small clubs of intellectuals, whereas it is the
'national fronts' which rapidly acquire real and persisting grass roots.

This might lead one to expect that this time round, nationalism will
be even stronger than it was the last time. Previously, nationalist
movements had non-nationalist rivals, often quite formidable ones.
Nationalism was not the camouflage of devious class interests, as
Marxists claimed, but all the same it did not completely sweep every-
thing before itself. Rival principles of association were also operative.
But at the same time , there can be no doubt but that there exists a
genuine craving for civil society, for pluralism, for the absence of poli-
tical and ideological and economic monopoly, and above all for the
absence of that catastrophic fusion of the three forms of centralism.

This is the new background against which ethnic and other political
revindications play themselves out. We can specifY the factors which
enter into the game; we cannot predict its outcome.

Moscow, September 1990

Postscript

The above text was typed out rapidly in the course of an afternoon on
a borrowed and dreadful Soviet typewriter, in the heavily guarded
(scientific departments?) Academy of Science high·rise building on
Leninsky Prospekt in Moscow, in reply to a pressing local request for
a comment on the Soviet ethnic situation. There follow some after-
thoughts, a year later, in Cambridge.

Raymond Aron used to say that there were only two real institutions
in France-the state and the Communist Party. In the USSR, these two
being identical, there was only one institution. So, in the absence
of alternatives, the Gorbachevite strategy of trying to use the only
'33
214 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

available institution did not seem to me wholly absurd. One could

argue against it, saying that you cannot use an institution to destroy
itself. One can argue in favour of it, and say that if only one tool is
available, you have to use it.

It was my sensitivity to this argument (without full conviction, and

without liking the situation that provided it with its premiss) which
separated me and many other Western well-wishers of perestroika,
from the Muscovite intellectuals who had come to loathe Gorbachev.
(The difference was not based on any assessment of his personality or
guesses about his political pensle intime, topics on which I do not pre-
sume to possess any insights. It was based simply on the outward, visi-
ble traits of a strategy;) But the sensitivity to this viewpoint was rein-
forced by an awareness of the fact that the only countervailing force,
capable of matching the (alas) single available institution, was made
up of ethnic movements, which could be and were mobilized rapidly
and effectively. Yeltsin's willingness to use this counterforce fright-
ened me. My fear was of course strengthened by the recollection of the
sequel to the analogous break· up of the Habsburg empire, which led
to a political system so feeble that it fell to Hider and Stalin with
barely a sign of resistance. Yeltsin was evidendy doing what Lenin
had done, abandoning all territories in the hope of securing allies or
neutrals, whilst fortifying his position at the centre. Lenin had a disci-
plined party and ideological commitment, whilst Yeltsin enjoys
neither of these benefits, which makes him correspondingly more
dependent an the unleashed ethnic forces. Lenin could eventually turn
to the much-invoked NEP: but people who invoke this now do not
seem to realize that the real present equivalent of NEP would be some
return to the old command-admin economic methods, on the prin·
ciple (the genuine analogy to NEP) that a method you no longer
believe in, but which is known to work more or less, and which
people know how to work, is better than one you do believe in, but
have not the slightest idea how to implement. The perestroichiki have
about as good an idea of how to operate a market as the Bolsheviks
had of how to build socialism. But the dismanding of the old struc-
tures also deprived Yeltsin of the option of a nationwide temporary
use of the old institutions.

For all these reasons, I was doubtful concerning the Yeltsinite stra-
tegy, without at any time wishing to be dogmatic about it. However,
events seem to have confirmed the correctness of Yeltsin's political
intuitions. Gorbachev's appeasement policy does not seem to have
bought off the Bunker. (It may, however, have contributed to its luke-
warmness and hesitation and abstention from the use of ruthless
methods.) When the backlash came in the form of the abortive coup,
it was the fact that Yeltsin had built up a rival power-base, unfasti-
diously using whatever material lay to hand, that was decisive in
thwarting the coup. This has to be acknowledged.

Cambridge, September 1991

134
 [11]
RETHINKING RECENT
DEMOCRATIZATION
Lessons from the
Postcommunist Experience
By VALERIE BUNCE*

RECENT DEMOCRATIZATION

O UR understanding of recent democratization-of such issues as

the origins and the consolidation of new democracies-has been
heavily influenced by the experiences of Latin America and southern
Europe. 1 This is not surprising. The third wave of democratization, as
Samuel Huntington termed it, began in southern Europe and then
moved quickly to Latin America. 2 Moreover, given the political oscilla-
tions of the region they study, specialists in Latin American politics
were unusually well positioned to address questions of regime transi-
tion. Finally, combining the experiences of these two regions offered a
comparative advantage. They contained a large number of countries,
virtually all of which had redemocratized over the course of a decade
and a half; they shared some commonalities in terms of history and cul-
ture; and yet they varied with respect to the timing and mode of transi-
tion. It is precisely such a mix of similarities and differences that makes
for instructive comparison.
The breakdown of state socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe between 1989 and 1991 and the subsequent rise of new regimes
and new states throughout this region provide us with an opportunity
to broaden the discussion of recent democratization. 3 By broadening, I
*1 thank Nancy Bermeo, George Breslauer, Michael McFaul, Phil Roeder, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss,
Sidney Tarrow, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on this article.
1 See, especially, Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transi-
tionsftomAuthoritarian Rule, vols. 1-4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
2Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
3 See also M. Steven Fish, "Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratization in East
Europe and Eurasia," Slavic Review 58 (Winter 1999); Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization:
Big and Bounded Conclusions," Comparative Political Studies 33 (August-September 2000); Thomas
Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal ofDemocracy 13 (January 2002).
216 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

168 WORLD POLITICS

refer, most obviously, to the geography of the conversation. If recent de-

mocratization is, indeed, a global process, then the terrain of these
studies should better reflect that fact. Moreover, only by expanding the
geographical horizons can we know whether our conceit as social sci-
entists-that is, our presumption of generalizability-is well founded.
There are, in addition, three other aspects of broadening. One is the
familiar argument, central to the ideology of pluralism, that more
voices are preferable to fewer in producing quality outcomes. This is
particularly important in comparative politics, given the correlation be-
tween geographical and intellectual boundaries. As we all know, the
concepts used, the questions asked, and the theories evaluated all tend
to take on a regional cast.
Just as familiar is a second consideration. Stepping outside our fa-
miliar terrain often alerts us to new factors and new relationships-
more generally, new thinking, to borrow from Gorbachev. As already
suggested, this is not just a matter of reaping intellectual benefits from
liberalization of trade among scholarly cultures. This is also a function
of the new issues that additional cases often introduce. For example,
with the rise of new states and new economic and political regimes in
the former communist world came heightened sensitivity among schol-
ars to a series of previously overlooked concerns. These include the im-
pact of economic regime transition on the democratic project;4 the
critical distinction between founding genuinely new democracies (as in
most postcommunist states) versus redemocratization (as with much of
Latin America and southern Europe); the impact of identity politics
and the state on democratization;5 the consequences for democratic
politics of deficiencies in civil and political society;6 and the role of in-
ternational institutions in founding, sustaining, and/or undermining
new democracies?

4 See M. Steven Fish, "The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Postcommunist World," East

European Politics and Societies 12 (Winter 1998).

5 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Domestic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Postcommunist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Debo-
rah]. Yashar, "Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America,"
World Politics 52 (October 1999).
6 Richard Rose, "Uses of Social Capital in Russia: Modern, Pre-Modern, and Anti-Modern,"
Post-Soviet Affairs 16 (January-March 2000); Marc Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-
Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
7 See Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effict: International Norms, Human Rights and the Demise of
Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Janine Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The
Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1998); Sarah L. Henderson,
"Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Non-Governmental Organization Sector in Russia," Com-
parative Political Studies 35 (March 2002).
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 217

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 169

A final benefit of broadening is methodological. The most illumi-
nating comparisons are those that restrain the universe of causes while
expanding the range of results. In the case of comparative democratiza-
tion, while Latin America and southern Europe go far in meeting the
first condition, they are less helpful on the second-though recent
threats to democracy in, say, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, and perhaps
Argentina have provided greater variation in dependent variables. By
contrast, the postcommunist region of East-Central Europe and the
former Soviet Union is unusually useful on both counts, given, for ex-
ample, similarities in institutional legacies and in both the timing and
the agenda of transformation alongside the sheer diversity of the re-
gion's economic and political pathways-what Charles King has aptly
termed the "mercurial dependent variables" of postcommunism. 8
The appeal of this region as an ideal laboratory for comparative in-
quiry has not been lost on analysts. There are thus a number of studies
that use cases from the postcommunist area to address such questions
as why democracies either do or do not arise and why some of the new
democracies succeed, whereas others break down;9 whether variations
in economic performance reflect historical or more recent influences
and geographical, economic, or political factors;10 and why transitions
to democracy are sometimes accompanied by nationalist protests, why
some states dissolve in reaction to these protests, and why state dissolu-
tion is either violent or peaceful. l1
8 King, "Post-Postcommunism: Transition, Comparison, and the End of 'Eastern Europe,'" World
Politics 53 (October 2000), On the divergent political and economic dynamics of the postcommunist
region, see Valerie Bunce, "The Political Economy of Post socialism," Slavic Review 58 (Winter 1999);
www.freedomhouse,org/ratings/index; Karen Dawisha, "Post-Communism's Troubled Steps toward
Democracy: An Aggregate Analysis of Progress in the Twenty-seven New States" (Manuscript, Cen-
ter for the Study of Post-Communist Societies, University of Maryland, September 1997),
'Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions
in the Postcommunist World," World Politics 54 (January 2002); M, Steven Fish, "The Dynamics of
Democratic Erosion," and Stephen E, Hanson, "Defining Democratic Consolidation," both in
Richard D, Anderson, M. Steven Fish, Stephen E. Hanson, and Philip G. Roeder, eds., Postcommu-
nism and the Theory ofDemocracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Interwar Europe and
post-WW II Latin America also provide an ideal laboratory for the study of democratic breakdown.
See Nancy Bermeo, Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Collapse ofDemocracy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
10 Vladimir Popov, The Political Economy of Growth in Russia, Program on New Approaches to Rus-
sian Security, no. 17 (Cambridge: Davis Center, Harvard University, 2000); Timothy Frye, "The Per-
ils of Polarization: Economic Performance in the Postcommunist World," World Politics 54 (April
2002); Anders Aslund, Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Soviet Bloc (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002); Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, "Geographical Diffusion and
the Transformation of the Postcommunist World," World Politics 53 (October 2000).
11 Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002); Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of
Socialism and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Carol Skalnik Leff, "Democ-
ratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the Communist Federations,"
218 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

170 WORLD POLITICS

COMPARING NEW DEMOCRACIES

This article aims to use the postcommunist experience in East-Central

Europe and the former Soviet Union-twenty-seven cases in all-to
rethink our understanding of recent democratization. It does so by con-
ducting a conversation between two bodies of research: (1) studies of
Latin America and southern Europe, which collectively have consti-
tuted the reigning wisdom in the field, and (2) research on postcom-
munist politics. The discussion will focus on two relationships central
to discussions in the field-between transitional politics and subse-
quent regime trajectories and between the consolidation and the sus-
tainability of democracy. We will see that the postcommunist
experience challenges the way both issues have been understood.
In particular, I argue the following. First, the degree of uncertainty in
democratic transitions varies considerably. This in turn affects the
strategies of transition and their payoffs. Second, mass mobilization can
contribute to both the founding and the consolidation of democracy.
Third, under certain conditions the democratic project is furthered by
transitions that involve both nationalist protest and changes in state
boundaries. Fourth, while rapid progress in democratic consolidation
improves the prospects for democratic survival in the future, it does not
follow that unconsolidated democracies are necessarily less sustainable.
Indeed, compromising democracy (and the state) may contribute to
democratic survival. Finally, while comparisons among new democra-
cies can identifY the optimal conditions for democratization, they may
have less to say about optimal strategies for democratization.

TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: ASSUMPTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

The analysis of recent democratization has been premised on some core

assumptions about transitions from dictatorship to democracy-with
the transitional period understood as beginning with an evident weak-
ening of authoritarian rule and ending with the first competitive elec-
tions. These assumptions include the following: (1) that immediate
influences are more important than historical considerations in shaping
transitional dynamics; (2) that transitions are inherently quite un-
certain; (3) that the central dynamic in a transition is bargaining be-

World Politics 51 (January 1999); Charles King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's
Unrecognized States," World Politics 53 (July 2001); Abby Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Rasma Karklins, Ethnopolitics and the Transition to Democ-
racy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 219

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 171

tween authoritarian leaders and leaders of the democratic opposition,
with outcomes a function of their relative power; and (4) that the key
issues on the table during the transition are breaking with authoritarian
rule, building democratic institutions, and eliciting the cooperation of
authoritarians. 12
These assumptions, coupled with comparative studies of Latin
America and southern Europe, have produced several generalizations
about what constitutes the ideal approach to transition. First, as
Dankwart Rustow argued more than thirty years ago, successful de-
mocratization seems to require at the very least a prior settlement of the
national and state questions.B Second, bargaining about the rules of the
transition and the new political order should be limited to a small
group of authoritarian elites and representatives of the democratic op-
position. Finally, given the uncertainty of transitions, it is useful to
forge compromises that promote political stability during the construc-
tion of a democratic order. In practice, this means pacting; reducing the
range of issues on the bargaining table (for example, avoiding reforms
of the state and, if possible, major and inherently destabilizing economic
reforms); demobilizing publics (which also limits the issues on the
table, while depriving the authoritarians of a rationale for sabotaging de-
mocratization); forming interim governments with leaders agreeable to
both sides; giving the military some room for political maneuver in the
constitution; and holding a competitive election that produces a gov-
ernment broadly representative of both authoritarians and democratsY

MASS MOBILIZATION

The postcommunist experience seems to challenge many of these as-

sumptions about transitional strategies. Let us begin by addressing the

12 O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (fn. 1); Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in
Latin America," Comparative Politics 23 (Spring 1990); Guiseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracy
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
13 Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2 (April
1970).
14 O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (fn. 1); Richard Gunther, "Spain: The Very Model of a

Modern Elite Settlement," in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consoli-
dation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992);
Robert M. Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy,"
World Politics 42 (April 1990); Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy ofDem-
ocratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jose Maria Maravall, "Politics and
Policy: Economic Reforms in Southern Europe," in Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Jose Maria Maravall,
and Adam Przeworski, eds., Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Moderate policies, however, do not imply the absence of
political conflict. See Nancy Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation," Comparative Politics 29 (April 1997).
220 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

172 WORLD POLITICS

role of mass publics in the transition. It is widely agreed among spe-

cialists and confirmed by the rankings over time by Freedom House
that the most successful transitions to democracy in the postcommu-
nist region have been in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia. 1s The transition to democracy in every
one of these cases, except Hungary, began with mass protests. 16 More-
over, if we restrict our focus to those countries that show significant im-
provement in their democratic performance over time, or Bulgaria and
Romania, we see the same pattern: mass mobilization at the beginning
of the transition.
Why was mass mobilization so often helpful to the democratic tran-
sition in the postcommunist context? The answer is that political
protests performed a number of valuable functions. They signaled the
breakdown of the authoritarian order; created a widespread sense that
there were alternatives to that order; pushed authoritarian leaders (and
sometimes even leaders of the opposition, as with Walesa in Poland) to
the bargaining table; created (and sometimes restored) a large opposi-
tion united by its rejection of the incumbent regime; and gave opposi-
tion leaders a resource advantage when bargaining with authoritarian
elites. Finally, mass mobilization created a mandate for radical change
that subsequently translated into a large victory for the democratic
forces in the first competitive elections and, following that, led to the
introduction of far-reaching economic and political reforms.

UNCERTAINTY

If we accept that mass mobilization during the transition can further

the democratic project, then we necessarily confront additional chal-
lenges to the received wisdom about recent democratization. First, it
can be argued that in many cases such mobilization in the postcommu-
nist region reduced the uncertainty of the transition-by providing a
clear reading of mass sentiments, by strengthening the bargaining
power of opposition leaders, and by forcing the communists to give up
their defense of the old order, either stepping aside quickly (as in
Czechoslovakia) or, when thinking prospectively, joining the movement

15 See fn. 8.
16 In Hungary mass mobilization was understood to be politically risky (and turned out ultimately
to be unnecessary), given the brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, on the one
hand, and the willingness of the reform communists, even before the roundtable, to jump on the
democratic bandwagon, on the other hand. See Patrick H. O'Neil, "Revolution from Within: Insti-
tutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary," World Politics 48
(July 1996).
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 221

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 173

for democracy (as in Poland, Slovenia, and the Baltic states)Y At the
same time, mass mobilization promised-and delivered-a popular
mandate for democracy in the first competitive elections.
Most of the transitions to democracy in the postcommunist world
were, of course, highly uncertain. This is evidenced by the fact that the
first competitive election in most of the countries in the region led to a
communist victory. Indeed, the larger the victory, the more likely that au-
thoritarian rule continued. Moreover, even ten years after the transition
began, only one-third of the postcommunist regimes were ranked fully
free. Although this is the highest number since state socialism fell, it is a
percentage much lower than what one finds at a comparable point in the
Latin American and southern European transitions. When combined
with the earlier observations, these patterns suggest that the uncertainty
surrounding postcommunist political trajectories varied significantly.18 In
some cases, a democratic outcome was relatively predictable; in most oth-
ers, the political options after communism were far more open-ended.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF UNCERTAINTY

The existence of a more certain political environment in some countries

calls into question both the necessity and the logic, outlined earlier, of
safeguarding the new democracy by forging compromises between au-
thoritarians and democrats. It is precisely the absence of pressure to do
so in the Polish, the Czech, and the other highly successful transitions
that explains another contrast between the "East" and the "South." It is
true that many of the most successful transitions in the postcommunist
area included pacting (though rarely as elaborate as the Spanish experi-
ence) and that some also evidenced for a brief time broadly representa-
tive interim governments. 19 It is also true, however, that the transitions
in the postcommunist region that combined pacting with demobilized
publics-or what has been asserted to be the preferred approach in the
South-were precisely the transitions that were most likely to continue
authoritarian rule in the postcommunist region. 20 Moreover, the other

17 See Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist
Parties in East-Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
18 Because Poland was the first country in the region to break with communist party rule, its transi-
tion was somewhat more uncertain. Given the character of the Soviet bloc, however, developments in
Poland during the first half of 1989 lowered the risks of transition for other members of the bloc.
19Jon Elster, ed., The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996).
20 Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia:
Power, Perceptions and Pacts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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174 WORLD POLITICS

compromises that were deemed so beneficial for the southern European

and Latin American transitions were rejected by opposition leaders in
Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and the like. Instead, they were strongly
positioned to favor an immediate and sharp break with the authoritar-
ian past. Thus, in every highly successful case of democratization in the
region, the military was excluded from political influence from the
start; the first elections involved a radical break with the political lead-
ership of the past; and major changes in the economy were introduced
quickly.21 Just as important was the commitment in each of these cases
to reforming the state, including in most of them its very boundaries.
For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the Baltic
states, then, the agenda of transition was unusually ambitious.
Postcommunist transition dynamics therefore ask us to amend the fa-
miliar formulation drawn from the South. It was precisely because mass
mobilization was so threatening to authoritarians that leaders of the op-
position in some of these countries were free to carry out radical political
and economic reforms. Put differently: because of popular mobilization
or, in the Hungarian case, reform communism and collaboration be-
tween democrats and authoritarians, opposition leaders in what became
the most sustainable and full-scale democracies in the East could pro-
ceed quickly in breaking with authoritarian rule and building democratic
(and, for that matter, capitalist) institutions without worrying as much
as their counterparts elsewhere about appeasing authoritarian interests.
This, in turn, altered the strategies of transition and their payoffs.
While bridging between the old and the new order constituted by all
accounts the most successful approach to democratization in Latin
America and southern Europe, the most successful strategy in the post-
communist region was the opposite-severing ties.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

Also contributing to these interregional contrasts in the optimal strate-

gies of transition was the very different role of the military in Latin
America and southern Europe, on the one hand, and in the communist
area, on the other hand. Specialists in the South have argued with es-
sentially one voice that the biggest threat to democracy today, as in the

21 On the benefits of breaking with past leadership, see Aslund (fn. 10); Frye (fn. 10); McFaul (fn. 9);
and Bunce (fn. 8). Hungary, again, provides an exception. Major economic reforms were introduced
only after the second competitive election, when the ex-communists returned to power with a large
mandate. However, Hungary was also exceptional in how far reforms went prior to the end of com-
munist party rule.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 223

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 175

past, is the military. One has only to recall, for example, the long his-
tory of military interventions in Latin American politics, most of
which terminated democracy (though some of them oversaw a return
to democratic governance, as also occurred in unusually circuitous fash-
ion, in the Portuguese transition). There is, in addition, the attempted
military coup d'etat in Spain in 1982. Indeed, precisely because of its
long importance in politics, the military has been awarded remarkable
powers in many Latin American constitutions, their democratic claims
notwithstanding. 22 When combined, these examples carry an obvious
message: the military in these contexts can make or break regimes. It is
precisely this capacity that contributed to the uncertainty of the transi-
tions in the South and that necessitated compromises with authoritar-
ian forces.
In much of the postcommunist world, by contrast, there is a long
tradition of civilian control over the military-a tradition that goes far
back in Russian history and that, following the Bolshevik Revolution
and the demilitarization after the Civil War, was maintained at home
and then after World War II was projected outward to the members of
the Soviet bloc.23 Civil-military relations, in short, constituted one area
where the authoritarian past proved to be beneficial, rather than a bur-
den, for democratization after state socialism. 24
With the military less threatening in the postcommunist context and
with mass publics in some cases mobilized in support of democracy, au-
thoritarian elites in the postcommunist region were indeed under siege.
This was particularly the case in East-Central Europe, where domestic
control over the military (and the secret police)-except in Yugoslavia,
Romania, and Albania-had been ceded to the Soviet Union after
1968. All this left the opposition in what came to be the most success-
ful democracies in the region with unusual freedom of maneuver-a
freedom enhanced by public support in the streets. As a result, both the
effects of mass mobilization and the most successful strategies of tran-
sition were different in the postcommunist context from what they had
been in Latin America and southern Europe.

22 Brian Loveman, "Protected Democracies and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in

Latin America, 1978-1993," Journal ofInter-American Studies and World Affairs 36 (Summer 1994).
23The key phrase is "members of the Soviet bloc." For those communist regimes outside the bloc or
mavericks within the bloc (Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia), party control over the military was
compromised. It was precisely in these cases that the exit from state socialism was violent. Variations
in civil-military relations also account in part for the violent disintegration of the Yugoslav state, in
contrast to the peaceful dissolution of both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. See Bunce (fn. 11).
24 See Bela Greskovits, "Rival Views of Postcommunist Market Society: The Path Dependence of
Transitology," in Michel Dobry, ed., Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe: Lessons for
the Social Sciences (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000).
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176 WORLD POLITICS

NATIONALIST MOBILIZATION

The analysis thus far has sidestepped an issue of considerable impor-

tance in the transitions from state socialism: the distinction between
protests against the regime and protests against the state. Here, the
postcommunist region exhibits another surprising pattern. While pop-
ular protest in both the Czech lands and Poland targeted the regime,
the Baltic and Slovene demonstrations are better understood as both
liberal and nationalist. In the latter cases, then, nationalism supported
democratic governance, even when nationalist concerns grew out of and
were in part responsible for the disintegration of a state.
There also seems to be another positive linkage between nationalist
mobilization and sucessful, sustained democratization. The republics
that made up the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia varied
considerably from each other with respect to whether publics protested,
whether the opposition was strong and united, and whether publics, the
opposition, and, indeed, even the communists were committed to de-
mocratization. With the breakup of these three ethnofederal states
along republican lines, those republics with the best conditions for
democratic governance were liberated from a political and economic
context that made such an outcome unlikely, if not impossible. Thus,
not just Slovenia and the Baltic republics, but also Macedonia,
Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine were better positioned to pursue a dem-
ocratic course following state disintegration. 25
How can we reconcile these observations with the familiar argument
that nationalist mobilization poses a threat to democracy on the
grounds that the logics of state building and democratization are con-
tradictory? This argument, moreover, has empirical support in the post-
communist world, given the deleterious effects of nationalism on
political developments after state socialism in Bosnia, Croatia, Geor-
gia, Serbia and Montenegro (and Kosovo), and Slovakia. In each of
these cases the nationalist movement excluded minorities residing
within the republic; transformed some communists into nationalists,
who then used nationalism to maintain authoritarian control; and con-
structed illiberal successor regimes while deconstructing successor
states. 26 What explains these divergent consequences of nationalism?
25 For a parallel situation, see Michael Bernhard, "Democratization in Germany: A Reappraisal,"
Comparative Politics 33, no, 4 (2001).
26 See Zsuzsa Czergo, "Language and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Contestations over
Language Use in Romania and Slovakia" (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 2000); Georgi
Derluguian, "The Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Adjaria before and since the Soviet Collapse," in
Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, eds., The "Myth" ifEthnic Conflict: Politics, Economics and
Cultural Violence, Research Monograph, no. 98. (l}erkeley: University of California International and
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 225

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 177

When nationalism enters the discussion, parsimonious arguments
often give way to thick explanations. In this instance, however, there
seems to be a relatively simple distinction: when nationalist demonstra-
tions began in the republics. Late nationalist mobilization-or nation-
alist demonstrations that first appeared when the communist regime
and state were disintegrating-is associated in virtually every instance
with a rapid transition to democracy and progress since that time in
building a stable-or at least increasingly stable-democratic order.
This describes, in particular, not just the cases of Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Slovenia, but also the far more flawed, but nonetheless
durable democracies of Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.
By contrast, nationalist demonstrations that first occurred before the
regime and state began to unravel are associated with very different po-
litical pathways after state socialism-either democratic breakdown or
a delayed transition to democracy. There were five republics and one
autonomous province that experienced such demonstrations by their
titular nation during the 1970s or at the beginning of the 1980s: Ar-
menia, Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo, Slovakia, and, to a more limited ex-
tent, Serbia. 27 In everyone of these cases the subsequent transition to
democracy was undermined, as was the successor state in most cases.
Why is timing so important? The key seems to be differences in
regime context. In the "early" cases, nationalist mobilization arose in re-
sponse to two conditions: a strong sense of identity on the part of
members and especially the self-appointed leaders of the republic's tit-
ular nation (reflecting earlier developments, such as the experience of
statehood prior to communist party rule) coupled with republican po-
litical dynamics that featured domination by the titular nation along
with significant autonomy from the center. Once demonstrations
began, three developments followed: minorities within these republics
(except homogeneous Armenia) defended themselves from titular
domination by building countermovements while allying with the cen-
ter; the center, fearing that nationalist protests would spread and
thereby challenge both the regime and the state, suppressed the titular

Area Studies, 1998); Ronald Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 2d ed. (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1994); Valerie Bunce and Stephen Watts, "Managing Diversity and Sustaining De-
mocracy: Ethnofederal versus Unitary States in the Postsocialist World" (Paper presented at the work-
shop on Power-Sharing and Peace-Making, San Diego, December 10-11, 2001).
27 See Beissinger (fn. 11); and Besnik Pula, "Contested Sovereignty and State Disintegration: The
Rise of the Albanian Secessionist Movement in Kosovo" (Master's Thesis, Georgetown University,
2001). On the Serbian case, see Valere P. Gagnon, "Liberalism and Minorities: Serbs as Agents and
Victims of Liberal Conceptions of Space" (Paper presented at the workshop on Citizenship in Multi-
cultural States: Comparing the Former Yugoslavia and Israel, Austrian Institute of International M-
fairs, Vienna, April2Q-21, 2001).
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178 WORLD POLITICS

national protesters, purged the republican party, and empowered mi-

norities as a counterweight to the titular nation; and the republican
party fissured in the face ofirreconcilable demands from local national-
ists versus central communists.
As a result, by the time state socialism began to dissolve, the stage
was already set for an unusually problematic transition to both demo-
cratic rule and independent statehood. Two insurmountable divides
were in place. The first was between nationalists, who dominated the
political scene, and liberals, who had been demobilized. The second
was between leaders of the majority nation and leaders of minority
communities. The national identities of these groups were well defined
and exclusivist, and their competing identities were joined with com-
peting interests, political alliances, and preferences for the future.
Moreover, the communist leaders of these republics, facing the loss of
both their institutional and their ideological bases for ruling, did not
have the option their Slovenian counterparts had, of defecting to an
opposition that embraced both independent statehood and liberal de-
mocracy. Instead, they could either become nationalists or, if adopting a
liberal position, face political marginalization.
By contrast, when nationalist mobilization began only later, in re-
sponse to the weakening of the regime and the state, all these condi-
tions were absent-or at least less well defined. This meant that the
majority and the minorities were free to coalesce around the issues of
republican sovereignty and liberal democracy. Thus, in these contexts a
liberal agenda combined with a nationalist agenda; and not only oppo-
sition forces but even many communists embraced that agenda.
We can now conclude our discussion of transitions in the South ver-
sus the East. The experiences of the latter region suggest the following,
all running counter to the received wisdom about Latin America and
southern Europe. First, historical factors are critical in shaping the re-
sources and especially the preferences of elites during the transition, as
well as, more generally, transition trajectories. Second, one proximate
and positive influence, lying outside the high politics of the transition,
is mass mobilization. Third, transitions seem to vary in their degree of
uncertainty, and this affects what constitutes the most successful path.
In the postcommunist world, where some transitions were less uncer-
tain, the most successful approach was one that moved quickly on both
political and economic fronts. Fourth, democratization can be success-
ful when it is combined with nationalist mobilization and the founding
of a new state. This is particularly so when such mobilization first be-
gins with the weakening of the state and the regime.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 227

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 179

Finally, if we divide the transitions in the postcommunist world into
two types-where nationalist mobilization was present and where it
was not-we find two simple stories, One has already been noted-the
consequences for democratization of timing-when nationalist mobi-
lization begins, The second story describes the remaining countries in
the region, Here, the key issue appears to be the strength of the oppo-
sition, as indicated by their competitiveness in the first election, Put
succinctly, the better their electoral performance, the more successful
the transition to democracy,

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND DEMOCRATIC SUSTAINABILITY

With the formation of the first popularly elected government, the tran-
sition to democracy is understood to have ended. Scholars then shift
their focus to two issues: the consolidation of democracy and its sus-
tainability. The consolidation of democracy refers to the degree to
which the key elements of a democratic order are in place, and whether
those elements function to promote effective, inclusive, and account-
able governance. The sustainability of democracy refers, simply, to the
continuation of democratic rule. In the first case, scholars look to mass
publics (public opinion, interest associations, and political participa-
tion), political institutions (parties, the state, and representative bodies),
and the behavior of political leaders. In the second, the concern of
scholarly investigations has been equally broad, looking to economic
and demographic factors, political institutions, political parties, public
opinion and behavior, and the decisions of political leaders.
These two bodies of work rarely confront one another, which is
surprising, since on the face of it they are analytically related. Despite
the parallel play, however, they do seem to converge along two lines of
argument. One is that the choices made by political leaders have pow-
erful effects on whether democracy consolidates and whether it sur-
vives. 28 The other is that the quality of democracy-that is, the degree
to which it is consolidated as defined above-predicts its sustainability.

RUSSIA'S MUDDIED POLITICAL PROFILE

It is precisely these two arguments that I wish to question. Rather than

comparing the postcommunist cases with each other, as I did earlier, I
will concentrate instead on one case in particular: Russia, which serves

28 See, for example, Higley and Gunther (fn, 14),

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180 WORLD POLITICS

as a useful empirical foil for two reasons. One is that Russia represents
in many respects the modal postcommunist case-for example, with re-
spect to economic development and economic performance, the age of
the state, the structure of its government, the weakness oflabor, and the
slow development of the party system. 29 Perhaps the most surprising
aspect of Russian politics-and one that, again, represents the central
tendency in postcommunist Eurasia-is the absence of significant po-
litical polarization among citizens and the relative stability of their po-
litical preferences over time. 3D The other reason to focus on Russia is
that the case provides a particularly good test of the arguments about
consolidation and sustainability. This is because Russia has a highly im-
probable and seriously flawed, yet durable democracy. The ledger of
Russian democracy can be summarized as follows. Russian democracy
is deficient in two key respects. One problem is the Russian presidency;
a second is the weakness of the Russian state. As is widely recognized,
Boris Yelstin played a central role in the rise of democracy in Russia,
yet many of his actions, beginning in 1993, would seem to have com-
promised the democratic project, as well as economic reform and state
capacity.31 Moreover, given his commitment to the recentralization of
the Russian state, Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin, could be viewed
as a less capricious and, therefore, potentially a more formidable force
against democratic politics. Such an interpretation is particularly
tempting, given the parallels between contemporary Russia and
Weimar Germany-for example, disastrous economic performance,
downward mobility in the international system, and the existence in
both cases of a mixed presidential-parliamentary system, with impor-
tant powers reserved for the presidency.32

29 See, for example, Bunce (fn. 8); Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "The Limited Reach of Russia's Party
System," Politics and Society 29 (September 2001); Stephen Crowley and David Ost, eds., Workers after
Workers' States: Labor and Politics in Post-Communist Europe (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield,
2001).
30 See, especially, Richard Ahl, "Society and Transition in Russia," Communist and Postcommunist
Studies 32 (April 1999); and Ted Brader and Joshua Tucker, "The Emergence of Mass Partisanship in
Russia," AmericanJournal ofPolitical Science 45 (January 2001); for a different view, see Valerii Solovei,
"Kommunisticheskaya i natsionalisticheskoi transformatsii Rossii," in Lilia Shevtsova, ed., Rossiia:
politichestkaya (Russia: Politics) (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 1998).
31 Three very insightful analyses of the Yelstin era are Lilia Shevtsova, Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Re-
alities (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999); Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolu-
tion: Political Change from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001); and
George Breslauer, Gorbachev andYeltsin as Leaders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
32 See Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, "The Weimar/Russia Comparison," Post-Soviet
Affairs 13 (July-September 1997). However, there is one striking contrast between these two cases:
civil society in interwar Germany was highly developed but German publics were polarized, whereas
civil society in Russia is far less developed but Russian publics tend to cluster at the center of the po-
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 229

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 181

If the Russian presidency is a problem, so, too, is the weakness of the
Russian state. It is weak because of the absence of rule oflaw, continu-
ing conflicts between central and local laws, and the privileging of lo-
calities over the center with respect to both the identities of local
officials and publics and the targets of compliance. As a consequence,
the Russian state and regime are both spatially fragmented. 33 This frag-
mentation, moreover, extends to the economy, thereby compromising
the capacity of the state to create the economic integration necessary
for capitalism to function effectively.34
If the internal boundaries of the Russian Federation are "too strong,"
then the external boundaries of this state are "too weak." This is evi-
dent, for example, in the continuing wars in Chechnya. Also important
is the absence of public agreement concerning the boundaries of the
state-which reflects both the power of localities in practices and in
public and official minds and the weakness of Russian national iden-
tity. Russian identity is weak for many reasons, including the absence
during the Soviet period of republican institutions that could forge
such an identity; the divisions within the Soviet and then Russian elite
stratum over whether and how to define this identity, and the consider-
able constraints on the construction of a common identity when the
particular protonation in question is numerically dominant, geograph-
ically dispersed, and located in the core, not the periphery, within an
empire, not within a state. 35 Thus, Russian national identity lacked
what many other groups within the former Soviet Union had and what
served as the basis for mobilization once the regime and the state began
to disintegrate: political, cultural, social, and economic institutions; ge-
ographical compactness; an "other" that was defined simultaneously in
litical continuum. See James Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consoli-
dating Russia's Democratic Tradition," American Journal of Political Science 45 (January 2001); and
Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," World Politics 49 (April
1997).
33 See, in particular, Kathryn Hendley, "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia," Post-Soviet Af-
fairs 13 (October-December 1997); Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Resisting the State: Reform and Retrench-
ment in Post-Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). A historical
perspective on rule of law in Russia is provided in George Yaney, "Law, Society, and the Domestic
Regime in Russia in Historical Perspective," American Political Science Review 59 (June 1965).
34 See David Woodruff, Money Unmade: Barter and the Fate ofRussian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor-
nell University Press, 1999).
35 See, especially, Yitzhak Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State,
1953-1991 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); and idem, "National Identity and Democ-
racy in Postcommunist Russia" (Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, August 2001). See also Veljko Vujacic, "Historical Capacities, Nationalist Mobilization and
Political Outcomes in Russia and Serbia: A Weberian View," Theory and Society 25 (December 1996);
Mark Beissinger, "Demise of an Empire-State: Identity, Legitimacy and the Deconstruction of Soviet
Politics," in Crawford Young, ed., The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University ofWis-
consin Press, 1993); Bunce (fn. 11), chaps. 4-5.
230 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

182 WORLD POLITICS

ideological, spatial, and national terms; and a sense of being an embat-

tled minority poised against a majority.
If there is a consensus that the Russian state is weak, there is also a
consensus that this poses a serious problem for Russian democracy. As
Stephen Holmes has observed: "Today's Russia makes excrutiatingly
plain that liberal values are threatened just as thoroughly by state inca-
pacity as by despotic power."36 While most definitions of democracy do
not mention the state and instead emphasize rights, liberties, and com-
petition, a capable state is nonetheless implied. Can there be civilliber-
ties and political rights without rule of law? Can political competition
function as it should in a democracy without, for example, power rest-
ing in the hands of elected officials and without state guarantees that
there will be free and fair elections and that public policies will be
implemented?37

THE CASE FOR RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY

There is little doubt, therefore, that Russian democracy is seriously

flawed and unconsolidated. In some important respects, however, de-
mocracy is well defined in Russia. First, since independence, Russia has
held five elections at the national level-and hundreds more at the local
and regional levels. These elections have by and large been free and fair:
they have invited considerable competition, and power has changed
hands repeatedly. In the gubernatorial elections of 1996-97, for ex-
ample, fully one-half of the incumbent candidates were defeated-an
important consideration, since one indicator that a democracy is
consolidating is peaceful turnover of political power. 38 Second, the rules
of the political game have been relatively stable since the referendum
on the 1993 Constitution. Third, the number of parties on the ballot
for the Duma has declined over time, as has the number of wasted
votes. 39 Fourth, there is evidence of growing cooperation over time be-
tween the president and the Duma. 40 Fifth, while there are some ex-
tremists in the Duma, Russian public opinion, as already noted, tends
to cluster at the center of the political continuum and to evidence im-
36 Holmes, "What Russia Teaches Us Now," American Prospect 32 (July-August 1997), 33.
37 See Barry Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," American
Political Science Review 91 (June 1997).
38 Steven Solnick, Putin and the Provinces, Research Monograph, no. 115 (Cambridge: Harvard
University, Davis Center, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, 2000).
39 See Robert Moser, Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in
Russia (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).
4°Thomas Remington, The Russian Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime,
1989-1999 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 231

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 183

pressively high support for democracy despite the uncertainty of the
political environment,41 Sixth, the Russian court system has functioned
relatively well; indeed, it may become even more effective in the future
if President Putin's recent reforms are fully implemented. 42 Finally, and
most important! for our purposes, gloomy predictions to the contrary,
Russian democracy has lasted.
It is precisely this final point that introduces two key questions. Most
obviously: given the ledger just presented, why has Russian democracy
endured? And less obviously: is this in spite of its democratic deficits, as
is usually presumed, or because of them?

COMPARATIVE STANDARDS

We can begin to answer these questions by addressing the issue of com-

parative standards. Yeltsin has been criticized for his role in weakening
the state (through, say, bilateral treaties with various regional gover-
nors), tolerating the accumulation of considerable power by various
economic interests, compromising economic reform in ways that serve
those interests, and, therefore, giving Russia a capitalism that does not
work. It is a state that is both corrupt and limited in its ability to ex-
tract resources, elicit compliance, and meet its financial obligations; and
it is a democracy that lacks accountability. What is often implied in
these critiques is that Yeltsin should have made other choices that sup-
ported the state, democracy, and capitalism, rather than undermining
them. But this introduces a question. Were those superior choices ef-
fectively available to Yeltsin? The answer to that question is rarely pro-
vided. Instead, another case-say, Poland or the Czech Republic-is
introduced to demonstrate the costs of the Russian approach to politi-
cal and economic transition.
There are good reasons to pair Russia with either Poland or the
Czech Republic, especially when the issue at hand is variations in shock
therapy or voucher privatization. 43 However, the problem is with a sec-
ond step that is sometimes taken, once the comparison is raised: to

41 See, especially, Donna Bahry, Cynthia Boaz, and Stacy Burnett Gordon, "Tolerance, Transition
and Support for Civil Liberties in Russia," Comparative Political Studies 30 (August 1997); James L.
Gibson, "The Russian Dance with Democracy," Post-Soviet Ajfoirs 17 (April-June 2001).
42Herman Schwartz, The Strugglefor Constitutionaljustice in Post-Communist Europe (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2000); Robert Sharlet, "Putin and the Politics of Law in Russia," Post-Soviet
Affairs 17 (July-September 2001); Peter Solomon, "Putin's Judicial Reform," East European Constitu-
tional Review 11 (Winter-Spring 2002).
43 See Peter Murrell, "What Is Shock Therapy? What Did It Do in Poland and Russia?" Post-Soviet
Affairs 9, no. 2 (1993); Hilary Appel, "Voucher Privatization in Russia: Structural Consequences and
Mass Response in the Second Period of Reform," Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 4 (1997).
232 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

184 WORLD POLITICS

argue that the Russian leadership did it wrong and should instead have
adopted the approaches taken by its more successful counterparts. But
this approach verges on the automatic, given the emphasis in the rele-
vant literature on (1) leadership choice and (2) the procedure ofidenti-
£)ring the optimal approaches by comparing cases with variable records
of success. Both arguments ignore differences in context and the ways
those different contexts produce not just different menus of choices but
also different consequences attached to the same choices.
Ignoring context can be highly misleading, as can leaving the notion
of context too vague. Here is where it is necessary to shift from the ab-
stract to the concrete: by comparing Poland and Russia. The Polish
leadership that came to power in late summer 1989 had the rare luxury
of being able to make choices that could be at once easy, yet radical. I
use both adjectives advisedly. Communism in Poland had created over
time a popular consensus supporting liberal politics and economics.
This consensus had multiple origins-for example, the long history of
Polish nationalism, which had been shaped in part by foreign domina-
tion, especially Russian and then Soviet; the extraordinary national ho-
mogeneity of Poland after the Second World War; Poland's democratic
tradition (which preceded the partitions and which was further rein-
forced through subsequent domination by authoritarian states); and the
vulnerability of the communist regime in Poland, given its political de-
pendence on the Soviet Union and its failure to fully Stalinize the
polity and the economy and to constrain popular unrest.
When the communist system made its formal departure in the sum-
mer of 1989, the newly elected Polish leadership was in the distinctive
position of being both liberal in its outlook and liberated from con-
straints. It was not just that Soviet power had retreated or that the
roundtable accords defined a two-stage transition to democracy. It was
also that the newly elected Polish leadership enjoyed a large mandate,
thanks in part to the unexpected outcome of the June 1989 semicom-
petitive elections and the subsequent support of the communists and
Gorbachev for the formation of a Solidarity-led government in August
of the same year. At the same time, with respect to economic reform,
Polish rent seekers, long suspecting that the game would soon be up,
had begun to reposition themselves as early as the mid-1980s to reap
benefits from the more liberalized economic order to come. They were,
in short, better understood as partners than as antagonists.
In this way, an unusually large coalition was in place in Poland to
support a transition to democracy in conjunction with sweeping eco-
nomic reforms (which were also aided by the long-term crisis of the
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 233

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 185

Polish economy and the failure of earlier rounds of reform in the face of
a continuing political stalemate). Critical to both the economic and the
political transition, however, was Polish nationalism-which length-
ened popular horizons. 44 Lest there be any doubt about the enormous
political capital supporting Poland's radical break with state socialism,
note that the finance minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, faced no opposition
to his economic reform package when he consulted with other mem-
bers of the government and with deputies in the Sejm; that Polish
publics did not rebel when the reforms produced an unexpectedly sharp
and prolonged economic downturn; and that the transition to democ-
racy proceeded more quickly than the roundtable accords had pro-
jected. Thus, Polish leaders had a rare opportunity, whether in the
annals of democratic politics in general or of new democracies in par-
ticular, to combine considerable power and public support with a radi-
cal reform agenda.
In Russia, by contrast and for many reasons, including the weakness
of Russian national identity and the dynamics of the collapse of the So-
viet state, there was much less consensus among publics and among
elites about either the regime or the state-in-formation. As a result, the
movement toward the new order was compromised and, because of
that, necessarily politically and economically solicitous of rent seeking.
Rather than jumping on a train they already knew was leaving the sta-
tion, as happened in Poland, rent seekers in Russia were waiting to see
whether there even was a train and, if so, where it was heading. In
doing so, to recall the earlier discussion, they benefited from the uncer-
tainty of the Russian transition and its consequences-partial economic
reform and partial democracy. 45
Indeed, the Russian version of this process did not originate with
Yeltsin or even with Gorbachev. It was also characteristic of the Brezh-
nev era, where central control over politics and economics was reduced
in order to prolong the regime and keep rent seekers within the fold
rather than pushing them outside, where they could make even more
mischief Simply put, Brezhnev gave up power in order to keep it-and
the weakness of the regime, the state, and the bloc, along with the lack-
luster performance of the economy during the Brezhnev era, all testi-
fied to how costly those compromises were. Indeed, one reason why the
Soviet bloc disintegrated so quickly and Russian economic performance

44 See Rawi Abdelal, Economic Nationalism after Empire: A Comparative Perspective on Nation, Econ-
omy and Security in Post-Soviet Eurasia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001).
4'The phrasing, as well as some of the logic, is borrowed from Joel S. Hellman, "Winners Take All:
The Politics of Partial Reform in PostcommunistTransitions," World Politics 50 (January 1998).
234 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

186 WORLD POLITICS

has been so poor for the past decade was Brezhnev's legacy of main-
taining power, the regime, the state, and the bloc by undermining all
four. 46
In the absence of either a popular or an elite consensus, then, the
"choice" in Russia, more recently as during the Brezhnev era, was, in
contrast to Poland, neither stark nor simple. Instead, choices were de-
fined by "ordinary politics"-to reverse Balcerowicz's apt characteriza-
tion of the "extraordinary politics" that shaped the early stages of the
Polish transition to democracy and capitalism. 47 As Andrei Shleifer and
Daniel Treisman have argued with respect to economic reform, choice
in Russia was severely circumscribed. As they generalized: "The task of
a reformer in a weak state is to persuade stakeholders to give up more
socially inefficient ways of receiving rents in exchange for less socially
costly payoffs."48 The same holds true in the political sphere. The task
of a democratizer in a precarious regime and state is to persuade stake-
holders-say, regional governors, powerful economic lobbies, and the
communists-to give up some of their political power in exchange for a
more stable order.
The contrasts between Russia and Poland suggest a more general
point. Two problems emerge from the scholarly emphasis on elite
choice, so central to the study of recent democratization (and economic
reform) and so in keeping with the recent preferences of the discipline
to search for optimal strategies and to privilege more immediate and
obvious influences over those that are more removed and subtle. One
problem is a failure to recognize most decisions as choices among
competing opportunity costs. The other is a pronounced tendency, es-
pecially when "unusual politics" is available as a comparative standard,
to overestimate what leaders can do. The first oversimplifies choice
while ignoring the thicket of constraints. The second transforms deci-
sion makers into heroes or villains-a characterization that speaks to
the excessively voluntaristic focus of much of the literature on recent
democratization.
Such a focus has been justified on the basis of both the extraordinary
impact ofleaders during the transition period and the notion of uncer-

46 Valerie Bunce, "The Political Economy of the Brezhnev Era: The Rise and Fall of Corporatism,"
British Journal of Political Science 13 (January 1983); idem, "The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution
of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability," International Organization 39 (Winter
1984-85).
47 See Bakerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation (Budapest: Central European University
Press, 1995).
48 Shleifer and Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia. (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 2000), 4.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 235

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 187

tainty-which has been interpreted as a reduction of constraints on
leaders, However, as noted earlier in this article, the privileging of po-
liticalleaders and the presumption of high uncertainty are both ques-
tionable, Moreover, while uncertainty logically gives leaders more room
for maneuver, it also curtails their ability to shape political and eco-
nomic developments, Both hold for precisely the same reason-insti-
tutional fluidity during transitional periods,49
If elite choice needs to be reconsidered, so does the relationship be-
tween the consolidation of democracy and its survivaL One reason is
that "the stability of a regime and the quality of a regime are analyti-
cally separate categories that should not be subsumed under one
word-consolidation,"50 The other reason can be deduced from the
ledger of Russian democracy, presented earlier: it is a democracy that is
flawed but not fleeting, Its flaws reflect the compromises, minus a for-
mal pact, that were required as a consequence of the uncertainty sur-
rounding this transition.
If that is the case, then we might want to reverse the usual formula-
tion regarding the relationship between consolidation and sustainabil-
ity. The sustainability of democracy could be construed as an
investment in democratic consolidation. At the same time, it could be
argued that the failure to consolidate democracy in Russia may explain
why Russian democracy has survived. Thus, it is precisely the demo-
cratic deficits in Russia that may have prolonged this democratic ex-
periment. This interpretation can be most readily supported by
considering the only alternatives to Yeltsin's policies that might have
furthered democracy-a capable, stable, and a well-functioning capital-
ist economy. What ifYeltsin had proceeded by, say, building a party,
strengthening democratic institutions, expanding state control over the
regions, and staying the course on economic reforms? Assuming for a
moment that these actions could somehow have been carried out, the
logical consequence would have been to alienate rent seekers. What
might have ensued was a coalition of authoritarians, powerful economic
lobbies, and decentralizers-three key groups that are currently di-
vided, not united. 51 This, in turn, could have produced a walkout-on
the economy, the state, and democracy,

49 Valerie Bunce and Maria Csanadi, "Uncertainty and the Transition: Postcommunism in Hun-

gary," East European Politics and Societies 7 (Spring 1993).

50McFaul (fn. 31), 310.
51 On the instability of these coalitions, see Philip Roeder, "The Rejection of Authoritarianism in
the Soviet Successor States," and Hanson, "Defining Democratic Consolidation," both in Anderson
et al. (fn. 9).
236 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

188 WORLD POLITICS

Yeltsin's options, therefore, were threefold: to resist a liberal revolu-

tion (like the Polish political stalemate of the 1980s), to embrace this
revolution fully (as in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, or the Baltic
states), or to proceed, but in compromised fashion. It can be argued on
the basis of the Russian context that the third approach was best posi-
tioned to yield a flawed but, perhaps because of that, sustainable de-
mocracy. Thus, democracy was shortchanged but durable; capitalism
was distorted but implanted; and the state, while weak and vulnerable
to challenges, nonetheless survived.

CONCLUSIONS

Research on democratization, particularly the founding and perfor-

mance of new democracies, is largely a literature about the choices po-
liticalleaders have made and the consequences of those choices. It is
also largely a literature based on the return to democracy in Latin
America and southern Europe. The purpose of this article has been
both to question and to complicate the focus on elites and the general-
izations that have been made about transitions to democracy, demo-
cratic consolidation, and democratic sustainability. I have done so by
adding an additional region to the empirical equation-the twenty-
seven countries that make up the Eurasian postcommunist region.
Several conclusions emerged. First, transitions to democracy seem to
vary considerably with respect to the uncertainty surrounding the
process. This variance in turn affects the strategies of transition and
their payoffs. In the postcommunist region it was widely assumed that
the uncertainty surrounding these transitions was unusually high,
given, for example, the absence in most cases of a democratic past to-
gether, the extraordinary economic and political penetration of state so-
cialism, and the seeming tensions among democratization, state
building, the construction of a capitalist economy, and the radically
changed relationship of the state to the international system. It turns
out, however, that for a number of countries in the region the transition
to democracy was in fact not so uncertain, for two reasons. First, the
military was eliminated from the transition. Second, there was present
a powerful opposition that gained strength from popular mobilization
against the regime (often also against the state) (as with the Baltic,
Slovenian, Czech, and Polish cases) and/or reform communists who
collaborated with an opposition committed to democracy (as with the
Baltic countries, Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary).
Because uncertainty was lower, moreover, the transition in all of
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 237

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 189

these cases produced a sharp break with the state socialist past-for ex-
ample, through founding elections that gave the opposition a large
mandate, rapid progress in constructing democratic institutions, quick
introduction of far-reaching economic reforms, and, in most of the
cases, the construction of a new state. By contrast, transition was far
more uncertain where the military was engaged in the transition, where
mass mobilization focused on leaving the state but not building de-
mocracy, and/or where the communists were able to command consid-
erable support in the first election. As a result, the break with the
authoritarian past was less definitive-in terms of both political lead -
ership and public policy.
These contrasts have several implications. One is that, while the
most successful transitions in the South involved bridging, the most
successful transitions in the East involved breakage. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely the bridging approach in the East that produced the most fragile
democracies. The other is that the contrast between bridging and
breakage-and the costs and benefits of each approach-in large mea-
sure reflected differences in uncertainty.
Another conclusion is that mass mobilization can playa very posi-
tive role in the transition, as it did, for example, in the Baltic, Polish,
Czech, and Slovenian cases and, most recently, in Serbia and Mon-
tenegro. This is largely because mass mobilization can reduce uncer-
tainty, thereby influencing the preferences of the communists, as well
as the division of power between them and the opposition.
Nationalist mobilization and the disintegration of the state can also
influence the democratic project. Whether this occurs seems to reflect a
key distinction: whether such protests first arose when the regime and
state were unraveling or whether the demonstrations at that time were
the culmination of a longer history of such protests. In the first case,
which describes Slovenia, the Baltic countries, Russia, Ukraine, and
Moldova, the transition produced sustainable democratic orders, albeit
of varying quality. By contrast, in every transition where nationalist
protest had a longer lineage, both the old and the new state, as well as
the democratic project, experienced continuing contestation.
This leads to another conclusion. If we divide the twenty-seven cases
into two groups-where the transition was accompanied by significant
nationalist mobilization and where it was not-we find two sets of sto-
ries. As already noted, the first story is about the timing of nationalist
mobilization. In the second group, the key issue is the strength of the
opposition, which is indicated, for example, by the outcome of the first
election.
238 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

190 WORLD POLITICS

This brings us to our final set of arguments. It is true, when adding

the amendments already discussed, that political leaders-their prefer-
ences, their power, and their actions-are critical to the founding and
the sustainability of democracy. However, it does not then follow that
leaders in different countries have the same menu from which to
choose; that similar choices in different contexts necessarily have the
same consequences; that there are, as a result, optimal choices that are
generally applicable; or that compromising the democratic project and
the state during and after the transition necessarily reduces the sustain-
ability of democracy. There are two basic distinctions here: between
conditions and strategies and between the consolidation of democracy
and sustaining it.
In the first distinction, the key point is that some transitions are
more constrained-or more uncertain-than others, and it is precisely
the degree of uncertainty that defines both the strategies available to
political leaders and the consequences of those strategies. Thus, "easy"
transitions feature very different matrices of choices and payoffs than
do "hard" transitions. In the postcommunist world there were transi-
tions, as noted above, where the opposition was powerful and the au-
thoritarians either marginalized or collaborative and where, as a result,
there could be a radical break with the past. These transitions then pro-
duced a quick consolidation of both democracy and capitalism and,
when accompanied by state disintegration, even the state. They also set
the standard for what constituted the ideal approach-in economics, as
well as in politics.
Most transitions in the postcommunist world did not fall into this
category, however. Instead, uncertainty was higher, and the best result
was a compromised democracy, capitalism, and state. Nonetheless, this
did not necessarily mean that leaders in these contexts adopted the
wrong strategies. Rather, they merely faced the "wrong" conditions.
Moreover, if they had pretended otherwise and opted for breaking over
bridging, thereby emulating their more successful counterparts, they
might very well have ended up with no state, democracy, or capitalism.
Thus, strategies and their particular payoffs are defined by contexts, not
by other cases-unless those cases have similar contexts.
This leads, in turn, to the relationship between the consolidation and
sustainability of democracy. It is certainly true that consolidated de-
mocracies are very likely to sustain themselves. But it does not follow
that unconsolidated democracies are necessarily less sustainable or that
policies and behaviors that compromise the consolidation of democracy
necessarily detract from its sustainability. Indeed, as the Russian case
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 239

RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 191

suggests, it may be precisely the limits to democracy, as well as to the
state and capitalism, and the policies that contributed to those limits
that sustain all three.
We are now in a position to address some issues of broader concern.
First, as this article reinforces, the cases chosen do indeed seem to de-
termine the conclusions drawn. This is particularly the case, one can
argue, when case selection reduces variation in dependent variables.
Moreover, case selection also seems to shape assumptions and therefore
analytical approaches. Second, as noted in the introduction, it can be
costly to restrict our regional reach. As we have discovered, expanding
regional horizons can introduce new variables and new issues, while
challenging common assumptions, approaches, and arguments. How-
ever, given the repeated contrasts between the South and the East that
emerged in this article, an obvious question presents itself: do these
contrasts mean that political dynamics are regionally defined?
It is tempting to concur with this statement. After all, for the post-
communist cases in particular, the notion of regional effects is logical-
given, for instance, the structural similarities forged by the political
economy of state socialism and the Soviet bloc; the common origins of
all the new states as a result of disintegration of the ethnofederal states
in the region along republican lines; and the similarities in the timing as
well as the key players involved in the transition to democracy. How-
ever, I would nonetheless argue against the notion that political dy-
namics respond to regional effects.
First and most obviously, a major rationale for analyzing the post-
communist cases is their extraordinary variability, not their similarities.
Indeed, it is ironic that the variable practices of authoritarianism in
Latin America and southern Europe and the variable timing of their
transitions to democracy seem to have produced less variation in tran-
sition dynamics and in the quality and sustainability of the democratic
project than we see in the postcommunist context. Second, like urban-
rural distinctions and even some nongeographical cleavages, such as
gender and class, that analysts habitually employ, region only begs the
question about the factors actually at work. As Adam Przeworski and
Henry Teune argued more than thirty years ago: the purpose of com-
parative analysis is to replace place-names with variables. 52 Indeed, this
is precisely what this article has attempted to do by framing the discus-
sion in terms of variations (1) in the timing of nationalist mobilization,
(2) in the historical role of the military in politics, (3) in the strength of

52Przeworski and Teune, The Logic of Social Inquiry (New York: John Wiley, 1970).
240 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

192 WORLD POLITICS

the opposition, (4) in the uncertainty built into the transition, and (5)
in the range of policy options available to political leaders and their
payoffs.
Thus, region is merely a summary of factors that have taken on geo-
graphical form. For this reason and because regions can provide not just
new factors and variation in those factors, cross-regional studies can be
quite helpful in contesting or complicating those assumptions and ar-
guments that were derived from the analysis of one or several similar
regions. 53 This is particularly the case when regions are very different
from one another in culture, historical development, and relationship
to the international system; when they add new causal considerations
to the analysis; when they vary the timing of the political dynamics of
interest; and when they evidence considerable variation in dependent
variables. It is precisely for these reasons-and not because region itself
matters-that it is advisable where possible to expand our geographical
horizons. This is particularly the case for democratization, given its
global reach.

53 See, for example, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
 Part VI
Human Rights, Refugees,
Immigrants, Migration
This page intentionally left blank
 [12]
OUTLINE OF A THEORY
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
BRYAN S. TURNER

Abstract Although the study of citizenship has been an important development in

contemporary sociology, the nature of rights has been largely ignored. The analysis
of human rights presents a problem for sociology, in which cultural relativism and the
fact-value distinction have largely destroyed the classical tradition of the natural-law
basis for rights discourse. This critique of the idea of universal rights was prominent
_in the work of Marx, Durkheim and Weber. However, recent developments in the
organisation of nation states, the globalisation of political issues, the transformation
of family life, and changes in medical technology in relation to human reproduction
have brought the question of human rights to the forefront of social and political
debate. The paper argues that a sociology of rights is important, because there are
obvious limitations to the idea of citizenship, which is based on membership of a
nation state. Existing conceptualisations of citizenship require the supplement of
rights theory. It is argued thats6ciology can ground the analysis of human rights in a
concept of human frailty, especially the vulnerability of the body, in the idea of the
precariousness of social institutions, and in a theory of moral sympathy. These three
analytical supports - ontological frailty, social precariousness, and moral sympathy-
are partly derived from the philosophical anthropology of Arnold Gehlen, from
Ulrich Beck's concept of the risk society, and Max Scheler's phenomenology of
sympathy. Emodied frailty is a human universal condition, which is compounded by
the risky and precarious nature of social institutions. Human vulnerability can be
contained or ameliorated by the institution of rights which protect human beings
from this ontological uncertainty. From a sociological perspective, rights are social
claims for institutionalised protection. However, it is because of collective sympathy
for the plight of others that moral communities are created which support the
institution of rights. This thesis not only offers a sociological version of traditional
notions of natural or inalienable rights, but also attempts to provide a sociological
alternative to enlightenment theories of social contract and individual rights.

Key words: human rights, citizenship, natural law, moral sympathy, human frailty,
social precariousness.

Introduction

Although the idea of citizenship has received a lot of attention in recent

sociological literature (Barbalet 1988; Jordan 1989; Roche 1987; Turner 1990),
there has been no parallel discussion of the sociological importance of rights. As
a general rule, sociology has neglected the empirical issue of human rights and
has not developed any general theory of social rights as institutions. Sociology
is typically sceptical, on historical and comparative grounds, about the possibi-
244 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

490 BRYAN S. TURNER

lity of the social existence of universalistic rights and obligations. By contrast,

the concept of rights is often thought to be central to political theory. For
example, Michael Freeden (1991 :43) comments that 'The peculiar nature of the
concept of rights, as a capsule surrounding other social and political concepts
such as liberty, welfare, interest and self-determination, makes it quite im-
possible to disentangle the analysis of rights from the properties of those
client-concepts'. One might add immediately, however, that while the concept
of rights might be constitutive of the core of political discourse, rights are no
less contested in politics than elsewhere (Dunn 1990: 14-5).
Although the concept of rights is highly contested in law, philosophy and
politics, the silence about rights in sociology is both interesting and important
for at least two reasons. Contests over rights as claims or entitlements are a
major feature of modern social life (such as social movements both for and
against abortion and pornography). It would be difficult to understand either
the domestic or the international contestation over the nature of social member-
ship (for unborn children, refugees, migrant labour or the chronically sick)
without some elementary notion of rights. Secondly, the institutionalisation of
rights through the United Nations charter has to be regarded as a central aspect
of the social process of globalisation (Robertson 1990:27). In fact 'International
human rights is the world's first universal ideology' (Weissbrodt 1988:1). Here
then is the problem. Human rights debates and legislation are major features of
the socio-political processes and institutions of modern societies, but sociology
apparently possesses no contemporary theory of rights.
This judgement might appear exaggerated, given the very obvious prominence
of the law in the writings of major sociologists like Durkheim and Weber.
Durkheim, for example, gave public lectures on law at Bordeaux between 1896
and 1900, in which he examined obligation, sanction and morality (Lukes
1973:256). However, Durkheim is probably a good illustration of my contention,
since when he approached the question of law he did so from an entirely
positivistic standpoint, which appears to rob the idea of 'rights' of an evaluative or
normative content. In his Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Durkheim 1992),
Durkheim attempted to establish a science of moral facts, that is social pheno-
mena which are external (to the individual), constraining (in terms of sanctions
and obligations) and collective. Social facts are 'things' which are able to exert an
external constraint on the behaviour of the individual. In Durkheim's positivistic
epistemology, legal norms are an important illustration of social phenomena
which exert external coercion over the individual.
Durkheim's treatment of the problem of law in relation to social solidarity
was positivistic in the sense that he was not interested in, and actually ruled out,
the possibility of a distinction between unjust and just laws, or unjust and just
juridical sanctions. This distincti~m might appear to be of some interest to a
sociologist since one might assume that social solidarity in Durkheim's terms
would be better supported by a just legal system rather than an unjust system
of sanctions and punishments. Durkheim was reluctant to entertain this line of
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 245

OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 491

reasoning, because he wanted to show that sociology was independent of

philosophy (Durkheim 1974). Questions about justice and fairness were viewed
by Durkheim as normative and therefore primarily the province of philosophy;
sociology was to deal with social facts in the framework of functional analysis
rather than with their evaluation. Sociology was to observe social facts as
things, not to philosophise over them.
Of course, in practice Durkheim's major sociological studies carried an
implicit and often explicit pay-load of philosophical inquiry into the nature of
religion, ethics, individual behaviour, legal theory, morality and so forth. As a
result, Durkheim got into enormous conceptual difficulty over this issue.
Because he was influenced by positivistic medicine as a model of science,
Durkheim made a distinction between pathological and normal social con-
ditions. Just as medicine attempted to understand abnormal functioning of the
body within the scientific understanding of diseases, so sociology would be able
to explain or understand the conditions which resulted from social pathology
(Hirst 1975). Durkheim attempted unsuccessfully to provide various solutions
to the problem through a scientific definition of social pathology. He proposed
a nominal definition of the normal as that which conforms to conventional
standards; alternatively, the normal is the average, or the normal conforms to
the given conscience collective. Unfortunately, in both medicine and sociology,
the definition of the normal involves an evaluation. While philosophers of
medicine have attempted to offer neutral, descriptive criteria of 'disease', there
is a strong argument to the effect that 'disease' is the product of a normative
classificatory scheme.
Two important claims about the philosophy of social science are embedded
in this introductory commentary. Firstly, a positivistic tradition in social
science, which attempts to avoid any engagement with normative debate by
aiming at a causal analysis or descriptive account of values, is unlikely to
approach problems of justice within a framework of human rights discourse.
Secondly, these positivistic solutions tend to be unstable (Parsons 1937)
because in practice it is difficult to expunge normative evaluation systematically
and radically. It can be shown that sociological explanations, for example of
political behaviour, are incomplete without recognition of a normative account
of laws, rights, entitlements, duties and other juridical institutions. Legal
institutions are not 'things' in the same sense that tables and chairs are 'things'
within a domestic environment, because the functions of laws in a society are in
part dependent on whether they are just, that is whether their creation and
imposition accords with such 'things' as the rule of law. The regularities of
social life are not like the regularities of the natural world, because social rules
and their enforcement depend on what social agents believe about these rules.
As Alasdair MacIntyre (1971) has argued, this question - is it significant that a
ruler should be just or merely appear to be just? - is an ancient one, deriving
from philosophers like Thrasymachus, who claimed that he was merely des-
cribing rather than evaluating political life where questions of justice can play
246 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

492 BRYAN S. TURNER

no part. One problem for a value-free science of politics is that whoever claims
that questions of justice cannot play a part in causal explanation has already
committed a value-judgement.

Sceptical Sociology

The scepticism of sociology towards normative analysis of legal institutions is

a legacy of the hostility of classical social theory. For example, Marx's analysis
of the tradition of bourgeois individualism, specifically in the so-called 'Jewish
Question', produced a conventional position in sociology which regards rights,
especially individual rights, as partial, ineffective and superficial. Marx's
negative view on bourgeois citizenship and the Declaration of the Rights of
Man were developed afOund 1843-4 as a response to the ideas of Bruno Bauer
on Jewish emancipation in Germany. Marx's basic criticism was that within
political society people were seen as co-operative, while in their economic roles
they were competitive, individualistic and egoistic. In short, the theory of rights
expressed the division and alienation of human beings. Within Marx's account
of capitalist civil society 'human rights' are merely a facade to hide or mask
fundamental economic and social inequalities. This interpretation of liberal
rights was an important aspect of his analysis of the Jewish situation in Europe.
The political emancipation of the Jews was not an answer to their social
separation; only a total transformation ofthe fundamental (economic) structure
of capitalist society would pave the way to full liberation by re-uniting the
political and the social nature of human beings. The same was true for the
working class.
Marx's critique of rights has been influential, but it is a problematic
influence. Firstly, there is no necessary reason why rights as such should be
understood exclusively from an individualist perspective; there is a perfectly
respectable communitarian tradition of rights, which has developed the idea of
'collective rights' (MacIntyre 1981; Sandel 1982). The problem with Marx's
analysis is that he treated 'the consolidated property right' which protects
'unrestricted claims to divisible portions of social capital' (Ungar 1987:511) as
the definitive model of rights as such. Marx was as a result unable to distinguish
between two separate circumstances: 'is it the case that human rights merely
served to disguise relations established in bourgeois society, or did they make
possible, or even give rise to, demands and struggles which contributed to the
rise of democracy?' (Lefort 1988:21). In any case, Marx's interpretation of the
liberal tradition was in fact a caricature (Macedo 1991). For example, J.S.
Mill's view of individualism was a critique of the narrow utilitarianism of
Bentham and James Mill; J.S. Mill adhered to a developmental view of
the individual which was far removed from the simplistic assumptions of
Bentham's doctrine of pleasure (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1986: 146;
Holton and Turner 1989:14-17): Secondly, the erosion of human rights in east
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OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 493

European societies and the Soviet Union under the social and political domin-
ation of civil society by a monopolistic party system has made the legacy of
Marx politically suspect. To take an example from Hungary, while under
Stalinism the concept of 'bourgeois' (polgar) had negative overtones, dissident
intellectuals eventually came to embrace the bourgeois values of intimacy,
privacy and subjectivity in opposition to party values of the public and the
social (Szelenyi 1988:52). Marx's own critique of bourgeois rights was bound
up with the fact that in German the concepts of 'citizenship', 'citizen' and 'civil
society' cannot be easily divorced from the concept of 'burghers' or 'bourgeois':
Burgerschaft, burgergesellschaft, burgerrecht and so forth (Turner 1990).
While Marx was sceptical about rights as merely an ideological mask of
individual property rights, sociology also inherited a tradition within the
sociology of knowledge which has a relativistic reaction to normative claims
(Meja and Stehr 1990). From the point of view of radical thinkers like Adorno
and Horkheimer, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge had converted the
critique of ideology into a description of belief systems. While Mannheim had
in fact argued, in the context of the growing crisis of German culture, that a
utopian mentality was actually necessary if human beings were ever to live
optimistically with hope, his work was received as a value-neutral sociology of
knowledge. That is, within Mannheim's sociology it woulrl not be possible to
distinguish between socialism and millenarianism: both were utopian belief
systems of subordinate social groups (Turner 1991).
The consequences of Marxist criticism of bourgeois right and the sociology
of knowledge have been to constrain the emergence of a sociology of human
rights as universal aspects of social entitlement and membership. However, the
crucial explanation of this lacuna in sociological theory is the influential
sociology of law in the work of Weber. My criticisms of the Weberian legacy are
based partly on the critical objections of Leo Strauss in his Natural Right and
History (1950). Strauss claimed that the idea of natural rights had been attacked
in social science, especially in Weber's philosophy of social science, in two
contexts, namely conventionalism and the fact-value distinction. Strauss res-
ponded by attempting to demonstrate the logical difficulties with the idea that
'truth' is whatever people construe as 'truth', and by pointing out that virtually
all of Weber's sociology depended on value judgements in the process of
constructing causal arguments.
In Economy and Society (Weber 1978, Volume 2), Weber developed a number
of important sociological arguments about the historical development of law.
His guiding theme was the increasing rationality of law, which was manifest in
the decline of religious justification of law, the increasing codification of the
law, the professional training of lawyers, the elimination of ad hoc legal
decision-making, the growth of the philosophy of law and so forth (Turner
1981). For Weber, the decline of the natural law tradition is an illustration of
the secularisation of the normative foundations of the law. In Economy and
Society in the chapter on 'The formal qualities of revolutionary law - natural
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494 BRYAN S. TURNER

law', Weber set out a number of social developments which have in one way or
another relativised the law. The growth of socialism has involved an emphasis
on substantive natural law doctrines (especially on 'justice') in the ideology of
the working class and among some intellectuals. However, it is difficult for
these substantive concerns to have much impact because they are 'being
disintegrated by the rapidly growing positivistic and relativistic-evolutionistic
scepticism' of the intelligentsia (Weber 1978:874). The axioms of natural law
have been discredited by the conflict between formal and substantive law, the
relativisation of legal norms as a consequence of juridical rationalism, the
decline of religious tradition and the spread of legal positivism. Weber thus
rejected the idea that a universalistic and normative foundation for law (and
hence for rights) is possible. The decline of the natural law has robbed the law
of 'a metaphysical dignity' (Weber 1978:875). While this decline of dignity may
have challenged the legitimacy of a particular rule, this secularisation has also
effectively promot~d the actual obedience to the power, now viewed solely from
an instrumentalist standpoint, of the authorities who claim legitimacy at the
moment. Among the practitionersofthe law this attitude has been particularly
pronounced (Weber 1978:875).
The conception of domination (Herrschaft) was central to Weber's sociology,
and law was thus seen as a crucial feature of modern social relations of power.
In fact Weber's entire sociology of domination was concerned with power,
legitimacy and discipline. Weber identified various forms of power: economic,
politico-military and symbolic. He analysed three types of legitimacy: tradi-
tional, charismatic and legal-rational. Why do social actors accept existing
power relations? In premodern society, power tends to be legitimised by
existing traditions and customs, or by the revolutionary authority of a charis-
matic leader such as a religious prophet. In modern societies, with the
widespread effect of secularisation on socio-political attitudes, legal-rational
authority is a far more common form of social legitimation. Rules are followed
because they are thought to be properly constituted by some public body which
has a mandate to operate in a certain way. We pay our taxes not because we
believe that the taxation authorities have a divine authority, but because the tax
regulations have been drawn up by an appropriate public authority, under the
appropriate circumstances, by government offices which have the legal
authority to extract taxes. These offices and officials have an authority which is
grounded in the state and not in a supra-societal normative order. Secular
legality is the ultimate basis of legitimacy.
It is not appropriate here to review Weber's political sociology (Mommsen
1984; Turner 1992b:217-41). However, one issue is particularly important in
thinking about Weber in relation to the absence of a sociology of rights. Weber
was deeply influenced by the philosophy of Nietzsche. As a result Weber saw
modern society as an arena of violence in which organised social classes and
status groups compete with each other for a monopoly of resources (economic,
political, symbolic). Dominant social groups attempt to legitimise their mono-
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OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 495

polistic enjoyment of resources by an appeal to religion, tradition, ideology or

whatever, but secularisation and rationalistic scepticism have meant that the
dignity of traditional systems of belief, by which power can be legitimised, has
been brought into question. 'Law' and 'rights' are part of this class struggle
whereby classes appeal to substantive law to justify their claim to resources. As
we have seen, Weber believed that this struggle over substantive law ('economic
justice') conflicted with the growing formalism of modern law. Whereas the
working class appealed to 'justice', the dominant classes manipulated law in the
name of 'social order'. In Germany, this social conflict was reflected in two very
different theories. Germanists saw the law as an essential feature of social
solidarity, while the Romanists thought law was about authority and domin-
ation. Because of the impact of Nietzsche, Weber saw no simple solution
whereby these conflicting views could ever be reconciled. The 'Death of
God' - the collapse of any authoritative normative principle as a framework for
traditional social life -led Weber to argue in his famous 'Science as a vocation'
lecture that modern society is characterised by the endless conflict of
polytheistic values. However, Weber did not ultimately deny that social
actors are motivated by ideals; he specifically recognised the importance of
both material and ideal interests. Although there is much dispute about his
methodology, Weber adopted the position of value-freedom (WertJreiheit).
Value-judgement is not a component of the scientific evaluation of institutions
and societies. Science tells people what they can do under given conditions, but
it cannot tell them what they should do. Science tells people what is possible,
not what is desirable.
From this perspective, we can see Weber's view of law and power-struggles
as part of a German legal theory of the Rechtsstaat in which the state is legally
acountable. In this respect, Weber's sociology of law had much in common with
the doctrines of legal positivism which were developed by Hans Kelsen in his
Pure Theory oj Law (1969). Authority is seen in this theory as a top-down
relationship. Rights inhere in the state rather than in the individual. Weber's
views on limited democracy, the need for a strong state, and on the necessary
relationship between economic growth and German imperialism were an aspect
of this statist ideology. The implication of Weber's arguments are that, in the
absence of a moral framework like natural law , might is right. Whoever happens
de facto to be in power will enjoy de jure control. We might express this idea
differently by saying that those (legal-rational) powers which happen to be in
control of the legal apparatus and the bureaucratic machine will have legiti-
macy. In Weber's sociology of domination, this legitimacy does not come from
below in terms of referenda or elections.

From Citizenship to Rights

We can now summarise the nature of sociology's scepticism towards human
rights. Given the legacy of a relativistic sociology of knowledge, sociology finds
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496 BRYAN S. TURNER

it difficult to accept the notion of human rights without also acknowledging a

universalistic human ontology. While it rejects an ontological grounding for
human rights, it may recognise 'rights' merely as claims for services or
privileges by social groups involved in competitive struggles. These negative
arguments about the role of relativism in sociology precluding the possibility of
a theory of natural rights in modern social science were, as we have noted,
opposed by writers like Strauss. Criticisms of value relativism have provided a
background to recent attempts to revive the theory of rights in political
philosophy by Luc Ferry (1990). Although Ferry's work is directly relevant to
my argument, I attempt later to derive a notion of intersubjectivity as a
foundation for a theory of rights not from Johann Fichte's The Science of Rights
(1970) but from Durkheim via Arthur Schopenhauer and Max Scheler, because
one can gain a stronger sense of the sociological roots of shared rights within a
Durkheimian tradition.
Given this scepticism towards the"" idea of human and natural rights in
classical sociology, a sociology of citizenship has functioned as a substitute for a
sociology of rights. Sceptical sociologists have felt intellectually more com-
fortable with the idea of citizenship, because it does not appear to raise
problems about universal ontology. Citizenship can be, in the tradition of T .H.
Marshall (1950), defined in institutional terms as participation in the civic,
political and welfare institutions of modern society. Unlike human rights,
citizenship appears to be historically and culturally specific to western culture.
I t developed out of classical ideas about democratic participation in the polis; it
flourished as a status entitlement within the autonomous cities of northern
Italy; it was embraced by nineteenth-century liberalism and finally it has been
developed in the late twentieth century as a critique of the consequences of
monetaristic restructuring of the welfare system. From a sociological point of
view, 'citizenship' is a middle-range theory of the evolution of the welfare
system; it was a set of provisions to counter-act the negative consequences of
class inequality in a capitalist system. Thus, a sociology of citizenship does not
appear to involve one in any questions about ontology, morality or evaluation.
However, I want to argue that to read 'citizenship' in this way is a mistake.
The debate about citizenship in sociology has been covertly normative. In the
work of Marshall, the concept was developed to answer a problem in liberalism.
In capitalism, liberal values were successful in emphasising freedoms and
individualism, but there was no easy liberal answer to critics who pointed out
that the classic freedoms (of speech, association, religion and so forth) were
ineffective tokens for the majority of the population who lived in poverty. In
part, the institutions of citizenship, especially in the B.ritish case, functioned to
ameliorate the condition of the working class without transforming the entire
property system. While 'citizenship' functions as a description of certain
institutions, it covertly carries the implication that they ought to exist in the
interests of social harmony. The Marshallian view of the evolution of citizen-
ship, embracing the majority of the population in a supportive system of social
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OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 497

security, is an evolutionary account of progress, In this respect, there is a

connection between the overtly normative character of the discourse of rights
and the covertly normative account of citizenship as progress, Thus, any
attempt (Harrison 1991) to argue that citizenship is not an evaluative concept is
certainly mistaken,
There are, however, three analytical problems with the concept of citizenship
which are specifically important for this discussion of rights, The first is a
comparative problem; the second is historical; and the third is juridical. It is not
clear whether the concept of citizenship is useful in comparative research, The
concept emerged in relation to a specific type of urban development, namely the
autonomous city-state, Furthermore, the concept privileges certain public
values, while criticising particularistic and private commitments, A good citizen
acts in the public interest, not with reference to tribal needs, or even family
loyalties. Thus, the western con_ception of 'corruption' has to be seen in the
light of this view of the 'public' which is part of the tradition of citizenship. A
good citizen acts in the public good by managing public assets in a fashion
which is disinterested and accountable, even when his or her actions might be
against the interest of the tribe, the family or the locality. It appears doubtful
therefore that 'citizenship' could apply easily to societies which have had very
different urban histories, or which have very different notions of 'the public'.
For example, there are significant problems in attempting to apply citizenship
concepts to Japan, especially in the area of law labour and industrial relations
(Woodiwiss 1992).
The second problem is that 'citizenship', like many core concepts in socio-
logy and political science implicitly view the 'nation-state' as the natural
boundary of 'society'. The very word 'citizen' is a combination of cite (city) and
sein (to be). A citizen was originally a member of a city-state. As the concept
developed after the French Revolution, it came to mean an active participant
in a republic, that is a nation-state built around some dominant ideology,
typically nationalism. Citizenship was a form of secular solidarity which within
the context of nationalism was replacing religious solidarity and religious
symbolism.
However, as European societies expanded through the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, many aboriginal communities in the 'white-settler societies' of
Australia, New Zealand, Africa and Canada lost their customary access to the
land and were either destroyed by military action or exterminated by disease.
They were not citizens of the new societies, but their own tribal structure had
often broken down. They were denizens rather than citizens, but to extend
citizenship rights to them may be simply a form of internal colonialism. With
the growing interconnectedness of the world economy and with the spread of
cultural globalism, it is no longer clear that the nation-state will survive in its
traditional form under these pressures of globalisation. The nation-state is not
necessarily the most suitable political framework for housing citizenship rights.
In Europe, citizens increasingly appeal to supra-national entities (the European
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498 BRYAN S. TURNER

court or the European parliament for example) to satisfy or achieve their

(national) citizenship rights. It is clear that there will be increasingly strong
regional, subnational and national pressure groups who look to Brussels not
national governments to achieve their rights. Furthermore as a result of both
nineteenth-century colonialism and twentieth-century globalisation, the world
refugee problem and aboriginal rights questions cannot be easily approached
within the framework of (nation-state) citizenship concepts.
In addition to these historical and comparative problems with citizenship, there
is a juridical objection that, while citizenship in sociological theory might appear
to fill the gap of a theory of rights, citizenship is merely a bundle of rights. In
Marshall's terms, it is a set of civic, political and social rights. Civil rights concern
the liberties of the individual; the political component is the right to participate in
the political decision-making process; and social rights refer ultimately to partici-
pation in civilised life. Thus, while sociologists writing about citizenship may be
inclined to think of citizenship as a social institution, Marshallian citizenship is an
ensemble of rights, which constitute the privileges of social membership. From a
legal point of view, one can argue that the Marshall tradition is unsatisfactory
because citizenship is an arbitrary or contingent set of rights. Marshall himself
wrote about (English) citizenship as a contingent outcome of certain historical
transformations of status (Turner 1986). Also citizenship is a mixture of (bour-
geois) individual rights and (democratic) collective rights. This instability of the
contingent mixture of rights may partly account for the contradictory interpret-
ations which are typically placed on citizenship. The question is: why this
particular ensemble of rights? One traditional objection to Marshall has been that
his view of citizenship neglects economic rights. As a result, 'citizenship' has not
been developed as a concept in social science with much regard to its logical
coherence.
In summary, by contrast with the discourse of citizenship, 'human rights'
appears to be more universal (because they are articulated by many nations
through the United Nations charters), more contemporary (because they are
not tied to the nation-state) and more progressive (because they are not related
to the management of people by a state). If sociology is the study of the
transformation of gemeinschaft (organic and particularistic values and institu-
tions) into gesellschaft (associations which are more universalistic in their
definition of social membership) as a consequence of modernization, we can
conceptualise human-rights solidarity as a historical stage beyond citizenship-
solidarity. Whereas citizenship as a doctrine has been a progressive feature of
western societies in terms of universalistic values behind the welfare state,
human-right concepts can be seen as a progressive paradigm which is relevant
to a world system. At least in the short-term, some combination of human
rights and citizenship institutions appears to be essential for developing policies
towards such conflict areas as Northern Ireland, Lebanon and Yugoslavia, and
towards such marginalised groups as aboriginals, stateless persons such as
Kurds or sufferers from AIDS. The point about the concept of hUJllan rights is
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OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 499

that they are extra-governmental and have been traditionally used to counter-
act the repressive capacity of states, By contrast, citizenship has been more
frequently associated with state-building and state-legitimacy (Bendix 1964;
Mann 1987), Human rights abuses in East Timor as a consequence of the
imposition of Indonesian state citizenship through population transfers and
organised violence would be an illustration of this argument.
Finally, one way round the traditional problem of (anthropological) rela-
tivism would be to argue that, precisely because we live in a world which is
integrated (but not wholly unified) by various globalisation processes (in terms
of tourism, consumerism, communications, law, time, economic integration,
military surveillance, and common ecological crises), the historical divisions
between national communities has been partly eroded by multiculturalism. It
would be a mistake to exaggerate this process, because global tendencies will be
resisted by strong movements to express local differences, but it is difficult to
see how any 'local' difficulty (such as the Gulf War) could be resolved without
global remedies. Thus, consciousness of the possibility of 'one world' (however
diversified and antagonistic) might create the sociological conditions in which
the conventional sense of anthropological relativism might decline, thereby
removing the scepticism about a common ontology as a basis for human rights
in the absence of a common law tradition.

Human Frailty and the Precariousness of Institutions

Human rights as a sociological concept have been defended as an important

supplement to the existing idea of institutional citizenship, partly on the
grounds that in a global political system 'rights' could function as more realistic
and more progressive than the traditional and national concept of citizenship.
Of course, 'human rights' as a concept has been challenged. It is seen by many
to be biased and western; it provides western powers with an opportunity to
intervene in the Third World under the auspices of the United Nations. The
human rights movement has been criticised in particular for adopting western
individualism as the underpinning for the modern exercise of rights (Holleman
1987). For those who follow or have been influenced by C. B. Macpherson
(Kontos 1979), human rights are still too closely connected with justifications of
the market and possessive individualism. For many critics of the concept of
rights, the contemporary status of human rights, especially when it is institu-
tionally and globally attached to the United Nations Universal Declaration on
Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, is in no
significant way different from its seventeenth-century intellectual forebears.
The concept of rights is thus still criticised on the grounds that there is no
ontological foundations for claims about universality, that it is an individualistic
concept of western (liberal) philosophy, and that it is covertly but inevitably
tied to the idea of (private) property.
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500 BRYAN S. TURNER

It is not possible to defend the concept of rights from all of these various
charges. The specific aim of this conclusion is to claim that the universality of
the concept of rights can be defended through a sociology of the body. If it is
possible to identify such a foundation, then this sociology of the body could
function discursively as a substitute for the ancient notion of natural law. This
argument recognises that natural law theory in its pristine form cannot be easily
resurrected, but a claim about the universality of rights which is based on some
theory of human nature requires a substitute for the certainties of natural law.
To be precise, the argument is that, from sociological presuppositions about the
frailty of the body and the precarious or risky character of social institutions, it
is possible to offer a sociologically plausible account of human rights as a
supplement to citizenship or as an institution which goes beyond citizenship
because human rights are not necessarily tied to the nation-state.
Sociology has been critical of the idea of human rights on at least two
grounds. First, it is critical of the idea of the ~human' or 'humanity' as a
universal category, because ithas adopted a social constructionist view of the
body (as a socially produced rather than natural phenomenon) and a relativistic
view of culture (in which different cultures would produce different forms of
reason and reasonableness). 'Human' is not a category which can be applied
cross-culturally, because the divide between human and not-human is socially
and historically variable. Secondly, 'rights', especially in the utilitarian tradi-
tion, have been regarded as a product of an individualistic, possessive and
egoistic society, and as an inevitable adjunct to and legitimation of inequalities
in capitalist society. By combining these two traditional criticisms, we can see
why the concept of 'human rights' has not been widely accepted within
sociological theory. The same type of argument would apply to related concepts
such as 'social rights', 'women's rights', 'aboriginal rights' or 'animal rights'.
The argument here is that it is possible to underpin the idea of 'human rights'
by asserting a common humanity across cultures via an appeal to a particular
tradition in philosophical anthropology, which is associated with the work of
Arnold Gehlen and Helmut Plessner (Honneth and Joas 1988), and by
challenging the epistemological validity of social constructionism (Turner
1992a:99-121). In the current theoretical climate, it is also probably unfashion-
able to adhere to debates about ontology and philosophical anthropology.
There is obviously a strong movement towards a deconstruction of natural
rights discourse (Douzinas and Warrington 1991:74-91), although Jacques
Derrida (1987) has taken a strong position towards law and rights, especially in
the case of South Africa. In this article, it is not possible to present an argument
about the ontological underpinnings of human rights in detail, although a fuller
justification of these assumptions has been presented elsewhere (Berger 1969;
Berger and Kellner 1965; Ainlay 1986; Turner 1984; Turner 1992a:I-28).
Briefly, Gehlen's philosophical anthropology was based on Nietzsche's notion
that human beings are 'not fully complete animals' enoch nicht Jestgestelltes
Tier). This notion has a number of dimensions. First, human beings are
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OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 501

'prematurely' brought into the world, as an accident of their evolution towards

an upright posture, and therefore they are socially dependent on society and
culture for a long period during maturation. In fact, human beings do not have
a species-specific environment for which they are instinctively equipped.
Secondly, they are therefore characterised by their 'world-openness'
(Weltoffenheit), because they do not have a stable instinctive baggage; they
experience a deprivation or lack of instincts (lnstinktarmut), for which social
institutions provide a substitute apparatus. Finally, Gehlen had a historical
view of these developments in which, in modern society, human 'character' has
been replaced by a fluid 'personality' which corresponds to an equally un-
certain, deinstitutionalised social reality. Modern life is thus precarious and
Gehlen drew extremely conservative conclusions from this ontological picture;
human beings require a more secure political and social environment to provide
some discipline, if social stability is to be maintained (Gehlen 1988).
Gehlen's philosophical anthropology has had a significant, if somewhat
disguised impact on modern social theory, especially on the sociology of
knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1966). In this presentation, I want to argue
that the central aspect of the legacy of Gehlen resides in two related ideas. First,
human beings are onto logically frail, and secondly that social arrangements, or
social institutions, are precarious. These two notions can be given a specific
operational content as follows. Human beings are frail, because their lives are
finite, because they typically exist under conditions of scarcity, disease and
danger, and because they are constrained by physical processes of ageing and
decay. Against this characterisation of human ontology, it can be argued that
this condition of frailty is historically and culturally variable and that therefore
it cannot function theoretically as a substitute for natural law. Notions like
'scarcity' and 'need' are notoriously ideological in that they can only assume
some meaning within a specific economic discourse. In particular, modern
western societies are societies of abundance (Xenos 1989).
The core of this counter-argument would be that technological development
and social modernisation have changed the circumstances of human ontology.
Now the paradox of this argument might be that technological and institutional
modernisation have made modern society, in some respects, more rather than
less precarious, and that human life is endangered by pollution, environmental
disaster, a scarcity of resources and chronic diseases of civilisation (cancers,
strokes and heart failure). In part, it is the very success of industrial modernis-
ation (or in cultural terms of instrumental rationality) that has made the planet
ecologically unsafe, at least in the absence of adequate institutions of global
government. In any case, human life is still finite, and the mass of the world's
population lives under circumstances of scarcity. The institutions which are
meant to protect human beings from their own frailty now appear as part of the
problem, not the solution.
There is therefore a dynamic and dialectical relationship between our
ontological frailty and our social precariousness. The institutions which are
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502 BRYAN S. TURNER

designed to protect human beings - the state, the law, and the church in
particular - are often precisely those institutions which threaten human life by
the fact that they enjoy a monopoly of power. The state is that institution which
enjoys a monopoly of violence in a given territory, while the church is an
institution which exercises a spiritual violence through its symbolic force
(Turner 1992b). Various social utopian dreams have always anticipated the
erosion of the state as a necessary precondition of human happiness and
security. It is here that we can see the limitations of the idea of citizenship and
welfare (Goodin 1988) as a social shield to protect human beings from their
frailties when they are exposed to sickness, unemployment and early retire-
ment. Citizenship is often not an adequate mechanism for protecting in-
dividuals against a repressive or authoritarian state. Human rights, insofar as
they are extra-political or supra-societal rights which have their legitimacy
beyond the state, are crucial in protecting individuals against state violence, or
at least in providing the normative grounds on which individuals could be
protected against state violence.
We can perhaps at this point begin to define social precariousness. The basic
idea here is that social institutions are in the long run often inadequate to
human purposes. First, there is the perennial argument in sociology that,
primarily as a consequence of bureaucratisation, human institutions change
over time in such a manner that they eventually deny or negate their original
design. For example, the routinisation of charisma is precisely such a fateful
theory; the inevitable transition of sects to churches, or the incipient
denominalisation of religious practices are processes which express a similar
view. In political sociology, the iron law of oligarchy as a theory of mass politics
embraced a fundamental pessimism about the possibility of democracy.
Secondly, there is the idea that form destroys or contradicts content. In Georg
Simmel's sociology (Levine 1971), there was a 'tragedy of culture' in which the
creative aspects of the life-world are destroyed by institutionalisation. We can
treat this tragic view as a version of Weber's institutionalisation of charisma,
which also expresses the idea that over time institutions can no longer adapt to
the conditions from which they originally sprang. This tragic view may well
prove to be a persistent feature of western social thought in which social
institutions stand in a fateful relationship to human purposes because they
contradict their origins (Turner 1981). Secondly, institutions, if they are to be
effective in achieving public ends, have to be powerfully equipped and consti-
tuted. In Althusserian terms, the repressive and ideological apparatus of the
state (Althusser 1971), such as the police, the army, the Church and the
professions, requires legal and ideological guarantees, which means that stand-
ards of democratic participation are subordinated to the requirements of strong
government. The bureaucratisation of political power in the interests of
predictability and continuity often operates against the interests of individuals
or marginal groups. Strong institutions require powerful custodians, but who
will exercise custody qver these custodians? Thirdly, institutional arrangements
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OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 503

are uncertain and insecure because they are also resources (or control access to
resources), and as a result they are an arena for competitive struggle between
powerful social groups, This competitive struggle for scarce resources neces-
sarily results in corruption and the abuse of public office, or in the existence at
various levels of 'legitimate' monopolies of privileges, status honours and
symbolic capital. In short, social systems are subject to the contradictory
problems of resolving the requirements of normative integration and allocation
of resources under conditions of scarcity (Parsons 1991:115), Because there is
no stable optimal solution to these contradictory requirements, social life is
precarious. Human beings as social agents are always exposed to contingencies,
uncertainties and risks, and the measures which are taken to regulate these risks
create further dilemmas of power.
We can see various features of this dynamic, which we can suitably call the
paradox of precariousness, in seventeenth-century versions of social contract
theory. In many respects, the acceunt I have given of human frailty and social
precariousness is a version of Hobbesian responses to the state of nature in
terms of the creation of political order through a contract. Hobbes saw human
life in a state of nature as nasty, brutish and short. Human beings are rational,
but it is difficult for rational humans to live amicably in a pre-social state,
because competition drives them against each other. They create an authority
to whom they surrender part of their freedom in order to establish the
conditions of social peace. This vision provided the classical foundations of
contractarianism. The idea of human frailty, which I have derived from
Gehlen, departs from the contractarian view in that Hobbesian Man is
aggressive and rational rather than frail and dependent. Human beings, in my
argument, are onto logically members of a community of suffering from which
they cannot escape (Hand 1989:39). The Lockean view might be somewhat
different in that Locke's state existed to protect human beings in order for them
to continue to enjoy their property rights. The assumptions which one can take
from Gehlen propose that human beings require institution-building because
they are 'unfinished' and 'world-open' not because they are cunning and
aggressive. Thus, the argument about frailty also departs from those social
philosophies which would derive (natural) rights from human dignity, as in
Ernst Bloch's Natural Law and Human Dignity (1986). Frailty and precarious-
ness sketch out a model of the indignity of human life, of its essential alienation.
However, the problems in Hobbes's theory of the state fit the precariousness
proposition very well. Hobbes's social contract theory was secular and indivi-
dualistic. The state exists, not because God has imposed it or sanctified it, but
because rational beings require its protection. It was for that reason that writers
like Sir Robert Filmer opposed the idea in his defence of royal patriarchal
authority in his Patriarcha which was written in 1640 and published in 1680
(Schochet 1975; Turner 1984:138-41). Filmer's patriarchal theory claimed that
the power of the king, just as the power of fathers over their households,
derived from God; it was a natural form of power not a social one. The problem
258 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

504 BRYAN S. TURNER

with Hobbes's theory is that it can be used to justify any type of power
(patriarchal, monarchic, ecclesiastical and so forth) provided that power is
contractual and effective. Critics of Hobbes feared that a contractarian ideology
could be used to justify an authoritarian system such as the last days of the
Cromwellian regime when Cromwell was contemplating his own appointment
to kingship. The Hobbesian state is, in this perspective on the unreliability of
institutions, quintessentially precarious. In the long-term, it can evolve in an
authoritarian direction which will come to destroy or oppress the very citizens
who, by mutual contract, put it in place. If the frailty of human beings can be
summed up in the Hobbesian phrase of 'nasty, brutish and short', the
precariousness of institutions might be captured in the ironic lines of Robbie
Burns's poem 'To a mouse' in which the precariousness of nature and social life
is expressed in the observation that 'The best laid schemes 0' mice an'
men, I Gang aft a-gley, I An' lea'e us nought but grief an' pain, I For promis'd
joy'. Social life is characterised by its risk, by the instability of social relations,
and hence by the precarious nature of trust. A risk society is one that produces
'bads' rather than 'goods' (Beck 1992).

Discussion

The argument is that we can, in the absence of natural law , avoid sociological
relativism through a re-interpretation of philosophical anthropology to assert
an ontology of rights in the claim that human frailty is a universal feature of
human existence. This position can be seen as a variation on Barrington
Moore's thesis in his Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery (1970: 1-2) that,
while human happiness is notable for its cultural diversity, misery is character-
ised by its unity. In this discussion, one major' objection to this position has
been considered, namely that technological improvements in the human con-
dition might radically change the fragility and frailty of human life. There are
two counter arguments. First, it seems inconceivable that social conditions
could sufficiently improve globally to believe that the mass of humanity could
escape from pain, disease and death. Secondly, changes which ameliorate
human frailty may typically increase precariousness. To take one example, the
spread of AIDS in the 1980s exposed the fallacy of assuming that medical
technology had overcome such global epidemics. To control the spread of
AIDS, it may be necessary, according to some political elites, to adopt
draconian public-health measures - quarantine, mass testing, compulsory vac-
cination, registration of victims, deportation and so forth - which would
undermine civil liberties (Sontag 1988). Making our health less fragile could
mean making our social environment more precarious. In terms of the sociology
of the body, we could consider modern society as a social system which is
developing into the 'somatic society' (Turner 1992a: 13). The body is no longer
the productive agency of economic accumulation; on the contrary, it constantly
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 259

OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 505

appears as a limit which must be transcended or replaced by medical and

industrial technology, by body substitutes, computers, and cyborgs, or over-
come by new regimes of management, surveillance and training. Modern
armies require drug therapy and drug enhancement if they are to function
effectively. The limitations of the human body must be constantly transcended
by medical technology if economic and military goals are to be achieved under
rational conditions, but this management of the body is a critical aspect of the
infringement of rights. The possibility that the state might claim ownership of
frozen fertile embryos from couples who are now dead is one striking illus-
tration of the complexity of medical intervention to overcome the existing
limitations of the reproduction of bodies.
We can consider some additional criticisms of this outline of a theory of
rights. First, since animals, especially those which share common character-
istics with humans, namely mammals, are also frail for the same reasons that
humans are frail, can one separate out animal from human rights? Animals age,
suffer and die in much the same way that humans do; therefore, animal rights
cannot be in fundamental terms separated or distinguished from human rights.
This issue arises partly because I am attempting to outline a minimal, thin
theory of human rights, that is a theory which appeals to a minimal criterion of
commonality (frailty), and which is thin because it avoids rich theories of
human culture, symbolic communication or reason. Therefore, the argument
about human frailty must have implications for the debate about the division
between nature and society, animals and humans. The idea of animal rights is
clearly controversial (Tester 1991), but the idea of human frailty would not
automatically imply the importance of animal rights. The quest for a mech-
anism to explain or to justify human rights sociologically suggests that animals
must be protected, because a threat to the existence of animals is indirectly but
ultimately a threat to the continuity and survival of the human species.
Protecting animals may ultimately contribute to the protection of human
beings, because animals and humans are both exposed to pollution, environ-
mental contamination, global warming and industrial waste. Rather than
engage in a debate about whether animal rights are possible (Regan 1983), I
have adopted a utilitarian position: improving animal happiness may contribute
to the total sum of human happiness; biological diversity is in the interests of
human existence.
The second objection might suggest that, while all human beings are frail,
some are more frail than others. My argument rather than providing a defence
of universal human rights could justify the principle of the survival of the
fittest. In a society where many social groups (the elderly, the sick and children)
are frail, it is in the interests of the survival of the strong (or the less frail) to
maximise their advantages (by genocide, for example). How can the frailty
argument get round the problem of human nastiness? As we have seen, the
Hobbesian solution (and generally all solutions which depend on some appeal
to human rationality) is to suggest that rational actors will have an interest in
260 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

506 BRYAN S. TURNER

security. The problems with this Hobbesian solution for sociology are well
known (Parson 1937). Furthermore, I have rejected the rich/patriarchal image
of homo economicus as a rational, achievement-oriented, inner-directed agent in
favour of an account of human nature which gives priority to what we might
call the theodicy problem, namely to human suffering, misery and frailty. A
rationally organised society in which a culture of individual civility and
education was long-established might produce, not harmony and security, but
a bureaucratic holocaust (Bauman 1989). In sociological terms, the moral
imperative of Kantian philosophy is too individualistic and rationalistic,
because it neglects the emotive (sympathetic) element of social dependency and
obligation.
These propositions about collective sympathy are seen as a necessary com-
ponent of the sociological answer to the question: why should any frail agent be
other-regarding? How can one deduce a theory of human rights rather than the
survival of the fittest from the theodicy problem? Ultimately my argument has
to assume that sympathy is also a consequence of, or a supplement to, human
frailty. Human beings will want their rights to be recognised because they see
in the plight of others their own (possible) misery. The strong may have a
rational evaluation of the benefits of altruistic behaviour, but the collective
imperative for other-regarding actions must have a compassionate component
in order to have any force. The strong can empathise with the weak, because
their own ontological condition prepares them for old age and death. There
may be a rational component to these anticipations of future dependency, but
the limitations of utilitarianism is to imagine that all altruistic acts are in
fact egotistical and individualistic. More importantly, sympathy is crucial in
deciding to whom our moral concern might be directed (Fisher 1987).
The notion of sympathy is not exclusively or even primarily a psychological
concept; it has on various occasions played an important part in sociology and
it is valuable at this juncture in indicating that the idea of frailty requires the
support of a theory of sympathy to underpin the sociological nature of this
argument about the connection between frailty and human rights. An adequate
justification for the importance of sympathy in a theory of morals lies beyond
the scope of this paper; it is, for example, an important part of modern theories
of rights which derive their arguments from the idea of self-legislation and
intersubjectivity in Fichte (N euhouser 1990). The idea of sympathy was
important in the development of a phenomenology of social relations in Max
Scheler's sociology of knowledge (Scheler 1980). Although Scheler's sociology
has been criticised (Frisby 1983), Scheler's attempt to find an alternative to
sociological relativism is directly relevant to my argument. Furthermore,
Scheler's phenomenology of sympathy and emotions (Scheler 1954) provides
an account of intersubjectivity, which is valuable in developing an understand-
ing of 'we-feeling'. It is now clear that similar issues lay behind Durkheim's
development of a science of morals. Stjepan Mestrovic (1991) has shown how
Durkheim adopted Schopenhauer's critique of Kant's theory of duty to argue
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 261

OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 507

that, without some notion of collective compassion, moral injunctions would be

worthless, We are collectively committed to duties and obligations, not merely
out of some rational appraisal of obligation, but because of collective sentiments
(compassion) about the moral force of rules. In my argument, it is from a
collectively held recognition of individual frailty that rights as a system of
mutual protection gain their emotive force,
The third objection, which would come from a feminist critique of the
private/public division, raises questions about the application of rights,
primarily to women, in a society, which is organised along patriachal principles,
These criticisms could be regarded as a specific aspect of the general criticism
of (individual) contractarianism by feminist political theory, A full answer to
the wide range of feminist criticism of rights theory cannot be considered here
(Dietz 1992), However, a defence of the frailty-theory of human rights would
entail the following considerations. First, feminist criticism of the liberal theory
of rights has many of the strengths and weaknesses of the Marxist tradition.
Rights mask underlying structural inequalities by an appeal to the sovereignty
of the individual. However, it is wrong to dismiss all versions of rights theory
on the grounds that one version is found wanting. Secondly, feminist criticism
is often in fact a criticism of theories of citizenship rather than human rights; it
concentrates on the patriarchal aspect of the private/public dichotomy in the
citizenship tradition which is not necessarily present in all theories of human
rights. Thirdly, while the function of rights in particular circumstances could
be criticised, one still needs a general theory of the democratic process, of which
rights would be an essential component. Finally, a critical analysis of feminist
metanarratives (Fraser and Nicholson 1988:382) suggests that the category
of 'woman' itself obscures fundamental differences between women (black
women, old women, disabled women and so forth). Here again, while there are
differences of circumstance, all women (like all men) are frail, and they are all
exposed, in different degrees, to social precariousness.
Finally, one could consider powerful politico-legal objections to this theory.
For example, the theory outlined here is essentially a theory of rights as claims
for immunity and protection, but there are other types of rights. For example,
some rights are privileges or entitlements. The classical liberal rights of
personal freedom might not appear to be protective human rights, because they
are by their critics associated with the functioning of the market. However, my
argument is that the core of rights is the idea of a protective arrangement which,
among other things, allows individuals or groups to seek redress for wrongs and
to make claims for security. Even the Lockean right to property might be
regarded, in this light, as a mechanism whereby parents might seek to protect
their own children against the vicissitudes of social life. A further objection is
that an elaborate theory (rather than an outline of a theory of rights) would have
to consider circumstances'where human rights may be in fundamental contra-
diction. For example, there are obvious problems with freedom of expression in
Article 19 and so-called 'hate speech'; there are equally obvious conflicts
262 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

508 BRYAN S. TURNER

around abortion and the rights of unborn children. However, these conflicts are
endemic to legal relations rather than simply to rights provisions, because they
reflect fundamental social conflicts of entitlement and protection. A more
profound issue concerns the institutionalisation of a global source of legitimate
power which would be capable of enforcing human rights, especially against the
interests of national governments. The paradox here is that any global govern-
ment or legal body with the capacity to enforce human rights, for example in
protecting human beings from industrial pollution, would also have the power
to curtail or expunge rights. This paradox appears to be inherent in the whole
problem of social precariousness which I have attempted to describe in this
article.

Conclusion: The Frailty Theory of Rights

This argument about the neglect of the problem of human rights has been
presented at a highly abstract level. It has not addressed the question of the
historical origin of rights, the political role of rights in modern democracies, or
the social conditions for human rights legislation. These questions have
been considered frequently in political history and political philosophy. For
example, a general account is to be found in Strauss's classical Natural Right
and History, to which I have already referred. My purpose in this account has
been somewhat different. The thesis about human frailty, social precariousness
and collective sympathy can be regarded as a ground-clearing exercise; it
represents an attempt to provide a general sociological orientation towards
human rights as a response to the traditional problems of conventionalism
and the fact-value dichotomy. Through an appeal to a modified version of
Gehlen's philosophical anthropology I have attempted to provide a minimalist
understanding of human attributes in order to circumnavigate the traditional
problem of cultural relativism. However, in order LV avoid both a static view of
the need for human rights as a system of protective claims and a purely
meta-theoretical analysis of social relations, the argument has considered the
historical implications of technological change for human existence and the
increasingly risky nature of social life with globalisation: there is a dynamic
relationship between human vulnerability and the precarious character of social
institutions.
In more specific terms, it is claimed that sociology needs to develop a theory
of rights as a supplement to a theory of citizenship. While the concept of
citizenship has functioned analytically as a substitute for a theory of rights, the
analysis of rights is important because citizenship is closely tied to the historical
fortunes of the nation-state. In a world which is subject to strong forces of
globalisation, the struggle over rights has become an increasingly important
feature of the global political order. However, within the nation-state itself,
there are constant political processes which erode the rights of citizens, and, as
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 263

OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 509

a consequence, appeals to courts outside the state are important for the
protection of individuals and groups against enhanced state power. To take one
example, it is widely believed that with the growth of prime ministerial power
in Britain, there is a pressing need to protect and enhance human rights, for
example by a Bill of Rights (Ewing and Gearty 1990), The improvement of
citizenship may not be the most appropriate response to state power or state
terror. If the sovereignty of the nation-state is eroded by the growth of
supranational legal and political institutions, then the debate about rights might
begin to replace the debate about citizenship in both academic and political life.
This article attempts to prepare the ground for a genuinely sociological account
of human rights, which will counteract the largely negative view of rights which
we have inherited from the classics within mainstream sociology.

Acknowledgements
This paper was originally developed for a workshop on human rights in the Human
Rights Centre, University of Essex. I am particularly grateful to Kevin Boyle, Michael
Freeman, and Onora O'Neill for their comments on an earlier draft. The paper was also
given as a seminar at Birkbeck College, London, where Paul Hirst and colleagues
provided generous criticism. I would also like to thank Joe Foweraker, Michael Harloe,
Karen Lane, Gordon Marshall, Ray Pahl, Robert Stones and Ian Taylor for advice on
earlier versions of this analysis of the relationship between citizenship and human rights.
However, I am finally responsible for the contents of the article.

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Biographical /lote: BRYAN S. TURNER is Professor of Sociology at Deakin University,

266 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

512 BRYAN S. TURNER

and Research Professor of Sociology and a fellow of the Human Rights Centre at the
University of Essex. He was previously Professor of Sociology at Flinders University
(1982-88), Professor of General Social Sciences at the University of Utrecht (1988-90)
and Professor of Sociology at the University of Essex (1990-93). He has been a Ginsberg
Fellow at the University of London (1981), an Alexander von Humboldt Fellow at
Bielefeld University (1987-8) and Distinguished Visiting Fellow at La Trobe University
(1992). He is a fellow of the Australian Social Science Academy and editor of Routledge
Sociology Classics. He has published Citizenship and Capitalism (1986), Equality (1986),
Status (1988) and Max Weber: From History to Modernity (1992).

Address: Department of Sociology, School of Social Inquiry, Deakin University,

Geelong, Victoria, Australia 3217.
 [13]
Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and
Social Transformation
Stephen Castles
Oxford University

ABSTRACT
Forced migration - including refugee flows, asylum seekers, internal displacement
and development-induced displacement - has increased considerably in volume
and political significance since the end of the Cold War: It has become an integral
part of North-South relationships and is closely linked to current processes of
global social transformation. This makes it as important for sociologists to develop
empirical research and analysis on forced migration as it is to include it in their the-
oretical understandings of contemporary society. The study of forced migration is
linked to research on economic migration, but has its awn specific research top-
ics, methodological problems and conceptual issues. Forced migration needs to be
analysed as a social process in which human agency and social networks play a
major part. It gives rise to fears of loss of state control, especially in the context of
recent concerns about migration and security. In this context, it is essential to ques-
tion earlier sociological approaches, which have been based on the principle of rel-
atively autonomous national societies. The sociology of forced migration must be
a transnational and interdisciplinary undertaking.

KEYWORDS
migration I refugees I social transformation

R efugees, asylum and other forms of forced migration have become major
themes of political debate in many countries. In Britain, as a quick glance
at job advertisements in professional journals will show, social policy is
increasingly concerned with these groups. Discussions on forced migration are
closely linked to national-level concerns with border control and national secu-
rity. These themes are, in turn, bound up with global considerations about
268 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

14 Sociology Volume 37 I Number I I February 2003

migration, conflict and development. Clearly, it is important for sociologists to

include forced migration in research and analysis on processes of social trans-
formation. This has not happened much in the past: there is little sociological
literature on forced migration and one certainly cannot find a developed body
of empirical work and theory. The British Sociological Association Conference
on the Sociology of Exile, Displacement and Belonging in April 2002 was,
therefore, a timely event, which, it is hoped, will mark a milestone in the
development of this field of study.
In this article I examine the need for a sociology of 'exile, displacement and
belonging' and discuss its theoretical framework, topics of study and methodo-
logical principles. I will argue that it needs to be understood as a sociology
of forced migration in the context of global social transformation. This is
because forced migration has grown dramatically and is a crucial dimension of
globalization and of North-South relationships in the post Cold-War era. It is
also linked in complex ways to processes of societal change in both the areas of
origin and of destination of forced migrants. A sociology of forced migration
cannot exist in isolation: it has to understand itself as part of an interdisci-
plinary and transnational project, informed by reflection on the social, cultural
and political dimensions of forced migration. Forced migration studies have
always been linked to such concerns, but the frequent failure to make this
explicit can contribute both to poor sociology and to policy failure.!

Forced Migration and the Global Order

The most obvious reason why we should study forced migration is because
it has grown dramatically in the post-Cold War period. The global refugee
population grew from 2.4 million in 1975 to 10.5 million in 1985 and 14.9 mil-
lion in 1990. A peak was reached after the end of the Cold War with 18.2
million in 1993. By 2000, the global refugee population had declined to
12.1 million (UNHCR, 1995,2000). However, this includes only officially
recognized refugees under the fairly narrow definition of the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention, which refers only to people forced to leave their countries due to
individual persecution on specific grounds. The fall in refugees after 1995 is due
mainly to the 'non-arrival regime' set up by developed countries to prevent
refugees entering and making asylum claims. This has led to containment of
refugees in their areas of origin, as well as to growth of people-smuggling as the
only way for many desperate people to make asylum claims.
The number of internally displaced persons - those forced to flee their
homes, but who have not crossed an international border - has rocketed: from
1.2 million in 1982 to 14 million by 1986 and to over 20 million by 1997
(Cohen and Deng, 1998). The number of countries with populations of inter-
nally displaced persons grew from five in 1970 to 34 in 1996 (UNHCR, 1997:
130).
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Towards a sociology of forced migration Castles 15

As for asylum seekers, annual applications in Western Europe, Australia,

Canada and the USA combined rose from 90,400 in 1983 to 323,050 in 1988
and then surged again, with the end of the Cold War, to peak at 828,645 in
1992. Applications fell sharply to 480,00 in 1995, but began creeping up again
to 534,500 in 2000. The UK had relatively few asylum seekers in the early
1990s, with 32,300 in 1992, but numbers increased to 55,000 in 1998 and
97,900 in 2000 (OECD, 2001).
Then there are types of forced migration which are hard to quantify.
Millions of people are displaced every year by development projects such as
dams, airports, roads, luxury housing, conservation areas and game parks. The
World Bank puts their number at 10 million a year. Some are able to rebuild
their livelihood, but many experience permanent impoverishment and
marginalization (Cernea and McDowell, 2000; World Commission on Dams,
2000). Typically, it is rural dwellers, ethnic minorities and indigenous people
who suffer 'in the national interest', while elites and transnational companies
benefit (Roy, 1999). In addition, many people have to migrate because of envi-
ronmental degradation, natural disasters and industrial accidents or pollution.
In such cases, it is extremely hard to distinguish between environmental, eco-
nomic and political factors, so that the label 'environmental refugee' is mis-
leading and even damaging, since it can divert attention from complex causes
(Black, 1998; Myers and Kent, 1995).
A final form of forced migration is the trafficking of people across interna-
tional boundaries for purposes of exploitation. The trafficking of women and
children for the sex industry occurs all over the world. Thai and Japanese
gangsters collaborate to entice women into prostitution in Japan by claiming
that they will get jobs as waitresses or entertainers. Victims of civil war and
forced displacement in former Yugoslavia, Georgia and Azerbaijan are sold to
brothels in Western Europe. Women in war zones are forced into sex-slavery
by combatant forces, or sold to international gangs. Although trafficking
affects mainly women and children, there are also cases of men forced into debt
bondage by trafficking gangs (Gallagher, 2002). The growth in people-
trafficking is a result of the restrictive immigration policies of rich countries.
The high demand for labour in the North, combined with strong barriers to
entry, have created business opportunities for a new 'migration industry'. This
includes legal participants, such as travel agents, shipping companies and
banks, as well as illegal operators.
However, mere growth in numbers is not enough to justify a new field of
sociological research. The numbers game has ambivalent results. The
International Organization for Migration (lOM) estimates that about 150 mil-
lion people currently live outside their country of birth - about 2 percent of the
world's population (10M, 2000). United Nations figures indicate that global
migration is growing only slightly faster than overall population (Zlornik,
1999). If we add up the global number of forced migrants - both international
and internal - it would corne to somewhere between 100 and 200 million
(depending on assumptions and definitions). Some scholars therefore argue that
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16 Sociology Volume 37 , Number I , February 2003

the key challenge is to explain why most people don't migrate - given the huge
disparities in wealth, social conditions and human rights (Arango, 2000).
We need a sociological argument, that points to the significance of forced
migration in contemporary society and in current processes of change. A first
clue is provided by Zygmunt Bauman, who argues that 'mobility has become
the most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor'. The new global eco-
nomic and political elites are able to cross borders at will, while the poor are
meant to stay at home: 'the riches are global, the misery is local' (Bauman,
1998: 9, 74). Of course many of the world's excluded also perceive that mobil-
ity brings the chance of wealth and are desperate to migrate, which helps
explain the upsurge in asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants. Following
the events of 11 September 2001, refugees have been branded as a sinister
transnational threat to national security - even though none of the 11
September terrorists were actually refugees or asylum seekers. In fact, refugees
and migrants have been increasingly linked to security concerns since the end of
the Cold War, leading to the emergence of the new research field of 'political
demography' (Weiner and Russell, 2001).
The link between economic integration and migration is to be found
throughout the globalization literature. The crucial characteristics of globaliza-
tion are the growth of cross-border flows and their organization by means of
multi-nodal transnational networks (Castells, 1996; Held et aI., 1999). Flows
and networks can relate to economic factors such as trade and investment, to
political cooperation and international organizations and to cultural products.
However, such flows are always also linked to flows of people. Much of this is
not counted as migration: circulation of business people, executives and highly-
skilled personnel within transnational companies and inter-governmental
agencies is seen as desirable mobility. The British National Health Service
recruits doctors and nurses in Africa and Asia. Germany introduced a new
migration law in 2002, explicitly designed to recruit information technology
specialists from India and elsewhere. However, migration of less-skilled people,
especially from South to North, is generally not seen as acceptable by policy-
makers. Hence the growing importance of migrant networks and the trans-
national 'migration industry' as a way of organizing migration. In reality,
Northern governments in Japan, the USA, Italy and elsewhere tacitly use
asylum and undocumented migration as a way of meeting labour needs with-
out publicly admitting the need for unskilled migration. Alternative and even
criminal networks correspond closely to the logic of globalization (Castells,
1998: Chapter 3), while those who try to stop migration are still focused on the
nation-state model.
It is easy to see why globalization provides a context for understanding
economic migration, but how does this relate to forced migration? An answer
to this question has two components. First, globalization is not a system of
equitable participation in a fairly-structured global economy, society and polity,
but rather a system of selective inclusion and exclusion of specific areas and
groups, which maintains and exacerbates inequality (Beck, 1997; Castells,
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Towards a sociology of forced migration Castles 17

1996; Hoogvelt, 1997), The most significant expression of this inequality is the
North-South divide, but it is important to see this as a social rather than a geo-
graphical divide, Within both North and South, the dynamics of inclusion and
exclusion lead to increasing social inequality, as well as to areas of growth in
the South and areas of decline in the North, These processes lead to conflict and
forced migration, Second, the distinction between forced migration and eco-
nomic migration is becoming blurred as a result. Failed economies generally
also mean weak states, predatory ruling cliques and human rights abuse. This
leads to the notion of the 'asylum-migration nexus': many migrants and asylum
seekers have multiple reasons for mobility and it is impossible to completely
separate economic and human rights motivations - which is a challenge to the
neat categories that bureaucracies seek to impose.
The sociology of migration is a fairly new area, which has developed
mainly in the context of voluntary (that is, mainly economic) migration.
Migration research has traditionally been dominated by economists and geo-
graphers. However, the frequent failure of policies based on their work has
highlighted the need to understand the social dynamics of the migratory pro-
cess. This has led to a new emphasis on the role of family and community in
shaping migration and on the study of social networks, social capital and cul-
tural capital as important factors in the process (Brettell and Hollifield, 2000;
Castles, 2000; Massey et aI., 1998; 1993; Portes, 1997). So far, such approaches
have (with a few exceptions such as Van Hear [1998]) had little influence in
refugee and forced migration studies. Understanding that forced migration is
not the result of a string of unconnected emergencies but rather an integral part
of North-South relationships makes it necessary to theorize forced migration
and link it to economic migration. They are closely related (and indeed often
indistinguishable) forms of expression of global inequalities and societal crises,
which have gained in volume and importance since the superseding of the bipo-
lar world order.

Forced Migration and Social Transformation in the South

Refugee movements are nothing new: as a result of war, conquest and political
struggle they are as old as human history. The imagery of flight and exile is to
be found in the holy books of most religions and is part of the founding myths
of countless nations. The task for a contemporary sociology of forced migra-
tion is to analyse the new characteristics of forced migration in the epoch of
globalization. Today, forced migration is both a result and a cause of social
transformation in the South. Situations of conflict, generalized violence and
mass flight emerged from the 1960s, in the context of struggles over decolo-
nization, state formation and incorporation into the bipolar world order of the
Cold War (Zolberg et aI., 1989). Local conflicts became proxy wars in the East-
West conflict, with the superpowers and their satellites providing modern
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18 Sociology Volume 37 I Number I I February 2003

weapons to their proteges. Such conflicts escalated in frequency and intensity

from the 1980s.
The context of this trend was the inability to achieve economic and social
development and the failure to build legitimate and stable states in large areas
of the South. What Mary Kaldor calls 'the new wars' are usually internal wars
connected with identity struggles, ethnic divisions, problems of state formation
and competition for economic assets. But they are simultaneously transnational
as they involve diaspora populations, foreign volunteers and mercenaries and
international intervention forces. They also draw in international journalists,
UN aid organizations, NGOs and regional organizations. The means of warfare
have also changed. The protagonists are not large standing armies but irregular
forces. The aim is not control of territory, but political control of the popula-
tion. Mass population expulsion is often a strategic goal, which is why the new
wars have led to such an upsurge in forced migration (Kaldor, 2001). Ninety
per cent of those killed are civilians. Both government forces and insurgents use
exemplary violence including torture and sexual assault as means of control.
Many politicians and media commentators saw the ethnic cleansing and geno-
cide of Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda etc. as the resurgence of 'age-old hatreds'.
It is more accurate to see such practices as systemic elements of a thoroughly
modern new form of warfare (Summerfield, 1999).
Northern economic interests (such as the trade in oil, diamonds, coltan or
small arms) play an important part in starting or prolonging local wars. At a
broader level, trade, investment and intellectual property regimes that favour
the industrialized countries maintain underdevelopment in the South. Conflict
and forced migration are thus ultimately an integral part of the North-South
division. This reveals the ambiguity of efforts by the 'international community'
(which essentially means the powerful Northern states and the intergovern-
mental agencies) to prevent forced migration. They seek to do this through both
entry restrictions in the North and 'containment' measures in the South.
Containment includes humanitarian aid, peace-keeping missions and even mil-
itary intervention. At the same time, the North does more to cause forced
migration than to stop it, through enforcing an international economic and
political order that causes underdevelopment and conflict.
However, violence and forced migration also cause social transformation.
They destroy economic resources, undermine traditional ways of life and break
up communities. Forced migration is thus a factor which deepens under-
development, weakens social bonds and reduces the capacity of communities
and societies to achieve positive change. Post-conflict reconstruction rarely
leads to restoration of the pre-conflict situation, but rather to new and often
problematic social relationships. The study of forced migration therefore
should be a central part of the sociology of development.
Forced migration is a factor in social transformation in an additional sense,
as Mark Duffield has recently argued (Duffield, 2001). Persistent under-
development in large parts of the South is not an economic problem for the
North, because these countries are largely disconnected from the global
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Towards a sociology of forced migration Castles 19

economy. However, underdevelopment is increasingly seen as a threat to secu-

rity in the North. This is because the South connects with the North in unex-
pected and unwanted ways: through the proliferation of transnational informal
networks, such as international crime, the drug trade, people smuggling and
trafficking, as well as migrant networks which facilitate irregular mobility. Such
phenomena are partly a result of trends towards economic deregulation and pri-
vatization in the North, which open up the space for informal economies. The
AI Qaida network can be seen as the very epitome of an undesirable trans-
national network, whose goals and mode of operation would have been
unthinkable in any earlier epoch.
Duffield argues that the result is a fundamental change in the objectives of
both development policy and humanitarianism. Containment of forced migra-
tion through neutral humanitarianism has failed. Similarly, the Washington
Consensus - the neo-liberal credo of the World Bank and the IMF that under-
development could be countered by economic growth based on foreign invest-
ments and export-led growth - has proved mistaken. Humanitarianism and
development policy have a new joint task: the transformation of whole societies
in order to prevent conflict and to achieve social and economic change. The
principle of transforming whole societies was contained in a remarkable lecture
by the then Senior Vice-President of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, in 1998.
He argued that development required fundamental shifts in cultural values and
social relationships and that it was the task of international agencies to help
bring these about (Stiglitz, 1998). In the meantime, Stiglitz has left the World
Bank and been awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize for Economics. Development is
now seen by Northern governments and international agencies as impossible
without security and peace. This means that humanitarian action and military
intervention can no longer attempt to be neutral. Rather, such interventions
seek to restore peace at the local level through imposing certain political and
economic structures as part of a system of 'networked global liberal gover-
nance'. This system has 'a radical mission to transform societies as a whole,
including the attitudes and beliefs of the people within them' (Duffield, 2001).
The price of being connected to global economic and political networks is thus
the adoption of Northern economic structures, political institutions and value
systems.

Forced Migration and Social Transformation in the North

Forced migration brings about social transformation in Northern societies by

increasing the social and cultural diversity of populations and by contributing
to the proliferation of transnational communities. This has much in common
with the effects of other types of migration, but there are specific aspects con-
nected with the distinctive experiences of refugees and asylum seekers. If one
looks back to the period of deliberate labour recruitment by Western European
countries as well as selective (that is, whites only) immigration programmes in
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20 Sociology Volume 37 I Number I I February 2003

Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA up to the early 1970s, it is
already possible to make out a trend towards greater diversity. Turks in
Germany, North Africans in France, New Commonwealth immigrants in the
UK and Mexicans in the USA all brought in new and varied religious, cultural
and social practices. However, diversity has increased exponentially through
refugee and asylum flows from the South and East, which became significant
from the 1980s. In some cases refugee flows broke old taboos - for instance, the
Indo-Chinese refugee programme brought the first significant Asian group to
Australia, leading to the final demise of the White Australia policy.
Moreover, the opening of Northern societies to global inflows coincided
with another important form of social transformation: processes of community
formation of the earlier labour migrants and their descendants, once it became
clear that they would remain permanently. It is important to remember that
such processes had not been anticipated by social scientists, nor planned for by
policymakers. The expectation had been either that the migrant workers would
leave when no longer required, or that they and their descendants would
become assimilated into the dominant culture. Sociological research on immi-
grants has been mainly concerned with processes of settlement and community
formation and with the impacts on existing social groups.
To complicate the picture even more, the upsurge in forced migration coin-
cided with the end of the long boom (marked by the Oil Crisis of 1973) and the
beginning of processes of economic restructuring, deindustrialization, privati-
zation and deregulation resulting from globalization. In this situation, immi-
grants, refugees and asylum seekers appeared as the physical embodiment of the
external threat to jobs, living standards and welfare. The result was a politi-
cization of migration and asylum, marked by heated public debates and
competition between the politicaL parties to be toughest on 'illegaLs'. Extreme-
right movements proliferated and racist violence became a serious problem. The
construction of the threatening 'Other' as a legitimation for public order mea-
sures and as a diversion from fundamental economic and political problems has
been a focus of much study (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991; Lutz et al., 1995;
Solomos, 1993; Vasta and Castles, 1996; Wrench and Solomos, 1993). What
we lack is sociological work on the impact of the newer groups that have
arrived since the 1990s. Yet the emergence of multicultural societies in
Northern countries took place simultaneously with the increasing diversity and
complexity brought about by the new global migrations. Clearly, this should
form a significant theme for sociological investigation.
An emerging sociological theme in this context is the growth of trans-
national communities. These may be defined as groups based in two or more
countries that engage in recurrent, enduring and significant cross-border activ-
ities, which may be economic, political, social or cultural in character.
Transnational theory argues that the rapid improvements in transport and com-
munications make it possible for migrants to maintain their links with co-
ethnics in the place of origin and elsewhere, while also building communities in
the place of residence. The result is multipLe affiliations which question the
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Towards a sociology of forced migration Castles 21

dominance of the nation-state as the focus of social belonging. Under the older
label of the diaspora, refugees and exiles have always fitted the model of the
transnational community. However, it can be argued that such exile diasporas
are taking on new characteristics under the conditions of globalization (Cohen,
1997; Van Hear, 1998). Only a minority of migrants probably belong to
transnational communities, with most still fitting into earlier models of either
temporary migration or permanent settlement.

Forced Migration and Social Transformation in

Intermediate Countries

It would be wrong to reduce the whole world to North or South. There are
many countries which belong geographically to the South, but which have
achieved industrial take-off. The 'Asian tigers' (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore
and Hong Kong) are being joined by the 'little tigers' (Malaysia and Thailand),
as well as by newly industrializing countries in Latin America. Giant states like
India, China, Mexico and Brazil have dualistic economies with fast-growing
modern industries, surrounded by declining rustbelts and backward rural areas.
Russia and other former parts of the Soviet Empire are in danger of joining the
South, while parts of Eastern and Central Europe are experiencing moderniza-
tion and expansion. Such processes of change involve substantial migrations,
both economic and forced. For example, the trafficking of women from war
zones in the former Soviet Union is rife. Many asylum seekers from Eastern
Europe belong to persecuted ethnic minorities. Economic migration between
Indonesia and Malaysia is bound up with ethnic conflicts at both ends of the
chain. Internal migration from the West of China is connected with the situa-
tion of the Uighur minority. Similarly, Asian labour-importers are beginning to
experience the same sort of dilemmas as Europe and North America (Castles,
2001a). It is impossible to pursue such examples here but, again, it seems clear
that forced migration must be an element in attempts to analyse change in many
transitional societies.

The Sociology of Forced Migration as Part of a Much

Broader Project

The deliberations so far seem sufficient to argue for a special branch of soci-
ology in this area. But the notion of a sociology of 'exile, displacement or
belonging' seems to put too much emphasis on the subjective and cultural
aspects of forced migration and to neglect its structural dimensions. That is why
the concept of a sociology of forced migration seems preferable. But is a socio-
logical sub-discipline of this kind really possible? It would contradict everything
said so far to argue for a separate form of inquiry in the sense of distinct
research topics, theories and methods. If forced migration is an integral part of
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22 Sociology Volume 37 I Number I I February 2003

globalization and the North-South divide, then it cannot be studied in isolation.

The sociology of forced migration needs to define itself as part of the broader
undertaking of understanding the social transformation processes inherent in
the emerging global social order (or disorder).
This does not mean that every study of a specific forced migration situation
needs to include an analysis of the global political economy. That would be a
demand that would stultify empirical research. Rather, it means that there is
a need for a scientific division of labour in which specific studies of specific
groups or situations are informed by broader studies of global social, political
and economic structures and relationships - and vice versa. The micro- and
macro-levels have to be linked through an analysis of the complex processes
that mediate between them. Ethnographic and cultural studies approaches may
find that change is experienced at the local and personal levels, yet they
need to be linked to broader analyses of institutions and structures. In
other words: there can be no local studies without an understanding of the
global context and no global theorization without a basis in local research. This
comes back to the Frankfurt School's principle that analysis of every specific
social phenomenon requires an awareness of its embeddedness in the societal
totality.
A further consequence of this approach is that the sociology of forced
migration must understand itself as a component within an interdisciplinary
undertaking. Migration is an existential shift which affects every part of human
life. No single discipline can adequately describe and analyse this experience on
its own. There are roles for:

history, anthropology, geography, demography, political economy and eco-

nomics in explaining the causes of forced migration and the dynamics of
movement;
political science and law in examining entry rules, migration policies and
institutional structures;
psychology, cultural studies and anthropology in studying individual and
group experiences of exile, identity, belonging and community formation;
and
law, political science and social policy studies in analysing settlement and
community relations.

Sociology - as the study of the individual, society and the relationship between
structures and group processes - is involved in research on all the above aspects
of the migratory process. Its task is to help bring together all the varying per-
spectives in an overall understanding of the societal dynamics of forced
migration. One side of this is connecting forced migration with social relations,
ideas, institutions and structures at various levels (global, regional, national and
local). The other is the study of processes of loss of identity and community dis-
integration and then the processes of redefining identity and of rebuilding com-
munity. The sociology of forced migration does not, therefore, have a fenced-off
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Towards a sociology of forced migration Castles

research field, but shares it with many other disciplines, The specific character
of sociology lies in its theoretical and methodological approaches, as I will
discuss below,

From Sociology of the Nation-State to Transnational

Sociology

Some years ago one might have stated the task of the sociology of forced migra-
tion as the study of people forced to flee from one society and becoming part of
another one. Globalization and transnationalism make this conceptualization
anachronistic, since the boundaries of national societies are becoming increas-
ingly blurred. If the dynamics of social relations transcend borders, then so
must the theories and methods used to study them. This is a problem for soci-
ology, for it developed in the 19th and early 20th centuries as the science of
'national industrial societies' (Wieviorka, 1994). It was concerned with prob-
lems of integration and order in emerging industrial societies, problems that
were politically and culturally framed by the nation-state. One central charac-
teristic of Western nation-states was their competition to colonize the rest of the
word. Sociology and its sister discipline, anthropology, were thus concerned
with understanding societies and cultures in order to control 'dangerous classes'
(that is, the industrial workers) and 'dangerous peoples' (that is, those who
resisted colonialism) (Connell, 1997). In early sociology we find developmental
models, such as those of Herbert Spencer or Emile Durkheim, which assert the
superiority of the Western industrial modeL Later we find models of social
order and conformity in the work of Parsons and other functionalists. The
exception to this preoccupation with the national is Marx's political economy,
which foreshadows globalization theory. Yet later critical sociology, while
drawing on Marxist ideas, often implicitly took the nation-state as the frame-
work for class analysis.
This has two consequences. First, the stranger, or 'Other', is seen as deviant
and potentially dangerous. We see this most clearly in the assimilation theories
developed in the USA in response to the mass immigration of the early 20th cen-
tury (Gordon, 1964). Assimilation theory was influenced by work of Robert E.
Park and the Chicago School who studied inter-group relations in the 1920s
when Chicago's population was over one-third foreign-born (Park, 1950). In
assimilationist views the migrant is characterized as someone whose pre-migra-
tion culture is useless and even harmful in the new setting. He or she must go
through a process of re-socialization or acculturation, which involves renounc-
ing the original culture and adopting the values, norms and behaviour of the
receiving society. The latter is seen in functionalist terms as fundamentally
homogenous and harmonious. The immigrant has to be assimilated - or at least
integrated - to restore this harmony. Migrants who maintain their own lan-
guages, religions and cultures and who cluster together as a way of coping with
racism and exclusion are seen as a threat to social cohesion. 2 This common
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24 Sociology Volume 37 I Number I I February 2003

sense understanding of the need for immigrants to adopt the dominant culture
remains highly influential in most immigration countries today, especially in
popular and political discourse, but also in academic approaches.
Second, if sociologists see the nation-state as the 'container' (Faist, 2000)
for all major aspects of social life, this implies the need for distinct bodies of
social-scientific knowledge for each country. Despite international inter-
change between sociologists, there was (and still is) considerable national speci-
ficity in the modes of organization, the theoretical and methodological
approaches, the research questions and the findings of the social sciences.
Within each country there are competing schools or paradigms, yet these func-
tion within distinct intellectual frameworks with strong historical roots and sur-
prising durability. The determinants of national specificity include: religious,
philosophical and ideological traditions; the varying historical roles of intellec-
tuals in constructing national culture and identity; the relationships between
states and 'political classes'; the role of social science in informing social policy
and the modes of interaction of state apparatuses with universities and other
research bodies.
The tunnel vision brought about by such national models is a major bar-
rier to understanding in migration research. Fundamental ideas on the nature
of migration and its consequences for society arise from nationally-specific his-
torical experiences of population mobility and cultural diversity. Past experi-
ences with internal ethnic minorities, colonized peoples and migrant labour
recruited during industrialization have helped shape current attitudes and
approaches. Historical precedents have led to stereotypes and practices which
are often deeply embedded in political and cultural discourses, so that they have
become an unquestioned 'common sense' (Goldberg, 1993: 41-3), which
affects even the most critical researchers. Such national ideologies affect govern-
ment policies on migration research, shape the questions asked by migration
researchers and influence modes of explanation and analysis. A look at any
major migration country will show the importance of such national models
(Castles, 2000; Castles and Miller, 1998).
Today, global change and the increasing importance of transnational pro-
cesses require new approaches from the sociology of migration. These will not
develop automatically out of existing paradigms, because the latter are often
based on institutional and conceptual frameworks that may be resistant to
change and whose protagonists may have strong interests in the preservation
of the intellectual status quo. If classical social theory was premised on the
emerging national-industrial society of the 19th and early 20th century, then a
renewal of social theory should take as its starting point the global transfor-
mations occurring at the dawn of the 21st century. The key issue is the analysis
of transnational connectedness and the way this affects national societies, local
communities and individuals (Castles, 2001b). Migration in general, and forced
migration in particular, are amongst the most important social expressions of
global connections and processes. The sociology of forced migration is, there-
fore, important not only as a field of sociological enquiry in itself, but also as
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Towards a sociology of forced migration Castles 15

an area with the potential to make major contributions to 'global sociology'

(Cohen and Kennedy, 2000).

Why do Migration Policies Often Fail?

Research on forced migration has always been close to practical and policy con-
cerns - in fact it is often policy-driven: that is, its research questions, methods
and even findings are shaped by the political interests of governments and fund-
ing bodies (Black, 2001). This raises an interesting question. Anyone who
studies migration policies closely will be struck by how often they fail to meet
their objectives, or, indeed, even achieve the opposite. Here are a few examples.

Australia's postwar immigration policy was designed explicitly to keep the

country white and British. Instead it led to the emergence of one of
the world's most diverse societies, with immigrants from over 100 coun-
tries (Castles et aI., 1988).
Germany's 'guestworker' recruitment between 1955 and 1973 was
designed to provide temporary migrant workers who would not settle per-
manently and could be sent away when they were no longer needed.
Instead, when the economic downturn came in 1973, family reunions
increased, ethnic communities developed and Germany became a multicul-
tural society (Castles et aI., 1984). This led to major social and cultural
changes, including a major change in German citizenship law in 1999.
The US Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was designed to cur-
tail illegal migration and reduce entries. Instead it led to an upsurge in
immigration, both legal and illegal (Portes, 1997: 818).
• In the 1990s, Western European countries adopted both national and
regional measures to reduce immigration and the entry of asylum seekers.
The unforeseen consequence of such restrictions was the rapid growth of a
transnational 'migration industry'. Rather than stopping immigration, the
measures created business opportunities for new transnational enterprises
(both legal and illegal).

Why do migration policies fail? These cases are drawn from migration in
general, but there are analogies in the forced migration field. Sociologists can
draw on the Mertonian notion of the 'unintended consequences' of social
actions (Portes, 1997: 818). But we need to ask more specific questions. Why
do policymakers fail (or refuse) to see what is happening around them?
Remember how German politicians chanted the mantra, 'the German Federal
Republic is not a country of immigration' right up to the late 1990s. The prob-
lem was perhaps less one of not seeing obvious facts and more one of being
unwilling to admit to past errors of judgement. More important for sociolo-
gists: did the researchers get it wrong, or did the politicians and bureaucrats
280 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

26 Sociology Volume 37 I Number I I February 2003

ignore them? The answer is both. Because social scientists often allowed their
research agendas to be driven by policy needs and funding, they often asked the
wrong questions, relied on short-term empirical approaches without looking
at historical and comparative dimensions and failed to develop adequate
theoretical frameworks. They gave policymakers narrow, short-term answers
that led to misinformed policies. Those sociologists who refused this role and
provided more critical analyses were largely ignored. They did not get funding
or invitations to carry out official studies.
The key point is that policy-driven research can lead not only to poor
sociology, but also to bad policy. This is because narrowly-focused empirical
research, often designed to provide an answer to an immediate bureaucratic
problem, tends to follow a circular logic. It accepts the problem definitions built
into its terms of reference and does not look for more fundamental causes, or
for more challenging solutions. The recommendations that emerge are chosen
from a narrow range of options acceptable to the commissioning body.
Migration policies fail because policymakers refuse to see migration as a
dynamic social process linked to broader patterns of social transformation.
Ministers and bureaucrats still see migration as something that can be turned
on and off like a tap through laws and polices. By imposing this paradigm on
researchers, the policymakers have done both social scientists and themselves a
disservice. But we have to ask ourselves the uncomfortable question: why have
so many of us accepted this role?
The answer lies in the origins of forced migration studies. As Richard Black
points out, it 'has always been intimately connected with policy developments'
(Black, 2001: 58). Moreover, as an academic field, it is very new, dating back
to only the early 1980s. It has always had dose links with humanitarian orga-
nizations, both inter-governmental and non-governmental. This practical orien-
tation is a strength, since it ensures concern for the human consequences of the
phenomenon and prevents any flight into abstract theorizing. But it is also a
weakness because it can lead to reactive and narrow research that does not
bring about the accumulation of knowledge. A corollary is that the sociology of
forced migration is seen as peripheral and atheoretical by mainstream sociology.
This means that researchers often have no choice but to seek their funding from
policy bodies (like the Home Office or the European Commission) - with the
consequences just described.
It is important for forced migration researchers to seek ways out of this
dilemma. These could include:

greater concern for theory, especially linking forced migration research to

broader theories of social relations, structures and change;
linking theory to a critical reflection on the practice of the various parti-
cipants in forced migration processes, including the forced migrants them-
selves, humanitarian agencies, receiving communities, social institutions
and policymakers;
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 281

Towards a sociology of forced migration Castles 27

the professionalization of forced migration research by seeking fora in

mainstream sociological courses, conferences and journals; and
seeking to make it clear to policymakers and funding bodies that indepen-
dent research, based on theoretical, historical and comparative principles,
leads to more useful public knowledge than short-term policy-oriented
studies,

Theoretical Framework

It is now possible to summarize the consequences of the preceding discussions

for the theory, research topics and methodology of the sociology of forced
migration and social transformation,
With regard to theory, Portes has argued that the predominance of local-
level empirical studies in migration research has led to an over-emphasis on
issues of cultural distinctiveness and adaptation and a neglect of the over-
arching factors of economic and social structure (Portes, 1997), It is, of course,
important to study the cultural dimensions of exile and of the encounter
between different groups, but to generalize from micro-studies of diversity can
lead to a false impression of a fragmented social world, Rather, it is necessary
to relate such studies to broader theoretical explanations of the structural
causes of forced migration and the structural determinants of the patterns of
incorporation of forced migrants in various types of society, This will help to
explain why forced migration has increased exponentially in the South in recent
years, why Northern societies have reacted in similar ways to refugees and asy-
lum seekers and why diverse groups have often ended up in similar societal
positions. Portes emphasizes the importance of theory to achieve cumulative
knowledge, but goes on to warn us not to expect a 'grand theory' of migration
that can explain every aspect of it in every place. Such a theory would be so
general as to be vacuous. Instead he advocates a set of 'mid-range theories'
that can help explain specific empirical findings by linking them to appropriate
bodies of historical and contemporary research.
It is clear that there can be no compartmentalized theory of forced migra-
tion. Theory, in this area, means analysing forced migration as a pivotal aspect
of global social relations and linking it to an emerging new political economy
in the context of US political and military domination, economic globalization,
North-South inequality and transnationalism. This implies departing from the
national focus of traditional social theory and taking global flows and networks
as the key frameworks for social relations (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998; Held et
aI., 1999). Migrants are then to be seen as moving, not between 'container soci-
eties', but rather within 'transnational social space' (Faist, 2000), in which
'global cities' with dualistic economies form the key nodes (Sassen, 1991). In
such spaces, transnational communities are emerging as a new focus for social
and cultural identity for both economic migrants (Basch et aI., 1994; Portes,
1999; Vertovec, 1999) and forced migrants (Cohen, 1997; Van Hear, 1998).
282 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

28 Sociology Volume 37 • Number I • February 2003

Conflict, forced migration and humanitarian action are closely linked to the
political economy of global change (Chimni, 1998; Duffield, 2001; Kaldor,
2001; Zolberg, 2001). There is no space to discuss such approaches adequately
here, but they provide a starting point for theoretical advancement in the
sociology of forced migration and social transformation.

Research Topics

This theoretical perspective implies a broad range of interlinked research topics

ranging from local ethnographic studies right through to global political econ-
omy. The crucial principle, as outlined above, is to integrate various levels of
analysis into a new global political economy. Here are some examples of impor-
tant research topics for the sociology of forced migration and social transfor-
mation. They are grouped for convenience, but many topics transcend these
rough categories:

Overarching Issues
The political economy of forced migration.
Gender dimensions of forced migration.
An organizational sociology of humanitarian and refugee agencies.

Causes of Forced Migration

• Causes in countries of origin.
• Why forced migrants go to one country rather than another.
Informal economies in the North as a pull factor.

Dynamics of Mobility
Migrant networks.
The migration industry.
The migration-asylum nexus.
Institutions of migration control.
• Refugee camps and reception centres as total institutions.

Dynamics of Settlement
Social policy for forced migrants and its relationship to broader social
policy.
The socio-economic and cultural experiences of the second and subsequent
generations.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 283

Towards a sociology of forced migration Castles 29

The relationship between bureaucracy and human agency in refugee settle-

ment.
Forced migrants and citizenship: how forced migrants can achieve or regain
the condition of being citizens and what effects their presence may have on
citizenship as an institution.
Public opinion and discourses on forced migration and settlement.

Community and Identity

Transnational communities.
Ethnographic studies of specific groups.
Community studies on settlement and inter-group relations.
Identity formation in exile.

Methodological Principles

Methodology is not, of course, identical with methods, which I will not

discuss here, except to say that forced migration research needs the whole
gamut of qualitative and quantitative techniques employed in contempor-
ary sociology. Quantitative methods can often be problematic in this area:
reliable data-collection rarely takes place in situations of conflict and insec-
urity. Ethnographic and other qualitative techniques will often be the
primary methods, but should be linked to larger data-sets and surveys, where
possible.
Methodology refers to the underlying principles for research and analysis.
The development of forced migration sociology cannot be based simply on an
accumulation of data through a proliferation of empirical studies. The research
needs to be guided by new questions and approaches, based on broad theoreti-
cal understanding. As this follows from what has already been said, I will
merely list some basic methodological principles here.

Interdisciplinarity is essential. Sociologists should work in interdisciplinary

teams in larger projects and make use of the research findings of other dis-
ciplines in smaller ones.
A historical understanding of both the sending and receiving societies is
vital in understanding any specific forced migration situation.
Comparative studies of experiences in different societies can increase
awareness of general trends and alternative approaches.
Forced migration researchers need to take a holistic approach, linking their
specific research topic to broader aspects of forced migration and its
embeddedness in social relations at various spatial levels.
A key level for analysis is that of transnational social transformation.
284 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

30 Sociology Volume 37 I Number I I February 2003

However, the understanding of local, national and regional patterns of

social and cultural relations and how they are affected by broader changes
is equally important.
The best organizational framework for linking the different spatial levels is
the transnational research network, involving researchers in both sending
and receiving countries.
It is vital to investigate the human agency of the forced migrants and of the
sending and receiving communities.
This implies the need for participatory research methods which give an
active role to forced migrants in research processes.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to address problems of sociological research on

forced migration at a very general level. The key argument is that sociologists
should be concerned with forced migration because it is a central aspect
of social transformation in the contemporary world. The old understanding
of refugee situations as a string of unrelated and specific humanitarian emer-
gencies does not stand up to the reality of the early 21st century, in which
forced migrations have become an integral part of North-South relationships.
I have tried to discuss some issues which are crucial for the further develop-
ment of the field. It is important to work out the specific tasks, research
themes and approaches of a sociology of forced migration and to link the sub-
discipline to an emerging sociology of global social transformation. This
endeavour has to depart from the nation-state boundedness of most socio-
logical tradition and to understand itself as part of a transnational and inter-
disciplinary undertaking. This essay can only be seen as a preliminary effort,
which will have achieved its purpose if it stimulates further discussion
amongst sociologists.

Notes

1 An earlier version of this article was presented as a keynote address at the

British Sociological Association Conference on the Sociology of Exile,
Displacement and Belonging at Staffordshire University from 17-19 April
2002. I thank the participants in the conference and four anonymous reviewers
for comments on the paper.
2 It is important to note, however, that work of the Chicago School itself contains
far more subtle analyses of the significance of ethnic identity and cultural mean-
ings for inter-group relations (Lal, 1986). Such discussions have led recently to
a new interest in the concept of assimilation in the search for better models for
understanding immigrant incorporation in the USA (Alba and Nee, 1997;
Zhou, 1997).
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 285

Towards a sociology of forced migration Castles 31

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Castells, M. (1998) End of Millennium. Oxford: Blackwell.
Castles, S. (2000) 'Thirty Years of Research on Migration and Multicultural
Societies', pp. 1-25 in S. Castles (ed.) Globalization and Ethnicity: From
Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen. London: Sage.
Castles, S. (2001a) 'International Migration and the Nation-state in Asia', pp.
178-201 in M.A.B. Siddique (ed.) International Migration in the 21st Century
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Castles, S. (2001b) 'Studying Social Transformation', International Political Science
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Castles, S., H. Booth and T. Wallace (1984) Here for Good: Western Europe's New
Ethnic Minorities. London: Pluto Press.
Castles, S., B. Cope, M. Kalantzis and M. Morrissey (1988) Mistaken Identity -
Multiculturalism and the Demise of Nationalism in Australia. Sydney: Pluto
Press.
Castles, S. and M.J. Miller (1998) The Age of Migration: International Population
Movements in the Modern World. London: Macmillan.
Cernea, M.M. and C. McDowell (2000) Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of
Resettlers and Refugees. Washington DC: World Bank.
Chimni, B.S. (1998) 'The Geo-politics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South',
Journal of Refugee Studies 11(4): 350-74.
Cohen, R. (1997) Global Diasporas: An Introduction. London: University College
London Press.
Cohen, R. and EM. Deng (1998) Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal
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Cohen, R. and P. Kennedy (2000) Global Sociology. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Connell, R.W. (1997) 'Why is Classical Theory Classical?', American Journal of
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Duffield, M. (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of
Development and Security. London and New York: Zed Books.
Faist, T. (2000) The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and
Transnational Social Spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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London: Macmillan.
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Summerfield, D. (1999) 'Sociocultural Dimensions of War, Conflict and

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Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
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of Migrant Communities. London: University College London Press.
Vasta, E. and S. Castles (1996) The Teeth are Smiling: The Persistence of Racism in
Multicultural Australia. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Vertovec, S. (1999) 'Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism', Ethnic and
Racial Studies 22(2): 445-62.
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and Oxford: Berghahn.
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Couper, D. Martuccelli and A. Peralva (eds) Racisme et Xenophobie en Europe:
une Comparaison Internationale. Paris: La Decouverte.
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for Decision-Making. London: Earthscan Publications.
Wrench, J. and ]. Solomos (1993) Racism and Migration in Western Europe.
Oxford: Berg Publishers.
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Solutions. New York and Oxford: Berghahn.
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New York: Oxford University Press.

Stephen Castles

Is Professor of Migration and Refugee Studies and Director of the Refugee Studies
Centre at the University of Oxford. He has worked in Germany, Australia, Asia and
Africa. His books include: Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (with
Godula Kosack, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); Here for Good: Western Europe's
New Ethnic Minorities (London: Pluto, 1984); The Age of Migration: International Population
Movements in the Modern World (with Mark Miller, London: Macmillan, second edition,
1998); Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the PolitiCS of Belonging (with Alastair
288 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

34 Sociology Volume 37 I Number I I February 2003

Davidson, London: Macmillan, 2000); and Ethnicity and Globalization: From Migrant Worker
to Transnational Citizen (London: Sage, 2000).
Address: Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, Universrty of Oxford,
21 St. Giles, Oxford, OX I 3LA, UK.
E-mail: [email protected]
 [14]
Embodied Rights:
Gender Persecution,
State Sovereignty,
and Refugees
Jacqueline Bhabha

r efugees crystallize the conflict between two founding principles of modern

l~ society: the belief in universal human rights which inhere in all indi-
viduals by virtue of their common human dignity, and the sovereignty of nation
states. 1 Legal systems - both national and international- address this conflict
in their refugee provisions and decision makers confront it in judgements on
individual cases. A janus-like focus, one eye on the global, the universal, the
international, the other on the particular, the specific, the national, is required
of both. As numbers of refugees escalate2 and the post-war international com-
mitment to refugee protection in the West is superseded by a preoccupation with

I would like to thank Arjun Appadurai, Lauren Berlant and Katie Trumpener for their helpful
comments, John Woods and Rashid Khalidi for their computer wizardry and Homi Bhabha for his
many rays of light.
1. Both these principles are abstractions, subject to historical evolution and renegotiation in any
given context, see 1. Elshtain, "Sovereign God, Sovereign State, Sovereign Self;' 66 Notre Dame L.R.
(1991) 1355. Nevertheless they frame the sphere of intervention of refugee law, see 1. Fitzpatrick,
"Flight from Asylum: Trends towards Temporary and Local Responses to Forced Migration," 35 Vir-
ginia 1. Iml. L. (1995) 13, 21. Indeed it is argued that refugees are an inevitable consequence of the
modern division of the globe into nation states, see A. Zolberg, A. Suhrke and S. Aguayo, Escape
from Violence (Oxford University Press, 1989).
2. Recent estimates suggest that there are about 20 million refugees worldwide and at least the
same number of people internally displaced. In a world population of 5.5 billion, this means roughly
one in every 130 people have been forced into flight, see United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees, The State of the World's Refugees: The Challenge of Protection (Penguin, 1993, p. 1).
290 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

4 Public Culture

immigration restriction and border fortification, 3 that focus shifts revealing the
ethical limits of the international order. The common dignity supposedly inherent
in all human beings is, it emerges, differentially coded throughout the refugee
adjudication system.
This double focus is particularly evident where refugees flee gender persecu-
tion - oppression related to "intimate" norms of one sort or another. For in this
context prevalent notions of individual privacy and human rights, in matters of
sexuality or reproductive choice for example, clash with equally established con-
ceptions of legitimate state interest in questions of public morals and demog-
raphy. In the modem state, the duty to produce future citizens inheres in the same
subject as the right to sexual privacy; but equally, from the vantage point of inter-
national law, the sovereign state's obligation to respect citizens' fundamental
human rights is paralleled by its right to address questions of population size.
This essay explores the conflict and interaction between notions of inherent
human rights and state sovereignty as they emerge in asylum cases based on
gender persecution. The conflict is clear: human rights arguments are supposed
to trump sovereign states' justifications for oppressive or restrictionist behavior
and the international refugee system is a mechanism for translating this theory
into practice; however, if in the process of this translation, the content of pro-
tected rights is relativised in line with practices prevailing in different states, the
system is undermined and the protection accorded individuals diminished. Inti-
mate behavior then becomes a legitimated site of state control.
Culturalist arguments offer a particularly persuasive means of justifying a
denial of individual protection because they may not entail contradiction of the
general principle: though human beings have a common inviolable dignity, a
given society may impose certain norms of behavior because it considers them
consistent with that human dignity. Norms about quotidian life, the various in-
stances of "private behavior" such as dress codes, personal relationships, sexual
conduct and initiation are most amenable to these arguments because within inter-
national law generally and human rights law in particular, they have traditionally
been disregarded as relatively trivial and frivolous, in contrast to the classic

3. For descriptions of the increasingly restrictive approach to refugee admissions into Europe
and North America see T. A. Aleinikoff, "State Centered Refugee Law: From Resettlement to Con-
tainment," 14 Michigan 1. Inti L. (1992) 120; D. Joly et aI., Refugees: Asylum in Europe? (Minority
Rights Publication, 1992); J. Hathaway, "Harmonization for Whom? The Devaluation of Refugee Pro-
tection in the Era of European Economic Integration;' 26 Cornell Inti L. 1. (1993) 719; A. Shacknove,
"From Asylum to Containment;' 5 Inti 1. Refugee L. (1993) 516; 1. Bhabha and S. Shutter, Womens
Movement: Women Under Immigration, Nationality and Refugee Law (Trentham Books, 1994, ch. 8).
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 291

State Sovereignty and Refugees 5

grounds of persecution - public political activism and discrimination based on un-

changeable physical or social characteristics. Gender persecution cases, where
private choices clash with public expectations of gendered identity, reveal the un-
resolved tension between individual and state interests in the control of sexuality,
and thus provide a fertile arena for investigating arguments qualifying the scope
of universal human rights intervention and denying refugee protection. 4
Moreover, in the post-Cold War era, when foreign policy (mirroring electoral
advantage) is increasingly invoked to mandate restricting access rather than sup-
porting protection, there are clearly forceful political reasons why the potential
trumping effect of human rights-based arguments is vulnerable at the outset. But
this is also the era when the West is championing one of its prize exports, respect
for universal human rights, as part of its new assault on "the rest" and in tandem
with its foreign policy strategy of "good governance:'5 To what extent can these
same human rights-based arguments be turned inwards to challenge Western prac-
tices? Cases where the very human rights violations, invoked to criticize non-
Western governments, are imported into the domestic arena through asylum ap-
plications and presented as a basis for seeking protection, reveal how refugees
become limit cases for the ethics of a given state. 6 A historical sketch of the evo-
lution of modern international refugee law precedes that inquiry.

Modern International Refugee Protection-The Post-War Compromise

between Individual and State Rights

The events of the Second World War, and in particular the evidence of mass ex-
termination and unprecedented barbarity of governments against their own citi-
zens, led to the emergence of an international consensus on the importance of
recognising and promoting "the inherent dignity and ... the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family"7 (emphasis added). It was accepted
that states could no longer be regarded as the sole arbiters of the needs and en-
titlements of their citizens8 and that these might become a legitimate concern of

4. I am grateful to Lauren Berlant and Katie Trumpener for suggestions incorporated into this
part of the argument.
5. S_ Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?" 72 Foreign Affairs (1993) 22; A_ Shacknove,
"From Asylum to Containment," see note 3, p_ 530_
6_ A_ Shacknove, "From Asylum to Containment;' see note 3, p_ 531.
7_ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U_N_G_A_ Res_ 217 A(III) of December 10, 1948,
Preamble_
8 _ The doctrine of internal sovereignty was qualified even before the end of the Second World
War, but no important legal doctrine challenged the supremacy of the state's absolute authority within
its territory_
292 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

6 Public Culture

international law, that "national democracies require[d] international democracy

... to be sustained and developed."9 The commitment to universalism in the rec-
ognition of fundamental human rights was thus inextricably linked from the start
with a challenge to doctrines of strong, national, territorially based sovereignty.
To erect the contemporary edifice of human rights and refugee protection, it was
necessary to weaken the exclusive access of the individual state to its citizens,
or conversely the complete dependence of citizens on their own government. This
was problematic in two respects.
First, since the international order had been based on recognition of sovereign
states, with sole rights to jurisdiction over their particular territory and popula-
tion, irrespective of their representativeness, there had been no question of or
mechanisms for states being subjected to international moral requirements. The
efficacy of international law depended crucially on the extent to which states had
an interest in the new scheme and therefore agreed to implement their obligations.
Curtailments of sovereignty could not be wrenched from states, they had to be
ceded willingly.
Second, loosening the reliance on the territorial state's protection could only
increase human rights' implementation if alternative protectors were available.
In a world of nation states this presupposed another challenge to state sovereignty,
a requirement that states accept some form of responsibility for individuals or
populations originating from outside their territory. But control over which non-
citizens can have access to the territory is a defining characteristic of the modern
state, and states in the twentieth century have guarded their borders with increas-
ing jealousy.
Recognition of these two major constraints, the need for state acquiescence
for effective curtailments of sovereignty, and the centrality of immigration control
to state power, affected the content of the post-war human rights instruments and
the specific provision made for refugees. At the same time, in the aftermath of
the Holocaust and confronted by huge refugee populations in Europe, iO there
was substantial support for some international instrument affording protection
for refugees. This is reflected in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Article 14 states: "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution" (emphasis added). This article describes a right to seek

9. D. Held, "Democracy: From City-states to a Cosmopolitan World Order?" 40 Political Studies

(1992) 10, II.
10. A 1945 State Departmem report eSlimated 20 10 30 million people uprooted during the war,
see G. Loescher, Beyond Charity-International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (Oxford
University Press, 1993, p. 46).
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 293

State Sovereignty and Refugees 7

asylum and a right to enjoy it if it is granted, but no right for any individual to
demand or obtain asylum. Both rights if realised concretize the separation of
individual human rights from national sovereignty.
Though it crystallised the new post-war thinking on human rights, the Uni-
versal Declaration on its own lacked binding force. And while most of its rights
were later articulated in binding conventions, no right to asylum was included
in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the legal instrument
central to modern refugee protection, or in any other international instrument.
Thus the well-known prohibition on refoulement contained in Article 33 of the
1951 Convention II contains no obligation on a particular state to offer permanent
asylum; it merely injuncts a state from sending a refugee back to a persecuting
country. This obligation can be met by sending the refugee to another, safe coun-
try or by keeping the refugee in a temporary status until the risk of persecution
ceases. According to the United States Supreme Court, considering the interdic-
tion of Haitian refugees by the U.S. Coast Guard, it can even be met by forcibly
preventing access to the host country's territory, so that no question of expulsion
arises. 12 So the encroachment on territorial sovereignty required by the Refugee
Convention is limited. Moreover in the absence of any international judicial ma-
chinery to adjudicate between asylum seekers and host countries, national autho-
rities have been final arbiters in the implementation of their responsibilities. They
have preserved considerable leeway to adjust their humanitarian obligations as
their political interests require. Indeed the politically partisan nature of the com-
mitment to refugee protection was an important aspect from the outset.

The Cold War Legacy: The Influence of Foreign Policy

on the Refugee System

At the time when the Refugee Convention was being drafted, between 1948 and
1951, the Cold War was in full swing: the states participating in the process were
sharply polarised, a crucial historical determinant of the shape of contemporary
international refugee law. Socialist states typically accorded central importance
to socio-economic rights (also known as second generation rights), the protection

II. "No Contracting State shall expel or return Crefouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
12. Sale v Haitian Centers Council, 113 S.C!. 2549. For a persuasive critique of this judgement
see H. H. Koh, "Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council;' 35 Harvard Inti L. 1.
(1994) I.
294 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

8 Public Culture

of a basic standard of living for all citizens, the access to essential resources such
as housing, medical services, food, employment; in their view, however, inter-
national protection was not to be afforded to those fleeing their country because
of ideological disagreement. Western states on the other hand were concerned
that protection by the international community should be afforded precisely to
those fleeing for ideological reasons, those whose civil and political (first gen-
eration) rights were under attack. In the event the Western bloc successfully
asserted its greater power: the definition of a refugee incorporated into the Con-
vention reflected liberal political values of nondiscrimination, individual auton-
omy and rationality and excluded socialist socio-economic concerns. The refugee
par excellence was someone heroically seeking to assert his (typically male) in-
dividuality against an oppressive state. The apparently neutral formulation of the
refugee ensured that Soviet dissidents would qualify for international protection
while Western vulnerability in the area of social and economic rights was ex-
cluded from scrutiny by the refugee regime. Western claims to the protection of
universal human rights must be assessed critically in the light of this funda-
mental, liberal individualistic bias. I3
Scoring ideological successes against the Soviet bloc during the Cold War cer-
tainly provided a justification for the limited encroachment on state sovereignty
that the refugee system required (decisions about which and how many refugees
to accept were always taken by individual states, never imposed by the interna-
tional organizations). This policy of privileging refugees from Communism is
most clearly evidenced by U.S. refugee policy and practice of the period but the
effect of foreign policy on refugee admissions is evident in other jurisdictions
too. 14 The change in world politics following the end of the Cold War disrupted
this direct causal link between foreign policy concerns and refugee policy. Instead
of a means for scoring ideological successes against the Soviet bloc, refugees
were increasingly perceived as a "loophole" in immigration control procedures,
a "cost" of the post-war human rights era with no countervailing benefit. More-
over, as the absolute numbers of asylum applicants in the West escalated from

13. J. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworth, 1991, pp. 7-8). The debate over the
relative importance of first and second generation rights is also addressed in terms of the opposition
between human rights and human needs, or the merits of singling out some rights as fundamental
within a hierarchically ordered set. See M. B. Oliviero, "Human Rights and Human Needs: Which
are more fundamental?" 40 Emory Law Journal (1991) 911; T. Meron, "On a Hierarchy ofInternational
Human Rights," Am J. Inti L. (1986) 1.
14. N. L. Zucker and N. F. Zucker, "The 1980 Refugee Act: A 1990 Perspective;' in Refugee
Policy: Canada and the United States, edited by H. Adelman (York Lanes Press. 1991, p. 235); D.
Joly et aI., Refugees: Asylum in Europe. see note 3, p. 33.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 295

State Sovereignty and Refugees 9

the 1980s onwards and as the proportion from destitute developing countries rela-
tive to industrialized ones increased, policies of deterrence and exclusion became
political assets. Refugees were increasingly viewed as an undifferentiated part of
"foreigners;' "illegal immigrants;' "outsiders;' rather than as vehicles for con-
demnation of enemy regimes. Domestic factors, particularly recessionary tenden-
cies, the widespread resurgence of popular racism and mass unemployment, have
combined with the changed foreign policy agenda, setting the stage for a growing
divergence between human rights and refugee law. 15

legal Standards and Ethical Judgements-The Relevance of National Sovereignty

Immigration judges and asylum adjudicators deciding refugee applications have

to confront and manage this divergence. Though formally separated from the
executive branch of government explicitly charged with implementing restriction-
ist immigration policies, these decision makers are at the very least subject to
the prevailing climate of opinion, well captured by the comments of members of
the U.S. House of Representatives debating a far-reaching immigration bill in
March 1996: the bill was "probably the most important bill that we will consider
this year"; stopping illegal immigration represented "the most important federal
law and order issue in generations."16 Often their institutional position makes im-
migration judges particularly prone to conservative or anti-immigrant posi-
tions. I7 They are also likely to share the foreign policy assumptions and priori-
ties of their government. They apply a legal standard informed by an ethical
judgement about the merits of each individual case. The legal standard is set forth
in the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. A
refugee is a person who

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,

religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic} nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being

15. See references in note 3.

16. "House Approves Immigration Bill after Removing Legal Immigration Restrictions," 73 Inter-
preter Releases (1996) 350.
17. D. Anker, "Determining Asyium Claims in the United Stales: An Empiricai Case Study: The
Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment;' 19 N.Y.U Rev. of
Law and Soc. Change (1992).
296 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

10 Public Culture

outside the country of his former habitual residence . .. is unable or,

owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it lS (emphasis added).

The crucial terms of the refugee definition, "well-founded fear" and "persecu-
tion;' are not defined in the Geneva Convention or in any national legislation. 19
The ethical judgement that decision makers exercise when determining whether
a particular asylum seeker meets the Convention test is a product of the complex
interplay between concepts of universal rights and concepts of state sovereignty:
does this behavior constitute persecution in this culture? Is this individual being
persecuted for belonging to a particular social group in that society? Could this
behavior give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution in a person coming from
this country?
All decisions about the relationship between personal identity and national or
ethnic origin confront asylum adjudicators with the central paradox of refugee
protection: it undermines the ideal of sovereign nation states (by providing non-
national protection) whilst reinforcing the division of the globe into nation states
as a whole (by insisting on the necessity of state protection). The refugee is
defined by the very fact of being outside yet from his or her country. Where issues
of intimate behavior, rather than chosen political opposition and its attendant
heroic acts, give rise to asylum claims, the asylum judge is drawn into a high-
stakes comparison and "objective" evaluation of opposing normative and ethical
systems where a sovereign state's internal cultural norms and policies may be
judged persecutory. This is fertile soil for claims and counterclaims about uni-
versalism, cultural relativism and cultural imperialism. 2o The issue is further

18. 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees Art. 1 A (2).
19. Various U.S. courts have produced working definitions of persecution. Some emphasize the
difference in viewpoint between the persecutor and the persecuted: "Persecution occurs only when
there is a difference between the persecutor's view or status and that of the victim; it is oppression
which is inflicted on groups or individuals because of a difference that the persecutor will not tolerate;'
Hernandez Oniz v INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir, 1985); others stress the division between "civil-
ized" or "legitimate" government behavior and its opposite: "[persecution is] the infliction of suffering
or harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as offensive ...
in a manner condemned by civilized governments" (emphasis added), Schellong v INS, 805 F.2d 655
(7th Cir. 1986); or "Persecution means, in immigration law, punishment for political, religious or
other reasons that our country does not recognize as legitimate" (emphasis added), Osaghae v INS,
942 F.2d 1160, 1163 (7th Cir. 1991).
20. See J Donnelly, "Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights;' 6 Hum. R. Q. (1984)
400 (defending the fundamental universality of human rights tempered by limited cultural variation
as required); for the assertion of a need for cultural dialogue between Western and non-Western
philosophies to identify appropriate equivalents to Western human rights notions see A. An-Na'im,
"Towards a Cross-Cultural approach to defining International Standards of Human Rights -The Mean-
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 297

State Sovereignty and Refugees II

complicated in the asylum context because restrictionist immigration pressures

and partisan foreign policy agendas have a clear bearing on the decision-making
process. Thus decisions upholding an asylum applicant's claim of persecution
may contain culturally arrogant, even racist descriptions of the state of origin's
policies; conversely judgements that dismiss the asylum application may adopt
the language of cultural sensitivity or respect for state sovereignty as a device
for limiting refugee admission numbers.

Legitimating Persecution: Respecting Sovereignty or Restricting Refugee Numbers?

Contemporary debates about abortion, gay rights and welfare mothers illustrate
the extent to which sexual/reproductive rights uncomfortably straddle the
public/private domain within western political discourse. The same contradictory
positioning is evident where noncitizens' rights are at issue. Can a woman suc-
cessfully claim asylum when her society of origin denies her (and women in gen-
eral) freedoms considered fundamental according to international human rights
norms? Conversely, can an insistence that she conform to norms prevailing in her
country of origin amount to persecution?2!

ing of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;' in Human Rights in Cross-Cultural

Perspectives: A Questfor Consensus, edited by A. An-Na'im (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992,
p. 19); for a critique of notions of universality in human rights see A. Pollis and P. Schwab, "Human
Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability" in Hurnnn Rights, Cultural and Ideological
Perspectives, edited by A. Pollis and P. Schwab (Praeger Publishers, 1979, p. 1). There is a refinement
of this theory, critiquing the policies of non-Western states in relation to their own traditional notions
of rights and obligations, in A. Pollis, "Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism;' 18
Hum. R. Q. (1996) 316. For a discussion of this debate within feminist discourse see N. Kim, "Towards
a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism and Un-
critical Absolutism," 25 Colum. Hum. RIs. L. Rev. (1993) 49; for interesting applications of these
concerns to specific situations see, with references to female genital mutilation, K. Brennan, "The
Influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human Rights Law: Female Circumcision as a Case
Study," 7 Minn. J-L. and Inequality (1991) 367; I. Gunning, '~rogant Perception, World-travelling
and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries," 23 Colum. Hum. RIs. L. Rev.
(1992) 189; with reference to Ugandan inheritance law, C. Harries, "Daughters of Our Peoples: Inter-
national Feminism Meets Ugandan Law and Custom," 25 Colum. Hum. RIs. L. Rev. (1994) 493; and
in relation to China's policies towards women, S. Hom, "Female Infanticide in China: The Human
Rights Specter and Thoughts towards (An)other Vision," 23 Colum. Hum. RIs. L. Rev. (1992) 249.
21. As with many other areas of international law, the duties of states in respect of the public
and private vulnerabilities of women were until recently discounted in refugee law, see generally
Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives, edited by R. 1. Cook (University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); C. Bunch, "Women's Rights as Human Rights: Towards aRe-Vision
of Human Rights," 12 Hum. R.Q. (1990) 486; H. Charlesworth, C. Chinkin, S. Wright, "Feminist
Approaches to International Law; 85 Am. J. IntI. L. (1991) 613. Since the 1980s, however, there
298 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

12 Public Culture

The cases analysed below exemplifY the invocation of st~te sovereignty to

define ethical and ideological boundaries for international protection. Asylum
adjudicators have tended to use simplistic notions of identity when analysing
female applicants' complex multilayered sets of identifications, and to think of
political opposition related to gender difference solely in terms of differences be-
tween nations rather than in terms of differences within nations, even within
ethnic, religious or kinship groupings. By using nationality as a homogenizing,
essentializing category these decision makers have erased difference and domi-
nation within the national group, particularly as they are inscribed in gendered
norms.
A clear example of this process is an early case decided in Great Britain. In
1984 Mashid Mahmoudi Gilani, the finance manager of a chemical company, fled
the Islamic revolution which had overthrown the Shah of Iran and applied for
asylum in Britain. She based her asylum application on her fear of persecution
arising out of her fundamental opposition to the regime's policies for women as
they had impacted on her personally. The 1951 Refugee Convention does not in-
clude gender as one of the grounds of persecution. 22 She therefore based her
claim of her fear of persecution on her "membership of a particular social group,"
"that group being either women in general or Westernized middle-class Islamic
women." In the alternative she argued that her well-founded fear of persecution
was for reasons of political opinion or religion. 23 As evidence in her appeal

has been growing attention to the particular legal problems of women asylum applicants, see N. Kelly,
"Gender-related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women," 26 Cornell Inti L. 1. (1993)
625; for a survey of gender persecution in various non-Western societies in relation to the definition
of a refugee in international law see L. Cipriani, "Gender and Persecution: Protecting Women under
International Refugee Law;' 7 Georgetown Immigration L. 1. (1993) 511; E. Love, "Equality in Polit-
ical Asylum Law: For a Legislative Recognition of Gender-based Persecution;' 17 Harv. Womens L. 1.
(1994) 133.
22. Some refugee advocates have suggested that the refugee definition should be amended to in-
clude gender specifically, see Cipriani, note 21, p. 513; Kelly, note 21, p. 627. In practice, in terms
of access to refugee status, the definitional deficiency has not presented a problem for women fleeing
persecution as traditionally conceived of, political activists, members of persecuted ethnic or religious
minorities-torture and imprisonment ground the asylum claims of women refugees in these situa-
tions as effectively as they do those oftheir male counterparts. But women fleeing fundamental human
rights violations not generally included in this traditional "political" category have found it difficult
to bring themselves within the scope of international refugee protection, see 1. Bhabha and S. Shutter,
note 3, p. 229.
23. Gilani v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Immigration Appeal Tribunal (1987)
TH/95l5/85(52l6), 3. The distinction between "personal" or "private" harm on the one hand and
"public" oppression on the other has reproduced the dichotomy between the domestic, traditionally
female sphere and the societal, male public arena. Persecution arising out of harm in the personal
sphere has traditionally been held to fall outside the scope of the Refugee Convention. A classic
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 299

State Sovereignty and Refugees 13

against refusal of asylum she described incidents where she had been
reprimanded for her mode of dress by the regime's revolutionary guards, On one
occasion she had been threatened with imprisonment for not wearing a veil and
clothing which covered her whole body. 24
As a result of these incidents she had suffered a nervous breakdown leading
to a skin disease. When asked by the immigration adjudicator what would happen
if she went back to Iran she replied: "I think my nervous breakdown would get
worse .... I won't be able to have a social and private life. I will just be stuck
in my own room or in a hospital. I need a new life - somewhere I can stay without
fearing. . . . I need somewhere to stay to find myself." Gilani's testimony was
supported by an expert on the position of women in Iran at the time who gave
details of severe punishments inflicted on those who did not conform to the strict
dress codes. 25 As a result of this evidence, the immigration adjudicator decided:
"as a matter of common knowledge that women of the Islamic faith are regarded
to coin a phrase as second class citizens. . . . Further that the regime in Iran is
regarded with abhorrence in the !lest and has been roundly condemned by the
United Nations.... I fully accept ... women in particular in many instances

instance of this approach is the case of Campos-Guardado v iNS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987), where
a Salvadoran woman, raped by government vigilantes after being forced to watch her anti-government
uncle and cousins being hacked to death, was denied asylum on the basis that the attackers' reprisals
against her were merely "personally motivated:' For a contrasting Salvadoran case, where a woman
sexually abused by a sergeant in the armed forces was granted asylum on the basis of "political
opinion" see Lazo-Majano v INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). See also UNHCR Catalogue Ref
CASIDEU/95, German Federal Republic, Bayer Verwaltungsgericht Ansbach AN 17 K91. 44245 (Feb.
19, 1992) where a German court held a Romanian woman sexually abused by the mayor of her town
to have a well-founded fear. Over the last few years, several jurisdictions, most notably the Canadian
and more recently the U.s., have adopted a more sympathetic approach to women's asylum claims,
see Immigration and Refugee Board, Women Refugee Claimants: Fearing Gender-Related Persecu-
tion, Guidelines issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act (Ottawa,
Canada, March 9, 1993); N. Kelly, "Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims;' 71 Interpreter Releases
(1994) 813.
24. Widely divergent views are held by Iranian feminists about the merits of the veil; for con-
trasting opinions see H. Afshar, "Women and Reproduction in Iran;' in Woman-Nation-State, edited
by N. Yuval-Davis and F. Anthias (MacMillan, 1989, p. 110); M. Poya, "Double Exile: Iranian
Women and Islamic Fundamentalism;' in Refusing Holy Orders: Women and Fundamentalism in
Britain, edited by G. Sahgal and N. Yuval-Davis (Virago, 1992, p. 141); L. Odeh, "Post-Colonial Fem-
inism and the Veil: Thinking the Difference," 43 Feminist Review (1993) 26.
25. For a description of the Iranian regime's interpretation of Islamic law with respect to women
see D. Neal, "Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum;'
20 Co/urn. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. (1988) 203. See also N. Entessar, "Criminal Law and the Legal System in
Revolutionary Iran," 8 Boston College Third World L. 1. (1988) 91. Years after the Iranian revolmion
there are signs of greater liberalisation in the treatment of women, see The Guardian, 28 June 1994,
p.8.
300 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

14 Public Culture

[have] suffered horrendous treatment." Turning to the particular circumstances

of the asylum applicant:

the appellant, from a middle-class background who has tasted the rela-
tive freedom allowed in Iran during the regime of the Shah and the
equality afforded to women in the Western world, does not wish to
return to Iran, where it is quite clear women in general are seriously
underprivileged. . . . However this is something that applies to all
women in Iran . . . it is clear that a very large number of women in
Iran do not agree with the emancipation of women. It seems to me one
is on dangerous ground if you attempt to inteifere with a persons
customs or religious beliefs and on even more dangerous ground- if you
do so on a national or world wide scale (emphasis added).

Yet interference with the applicant's beliefs by the Iranian government was pre-
cisely the basis of the asylum application. At a subsequent, higher level appeal
against refusal of asylum, refugee status was denied again, this time on the fol-
lowing grounds:

there is no evidence that the appellant's objections to these practices

stem from any difference in political opinion rooted anywhere other
than in the practices themselves . . . . If the liability to persecution
flows from the inability to exercise basic human rights, then this could
amount to persecution because of being a woman. It is a matter of
degree and in assessing the matter, we bear in mind that many women
in Iran seem content with their lot, and that in Islam, men and women
are not treated equaUy26 (emphasis added).

To make prevalence a qualifying factor in calculating access to rights is to de-

politicize majoritarian dominance. By conflating the applicant's customs and
beliefs with those of the Iranian government, establishing a binary opposition be-
tween Westernized and Iranian worlds, and using a personalized appeal to na-
tional sovereignty as a trump, this case maps the Iranian state directly onto the
woman's body,27 and eliminates precisely that space for the articulation of differ-
ence within the category of woman, and of individual autonomy that the refugee
regime was designed to protect. Significantly, this case also eliminated an escape

26. Gilani v Secretary of Stare, 12.

27. For one of many challenges to the notion that women are "reducible to OUi origins, skin col-
our, or material locations;' see C. Sylvester, ''African and Western Feminisms: World Traveling and
the Tendencies and Possibilities;' 20 Signs (1995) 941, 956.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 301

State Sovereignty and Refugees 15

route for a potentially sizeable group of westernized Iranian women fleeing the
excesses of the Khomeini revolution, at precisely the time when the danger of
mass asylum requests in Britain from Iranians loomed large. 28 Justifying the
denial of individual protection by relying on state sovereignty thus served the dual
purpose of homogenizing all Iranians (including Iranian feminists) into a unitary,
"non-Westernized" classification and limiting the numbers of potential Iranian
entrants to Britain.
Five years later very similar issues were addressed in an American case con-
cerning an Iranian woman appealing the refusal of asylum. Prior to fleeing Iran,
Paras too Fatin had belonged to a pro-Shah student group opposed to Ayatollah
Khomeini, to a women's rights group associated with the Shah's sister and had
refused to wear a veil. Like Gilani, she testified that if forced to return to Iran
she would have to practice the Muslim religion, including wearing the veil, or
"be punished in public or be jailed." She also testified to considering herself a
"feminist:' Her claim for asylum was rejected by the immigration judge on the
basis that "her fear of return to Iran while indeed understandable is based upon
uncertainty and the unknown."29 Appealing this decision Fatin argued that her
fear of persecution was on account of her membership in the "particuJar social
group of the upper class of Iranian women who supported the Shah of Iran, a
group of educated Westernized free-thinking individuals." The Board of.lmmigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) rejected her appeal on the basis that she would merely be
subjected to the "same restrictions and requirements as the rest of the population."
This is a version of the sovereignty argument analysed in the Gilani case above;
even if state-imposed practices go against the applicant's fundamental beliefs and
result in a fear of persecution, it is up to an individual member of the society
to conform because of her nationality (emphasis added). Fatin's further appeal
to the Court of Appeals was similarly unsuccessfuPo

28. Iranians were the first group of asylum seekers to the U.K. to have visas imposed on them,
in 1980, in an effort to stem the refugee flow. Once asylum applicants reach the territory, however,
their applications have to be considered. Following the Gilani case, another female Iranian asylum
applicant challenged and successfully overturned the British government's refusal of asylum, Dina
Djahanara Tadayon v Secretary of State for the Home Department, IAT Sept 25, 1987, TH/15675/86
(5379); though the evidence of persecution was similar (fright but no physical torture or imprison-
ment) this applicant had been a close associate of Empress Farah, the Shah's wife. Presumably the
limited impact of this case on future numbers, given the facts, influenced the decision. For another
similar British case which followed Gilani see Rozira lata Pour v Secretary of State for the Home
Department, IAT Feb. 9, 1988, THIl3876/86 (5619).
29. Fatin v INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993) 1237.
30. Before this forum Fatin's advocates defined her social group membership as consisting of
"Iranian women who refuse to conform to the Government's gender-specific laws and social norms."
302 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

16 Public Culture

The Next Stage: Feminism and the Islamic Threat

In the post-war era, the Iranian Revolution was the first major precipitator of ref-
ugees from Islamic fundamentalism to the West. Though initially fuelled by
strong pressure to homogenize the evil new empire and to exclude would-be ref-
ugees from Iran as the above cases suggest,31 the reaction of western asylum ad-
judicators to the Islamic revolution has evolved over time. As the perceived threat
ofIslamic fundamentalism spread beyond Iran, a more complex agenda has inter-
vened, creating space to validate dissidents from within the regimes and problem-
atizing the legitimacy of some states' claims to sovereignty.
One example of this differentiating approach is the case of Saideh Fisher, also
concerning an Iranian woman fleeing the Ayatollah's fundamentalist regime. In
this case a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
vacated the BIA decision refusing asylum by relying on the applicant's distinction
between different forms of Islam - the Iranian regime's "ultraconservative" rules
on the one hand and her own deeply held Muslim religious convictions, "at odds
with those espoused by the Khomeini regime."32 The Court accepted the
applicant's contention that "the moral codes are persecutory because they repre-
sent a conception of Islam that [the applicant] finds abhorrent and because the
regime is attempting to suppress her beliefs through sanctioning her for noncom-
pliance with the moral codes."33

The Court set out its understanding of the scope of this definition: "It does not include all Iranian
women who hold feminist views. Nor does it include all Iranian women who find the Iranian govern-
ment's "gender-specific laws and repressive social norms" objectionable or offensive. Instead it is
limited to those Iranian women who find those laws so abhorrent that they "refuse to conform"-even
though, according to the petitioner's brief, "the routine penalty" for noncompliance is "74 lashes,
a year's imprisonment, and in many cases brutal rapes and death." Having set the stakes at this level,
the court then proceeded to determine that Fatin did not fall within the social group identified because
she had not proven that she would indeed refuse to conform. Her testimony had been that she "would
try to avoid wearing the chador as much as she could." The court accepted that the punishments out-
lined would constitute persecution. But it set explicitly stated willingness to incur those punishments
as the threshold for establishing a claim to refugee protection. Refugee protection, thus conceived,
is a reward for heroism, martyrdom or exceptional bravery-by these standards most refugees fleeing
Communist regimes would have been ineligible for asylum. It becomes an extremely scarce com-
modity (not an unintended consequence) signalling a degree of international abstentionism inconsis-
tent with the founding premises of the Refugee Convention. The Fatin judgement was followed in
another Iranian woman's case, Safaie v INS, 25 F.3d (8th Cir. 1994) 636.
31. From June 1983 to September 1986, INS district directors received 10,728 cases filed by Ira-
nians seeking asylum, 7005 of which were granted. Refogee Reports (1986), Dec 12, 14.
32. Fisher v INS 61 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1995) 1369.
33. Fisher v INS, see supra note 32, 1374. The case was eventually reheard by the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeal en banc and the applicant's appeal against the BIA refusal of asylum was denied.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 303

State Sovereignty and Refugees 17

Another example concerns a U.S. immigration judge's decision about a Jor-

danian Muslim asylum seeker fleeing domestic violence. 34 The asylum seeker
based her claim on the persecution to which she had been subjected by her hus-
band and the unwillingness or inability of the Jordanian state to protect her from
it. 35 She established that her powerful and wealthy husband was well-connected
to the Royal family; had subjected her to severe physical abuse over a thirty-year
period; and her attempts to resort to legal remedies for protection had been un-
successful because of the husband's prominence. The immigration judge found
that the wife had established a well-founded fear of persecution based on her hav-
ing "continued to express her belief in Western values through her actions"; that
she had "challenged the society and government of Jordan" and had been punished
because "her actions collide[d] with the societal and religious norms in Jordan.
. . . Leaving Jordan . . . was . . . the respondent's latest attempt to challenge
her husband, his society, and his government." In deciding to grant the woman
asylum, the judge concluded: "the respondent is among the group of women who
are challenging the traditions of Jordanian society and government. The
respondent's challenge of these traditions is threatening the core of Jordanian so-
ciety, and because of this, the respondent is beaten to achieve her submission into

A majority of the full court decided that the applicant had failed to demonstrate persecution on ac-
count of her religious or political beliefs: "The mere existence of a law permitting the detention,
arrest, or even imprisonment of a woman who does not wear the chador in Iran does not constitute
persecution any more than it would if the same law existed in the United States. Persecution requires
the government actor to inflict suffering on account of the individual's religious or political beliefs,
race, nationality or membership in a particular social group .... It does not include mere discrimi-
nation, as offensive as it may be." Fisher v INS (1996, 9th Cir.) Lexis 6097,16. This view is sharply
criticised by dissenting judge Noonan, who characterises it thus: "It is this particular majority which
has the view that if in the United States a law imposed a religiously-inspired dress code on all women
under penalty of imprisonment the law would not be evidence of persecution of a particular social
group. If only there is a law, if only the law is general enough, half of the population may be subjected
to discrimination and subject to incarceration for disobedience to the discriminatory regulation. We
are not very far from the Handmaid's Tale when seven judges of this court are capable of expressing
such a view" (p. 37).
34. In the matter of A and Z [1994] A 72-190-893,A 72-793-219.
35. It is accepted that domestic violence can amount to persecution by the state in cases where
the state is unwilling or unable to prevent it. See K. Bower, "Recognizing Violence Against Women
as Persecution on the Basis of Membership in a Particular Social Group;' 7 Georgetown Irnrnig. L. 1.
(1993) 173; P. Goldberg, "Anyplace but Home: Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing In-
timate Violence;' 26 Cornell IntI. L. 1. (1993) 565. Canadian courts have granted asylum on this basis
in numerous cases, see for example Mayers v MEl (1992) FC.A. No.A-544-92. Both the Canadian
(Canadian Women Refugee Guidelines, see note 23, p. 7) and the U.S. guidelines (INS, "Considera-
tions for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women" [1995] 9) recognize domestic
violence as a form of persecution.
304 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

18 Public Culture

the society's mores. The respondent should not be required to dispose of her
beliefs"36 (emphasis added). The applicant is accorded an autonomous space
from which to dissent and challenge; unlike in the earlier cases, there is no in-
vocation of nationality to circumscribe her private expectations or beliefs, though
by characterising her dissent as "western" the court perpetuates the earlier essen-
tialized dichotomy that elides social and political complexities in Jordan and "the
West."37
In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution many Western jurisdictions consid-
ered whether Iranian women fleeing their society's Islamic norms qualified for
a grant of asylum. The general pattern of decision making has reflected the shift
outlined above: courts38 tended to deny asylum in early cases but show greater
sensitivity to the reality of dissidence over gendered norms in later decisions. 39

36. In the Matter of A and Z, p. 15, 16 (emphasis added). There is a clear parallel between the
reasoning in this case and in the well-known case of Lazo-Majano v INS 813 F.2d (9th Cir. 1987)
1432, where a Salvadoran woman sexually abused by a sergeant in the armed forces was granted
asylum on the basis of "political opinion." In both cases a woman's flight from sexual violence is taken
as evidence of a feminist political opinion without such an opinion having been explicitly articulated.
37. For example, he suggests that domestic violence is defended in Jordan and prevented in the
West, a manifestly false suggestion.
38. It is important to recall that the overwhelming majority of refugee decisions are dealt
with purely administratively; they never corne before the courts or are documented in detail as a
consequence.
39. In a 1989 Dutch case, for example, an Iranian woman who had been imprisoned twice (albeit
briefly) for not wearing prescribed clothing, who had demonstrated against the regime and who was
dismissed from her job because of her political/religious opinions was denied refugee status on the
basis that her political activities were too slight (Dutch Refugee Council, Female Asylum Seekers:
A Comparative Study Concerning Policy and Jurisprudence in the Netherlands, Germany, France,
the United Kingdom [1994] hereafter Dutch Report, Case 3.8,32); but some years later several women
in similar situations were recognized as refugees (Dutch Report, Cases 3.12 and 3.13,35). In 1987,
an Iranian woman claiming asylum in Germany on the basis of her fears of persecution by the Iranian
authorities was refused asylum. According to a report of this case, the tribunal's reasoning was that
"women from Islamic countries are hampered in their personal development. This does not constitute
treatment defying human dignity. This is not different if the woman's innermost feelings do not agree
with the restrictions imposed on her" (Dutch Report, Case 4.3,51. In another 1987 case an Iranian
woman refusing to comply with dress regulations was granted asylum, but she was the daughter of
a well-known opponent of the regime and the decision was in part based on the dangers she faced
as a relative). In subsequent years, however, the German courts have accorded refugee status to several
Iranian women opposed to the regime, accepting both that their disagreement with the dress regula-
tions and the subordinate role of women constitute a political opinion (Dutch Report, Case 4.10,55
and 4.12,56) and that as a social group they are subject to persecution by the regime (Dutch Report,
Case 4.11,56). In France an Iranian woman of Armenian origin applied for asylum in 1987; she based
her claim on the persecution she had been subjected to in the past and feared in the future because
of her failure to observe the dress code and because of her Christian religion and Armenian origin.
Her application was rejected in part because the French Refugee Board (OFPRA) did not accept that
persecution arising out of noncompliance with a dress code could fall within the scope of the Refugee
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 305

State Sovereignty and Refugees 19

This reflects a gradual but growing judicial acceptance of gender persecution as

a valid ground for the grant of refugee status. 40 But it also mirrors more far-
reaching geopolitical changes. This body of case law has emerged since the sec-
ond half of the 1980s. It has therefore coincided with the fall of Communism as
the prime target of Western foreign policy, and the rise of Islamic fundamental-
ism as a movement of increasing concern to Western governments. 41 The latter
development may be associated with a decreasing deference to the state sover-
eignty of Islamic regimes and may contribute to a climate of opinion in refugee
decision making where feminist arguments concerning women's rights are used
(and at times abused) to defend an undifferentiated concept of "Western values,"
to attack a simplistic, homogenized notion of Islam and therefore to serve a new
foreign policy-inspired agenda. More complex understandings of the intricate,
often nonlinear interactions between racial, cultural, class and other social differ-
entiations have yet to find their way into judicial thinking. Meanwhile non-
"Western" women may now have increasing scope, at least in the refugee adju-
dication context,42 for defending their decisions to break away from certain so-
cially and culturally imposed behavioral norms. Whether this will significantly

Convention (UNHCR, REFCAS, CAS/FRA/94 66191, 1987). But in a 1989 case, another Iranian
woman of Christian Armenian background, who had been punished for not wearing the chador and
refusing to convert to Islam was granted refugee status in France (Dutch Report, Case 5.8,69).
40. The first international recognition of the need to consider gender-based persecution was a
European Parliament resolution in April 1984 calling for women facing persecution for violating the
"social mores of the country" to be considered as falling within the "social group" ground of the 1951
Convention, Official Journal (C 127) 1984, 137. A year later UNHCR recognised the problem, but
left it up to individual states to decide whether such women fell within the social group category,
Report of the 36th Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program
U.N.DOC. A/AC.96/673 (1985). In 1991 UNHCR issued Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee
Women which sought to promote improved understanding of the basis for granting women's asylum
claims, UNHCR, Geneva (1991). Since then both the Canadian and the U.S. authorities have issued
guidelines for processing gender-based asylum claims, see notes 23 and 35.
41. For a description of this process see 'The Red Menace Is Gone. But Here's Islam," New York
Times, 21 January 1996, Section 4, p. 1. I am grateful to Carol A. Breckenridge for drawing my at-
tention to this article.
42. One can contrast the improved attitude to refugee women fleeing oppressive Islamic norms
with the increasing hostility to women seeking to maintain those norms as immigrants in the West.
Several French schools have expelled Muslim girls for wearing Islamic head scarves, Migration News
Sheet (1994) January, p. 11; a Swiss Chief of Police for Foreigners refused to renew residency permits
of Muslim women who wore the hijab for passport photographs, defending his position thus: "The
orJy exception is for nuns. If we had to bend over for all sorts of particularities, we would have to
tolerate passport pictures with a sack covering a face;' 5 Institute of Race Relations European Race
Audit (October 1993) 12.
306 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

20 Public Culture

affect their overall prospect of success in gaining refugee status is not clear, given
the continuing decline in access to refugee procedures and the increasing hostility
to non-Western immigration generally.

Intimate Violence: The Territory of Women's Bodies

The incommensurable claims of individual human rights on the one hand and
policy-motivated considerations regarding state sovereignty on the other have sur-
faced in another group of gender-related asylum cases. These concern women's
rights to control their own bodies, more specifically their reproductive or genital
organs, in opposition to prevailing social or legal norms. Whereas Western pre-
occupations with Islamic fundamentalism may coincide with a more receptive
climate towards refugees challenging Islamic norms (much as a hardening of
attitudes during the Cold War gave anticommunists relatively easy access to the
West), conflicting views on the relative importance of "non-interference" with
state norms (and its correlative impact on keeping refugee numbers down) as
against human rights interventionism have fuelled a complex and contradictory
body of refugee case law. Human rights-based arguments have been used vocifer-
ously to condemn "barbaric" or "primitive" practices occurring in non-Western
states, but less consistently to protect victims of those practices seeking refuge
in the West. A double standard is often apparent.
A substantial part of this body of law arises out of China's recent population
control program. Its consistencies may, it is suggested, mirror the Western, par-
ticularly American, complex policy towards China as a valued trade partner
though human rights violator. International endorsement of the achievements of
the Chinese population control program43 has been coupled with sustained criti-
cism of the attendant human rights abuses. According to one expert, "China's

43. The policy was first introduced in 1979 in Sichuan province. Inaccurately termed China's "one
child policy"- there is considerable regional variation, especially in the rural and minority areas - it
allegedly resulted in "a fertility drop of almost 25%" according to the minister in charge of China's
state birth planning commission, see S. Greenhalgh, Zhu Chuzhu and Li Nan, "Restraining Popula-
tion Growth in Three Chinese Villages, 1988-93," 20 Population and Development Review (June 1994)
365. There are however divergent views on the relationship between population growth and economic
development, and on the effect of the state's policy on population growth, see Zhang Lei and Yang
Xiaobing, "China's Population Policy;' Beijing Review (April 13-19, 1992) 17; B. Hartmann, Repro-
ductive Rights and Wrongs: The Global Politics of Population Control and Contraceptive Choice
(Harper and Row, 1987, p. 12); 1. Aird, Slaughter of the Innocents (AEI Press, 1990); D. Gaie john-
son, "Notes on China's Population Policy: Is It Necessary?" unpublished manuscript delivered to Work-
shop on East Asia, University of Chicago, April 30, 1996.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 307

State Sovereignty and Refugees 21

birth control program has earned a worldwide reputation as the most draconian
since King Herod's slaughter of the innocents."44 Since the late 1970s substantial
evidence of coercion has indeed accumulated; penalties have included mass
"mobilizations" for sterilizations, and abortion "from which women often flee
from their homes and go into hiding because once caught up . . . they have little
chance of refusing what the cadres demand;'45 loss of employment for urban
families and revocation of land rights for rural dwellers. Female infanticide, com-
mon in China before the Revolution but virtually eradicated in the early 1950s,
returned on a significant scale. According to one American reporter, there were
close to 300,000 cases of female infanticide in China during 1982 and 345,000
in 1983. 46
Evidence of enforced abortions and sterilization of women has featured promi-
nently in the asylum litigation and has been the locus of the opposition outlined
above. The arena of conflict is clear: China's right and need to control its popu-
lation has been endorsed by many policy makers and refugee adjudicators. At the
same time there is widespread international agreement that involuntary steriliza-
tion and coerced abortion constitute basic human rights violations. 47 In 1993
both the Canadian Federal Court of Appeals and the U.S. Board of Immigration
Appeals reviewed cases challenging the refusal of refugee status to Chinese appli-
cants fleeing their country's coercive population policies. The cases had opposite
outcomes.
The Canadian case concerns Ting Ting Cheung and her daughter Karen
Lee. 48 In 1984 Cheung gave birth to a son, following which she used an intra-
uterine device, in compliance with the "one child policy;' as a method of birth
control. Medical complications caused by the device forced her to abandon its
use, and over the next two years Cheung had three abortions. She refused steril-
ization urged upon her by her doctor, apparently because of her husband's oppo-

44. J. Aird, Slaughter of the Innocents, note 43, p. 1.

45. J. Aird, Slaughter of the Innocents, note 43, p. 17.
46. M. Weisskopf, "China's Birth Control Policy Drives Some to Kill Baby Girls;' Washington
Post, 8 January 1985, A-I, quoted in S. Hom, note 20, p. 256, note 28. According to the U.S. De-
partment Country Report for 1984, there were 35 million female and 19 million male sterilizations
in China between 1971 and 1982, quoted in S. Hom, note 20, p. 267, note 63.
47. Such practices violate the UN Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 3: "Everyone has the right
to life, liberty and security of person"; Art. 5: "No-one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment"; see also Skinner v Oklahoma 316 US 535, 86L.Ed. 1655, 62 S.St.lllO
(1942) establishing that the right to bear children is "one of the basic civil rights of man" and that
involuntary sterilization constitutes an egregious infringement of that fundamental right to procreate.
48. Cheung v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) Federal Court of Appeals, 102
D.L.R. (1993) 4th 214.
308 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

22 Public Culture

sition to that procedure. In 1986 she became pregnant again and, having decided
against another abortion, moved away from her home to her parents-in-law, who
lived in a different area, in order to avoid the authorities and a coerced abortion.
After giving birth to Karen Lee, Cheung returned to her home but was compelled
to leave her daughter with the grandparents.
The evidence presented was that this child was ineligible for normal medical
attention and food subsidies,49 and might not be registrable for school. Shortly
after her return home, Cheung was forcibly taken by the Family Planning Bureau
to be sterilized. Because she was suffering from an infection at the time, the
operation was postponed for six months. During that period Cheung fled to her
in-laws to avoid compulsory sterilization. While there she became pregnant and
had another abortion. Over the next three years Cheung returned to her home
periodically to visit her son who was living with her parents. In the course of
these visits in 1989 she participated in three pro-democracy movement demon-
strations. Shortly afterwards, the Public Security Bureau visited her parents'
home on several occasions. Sometime thereafter she fled to Canada with her
daughter.
The asylum applications of mother and daughter were first considered by the
Refugee Appeals Board who dismissed them, though the Board accepted that
Cheung would be sterilized if forced to return to China. According to the Board
the evidence indicated "simply a desperate desire [on the part of the Chinese
authorities] to come to terms with the situation that poses a major threat to its
modernization plans. It is not a policy born out of caprice, but out of economic
logic. . .. The possibility of coercion in the implementation of the policy is not
sufficient ... to make it one of persecution. I do not feel it is my purpose to tell
the Chinese government how to run its economic affairs" (emphasis added).
Reasoning that a sovereign state can legitimately resort to such measures as com-
pulsory sterilization, if there are nonarbitrary reasons for so doing, the Board
defined its responsibilities to individual asylum applicants by a variable standard,
determined by the individual's nationality. The individual woman's body was con-
sidered a legitimate site of state control in China even though such control would
be considered unlawful in Canada.
The Federal Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision: "Under certain
circumstances, the operation of a law of general application can constitute per-

49. Though different in many respects, Chinese methods for penalising women whose reproduc-
tive choices are at odds with state policy have some point, in common with recent U.S. poiicies
attacking the rights and entitlements of '"welfare mothers" to choose the number of children, see New
York Times, 19 March 1995, A-I.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 309

State Sovereignty and Refugees 2J

secution. . If the punishment or treatment under a law of general application

is so Draconian as to be completely disproportionate to the objective of the law,
it may be viewed as persecutory. This is so regardless of whether the intent of
the punishment or treatment is persecution. Cloaking persecution with a veneer
of legality does not render it less persecutory. Brutality in furtherance of a
legitimate end is still brutality" (emphasis added). The Court concluded that
forced sterilization of women was a fundamental human rights violation and that
Cheung had a well-founded fear within the scope of the Refugee Convention. 50
Confronted with "the unhappy state of radical incommensurability"51 between
China's demographic goals and individual human rights implementation, the
Canadian appeals court adopted an interventionist stance privileging private
choice. 52
Contrast this decision with the following u.s. case. 53 It concerned a twenty-
nine-year-old married Chinese man, G., one of approximately 300 passengers
aboard the cargo freighter Golden J1?nture that ran aground off the coast of New
York on June 6, 1993 after a three-month voyage from China with all the pas-
sengers hidden in the ship's cargo hold. Seven of the passengers died attempting
to swim to land; G. managed to reach the shore, where he was eventually arrested
and subsequently imprisoned. He was placed in exclusion proceedings, refused
asylum and withholding of deportation 54 by the immigration judge who first
heard the case; he then appealed against the refusals to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA).55
In support of his asylum application, G. claimed that his problems with the

50. The Court also upheld the claim to refugee status of the daughter; the severe discriminatory
treatment that she faced and would encounter if returned "as a black market person" amounted to
persecution, Cheung v Canada, note 48.
51. This concept is developed in C. Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation in Law;' 92
Michigan L. R. (1994) 779.
52. A later Canadian decision reached the opposite conclusion, ruling that violations of basic
human rights resulting from implementation of legitimate state laws did not amount to persecution,
Chan v Canada (1993) 3 F. C. 675. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between popu-
lation policies and human rights see R. Boland, "Civil and Political Rights and the Right to Nondis-
crimination: Population Policies, Human Rights, and Legal Change," 44 Amer. U L. Rev. (1995) 1257.
53. Matter of G, BIA Interim Decision 3215, No. A-72761974 (1993) December 8.
54. U.S. law provides two separate procedures for refugees seeking to resist exclusion from the
territory, asylum and withholding of deportation. For a description and explanation of the differences
see A. Aleinikoff, D. Martin and H. Motomura, Immigration Process and Policy (West Publishers,
1995, p. 770).
55. The case contains a graphic description of the final stage in the multimillion dollar Golden
lknture smuggling operation, and the tragic denouement for the passengers, many of whom had paid
fees of over $20,000 or agreed to be indentured servants in the U.S. in exchange for the passage.
310 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

24 Public Culture

Chinese authorities started in 1990 when his wife was fitted with an intrauterine
device after the birth of their first child, a son. The authorities monitored the
couple's use of contraception by monthly physical examinations. In 1992 G.'s wife
became pregnant with their second child; to conceal this the couple left home
and moved to another part of the city. The authorities appropriated their posses-
sions and interrogated G.'s parents; when they feigned ignorance of the couple's
whereabouts the authorities threatened the parents with imprisonment and de-
stroyed their home, forcing them to flee the city. G. fled China fearing retribution
for having had more than one child. A letter from G.'s wife in China after his
departure describes how the authorities had imposed a fine on him, were requir-
ing her to undergo mandatory sterilization and were preventing registration of
the second child's birth until these measures were complied with. The BIA re-
jected G.'s appeal. Relying on an earlier decision, in Matter of Chang,56 and in
contrast to the Canadian case discussed above, the Board held that the Chinese
Government's implementation of its family planning policies was not on its face
persecutive, "even to the extent that involuntary sterilization may occur" (empha-
sis added). According to the Board, "it is not enough for the applicant to show
that such acts may have occurred or that there is a reasonable possibility that they
would occur upon his return to China. To prevail on a claim premised on China's
one couple, one child policy, it is incumbent upon the applicant to come forward
with facts that establish that the policy was being selectively applied against him"
(emphasis added). According to this judgement, mass application prevents a state
policy that violates human rights from being grounds for asylum; as in the Gilani
case above (and in the Fisher en banc decision57), a national norm is invoked to
delimit the space for international protection.
This reasoning has been applied in numerous Chinese asylum cases decided
in the U.S. since the precedent-setting decision in Matter of Chang. These have
included cases where the applicant's pregnant wife was arrested and forced to
undergo an abortion while the applicant was fined approximately twelve times
the family's annual income and forcibly sterilized;58 where the applicant's wife
was subjected to forcible sterilization, the couple's furniture was confiscated and
their home partially destroyed for nonpayment of onerous birth control fines;59
where the applicant's wife had a forced abortion following an IUD failure, and

56. BIA Interim Decision 3107 (1989) May 12.

57. See notes 23 and 33 above.
58. Chai v Carroll (4th Cir. 1995) Lexis 4338.
59. Zheng v INS 44 F. 3d 379; (5th Cir. 1995) Lexis 2899.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 311

State Sovereignty and Refugees 25

the applicant was threatened with having his entire business confiscated if he did
not submit to sterilization,6D
These decisions apply Matter of Chang as controlling precedent, Yet, it has
been suggested persuasively that the facts in Matter of Chang were considerably
weaker than in many subsequent cases,6l Moreover, over the past eight years,
there have been at least nine inconsistent US, administrative pronouncements re-
garding the effect of opposition to coercive population control policies on asylum
eligibility, Almost a year before the Chang decision the Department of Justice
had issued policy guidelines to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
to facilitate the granting of asylum to applicants fleeing China's coercive abortion
and sterilization programs, The INS did not implement those guidelines, Matter
of Chang was decided a month before the Tiananmen Square massacre of June
1989; soon after efforts were made in Congress to overturn the decision. There
followed a four-year period of conflicting, contradictory and inconclusive ad-
ministrative moves in relation to this issue, which have resulted in a stalemate. 62
An immigration judge reviewing the administrative pronouncements character-
ized them thus: "they amount to an administrative cacophony, undeserving of
judicial deference. To hold otherwise would be judicial abdication, not principled
judicial deference:'63
The political indecision and the ambivalent foreign policy stance towards
China are reflected in inconsistent judicial decision making. Though the over-
whelming majority of US. asylum decisions have followed Chang and deferred
to the Chinese government's popUlation policies, several cases64 have been de-
cided the other way. In one case, a district judge held that the right to make pro-
creational decisions was a basic right analogous to other basic rights such as free-
dom of religion or speech, so that the asylum applicant's opposition to forced
sterilization and abortion clearly amounted to a political opinion; considering the
Chinese government's confiscation of the applicant's personal property and de-
struction of his living quarters, the judge commented: "It simply defies logic to

60. Shon Oi Lan v Waters 869 F.Supp. 1483 (US Distr. 1994) Lexis 16474.
61. Chang failed to mention opposition to the PRC's population policies in his initial asylum
petition; instead he based his application on his anti-Communist views, indicating that neither he nor
his family had been mistreated. His first references to opposition to the population policies were made
at his deportation hearing, by which time his credibility was undermined.
62. For a concise summary see C. Gordon, S. Mailman and S. Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law
and Procedure (Bender, 1996, rev. ed., pp. 33-39).
63. Guo Chun Di v Carroll, 842 ESupp. 858 (US Distr. 1994) Lexis 394.
64. Xin-Chang v Slattery 859 F.Supp. 708, 711-l3 (S.D.N.Y.); Zhang v Slattery No. 94 Civ. 2119
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Guo 842 F.Supp. 865-70.
312 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

26 Public Culture

contend that these governmental actions do not amount to persecution."65 The

judge denied he was infringing "the foreign policy territory of the political
branches;' or using his decision-making power as "a vehicle for foreign policy
debates in the courts:' But the choice between deference to laws of foreign states
and enforcement of international human rights norms, when the two are in
conflict, is inescapably political. Judicial reticence does not alter this.
The double standard referred to earlier, where Western states unselfcriti-
cally66 term certain gendered norms imposed on women "barbaric" or "primi-
tive;' and yet fail to accord protection to individuals seeking to challenge and flee
these norms, is also evident in the recently developing jurisprudence on female
genital mutilation (FGM) as a basis for asylum. This "culturally challenging
practice;'67 a traditional norm that concretizes - even epitomizes - gender in-
equality, has been the subject of considerable critical attention from within the
societies affected and the wider international community since the late 1970s. 68

65. Guo Chun Di v Carroll, note 62, p. 42.

66. The self-righteous tone of much Western criticism of female genital mutilation (FGM) has
provoked critical responses, such as the following comment of the Egyptian Minister of Health, in
a letter to an American anti-FGM activist: "Let me assure you Mr. Boehmer, we positively compre-
hend and totally share your profound repudiable [sic] attitude vis-a-vis this deeply rooted "Mal" prac-
tice . . . . Lastly but not least, you must agree with me Mr. Boehmer, that anywhere in this world
deeply rooted customs specifically of harmful pattern on human beings, didn't and perhaps couldn't
be easily and promptly eradicated as we might figure it out. Even in the United States, let me respect-
fully remind you, still exists traditions of the different sects like Mormons, the Amish, and specifically
those refusing the life-saving act of blood transfusion, and we hardly heard them in such crucial hu-
manitarians [sic] conditions obeying up to this moment to banning decrees, if ever present." Letter
from Dr. Ali Abdel Fattah to Mr. Boehmer, June 12, 1995, reproduced in "Equality Now;' Egypt:
Government Efforts to Medicalize Female Genital Mutilation (1995) Update 8.2.
67. I. Gunning, note 20, p. 193. For descriptions of the different types of female genital mutilation
performed, their incidence and consequences see F. Hosken, "Female Genital Mutilation in the World
Today: A Global Review;' 11 Inti 1. Health Service (1981) 45; E. Dorkenoo and S. Elsworthy, Female
Genital Mutilation: Proposals for Change (Minority Rights Press, 1992); O. Koso-Thomas, The Cir-
cumcision of Women: A Strategy for Eradication (Zed Books, 1992).
68. In fact the first examination of FGM by a UN body took place in 1952, when the Commission
on Human Rights addressed the issue. Since then the Commission has explicitly criticised the prac-
tices as not only dangerous but a serious attack on the dignity of women, Commission on Human
Rights, Report on the Second United Nations Regional Seminar on Traditional Practices Affecting
the Health of Women and Children (1994) E/CN .4/Sub.211994/10,42; the Sub-Commission on the Pre-
vention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities has resolved that the practice constitutes
a human rights violation, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/45; whereas the Working Group in Tradi-
tional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children established by the Sub-Commission
adopted a more cautious approach, weighing the cultural significance of the practices against their
harmful health consequences, and concluding that the traditional justifications for the practices were
being eroded over time, see UN Doc. E/CN.41i986/42 and K. Brennan, note 20, p. 390. For a useful
analysis of the debate over FGM in feminist and judicial circles see B. Winter, "Women, the Law
and Cultural Relativism in France: The Case of Excisions;' 19 Signs (1994) 939.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 313

State Sovereignty and Refugees 27

Human rights and feminist activists and health professionals have stressed the
irrefutable and dramatic health hazards associated with FGM, its short and long
term painfulness and its place in a gendered system of oppression and domina-
tion; opponents of "homogenizing normativity" on the other hand, critical of the
cultural myopia, arrogance and racism through which the critique of FGM is
often articulated, have emphasized the practice's embeddedness within a complex
web of social and political structures, the vulnerability of communities practising
FGM, particularly as immigrants in Western countries, and the need to evolve
a nonpunitive, culturally sensitive and consensual approach to modification from
within the affected group. Certainly extensive condemnation69 of the various
forms of the practice stands in sharp contrast to its widespread prevalence to this
day,70 unlike other traditional customs which are in some respects analogous
such as footbinding or sati. 71
FGM is increasingly entering the legal arena in the West as an alleged persecu-
tory practice grounding an asylum claim. As with the Chinese cases, judicial at-
titudes have been characterised by an overall inconsistency; some adjudicators,
mindful of the immigration risks in opening a potential floodgate to a large group
of would-be refugees, have refused refugee status, on occasion conveniently de-

69. While few African countries (notably Sudan and Egypt) have passed legislation prohibiting
or limiting FGM, see Brennan, note 20, p. 375, several Western states have criminalized the practice,
either by passing specific anti-FGM legislation (these include Switzerland, Sweden, the U.K. and,if
current legislative proposals are enacted, the U.S.) or by invoking existing criminal laws against
bodily mutilation (France and Canada).
70. Estimates of the numbers of women and girls subjected to FGM range from 80 million to
over 114 million, see B. Ras-Work, "Traditional Practices that Inflict Disability;' in Women and Dis-
ability, edited by Boylan (1991), p. 23; Commission on Human Rights, Preliminary Report Submitted
by the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, E/CNAI
1995142, Para 146.
71. Both customs were also traditionally performed by women on their daughters in order to im-
prove or guarantee their social prospects; footbinding has been eradicated as a result of the mass mo-
bilization of Chinese women; for an account of the activism of prominent feminists as well as over
a million and a half rural women in leagues to fight for the abolition of footbinding in China in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see D. Davin, Woman-Work: Women and the Party in
Revolutionary China (Clarendon Press, 1976, pp. Jl-15); E. Croll, Feminism and Socialism in China
(Routledge, 1978, pp. 18-20). Sati or widow immolation, while much less prevalent than formerly,
still occurs in India; the recent case of the sati of a teenage widow sparked off a furious debate over
the proper relationship between modern, secular and traditional, religious society; for opposing
points of view see A. Nandy, "The Human Factor," The Illustrated Weekly of India, 17 January 1988,
p. 20 (arguing that sati represents a valid if darker side of traditional and now threatened Indian cul-
ture); contrast with P. Philipose and T. Setalvad, "Demystifying Sati," The Illustrated Weekly of India,
13 March 1988, p. 40; K. Sangari, "Perpetuating the Myth," 342 Seminar (1988) 24 (criticizing the
nativist anti-colonialism of the defenders of sati). I am grateful to Tejaswini Niranjana for these
references.
314 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

28 Public Culture

fending this gate-keeping In the language of cultural relativism despite the

applicant's explicit rejection of the cultural norm; in other cases an affirmation
of universal human rights norms has been coupled with an arrogant, even racist
willingness to critique the local custom and justify international normative inter-
ference. The task of defining a just, humanitarian standard for the grant of refugee
status in such cases is complex and urgent, as the brief discussion that follows
illustrates. As in earlier sections, two contrasting judgements are briefly
considered.
A thirty-seven-year-old woman from Sierra Leone, who had overstayed her
period of lawful residence in the U.S., claimed asylum, inter alia, because of
her fears relating to female genital mutilation for herself and her three minor
daughters; she feared imposition of the custom on her daughters and retribution
against herself for having publicly criticized her own, earlier mutilation. 72 The
immigration judge, relying on an argument about the nature of "political" opinion
similar to that outlined in the Fatin case above,73 found the applicant's fears un-
founded and refused asylum: "Her greatest fear is of the tribes back in Sierra
Leone. She disagrees with FGM, refuses to submit her children to it and fears
retribution and isolation from her tribe because of her differing views. The Court
does not find this to be an adequate showing of fear of political persecution .
. . . In this situation, respondent cannot change the fact that she is female, but
she can change her mind with regards to her position towards the FGM practices.
It is not beyond the respondents control to acquiesce to the tribal position on
FGM'74 (emphasis added). This statement should act as a warning to dogmatic
cultural relativists of the dangers of uncritical, opportunistic relativism. 75
An opposite conclusion was reached in another U.S. decision regarding an asy-
lum applicant from Sierra Leone, the first u.s. case in which FGM has been held
to constitute persecution for purposes of asylum.76 Here the applicant had

72. Matter of 1. (1995) No. A72 370 565 (11, Baltimore, April 28) reported in 72 Interpreter
Releases (1995) 1375.
73. See note 29.
74. See note 72.
75. The first FGM asylum case to come to Western attention was that concerning a Malian
woman, Aminata Diop, who sought asylum in France in 1991. Though the French asylum adjudi-
cation body (OFPRA) refused her asylum application on the basis that she had not effectively ex-
hausted the domestic remedies available to resist mutilation, it did decide that FGM was a form of
persecution and that the threat of it could found an asylum claim, UNHCR REFCAS Directory (1991)
Case No. 164078, September 18. The negative decision by OFPRA in this case created such an outcry
that Diop was eventually granted permission to reside in France permanently_
76. Canada had already made female genital mutilation a possible grounds for asylum in the 1993
Guidelines on Gender Persecution, see note 23. In response to a question about the impact of this
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 315

State Sovereignty and Refugees 29

been forcibly subjected to FGM despite vigorous resistance on her part, and was
found to be suffering from long term health problems as a result of the procedure.
In a careful and detailed judgement which avoided arrogant outrage at or dis-
missal of the custom,77 the immigration judge found the applicant's claim to fear
persecution well-founded on the basis of her political opinion opposed to the prac-
tice, and as a member of a particular social group consisting of "Sierra Leone
women who are forced to undergo female genital mutilation and . . . of women
who have been punished with physical spousal abuse for attempting to assert their
individual autonomy."78 By contextualizing the applicant within her society of
origin and exploring her individual political activism the judge avoided the
imposition of extraneous moralism or uncritical relativist deference.
Since these cases were decided, the issue of FGM as a basis for claiming
asylum has been catapulted from the tragic obscurity of immigration courts and
detention centers to the headlines of national newspapers79: the case of Fauziya
Kasinga, the nineteen-year-old woman from Togo, detained in oppressive con-
ditions by the U.S. immigration authorities for over a year and a half pending
an appeal against refusal by an immigration judge in August 1995 of her FGM-

policy on refugee admission numbers the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board spokesman said:
"We referred to it here as the floodgates argument; it just did not happen." C. W. Dugger, "U.S. Hear-
ing to Decide Rights of Women Who Flee Genital Mutilation;' New York Times, 2 May 1996.
77. This case can be contrasted in this respect with an earlier U.S. case, Matter of Oluloro (1994)
A72-147-491, U Portland, Ore., March 23, where the court granted a suspension of deportation to
a Nigerian woman and her two young U.S. citizen daughters, on the basis that the likely imposition
of FGM on the daughters created an extreme hardship justifying such relief. In this case FGM is
described as "a brutal, gruesome ritual that violates the most fundamental notions of decency and
civilization at the heart of this Republic;' quoted in I. Gunning, "Female Genital Surgeries and Multi-
cultural Feminism: The Ties that Bind, the Differences that Distance," unpublished manuscript on
file with author, p. 34; this manuscript contains a detailed critique of the 010lum judgement and its
"civilized-barbaric oppositional imagery." Whilst the "racialised binary oppositional representation"
adopted in the judgement is unacceptable and regrettably typical of much Western judicial comment
in this field, the successful outcome of the case, the first suspension of deportation based on fear of
FGM, is to be applauded, representing as it does a recognition of forms of hardship not previously
considered within Western-centric U.S. judicial discourse. Moreover the judgement alludes, albeit
weakly, to the difficulties involved in the critique of FGM: 'i\lthough [the Court] attempts to respect
the traditions and cultures of other societies, as to this practice the Court concludes that it is cruel
and serves no known medical purpose" (p. 3).
78. Matter of M.K. (1995) A72-374-558, IJ Arlington, Va., August 9, 18. The applicant's claim
to asylum was upheld not only because of fear of persecution based on FGM, but also because of
her resistance to physical spousal abuse and her political activism, all of which were held likely to
result in further persecutory acts if she was returned to Sierra Leone.
79. C. W Dugger, "Woman's Plea for Asylum Puts Tribal Ritual on Trial," New York Times, 15
April 1996, A-I
316 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

30 Public Culture

based asylum application, created a political outcry that reached the White
House. The compelling facts of her case, including her horror of the practice and
her escape from oppressive family pressures, became the subject of television
talk shows and web discussion pages. Shamed by the publicity, the INS promptly
released her and detailed its senior general counsel to argue the government's case
at a May 2, 1996 hearing before the precedent-setting Board of Immigration
Appeals.
The case was presented as a balancing act in which the government allegedly
attempted to "provide real protection for those seriously jeopardized if returned
to their home countries" and at the same time attempted to avoid damaging U.S.
sovereignty in the form of "the broad fabric of governmental immigration con-
trol."80 Its proposed solution however belied the first part of this claim: it was
to limit cases where FGM or other "objectionable cultural practices" would
amount to persecution to those rare situations where "the practice, visited upon
a resisting recipient, is so extreme as to shock the conscience of the society from
which asylum is sought," where it is inflicted "in a manner condemned by civilized
governments"81 (emphasis added). Framing the test in this manner instead of re-
ferring to established international human rights norms as a basis for delimiting
persecution, replicates the tendency that has underwritten Western refugee adjudi-
cation, to homogenize gendered and other differences within groups, and to erect
an emotive dichotomy between "civilized" and other governments or societies.
On June 13, 1996, the Board of Immigration Appeals, in a narrow ruling, decided
that genital mutilation, as practiced by Kasinga's tribe, constituted persecution
and awarded her asylum. 82

80. In the Matter of X, Government's Brief in Response to Applicant's Appeal From Decision
of Immigration Judge, on file with author, 14.
81. Note 79, p. 17. The government's brief then qualifies this vague and subjective test by explic-
itly excluding the following situations as not reaching the "shock the conscience threshold": "relatively
minor actions such as bodily scarring ... or male circumcision"; bodily invasions inflicted on con-
senting or nonresisting individuals, so that "persons who were subjected to FGM in the past, at a
time when they consented or at least acquiesced (as in the case of FGM practiced when the woman
was a small child) have not experienced persecution"; and situations where the applicant would be
able to escape the feared persecution even if she would be subjected to social ostracism or economic
pressure (such as receiving reduced wages) as a result. This solution has the merit of ensuring that
refugee numbers will not be noticeably affected because very few asylum applications based on
"objectionable cultural practices" will succeed: ostracised teenagers, traumatized survivors, and the
vast majority of FGM victims-young "acquiescing" girls under sixteen-would ail be excluded.
82. C. W Dugger, "U.S. Grants Asylum to Woman Fleeing Genital Mutilation Rite," New York
Times, 14 June 1996, A-I.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 317

State Sovereignty and Refugees 31

•••
Western decision makers adjudicating asylum applications based on opposi-
tion to oppressive cultural, social or legal norms face the conflict between notions
of fundamental rights and of state sovereignty in terms of the choice of an ap-
propriate human rights standard applicable to noncitizens. The unresolved ten-
sion between private choice and public control over matters of sexuality or re-
productive rights carries over into an inconsistent, contradictory body of case
law. Moreover, the ethical stance associated with a commitment to refugee pro-
tection and membership of the "international community" may collide with do-
mestic and foreign policy concerns relating to immigration control or interna-
tional diplomacy. Iranian and Chinese refugees are clearly caught up in this
process. In this context the debate about the competing merits of universalist as
opposed to relativist conceptions of human rights takes on a very particular set
of implications.
Critics of the "Western" universalist conception of human rights must bear in
mind that in the asylum context, the application of a uniform standard informed
by human rights norms can provide the basis for a defense of the right to differ
and a critique of persecutory practices imposed on individuals which a relativist
perspective may preclude. It can also provide the consistency in the application
of basic international protection that undermines narrowly nationalistic, anti-
immigrant, even racist standards for public and foreign policy. In the current,
post-Cold War world, the relation between particular conceptions and applica-
tions of human rights and Western foreign policy goals is complex. As the analy-
sis of the gender persecution asylum cases above shows, feminist arguments re-
sulting in a more gender-inclusive human rights climate can become allied with
the articulation of clearly anti-Islamic "Western values."
Relativist conceptions of human rights, while anti-imperialist in intent and
rhetoric and sensitive to the need to contextualize social and cultural norms, can
in the context of asylum easily become vehicles for discriminatory hierarchiza-
tion of human rights protection and an uncritical reinforcement of exclusionary
state practices. Deference to the sovereign powers of state governments can
parallel anti-imperialist claims to regional autonomy but readily translate into a
justification for exclusionary policies that effectively withdraw human rights pro-
tection from unwanted new migrants. Rights are not ends in themselves. They
are instruments to facilitate interventions in the political and social arena. The
context in which they are invoked crucially determines their potential effect; prag-
matic considerations about context and goal should therefore influence decisions
318 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

32 Public Culture

about the particular articulation of rights. Paradoxically, protection of individual

asylum seekers' rights to differ, of their right to challenge the norm, is best served
by articulating and upholding notions of human rights which do not accommodate
to the particular.

Jacqueline Bhabha, formerly a practicing human rights lawyer, is now Asso-

ciate Director of the Center for International Studies at the University of Chicago.
She co-authored with Sue Shutter Womens Movement: Women Under Immigra-
tion, Nationality and Refugee Law (Trentham Books, 1994). Her current re-
search is on the relationship between human rights and refugee law and on the
notion of "citizenship" in the European Union and its impact on noncitizens.
 Part VII
Regionalism, Multi-Level
Governance and the EU
This page intentionally left blank
 [15]
Regionalism: Old and New
RAIMO VAYRYNEN
University of Notre Dame and Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies,
University of Helsinki

This review of recent literature on political, economic, and cultural

regionalism shows that this area of inquiry has become increasingly
fragmented not only as a result of debates between the protagonists of
methodological approaches but also because of underlying changes in
international relations. Traditional views concerning the state-centric
regional system are being challenged by the concentration of political
and military power at the top as well as by transnational networks built
around economic ties and cultural identities. Early post-Cold War
expectations that regions and regional concerts would form the
foundation for a new international order have proven untenable.
Instead, regions appear to arise either through the dissemination of
various transactions and externalities or as protection against the
hegemony of capitalist globalization and great-power politics. Older
conceptions of regionalism need to be redefined and reintegrated into
current international relations theories.

The purpose of this essay is to introduce and evaluate recent scholarship (for
example, Lake and Morgan 1997; Mansfield and Milner 1997; Scott 1998; Solingen
1998; Baldwin et aL 1999; Hettne, Inotai, and Sunke! 1999; Hook and Kearns
1999; Matdi 1999; Page 2000) examining security and functional regions,
juxtaposing these two types of regions and exploring the impact of recent
methodological debates on our understanding of regionalism. Of particular interest
is whether there exists in the field of international relations one logic or two with
regard to regionalism, that is, whether geopolitics and capitalism are conflated or
are both autonomous parts of this area of inquiry (see also Thompson 1983; Chase-
Dunn 1989). Using the literature on regions and regionalism, this essay will argue
that these two logics are analytically separable but empirically intertwined.

Defining Regions
With the end of the Cold War and the trend toward economic globalization as well
as the increasing complexity of international relations, the concept "region" risks
becoming an empty idea. These forces have redefined the structural and agentive
relationships between the global, regional, and national contexts. Moreover, they
are leading us to re-examine the theoretical foundations of the study of
regionalism. Our regional images are often based on unexamined and outdated
metageographical conceptions of the world -a perspective dubbed the 'Jigsaw-
puzzle view" that assumes discrete, sharply bounded, static continental units fit
together in an unambiguous way. Yet, the world is not structured in such a neat
manner; to the contrary, regions disappear and reappear as they are transformed
by various economic, political, and cultural factors (Levis and Wigen 1997).
322 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

26 Regionalism: Old and New

Key Distinctions
Often those engaged in defining the concept "region" are content to list physical,
political, and economic criteria without embarking on theory development. For
example, Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner (1997) emphasize geographical
proximity and specificity as the key defining traits of a region. Or, researchers refer
to early conceptual analyses (for example, Thompson 1973) and essentially leave
the concept undefined. Scholars in history and political science seem to think that
they will know a region when they see one. For economists, the choice is even easier,
region is coextensive with a preferential trading agreement or a customs union.
Thus, L. Alan Winters (1999:8) discusses in detail the concept of multilateral ism but
takes its counterpart, regionalism, almost for granted. For him, it refers to "any
policy designed to reduce trade barriers between a subset of countries, regardless of
whether those countries are actually contiguous or even close to each other."
These are inadequate solutions to the definitional problem because both the
character and functions of regions have recently experienced a major transforma-
tion. One change has occurred in the relative weights given various levels of
analysis-global, regional, national-and the links between them. During the Cold
War, most regions were either political or mercantile clusters of neighboring
countries that had a place in the larger international system. Occasionally, political
and military motives fostered the establishment of superregions such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
However, since the late 1980s, subregional and micro regional organizations have
become more common, for example, the Baltic Council of Ministers, the Visegrad
Group, the Shanghai Group, and Mercosur. This trend is, in part, a response to the
fragmentation of great-power blocs, especially in Eastern Europe and Central Asia,
but it also reflects the need to react to the pressures created by economic
globalization through local means.
A second change is the growing differentiation between physical (geographical
and strategic) regions and functional (economic, environmental, and cultural)
regions. This transformation appears linked to the first change. The increasing
emphasis on the global-regional relationship has led to paying more attention to
functional and subregional relations, even though the nation-region nexus is still
predominantly viewed in physical and state-centric terms.
The study of regionalism is also undergoing a methodological renewal that is
manifested in the new divide between rationalist and constructivist research
agendas regarding the processes of region formation. In the past, regions were
often delineated and compared in time and space inductively by using data on the
economic and institutional ties between states (for example, Russett 1967;
O'Loughlin and van der Wusten 1990). Currently, most trade economists take
regions as institutionally granted-for example, the European Union (EU), North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Mercosur-using them to study
changes in the shares of intra- and interregional trade (for example, Frankel 1997,
1998). As a result, the economic approach provides reasons for the debates between
regionalists and multilateralists, but the arguments do not necessarily contribute to
the study of the dynamics of economic regionalization except in tracing changes in
trade shares. Thus, for example, Jeffrey Frankel (1997) found in 1994 that regional
trade concentration ratios were the highest in Mercosur and the Andean
Community followed by ASEAN, NAFTA, and the EU, whereas a comprehensive
assessment of the depth of integration in these various regions based on nine
different indicators showed that the European Union was in the lead followed by
Mercosur (Page 2000).
In contrast to this more material delineation of regions, the constructivist
approach stresses how regions arise from the redefinition of norms and identities
by governments, civic groups, and business firms. The use of common cultural
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 323

RAIMO V;;'YRYNEN 27

identities to define regions grew out of the process of decolonization, which was
observed to lead to the construction of "culture blocs" (Meinig 1956), By "social
construction" of regions is meant that regions are shaped by the collective
perception of identities and meanings with blurred and ever shifting boundaries.
This view rejects the static conception of regions and considers them changing
cognitive structures cemented by common institutional and economic ties (see
also Murphy 1991; Adler 1997). Constructivism stresses the instrumental uses
of regionalism to promote specific political and economic ends. To constructivists,
actors create social facts by assigning functions to various spatial units. These
functions "are never intrinsic; they are assigned relative to the interests of users
and observers" (Searle 1995:19). Functions assigned to social facts can be
either agentive or non-agentive; the former serve the intentions of actors, but the
latter happen independently. Obviously, the physical location of a region is
non-agentive; the establishment of a regional military alliance has an agentive
function.
In the study of regions, then, the key dimensions center around the division of
the world by levels of analysis and by the physical-functional distinction. Physical
regions refer to territorial, military, and economic spaces controlled primarily by
states, but functional regions are defined by nonterritorial factors such as culture
and the market that are often the purview of nons tate actors. For instance, an ethnic
group may want to create a cultural region and use it agentively to promote an
independent political community. In the global system, economic regions are
constructed by transnational capitalist processes, environmental regions by the
interplay between human actions and the biosphere, and cultural regions by
identity communities.
The distinction between physical and functional regions is reminiscent of Manuel
Castells' (1996) differentiation between a "space of places" and a "space of flows."
He defined a place as "a locale whose form, function, and meaning are self-
contained within the boundaries of physical contiguity" (Castells 1996:423). Places
are historically rooted yet reshaped increasingly by the flows of information and
people. The space of flows refers to the "material organization of the time-sharing
social practices that work through flows" and networks (Castells 1996:412).
Networks have their own hubs of power and managerial elites who, even though
spatially located, organize the space of flows independently of physical contiguity.
In international relations, the study of physical regions has been predicated on
the notion of anarchy, which leads sovereign states to work to control specific
territories and to form regional security complexes. As a result, regions are defined
as spatial clusters of states that the logic of anarchy has facilitated, positively or
negatively, becoming dependent on each other. In contrast, the study of functional
regions does not need the assumption of anarchy. The driving force in functional
regions is either the economy (for example, production networks), the environ-
ment (for example, acid rain), or culture (for example, identity communities).
Whereas physical definitions of regions are usually provided by states in an attempt
to reaffirm their boundaries and to organize into territorially exclusive groups,
functional conceptualizations of regions emanate from the interplay of subnational
and transnational economic, environmental, and cultural processes that the states
are only partially able to control. Thus, the control of places and the control of flows
require different ideas and instruments depending on which definition of region
one employs.
A number of scholars (for example, Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Newman 1999)
have tried to link the physical and functional conceptions of regions by focusing on
the boundary-eroding consequences of globalization and identity formation and
the extraterritorial challenges to sovereignty that these forces unleash. They
suggest that physical and functional definitions of regions may be viewed as a
sequence in which territory gradually gives way to space. Indeed, the transition
324 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

28 Regionalism: Old and New

from physical to functional regionalism is due to the increase in the interaction

capacity of the system. In a low-capacity international system, physical vicinity
matters; states are linked with their neighbors by economic and security concerns
and international relations are subsystem dominant. An increase in the interaction
capacity of the system helps the actors reach beyond their immediate neighbor-
hoods; these new contacts give rise to more system-dominant international relations
(see also Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993).

Regionalism and the End of the Cold War

During the Cold War, bipolarity and nuclear weapons created contextual effects
that contributed to the emergence of a semiglobal system. In Europe, in particular,
extended US nuclear deterrence and Soviet political-military control of its eastern
half limited the autonomy of individual states and made them parts of a larger
whole. Local security systems existed, but they were overshadowed by the ability of
external powers to "move directly into the local [security] complex with the effect of
suppressing the indigenous security dynamic" (Buzan 1991:219-220).
The end of the Cold War has reduced the effects of the global system on regional
security dynamics and national decisions. Thus, "an end to the bipolar cleavage [has
led] to a restoration of regional sovereignty" and to the establishment of "several
regional powers dominating their geographical areas" ( Rosecrance 1991:373, 375).
Changes in the international structure and new security challenges were expected
to push the development of regionalism, providing order and stability in the
regions (see Rosecrance 1991; Hurrell and Fawcett 1995; Morgan 1997). And
certainly in Mrica, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, one can discern tendencies
toward a diminution in the presence of the major powers, especially the USSR/Russia
(see Keller 1997; Khong 1997; Pervin 1997). Indeed, Arthur Stein and Steven
Lobell (1997) have argued that even during the Cold War regional security was not
globalized. Though the United States was a significant player in most regional
security arrangements, it, too, remained reluctant to participate in Mrican and
Asian conflicts that were not considered central to its interests.
The thesis proposing the rise of regionalism with the end of the Cold War has
also been contested. Early on, Richard Rosecrance (1991) noted that this scenario
could be challenged by two competing models, namely US hegemony and a global
concert of powers. In fact, he argued that because the global concert was an unlikely
prospect, the dominant international role of the United States remained the major
challenge to the regionalist scenario. And, in terms of the distribution of
capabilities, a number of scholars (for example, Mastanduno 1999; Wohlfort
1999) have defined the present system as a unipolar order that appears durable
and peaceful. Because of US dominance, counterbalancing regionalism is not an
option as the pivotal states in each region prefer, instead, to align with the unipolar
center of power.
This latter interpretation appears myopic, however, because it makes the
assumption that dominant economic and military capabilities can be invariably
converted into regional political control. Despite its material superiority and local
political commitments, the United States (or any other external power) is unable to
effectively control regional security processes. Consider the limits of US influence
on the former Soviet states. Much of post-Soviet space continues to be a separate
international region where Russian hegemony prevails (Roeder 1997). Of course,
given that Russian space is vast, amorphous, and administratively complex, it is
difficult to master such control without a strong organization and resource base. :"Jo
doubt Vladimir Putin has learned that it is not as easy in actuality as it is rhetorically
to pursue becoming a strong state and a major power while simultaneously
maintaining regional hegemony (Medvedev 1999). The war on terrorism since the
events of September 11, 2001 has strengthened Putin's hand in this regard in
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 325

RAIMO Vii.YRYNEN 29

Russia while at the same time bringing about a realignment with the United States
that has reduced the autonomy of the Eurasian political space, especially in the
Caucasus and Central Asia (Stent and Shevtshova 2002/2003).
In the post-Cold War international system, even though there has been an
increasing demand for external intervention and crisis management for humani-
tarian and other political reasons, neither the United States nor any other major
power has shown a willingness to shoulder the full responsibility for managing
these regional crises. As a solution to this dilemma, some have suggested the
establishment of a concert of powers to replace global hegemony (which is thought
to be unattainable) and a balance-of-power system (which is considered unstable).
Indeed, a central theme of David Lake and Patrick Morgan's (1997) edited book
Regional Orders is the advocacy of regional concerts and the assessment of their
feasibility.

The Prospect for Concerts

A concert requires from its members a commitment to common goals and policies
while at the same time permitting members to pursue their own specific interests.
In effect, a concert tries to find a middle way between the instability of a balance-of-
power system and the rigidity of the collective-security system. Scholars, however,
differ in their definition of what a concert is and their assessment of its feasibility.
For example, Paul Papayoanou (1997) has argued that economic interests of the
major powers drive them to engage in regional security arrangements. In his view,
Western Europe was the most likely candidate for a concert given the
complementarity of the economic interests of the countries in this region and
their capacity to make credible commitments. His stress on the co-management of
security problems hints at an assumption that a concert-type arrangement may be
necessary where there are potential conflicts between the powers in a region. Ole
Waever (1998) seems to agree with Papayoanou by refusing to rule out security
rivalries, short of war, among EU members. These scholars' ideas contrast with a
common view that the Western European region is not only a regional security
complex but also a security community in which mutual interdependence and
identity are a strong guarantee against conflicts over security.
Western Europe may not be a good example of a regional concert due to its
collective defense alliance with the United States. This alignment reduces the
opportunities for the European NATO members to pursue their own policies, not
to speak of limiting their ability to opt out of the alliance. NATO has historically
lacked some key characteristics of a concert such as political Rexibility and freedom
of choice as well as members of roughly equal size. Perhaps a better definition of a
concert would be a political arrangement between non allied states that possess a
significant interest in, and capacity to, reduce the level of international conflict in
their region by their common actions without resorting to mutual competition or
free-riding.
Rosecrance and Schott (1997) seem to doubt that the power of common interests
in conRict mitigation can lead to a concert. Instead, they stress the importance of
shared ideology and financial interdependence. Applying the oligopoly model to
international security relations, these authors suggest that a great-power concert is
analogous to a business cartel that fixes prices and production quotas. Although
members of a cartel depend on each other and may share some values, their
primary relationship is competitive. Thus, members prefer a concert to mutual
rivalry, balance of power, or closer integration.
Rosecrance and Schott distinguish between central and regional concerts,
suggesting that the main task of the central concert is to integrate former
adversaries into a cooperative security system, but an effective regional concert
reduces the security costs of the central concert and removes potential frictions
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30 Regionalism: Old and New

from its agenda. This perspective may be too narrow because a concert can also be
set up to manage a particular security problem and to avoid unilateral interventions
that would only lead to a deterioration in the situation. Bosnia and Kosovo show
how regional instability can call for coercive intervention by a central concert
without creating a robust regional concert. In fact, the economic resources of the
core states-in this case the European Union-may be a necessary incentive to gain
local cooperation.
Scholars writing about specific regions also differ in their conclusions regarding
the feasibility and effectiveness of regional concerts. With regard to Latin America,
for instance, David Mares (1997) argues that the best alternative is the stabilization
of the old balance-of-power system with continuing, but possibly less hegemonic,
involvement by the United States. This advice is questioned by Andrew Hurrell
(1995, 1998) who claims that a security community, although loosely knit and
bounded, is emerging between the two old rivals Argentina and Brazil and
eliminating their old balance-of-power competition. He notes, though, the
ambiguities in Brazilian policy and its refusal to commit itself to a deeper
cooperation in the hemisphere that is made even more difficult by the economic
crisis in both countries.
The rejection of the nuclear-weapons option by Argentina and Brazil, their
mutual confidence-building measures, and the establishment of Mercosur (Mercado
Comun del Sur) have created an impression of new regionalism in the Southern
Cone of Latin America. And Mercosur has, indeed, sparked a major surge in
intraregional trade but without diversifYing trade significantly with external
partners. Moreover, although increasing, intra-Mercosur trade has been growing
primarily in the less dynamic sectors and has not led to a change in its role in the
international division oflabor (Cammack 1999; Roett 1999). Since 1998, the region
has been experiencing a major economic crisis. As a result of the 35 percent
devaluation of the Brazilian real in that year, trade relations with Argentina have
stagnated and companies have begun moving their businesses to Brazil. Since the
deterioration of the Argentinian economy in 2001-2002, the pressures within that
country have also been increasing, but even so Mercosur seems to be able to
muddle through (Phillips 2001).
If Latin America does not have a robust regional concert, how about other
regions? David Pervin (1997) has argued that the Middle East does not have a
concert but rather a superficial balance-ot:power system. Some (for example, Aarts
1999) have even asked whether there is any regionalism at all in the Middle East. In
the last couple years, it has become clear that unilateralism rather than concert
behavior is the main rule in this area of the world. However, the recent
establishment of the Quad composed of the United States, Russia, the European
Union, and the United Nations to promote a peaceful solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian problem suggests that having a central concert may be one of the few
viable alternatives to managing conflict in an unruly region.
In the Asia-Pacific region, the balance-of-power system has seldom been
considered a viable option. Instead, a regional concert of power-comprising the
United States, China, Japan, and Russia-has been offered as an alternative (Shirk
1997). Today, there are signs of the emergence of such a concert in the effort to
collectively pressure North Korea to give up the nuclear-weapons option. The
absence, however, of a shared ideology in this region has been viewed as an obstacle
to building such a concert. Behavior in the region is "preeminently political,
focused on building trust and shared understandings, and, in the process, shaping
the normative context of the metaregime rather than on the immediate regulation
of state behavior through specific regimes" (Alagappa 1998:643). With regard to
Africa, both the internal politics of the states and their mutual relations are too
fragmented to make it meaningful to speak of a regional concert, although the
competitive bargaining between South Africa, Nigeria, and Senegal in the
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RAIMO VAYRY;\1EN 31

establishment of NEPAD suggests there may be the beginnings of a regional

dynamic at play,
This discussion leads to the inevitable conclusion that even though regional
concerts have some prospects, they are not a likely outcome in most regions, Either
the region is too fragmented (the Asia-Pacific region and Africa) or external powers
have too much influence (Latin America and the Middle East) for a coherent
regional concert to be a feasible option, Charles Kupchan (see Kupchan and
Kupchan 1991) has been perhaps the most vocal advocate for a concert solution to
European security problems. He perceives a concert as a particular form of
collective security; it tames international anarchy and, as a result, ameliorates the
security dilemma while at the same time not committing states to common action.
In his view, it also leads to institutionalized, cooperative management of security
relations and permits a smooth formation of balancing coalitions.
Kupchan and other supporters of the concert approach (for example,
Richardson 1999) draw for their arguments on the nineteenth-century Concert
of Europe without necessarily recognizing that some things have changed
significantly since then. The dynastic consensus has given way to ideological
heterogeneity and the degree of economic interdependence is now much higher. As
a consequence, coalitions among the major powers are formed more on the basis of
economic than ideological criteria. (This is why China and Russia continue to
cooperate with the West.) Moreover, the increasing spatial incongruence among
economic and security institutions complicates the formation of concerts (Kupchan
1997). Nevertheless, with the enlargement of the European Union and NATO, this
congruence appears to be growing again within Europe.
The limited feasibility of, and the diminished need for, concert-based collective
security has cooled down even its main advocates (see also Rosecrance and Stein
2001). Even though Kupchan (1997:224) admits that "a pan-European collective
security system offers an attractive end point for Europe," he has come to favor, as
an interim solution, the establishment of three subregional security groupings, one
each in western, central, and eastern Europe. These would balance power on the
European scale and, thus, help build a "pan-European security community"
(Kupchan 1997 :229). Cooperation between the subregional organizations would be
managed by two pivotal states, Germany and Ukraine. Unfortunately, this strategic
vision lacks a political basis given that the Central European states are unwilling to
establish a new subregional organization and Ukraine is not a capable and
acceptable intermediary between Central and Eastern Europe. In effect, the
German-Russian relationship remains pivotal on the ground; and, yet, to avoid
future risks it needs to be embedded in a multilateral framework.
Although not those that Kupchan proposed, subregional organizations are
growing in Europe, but in a less planned way. About a dozen such organizations (for
example, the Council of Baltic Sea States, Central European Free Trade
Agreement, Visegrad Group, and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation) have
been set up. Their function is to reintegrate subregions in Europe that were divided
during the Cold War. These subregional organizations are not an alternative to the
enlargement of NATO or the European Union; in fact, some may become
unnecessary after such enlargement takes place. Yet, they have contributed to
cooperation and its institutionalization in the pan-European context (see Bremmer
and Bailes 1998; Kearns 1999; Konidaris 1999; Cottey 2000).
If the theory and policy regarding a regional concert in Europe have come to a
dead end and subregionalism is still too weak, what, then, is the alternative?
Kupchan (1997) appears on the right track in arguing that there is a tendency
toward a pan-European security order. As we have already observed, such an order
is being realized not by any grand design but rather by much more subtle
processes. Indeed, the gradual strengthening of security arrangements through the
enlargement of NATO and the European Union may provide the most feasible
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32 Regionalism: Old and New

strategy for building this security order. In NATO and the European Union, the
enlargement process started by various thin arrangements of military and economic
cooperation with the accession states. These arrangements were then gradually and
selectively converted into thicker forms of integration and, ultimately, will evolve
into full membership for these countries. In the course of this process, a major goal
was to maintain a balance between the costs and benefits of enlargement, which has
often militated against the wishes of new members to join the organization without
delay (see also Croft et al. 1999; Mannin 1999; Sandler and Harley 1999). In
contrast, consider how the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and
the Council of Europe enlarged. In their case, new members came on board and
immediately had to assume essentially the same political and legal obligations as
older members.

Globalization and Regionalization

In the security sphere, the weakness of global arrangements has given priority to
the national and regional levels. And as major powers, particularly the United
States, wield decisive unilateral and multilateral influence, the national-regional
linkage continues to dominate international security relations. If concerts between
major powers are established at all, they are informal arrangements focusing on the
management of a particular crisis rather than, as traditional theories suggest,
comprehensive arrangements to produce collective security. The Contact Group,
dealing originally with Bosnia and then other parts of the former Yugoslavia, is an
example of a new type of concert of major powers (Boidevaix 1997; Giersch 1998).
In the economic sphere, however, the situation is quite different. The process of
globalization, although partial and variable in nature, is creating an increasingly
autonomous economic reality that interacts directly with both national and regional
economies. The formation of regions takes place at the interface between global
economic and technological forces and national realities. National actors may, in
fact, perceive regionalism as a defense mechanism against the competitive pressures
arising from the globalization process (Pelagidis and Papasotiriou 2002). Moreover,
regions are shaped by the spillover of domestic conditions across borders. Despite
that connection, the new regionalism cannot be linked solely with national factors
and separated from the global context. Instead, "the two processes of globalization
and regionalization are articulated within the same larger process of global
structural change" (Hettne 1999:2).
The mutual interdependence or dialectic between globalization and regionaliza-
tion is widely accepted; indeed, among radical political economists the point is
uncontested. According to Samir Amin (1999), the historical development of
capitalism has been to gradually move from the local level to the global, and at each
step to create new polarizing tendencies. To be able to improve their economic
positions, peripheral countries have had to de-link themselves from the global
system and adopt alternative, countervailing strategies, one of which is regionaliza-
tion.
James Mittelman (1996, 2000) also considers "transtormative regionalism" a
counterthrust to "neoliberal globalization." His view of regionalism is more
nuanced than Amin's noting that the tendency toward flexible specialization in
global production networks gives rise to many different types of regional and
transborder arrangements. Mittelman warns against a too strict contrast between
globalization and regionalism. This point has been made more specifically by Ralph
Pettman (1999) who reminds us that such a simple dichotomy has both analytical
and political costs. Analytically, one may ask "what's the point of dichotomizing
regionalism and globalism when they would seem to be points [along] a continuum
and not [really] opposed?" (pettman 1999:199). Politically, the counterposing of
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RAIMO Vii,YRYNEN 33

these two categories can lead to an antagonistic impression that the West is global
and the East regional.
The relationship between globalization and regionalization has been extensively
studied and debated by mainstream economists, The basic question underlying this
research and current debates is stated well by Bhagwati (1991,1992) when he asks:
Were the preferential free trade areas and customs unions belonging to the "second
regionalism" of the 1980s building blocs or stumbling blocs for the multilateral
economic order? In his view, due to the dominating effects of trade diversion,
regionalism became a stumbling bloc, slowing down progress toward multi-
lateralism, In contrast to the advocates of regionalism, Bhagwati and others (for
example, Krueger 1999; Panagiriya 1999) do not seem to believe that globalization
as such elicits regional responses; they start from a regional perspective and
explore its effects on the global trading system,
The possibility that regional trading arrangements block multilateral free trade
should receive a fair hearing, In particular, political economy models observe that
due to the prevalence of vested interests and lobbying, regionalism is often
accompanied by protectionism and trade diversion that may lock the participants
into closed economic blocs. Moreover, effective regionalism is a policy pursued by
strong powers, but the weak ones are sidelined in all ways in the global trading
system (Pelagidis and Papasotiriou 2002). A review of this literature (Frankel
1997:216) concludes that "there is no shortage of models and arguments in which
regional trading arrangements can undermine multilateral liberalization." The
expectation of trade diversion at the expense of trade creation-and, thus, gains
for special interests-increases the likelihood of concluding a preferential trading
agreement (Grossmann and Helpman 1995).
In contrast, there is also abundant evidence that regional arrangements are
compatible with, or even pave the way for, multilateral trade liberalization. Regional
preferences can strengthen export constituencies, provide insurance against
failures, lock in unilateral liberalization, and encourage competitive liberalization.
Within regions, industries in which export-oriented firms dominate have a greater
interest in achieving returns to scale and in promoting regional and international
liberalization of trade (Busch and Milner 1994; Milner 1997). Although the actual
picture is always complex and mixed, on balance there appears to be support for
the contention that regional and global trading arrangements are compatible with
one another (Oye 1992; Frankel 1997; Ethier 1998).
Moreover, this benign interpretation of preferential trading agreements receives
confirmation in empirical studies of international trade flows. Obviously, some
regional arrangements are more open than others and trends among industries
and regions vary. And, in some cases, trade within regions has expanded more
quickly than between them. But there is little evidence that the world economy is
devolving into exclusive regional blocs and, even less, into permanent trade wars.
To the contrary, both intra- and interregional trade seem to be expanding
simultaneously without undermining each other (Milner 1994; O'Loughlin and
Anselin 1996; Frankel and Wei 1998).
Economists arguing about the relationship between regional and multilateral
trading arrangements invariably take regionalism as their point of departure and
assess whether regionalism is closed or open. Irrespective of the empirical
conclusion, their normative stance is usually that closed regionalism is malign;
instead, they propose that we should be interested in trade-creating building blocks
for a liberal world order (for example, Hormats 1994). It is intriguing that
economists seldom ask how economic globalization might potentially shape the
process of regionalization, the question of major concern for political scientists.
One of the few exceptions is Robert Lawrence (1996) who argues that economic
globalization does, in fact, demand deeper regional integration. He rejects the
traditional view that foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade are substitutes for
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34 Regionalism: Old and New

each other. Instead, Lawrence observes the growing role of FDI and the need it
creates to restructure, specialize, and engage in network production. The
expansion of FDI has led to regional production and service clusters intended to
improve efficiency and reduce transaction costs. Due to the globalization of FDI,
regional integration has become progressively deeper and moved beyond
preferential trading arrangements.

Political-Military Regions
Given our discussion to this point concerning global-regional security linkages,
especially from the viewpoint of concert theory, it is possible to conclude not only
that this linkage is relatively weak but that the theory itself is conceptually muddled
and empirically oflimited value. Therefore, alternative formulations are needed to
create a proper spatial context for security theories. This task seems all the more
important because defining region and regionalism using the concepts of
traditional security theories does not appear to be of much help. Neorealism-with
its focus on anarchy, risks of defection, and relative gains-does not take spatial
dimensions seriously. The same applies to neoliberal institutionalism in which
spatial concepts find hardly any place at all. Instead, institutions are treated almost
exclusively as analytical and nonspatial phenomena (for example, Baldwin 1993;
Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander 1999). Only in discussions of "offensive
realism" do we find strong geopolitical undertones as a result of its concentration
on great-power competition (Mearsheimer 2001).

Externalities
The problematic status of regionalism in mainstream international relations
theories may explain why their supporters introduce the spatial dimension only
indirectly by using general concepts such as externalities. An illustrative externality
is the concept "regional security complex," defined as "a group of states whose
primary security concerns link sufficiently closely that their national securities
cannot realistically be considered apart from one another" (Buzan 1991:190).
These complexes are kept together by the negative or positive security links
between states.
Lake and Morgan (1997) use the regional security complex as their basic unit of
analysis. Indeed, these scholars have picked a specific aspect of the complex to
study, namely, "regional order," which they view as "the mode of conflict
management within the regional security complex" (Lake and Morgan 1997:11).
These orders can produce security in different ways: by integration, pluralistic
security communities, collective security, a great-power concert, or power
politics. Moreover, regional orders contain different mixes of cooperation and
conflict and varying degrees of external penetration. And there is a certain
hierarchy among the security orders; they are "rungs on a ladder up which
regional security complexes may climb as they pursue security management"
(Morgan 1997: 16).
Lake and Morgan's state-centric approach is reflected in their definition of
region, which they argue is held together by negative and positive security links
between states. The amount and strength of the links can be used to define the
territorial domain of the region. Lake (1997) has made a theoretical attempt to
develop an institutional conception of region by building on positive and negative
externalities that are primarily nonspatial (but based on state-centric premises). As a
result, he conceives of a regional system as "a set of states affected by at least one
transborder but local externality that emanates from a particular geographical
area" (Lake 1997:48). As externalities are usually reciprocal, the mutual imposition
of this set of states upon each other creates an externality "that binds the relevant
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RAIMO VXYRYNE:'-I 35

states together as a set of interacting units" (Lake 1997:40). Externalities may be

due, for instance, to collective action problems or particular policies that
neighboring states pursue toward one another.
The externality approach does not address the conceptual transition from the
study of regional systems to regional orders that is a common weakness in the
theory of regional security complexes. In fact, the approach seems to lead to the
study of coalition formation as the operative mechanism in region formation,
reinforced by the emphasis on transaction costs. One can assume that actors use
externalities as grounds for making decisions on their participation in regional
security arrangements. Furthermore, it seems likely that actors affected by the same
external effects are inclined to deepen their cooperation for mutual protection.
(The traditional example is, of course, the establishment of a defensive coalition
against a common external threat.) This reaction tends to exclude sources of
negative externalities from the regional system. Against this backdrop, one can
define a regional security system as a coalition in which positive externalities are
maximized and negative externalities minimized (see also Lake 1996). This choice
helps give size and a spatial domain to the regional system.
This theory of externalities can help us differentiate among security orders.
Integration and the building of security communities are principal intraregional
strategies that facilitate the development of a local security order, but hegemony,
concert, and balance of power almost always involve extraregional powers. As it
may be misleading to exclude external factors from the analysis of regional security,
a potential next step would be to explore the relationship between the intra- and
extraregional dimensions of security orders. Such an analysis would benefit from
the specification of the kinds of externalities that different security orders produce,
for instance, the externalities of hegemony (limitation of the domestic autonomy of
smaller states) compared with those involved in the balance of power (breakdowns
that can lead to war).
An intriguing possibility is that the concept of externality may be emerging as an
analytical tool by which both those advocating liberalism and realism can
incorporate regionalism into their theoretical frameworks. In the liberal context,
as Walter Mattli (1999:44-50) has argued, regional integration can be seen as an
institutional arrangement through which externalities are internalized by establish-
ing rules, regulations, and policies. The demand for such rules and policies comes
primarily from below, that is, from the market and civil society actors who suffer
from high opportunity costs under prevailing institutions. These costs, and the
promise of benefits under alternative arrangements, create an interest in
transforming current rules and policies.
Mattli (1999) correctly notes the possibility that regional integration by means of
the internalization of externalities will encourage protectionism and, as a
consequence, undermine global multilateralism. Those affected outside may
respond either by merging into the area or by creating their own regional group.
In addition to policy imitation, outside countries may apply for membership if there
is an economic performance gap that is working to their disadvantage. Mattli also
suggests that an economic union accepts new members only when negative
externalities originating from them threaten to disrupt the union or when the costs
of externalities are higher than those of admitting these new members into the
umon.
As this discussion indicates, in the study of regionalism, realism and liberalism
have more in common than we might expect from recent debates. One of the
common traits is the assumption of rationality; national reactions to both negative
externalities and rising transaction costs are determined by the net costs accruing to
the states. This rational account of region [ormation, though, runs into problems
when we try to do empirical research. How are we to measure externalities due to
such things as environmental pollution, illegal migration, or political instability and
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36 Regionalism: Old and New

compare them with the costs of membership when these externalities are supposed
to be internalized?

Domestic Coalitions
The theory of externalities can also be used to tap nonrational approaches to the
study of regionalism. Take, for example, Etel Solingen's (1997,1998) writings that
emphasize the importance of domestic coalitions and the grand strategies that they
pursue vis-a-vis other states. In this way, she helps us break out of the state-centric
framework in which much of the study of regionalism has found itself confined.
Solingen distinguishes between liberal-internationalist and statist-nationalist
coalitions; the former prefer economic cooperation and political accommodation,
and the latter seek economic protection and political conflict. As a result, the
structure of the regional order can be liberal (Western Europe), nationalist (Middle
East), or mixed (Southern Cone of Latin America).
Solingen's coalitional approach is compatible with Lake's (1997) theory of
regionalism because the impact of coalitions on national strategies (inside-out
effects) can be considered externalities that create costs or opportunities for other
states. The way in which these externalities are received and reacted to by other
countries depends, according to both theories, on the nature of the dominant
coalition. The coalitional approach to regionalism permits a dynamic and cognitive
conception of region because "the scope of the region is thus in the eyes of
coalitional beholders, and therefore subject to continuous redefinition" (Solingen
1998:4). Like the theory of externalities, the coalitional approach stresses the
importance of the "second image," that is, the effects of domestic structures and
policies on states' foreign policy. However, the penchant in externality theory to use
a state-centric model does not facilitate the specification of relevant domestic factors
resulting in statements such as "regional systems comprise local externalities that
radiate outward from a distinct geographic focus" (Lake 1997:50).
In some ways, then, Solingen's coalitional approach is superior to a state-centric
analysis because it permits not only differentiation among states but also
exploration of the effects of external factors on domestic structures and policies.
The strength of statist-nationalist and liberal-internationalist coalitions obviously
hinges on the regional context~whether conditions are generally cooperative or
conflictual~and on the distributional effects of participation in the world market.
In other words, liberal-internationalist domestic coalitions have greater difficulty in
reaching their goals in a nonpermissive regional environment, but statist-
nationalist coalitions have to readjust their goals in a liberal environment. The
relationship between domestic coalitions and region formation is, thus, a two-way
street.
Management of distributive effects appears to depend on whether the openness
of the economy is repeatedly correlated with domestic economic growth on the one
hand and wage inequality and interregional income differences on the other. In this
respect, recent evidence does not provide for any simple conclusions. Globalization
and regional integration have their economic blessings but they cannot be taken for
granted. Liberalization of national economies probably accelerates economic
growth, yet it can also lead to increased wage disparities and make unskilled labor
more substitutable (Rodrik 1999; Wood 1999, 2002). In addition, the nature of the
relationship between liberalization and the spatial distribution of economic activities
remains a largely unsolved puzzle. Perhaps the one sure thing we can say is that the
opening up of national economies results in greater specialization that may involve
both decentralizing and centralizing processes (Rodriguez-Pose 1998; Fujita,
Krugman, and Venables 1999; Venables 1999).
In sum, Solingen (1998) defines "region" in terms of the interaction between
regional (and global) contexts and the grand strategies of domestic coalitions. Her
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RAIMO VAYRYNE1\ 37

emphasis on the global-regional nexus differs from that of other scholars writing
on this issue (for example, Hettne 1999; Mittelman 2001) in that she rates the
impact of domestic factors as pivotaL Moreover, she does not pay any systematic
attention to the economic redistribution that may result from the choice of specific
coalitions and grand strategies (though, to be fair, she addresses the problem in the
case of Brazil). Perhaps the time has come to try to synthesize economic research on
the intranational consequences of liberalization and political science literature on
domestic coalitions and their regional strategies regarding cooperation and rivalry.

Identity Regions
A dynamic approach to region formation is also stressed by those writing from a
constructivist approach. These authors define regions with the help of such
concepts as trust, common identities, and shared values as these are embedded in
cross-border networks. Such imagined or cognitive regions-often produced by
the spread of liberal values and interests-are delineated by nonphysical markers.
The existence of a cognitive region does not necessarily require that its members
occupy a common space for it can be formed through nonspatial interactions. A
major type of cognitive region is the security community whose members expect
change to occur peacefully and disputes to be resolved nonviolently (Murphy 1991;
Adler 1997; Adler and Barnett 1998).
Identity regions exist in the consciousness of people. They must have historical
and contemporary symbols that the people inhabiting the region recognize and
share. And such regions must be institutionalized; that is, their territorial and
political symbols should have continuity and their behavior should be repeated and
standardized (see also Paasi 1986).
Eastern Central Europe has been suggested as an example of an imagined region
that has been recreated by the spread of democratic values and practices. This
process has resulted in a "new spatial imaginary" that differs significantly from the
Cold War era as both the political position and the identities of the region have
changed (Painter 1999). This observation, though, exaggerates both the strength of
the common identity and political commitments to this region. For instance,
historians are quick to adopt the concept of Mitteleuropa and work to justify its
existence (Peter 1999). Political and economic differences between the central and
eastern parts of the region are considerable and regional organizations such as the
Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) have become an instrument to pursue
EU membership rather than a medium for building common identity and
cooperation (Rhodes 1999; Zukrowska 2000).
With regard to the economy, the optimum currency area is an example of a
region that is constructed by political decisions. The operation of such an area is
influenced by asymmetric economic shocks, movements of relative prices, factor
mobility, and fiscal transfers. These factors give rise to externalities that create
networks formed around spatial dependencies. The spatial element can also be
seen in the specialization in production that results from such currency unions
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1999; Matdi 1999; Kenen 2002).
The development of a currency area leads to both functional and territorial
regions. Territoriality becomes a part of such an area for the simple reason that its
members are states that have agreed to fix the relationship between their currencies
or create a new, common currency. The establishment of a common currency, such
as the euro, has been viewed in constructivist terms as an expression of the search
for common identity and political vision (Marcussen 1999; Risse et aL 1999).
Although the emphasis on identity and vision seems to leave little room for territory
in understanding currency unions, the fact remains that even currencies with fixed
exchange rates derive their position from connections with states. The European
Monetary Union (EMU) is an interesting test case of how far a currency union can
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38 Regionalism: Old and New

move in the direction of nonterritoriality before it reaches the limits of interstate

politics.
Benjamin Cohen (1997) has differentiated between state-based currency areas
and currency regions that are primarily created by market forces-a distinction
that is relevant here. Currency regions are functional and bounded only by the
acceptability of each currency outside its political domain. In Cohen's (1997:60)
definition, "currency regionalism occurs whenever money's authoritative domain
extends significantly beyond the legal jurisdiction of its issuing government." The
dollar is widely accepted as a medium of payment in Latin America as is the euro in
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia. These currencies have created an authoritative
transnational domain that is defined by a mixture of market forces and intangible
political factors such as hegemony, credibility, and stability.
No doubt, shared identities and their institutionalization are important elements
in region formation. Adler and Barnett (1998) wisely point out, however, that trust
and collective identity alone do not bring about security communities. The process
leading to these communities has to begin with precipitating conditions such as
economic changes and external threats and then work through power relations,
organizations, and social learning. In fact, three tiers form security communities.
Precipitating conditions, factors of trust and collective identity, and dependable
expectations of peaceful change define these tiers. In other words, one has to be
careful not to attribute the rise of security communities solely to cognitive and
institutional factors but also consider material conditions and external threats
(Viyrynen 2000).
Adler and Barnett's (1998) phase model is intended as a framework for
comparative research. Yet, one can identify at least two regions-North America
and the Nordic countries-whose development paths have differed from this
model. In North America, the demilitarization of the US-Canadian border set the
stage for movement toward a pluralist security community rather than transactions,
institutions, and learning (Shore 1998). In the Nordic countries, a common cultural
and historical framework rather than specific precipitating conditions has pushed
these states toward a security community (Adler and Barnett 2000; Wiberg 2000).
The limits to placing a strong emphasis on identity and trust in the formation of
regions is in evidence in the case of ASEAN. Common cultural practices, values, and
interests have been proposed as being at the root of the so-called ASEAN Way of
resolving mutual conflicts (Vayrynen 2000). True, ASEAN does rely on mutual
respect, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, a norm of consultation, and
national resilience to thwart off internal threats to governments. However, these
intraregional ties have not been able to eliminate mutual conflicts and different
approaches to extraregional problems including economic shocks. ASEAN is, at
best, a nascent security community (Khong 1997; Acharya 1998).
Two types of criticisms have been leveled against the constructivist interpretation
of the ASEAN Way. The first asserts that although informal consultations,
confidence-building measures, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs
may have promoted regional stability, they failed to stop the competitive acquisition
of weapons in the early 1990s-a practice that was halted only by the subsequent
economic crises. Moreover, ASEAN's split over East Timor, disagreement on policy
toward Burma, and its ineffective response to the environmental and economic
crises in the region indicate only a limited capacity for collective action (Collins
1999; Henderson 1999). These observations are not inconsistent with the view that
even though the diplomatic behavior of the ASEAN states follows certain rules, it is
premature to consider ASEAN an identity-based community (Nischalke 2002).
The second criticism involves the argument that culture and learning had little to
do with the regional integration process and proposes that the celebrated ASEAN
Way has reflected a conscious effort to keep the disenfranchised out of an elite-
driven political process. In fact, the Way has been viewed as a direct political
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 335

RAIMO VAYRYNEN 39

"response to the end of U.S. hegemony and its subsequent ... recourse to
unilateralism" (Kelly 1999: 174). Hari Singh (2000) has shown that the hegemonic
explanation for region formation in Southeast Asia applies across most of that
region's history; ASEAN's political role has been defined by patterns of hegemonic
dominance and inter-hegemonic interactions. The end of the Cold War, the
collapse of great-power bilateralism, and a partial US withdrawal from the region
have led to a stress on economic cooperation for which there is little natural basis.
As a result, there is a tendency to "sub-regionalize Southeast Asia into a mainland-
maritime divide" (Singh 2000: 143).

Security Complex, Constellation, or Community?

The above analysis of regional security issues has indicated that the concept of
regional order, though useful, is too general to provide us with much conceptual
leverage. The same point applies, although to a more limited degree, to the concept
of regional security complex. The latter concept gives us ideas and criteria for how
a particular region can be carved out of its environment, but it is unclear what other
theoretical advantages the concept provides. One way to free security studies from
their territorial prison is to regard security relations as networks of commitments
and actions associated with various negative and positive externalities and
identities.
Buzan and his colleagues (1998) have tried to expand the applicability of the
security complex idea to include nonmilitary areas and to marry the resulting
construct to constructivist methodology. These scholars have concluded that
expanding the scope of the concept is not easy and, if it is to be successful, requires
ushering in a new concept-"security constellation" -to capture the spatial
implications of nonmilitary security. Security constellations are "a much wider
concept than security complexes, reflecting ... the totality of possible security
relationships at all levels" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998). Although this
approach resonates with the complexity of reality, conceptually it seems once again
too broad.
As an alternative, one can argue that regional security complexes tend to evolve
toward cooperative systems, that is, regional integration rather than conflict is the
dominant trend (see also Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998; Ayoob 1999). If such
is the case, then further development of the notion of security community may help
us out of our theoretical quandary. To expand on the idea of security communities
would necessitate that we analyze the internal transformations and shifting
boundaries of regional systems focusing on identities, networks, and externalities
rather than static territorial characteristics. This type of analysis would, in turn, call
for comparative studies of regions to understand the interaction between their
specific internal and external dynamics. For such efforts, see the work of Peter
Katzenstein (1996) and the author (Vayrynen 2001).

Toward a New Regionalism

Regional dynamism appears to have two interrelated dimensions, namely, the
processes of intraregional change and the definition of the region's outer
boundaries. The process of intraregional change is often called regionalization
and depicted conceptually as a multidimensional (economic, security, cultural, and
environmental) process that proceeds simultaneously on several levels (Hettne
1999). The process of regionalization fills the region with substance such as
economic interdependence, institutional ties, political trust, and cultural belonging.
The concept of "regionness" has been used to describe the situation in which the
process of regionalization has advanced far enough for the region to attain some
intrinsic regional features. For Bjorn Hettne (1999), regionness is a variable that
336 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

40 Regionalism: Old and New

implies the degrees of regionalization that have occurred in terms of, for example,
spatiality, cooperation, and identity. Katzenstein (1996, 1997) appears to entertain a
similar idea when he compares the regionness of Western Europe and East Asia. He
finds in the former system regionalism that is more closed and centralized than in
the latter which is more open and decentralized due to the existence of multiple
power centers. The regionalization of the European Union relies more on formal
multilateral institutions, but in East Asia regionalization is primarily founded on
bilateral relations in politics and networking in business.
Joseph Grieco (1997, 1999) has set out to explain this difference in the
institutionalization of regional cooperation in the two places. His basic argument is
that the relative equality and stability of the distribution of capability in the
European Union has alleviated fears about the regional dominance of Germany
and, thus, has facilitated institutionalization. In East Asia, the stronger and
increasingly dominant role of Japan has had the opposite effect. Grieco proposes
that the failure to institutionalize cooperation in East Asia, despite the increase in
regional "trade encapsulation," refutes institutional-functional theory. Despite the
growing dominance of Japan in intraregional trade relations in East Asia, no robust
institutions of integration have emerged.
What Grieco describes, however, is not necessarily the case. More advanced
measures of intraregional trade intensity show that from the 1960s to the mid-
1990s this indicator has declined both in East Asia and in ASEAN. In contrast to the
United States and Germany, Japan's foreign trade has become more global at the
expense of its regional trade in East Asia (O'Loughlin and Anselin 1996; Frankel
1998). Grieco (1999) seems to be closer to explaining what is actually happening
in stressing Japan's greater economic and security dependence on the United States
as compared to Germany's. This dependence provides Washington with a lever
to influence Japan's policy if the latter tries to promote either trade or monetary
groupings in which the United States is not envisaged as a member. To
this statement one should hasten to add, though, that there are deep suspicions
all over East Asia regarding any Japanese plans to strengthen its position in the
regIOn.
Another implication of regionness is that regions do not need fixed boundaries.
Regional clusters of actors can be defined by their mutual externalities, common
identities, or the interactions among domestic coalitions. Boundaries are in constant
flux, especially in mixed-actor regions. But even state-based regions expand and
contract. Thus, after attaining their independence, the Baltic countries quickly
became members-in terms of institutions and identities-of a larger Nordic-
Baltic region. They have also systematically, and successfully, aspired to join NATO,
the transatlantic framework whose territorial boundaries have expanded and
become blurred across the past ten years.
Regions also enlarge and contract in more subtle ways. Regional organizations
disseminate their norms and institutions outside their territorial domains, creating
varying zones of conformity with them. The influence is particularly strong if
compliance with the norms is a precondition for being admitted as a member of the
regional system. For this reason, the EU and NATO enlargement processes have
created a political regime that reaches much beyond their formal domains. In
general, the degrees of regionness or intraregional density vary considerably in the
central and peripheral zones. Following Lake (1997:54-55), we can say that in
Europe "thicker" regions are "nested" within "thinner" regions. The latter regions
are more volatile and, therefore, provide a challenge to the stability of the core
region.
The boundaries of different economic and political zones do not necessarily
follow national borders; they may even cut across individual states. Consider
Western Estonia and Western Ukraine, for instance; they are much more closely
integrated with the core regions of Europe than are the eastern parts of these
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 337

RAIMO VAYRYNE:--I 41

countries. These so-called European superregions are based on historical and

functional divisions (see also Delamaide 1994). Among these superregions are the
Latin Crescent, Adantic Coast, Baltic League, Mitteleuropa, Alpine Are, Danube
Basin, Balkan Peninsula, and Slavic Federation. ?-Jeedless to say, the boundaries of
these regions are impressionistic rather than based on any solid empirical fact.
In a related manner, the growth triangles in Southeast Asia combine subnational
regions from several countries. Transnational economic zones such as the Tumen
River Area Development Programme have also been established in northeast Asia.
This project has a much stronger strategic and state-centric dimension to it than the
transnational zones in Southeast Asia which are molded primarily by market
conditions and the need to find a place in the global marketplace. Economic
cooperation in the subregion comprising southern China, Hongkong, and Taiwan
also has major geopolitical implications because it is likely to increase the influence
of the People's Republic of China not only in Hong Kong but in Taiwan, whose
companies are becoming increasingly dependent on the Chinese labor force (Yue
and Yuan 1993; Thant, Tang, and Kakazu 1994; Yue 1997; Sum 1999).
Politically organized and functionally networked variants of regionalism have a
complex relationship with one another. Traditionally, regionalism has been
understood as an organized form of interstate cooperation between neighboring
states (see, for example, Riggins 1992). The establishment of regional organizations
was seen to reflect the concerns and ambitions of national leaders (Taylor 1990;
Mansfield and Milner 1999). Today, views differ on whether regional cooperation is
driven by political leaders. On one side are comparative studies of regional
organizations (see, for example, Rotte 1998; Hook and Kearns 1999; Cameron and
Tomlin 2000) that suggest the interests of political elites remain primary in keeping
cooperation going in such organizations. Elites promote and restrain cooperation
on the basis of its estimated impact on their domestic power positions. On the other
side are those (see Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel 1999) who consider regionalization a
response to the polarizing and peripheralizing pressures of economic globalization
and pay only scant attention to the role of national political forces or leaders. New
regionalism from this latter point of view means "the return of the political"
although it does not signify the "return of the leaders" (Hettne 1999:7), at least not
"political leaders" to use Matdi's (1999) terminology.
Matdi argues that the demand factors emanating from business leaders in a
region are more decisive in promoting regional integration than the supply-side
actions of national politicians. There is evidence in both the European Union and
NAFTA that deepening regional integration has developed as a result of demands
from transnational business leaders who have become worried about market shares
and loss of competitiveness. In the world economy, there appears to be a general
trend toward increasing intraindustry trade, product differentiation, and returns to
scale. Thus, regional economic systems are organized by industries with increasing
economies of scale and a hectic wave of mergers and acquisitions. As these
industries do not often have strong mutual linkages, new regional forms arise that
are internally specialized and divided. In this way, global capitalism erodes the
formal regional cooperation in which governments continue to wield power,
increasingly limiting the latter's political influence (Hveem 1999).
The recent wave of regionalization has often been considered a statist response to
the regional projects of Japan and the European Union. As argued by Matdi (1999),
at least NAFTA, Mercosur, and ASEAN were set up to mobilize regional resources
more effectively to deal with interregional competition and various kinds of
externalities. However, Mattli (1999) himself shows that NAFTA was also a response
to recurrent financial crises in Mexico that the United States could neglect with
impunity. The primary US response was to push for the liberalization of the
Mexican economy to bring it in line with the global trend toward a neoliberal
market regime. NAFTA only became possible after the Salinas government decided
338 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

42 Regionalism: Old and New

to relax investment rules, liberalize financial services, and make other concessions
to US capital (see also Gonzalez and Haggard 1998).
The story of NAFTA also helps us specify the role of the business community in
its relations with political leaders. United States business was divided into factions
regarding NAFTA, interested in either protecting their own markets or opening up
Mexican markets; indeed, they were so divided that they were only an effective
lobby during the ratification process. Political leaders took the initiative on NAFTA;
its advocacy remained largely in the hands of the White House given the reluctance
of business to wrestle with NAFTA's opponents. Moreover, success in the
negotiation and ratification process required things only the US government could
deliver: prior commitments, the process of convergence, and side-agreements
(Mayer 1998; Milner 1998; Cameron and Tomlin 2000). In Mexico, financial crises
allowed the reform-minded political elite to start restructuring the economy in
phases. Had all the reforms been packaged into one, resistance by entrenched
economic interests would probably have blocked the changes. The phased
liberalization of the economy created a new export-oriented economic elite willing
to support NAFTA (Tornell and Equivel 1997).
In addition to global market actors, there are also other transboundary
operations that are creating new types of informal regional networks. Such
networks often involve illegal transactions in products and commodities traded
across borders. These informal economic spaces are not apolitical; to the contrary,
organized crime, drug dealers, terrorist groups, clan leaders, and warlords use
these informal trading relations for their own political purposes (Griffiths 1996;
Bach 1999; Reno 2000). "Shadow regionalism" differs from both state-directed and
market-driven regional relations; it is based on a network of private contracts and
nonmarket transactions.

Functional Regionalism
Social Spaces
The social definition of region focuses on functional exchanges as the source of
spatiality and can be traced back to Jean Gottman's (1952) distinction between
"iconography" and "circulation," between "places" and "flows" to use today's
terminology. Another major contributor to the definition of spatiality was Robert
Sack (1981:5) who distinguished between territoriality used to control a spatial
political organization and nonterritorial action; he considered territoriality as the
"attempt to affect, influence, or [have] control over a specific area." Later on, Sack
(1983) realized that territory is usually contested and started to stress the
importance of access to it. The distribution of territorial power is rarely equitable
because actors have different abilities to control and enter a particular territory.
With this in mind, Sack (1983:56; see also Vayrynen 1993) redefined territoriality as
a "strategy to establish differential access to people, things, and relationships."
The creation of resources by social interactions, exchange, and circulation
underlines the importance of considering social units as more than merely
containers of power. Criticizing the notion of "autonomous and well-bounded
states," Charles Tilly (1998:404, 410) has explored communities that comprise both
"multiple states and powerful non-state actors," defining these communities as "all
categorically bounded networks in which a substantial proportion of relations fall
into triads." In making this criticism, he relies on the idea that multiple actors, both
state and nonstate ones, are linked to each other by partially overlapping triads
rather than through bilateral or hierarchical relations and in a manner so that these
bounded networks can be separated from the environment. Tilly's (1998:408) basic
idea is that triads form "trans-state communities, which, if favorable," contribute to
peace and the emergence of security communities.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 339

RAIMO Vii,YRYNEN 43

The discussion above hints at a tension between regionalism, regionalization, and

the new regionalism. Traditionally, regionalism has been based on institutionalized
intergovernmental coalitions that control access to a region. Regionalization has
been viewed as the dynamic process associated with region formation. In the
literature on the so-called new regionalism (or regionness), the concept has been
given a more complex, normative meaning. As formulated by Hettne (1999:17),
regionalization is conceived as a multidimensional and multilevel process that
involves the "political ambition of establishing territorial control and regional
coherence cum identity." In other words, according to new regionalism,
regionalization is intended to control access to a particular region to protect it
against the process of globalization.
Because regions and their boundaries change when states leave or join them and
when power relations within and between them are significantly redefined, the new
regionalism argues that regional change occurs when critical political and territorial
saliencies are reframed by the participating states. In political regionalism, key
issues concern the stability of the region, the security of its members, its
contribution to the current global order, and the relationship of the member states
to the global system (see also Hurrell and Fawcett 1995). In effect, regionalization is
a dynamic and flexible process in which change is continual rather than happening
by distinct leaps and bounds; the emergence of a shared identity is necessarily an
evolutionary process.

Economic Regions
Economic regionalization appears to depend on both political decisions at the
regional level and the locational decisions made by firms. In effect, regions are
viewed as an appropriate unit in which to organize governance and stimulate
political participation. But often, as in the European Union, regional governance
has remained weak. In fact, its regional dimension has been more manifest in the
rise of economic pivot regions and of capital- and technology-intensive cities that
support local development. There is evidence to suggest that, at least in Europe,
differences in regional growth rates have depended on a combination of local
conditions and their linkages to the world economy (Le Gales and Lequesne 1998;
Rodriguez-Pose 1998; Braunerhjelm et at. 2000; Newman 2000). Neither the state
nor regional government alone can assure regional success that is based on the
interrelationship among local resources, transnational capital, and public-private
interactions. Loose policy initiatives and regional networks cannot save a regional
project if its market incentives are inadequate (Cowling and Sugden 1999; Koch
and Fuchs 2000).
Regional specialization and growth are due both to expanding trade and
investment as well as endogenous factors. Decreasing transaction costs playa role in
the relocation of production within and between countries. The result is a center-
periphery division that changes as development spurts integrate new regions into
the center. Due to backward and forward linkages, production tends to
agglomerate to areas where there is already similar production, irrespective of
the intensity of trade relations (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999; Venables
1999).
In Regions and the World Economy, Allen Scott (1998:25) traces the historical
interaction of state formation and capitalism and notes that "the continual
expansionary thrust of capitalism over the very long run makes it extremely
mutable in geographic terms." It may, as a result, break out in quite different
contexts. Thus, capitalism does not have any single locus, but, much like
Foucauldian power, is everywhere. National economies are composed of regional
production complexes that are connected to one another within and across national
borders, facilitating the clustering of economic activities and adding to "the global
340 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

44 Regionalism: Old and New

mosaic of regional economies" (Scott 1998:48). Scott has envisaged a four-tiered

system of governance ranging from the global level through international regions
and sovereign states to subnational regions across borders. The result depicts the
new complexity in international relations in which actors operate in both territorial
places and functional spaces. Thus, multinational corporations have created their
own, autonomous transnational business spaces while also being connected with the
governments of their host states. Territoriality and functionality have become
independent but intertwined characteristics of the global and regional systems.
The new regional economies are usually based on nonstandardized technologies
and economies of variety, necessitating the agglomeration of producers to attractive
places. These agglomerations rely on advanced technologies and an educated labor
force becoming the "regional motors ofthe new global economy" (Scott 1998:68).
Industries that have standardized technologies and economies of scale may also
develop international linkages but that happens through vertical integration within
companies (that is, by increasing internal scope). Territorial proximity facilitates the
creation of institutions and conventions ("untraded interdependencies") that
confer new capacities to initiate transactions to economic agents (see also Storper
1997; Dunning 2000). Transactions have a dual dimensionality as they take place in
both geographical (between firms) and functional (within firms) spaces. As a result,
the hubs of economic and technological development are organized by horizontal
interdependencies between the key actors and through hierarchical patterns of
power within and between actors.

Conclusions
The primary purpose of this essay has been to argue that major political and
economic changes have altered the relationships among various layers of the
international system and that these changes have had different effects in the
political-military and functional spheres. With the shrinking of the state, the
national level has lost some of its influence, which in turn has fostered new links
between the global and regional levels on the one hand and between them and the
local level on the other hand. In other words, international relations are in the
process of undergoing a vertical reorganization in which the emphasis is shifting
both upward and downward from the national leveL The reorganization is evident,
for instance, in the role that business pressures from below play in the formation of
regional economic associations. This change has had a particular impact in the
functional sphere where the organizing power of the state is diminishing and that of
the global market and local initiatives is growing.
At the same time, we are also seeing a horizontal reorganization taking place in
international relations as various subnational and regional units develop networks
that cross territorial boundaries. This process lies at the heart of the constructivist
view of the world in which regional processes are assigned functions such as
insuring the political coherence of the region and the resistance to globalization
(new regionalism). The theory of externalities is not constructivist in nature, but it
hints at the same dynamics; regionness is strengthened by the inside-out effects of
political, economic, environmental, and cultural processes that move boundaries of
regions through spillovers and emulation. These images of regions emphasize
flexibility and dynamism, but the traditional state-centric security perspective has
favored a fixed and static view of the region.
The marketization and fragmentation of the world system has inspired calls for
new mechanisms of political controL In the early 1990s, it was popular to suggest
that such management should be entrusted to a global or regional concert as both
hegemonic and balance of power systems had undesirable qualities. This reliance
on the concert metaphor did not turn out, however, to be a viable solution. Instead,
the concepts of hegemony and empire have returned to mainstream international
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 341

RAIMO Vj\YRY:-lEN 45

relations discourse to describe the emerging world order. These trends usher in a
creative controversy between hierarchical hegemonic control and decentered
constructivism and transactionalism. In both these tendencies, it seems the
established notions of regionalism are devalued; they are either subsumed in
hegemonic structures or converted into a process in which free agents aim to
promote new political alternatives to both global capitalism and political discipline.
As a result of these vertical and horizontal transformations occurring in the
world, a growing disjuncture is emerging between the static-place character of
physical regions and the dynamic-flow character of functional regions. In the study
of regions, this disjuncture is leading scholars away from studying regionalism and
regional organizations to the analysis of regionalization and, thus, away from
examining military and political issues toward those involving society, economy, and
culture. This shift means that the regional agglomeration of technology and capital
as well as the political reconstruction of reality are becoming at least as relevant as
the multinational organization of military capabilities in regional alliances. Indeed,
these new ways of conceiving of regionalism call for a renewal in the realist and
liberal approaches.

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 [16]
Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation, and
Democracy in the EU 1
Richard Bellamy*

Abstract: Critics of the E U' s democratic deficit standardly attribute the problem to either
sociocultural reasons, principally the lack of a demos and public sphere, or institutional
factors, notably the lack of electoral accountability because of the limited ability of the
European Parliament to legislate and control the executive powers of the Commission and
the Council of Ministers. Recently two groups of theorists have argued neither deficit need
prove problematic. The first group adopts a rights-based view of democracy and claims
that a European consensus on rights, as represented by the Charter of Fundamental
European Rights, can offer the basis of citizen allegiance to EU wide democracy, thereby
overcoming the demos deficit. The second group adopts a public-interest view of demo-
cracy and argues that so long as delegated authorities enact policies that are 'jor' the
people, then the absence of institutional forms that facilitate democracy 'by' the people are
likewise unnecessary-indeed, in certain areas they may be positively harmful. This article
argues that both views are normatively and empirically flawed. This is because there is no
consensus on rights or the public interest apart from the majority view of a demos secured
through parliamentary institutions. To the extent that these remain absent at the EU level,
a democratic deficit continues to exist.

I Introduction
Criticism of the EU's democratic deficit has standardly centred on the absence of a
European demos and the shortcomings of its institutional arrangements. Though
related, these two arguments also work against each other to some degree. Those who
emphasise the first critique focus on the low levels of popular identification with the
EU, a factor associated with apathy and even antagonism towards EU politics. Accord-
ing to this argument, the lack of a European demos, along with the complexity and

1An earlier version of this paper was given at a Conference on Shifting the Boundaries of Sovereignty:
Governance and Legitimacy in the EU and Australasia, organised by the National Europe Centre, ANU,
and is based on research undertaken while a Visiting Fellow at the Centre as part of the 'Democracy Task
Force' of the EU-funded 6th Framework Integrated Project on New Modes of Governance (Contract
No CITI-CT-2004-506392). Later versions have been delivered to the NoSoPhi seminar at the Universitc
Paris I, the Second Annual Conference of the Consortium on Democratic Constitutuionalism at the
University of Victoria on 'Supranational Political Community: Substance? Conditions? Pitfalls?' and
the Graduate School of Politics and International Studies, Hull University. I am grateful to the other
participants at these events for their comments and to Neil Walker, Jo Shaw, Chris Hilson, David Coen,
Andrew Moravscik, and Albert Weale for written remarks.
* Professor of Political Science, School of Public Policy, University College London.
350 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

European Law Journal Volume 12

distance of European decision-making, necessarily weakens the potential for EU-wide

democracy. Advocates of the second critique tend to respond that political identifica-
tion would be strengthened by enhancing the role of democratic institutions within the
EU, particularly the European Parliament. However, supporters of the no-demos thesis
counter that such measures would deepen rather than alleviate the EU's democratic
deficit. Without a demos, EU wide democratic decision-making risks producing the
majority tyranny of one or more demoi over others. On this view, there are limits to
what the EU should attempt to achieve if democratic accountability and legitimacy are
to be retained.
Recently, this debate has been re-invigorated by two approaches to the problem that
challenge the respective presuppositions of these conventional positions. In rather
different ways, these scholars relate the EU's legitimacy problems and democratic
deficit to parallel difficulties and changes within the democracies of most advanced
industrial societies, many of which stem from the impact on nation states of the very
global economic and social processes that have given rise to the EU. As a result, the
Member States are said to have been similarly afflicted by a weakening of affective
national bonds and a loss of confidence in the competence of politicians. 2 They argue
that the virtual absence of a demos-based, majoritarian parliamentary model of democ-
racy at the EU level merely reflects its attenuation and partial replacement by new
forms of democratic legitimation at the Member-State level.
What I shall call the 'rights-orientated' strand of this argument suggests that
EU-wide democracy can work, but it needs to be established on a new basis to some
form of European identity.3 This strand stresses how citizens now tend to justify their
claims in terms of rights and regard them as constraints on the behaviour of their
compatriots and politicians. A commitment to justice is said to be a more powerful
political bond within a pluralist society than ethnicity, history, or shared cultural
values. Most important, it offers the prospect of a post-national form of democracy
suited to the EU. After all, the EU has created a transnational legal system guided by
international norms of rights and the rule of law. Though EU law originated to secure
the basis for a common market, it has reached beyond the narrowly economic sphere.
It now disseminates standards of equality and fairness in a whole range of areas: from
consumer protection to the recognition of gay relationships. The Charter of Rights and
the Constitutional Treaty are seen as the culmination of this process and said to offer
an alternative, civic, basis for a pan-European constitutional democracy to a shared
European identity of an ethnic or cultural kind similar to the nationalisms of the
Member States. As they note, the potential for rights protection at the EU level already
provides a focus for many transnational civil society groups.
By contrast, what I shall call the 'public interest-orientated' strand, while not indif-
ferent to these concerns, argues that democratic accountability plays a diminished role

2 It is noticeable, for example, that the White Paper on European Governance explicitly treats the EU's
legitimacy problems as symptomatic of various common difficulties confronting advanced democracies
more generally (European Governance: A White Paper, Commission of the European Communities,
Brussels 25.7.2001, Corn (2001) 428, p. 3).
J The most prominent exponent of this view is Habermas. See J. Habermas, 'Citizenship and National
Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe', (1992) 12 Praxis International, 1 and 'Why Europe
Needs a Constitution', (2001) \I New Left Review 5. Among the many others promoting this strand,
see E. O. Eriksen, J. E. Fossum, and A. J. Menendez, 'The Chartering of a European Constitution', in
E. O. Eriksen, J. E. Fossum, and A. J. Menendez, (eds), Constitution Making and Democratic Legitimacy,
Oslo: ARENA Report, No 5/2002, pp. 1-11.

726
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 351

November 2006 Still in Deficit

in the operation of most states. 4 It proves not just unnecessary but potentially perni-
cious. EU governance simply reflects this situation. According to this strand, what
matters most to citizens is the securing of certain goods-such as high employment,
economic growth, and environmental protection. Citizens no longer look to states to
provide these directly but indirectly, through regulation. Moreover, policies in these
areas are often highly technical and susceptible to being distorted to favour particular
powerful private interests. What people want in such fields is expertise, efficiency, and
equity. They look for Pareto-efficient improvements that correct for market failure.
Proponents of this strand argue that the democratic output of policies that reflect such
public interests do not require-indeed they may even be subverted by-too much
democratic input. There should be consultation with affected parties, but this exercise
is for information gathering not to promote democratic accountability or responsive-
ness. Even at the domestic level, technical regulatory issues tend to be delegated to
unelected expert bodies. To the extent the EU merely oversees those regulatory prob-
lems best tackled at an international level, and of a kind that democratic politicians in
any case handle badly, then the relative absence of direct democratic control poses no
problem. In fact, intergovernmental democratic bargaining would inevitably raise
transaction costs and might well produce distorted and suboptimal outcomes as poli-
ticians sought to protect a variety of national level interests. The indirect control and
checks provided by elected politicians within the Council of Ministers and the Euro-
pean Parliament are sufficient.
These two views appear to be at variance with each other: the one advocating the
expansion of democracy on a new basis, the other defending the attenuation of older
forms. Indeed, some advocates of 'the rights-orientated view' have criticised what they
regard as the utilitarian and instrumental emphasis of 'the public interest-orientated
view'.5 Yet that criticism is not entirely fair. For the 'public interest' view sees the
technocratic setting and upholding of regulatory standards as a parallel to, and con-
strained by, the judicial maintenance of rights standards. 6 In that respect, the rights-
based view also seeks to limit democracy. Moreover, to a surprising degree the two
views share certain common normative assumptions: namely, that impartial proce-
dures, fostering deliberation and openness among well-informed and appropriately
motivated persons, and consulting with affected civil society groups, will generate a
consensus on rights or the public interest in their respective areas.
The following examination of these two accounts concentrates primarily on a nor-
mative assessment of their common core. In contrasting ways, both views claim they
are more 'realistic' than the standard critiques of the EU's democratic deficit. The
'rights-orientated' theory takes issue with the 'no-demos' thesis and contends the
emphasis on nationality as a source of political identity harks back to an outmoded,
and often malign, ideal of cultural and ethnic homogeneity.7 The 'public-interest' view

4 The prime examples of this strand are G. Maione, e.g. 'Europe's Democratic Deficit: the Question of
Standards,'(l998) 4 European Law Journal 5; and A. Moravscik, e.g. 'In Defence of the Democratic
Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the EU', (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 603.
5 E. O. Eriksen and 1. E. Fossum, 'Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation Assessed',
(2004) 25 International Political Science Review, pp. 439-441.
6 G. Maione, 'Regulatory Legitimacy' in G. Maione (cd.), Regulating Europe (Routledge, 1996), p. 286;
A. Moravcsik, 'Is There a "Democratic Deficit" in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis', (2004) 39
Government and Opposition 344-346.
7 Habermas, 'Citizenship and National Identity', op. cit. note 3 supra, pp. 13-18. Eriksen and Fossum,
op. cit note 5 supra, pp. 443-445.

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criticises those seeking more democratic decision-making within the EU for applying
highly idealised standards of an 'ancient, Westminster-style' democracy.' However, I
shall argue that both views involve idealised assumptions of their own that are only
credible in the context of the very positions they criticise.
The basic problems can be summarised as follows:

1. Both rights and the public interest are subject to reasonable disagreement. As
a result, democratic legitimacy cannot be secured by arriving at an 'objective'
view of rights or the public interest that all European peoples could be assumed
to espouse, regardless of whether they are actually involved in reaching that
view or not.
2. When independent bodies, such as courts or regulators, set such standards they
are often controversial. Within established democracies public pressure can be
brought to bear on these bodies in ways that render them broadly responsive to
sustained majority opinion. Such pressures are often indirect and inadequate,
yet when ignored, in whole or in large part, they give rise to concerns about a
national democratic deficit.
3. To the extent that a consensus exists on rights or the public interest it is because
it reflects the majority view of a demos. Therefore, the possibility of such
consensuses cannot be used as substitutes for collective democratic decision-
making among a people who accept its legitimacy because they feel a sense of
commonality and acknowledge the authority of the state to decide issues of
public concern within its territorial sphere. If at least part of the reason the EU
suffers from a democratic deficit lies in the absence of a demos, then that deficit
may be intensified rather than diminished by the development of EU-level
rights or regulatory standards possessing minimal democratic endorsement or
control by a yet-to-be created European people.

I shall start by outlining the nature of disagreements about rights and the public
interest and the role democracy can play in deciding them. I shall also briefly explore
whether democracy at the EU level possesses the same normative qualities to perform
this role as at the Member State level. I then look in more detail at the merits of the
post-national rights-orientated view of EU democracy and a public-interest based
delegatory democracy. Both are found wanting, with the democratic deficit a continu-
ing problem.

II Democracy and Disagreement

The vast majority of citizens within democracies believe in the importance of rights and
regard certain state activities to be in the public interest. However, they also disagree
about the character and substance of both, and often divide over the policies most
conducive to securing them. No doubt self-interest, prejudice, and ignorance lie behind
many of these differences. However, they also stem from nothing more sinister than the
limitations of the human condition. Not only can various worthwhile goals and values
prove either contingently or logically incompatible, and so cannot be contained within
one social world, but in addition, our evaluations of which mix should be preferred are

8 Majone, op. cit. note 6 supra, p. 285, Moravcsik, 'In Defence of the Democratic Deficit', op. cit. note 4
supra, p. 605 and 'Is There a "Democratic Deficit"?' op. cit. note 6 supra, p. 337.

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subject to conflicting appraisals. Such conflicts need not reflect bias or bad faith, but
simply what Rawls's calls 'the burdens of judgement'.9 These burdens range from the
difficulty of weighing empirical evidence to the conscientious employment of differing
normative standards. All these elements can produce divergent opinions among even
reasonable, well-motivated people. Indeed, they lie at the heart of most political
debates and divisions. Debates between right and left over the best mix of public and
private in running the economy or the legitimacy of social rights are both legitimate and
enduring precisely because they do not admit of any definitive, knock-down solution-
even if academics and politicians on each side of these and other issues attempt to offer
their alternative answers.
The existence of reasonable disagreement in these areas makes the assumption of an
underlying European (or national) consensus on rights or the public interest debateable.
It also poses a difficulty for the 'objective' setting of standards by supposedly impartial
bodies, such as courts and regulators. Either they will disagree as much as the rest of the
population, or their agreement will reflect a somewhat false professional consensus that
fails to take into account many factors that legitimately matter for ordinary people.
Within democracies such as those existing in all the Member States, the problem of
reasonable disagreement is largely overcome through appeals to rights and the public
interest being nested within a national public sphere and democratic system. Indeed,
Weale and Waldron see reasonable disagreement on matters that nonetheless require a
mutually acceptable collective decision as framing the 'circumstances of democratic
politics' in much the same way Hume and Rawls regarded moderate scarcity and
limited altruism as forming the 'circumstances of justice'. 10 Four factors lead citizens to
accept the authority of democracy to resolve their differences in these cases. The first
three factors serve to establish a political community, the fourth concerns the character
of democratic decision-making. First, they must share certain common interests and
acknowledge that various collective decisions have to be made if their lives are to go
well and social cooperation is to be possible. For example, in the case of certain
coordination problems, having an agreed collective decision, even one you do not like,
can be better than the uncertainty resulting from having no agreed decision at all.
Second, the institution towards which the democratic decision is directed must have de
facto and de jure authority over the issue-it can actually deliver and is widely regarded
as being entitled to do so. Third, there has to be a degree oftrust and solidarity among
citizens. They need to believe that their fellows will honour their mutual obligations
and stand by decisions that go against them, and be prepared to make sacrifices to
promote certain public goods and common purposes. Lastly, they regard democracy as
a fair procedure for selecting a collectively binding decision. Two common misconcep-
tions about democracy need to be avoided in this regard. The language of preferences
can suggest that collective decision-making is about satisfying conflicting wants. This
characterisation misdescribes the nature of political choice. Rather than straightfor-
wardly expressing their own wants, voters are offering judgements on the nature of
their common interests and the best ways to promote them. However, democracy is not
about producing the 'right' answer on these matters either. Those on the losing side of
a democratic vote rarely concede they were wrong-at most they admit to having
misjudged the public mood and may even endeavour to win people round next time.

9 1. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Chicago University Press, 1993) pp. 55-57.

10 1. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999) pp. 107-118; A. Weale, Democracy,
(Macmillan, 1999) pp. 8-13.

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People typically accede to a democratic vote to resolve, rather than to dissolve, their
continuing disagreements. Indeed, democracy's attractiveness lies in its not requiring
their substantive agreement in order to arrive at an agreed decision. It simply offers a
fair way of overcoming differences of opinion that is not intrinsically biased towards
any given decision. This fairness consists in treating different views on an equal basis
and responding to the majority opinion. It also allows mistakes to be corrected and the
losers to try again by permitting the periodic revision of decisions and the removal of
those responsible for them. II
A number of features of actually existing democratic decision-making are worth
noting for what follows. First, even local democracy usually involves a large degree of
delegation to elected representatives. Switzerland apart, citizens rarely vote on indi-
vidual policies. Rather, they elect politicians to enact political programmes. Basically,
elections screen for politicians possessing certain qualities of political leadership and
build coalitions between different groups of people, often by log-rolling and arranging
trade-offs between their various policy objectives. By allowing those politicians who
disappoint to be deselected, elections provide an incentive for them to pursue policies
that are in the interests of stable majorities. This system does not rely on voters offering
expert opinions on how the economy works, the causes of crime and the best means of
reducing it, or any other complex policy issue. They merely choose between the differ-
ent policy prescriptions of the parties in contention and judge on results. As Weber
noted in a famous analogy,12 elections in this respect resemble consumption in the
market-most voters no more know how to run the country than they know how to
make shoes, but they know when the shoe pinches and likewise when governments fail.
Second, within all democratic states certain policies are delegated to bodies that are
either formally outside the control of democratically elected politicians, or only very
indirectly subject to them-such as central banks, courts, and other independent regu-
latory agencies. However, these bodies are not thereby isolated from any political
pressure. Both politicians and public opinion more generally will express views on their
performance. Usually, these bodies respond to sustained criticism. Moreover, supple-
mentary political action is often required to give real effect to their decisions-giving
politicians an indirect source of control.
Lastly, the first three of the four factors noted above are, on most accounts, consid-
erably weaker at the EU level than in the Member States. Eurobarometer polls reveal
that on average a (bare) majority of Europeans believe they benefit from the EU and
view EU institutions reasonably favourably, indicating that by and large the first factor
applies-if only for just over 50% of EU citizens. So, by implication, does the second
factor-at least for the limited policy sphere in which the EU operates. That said,
support is lukewarm even among pro-Europeans. Strong enthusiasm for the EU, like
hardline Euroscepticism, is a minority pursuit. 13 However, identification with the
EU and fellow Europeans is far lower, suggesting that the third factor of trust and

II On both these caveats see Waldron, op. cit. note 10 supra, Ch. 5 and Weak, op. cit. note 10 supra, Ch. 7.
12 M. Weber, 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany', in Economy and Society, Vol 2,
(Berkeley, 1978) p. 1456.
13 For example, when the image of the EU is broken down into 'very positive' and 'fairly positive', then
around 7-10% opt for the former category and 35-40% for the latter. A similar division can be found in
most assessments of the EU, with the overall positive view fluctuating around 50% with a small but steady
decline in support among long-term members, albeit with large differences between Member States.
See J. Blonde!, R. Sinnott and P. Svensson, People and Parliament in the European Union: Participation,
Democracy and Legitimacy (Clarendon Press, 1998) pp. 56-62.

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solidarity is very weak. By and large, around 3% of citizens generally view themselves
as 'Europeans' pure and simple, with barely 7% saying that a European identity is more
important than their national one. By contrast, approximately 40% describe themselves
as national only and 47% place nationality first and Europeanness second. Indeed,
though 89% of these citizens usually declare themselves attached to their country and
87% to their locality, only 58% feel attached to the EU. I4
As we shall see, 'public interest' defenders of the EU's democratic deficit often argue
that criticisms of the EU's political arrangements apply unrealistic democratic stan-
dards. However, it does not seem wildly utopian to expect a degree of democratic
accountability and control concerning the overall direction of EU policy, the perfor-
mance of individual decision-makers and the impact of particular decisions-
particularly if, as I shall argue below, the deliberations of delegated bodies prove more
contentious than is claimed. The issue then becomes how far such democratic control
is achieved, possible, or acceptable within the EU. Those who cite the absence of a
demos as a limiting factor on EU democracy normally focus on the weakness of the
first, second, and third factors. The 'rights-orientated' strand comes in here, arguing
that a common commitment to justice rather than a shared national identity and public
culture provide the best basis for trust and solidarity. The difficulty with this argument
is that the ties of justice apply to all human beings-not just one's fellow citizens.
Moreover, they are themselves deeply contested. As such, they are too thin and con-
troversial to bind citizens to a specific state as the locus where disagreements about
their collective interests and rights might be appropriately negotiated and decided. I5 In
addition, a shared culture often provides a common language that facilitates public
discussion. Though there are many multilingual states and most are multinational, they
have tended towards ever greater autonomy of sub-national and sub-linguistic units.
The key issue concerns how far a set of common entitlements and concerns can allow
the EU to buck this trend.

III Rights-Orientated Post-National Democracy

The rights-orientated, post nationalist strategy conceives the EU 'as building
on ... principles and rights that are uniquely European and normatively uncontrover-
sial, since every Member State subscribes to them and since these moral norms are
increasingly spread worldwide'16 Their 'presumption is that public support will reside
in a constitutional patriotism, which emanates from a set of legally entrenched funda-
mental rights' .17 These rights provide the basis 'both for protecting the integrity of the

14 These figures come from Eurobarometer 60 (published February 2004 and based on fieldwork October-
November 2003), and the results of earlier studies reported there. I have used results based on the old 15
rather than the new 25 because these can be placed in the context of a general trend. Figures from
Eurobarometer 62 (Field work October-November 2004, Publication December 2004) reveal the new
members to be on average a little more positive about the benefits coming from the EU. As a result, the
slow decline in approval of the EU from the high point reached in the early 1990s appears, temporarily at
least, to have been slightly reversed. In fact, new members almost always boost average support for the
EU, after which it declines slightly. The figures relating to identity have been remarkably stable over the
past decade or so (see B1ondel, Sinnott and Svensson op. cit. note 13 supra, pp. 62--65).
15 Arguably Rawls himself partly acknowledges this fact when he explicitly assumes cultural attachments as
undergirding agreement on the principles of justice, op. cit. note 9 supra, p. 277.
16 Eriksen and Fossum, op. cit. note 5 supra, p. 447.
17 Ibid, p. 446.

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individual (private freedom) and for making possible participation in the opinion-
formation and decision-making processes (that is, political rights that establish public
freedom./ I8 Indeed, these rights are supposedly both the foundations for and the
product of a 'European public sphere'.
I think all these claims are flawed. As I have already noted, there is a problem with
viewing rights as sources of a European political identity, given their allegedly universal
status. That ambivalence is present in the contradictory statement, cited above, to the
effect that these principles are 'uniquely European' and yet 'increasingly spread world-
wide'. They can be hardly be both. If these rights ought to be (and to a large degree are)
upheld by all liberal democracies, including those outside Europe-such as the United
States, India, Australia, or Japan, then they do not provide grounds in and of them-
selves for any sort of 'uniquely European' allegiance.
Meanwhile, the belief that rights are 'normatively uncontroversial', in part 'since
every Member State subscribes to them' is too simple. All Member States do 'take
rights seriously'. All adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights and have
domestic bills of rights of various kinds and some form of rights-based judicial review.
But though they share roughly the same liberal democratic values, their valuations of
them frequently diverge. 19 For example, though all acknowledge a 'right to participate',
'freedom of speech', and the other 'political rights that establish public freedom', they
have very different political and electoral systems. Consequently, they interpret citi-
zenship rights in correspondingly diverse ways. They also employ different construc-
tions of the fundamental rights 'protecting the integrity of the individual', or 'private
freedom', such as the right to life. Thus, Belgium and The Netherlands are the only
Member States that currently allow certain forms of euthanasia, and even they define
and regulate it differently.
These different valuations not only differ from each other but also may conflict. For
example, Germany understands privacy and its relationship to freedom of speech
somewhat differently to Britain. As a result, Chancellor Schroeder was able to prevent
Die Bild reporting certain details about his personal life that The Sun was allowed to
publish. Moreover, not only do Member State valuations often conflict with each
other, but they may also clash with the valuations offered by the Court of Justice at the
EU level, as cases such as Grogan 20 notoriously revealed.
These differences render the notion of rights providing a 'normatively uncontrover-
sial' basis for EU democracy somewhat problematic. The aspiration was to see these
rights as somehow transcending national differences, but they now seem to be shaped
by them. Of course, it might be objected that all these countries already subject
themselves to certain common international rights regimes, and accept the rulings of
international courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights. Arguably, these
regimes do pose problems for a democrat. After all, one of the reasons Britain had for
incorporating the ECHR was to 'domesticate' the European Convention by 'bringing
rights home', as the White Paper introducing the Human Rights Act put it. However,
even placing these difficulties to one side, there is a qualitative difference between the
role of an international rights regime, such as the ECHR, and the aspirations that
post-nationalists have for an EU rights-based order. The former operates at the

18 Ibid., p. 445.
19 See N. Nic Shuibhne, 'The Value of Fundamental Rights', in M. Aziz and S. Millns (cds), Values in the
Constitution of Europe (Dartmouth, 2006), Ch. 8.
211 SPUC (Ireland) Ltd v Grogan Case C-159/90 [1991] ECR 1-4685.

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margins, Its function is to ensure that all signatories provide political arrangements and
policies that can be regarded as plausible readings of the European Convention and to
protect those, such as asylum seekers or foreign nationals, who have no voice in the
country's democratic system. Consequently, the ECHR employs abstract formulations
compatible with widely differing valuations of rights and grants a 'margin of appre-
ciation' to states in many cases. The latter aims to bring into being a European public
sphere based on a shared understanding of rights and so motivate agreement on a
federal structure for Europe that in various ways goes beyond national allegiances and
political cultures?l
As we have seen, at present no such shared understanding exists-indeed, it has been
the attempt of the Court of Justice to give a 'Community' reading of certain rights that
departs from their national meaning that has often been a cause of constitutional
friction between it and the constitutional courts of the Member States. 22 That does not
mean that Member States cannot participate within a common political system.
However, they do so in ways that reflect rather than transcend national traditions. For
example, though elections to the European Parliament occur under common rules,
Member States interpret their European political rights in slightly different ways-
using different variants of PR, voting on days that fit with local practices and, most
importantly, mainly campaigning on domestic issues and debates about Europe under
the guise of the same parties that contest national elections. European Parties are
largely a post-hoc creation within the European Parliament, with a European public
sphere-to the extent it exists-being found only among Euro-elites. The absence of a
common language, media, political culture, and the growing size of the EU all make a
genuine EU public sphere unlikely.
European law and rights has been correspondingly 'inter-national' in character-an
ongoing dialogue between different national jurisprudential traditions, negotiated
between the Court of Justice and the courts of the Member States, notwithstanding the
former's insistence on supremacy, direct effect, and its own competence-competence 23
After all, the Court of Justice's development of a rights jurisprudence came in large part
as a result of rights-based challenges from national constitutional courts. The post-
nationalists believe these practical compromises detract from a potential European
normative consensus, risking incoherence and potentially injustice in the process. Yet,
given the diversity of European views on rights, such a consensual view would be a false
imposition.
Post-nationalists make two responses to this sort of critique. The first rests on the
role and supposed democratic credentials of constitutional courts as mechanisms for
determining the view of the political community. After all, disagreements about rights
exist within the Member States as well as between them. In many countries, a court
resolves these disputes rather than a democratic process. However, some commentators
contend that this solution need not be seen as anti-democratic, but rather as a way of
giving effect to the underlying principles of democracy, notably the showing of equal
concern and respect to all citizens, in ways that democratic procedures may not through

21 Eriksen and Fossum, op. cit. note 5 supra, pp. 446-447.

" See 1. H. H., Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: 'Do the new clothes have an emperor' ami other essays on
European integration (Cambridge University Press, 1999) Ch. 3, especially the discussion of Case 44/79,
Lise/otte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3,727 at pp. 108-116.
23 See 1. H. H. Weiler, 'In Defence ofthe Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg' in 1. H. H. Weiler
and M. Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

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majorities being influenced by prejudice, ignorance, or vested interests. Surely, the

Court of Justice would be acting no differently in being the authoritative interpreter of
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights? It would be compensating for the
inadequacy of European democratic procedures by expressing the substance of a
pan-European democratic consensus.
As with the earlier comparison with other international courts, there is a difference
of degree. National Courts are not nearly so insulated from democratic influences as
the Court of Justice. They belong to the domestic political system and come under a
great deal of direct and indirect democratic pressure. The US Supreme Court is often
portrayed as a model of how a rights-based judicial review can forge unity and reinforce
democratic values within a federal system. Yet, analysts of the Supreme Court have
observed how throughout its history it has faced periodic democratic challenges, often
shying away from federal adjudication for long periods as a result. 24 Few successful
Supreme Court decisions can fly in the face of sustained national majorities-not least
because without legislation and government action to promote and enforce them, they
are likely to fall into neglect. Moreover, the main successful anti-majoritarian decisions
of the US Supreme Court do not provide a particularly edifying example of the
democracy promoting role of courts or their defence of weak minorities. Made during
the Lochner era, these struck down some 150 pieces of labour legislation improving
working hours and conditions. Only the overwhelming democratic endorsement of
Roosevelt's New Deal could right these injustices. Anti-majoritarian checks can not
only protect individual rights, but also favour entrenched privileges and vested inter-
ests. Litigation tends to be an expensive business, with legal avenues in the EU-as
elsewhere-being disproportionately exploited by corporate bodies 25 Used excessively,
litigation can also stunt the evolution of democratic, collective problem solving, and
divert attention to ultimately self-defeating forms of individual redress, particularly in
the area of compensation and liability.26 Within the EU, where the absence of a
European people or public sphere makes it hard to talk of a European majority or, were
it to exist, for it to exert much pressure, the dangers of a court reinforcing rather than
diminishing the EU's democratic deficit are particularly strong.
The second response of the post-nationalists enters here. They argue that the Charter
and the Constitutional Treaty, which incorporates it and makes the Court of Justice the
authoritative interpreter of both, can also claim a degree of procedural democratic
legitimacy through being produced by a process of democratic deliberation and sub-
jected to subsequent democratic endorsement by either a referendum or parliamentary
vote in each of Member States?7 Many postnationalists have set great store by the
'convention method'.28 Though unelected, the conventions used to draft the Charter
and Constitution were comparatively representative bodies. Unlike IGCs, they con-
tained a majority of national and European parliamentarians alongside government
and commission representatives, and consulted widely with civil society groups. As a
result, the main national, supranational, and transnational positions were included,

24 See N. Devins and L. Fisher, The Democratic Constitution, (Oxford University Press, 2004) Ch. 3.
25 C. Harding, 'Who Goes to Court? An Analysis of Litigation against the European Commnnity' (1992) 17
European Law Review 105.
26 C. Harlow 'Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State' (1996) 2 European Law Journal 199.
27 With the French 'Non' and the Dutch 'Nee', the second aspect of this claim has obviously proved false.
Yet, the reactions of many academics and EU figures suggests this outcome was largely unexpected and
certainly unprepared for.
28 Eriksen and Fossum, op. cit. note 5 supra, p. 453.

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along with the central ideological divisions found within each---even if some groups,
notably women and ethnic minorities, were conspicuous by their relative absence. Most
importantly from their advocates' point of view, decisions within the conventions were
taken not by majority vote but by seeking a consensus. Deliberative democrats contend
that, on matters of constitutional principle at least, this requirement should lead to
participants relinquishing self-serving and partial views and converging only on those
reasons and conclusions that would be acceptable to free and equal individuals. In this
way, an ideal European democratic process was to give rise to the foundations for a real
European democracy.
It is one thing to regard consensus as the logical goal of democratic deliberation,
another to believe it a likely or the only rational outcome. Obviously, post-nationalists
were all too aware of the limitations of any actual deliberative process. However, they
tend to regard all differences stemming from national interests or ideological divisions
as illegitimate, the product of partiality or prejudice,z9 Yet, their source may well be an
alternative understanding of rights, freedom, and equality. As we saw, the 'burdens of
judgement' make reasonable disagreement on such matters possible. Given that innu-
merable seminars have not produced a consensus among philosophers on these issues,
it is perhaps no surprise that the conventions failed to do so. Instead, they generated
numerous compromises, with many disagreements being resolved by framing the right
or clause so abstractly as to be compatible with almost any reading. In essence, the
Charter-and even more the Constitution-represent not a normative consensus, but
the most acceptable pragmatic solution to the practical problems currently facing EU
decision-making that those involved could agree to.30
Their status as a time-bound compromise rather than a timeless consensus substan-
tially weakens the claims that can be made for these documents. They reflect the best
deal that elites representing different national and European interests could negotiate
in present circumstances, not a move towards pan-European democracy. The subse-
quent referenda and parliamentary debates appear to confirm this scenario. Rather
than exercises in pan-European idealism, the key issue has been whether they will
ensure that on balance the country concerned benefits rather than loses from EU
membership. At best, the Constitution represents a reasonable modus vivendi for regu-
lating the interactions of the various demoi within the EU. As we have seen, quite a few
European citizens doubted even that.
There is a vicious circularity to the post-nationalist argument. It posits an ideal
democratic European consensus as both the underpinning and the potential result of a
(properly constructed) real European democratic process. In other words, it makes an
assumed European demos the pretext for attempting to bring it into existence. Any
failure for this putative demos to emerge gets attributed to shortcomings in the current
ground rules. Yet, this thesis builds its conclusions into its premises, and in practice
puts the cart before the horse. Though both the normative and empirical bases for the
postnational argument are questionable, the plausibility of each rests on the truth of
the other. Absent any consensus, then, as I noted, disagreement standardly gets over-
come through majoritarian decision-making-but that assumes a demos of the kind

29 Ihid, p. 454.
30 See R. Bellamy and J. Schiinlau, 'The Normality of Constitutional Politics: An Analysis of the Drafting
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights', (2004) 11 Constellations: An International Journal oj Critical
and Democratic Theory 412; P. Magnette and K. Nicolaidis, The European Convention: Bargaining in the
Shadow of Rhetoric', (2004) 27 West European Politics 381.

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that post-nationalists seek to do without. Indeed, given that the EU has to cope with
diversity as well as disagreement, the current rules with their more consociational and
Madisonian features are arguably more legitimate than majoritarian ones would be.
However, whether they can claim, or need, democratic legitimacy remains at issue.

IV Public-Interest Orientated Delegatory Democracy

This position more or less forms the starting point for theorists of the public interest
model of delegated democracy. They criticise many democratic theorists for applying
ideal, utopian criteria to the complicated reality of the EU, noting that proposals for
improving democracy must be not only philosophically coherent but pragmatically
viable. 3 ! They contend that it is the very absence of a European demos that legitimises
the use by the EU of 'non-majoritarian' institutions.32 Indeed, in many areas-
particularly those that most concern the EU-they note that a sub-set of such non-
majoritarian mechanisms, namely expert, regulatory bodies, have become standard
even in otherwise majoritarian democratic systems. Yet, curiously a similar putative
European consensus, this time of a technocratic kind, underlies their arguments.
Delegation, the focus here, has a different rationale to many other non-majoritarian
schemes. As Majone rightly notes,33 in complex, plural societies, where the dangers of
factionalism and minority oppression are said to be greater, it is common to adopt
mechanisms aimed at sharing, dispersing, and limiting power. Given that the EU is split
by a number of deep rifts, from the distinction between small and large states, to
differences of language, religion and political culture, the use of such non-majoritarian
mechanisms seems appropriate. As we saw, the basic rationale for majoritarian decision-
making is that it is a fair procedure among people who share common interests for
deciding among their different j udgements as to how these might be best pursued. Many
of these non-majoritarian schemes share that same logic. They simply note that for some
purposes certain groups' interests may not be common, or may be viewed so differently
as to make common rules for determining how they should be pursued unsuitable. Thus,
the standard form of dispersing power is to devolve it to a particular locality or region.
The aim here is to select the functionally or culturally appropriate majority for the
issues in question. The prime strictly non-majoritarian strategies arise where there are
territorially dispersed consistent minorities, making the federal/devolved option un-
available. These seek to secure either a threshold voice for a given group or a degree of
proportionality in decision-making in order to protect the special interests of those
concerned. By contrast, delegation-at least in the area of regulation-assumes that all
concerned have common interests, but that, for one reason or another, the judgements
of ordinary people or those of their chosen representatives are suspect 34

31 Moravcsik, up. cit. note 6 supra, p. 337.

32 Majone, op. cit. note 6 supra, p. 285.
33 Ibid., pp. 285-287.
34 Moravcsik, op. cit. note 6 supra, pp. 344-46, 355-56 draws a parallel between regulation and judicial
review in the area of rights. Some accounts do suggest the rationale for the judicial protection of rights is
to guard against the prejudices or carelessness of voters. As I have implicitly noted in the last section, such
arguments are weak. A better case follows the logic of most other non-majoritarian institutions-namely,
that we need some way of protecting those who do not share sufficient common interests with the
collectivity, or have special interests requiring protection, or who have no say in democratic decision-
making. Examples of such groups include children or asylum seekers. However, such special cases do not
provide good grounds for a general system of judicial review.

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Underlying the 'public-interest' account is a crucial distinction between redistribu-

tion and regulation. 35 Redistribution is a zero-sum game. As such, it requires demo-
cratic endorsement to legitimise the transfer of resources from one group to another.
However, regulation aims at improving efficiency and should be a positive-sum game
where everyone gains. Such measures dominate the EU agenda and include the removal
of trade-barriers to improve the functioning of the market, the promotion of food and
safety standards that render us all healthier, and the correction of market failures by
tackling such negative externalities as pollution. Yet, though intended to make us all
better off, they prove more contentious than the advocates of delegation maintain.
As they at least partially acknowledge, the distinction between redistribution and
regulation is not clear-cut. Regulation aspires to secure diffuse, long-term benefits, but
invariably imposes short-term costs on assignable groups and individuals, often in very
specific geographical locations. Thus, many EU regulations have significant redistri-
butional effects with identifiable winners and losers. For example, they tend to favour
transnational corporations over smaller enterprises producing for the domestic market.
Delegation theorists address this problem by arguing that within the EU a condition of
'no wealth effects' holds. 36 That is, the temporary, adverse effects of a regulatory
outcome can be overcome by compensatory measures through the Social Fund, the
European Investment Bank, and other similar mechanisms. However, these 'political',
redistributive decisions can and should be separated from the technocratic, a-political
policy decision about the best means to promote aggregate welfare through enhancing
efficiency.
Putting to one side the degree to which the 'no wealth effects' condition truly holds
in the EU, the argument still remains problematic. 'Efficiency' can be a contested
value-both in itself and more especially as a synonym for sound, mutually beneficial
policies that promote the public interest. Like rights, it is subject to the 'burdens of
judgement'. Different normative considerations and conflicting empirical assessments,
including over what evidence is relevant or not, can all lead to as many disagreements
among experts as there are likely to be among ordinary citizens. For example, small,
family-run farms may produce fewer crops and at greater expense than larger farms,
but they may also be more eco-friendly and preserve rural communities, minimising
certain social problems in the process. The efficiency of one over the other is a norma-
tive judgement, while calculating the costs and benefits of each to come up with a 'no
wealth effects' solution is highly problematic. Thus, not everyone will regard rural
communities as worth preserving, the costs of not doing so may turn on a number of
contingent factors, there will almost certainly be various unanticipated knock-on
effects, while the whole chain of cause and effect may be hard to disentangle. Different
social and moral theories are likely to highlight different aspects of the problem.
Consequently, it is hard to think of a technical or economic decision with no discre-
tionary elements.
Advocates of delegation have tended to respond to these concerns by contending that
democracy remains inappropriate nonetheless, while the process of expert decision-
making can claim certain democratic credentials. These two claims largely parallel
those defending the democracy-promoting properties of judicial review and constitu-
tional rights examined in the last section: indeed, courts have come to play an increas-

35 Majone, op. cit. note 6 supra, pp. 294-296.

36 Ibid., p. 295.

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ing role as the people's tribunes in regulatory governance. 37 They also prove similarly
flawed. Like the equivalent rights-based arguments, they tend to overstate the parallels
with the apparently analogous domestic arrangements and mis-characterise the
purpose and nature of democracy. Let us take each in turn.
Democratic accountability is deemed inappropriate because potentially it has huge
transaction costs in such areas and introduces biases favouring well-organised and
influential sectoral interests. Delegation at the EU level has the particular advantage of
overcoming the under-representation or blocking at the national level of the interests of
diffuse transnational minorities or even majorities. Moreover, the issues are claimed to
be not that electorally salient for most citizens anyway. They tend to be highly technical
and often arcane matters that even elected politicians are happy to delegate to experts.
Politicians may also want to delegate so that they can make long-term commitments in
contentious areas that will not be subject to the vagaries of the electoral cycle, while
being able to shift the blame on to others should these policies prove unpopular. 38
Though plausible enough in theory, many of these arguments prove normatively
suspect and practically unfounded. For a start, shifting the possibility of being blamed
for contentious policies may not only be a means of insulating long-term interests
against short-term popular myopia or prejudice, but also a way of evading political
responsibility for poor decisions. Complaints of an EU democratic deficit stem in part
from the tendency of national politicians to attribute certain economic or other failings
to decisions by an anonymous 'Brussels', without acknowledging their own part in
them. Second, most political decisions involve abstruse technicalities. However, poli-
ticians generally specialise in particular areas and get used to conSUlting, and evaluat-
ing, the advice of a range of expert advisors. Moreover, like ordinary citizens, they tend
to be especially and legitimately sensitive to the good or bad consequences of policies.
Third, Moravscik and Majone arguably overplay the domestic analogy, underestimat-
ing the ways elected politicians control non-majoritarian regulatory bodies in the
Member States. The autonomy of domestic regulatory bodies is generally limited by
various screening and sanctioning mechanisms that allow the political principals to
control their technocratic agents. Though many formal instruments appear too costly
and arduous to employ with any regularity, potentially impugning the neutrality of the
agency and thereby undermining its chief asset, or risking associating the political
principals with any failure, a range ofless overt and informal measures arguably prove
more effective. By selecting friendly yet independent experts, with no direct party or
other link to government, and managing the effectiveness of the body through their
hold on information or role in implementing its recommendations, politicians can
shape the institutional incentives in such ways that regulators propose congenial poli-
cies. 39 At the EU level, the plurality of principals and the ability of the Commission to
develop a complex network of overlapping agencies, all reduce this influence while
introducing the dangers of conflicting forms of accountability. Meanwhile, the possi-
bilities for regulatory capture are increased by the closeness of EU regulation to various
'stakeholders' -notably business and unions.4() Lastly, domestic regulators come under

37 Majone, op. cit. note 4 supra, pp. 21-22.

38 Ibid., pp. 13, 16-18; Moravcsik, op. cit. note 6 supra, pp. 343-348.
39 M. Thatcher, 'The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agenices and Elected Politicians in Europe',
(2005) 18 Governance 347.
«I D. Coen and M. Thatcher, 'The New Governance of Markets and Non·Majoritarian Regulators', (2005)
18 Governance, pp. 341-342.

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diffuse public pressure from the media and other organs of the national public
sphere-a pressure that is far harder to exert at the EU level given the virtual absence
of a pan-EU public sphere.
For example, the paradigm case of delegated regulatory power is often taken to be
the fixing of interest rates by a central bank. Typically viewed with approval,41 there is
always the danger that these regulators will serve the interests of the financial commu-
nity rather than those of producers and consumers. For far from being pure technical
exercises, such decisions have an obvious political dimension, involving as they do
judgements over the best balance between the risks of inflation and those of higher
levels of unemployment. 42 As we saw, appeals to efficiency do not get us very far
because the factors that might lead one to characterise one position as more 'efficient'
than another may be partly 'ideological'. Different economic theories tend to involve
value and other judgements that favour and draw on different political perspectives. As
a result, the separation of 'policy' from 'politics' is far from clear-cut.
These are also decisions that ordinary citizens have a strong interest in, even if most
would not claim to have a very sound knowledge of how the economy works or much
of an interest in fiscal policy per se. Defenders of delegation sometimes write as if those
worried by the EU's democratic deficit are advocating a return to ancient Greece and
judging its arrangements by 'an ideal form of perfectly participatory, egalitarian,
deliberative politics'.43 Thus, Moravscik proclaims that 'We do not expect complex
medical, legal or technical decisions to be made by direct popular vote'.44 Quite-but
whoever suggested we didr5 By and large, we leave such decisions to professional
politicians, who, operating in committees and government departments-invariably
with the advice of experts, reveal themselves able to formulate very sophisticated
policies in such sensitive and technical areas as taxation. As I remarked above, demo-
cratic accountability usually gets exercised post-hoc, when the 'shoe' fails to 'fit'.
Citizens may be poor economists but they know when the economy lets them down.
Democracy is all about giving politicians an incentive to respond to the needs of the
public rather than powerful sectoral interests or fashionable economic theories.
Within the Member States, regulatory bodies tend to be embedded within a national
democratic culture. Even if banks control interest rates, they can come under public
scrutiny via the press and considerable indirect political pressure. 46 Indeed, in the UK
(as in New Zealand) the inflation target is set politically, and the governor can be held
accountable if the bank fails to meet it. The same is true of other regulatory bodies,
especially those in the service sector where popular sensitivity to their actions is high.
Here too, policy, as opposed to its implementation, remains firmly under political

41 G. Majone, 'The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation', (2000) 38 Journal of Common Market
Studies, pp. 288-289.
42 K. McNamara, 'Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation',
(2002) 25 West European Politics 47.
4J Moravcsik,op. cit. note 6 supra, p. 343.
44 Moravcsik, up. cit. note 6 supra, p. 344.
45 The relevant article is rather short on references, but Dahl and pluralists more generally-to name but one
name/group of thinkers who are mentioned, seem unlikely candidates for this sort of characterisation.
Dahl does criticise 'guardianship' somewhat trenchantly, but not in the name of some utopian ideal
democracy but against real, Schumpeter style, competitive party democracy of the kind most actually
existing democracies aspire to for most political decision-making. R. A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics
(Yale University Press, 1989), Ch. 4.
46 See, for example, the following article from the very day I drafted this paragraph-L. Elliott, 'Manufac-
turing Woe Raises Rate Pressure', The Guardian, 2 June 2005, p. 25.

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control. By contrast, such scrutiny is often limited at the EU level. The European
Central Bank is particularly insulated, being able to make legally binding regulations
without involving the national or European parliaments or other EU institutionsY For
the reasons explored earlier regarding the absence of an EU-wide public sphere, infor-
mal pressures are also much harder to achieve for EU bodies.
Defenders of delegation attempt to rebut some of these criticisms by invoking the
democratic qualities of the regulatory bodies themselves. Though delegation aims to
isolate the policy-making process from politics, it is said to possess many of the formal,
procedural attributes of democratic decision-making. Great play has been made in
recent accounts of their 'deliberative' and 'professional' qualities, whereby experts-
who are normally national appointees, and so supposedly representative of various
local interests-come to adopt more 'cosmopolitan' and impartial outlooks. 48
However, we have seen tthat there are no reasons for believing deliberation will any
more produce a consensus on 'efficiency' than on 'rights'. If any argument involves a
naIve, utopian idealisation of the democratic processes, it is surely this claim. Should a
consensus emerge, then it probably bears witness simply to the current dominance of a
particular view among the profession. 49 As such, this apparent consensus will reflect
more the common identity of the body's members as 'experts' than a convergence of
national interests. Nor should we regard the isolation of the decision from such con-
cerns as a good thing. Experts have an unfortunate tendency to overlook issues that are
legitimate worries for ordinary folk. People's everyday contact with doctors, lawyers,
and other professionals means they are well aware that experts can make mistakes or
overlook the dilemmas facing those they are supposed to serve. Their use by politicians
to bolster unpopular decisions has also resulted in their being scarcely distinguishable
from their political masters. Certainly, episodes such as BSE and the French blood
scandal have somewhat tarnished technocracy in the eyes of European citizens. Of
course, politicians can introduce compensatory measures post-hoc when certain groups
are adversely affected. But it seems naive to expect the national politicians likely to be
held responsible for such costs to wait until the damage is done before seeking to rectify
it---especially if they have to gain the consent of possibly unaffected European partners
in order to do so.
lt is partly in order to address these problems that there have been moves to make
regulatory bodies more transparent and consultative. Majone, in particular, appeals to
the American experience in this regard. 50 However, the USA proves to be an ambiguous
model, with the differences as instructive as the parallels. 5 ! The US bodies originated as
creatures of the highly democratically legitimate Roosevelt Presidency as a way of
overcoming some of the counter-majoritarian checks on the Federal administration.
Their opening-up was championed largely by a Supreme Court suspicious of technoc-
racy and Presidential power. The aim was not to depoliticise these bodies but to ensure
a greater degree of political balance within them. Unfortunately, these measures have

47 Moravscik, up. cit. note 6 supra, p. 621 does acknowledge this isolation in the European Central Bank case
as a problem, even if Maione regards it as an asset (op. cit. note 6 supra, pp. 288-289).
4R Maione, op. cit. note 6 supra, pp. 291-294 and op. cit. note 40 supra, pp. 295-298, and see deliberative
accounts of the comitology process in C. Jorges and E. Vos (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation. Law
Politics (Hart, 1999).
49 M. Shapiro, ' "Deliberative", "Independent" Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo the
EU?', IILJ Working Paper 2004/5 (Global Administrative Law Series), pp. 9-10.
50 Maione, up. cit. note 40 supra, pp. 293-295.
51 Shapiro, op. cit. note 47 supra, pp. 5--6.

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November 2006 Still in Deficit

had mixed results. The guarantees of openness and participation have been mainly used
by those interest and other groups best able to organise and fund a team of counter-
experts to those favoured by the regulators. Their efforts have often produced regula-
tory capture or expert stalemate, with specialist courts ending up making the decisions.
Majone echoes certain US scholars in justifying this judicial control of the regulatory
process as the most functionally appropriate means for protecting individual rights
through its being 'insulated from political responsibility and unbeholden to self-
absorbed and excited majoritarianism'.52 Thus, an initiative that began as a majoritar-
ian measure for overcoming entrenched counter-majoritarian privileges and interests
blocking federal schemes has now been turned into yet another counter-majoritarian
strategy, albeit one that claims to articulate a consensus on the public interest and
rights. We have come full circle, with the regulatory case for delegation dove-tailing
with the rights-based argument. Yet, as we saw, both the threats posed by majoritari-
anism and the democracy and rights promoting credentials of courts are at best con-
tentious. Indeed, there has been something of a democratic backlash against the US
agencies amid calls for more effective Presidential coordination of economic and other
policies. 53
Similar moves within the EU are likely to encounter parallel problems. The White
Paper on Governance has been seen as an attempt to open up the technocratic process
and boost its democratic credentials by insisting on not only greater openness but also
consultation and participation. 54 However, despite the rhetoric about involving the
'general public', the main proposals for consultation refer to 'civil society organisa-
tions', 'interested parties', 'partners' and 'stakeholders' .55 There is a single, ritually
pious, reference to the importance of European political parties and none at all to their
rather more substantial national counterparts. Although the White Paper recognises
the dangers of consulting what are often self-selecting and unaccountable bodies, the
proposals it offers for overcoming the resulting biases are largely superficial. Therefore,
this policy still risks favouring well-funded groups whose interests may well be at
variance with that of the public at large. None of these groups need be particularly
democratic themselves and involve the citizens that they allegedly speak for in their
decisions. This weakness is even truer of most consumer and public-interest organisa-
tions than of certain producer groups. After all, unions at least have a degree of internal
democracy. Worse, the ability of many NGOs to criticise regulatory proposals is often
constrained by their reliance on EU funds, itself a sign of their low levels of member-
ship.56 The Commission claims to be able exercise a general supervisory role, yet unlike
elected national executives this too is a technocratic body. The Court of Justice has also
been invoked as being able to ensure due process, yet this will either be purely formal
or lead the Court of Justice into seeking to second-guess the substantive conclusions of
democracy. In fact, Americanisation has gone less far than delegatory theorists imag-
ined, with the European Parliament playing an increasing part in overseeing comitol-
ogy. However, if delegatory theorists are right in believing that the cleavage structure

52 J. Choper, Judicial Review in the National Political Process (University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 68 cited
in Majone, op. cit. note 6 supra, p. 22.
" Shapiro, op. cit. note 40 supra, p. 13.
54 European Governance, op. cit. note 2 supra, pp. 11-19.
55 Ibid., pp. 11, 14, 15, 17,21.
56 A. Warleigh, , "Europeanizing" Civil Society: NGOs as Agents of Political Socialisation' (2001) 39 Journal
of Common Market Studies 619.

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European Law Journal Volume 12

of the Union makes an EU demos unworkable, then the European Parliament's involve-
ment will likewise involve a democratic deficit. In whichever case, the aspiration to
substitute technocracy for democracy seems empirically and normatively questionable.

V Conclusion
Both the rights-based and the public-interest arguments attempt to overcome the
weaknesses of democratic legitimacy within the EU by positing an EU consensus that
can be arrived at by a 'non-political' democratic procedure. At the same time, they tend
to mischaracterise the nature and effects of the forms of majoritarian democratic
accountability found in most of the Member States. Since neither their alternatives nor
their criticisms appear that convincing, the standard versions of the EU's democratic
deficit retain their force. If an EU demos can be said to exist, then a move should be
made towards enhancing the role played by directly elected majoritarian decision-
making bodies within the ED. If, as seems more likely, an EU demos and public sphere
remain absent with little immediate prospect of being established, then means need to
be found for enhancing the democratic accountability of EU decision-makers within
the established democracies of the Member States. 57 Either way, the current limitations
ofEU democracy place democratic limits on what the EU should do----even in the name
of rights or the public interest.

First Submitted: August 2005

Final Revision Accepted: February 2006

57 I have explored this issue in my 'Between Past and Future: The Democratic Limits of EU Citizenship', in
R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione and J. Shaw (eds) Making European Citizens: Civic Inclusion in a Transnational
Context (Pal grave, 2006).

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 Part VIII
Cosmopolitans and their Critics
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 [17]
Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social
sciences: a research agenda

Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

Abstract

This article calls for a re-conceptualization of the social sciences by asking for a
cosmopolitan turn. The intellectual undertaking of redefining cosmopolitanism is
a trans-disciplinary one, which includes geography, anthropology, ethnology, inter-
national relations, international law, political philosophy and political theory, and
now sociology and social theory. Methodological nationalism, which subsumes
society under the nation-state, has until now made this task almost impossible. The
alternative, a 'cosmopolitan outlook', is a contested term and project. Cosmopoli-
tanism must not be equalized with the global (or globalization), with 'world system
theory' (Wallerstein), with 'world polity' (Meyer and others), or with 'world-
society' (Luhmann). All of those concepts presuppose basic dualisms, such as
domestic/foreign or national/international, which in reality have become ambigu-
ous. Methodological cosmopolitanism opens up new horizons by demonstrating
how we can make the empirical investigation of border crossings and other
transnational phenomena possible.
Keywords: Cosmopolitanism; methodological cosmopolitanism; methodological
nationalism; social theory

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, we are witnessing a global trans-

formation of modernity which calls for a re-thinking of the humanities and the
social sciences. The period after the Second World War was the golden age [or
social scientific research grounded in seemingly natural, never ending histori-
cal 'Wertbeziehungen' (value relations) (Max Weber): The humanities and
social sciences drew lessons from the end of Nazi barbarianism, took part
in the construction of the welfare state or the process of decolonization,
370 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

2 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

liberation and democratization around the world; and participated in social

movements which were challenging all kinds of domination, injustice and
technocratic systems.
This golden age of corresponding cultural, political and social scientific
'value relations' has definitely ended.! Already a century ago Max Weber had
drawn his own conclusions for the historical sciences. 'But at some point the
colour changes. The meaning of the unthinkingly espoused views becomes
unccrtain, thc path gcts lost in thc twilight. Thc light of the grcat cultural prob-
lems has moved on (Weber 2002; 148). At that point science, too, prepares to
change its position and conceptual equipment and to look from the heights of
thought down to the flow of events.
Indeed, the basic idea behind this special issue of the British Journal oj Soci-
ology is that 'the light of the great cultural problems has moved on' from a
nation-state definition of society and politics to a cosmopolitan outlook. At
this point the humanities and social sciences need to get ready for a trans-
formation of their own positions and conceptual equipment - that is, to take
cosmopolitanism as a research agenda seriously and raise some of the
key conceptual, methodological, empirical and normative issues that the
cosmopolitanization of reality poses for the social sciences. The intellectual
undertaking of redefining cosmopolitanism is a trans-disciplinary one, which
includes geography, anthropology, ethnology, international relations, interna-
tional law, political philosophy and political theory, and now sociology and
social theory (see 'A literature on cosmopolitanism' in this issue (Beck and
Sznaider 2006: 153-62). Cosmopolitanism is, of course, a contested term; there
is no uniform interpretation of it in the growing literature. The boundaries sep-
arating it from competitive terms like globalization, transnationalism, univer-
salism, glocalization etc. are not distinct and internally it is traversed by
all kind of fault lines. Yet we will argue that the neo-cosmopolitanism in the
social sciences - 'realistic cosmopolitanism' or 'cosmopolitan realism' - is an
identifiable intellectual movement united by at least three interconnected
commitments:
First, the shared critique of methodological nationalism which blinds con-
ventional sociology to the multi-dimensional process of change that has irre-
versibly transformed the very nature of the social world and the place of states
within that world. Methodological nationalism does not mean (as the term
'methodological individualism' suggests) that one or many sociologists have
consciously created an explicit methodology (theory) based on an explicit
nationalism. The argument rather goes that social scientists in doing research
or theorizing take it for granted that society is equated with national society,
as Durkheim does when he reflects on the integration of society. He, of course,
has in mind the integration of the national society (France) without even men-
tioning, naming or thinking about it. In fact, not using the adjective 'national'
as a universal language does not falsify but might sometimes even prove
TJrilish Journal of Sociology 57(1)
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 371

Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences 3

methodological nationalism. That is the case when the practice of the argu-
ment or the research presupposes that the unit of analysis is the national
society or the national state or the combination of both. Ine concept of
methodological nationalism is not a concept of methodology but of the soci-
ology of sociology or the sociology of social theory.
Second, the shared diagnosis that the twenty-first century is becoming an
age of cosmopolitanism. This could and should be compared with other his-
torical momcnts of cosmopolitanism, such as those in ancient Greece, the
Alexandrian empire and the Enlightenment. In the 1960s Hannah Arendt
analysed the Human Condition, in the 1970s Francois Lyotard the Post-
modern Condition. Now at the beginning of the twenty-first century we have
to discover, map and understand the Cosmopolitan Condition.
Third, there is a shared assumption that for this purpose we need some kind
of 'methodological cosmopolitanism'. Of course, there is a lot of controversy
about what this means. The main point for us lies in the fact that the dualities
of the global and the local, the national and the international, us and them,
have dissolved and merged together in new forms that require conceptual and
empirical analysis. The outcome of this is that the concept and phenomena of
cosmopolitanism are not spatially fixed; the term itself is not tied to the
'cosmos' or the 'globe', and it certainly does not encompass 'everything'. The
principle of cosmopolitanism can be found in specific forms at every level and
can be practiced in every field of social and political action: in international
organizations, in bi-national families, in neighbourhoods, in global cities, in
transnationalized military organizations, in the management of multi-national
co-operations, in production networks, human rights organizations, among
ecology activists and the paradoxical global opposition to globalization.

Critique of methodological nationalism

Mcthodological nationalism takcs thc following prcmiscs for granted: it

equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their govern-
ments as the primary focus of social-scientific analysis. It assumes that human-
ity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which organize
themselves internally as nation-states and externally set boundaries to dis-
tinguish themselves from other nation-states. And it goes further: this outer
delimitation as well as the competition between nation-states, represent the
most fundamental category of political organization.
The premises of the social sciences assume the collapse of social boundaries
with state boundaries, believing that social action occurs primarily within and
only secondarily across, these divisions:
[Like] stamp collecting ... social scientists collected distinctive national
social forms. Japanese industrial relations, German national character, the
British Journal of Socio/OKY 57(1)
372 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

4 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

American constitution, the British class system - not to mention the more
exotic institutions of tribal societies - were the currency of social research.
Ihe core disciplines of the social sciences, whose intellectual traditions are
reference points for each other and for other fields, were therefore domes-
ticated - in the sense of being preoccupied not with Western and world
civilization as wholes but with the 'domestic' forms of particular national
societies (Shaw 2000: 68).

The critique of methodological nationalism should not be confused with the

thesis that the end of the nation-state has arrived. One does not criticize
methodological individualism by proclaiming the end of the individual.
Nation-states (as all the research shows - see also the different contributions
in this volume) will continue to thrive or will be transformed into transna-
tional states. What, then, is the main point of the critique of methodological
nationalism? It adopts catcgorics of practicc as catcgorics of analysis. Thc dcci-
sive point is that national organization as a structuring principle of societal and
political action can no longer serve as the orienting reference point for the social
scientific observer. One cannot even understand the re-nationalization or re-
ethnification trend in Western or Eastern Europe without a cosmopolitan per-
spective. In this sense, the social sciences can only respond adequately to the
challenge of globalization if they manage to overcome methodological nation-
alism and to raise empirically and theoretically fundamental questions within
specialized fields of research, and thereby elaborate the foundations of a newly
formulated cosmopolitan social science.
As many authors - including the ones in this volume - criticize, in the
growing discourse on cosmopolitanism there is a danger of fusing the ideal
with the real. What cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately be separated from
what cosmopolitanism should be. But the same is true of nationalism. The
small, but important, diffcrcncc is that in thc casc of nationalism thc valuc
judgment of the social scientists goes unnoticed because methodological
nationalism includes a naturalized conception of nations as real communities.
In the case of the cosmopolitan 'Wertheziehung' (Max Weber, value relation),
by contrast, this silent commitment to a nation-state centred outlook of soci-
ology appears problematic.
In order to unpack the argument in the two cases it is necessary to distin-
guish bctwccn thc actor pcrspcctivc and thc observer pcrspcctivc. From this
it follows that a sharp distinction should be made between methodological and
normative nationalism. The former is linked to the social-scientific observer
perspective, whereas the latter refers to the negotiation perspectives of polit-
ical actors. In a normative sense, nationalism means that every nation has the
right to self-determination within the context of its cultural, political and even
geographical boundaries and distinctiveness. Methodological nationalism
assumes this normative claim as a socio-ontological given and simultaneously
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Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences 5

links it to the most important conflict and organization orientations of

society and politics. These basic tenets have become the main perceptual
grid of the social sciences. Indeed, this social-scientific stance is part of the
nation-state's own self-understanding. A national view on society and politics,
law, justice, memory and history governs the sociological imagination. To some
extent, much of the social sciences has become a prisoner of the nation-
state. That this was not always the case is shown in Bryan Turner's paper in
this issuc (Turncr 2006: 133-51). This docs not mcan, of coursc, that a cos-
mopolitan social science can and should ignore different national traditions
of law, history, politics and memory. These traditions exist and become part
of our cosmopolitan methodology. The comparative analyses of societies,
international relations, political theory, and a significant part of history
and law all essentially function on the basis of methodological nationalism.
This is valid to the extent that the majority of positions in the contem-
porary dcbatcs in social and political scicncc ovcr globalization can bc sys-
tematically interpreted as trans disciplinary reflexes linked to methodological
nationalism.
These premises also structure empirical research, for example, in the choice
of statistical indicators, which are almost always exclusively national. A refu-
tation of methodological nationalism from a strictly empirical viewpoint is
therefore difficult, indeed, almost impossible, because so many statistical cat-
egories and research procedures are based on it. It is therefore of historical
importance for the future development of the social sciences that this method-
ological nationalism, as well as the related categories of perception and dis-
ciplinary organization, be theoretically, empirically, and organizationally
re-assessed and reformed.
What is at stake here? Whereas in the case of the nation-state centred per-
spective there is an historical correspondence between normative and method-
ological nationalism (and for this rcason this corrcspondcncc has mainly
remained latent), this does not hold for the relationship between normative
and methodological cosmopolitanism. In fact, the opposite is true: even the re-
nationalization or re-ethnification of minds, cultures and institutions has to be
analysed within a cosmopolitan frame of reference.
Cosmopolitan social science entails the systematic breaking up of the
process through which the national perspective of politics and society, as well
as the methodological nationalism of political science, sociology, history, and
law, confirm and strengthen each other in their definitions of reality. Thus it
also tackles (what had previously been analytically excluded as a sort of con-
spiracy of silence of conflicting basic convictions) the various developmental
versions of de-bounded politics and society, corresponding research questions
and programmes, the strategic expansions of the national and international
political fields, as well as basic transformations in the domains of state, poli-
tics, and society.
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6 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

This paradigmatic de-construction and re-construction of the social sciences

from a national to a cosmopolitan outlook can be understood and method-
ologically justified as a 'positive problem shift' (Lakatos 1970), a broadening
of horizons for social science research making visible new realities encourag-
ing new research programmes (Back and Lau 2005 and Beck, Banss and Lau
2003: 1-35). Against the background of cosmopolitan social science, it sud-
denly becomes obvious that it is neither possible to distinguish clearly between
thc national and the international, nor, correspondingly, to make a convincing
contrast between homogeneous units. National spaces have become de-
nationalized, so that the national is no longer national, just as the international
is no longer international. New realities are arising: a new mapping of space
and time, new co-ordinates for the social and the political are emerging which
have to be theoretically and empirically researched and elaborated.
This entails a re-examination of the fundamental concepts of 'modern
society'. Household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state,
commerce, public, community, justice, law, history, memory and politics must
be released from the fetters of methodological nationalism, re-conceptualized,
and empirically established within the framework of a new cosmopolitan
social and political science. It would be hard to understate the scope of this
task. But nevertheless it has to be taken up if the social sciences want to avoid
becoming a museum of antiquated ideas.

Structure and normativity: the cosmopolitan condition and the cosmopolitan

moment

In order to unpack cosmopolitanism, we need to make another important dis-

tinction, namely that between normative-philosophical and empirical-
analytical cosmopolitanism; or, to put it differently, between the cosmopolitan
condition and the cosmopolitan moment. Up to now, much of the social sci-
entific discourse has assumed the notion of cosmopolitanism as a moral and
political standpoint, a shared normative-philosophical commitment to the
primacy of world citizenship over all national, religious, cultural, ethnic and
other parochial affiliations; added to this is the notion of cosmopolitanism as
an attitude or biographical situation in which the cultural contradictions of
the world are unequally distributed, not just out there but also at the centre
of one's own life. A world of yesterday turned into an utopian future and
reclaimed by social thinkers is elevating 'homelessness', 'fluidity', 'liquidity',
'mobility' to new heights. 'Cosmopolitanism' has a noble ring in a plebeian
age, the nobility of a Kant in a postmodern age. This is the kind of cos-
mopolitanism familiar to philosophers since ancient times, but alien to social
scientists. Here, cosmopolitanism is equated with reflexive cosmopolitanism.
This idea of cosmopolitanism includes the idea that the self-reflexive global
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Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences 7

age offers space in which old cosmopolitan ideals could and should be
translated and re-configured into concrete social realities and philosophy
turned into sociology, Nevertheless, the question has to be asked and
answered: Why is there a cosmopolitan moment now, at the beginning of the
twenty-first century?
On the other hand the discourse on cosmopolitanism so far has not really
paid attention to the fact that, besides the intended, there is an unintended and
lived cosmopolitanism and this is o[ growing importance: the increase in inler-
dependence among social actors across national borders (which can only be
observed from the cosmopolitan outlook), whereby the peculiarity exists in
the fact that this 'cosmopolitanization' occurs as unintended and unseen side-
effects of actions which are not intended as 'cosmopolitan' in the normative
sense, Only under certain circumstances does this latent cosmopolitanization
lead to the emergence of global public spheres, global discussion forums, and
global regimes concerned with transnational eonOids ('inslitutionalized
cosmopolitanism'). Summarizing these aspects, we speak of the Cosmopolitan
Condition as opposed to the Post-modern Condition.

The cosmopolitan condition

If we make a clear distinction between the actor perspective and the observer
perspective, both in relation to the national outlook and the cosmopolitan
outlook, we end up with four fields in a table representing the possible changes
in perspectives and reality. It is at least conceivable (and this needs a lot of
optimism!) that the shift in outlook [rom methodological nationalism to
methodological cosmopolitanism will gain acceptance. But this need not have
any implications for the prospect for realizing cosmopolitan ideals in society
and politics. So, if one is an optimist regarding a cosmopolitan turn in the social
sciences, one can certainly also bc a pcssimist regarding a cosmopolitan turn
in the real world. It would be ridiculously naive to think that a change in sci-
entific paradigm might lead to a situation where people, organizations and gov-
ernments are becoming more open to the ideals of cosmopolitanism. But
again: if this is so why do we need a cosmopolitan outlook for the social sci-
ences? Our answer is: in order to understand the really-existing process of
eosmopolitanization of the world.
Like the distinction between 'modernity' and 'modernization', we have to
distinguish between cosmopolitanism as a set of normative principles and
(really existing) cosmopolitanization. This distinction turns on the rejection of
the claim that cosmopolitanism is a conscious and voluntary choice, and all
too often the choice of an elite. The notion 'cosmopolitanization' is designed
to draw attention to the fact that the emerging cosmopolitan of reality is also,
and even primarily, a function of coerced choices or a side-effect of uncon-
scious decisions. The choice to become or remain an 'alien' or a 'non-national'
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8 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

is not as a general rule a voluntary one but a response to acute need, political
repression or a threat of starvation, A 'banal' cosmopolitanism in this sense
unfolds beneath the surface or behind the fa<;ades of persisting national spaces,
jurisdiction and labelling, while national flags continue to be hoisted and
national attitudes, identities and consciousness remain dominant. Judged by
the lofty standards of ethical and academic morality, this latent character
renders cosmopolitanism trivial, unworthy of comment, even suspect. An ideal
that formcrly strullcd the stage of world history as an ornament of the elite
cannot possibly slink into social and political reality by the backdooL Thus,
we emphasize the centrality of emotional engagement and social integration
and not only fragmentation as part of the cosmopolitan world. And this
emphasizes that the process of cosmopolitanization is bound up with symbol
and ritual, and not.i ust with spoken ideas. And it is symbol and ritual that turns
philosophy into personal and social identity and consequently relevant for
social analysis. The more such rituals contribute to individuals' personal sense
of conviction, the larger the critical mass available to be mobilized in cos-
mopolitan reform movements for instance, be they movements against global
inequality or human rights violations (see the contributions by Robert Fine
(Fine 2006: 49-67) and Angela McRobbie (McRobbie 2006: 69-86)). And the
farther cosmopolitan rituals and symbols spread, the more chance there will
be of someday achieving a cosmopolitan political order. This is where nor-
mative and empirical cosmopolitanism meet. At the same time, we must
remember that a cosmopolitan morality is not the only historically important
form of today's globalized world. Another one is nationalism.lhe nation-state
was originally formed out of local units to which people were fiercely attached.
They considered these local attachments 'natural' and the nation-state to be
soulless and artificial - Gesellschaft compared to the local Gemeinschaft. But
thanks to national rituals and symbols, that eventually changed completely.
Now today many people consider national identity to be natural and cos-
mopolitan or world identity to be an artificial construct. They are right. It will
be an artificial construct, if artificial means made by humans. But they are
wrong if they think artificial origins prevent something from eventually being
regarded as natural. It did not stop the nation-state. And there is no reason it
has to stop cosmopolitan morality. However, the challenge will be to see these
moral orders not as contradictory but as living side by side in the global world.
Cosmopolitanism and nationalism arc not mutually exclusive, neither method-
ologically nor normatively.
There can be no doubt that a cosmopolitanism that is passively and unwill-
ingly suffered is a deformed cosmopolitanism. The fact that really-existing cos-
mopolitanization is not achieved through struggle, that it is not chosen, that it
does not come into the world as progress with the reflected moral authority
of the Enlightenment, but as something deformed and profane, cloaked in
the anonymity of side-effects - this is an essential founding moment within
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Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences 9

cosmopolitan realism in the social sciences, Our main point is here to make a
distinction between the moral ideal of cosmopolitanism (as expressed in
Enlightenment philosophy) and the above mentioned cosmopolitan condition
of real people, It's also the distinction between theory and praxis, This means,
in our case, the distinction between a cosmopolitan philosophy and a cos-
mopolitan sociology.

Cosmopolitanism and globalization

But, one might object, isn't 'cosmopolitanization' simply a new word for what
used to be called 'globalization'? The answer is 'no': globalization is something
taking place 'out there', cosmopolitanization happens 'from within'. Whereas
globalization presupposes, cosmopolitanization dissolves the 'onion model' of
the world, where the local and the national form the core and inner layer and
the international and the global form the outer layers. Cosmopolilanization
thus points to the irreversible fact that people, from Moscow to Paris, from
Rio to Tokyo, have long since been living in really-existing relations of inter-
dependence; they are as much responsible for the intensification of these rela-
tions through their production and consumption as are the resulting global
risks that impinge on their everyday lives. The question, then, is: how should
we operationalize this conception of the world as a collection of different cul-
tures and divergent modernities? Cosmopolitanization should be chiefly con-
ceived of as globalization from within, as internalized cosmopolitanism. This
is how we can suspend the assumption of the nation-state, and this is how we
can make the empirical investigation of local-global phenomena possible. We
can frame our questions so as to illuminate the transnationality that is arising
inside nation-states. This is what a cosmopolitan sociology looks like.

Cosmopolitan traditions
If we ask who are the intellectual progenitors of this internal cosmopoli-
tanization of national societies, Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville and John
Dewy come to mind, as well as such classical German thinkers as Kant,
Goethe, Herder, Humboldt, Nietzsche, Marx and Simmel. All of them con-
strued the modern period as a transition from early conditions of relatively
closed societies to 'universal eras' (universelle Epochen, Goethe) of interde-
pendent societies, a transition that essentially involved the expansion of com-
merce and the dissemination of the principle of republicanism.
For Kant, even more so for Marx, and in different ways also for Adam Smith
and Georg Simmel, the dissolution of small territorial communities and the
spread of universal social and economic interdependence (through the not yet
associated risks) was the essential mark, and even the law, of world history.
Their preoccupation with long lines of historical development made them
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10 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

sceptical towards the idea that state and society in their nationally
homogenous manifestations could constitute the end point of world history.
Cosmopolitanization thus includes the proliferation of multiple cultures (as
with cuisines from around the world), the growth of many transnational forms
of life, the emergence of various non-state political actors (from Amnesty
International to the World Trade Organization), the paradoxical emergence
of global protest movements, the hesitant formation of multi-national
states (like the European Union) etc. There is simply no way of turning the
clock back to a world of sovereign nation-states and national societies.
Therefore we need a cosmopolitan sociology - even to understand why anti-
cosmopolitan movements actually influence, and in the future maybe even
dominate, the world.

The cosmopolitan moment

While reality is becoming thoroughly cosmopolitan, our habits of thought and

consciousness, like the well-worn paths of academic teaching and research,
disguise the growing unreality of the national gaze (and methodological
nationalism). A critique of the unreal science of the national, which presents
itself in universalistic garb but can neither deny nor shake off its historically
internalized national gaze, presupposes the cosmopolitan outlook and its
methodological elaboration. But what is the difference between (latent) cos-
mopolitanization and the cosmopolitan outlook?
Ihat is a difficult question which has to be approached from different angles.
One answer is: the (forced) mixing of cultures is not anything new in world
history but, on the contrary, the rule; one need only think of wars of plunder
and conquest, mass migrations, the slave trade and colonization, world wars,
ethnic cleansing and forced repatriation and expulsion. From the very begin-
ning, the emerging global market requircd the mixing of peoples and imposed
it by force, if necessary, as the opening up of Japan and China in the nineteenth
century demonstrate. Capital tears down all national boundaries and jumbles
together the 'native' with the 'foreign'. What is new is not forced mixing but
global awareness of it, its self-conscious political affirmation, its reflection and
recognition before a global public via the mass media, in the news and in the
global social movements of blacks, women and minorities, and in the current
vogue for such venerable concepts as 'Diaspora' in the cultural sciences. It is
this, at once social and social scientific, reflexivity that makes the 'cosmopoli-
tan outlook' one of the key concepts and topics of the reflexive second
modernity.
Therefore, the question 'Is there a Cosmopolitan Moment Now?' has to be
translated into a research agenda by asking: under what conditions, subject to
what limits and by which actors are cosmopolitan principles nevertheless being
translated into practice and thereby acquiring enduring reality - and which
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Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences 11

principles and against what forms of resistance? What are the characteristics,
and who or what is the 'subject', of the cosmopolitan moment at the begin-
ning of the third millennium?
This question can be posed and answered paradigmatically and paradoxi-
cally within the theory of World Risk Society (Beck 1999). The nation-state is
increasingly besieged and permeated by a planetary network of interdepen-
dencies, for example, by ecological, economic and terrorist risks, which connect
the separate worlds or developed and underdeveloped countries. To the extent
that this historical situation is reflected in a global public sphere (last example:
the Tsunami-catastrophe), a new historical reality arises, a 'cosmopolitan
outlook' in which people view themselves simultaneously as part of a threat-
ened world and as part of their local situations and histories.
We need to distinguish between at least four different axes of conflict in
world risk society: first, ecological (and technological) interdependency crises,
which have their own global dynamic; second, economic interdependency
crises, which are initially individualized and nationalized; third, the threat pro-
duced by terrorist interdependency crises; and fourth, moral interdependency
crisis, which springs from the spread of the human rights regime.
Despite their differences, however, ecological, economic, moral and terror-
ist interdependency crises share one essential feature: they cannot be con-
strued as external environmental crises but must be conceived as culturally
manufactured actions, effects, insecurities and uncertainties. In this sense,
global risks can sharpen global normative consciousness, generate global
publics and promote a cosmopolitan outlook. In world risk society - this is the
central point or the research agenda - the question concerning the causes and
agencies of global threats sparks new political conflicts, which in turn promote
an 'institutionalized cosmopolitanism' in struggles over definitions and juris-
dictions. Another side of 'institutionalized cosmopolitanism' is represented by
individualism or internalized cosmopolitanism. Issues of global concern are
becoming part of people's moral life-worlds, no matter whether they are for
or against cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitan horizon becomes institutional-
ized in our own subjective lives. A cosmopolitan sociology, therefore, brings
the subject back into the social sciences after systems theory and post-
structuralist theories have tried to construct a social science without subjects.
Cultural risk perceptions and definitions at the same time draw new bound-
aries. Those groups, countries, cultures and states which share the same defin-
ition of a threat may be said to 'belong to it'; they form the 'inside' of a
'transnational risk community', which develops its profile and institutional
structure (national and international players and institutions) in an ultimately
preventive defence against certain causes and sources of danger. Those who,
for whatever reason, do not share this definition of a threat constitute the
'outside' of the risk community and - even if they wish to remain 'neutral' -
can easily become part of the threat against which the fight is being waged. In
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12 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

this way, conflicts take shape under the aegis of risk perception between
regions that enter the terrain of world risk society with very different histor-
ical situations, experiences and expectations.
The politics of human rights provides empirical evidence for this claim. If
human rights come to be understood as the necessary basis of an increasing
number of individuals' autonomy, these people will 'feel' that they are defend-
ing the foundations of their own identities when they defend the importance
of human rights for forcigncrs and strangers. The cultural and political diver-
sity that is essential to this kind of life has been slowly elevated to a central
political principle. It sometimes seems as if it were even more highly valued
than the representative principle with which it now shares pride of place. The
interesting thing about an individualistic culture is that it could conceivably
embrace a concept like cosmopolitan justice in the same paradoxical way that
it is able to embrace the politics of ecology. Ecology in many ways embodies
a conservative perspective. It takes the values of local community, the idea of
communal responsibility, and magnifies it to the level of civil society. In effect,
it treats civil society as a great community, one which should have control over
its environment. It treats society as something that can be regarded for these
purposes as a single community, despite the fact that it consists of very dif-
ferent subgroups and classes.
This demonstrates that the everyday experience of cosmopolitan interde-
pendence is not a mutual love affair. It arises in a climate of heightened global
threats, which create an unavoidable pressure to co-operate. With the con-
ceptualization and recognition of threats on a cosmopolitan scale, a shared
space of responsibility and agency bridging all national frontiers and divides
is created that can (though it need not) found political action among strangers
in ways analogous to national politics. This is the case when recognition of the
scale of the common threats leads to cosmopolitan norms and agreements and
thus to an institutionalized cosmopolitanism.
However, existing research on the emergence of corresponding supra- and
transnational organizations and regimes has shown how difficult it is to make
the transition from agreement on the definition of the threats to agreement on
what form the required response should take. Ongoing communication con-
cerning threats is an important component of informal cosmopolitan norm-
formation. The socializing effect of world risk society is not adequately grasped
if we restrict its potential to new and yct-to-bc founded institutions of success-
ful global co-ordination. Already prior to any cosmopolitan institution-
formation, global norms are produced by outrage over circumstances that are
felt to be intolerable. The emergence of global norms is not necessarily contin-
gent on the conscious efforts of 'positive' norm formation but can be fuelled
'negatively' by the evaluation of global crises and threats to humanity.
The concept of cosmopolitan memory is a good example in this connection.
It is not global in any homogeneous sense. It rather represents a mixture of
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Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences 13

the local and national with the global, which in turn never was truly global but
sprang from very specific historical occurrences. This 'cosmopolitanization' of
memory can potentially create new solidarities and support global-political
and global-cultural norms for the effective spread of human rights: cos-
mopolitanized memory as practical enlightenment, as it were. Through the
media and other means of communication, people are drawn into cycles of
cosmopolitan sympathies, at times even against their own will (Levy and
Sznaidcr 2005).
Thus analytical-empirical cosmopolitanism simultaneously delimits itself
from normative-political cosmopolitanism and presupposes it. This distinction
does not only promote a 'value-free' approach to everyday experience and to
the epistemology of world risk society in the social sciences; it compels us to
demarcate, though not to neglect, normative and political cosmopolitanism in
a world that has become a danger to itself. In fact, this distinction first makes
it possiblc to posc thc q ucstion of thc rclation bctwccn thc catcgorics and cog-
nitions of the cosmopolitan outlook (or the critique of methodological nation-
alism), on the one hand, and the topics of cosmopolitan ethics and politics, on
the other. How are cosmopolitan democracy, justice, solidarity, community,
identity, law, politics, state, etc. possible? What does a cosmopolitan redefini-
tion of religion mean?

Methodological cosmopolitanism

We can distinguish three phases in how the code word 'globalization' has been
used in the social sciences: first, denial, second, conceptual refinement and
empirical research, and, third, epistemological shift.
To the extent that the second phase was successful, the insight began to gain
ground that thc unit of rcscarch of thc rcspcctivc social scicntific disciplincs
becomes arbitrary when the distinctions between national and international,
local and global, us and them, loose their sharp contours. The question for the
research agenda following the epistemological turn is: what happens when the
premises and boundaries that define the units of empirical research and theory
disintegrate? Ihe answer is that the whole conceptual world of the 'national
outlook' becomes disenchanted, that is, de-ontologized, historicized and
strippcd of its ncccssity. Howcvcr, it is only possible to justify this and think
through its consequences within the framework of an interpretative alterna-
tive which replaces ontology with methodology, that is, the current leap which
replaces the ontology and imaginary of the nation-state with 'methodological
cosmopolitanism'.
This leap seeks to overcome the naive universalism of early Western soci-
ology. Methodological cosmopolitanism implies becoming sensitive and open
to the many universalisms, the conflicting contextual universalisms - for
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14 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

example, of the post-colonial experience, critique and imagination, where the

retreat from empire has resulted in large waves of immigration from the
margins (offormer empires to it) to the former metropolitan centres. Method-
ological cosmopolitanism also means including other ('native') sociologies -
the sociologies of and about African, Asian and South-American experiences
of 'entangled modernities'. 'Entangled modernities' replace the dualism of the
modern and the traditional, pointing to and again creating the image of a de-
tcrritorializcd mclangc of connicting contextual modernities in their eco-
nomic, cultural and political dimensions. Methodological nationalism is clearly
at work in our conviction that the way to clarify any mixture is to segregate
out which nation is the influencer and which one is the influenced. The world
is generating a growing number of such mixed cases, which make less sense
according to the 'either/or' logic of nationality than to the 'both/and' logic of
the cosmopolitan vision. Our intellectual frames of reference are so deeply
ingrained that this cosmopolitan way of thinking has rcmaincd comparativcly
undeveloped. There are a number of questions which have to be asked and
discussed to make the notion of methodological cosmopolitanism concrete.
First, what are alternative, non-national units of research? In other words, what
are post-national concepts of the social? Second, do we need a notion of 'cos-
mopolitan understanding' of 'cosmopolitan hermeneutics'? Third, how does
cosmopolitanism relate to universalism, relativism etc.?

A lternative units of research

Cosmopolitanism diverges from universalism in that it assumes that there is

not just one language of cosmopolitanism, but many languages, tongues, gram-
mars. If cosmopolitanization means that reality itself - social structures - is
becoming cosmopolitan, how can we observe and do research on the emer-
gence of a growing 'cosmopolitan interdependence'? Is this cosmopolitani-
zation of national societies ultimately an irreversible process? Does the
realization that the tragedies of our time are all global in origin and scope in
fact create a global horizon of experience and expectation? Is there really a
growing awareness that we are living within a global network of responsibil-
ity from which none of us can escape? Didn't September 11, 2001 and the
attacks in London in July 2005 also show that the opponents of cosmopoli-
tanization can claim some bloody 'successes'? But how is this possible if
cosmopolitanization is an inexorable process?
How, then, can both cosmopolitanization and anti-cosmopolitanization be
understood as two competing and contradictory movements, as consequences
of the progressive internal cosmopolitanization of reality? It is important to
realize that there is no necessary relation between the internal cosmopoli-
tanization of national societies and the emergence of a cosmopolitan con-
sciousness, subject or agent, regardless of what some cultural theorists seem
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Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences 15

to think. Consciousness and politics are for that very reason fundamentally
ambivalent.
But doesn't the converse also hold? Because consciousness and politics are
fundamentally ambivalent, the cosmopolitanization of reality is advancing.
For example, all 'opponents of globalization' share with their 'adversaries' the
global communications media (thereby enhancing their utility for promoting
and organizing transnational protest movements). The globalized economy
can only bc rcgulated globally - only those who fight for regulation at the
global level have the remotest chance of success. Thus much of the anti-
globalization movement is in fact promoting an alternative globalization.
How can all those big questions be translated into research agendas? If
methodological nationalism has permeated and shaped everything we do in
the social sciences, how can we overcome it? We need to create an observer
perspective that revives the original sociological curiosity and the sociological
cognition of the concrete. This is doubtlcssly easicr said than done.
The first step is to answer the difficult question: which alternative unit of
research beyond methodological nationalism can be theoretically and empir-
ically developed and justified? How do those research units relate to the spe-
cific purposes and topics of the particular research project? And what are the
implications and conditions for comparative analysis beyond methodological
nationalism?
In the Research Centre on Reflexive Modernization in Munich we are prag-
matically testing different solutions for these problems: in one research project
the state-centred distinction between national and international politics is
being replaced by the new research unit 'transnational regimes of politics',
which can be used as the focus for theoretical and empirical analysis and com-
parisons. This reconstruction of the unit of research beyond methodological
nationalism makes it possible to open up the field of vision to the plurality of
interdependencies, not only between states but also between different politi-
cal actors in different dimensions of action. This could be an important step
to denationalizing political science and introduce a cosmopolitan outlook of
transnational spaces, strategies of actions and institutions (see the contribu-
tion of Grande in this volume (Grande 2006: 87-111) and Grande 2004; Kriesi
and Grande 2004).
In a different research project the common equation between national
society and national history is being challenged by the research unit of
'transnational spaces and cultures of memory'. This shift in the focus of
research allows it to develop a new kind of comparison in which the timing
and themes of different transnational politics of memory can be systematically
brought into relation to each other (Beck, Levy and Sznaider 2004).
With the cosmopolitanization of reality the question arises: how to redefine
the basic concepts of the social? Should we reflect on Max Weber's notion of
sociology as understanding the meaning of social action 'with a cosmopolitan
British Journal of Socio/OKY 57(1)
384 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

16 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

intent' (to use Kant's formula)? Can the concept of 'social system' (Talcott
Parsons), the picture book example of methodological nationalism, really be
reconstructed in a cosmopolitan way? Or do all concepts of 'system' - as
Martin Albrow argues - have one basic characteristic in common, namely, that
the semantics of system implies a totalizing discourse.
The most inappropriate way to grasp the reality of the Global Age is to seek
how to refit human society back into the systems mould. Systems theory
requires a firm position on what constitutes the system and what its envi-
ronment is. Tn order to preserve the nation-state society as the unit of analy-
sis, Parsons had to allocate other state societies, as well as the material world,
to the category of environment.lhis was artificial even in the 1950s. Nation-
state societies exist within a field of other societies, in persistent exchange
and interaction. This has been part of the self-evident premises of the theory
of international politics, but it applies equally to those institutions which
elude state control, including money, information, science, transport, tech-
nology and law. The collapse of the Soviet system is only the most blatant
example of what happens if the control attempt is carried through regard-
less of the risks involved. In other words, totalization discourse was a
symptom of the overreach of the nation-state. (Albrow 1996: 111).
What about the basic conceptual ideas which came up since the 1970s, like
'Weltgesellschaft' (Niklas Luhmann), 'world system theory' (Immanuel
Wallerstein), 'world polity' (John Meyer and his group)? These are more or
less established sociological theories and research programmes which do have
a huge impact on the international sociological debates. Their surplus value in
conceptualizing the cosmopolitanization of the world has to be examined very
carefully. But some problems can be identified and demonstrated.
Niklas Luhmann, on the one hand, criticized what we call 'methodological
nationalism' already in the 1970s. On the other hand, he introduced his
concept of 'world society' as a logical implication of his theory of communi-
cation. His argument is that in principle, there are no borders to communica-
tion, therefore there only can be one society and that is the world society -
without any consideration of empirical facts. Thus his hypothesis can neither
be falsified nor verified. If there is - analytically! - only one world society,
there is no need, for example, to explore the new realities of fifty years of
Europeanization. So here we have another reason why social theory is blind
to Europe.
Immanuel Wallerstein's 'world system' theory presupposes the national-
international dualism, as does John Meyer's concept of 'world polity'. Even
though both concepts are very powerful in producing extremely interesting
empirical interpretations, they both ignore the new historical facts of Euro-
peanization (as does Niklas Luhmann's system theory). And neither realizes
that the distinction which underpins their view of the world, namely that
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 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 385

Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences 17

between national and international spheres, is now dissolving in what remains

a somewhat hazy power space of 'global domestic politics', None the less, it
was this distinction that helped to shape the world of the first modernity,
including the key concepts (and theories) of society, identity, state, sovereignty,
legitimacy, violence and state authority.
Methodological cosmopolitanism means we have to ask: how might we con-
ceptualize a world in a set of global dynamics in which the problematic con-
scqucnces of radicalized modernization crfectively eliminate corner stones
and logics of action - certain historically produced fundamental distinctions
and basic institutions - of its nation-state order? Cosmopolitan realism goes
as follows: the new global domestic politics that is already at work here and
now, beyond the national-international distinction has become a 'meta-power'
game whose outcome is completely open-ended. It is a game in which bound-
aries, basic rules and basic decisions have to be re-negotiated - not only those
between the national and thc international sphcrcs, but also those betwcen
global business and the state, transnational civil society movements, supra-
national organizations and national governments and societies (Beck 2005).

Cosmopolitan understanding

How and why is the twenty-first century very different from France in 1912
when Durkheim published The Elementary Forms of Religious Life? One
obvious difference is that Australian aboriginals have access to Durkheim's
sociology of religion either through their interaction with contemporary
anthropologists, or through educational web-sites, or through participation
in university discourses on Durkheim's sociological theory. Cosmopolitan
understanding, despite the existence of digital divide, is discursive, dialogic
and reflexive. Whereas the Elementary Forms assumed hat the Aunta tribe
was a passive object of sociological inquiry, the contemporary world is con-
nected together as a (more or less) unified place in a (more or less) simul-
taneous time. Network society makes endless and instant dialogue. (Turner
2004: 11)
Ine distinction between the actor perspective of society and politics and the
observer perspective of the social sciences only unfolds its disruptive poten-
tial when the expanded options opened up by cosmopolitanization arc viewed
from both perspectives. It then becomes clear that cosmopolitanization, in
both the agent and the observer perspectives, must be developed as a new
politics of perspectives (of starting points, modes of access, standards, framings,
foregrounds and backgrounds, etc.). (On the 'politics of scale' - i.e., the nego-
tiation of hierarchy and legitimacy among different 'scales' of social interac-
tion - see Brenner 1999,2000; Tsing 2000; Jonas 1994; Burawoy et a1. 2000). It
follows that social science can conceptualize and thematize the relational
British Journal of Socio/OKY 57(1)
386 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

18 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

patterns 'transnational', 'global-local', 'global-national', 'national-global' or

'global-global':
• with a local focus (e.g. transnational lifestyles of Turks in London; global
co-operation and conflict within the World Trade Organization, the Ameri-
can government or NGOs; conflicts between national and communal gov-
ernments over fertility policy; anti-poverty initiatives in New Delhi; the
impact of the BSE risk on an agricultural community in Scotland); or
• with a national focus (e.g. transnational forms of marriage and family in
different countries; the modes and frequency of transnational communica-
tion in the USA, Russia, China, North Korea and South Africa; the nation-
alities and languages of schoolchildren in different countries, etc.); or
• with a transnational (or translocal) focus (e.g. German Turks who have
developed a transnationallifestylc moving between Berlin and Istanbul arc
being researched in both Berlin and Istanbul; this involves an exchange of
perspectives which sets the nation-state framings of Turkey and Germany
into systematic relations with each other (as regards values, administrative
regulations, cultural stereotypes, etc., which determine, facilitate or prevent
transnationalization); the transnational dynamics of risk and conflict of the
BSE crisis and their cultural perception and evaluation in different Euro-
pean countries are being investigated in a comparative study); or
• with a global focus (how far advanced is the internal and external cos-
mopolitanization of national domains of experience in particular countries,
what implications docs this have, and what theoretical, empirical and polit-
ical conclusions can be drawn from it?).
Thus methodological cosmopolitanism is not mono- but multi-perspectival.
More precisely, it can and must observe and investigate the boundary-
transcending and boundary-effacing multi-perspeetivalism of social and
political agents through very different 'lenses'. A single phenomenon, transna-
tionality, for example, can, perhaps even must, be analysed both locally and
nationally and transnationally and trans-locally and globally.
The result is a host of methodological problems: how can all this and the
consequent politics of perspectives be made transparent and methodologically
tractable? What substantive, thematic-theoretical, and what social and politi-
cal consequences are associated with the various 'lenses'? And what conse-
quences docs this have, in turn, for the standing of the social sciences in the
national, interstate and international fields (financing, public presence and
legitimation, contexts of use)? How can the complexity and contingency
thereby opened up in the internal and external relations of national and inter-
national sociologies be methodologically tamed? Does this imply a decline, a
cultural relativization and a subjectivization of the social sciences? Or should
we not rather expect just the opposite, namely, that the social sciences bring
their claim to knowledge to bear thematically, methodologically, and
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 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 387

Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences 19

politically beyond the state and nation in novel ways which impact on a global
public? When and how will the one or the other become possible, or proba-
ble, or be excluded?

Universalism and cosmopolitanism

What distinguishes the cosmopolitan outlook from a universalistic outlook?
And what makcs thc cosmopolitan outlook at thc bcginning or thc twcnty-
first century 'realistic', in contrast with cosmopolitan idealism? Here are just
a few considerations by way of exploring these questions:
Political cosmopolitanism in sociological terms answers the question: how
do societies deal with difference and borders under conditions of global
interdependence crises?
Different social modalities of dealing with difference have to be distin-
guishcd - univcrsalism, rclativism, cthnicity, nationalism, cosmopolitanism,
multiculturalism, etc. Universalistic practices, for example, but also relativism,
etc., involve confiicting impulses. Universalism obliges us to respect others as
equals as a matter of principle, yet for that very reason it does not involve any
requirement that would arouse curiosity or respect for what makes others dif-
ferent. On the contrary, the particularity of others is sacrificed to an assump-
tion of universal equality which denies its own context of emergence and
interests. Universalism thereby becomes two-faced: respect and hegemony,
rationality and terror. Similarly, the emphasis on context and on the relativity
of standpoints springs from an impulse to acknowledge the difference of others,
but when it is absolutized in thought and practice it nips over into an incom-
mensurability of perspectives which amounts to pre-established ignorance.
Realistic cosmopolitanism - this is the inference - should be conceived,
elaborated and practiced not in an exclusive manner but in an inclusive rela-
tion to univcrsalism, contcxtualism, nationalism, transnationalism, ctc. It is this
particular combination of semantic elements which the cosmopolitan outlook
shares with the universalistic, relativistic and national outlooks and which at
the same time distinguishes it from these other approaches.
Realistic cosmopolitanism presupposes a universalistic minimum involving
a number of substantive norms which must be upheld at all costs. Ihe princi-
ple that women and children should not be sold or enslaved, the principle that
pcople should bc able spcak frcely about God or thcir govcrnmcnt without
being tortured or their lives being threatened - these are so self-evident that
no violation of them could meet with cosmopolitan tolerance. We can speak
of 'cosmopolitan common sense' when we have good reasons to assume that
a majority of human beings would be willing to defend these minimum uni-
versal norms wherever they have the power, if called upon to do so.
On the other hand, realistic cosmopolitanism includes universal procedural
norms, since they alone make it possible to regulate how difference is dealt
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388 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

20 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

with across cultures. Accordingly, realistic cosmopolitanism must also confront

the painful questions and dilemmas, such as the universalist-pluralist dilemma:
is cosmopolitanism single or multiple?
Should recognition of the freedom of others apply equally to despots and
democrats, to anti-cosmopolitan predators as well as to those they prey upon?
In other words, realistic cosmopolitans must come to terms with the tolerance-
violence dilemma, particularly alien to cosmopolitan thought, that in making
rccognition of othcrs ccntral to its conccption of socicty and politics cos-
mopolitanism makes enemies who can only be checked by force. Hence it must
embrace the contradiction that, in order to uphold its basic principles - defend-
ing individual liberties and safeguarding difference - it may be necessary to
violate them.
Last but not least, there is the nationalism-cosmopolitanism dilemma: cos-
mopolitanism does not only negate nationalism but also presupposes it.
Without thc stabilizing factors which nationalism affords in dcaling with dif-
ference, cosmopolitanism is in danger of losing itself in a philosophical never-
never land. ilut can there be many 'cosmopolitan nationalisms' and many
'national cosmopolitanisms'?

Conclusion: methodological cosmopolitanism and its relation to other fields

How does this relate to the post-Second World War period of sociological
thinking? In the 1960s the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory were the dom-
inant intellectual movements, in the 1970s and 1980s this role was assumed by
the French post-modernists; and now a cosmopolitan mixture in British soci-
ology could give birth to a cosmopolitan vision for the humanities and the
social sciences. This opens up new fields and research projects which this issue
will hopefully ignitc. At thc samc timc, mcthodological cosmopolitanism
emerges out and develops three fields in sociological research and practice.
The first field develops out of the old agenda of sociological theory after the
World War II and tries to integrate it within a new cosmopolitan sociological
imagination for the twenty-first century. The postwar confiicts in sociological
theory in Western Europe, especially in Britain, were pretty much concen-
trated on the relation between social class, race, gender and the welfare state
as an cgalitarian actor of cxpanding citizcnship. Sociology thcn was conccrncd
with 'bringing the state back in'. It was class and in particular the rise of the
working class which was seen as the big social problem and the solidarity of
the nation-state was seen as the solution. As in the methodological national-
ism of Emile Durkheim fraternity became solidarity and national integration.
The new agenda highlights societal relations as distinct from the nation-
state. 'Society' no longer appears under anyone's control. In the cosmopolitan
constellation sociology is then concerned with the formation of post-national
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 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 389

Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences 21

and cross-national bonds, or who belongs and who does not, and how inclu-
sion and exclusion arise. Therefore the new agenda does not intend to 'throw
the state back out', but to understand how states are being transformed in the
cosmopolitan constellation, how new non-state actors arise and a new type of
cosmopolitan states might develop. This post-national state formation is not
anymore the 'General Will' of modern democracy as mapped by Jean-Jacques
Rousseau onto the nation and further developed into sociological theories of
Durkhcim and Wcbcr. Rousscau's Gcneral Will was not only thc foundation
of modern relativism; it was also the foundation of the modern idea of the
nation as the ultimate reality, not as a collection of followers, but as the one
thing that reconciled freedom and determinism. It was the birth of society as
national society, since the General Will must always be general in its object
and its subject and it is only general if it acts generally - that is, when one
decides something that applies to all. Now, the general is called universal and
thc univcrsal is considcrcd to bc thc nation. This is how mcthodological
nationalism became tied up with universalism in sociological theory. Bryan
Turner (2006: 133-51) and Gerard Delanty (2006: 25-47) have problematized
the connection between the old and the new agenda in sociological theoriz-
ing. Their articles build the bridge to be crossed for the new agenda. The essay
from Bronislaw Szerszynski and John Urry (2006: 113-131) and the one from
Edgar Grande (2006: 87-111) push the new agenda a step further: the first
through an analysis of mobility and space showing how space can be decon-
structed and opened up for a cosmopolitan sociology. Edgar Grande takes the
science of the state to new levels by showing what methodological cos-
mopolitanism can do for the mother science of nationalism and the state.
The second field from which a methodological cosmopolitanism emerges is
the cultural field of particularism either in its post-colonial, feminist or cul-
tural theory version. Methodological cosmopolitanism should be aware of
'stratcgic csscntialism' whcrc positivc claims arc bcing put forward by so-
called 'essentialist' groups which claim that social bonds and moral sentiments
are based on particularity and as a consequence, therefore, sociology, as a
moral science, needs to theorize the particular. These theories of particularity
do not stand in opposition to the above universal theories of the nation. They
complement and relate to each other. Ineories of particularity oppose the
homogenizing character of universal theories, and therefore recognize and
criticizc how univcrsalizing univcrsalism can bc. Howcvcr, on thc othcr hand
they do set a context for these theories that has no universal horizon: i.e.
cognitive, moral or political. Angela McRobbie's essay (McRobbie 2006:
69-86) tries to disentangle the importance and dilemmas of these contextual-
ized theories and shows how they can be used fruitfully for newly conceived
methodological cosmopolitanism.
The third related field holds the above together. This is the field of norma-
tive social science whose followers read Kant as a sociologist. It is based on a
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390 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

22 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider

mixture of the moral universalism and cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth

century and centres itself upon (international) politics and not society as its
main field. Ihese cosmopolitan normative theories have a tendency to ignore
society and its more banal forms of everyday life. They create an opposition
between pure, ennobling public life, and cramping, constraining private life.
However, under the conditions of an interdependent global world, a globality
of risk and an advanced division of labour, every act of production and con-
sumption and cvcry act of cvcryday life links actors to millions of unseen
others. This is what social life under cosmopolitan conditions means. It creates
the moral horizon for a newly conceived form of at times banal, and, at times,
moral cosmopolitanism. Robert Fine demonstrates how this works under the
shadows of catastrophe and what the sociological preconditions for military
interventions could be and how they connect to the social (Fine 2006: 49-67).
Methodological cosmopolitanism does not, therefore, mean the end of the
nation but its transformation. It is the newly conceived research agenda which
tries to bring sociology back to its subject matter - reality, which, of course,
has to be demonstrated in detail and which is no longer a national or inter-
national but a cosmopolitan one. This opens up the horizon for the cos-
mopolitan realism of a New Critical Theory which has a strong standing
against the retrogressive idealism of the national perspective in politics,
research and theory.
(Date accepted: December 2005)

Notes

1. See also the debates on 'public sociology' (Burawoy 2005 and this special issue on Cos-
mopolitan Sociology 57(1) ofthe 8JS).

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Society 28(2): 39-78. sity Press.
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 [18]
The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers:
Toward a Critique of Actually Existing
Cosmopolitanism

Craig Calhoun

Somt' claim that the world is gradtlally becoming

united, that it will grow into a brotherly community
as distances shrink and ideas are transmitted through
the air. Alas, you must not believe that men can be
united in this way.
- Fyodor Dostoevsky, Ike Brothers Karamazov (l&SO)
A certain ~ttelluated cosmopolitanism had taken place
of the old insular horne-feeling.
- TIlomas Carlyle, Tht: Life of Robert Burns (18201
Among the great struggles of man-good/evil. rea·
son/unreason, etc.-there is also this mighty conflict
between the fantasy of Home and the fantasy of Away,
the dream of roots and the mirage of the journey.
-Salman Rushdie. The Ground Beneath Her Feet
(2000)

On September 11, terrorists crashing jets into

the World Trade Center and Pentagon struck
a blow against cosmopolitanism-perhaps more
successfully than against their obvious sym-
bolk targets, the unequal structures of global
capitalism and political power. They precipi-
tated :I renewal of state-centered politics and a
"war on terrorism" seeking military rather than
law enforcement solutions to crime. Moved by
394 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology,
Sociology , Volume Three

87G
870 Cmig Gllho),m
CUlllOlI"

~heltered by Afghanistan's Taliban. they

IsJamk Puritanism and sheltered
Wahabbi Islamic
seemed to exemplify a sirnplistk
simplistic opposition hetween
between backward traditional-
traditionaJ-
ists and Western modernism. That Muslims had long be~n been stereotyped as at'
the bad other to globalization only made it easier for Westerners to accept
this dubious framing of the events, and made it harder for them to see ad
clash between different modernist projects,
dash projects. to miss the evidently popular
message that "technology can be OUf our weapon too."
he no friend to terrorism to
One need bellO to'be
be sorry that the dominant response
to the terrorist attacks has been framed as a matter Qf ofwar rather than crime,
crime .,
an attack on America rather than an attack on on humanity. What couldcou~d have
been an occasion for fOT renewing the drive to establish an international crimi-
nal court and multilateral institutions needed for law enforcement quickly
became an occasion for America to demonstrate its power and its allies to
terrorisJn. n Militarism gained and civil society
fall in line with the "war on terrorism."
lost not only on September IT lJ but in the response that followed. 11 This was
domestica11y as well as internationally,
true dQmestically internationally. as the United States and other
administrations moved to sweep aside protections for the rights of citizens
and immigrants alike and strengthen the state in pursuit of "security,"
ofusecurity."
In this context, the cosmopolitan ideals articulated during the 1990S t990S
seem aU all the more attractive but their realization much less immanent
immanent. It
is important not only to mourn this, but to ask in what ways the cosmo· cosmo-
itself was limited-overoptimistic, perhaps, more attentive
politan vision 'itself
globaJization than to equally impor-
to certain prominent dimensions of globalization impor.
tant others. In the wake of the cold war. it seemed seemed to many political theo-
rists and public actors that th€' the moment had finally arrived not just for
Kantian perpetual peace but for cosmopolitanism to extend beyond mere
tolerance to the creation of a shared global globaJ democracy.
democracy, It seemed easy to
df'nigrate states as old-fashioned
denigrate oId·fashioned authorities of waning influence and to
extol the virtues of international civil society. It was perhaps a weakness
or this perspective that the myriad d.imensions
of dimensions of globalization all aJl seemed
evidence of tilethe need for order. and therefort>
fOT a more cosmopolitan order, tl"n-
therefore the It'o·
It'D'
sicns among them were insutl1dent!y
sions insufficiently examined. Likewise,
Likewise. the (osmopoli·
cosmopoli-
tanism of d.emocratic
tani:sm
tani:;m democratic activists was not always dearly distinct from that of
global corporate leaders,
glohal leaders. though the latter would exempt corporate prop-
erty from democratic control. lust as protE-sters against the World Trade
['rty
tlU'mselvcs a,'l
Organization (WTO) often portrayed themselves as "antigloba!ization,"
a'l "antiglobalizatiQIl," even
eveu
though they formed a global globaJ social movement
movement. advocates of cosmopolitan
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 395

Cluss C(/nsdOtmt~y; of Freqwmt TmlJc/ers sn

institutions often sounded simply proglobalization rather than sufficiently

discriminating among its forms.
In a sense, the noncosmopolitan side of globalization struck back on Sep-
tember 1 r. Migrants whose visions oftlldr home cultures were more conser-
vative and ideological than the originals figured prominently. Indeed, most
of the terrorists were Arabs who had spent considerable time studying in
the West -even at seemingly cosmopolitan Oxford. in the case ofOsama bin
Laden. A dark side to globalization was brought to light: criminal activity
and Rows of weapons, people, ideas, money. and drugs that challenged state
authority but hardly in the name of international civil society. and some-
times financed terrorist networks. At the same time, the sharp inequali-
ties masked by cosmopolitan ideals- and especiaUy the use of cosmopolitan
rhetoric by neoliberal corporate leaders whose actions contribute to those
inequalities-challenged efforts to "solve" terrorism as a problem separate
from others.
This essay is an effort to examine some of the limits and biases of the
cosmopolitan theory that flourished in the 19905. It is written not in rejec-
tion of cosmopolitanism, but as a challenge to think through more fully
what sorts of social bases have shaped cosmopolitan visions and what sorts
of issues need more attention if advances in democracy are to be made.
What experiences make cosmopolitan democracy an intUitively appealing
approach to the world? What experiences does it obscure from view? 1 want
also to consider how much the political theory ofcosmopolitanism is shaped
by liberalism's poorly drawn fight with communitarianism and thus left
lacking a strong account of solidarity. This impedes efforts to defend the
achievements of previous social struggles against neoliheral capitalism. or
to ground new political action. Finally, 1 wish to offer a plea for the impor-
tance of the local and particular-not least as a basis for democracy. no less
important for being necessarily incomplete. Whatever its failings, "the old
insular home-feeling" helped to produce a sense of mutual obligations, of
"moral economy," to borrow the phrase Edward Thompson retrieved from
an old tradition,l
Cosmopolitanism today partly resumes its own old tradition. Cosmopoli-
tan ideals RQurished as calls for unity among andent Greek city-states.
though in fact city-states were often at war. Rome was more cosmopoli-
tan if less philosophical than Greece. Cosmopolitanism has been a project
of empires, of long-distance trade, and of cities. Christianity offered a cos-
396 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

871 Calhoun.

mopolitan framework to medieval Europe, lhough it equally informed a

nOl1cosmopolitan rejection of those it deemed heretics and heathen. The
OUoman Empire offered a high point of cosmopolitanism, and European
empires their own often less tolerant versions. But the cosmopolitanism of
church and empire depended on the distinction of merchants and derks
from rulers, it is thus an innovation to see cosmopolitanism as a political
project and especially to speak of "cosmopolitan democracy." The tolerance
of diversity in great imperial and trading cities has always reflected, among
other things, precisely the absence of need or opportunity to organize politi-
cal self-rule.
A new cosmopolitanism flourished in the Enlightenment. lnis flourish·
ing once again involved relative elites without a responsibility for ruling.
It did nonetheless influence rulers, not least by encouraging a courtly
cosmopolitanism in the later years of the ancient regime. There were also
cosmopolitan links among democrats and other insurgents, and these con-
tributed to the ideals of the late-eighteenth-ccntury public sphere_ Nation-
alism and cosmopolitanism met in certain strands of the American and
French Revolutions and linked to democracy in figures like Thomas Paine.
But eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism, especially its elite variants, was
hostile to religion, and in opposing reason to prejudice often imagined a
collective life free of traditional loyalties rather than incorporating them
in heterogeneous form. Philosophical cosmopolitans of the Enlightenment
imagined a world reflecting their lives and intellectual projects. During the
same period, though, European colonial projects were becoming increas-
ingly importlmt. They informed the development of both nationalism and
cosmopolitanism, the view of both home and away. While some nineteenth-
century thinkers embraced cosmopolitanism as an urban aesthetic ideal,
others. like Thomas Carlyle, were ambivalent about cosmopolitanism. They
worried that it was somehow an "attenuated" solidarity by comparison to
those rooted in more spedfic local cultures and communities.
Today's cosmopolitans need to confront the same concerns. Many rightly
point to the limits and dangers of relying on nation-states to secure demo(;-
racy in it world that is ever-more-dramatically organized across state hoI"
ders. Yet tbey-we-imagille the world from the vantage point of frequent
travelers. easily entering and exiting polities and social relations around the
world. armed with visa-friendly passports and credit cards. For such rre·
quent travelers cosmopolitani.sm has considerable rhetorical advantage. II
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 397

Class COII$dm.lsltc~s (1' FreqlUmt Travekrs 873

seems hard not to want to be a "citizen of the world." Certainly. at least in

Western academic circles, it is hard to imagine preferring to be known as
parochial. But what does it mean to be a "citizen of the world"? Through
what institutions is this "citizenship" effectively expressed? (s it mediated
through various particular, more local solidarities? Does it present a new,
expanded category of identification as better than older. narrower ones (as
the nation has frequently been opposed to the province or village), or does
it pursue better relations among a diverse range of traditions and commu-
nities? How does this citizenship contend with global capitalism and with
noncosmopolitan dimensions of globalization?
A thoroughgoing cosmopolitanism might indeed bring concern for the
fate of all humanity to the fore, but a more attenuated cosmopolitanism is
likely to leave us lacking the old sources of solidarity without adequate new
ones. Much cosmopolitanism focuses on the development of world govern-
ment or at least global political institutions. These, advocates argue. must be
strengthened if democracy is to have much future in a world where nation-
states are challenged by global capitalism, cross-border flows, and interna-
tional media and accordingly less able to manage collective affairs.} At the
same time, these advocates see growing domestic heterogeneity and newly
divisive subnational politics as reducing the efficacy of nation-states from
within. While most embrace diversity as a basic value, they simultaneously
see multiculturalism as a political problem. In the dominant cosmopoli-
tan theories, it is the global advance of democracy that receives the most
attention and in which most hopes are vested. But cosmopolitanism without
the strengthening of local democracy is likely to be a very elite affair. And
advances in global democracy are challenged by fragmented solidarities at
both intermediate and local levels.
Cosmopolitanism is often presented simply as global citizenship. Advo-
cates offer a claim to being without determinate social bases that is remj-
niscent of Mannheim's idea of the free-floating intellectual. In offering a
seeming "view from nowhere." cosmopolitans commonly offer a view from
Brussels (where the postnational is identified with the strength ofthe Euro-
pean Union rather than the weakness of, say, African states). or from Davos
(where the postnational is corporate). or from the university (where the illu-
sion ofa free-floating intelligentsia is supported by relatively Auid exchange
of ideas across national borders),
Cosmopolitanism is a discourse centered in a Western view onhe world.·
398 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

814 Craig CalhoHI!

It sets itself up commonly aJ; a "Third Way" between rampant corporate

globalization and reactionary traditionalisrn or nationalisrn. If Giddens's
account of the Third Way is most familiar, the trope is still more wide-
spread. Benjamin Barber's notion of a path beyond "Jihad vs. McWorld" is
an example brought to renewed prominence (and the best-sener lists) fol-
lowing the September n attacks.s Such oppositions oversimplify at best,
though, and often get in the way of actually achieving some of the goals
of cosmopolitan democracy. In the first place, they reflect a problematic
denigration of tradition, including ethnidty and religion. This can be mis·
leading in even a sheer factual sense-as, for example, in Barber's depic-
tion of lslamism as the reaction of small and relatively homogeneous coun-
tries to capitaHst globalization. The oppositions arc also prejudicial. Note,
for example, the tendency to treat the West as the site of both capitalist glob-
alization and cosmopolitanism. but to approach the non-West through the
category of tradition. More generally, cultural identities and communal soli·
darities are treated less as creative constructions forged amid globalization
than as inheritances from an older order. They should be available to people.
much cosmopolitan thought implies. as lifestyle choices. As Timothy Bren·
nan puts it, cosmopolitanism "designates an enthusiasm for customary dif-
ferences, but as ethical or aesthetic material for a unUied polychromatic cul-
ture-a new singularity born of a bJending and merging of multiple local
constituents."" This vision of unity amid difference echo(:'s on a grander
scale that of great empires and great religions, and it underwrites the cos-
mopolitan appeal for all.encompassing world government.'
Cosmopolitanism also reflects an elite perspective on the world. Certainly
few academic theories escape this charge, but it is especially problematic
when the object of theory IS the potential for democracy, The top ranks of
capitalist corporations provide exemplars of a certain form ofcosmopolitan-
ism, though not of democracy_ Likewise, a large proportion of global civil
soc!ety-from the World Bank to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
setting accountancy standards -exists to support capitalism not pursue
democracy. Even the ideas of cosmopolitan dernocracy and humanitarian
activism, however, reflee! an aWart~ness of the world that is made possible
by the proliferation of NGOs working to solve environmental and humani-
lari:m problems. and hy the growth of media attention to those problems.
Thest:' are important - indeed vital- com:cms. Nonetheless. the concerns,
the media, and thp NGOs need to be grasped reflexively as the basis for an
intellectual perspective. It is a pNspedlve. example. that makes nation-
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 399

Clnss Ct)niciollSlteSS of Frequent Travdm &75

alism appear one-sidedly negative, This is detennined first perhaps by the

prominence of ethnonationalist violence in recent humanitarian crises, but
also by the tensions between states and international NGOs. It is also shaped
by specifically European visions and projects of transnationalism. Nation-
alism looks different from, say, an African vantage point. And it 1S often
the weakness of states that seems the most pressing problem. even when
tyrants control those relatively weak states.
The cosmopolitan ideals of global civil society can sound uncomfortably
like those of the civilizing mission behind colonialism, especially when pre-
sented as a program from the outside borne by global NGOs rather than an
opportunity for local development. In this connection, we should recall how
recent, temporary, and ever incomplete the apparent autonomy and closure
of nation is. In Europe. the invocation of nation may sound conservative and
traditional (though it was not always so). Looked at from the standpoint of
India, say, or Ethiopia, it is not at all dear whether nation belongs on the side
of tradition Or developing cosmopolitanism. Or is it perhaps distinct from
both -a novel form of solidarity and a basis for political claims on the state,
one that presumes and to some extent demands performance of internal
unity and external boundedness?
The very idea of democracy suggests that it cannot be imposed from
above, simply as a matter of rational plan. Democracy must grow out of the
life-world; it must empower people not in the abstract but in the actual con-
ditions of their lives. This means to empower them within communities and
traditions, not in spite of them, and as members of groups, not only as indi-
viduals. This does not mean accepting old definitions of all groups; there
may be struggle over how groups are constituted. For example. appeals to
aboriginal rights need not negate the possibility of struggle within "tradi-
tional" groups over such issues as gender bias in leadership.8 Cosmopolitan
democracy-refusing the unity of simple sameness and the tyranny of the
majority-must demand attention to differences-of values, perceptions,
interests, and understandings.
Yet it is important that we recognize that legitimacy is not the same
as motivation. We need to pay attention to the social contexts in which
people are moved by commitments to each other. Cosmopolitanism that
does so will be variously articulated with locality, community. and tradi-
tion, not simply a matter of common d<>oominators. It will depend to a very
large extent on local and particularistic border cfossings and pluralisms, not
universalism.
400 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

816 Craig Calhoun

Such cosmopolitanism would both challenge the abandonmrnt of glob-

alization to neoliberalism (whether with enthusiasm or a sense of help-
less pessimism) and question the impulse to respond simply by defending
nations or communities that experience globalization as a threat Nonethe-
less, the power of states and global corporations and the systemic impera-
tives of global markets suggest that advancing democracy will require
struggle-not only struggle against states or corporations, but also within
them to determine the way they work as institutions, how they distribute
benefits. what kinds of participation th('y invite. The struggle for democ-
racy, accordingly, cannot be only a cosmopolitan struggle from $odalloca-
Hons that transcend these domains: it must be also a local struggle within
them. It would be a mistake to imagine that cosmopolitan ethics-univer-
sally applied - could somehow substitute for a multiplicity of political, ceo-
nomic, and cultural struggles. Indeed, the very struggle may be an occasion
and source for solidarity.
Contemporary cosmopolitanism is the latest effort to revitalize liberal-
ism.') It has much to recommend it. Aside from world peace and more
diverse ethnic restaurants, there is the promise to attend to one of the great
lacunae of more traditional liberalism. This is the assumption of nationality
as the basis [or membership in states, even though this implies a seemingly
iHiberal reliance on inheritance and ascription rather than choice, and an
exclusiveness hard to justify on liberal terms.
Political theory has surprisingly often avoided addreSSing the problems of
political belonging in a serious, analytic way by presuming that nations exist
as the prepolitical bases of state-level politics. 1 do not mean that political
theorists are nationalists in their political preferences. but rather that their
way of framing analytic problems is shaped by the rhetoric of nationalism
and the ways in which this has hecome basic to the modern soda I imagi-
nary.!() "Let us imagine a society," theoretical deliberations characteristically
begin, "and then consider what form of government would be just for it."
Nationalism provides thhi singular and hounded notion of society with its
intuitive meaning.
Even SQ, Kantlan, methodologically individualistic, and generaliy norma-
lionalist a theorist as John Rawls exemplifies the standard procedure, seek-
ing in A Theory vf Ju~tice to understand what kind of society individuals
behi tid the veil of ignorance would choof'?€'-- but presuming that they would
imagine this 011 the model ora nation-stale. Rawls modifies his argu-
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 401

Cla5,1 ConsciouSl1ess oj Frequ.:;l1t Travelers 877

ments in considering international affairs in Political Liberalism and The Law

of Peoples, but continues to assume something like an idealized nation-state
as the natural form of society. As he writes,
We have assumed that a democratic society, like any political society,
is to be viewed as a complete and dosed sodal system. It is complete
in that it is self.sufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of
human life. It is also dosed, in that entry into it is only by birth and
exit from it is only by death.!'
Rawls is aware of migration, war, and global media, of course, even while
he rules them out of theory and even though it is striking how little he con-
siders the globalization of economic foundations for his imagined society.
For Rawls, quel>iions of international justice seem to be just as that phrase
and much diplomatic practice implies: questions "between peoples." each
of which should be understood as unitary. Note also the absence ofattention
to local or other constituent communities within this conception of society.
Individuals and the whole society have a kind of primacy over any other pos-
sible groupings. This is the logic of nationalism. 12
This is precisely what cosmopolitanism contests-at least at its best-
and rightly so. Indeed, one ofthe reasons given for the very term is that it is
less likely than "international" to be confused with exclUSively intergovern-
mental relations.u Advocates of cosmopolitanism argue that people belong
to a range of polities of which nation-states are only one. and that the range
of significant relationships formed across state borders is growing. Their
goal is to extend citizenship rights and responsibilities to the fun range of
associations thus created, In David Held's words,
People would come, thus, to enjoy multiple citizenships-political
membership in the diverse political communities which significantly
affected them. They would be citizens of their immediate political
commtmities, and of the wider regional and global networks which
impacted upon their IivCS.14
Though it is unclear how this might work out in practice, this challenge
to the presumption of nationality as the basis for citizenship is one of the
most important contributions of cosmopolitanism (and cm;mopolitanism
is strongest when it takes this seriously, weakest when it recommends the
leap to a more centralized world government).
402 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology,
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878 Craig CalhoHn

Calhoun

I'ension with the assumption or

The cosmopolitan tension of nation as the prepolili-
prcpoliti-
cal basis tor citizenship
citizE:nship is domestic as well as international. As JUrgen
Habermas puts it,

TIle nation-state owes its success to the l:act

itc; historical suc:<:ess fact that substihlted
thaL it substituted
relations ofsolidarity between the citizens for the disintegrating corpo-
rative tics of early modern sodety.
liOciety. But this republican achievement is
endangered when, conversely, the integrative fOITe force of the nation of citi-
zens is traced back to the prepolitical fact of a quasi-natural people, that tha~
is.
ls, to something independent of and prior to the political opinion- and
of the citizens themselves. IS
wHl-fol1llation ofthe
wjJl-formation I,
But pause here and notice the temporal order implied in this passage. First
there were local communHies,
communities, guilds, religious
religiOUS bodies. and other "corpora-
tive bonds." Then there was republican citizenship with its emphasis on the
civic identity of each citizen. Then this was undermined hy by ethnonational.
ethnonational-
ism. What this misses is the extent to La which each of these ways oforganizing
social life existed simultaneously with the others, sometimes in struggle
sodal
and sometimes l:'ymbiotkally.
symbiotically. New "corporative ties" have been created,
for example, notably in the labor movement and in religious communities.
Conversely, there waS was no "pure republican" moment when ideas of nation· natioll-
ality did not inform the image of the republk republic and the constitution of its
boundaries.
As Habermas goes on, however, "the question arises of whether there
fusion of the nation of citizens with the
exists a fimctional equivalent for the rusion
ethnic nation."'" We need not accept his idealized history or
t~thnic nation."ll; OT entire theoreti-
cal framework to See basic issue. That is, tor polities not con-
see that this raises a3 bask
nations, what makes membership compelling? TIlis
structed as ethnic nation!:>, This is a
question for the European Union, certainly, but also arguably for the United
States itself.
itself, and for most projects of cosmopolitan citizenship. Democracy
sense of mutual commitment among citizens that goes beyond
requires a sense:
classification, holding a passport, or even respect for pal'tiwiar
mere legal classification, particular
institutions. As Charles TarimTaylor has argued forcefully, "self-governing
"self'governing sod·
soci-
cohesion."I'
eties" have need "of a high degree of cohesion."!?
Cosmopolitanism needs au account of how social solidarity and public publiC'
discourse might develop enough in tbese these wider networks to become the
basis for active citizellshift
citizellship. So far
far, mo::;!
t most versions of cosmopolitan
(osmopolitan rhE'ory
thE-ory
share with lraciitionalHberaDsm
lraditionalliberalism a thin conception of social life, commit· commit-
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 403

Cl(l~'i ComciQuslusS oI Frequr:nt Travelers 879

ment, and belonging. They imagine society-and issues of social belonging

and social participation-in too thin and casual a manner. The result is a
theory that suffers from an inadequate sociological foundation. Cammu-
nitarianism is more sociological in inspiration, but often suffers from an
inverse error, a tendency to elide the differences between local networks of
social relationships and broad categories of belonging like nations.
The cosmopolitan image of multiple, layered citizenship can helpfully
challenge the tendency of many communitarians to suggest not only that
community is necessary and/or good, but that people normaUy inhabit one
and only one community.'11 It also points to the possibility - so far not real·
ized-of a rapprochement between cosmopolitanism and communitarian-
ism. As Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione write, hoping to bridge the
opposition between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. "a pure cos-
mopolitanism cannot generate the full range of obligations its advocates
generally wish to ascribe to it. For the proper acknowledgment of'thin' bask
rights rests on their being specified and overlaid by a 'thicker' web of spe-
cial obligations."t9 They would strengthen Held's suggestion that persons
inhabit not only rights and obligations, but also relationships and commit-
ments within and across groups of all sorts including the nation.
More often, however, cosmopolitans have treated communitarianism as
an enemy, or at least used it as a foiUo Despite this. advocates of cosmo-
politan democracy find themselves falling back on notions of "peoples" as
though these exist naturally and prepolitically. They appeal. for example, for
the representation of peoples-llot only states-in various global projects
including an eventual world parliament.u This representation poses deeper
problems than is commonly realized. Not only is the definition of people
problematic, the idea of representation is extremely complex. Representing
peoples has been one of the primary functions of modern states- however
great the problems with how they do it. Advocates for "peoples" represent
them in the media and claim to represent them even in terrorist action.
But it is the legal and political procedures of states and the relatively cohe-
sive public spheres associated with them that provide effective checks on
unstated claims to represent others and tie mediatic images to concrete
policy choices. Absent state-like forms of explicit self-governance, it is not
dear how the representation of peoples escapes arbitrariness.
Cosmopolitan democracy requires not only a stronger account of repre-
sentation, but also a stronger account of sodal solidarity and the forma-
404 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

ggO CuJiWW1

Hon and transformation sodal groups. if one of its virtues is <:hal1eng-

ing the idea that nationality (or ethnic or other idt~ntities understood as
analogous to nationality) provides people with an unambiguous and singu-
lar collective membership. one of its faults is to conceptualize the alternative
too ahstractly and vaguely. Another is to underestimate the positive side of
nationalism, the virtues of identification with a larger whole. This identifi-
cation can indeed be oppressive and antidemocratic. But it can also be the
source of mutual commitment and solida.r;ity underpinning democracy and
uniting people across a range of differences. Moreover. whatever its limits,
the nation-state has proved more open to democratization than religions or
some other kinds of large groupings.
In cosmopolitanism as in much other political theory and democratic
thought generally, there is a tendency to assume that sodal groups are ere·
ated in some prepolitical process-as nations, for example. ethnicities. reli-
gions, or local communities. They reflect historical accident. inheritance,
and necessity. They result perhaps from the accumulation of unintended
consequences of purposive action, tmt they are not in themselves chosen.
Surely, though, this is not always so.
The sodal solidarity that makes sodal commitments compelling is
indeed shaped by forms of integration, like markt1:s, that link people
temical1y, by force of necessity, or as it were "hehind their backs." It is also
shaped by material power, as, for example. modern economic life is a matter
not only of markets but also of corporations and state regulation. Clearly. it is
informed by shared culture and by categorical identities like race. ethnidty,
class. and nation. And crudal.ly it is built out of networks of directly inter·
personal social relations, such as those hask to local community. The last
already suggests the importance of choice: community is not just inherited,
it is made and remade-and interpersonal relationships are also bask to
social movements. More generally, though, we should recognize the impor·
t:mce of public discourse as a source of social solidarity. mutual commit·
ment. and shared interest. Neither ind.ividuals nor sodal groups are fully or
or
finally formed in advance public discourse. Peopl.e's identities and uncler-
standings of the world are changed by participation in public discourse.
Groups are created not just found, and the forms of group nfe are atlea.st
potelltiaHy op<m to choice.n
Public discourse is not simply a matter of finding pr~exigting common
interests, in short. nor of dt:vdoping strategies for acting on inherited iden-
tities: it is also in and of itself a fom) of solidarity. The women's movement
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 405

Cicm Consciol!sness of Frequent Travelers 881

offers a prominent example; it transformed identities, it did not just express

the interests of women whose identities were set in advance. It created both
an arena of discourse among women and a stronger voice for women in dis-
courses that were male dominated (even when they were ostensibly gender
neutral). The solidarity formed among women had to do with the capacity of
this discourse meaningfully to bridge concerns of private life and large-scale
institutions and cultur~. We can also see the inverse, the extent towhich this
gendered production of solidarity is changed as feminist public discourse
is replaced by mass marketing to women and the production of feminism's
successor as a gendered consumer identity in which liberation is reduced
to freedom to purchase.
In short, there are a variety of ways in which people are joined to each
other, within and across the boundaries of states and other polities. Theo-
rists of cosmopolitan democracy are right to stress the multiplicity of con-
nections. But we need to complement the liberal idea of rights with a
stronger sense of what binds people to one another. One of the peculiari-
ties of nation-states has been the extent to which they were able to com·
bine elements of each of these different sorts of solidarity. They did not do
so perfectly, of course. Markets flowed over their borders from the begin-
ning. and some states were weak containers ofeither economic organization
or power. Not all states had a populace with a strong national identity, or
pursued policies able to shape a common identity among citizens. Indeed,
those that repressed public discourse suffered a particular liability to fissure
along the lines of ethnicity or older national identities weakly amalgamated
into the new whole; the Soviet Union is a notable case. Conversely, though,
the opportunity to participate in a public sphere and seek to influence the
state was an important source of solidarity within it.
Actually existing international civil society includes some level of each
of the different forms of solidarity I listed. In very few cases, however. are
these joined strongly to each other at a transnational level. There is com-
munity among the expatriate staffs of NGOs; there is public discourse on
the Internet. But few oHhe categorical identities that express people's sense
of themselves are matched to strong organizations of either power or com-
munity at a transnational level. What this means is that international civil
society offers a weak counterweight to systemic integration and power. [f
hopes for cosmopolitan democracy are to be realized. they depend on devel-
oping more social solidarity.
As I have emphasized. such so1idarity can be at least partially chosen
406 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology
Sociology,, Volume Three

gSI
882 Craig Calnou/!
CIl/hoof!

through collective
coilective participation in the public sphere. it It is unlikely. hQw\?ver,
howevt'r,
enlirely a matter ofchoice. This is the import of Haber-
that solidarity can be entirely
mas's question about whether the nation of citizens can (an fully replace the
ethnic nation. It is a problem to rely heavily on a purel)' political concep· concep-
tion of human beings. Such a conception has two weak points, points. First, it docs
not attend enough to all the ways in which solidarity is achieved outside
of political organization. and does not adequately appreciate the bearing of
these networks on questions of politicallegitlmacy.
tbese politkallegitlmacy. Second. it does not con·
sider the "eextent
xtent to which high political ideals founder on the shoals ofevery-
day needs and desires-including quite legitimate ones. ones, The ideal of civil
sodety has sometimes been expressed in recent years as though it should
society
refer to a constant mobilization of all of us all the time in various sorts of
voluntary organizations.2S 2J
of the things
But in fact one ofthe tbings people quite reason-
reason·
ably want from a good political
politial1 order is to be left alone some of the time-
to enjoy a Ilonpoliticallife
nonpolitical life in civil society. tnrn something oftheof the same sense,
Oscar Wilde famously said of sociaJism
socialism that it requires too many evenings.
We could say ofcosmopolitanism that it requires too much travel, travel. too many
dinners out at ethnic restaurants, too much volunteering with Mededns Medecins
Sans Frontieres. Perhaps not too much or too many for academics (though
r wouldn't leap to that presumption) but too much and too many to base a
[wouldn't
political order on the expectation that everyone will choose to participate-
pilrticipate-
even ifjf they acknowledge that they ought to.
A good political order must deal fairly with the fact that most people will
not be politically active most of the actually existing politics tum
tlre time. That actuaHy
many people off only makes the issue more acute. But for cosmopolitan
democracy.
democracy, scale is the biggest issue. Participation rates are low in local and
national
natiollal politics; there is good reason to think that the very scale of the global
ecumene will make participation in it even narrower and more a province
ec:umene
of elites than participation in national politics. Not only does Michels' law
of oligarchy apply, if perhaps not with the iron forcl' forc~ he imagined. but thl' the
capacities to engage cosmopolitan politics-from
politics - from literacy to computer lit· Ii t·
eracy to familiarity with the range of acronyms-are
acronyms - Olfe apt to continue to he be
unevenly distributed. lndet'd, commonly noted but slgnitl'
Jndet'd, there are less commonl;' signiti·
cant inequalities directly tied to locality. Within almost any social movement
NCO, as one moves from the local to the
or activist NGO. tht~ national and global in
either puhlic
public actions
action!'; or levels of internal organization
orgOlnization oneOlle secs a reduction
in women's participation. Largely because su mllch labor of social repro-
50 mw::h repro·
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 407

Class Consciousness of Frequcllt Travelers 883

duction-childcare, for instance-is carried out by women. women find it

harder to work outside of their localities. This is true even for social move-
ments in which women predominate at the 10calleveJ.2 4

Contemporary cosmopolitan theory is attentive to the diversity of people's

social engagements and connections. But this cosmopolitanism is also
rooted in seventeenth· and eighteenth-century rationalism with its ethical
universalism.2.$ Modem cosmopolitanism took shape largely in opposition
to traditional religion and more generally to deeply rooted political iden-
tities. Against the force of universal reason, the claims of traditional cul-
ture and communities were deemed to have little standing. These were at
best particularistic. local understandings that grasped universal truths only
inaccurately and partially. At worst, they were outri.ght errors, the darkness
that Enlightenment challenged. Certainly, the sixteenth. and seventeenth-
century wars of faith seemed to cry out for universalistic reason and a cos-
mopolitan outlook. Yet, nationalism was as important a result as cosmo-
politanism, and the two developed often hand in hand. Religion sometimes
divided nations, but nations also provided a secular framework for achieving
unity across religious Hnes.
Early modern rationalism was also rich with contractarian metaphors
and embedded in the social imaginary of a nascent commercial culture.
It approached social life on the basis of a protoutilitarian calculus. an idea
of individual interests as the basis of judgment. and a search for the one
right solution. Its emphasis on individual autonomy. whatever its other mer·
its, was deployed with a blind eye to the differences and distortions of pri-
vate property. The claims of community appeared often as hindrances on
individuals. They were justified mainly when community was abstracted
to the level of nation, and the wealth of nations made the focus of politi-
cal as well as economic attention. Much of this heritage has been absorbed
into contemporary liberalism, including the political theory of cosmopoli.
tan democracy.
Like the earlier vision of cosmopolis. the current one responds to inter-
national conflict and crisis. It offers an attractive sense of shared respon·
sibility for developing a better soci€'ty and transcending both the interests
and intolerances that have often lain behind war and other crimes against
humanity. However. this appears primarily in the guise of ethical obligation,
408 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

884 Craig CalhoHn

an accou n t of what would be good actions and bow institutions and loyal.
ties ought to be rearranged. Connection is seldom established to .my idea of
political action rooted in immanent contradictions of the social order. From
the liberal rationalist tradition, contemporary cosmopolitanism also inher-
its suspicion of religion and rooted traditions; a powerful language of rights
that is also sometimes a blinder against recognition of the embedded ness
of individuals in culture and social relations: and an opposition of reason
and rights to community. This last has appeared in various guises through
three hundred years of contrast between allegedly inherited and constrain-
ing local community life, on the one hand, and the ostensibly freely chosen
soda.l relationships of modern cities, markets, associational life, and more
generally cosmopolis, on the other.
Confronting similar concerns in the mid-twentieth century. Theodor
Adorno wrote,

An emancipated society ... would not be a unitary state, but the real-
ization of universality in the reconciliation of differences. Politics that
are still seriously concerned with such a society ought not, therefore,
propound the abstract equality of men even as an idea. Instead, they
should point to the bad equality today ... and conceive the better state
as one in which people could be different without fcar. 2"

This is very inadequately achieved at the lev-el of the nation·state. to be sure.

but it seems harder. not easier. to develop in a gJobal polity. Indeed, the pro·
jection of nationality to a global scale is a major motivation behind repres-
sion of difference. This is not to say that cultural and social differences pro-
voke 110 conflict in villages or urban neighborhoods. They do, but face-to-face
rela.tions also provide for important fonns of mediation. Ethnic violence
in cities and villages commonly reflects organized enmity on a larger scale
rather than being its basis.
The tension between abstract accounts of equality and rooted accounts
of difference has been renewed in the recent professional qua.rrels between
liberal and communitarian political theorists. For the most part, cosmopoli-
tans model political life on a fairly abstract, liberal notion of person as a
bearf'r of rights and obligations."' This is readily addressed in rationalist
and indeed proceduralist terms. And however widely challenged in recent
years, rationalism retains al least in intellectual circles a certain presump-
tive superiority. It is ('asy to paint communitari.:m claims for the importance
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 409

Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers 885

of particular cultures as irrational, arbitrary, and only a shade less relativ-

ist than the worst sort of postmodernism.zlI But immanent struggle for a
better world always builds on particular social and cultural bases. 29 More·
over, rationalist universalism is liable not only to shift into the modeof"pure
ought" but to approach human diversity as an inherited obstacle rather than
as a resource or a bask result of creativity.
Entering this quarrel on the liberal side, but with care for diversity. Held
suggests that national communities cease to be treated as primary political
communities. He does not go so far as some and claim that they should [or
naturally will) cease to exist, but rather imagines them as one sort of relevant
unit of political organization among many. What he favors is a cosmopolitan
democratic community:

A community of all democratic communities must become an obli-

gation for democrats, an obligation to build a transnational. common
structure of political action which alone. ultimately. can support the
politics of self-determination.'o

In such a cosmopolitan community, "people would come ... to enjoy

multiple dtizenships-politicaI membership in the diverse political com-
munities which significantly affected them."31 Sovereignty would then be
~stripped away from the idea offixed borders and territories and thought of
as, in principle, malleable time-space clusters, ... it could be entrenched and
drawn upon in diverse self-regulating associations, from cities to states to
corporations."32 Indeed, so strong is Held's commitment to the notion that
there are a variety of kinds of associations within which people might exer-
cise their democratic rights that he imagines "the formation of an authori-
tative assembly of all democratic states and agencies, a reformed Gen·
eral Assembly of the Unitt:!d Nations .. ," with its operating rules to be
worked out in "an international constitutional convention involving states,
IGOs, NGOs, citizen groups and social movements."!J The deep question is
whether this all.embracing unity comes at the expense of cultural particu-
larity-a reduction to liberal individualism-or provides the best hope of
sustaining particular achievements and openings for creativity in the face
of neoliberal capitalism.
Various crises of the nation-s.tate set the stage for the revitalization of
cosmopolitanism. The crises wefe occasioned by the acceleration of global
economic restructuring in the T990S, new transnational communications
410 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

886 flows Calhoun

media. new flows of migrants, and proliferation of civil wars and humani·
tarian crises in the wake of the cold war. The last could no longer be com·
prehended in terms of the cold war, which is one reason why they often
appeared in the language of ethnidty and nationalism. Among their many
implications. these crises all challenged liberalism's established under·
standings of (or perh:lps willful blind spot toward) the issues of political
membership and sovereignty. They presented several problems simulta·
neously: Why should the benefits of membership in anyone polity not be
available to all people? On what bases might some polities legitimately inter·
vene in the affairs of others? What standing should organizations have that
operate across borders without being the agents of any single state (this
problem. I might add, applies as much to business corporations as to NGOs
and social movements) and conversely how might states appropriately regu-
late them?
Enter cosmopolitanism. Borders should be abandoned as much as pos-
sible and left porous where they must be maintained. Intervention on behalf
of human rights is good. NGOs and transnational sodal movements offer
models for the future of the world. These are not bad ideas, but they are
limited ideas.
The current enthusiasm for global citizenship and cosmopolitanism
reflects not just a sense of its inhenmt moral worth but also the challenge of
an increasingly global capitalism. It is perhaps no accident that the first ciled
usage under cosmopolitan in the Oxford English Dictionary comes from John
Stuart Mill's Political Economy in 1848: "Capita! is becoming more and more
cosmopolitan." 1>1 Cosmopolitan, after all, mean.s "belonging to aU parts oftne
world; not restricted to anyone country or its inhabitants." As the quotation
from Mill reminds us, the latest wave of globalization was not required to
demonstrate that capital fit this bil1. Indeed, Marx and Engels wrote in the
Communist Man~fCst(l,

l11e bourgeoisie hus through its exploitation in the world market

given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in
every country.... All old-established national industries have been
destroyed or are daily being dl?stroyed .. , . In place of the old local and
national seclusion and self-sufficiency. \\I{' have intercourse in ('very
direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in matf'ria!
so a.lso in intellectual production. The intellectual creatiom; in indio
vidual nations nations common property. National ol1c·:;idedm:ss and
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 411

Cla~5 Comciausness oJ Frequellt Tntl'ders &81

narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from

the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world
literature.3S
This is progress. of a sort, but not an altogether happy story. "The bourgeoi-
sie," Marx and Engels go on, "by the rapid improvement ofall instruments of
production. by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws
all. even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation.... It compels all
nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production;
it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e.,
to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its
own image.":u,
It is not clear that these new commonalties are necessarily a basis for
harmony, though, and Marx and Engels stressed the contradictions within
capitalism and the inevitable dashes among capitalist powers.
The rise of the modem capitalist world system was not simply a progress
of cosmopolitanism. It marked a historical tum against empire, and capi-
talist globalization has been married to the dominance of nation-st.ates in
politicsP Capitalist cosmopolitans have indeed traversed the globe, from
early modem merchants to today's World Bank officials and venture capi-
talists. They have forged relations that cross the borders of nation-states.
But they have also relied on states and a global order of states to maintain
property rights and other conditions of production and trade. Their pass-
ports bear stamps of many countries, but they are still passports and good
cosmopolitans know which ones get them past inspectors at borders and
airports.
Not least of all, capitalist cosmopolitanism has offered only a weak de-
fense against reactionary nationalism. This was clearly declasse So far as
most cosmopolitans were concerned. But Berlin in th.c 1930S was a very cos-
mopolitan city. Ifhaving cosmopolitan elites were a guarantee of respect for
civil or human rights. then Hitler would never have ruled Germany, Chile
would have been spared Pinocht't, and neither the Guomindang nor the
Communists would have come to power in China. Cosmopolitanism is not
responsible for empire or capitalism or fascism or communism, but neither
is it an adequate defense.
Even while the internal homogeneity of national cultures was being pro-
moted by lingUistic and educational standardization (among other means),
the great imperial and trading cities stood as centt'rs of diversity. Enjoying
412 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

&88 Craig Calhouu

this diversity was one of the marks of the sophisticated modt'HI modt'm urbanite
by contrast to the "traditional" hick hick. To be a cosmopoJitan
cosmopolitan was to be com·
f()ftable
fortable in heterogeneous public space!8 ;8 Richard Sennett dtes
cites (and builds
on) a French usage of 1738: "A cosmopolite,
cosmopolite ... .. is a man who moves com- com·
fortably in diversity: he is comfortable in situations which have no links or
parallels to what is familiar to him." Yet there is a tendency for commercial
capitalism and politkalHberalism
political liberalism to tame this diversity. While dties cities can be
places of creative disorder,
disorder. jumbling together ethnicities, classes. and politi.
ethnidties. classes, politi-
projects. most people claim only familiar parts of the diversity on offer.
cal projects,
The di.fference between a willingness to enter situations truly without par-
allels or familiarity and a willingness
\'.ilHngness to experience diversity as 3.."1 packaged for
consumer tastes is noteworthy. While Sennett's strong sense of cosmopoli· cosmopoli-
caBs for confrontation with dt"ep
tanism calls deep and necessarily contentious dif·
ferences between ways of life, there is a tendency for a soft cosmopolitan-
ism to emerge. Aided by the frequent.flyer
frequent-flyer lounges (and their extensions in
"international standard" hotels), contemporary cosmopolitans meet others
of different backgrounds in spaces that retain familiarity.
The notion of cosmopolitanism gains currency from the .flourishing flourishing of
multiculturalism
mu1tkulturalism-and -and the opposition of those who consider themselves
multiculturally modern feel to those rooted in monocullttral
monoculittral traditions. The
latter, say the former, are locals with limited perspective, if not outright
racists. It is easier to sneer at the far right, but too much claiming of ethnic
solidarity by minorities aisoalso falls
falll> afoul of some advocates of cosmopolitan-
ism. It is no accident either that the case against Salman Rushdie began to
be formulated among diaspork Asians in Britain or that cosmopoliticians
are notably ambivalent toward them. Integrationist white liberals in the
United States are similarly unsure what to make of what some of them see
as "reverse racism" on the part of blacks striving to maintain local commu- commu·
nities. Debates over English as a common language reveal related ambiva-
lence toward Hispanics and others. It H is important for cosmopolitan theo-
rists to recognize. though. that sodetiesoutside the modern West have by no
"monocultural," On the contrary,
means always been "monocultural:' contrary. it is the development
of the European nation-state that most pressed for this version of unity.
And it is often the insertion of migrants from around the world into the
We:;tem nation-slatt:'
Western nation-statt:' system that produces intense "reverse "rev('rse monocultural-
monocullural-
ism,"
ism," including both the notion that
!h:'lt the culture "back horne" is singular
j'back home"
and unified and pure and sometimes the ;:lttempt attempt by polilicalleadcrs
political 011 the
on
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 413

Class CotlSciouslUss of Frrqr.kmt Travelers 889

homefront to make it so. Such projects rnay be simply reactionary, but even
when proclaimed in the name of ancient religions, they often pursue alter-
native modernities. An effectively democratic future must allow for such
different collective projects-as they must allow for each other. It must be
built in a world in which these are pow(;'rful and find starting points within
them; 1t cannot be conceptualized adequately simply in terms of diversity
of individuals.
This complexity is easy to miss if one's access to cultural diversity is
organized mainly by the conventions of headline news or the packaging of
ethnidty for consumer markets. In the world's global cities. and even in
a good many of its small to'WllS, certain fonus of cosmopolitan diversity
appear ubiquitous. Certainly Chinese food is now a global cuisine - both in
a generic form that exists especially as a global cuisine and in more "authen-
tic" regional versions prepared for more cultivated global palates. And Olle
can buy Kentucky Fried Chicken in Beijing. Local taste cultures that were
once more closed and insular have indeed opened up. Samosas are now
English food just as pizza is American and Indonesian curry is Dutch. Even
where the hint of the exotic (and the uniformity of the local) is stronger. one
can eat internationally-Mexican food in Norway, Ethiopian in Italy. This
is not a11 "McDonaldization" and it is not to be decried in the name of cul-
tural survival. Nonetheless. it tells us little about whether to expect democ·
racy on a global scale, successntl accommodation ofimmigrants at home, or
respect for human rights across the board. Food, tourism, music, literature,
and clothes are all easy faces of cosmopolitanism. They are indeed broaden·
ing, literally after a fashion, but they are not hard tests for the relationship
between local solidarity and international civil society.
Despite the spread of consumerist cosmopolitanism. too many states still
wage War or take on projects like ethnic cleansing that an international pub-
lic might constrain or at least condemn. Profit, moreover, is pursued not
only in "above board" trading and global manufacturing. but in transna·
tional flows of people, weapons, and drugs. The "legitimate" and "illegiti-
mate" sides of global economic life are never fully separable--as is shown,
for example, by the role of both recorded and unrecorded financial transfers
in paving the way for the September II attacks. The cosmopolitan project
speaks to these concerns, suggesting the need not only for multilateral
regulatory agreements but for new institutions operating as more than the
sum- or net outcome-of the political agendas of member states. It may be
414 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

&90 Craig Culhm</l

that "legitimate" businesses have all interest in SUdl institutions and that
this will help to compensate for their weak capacity to enforce agreements.
Trying to secure some level of democratic participation for such tramma·
tional institutions will remain a challenge. though, for reasons suggested
in this essay. $0 too will avoiding a predominantly technocratic orientation
to global governance projects. Not least, there will be important tensions
between liberal cosmopolitan visions that exempt property relations irom
democratic control and more radical ones that do not. Ifthis is not addressed
directly, it is easy for the rhetoric of cosmopolitanism-and indeed cosmo-
politan democracy-to be adopted by and become a support for neoliberal
visions of global capita.lism.
Cosmopolitanism - though not necessarily cosmopolitan democracy-
is now largely the project of capitalism. and it flourishes in the top man·
agement of multinational corporations and even more in the consulting
firms that serve them. Such cosmopolitanism often joins elites across
national borders while ordinary people live in local communities. This is
not simply because common folk are less l:;ympathetic to diversity-a self·
serving notion of elites. It is also because the class structuring of public life
exdudes many workers and others. This is not an entirely new story. One
of the striking changes of the nineteenth and especially twentieth centuries
was a displacement of cosmopolitanism from cities to international travel
and mass media. Inten1ational travel, moreover. meant something different
to those who traveled for business or diplomacy and those who served in
armies fighting wars to expand or control the cosmopolis. If diplomacy was
war by other means, it was also war by other dasses who paid less dearly
for it.
Deep inequalities in the political economy of capitalism (as earlier of
empire) mean that some people labor to support others whose pursuit of
global relations focuses on acquisition and accumulation. Cosmopolitanism
does tlOt in itself speak to these systemic inequalities. any more than did the
rights of the bourgeoiS man that Marx crHidzed in tbe r840s. If tbere is to
be a major redistribution of wealth, or a challenge to the way the means of
production are controlled in global capitalism, it is not likely to be guided hy
cosmopolitanism as such, Of course, it may well depend on transnational-
even cosmopolitan-solidarities among workers or other groups. But it will
have- to contend both with capitalism's economic power and its powerful
embeddedness in the institutional framework of global relations.
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 415

Class CO/lsciousm:ss of Frequent Travelers 891

The affinity of cosmopolitanism to rationalist liberaL individualism has

blinded many cosmopolitans to some of the destructions ncoliberalism-
the cosmopolitanism of capital-has wrought and the damage it portends to
hard-won sodal achievements. Pierre Bourdieu has rightly called attention
to the enormous investment of struggle that has made possible relatively
autonomous social fields-higher education. for example. or science-and
at least partia1 rights of open access to them. 39 Such fields are organized
largely on national bases, at present, though they include transnational link-
ages and could become far more global. This might be aided by the "new
internationalism" (especially of intellectuals) that Bourdieu proposes in
opposition to the globalization of neoliberal capitalism. The latter imposes
a reduction to market forces that undermines both the spedfic values and
autonomy of distinctive fields-including higher education and science-
and many rights won from nation-states by workers and others. In this con-
text, defense of existing institutions induding parts of national states is not
merely reactionary. Yet it iscommonly presented this way, and cosmopolitan
discourse too easily encourages the equation of the global with the modern
and the national or local with the backwardly traditionaL
Neoliberalism presents one international agenda simply as a force of
necessity to which all people, organizations. and states have no choice
but to adapt. Much of the specific form of integration of the European
Union, for example, has been sold as the necessary and indeed all but
inevitable response to global competition, This obscures the reality that
transnational relations might be built in a variety of ways. and indeed that
the shifting forces bringing globalization can also be made the objects of
collective choice. likewise, existing national and local institutions are
not mere inheritances from tradition but-at least sometimes-hard-won
achievements of social struggles. To defend such institutions is not always
backward.
The global power of capitalism, among other factors, makes the creation
of cosmopolitan institutions seem crudal. But it would be a mistake for this
to be pursued in opposition to more local solidarities or without adequate
distinction from capitalism, Appeals to abstract human rights in themselves
speak to neither-or at 1east not adequately as currently pursued. Building
cosmopolitanism solely on such a discourse of individual rights-without
strong attention to diverse solidarities and struggles for a more just and
democratic social order-also flInS the risk of substituting ethics for polio
416 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

892 Cmig Calhoull

tics, An effective poptlla.r polliks mllst find roots in solitary sodal groups
and networks of ties among them.
The current pursuit of cosmopolitan democracy flies in the face of a
long history in which cosmopolitan sensibilities thrived in market cities,
imperial capitals, and court society while democracy was tied to the nation-
state. Cosmopolitanism flourished in Ottoman Istanbul and old.regime
Paris partly because in neither were members ofdifferent cultures and com-
munities invited to organize government together. It was precisely when
democracy became a popular passion and a political project that national-
ism flourished. Democracy depends on strong notions of who "the people"
behind phrases like "we the people" might be, and who might make legiti-
mate the performative declarations ofconstitution-making and the less ver·
bal performances of revolution.~Q
One way oflooking at modem history is as a race in which popular forces
and solidarities are always running behind. It is a race to achieve social inte-
gration, to structure the connections among people and organize the world.
Capital is out in front. Workers and ordinary citizens are always in the posi-
tion oftrying to catch up. As they get organized on local levels, capital and
power integrate on larger scales. States come dose to catching up, but the
integration of nation-states is an ambivalent step. On the one hand. state
power is a force in its own right-not least in colonialism-;;tnd represents
a Row of organizing capacity away from local communities. On the other
hand. democracy at a natjonallevel constitutes the greatest success that ordi-
nary people have had in catching up to capital and power. Because markets
and corporations increasingly transcend states, there is new catching up to
do. This is why cosmopolitan democracy is appealing.
Yet, as practical projects in the world (and sometimes even as theory) cos-
mopolitanism and democracy have both been intertwined with capitalism
and Western hegemony. If cosmopolitan democracy is to flourish and be
fully open to human beings of divers{' circumstances and identities, then it
needs to disentangle itself from neoliberal capitalism. It needs to approach
both crossculturai relations and the construction of sodal solidarities with
deeper recognition of the significance of diverse starting points and poten-
tial outcomes. It needs more discursive t'ngagemcl1t across lines of dif-
ference, more commitmt'ni to reduction of material inequality, and more
openness to radical change. Like many liberals of the past, advocates of cos-
mopolitan democracy offer a vision of political reform attractive to
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 417

Cw"s COflstiollsm:ss of Fmql«:nt Tmvelers 891

elites partly because it promises to find virtue without radical redistribution

of wealth or power. This is all the more uncomfortable for the left in the
advanced capitalist countries because those advocating more radical change
typically challenge Western culture and values-including much ofliberal·
ism-as well as global inequality.
The answer dearly does not lie with embracing illiberal nationalisms or
"fundamentalisms." These may be voices of the oppressed without being
voices for good. But not all nationalism is ugly ethnonationalism; not all
religion is fundamentalism. Both can be sources of solidarity and care for
strangers as well as xenophobia or persecution of heretics. They are also in
conflict with each other as often as they are joined together. But if cosmo-
politan democracy is to be more than a good ethical orientation for those
privileged to inhabit the frequent-flyer lounges, it must put down roots in
the solidarities that organize most people's sense of identity and location in
the world. To appeal simply to liberal individualism-even with respect for
diversity-is to disempower those who lack substantial personal or organi-
zational resources. It is also disingenuous, if would·be cosmopolitans don't
recognize the extent to which cosmopolitan appreciation of global diversity
is based on privileges of wealth and perhaps especially citizenship in certain
states. Cosmopolitan democracy depends on finding ways to relate diverse
solidarities to each other rather than trying to overcome them.
This is surely a matter of robust public communication in which ordi-
nary people can gain more capacity to shape both the societies within which
they live and the global forces that shape the options open to them. But
it is important to recognize that relations across meaningful groups are
not simply matters of rational·critical discourse but involve the creation of
local hybrid cultures, accommodations, collaborations. and practical knowl-
edge. Equally. it is important to see that attenuated cosmopolitanism won't
ground mutual commitment and responsibility, Not only tolerance but soli·
darity is required for people to live together and join in democratic self·
governance.
Still, feeling at home can't be {'nough an adt"quate basis for life in mod-
ern global society. Exclusive localism is neither empowering nor even really
pOSSible. however nostalgic for it people may ft>e-L Cosmopolitanism by itself
may not be enough; a soft cosmopolitanism that doesn't challenge capital·
ism or Western hegemony may be an ideological diversion; hut some form
of cosmopolitanism is needed.
418 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology,
Sociology , Volume Three

894 Craig CalhoHN

C~lhOiI/l

Notes

Earlier versinns
Earlkr vers;ttll~ of this eS$JY .....erl.' preRenled :11
eS!:3y wen; :lIthl'
th", (onti'fence wnw
contl'n'nce "TIlt' Futnl<" Futnrt" o!01 CosmopolitJn,
Cosmopolitan.
i~m" a1
al til
th.. University of Warwick, April ;;;000; In1eflliltionill Studies Ass(Jciati<'JIl
lOOO: 10 Ihe Int('mali0l'wl Association in
F~brwr)' 1.001: w
February 2001; W
to the Uni\TISity of NQrth North Cafolim
Cacolina "Conferem:e
MCunft'wlll:t' on L(K;Jj Ot>mol.raty and Glnb·
lOlal D(,rllouac), Glub·
alizatinn"
aliUliolJ" in March .a001; ;md at Cmdidn
200' ; ;lfld Candido Mendrs university in Mal'
Mendl's University ..1001. 1I am grateful
May );001. gratd'ul for
comtnenl~ on all thl:'Se
comments thf'Se occasions and cspertJlly from Pamela DeLargy.
"nd I?sjJedally DeLargy,
Delargy, Saurabh Dubt>, Duixo, Michael
Michar.1
!(F,rmedy,
~nnedy, l.auralaura MacDonald. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy. and ind Kathryn Sikkink.
1t goo..l auruy!)js.
For a gtlod $t'C Mary Kaldor,
aoaly$is. li'''C ¥Beyond Militarism, Arlll!!
Kaldor. ~Bey(md Ami!! Races and Arms Am\S COil- Con-
trol." III
tro!," in Craig CalhoUl1,
Calhoun, Paul Price. Price, and Ashley Tirnmer. Understamiing
AshJey'Jimme-r,
Tirnmer, Septtmbtr IIu (New
Understandin8 Seprem/)(r
York: New Press. 2.002.).
Nl'W Press,
PreS!, 2002).
2. E,
:!. E. 1'.
P. Thompson. "The ~The MOTalMoral Economy of uf tht:
~ English Crowd in ill the Eighteenl h Centllry.~
Century.~
Past and Pl1IWIt
Pa.>! Pn:scnt 50 (1971);(1971): 7G-l~6.
7fi-IJ6.
See David Held. Held, Del1lccrac),
lMnlOl:rac), und the
Del1lc,rac), t.IK Global Ordfr Orda;r (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Press.
1995);
1995): Cosmopolitan
CosmopolitGn Democracy: Democt'IJcy; An Agc:mia Agenda for for"a Nell'
Ntll' World Order, Daniele AKhi·
Ordtr. cd. J)anidl' Archi·
bugi and David D3vid Held [Stanford:(Stanford: St;mford Stanford University Press, IlJ9;); Rt;·lm"fjiniltg
l'rl'Ss, 1~95l; Rt;<lm"fjiniltg
Re-/~nillg Pol.itimlPoUtical
Community: Studies SJudies in CO$t/lOpoiitafl
Cosmopolitall iXmccmcy. LKII\OI:lYI(;)'. cd. Daniele Archibugi, Arcrubugi, David Held, Held. and
Martin KohlerKiihter /St:mfurd:
(St:Jnford: Stanford University Press, 1998), lield,
Press. 199B), Held, Archlbugi,
Archibugi. and their
colleagues conceptualize democratic cusmopolitan c:osmopolitan politics as a matter (If ofseveral layer;:
\;Jyl!'r~ of
partidpa!ion
participation in discourse and decision-making, including especially the slfengthening slfengtheni.ng
suengthening
(If institutions of global civil society,
of jnstitutions society, rather
society. ratilrr than
thal1 lin international politics
an intt"rnutional politiC.1 dominated by
nation-states. 1.ess tess layered lind and complex aC(Olmts lKcounts appt'ar in
aC(Ollflis ill Richard Falk's
F~lk's (all for glohal global
govl.'rnanc(' lind
gOV('fmUK(' and Marlha
Martha Nussbaum's
Nu.~baum·s universalism, universalism. See Richard Falk, FaIk, Human
HIlrMlt RighlS
Righl5 Hor!· Hori-
Hori<
.Ul1IS: Thr. r>u,,"-uit
zons: 111(; ofJusr.il.'l! in
f.>um.it ofJusticc iH a Globalizing World (New York: Routledge. zooo): and Martha
Routlt'dge, 2.(00);
2.000);
Nussbaum. Cultival-ing
Cultil'atillg UUI/un!"t}' (Cambridge: Harvard Univenrity
HJlInallUy (Cambridge: Uni\'er~ty Press,
Press. H)98).
1998).
4 One i1!
.. is reminded of Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Monamad's Mohnmad's
Mohamad's ;!(count account of human
right\! as the n('w
rights !l('W
nl'W ChrL~tiilnity-
ChrL~tW1ity. It make!; makes Etlwpcans
Europt!3J1s fee! feel entitled. h(> suggt'stt.'l.l, to invadi'
entitlt'<!. h(' invadeo
( ounlrir:s around tht'
(otmtrlt:5 Ih(' world and try Iry tn slIbvf'rt !ht'ir
to subv!"rl Ihf'ir traditional values, value~ . convert !h('m.
tlH·rn. and aud
subjugate t!wm.
suhjugate tlwm. Ma!Jatnir
tl1t'm. M.lhathir was of comse course def('nciing
defending lin an often aPIlJ;ive
3bl1.~ive government
govemm('nt as wdt wdl
loca! culture, but aII deep<?f
a.'lID4:al
liS deeper question is raised. raiSt'tl.
·Jihad ::md
-Jihad and MCW(lrld
McWorid opt'raieoFrale with wilh ('t!ua!
l"<\ual l1\:renglh
('tilla! opposite dlrectiollJ'l,
~;T('nglh in (lFposil.: lhe.· Vile
direction", ttl(' une clrin:n
vne t1rin:n
drin:n
hy parochial hatreds, the otiwr
p'.lrD4:hi31 hatredR, otht'r by univer5.1lizang li1ark('ts, markl.'ls, Ih(' (llle f!"«T(-ating
one f!"'(T(-ating
rf'-cr~ti"l!: am:ient
aru:itmt
subllatiol1al
subnatiollal and ethnic borders bordc?TS from Within. within . !hl~ tllher making war on Halional
1m! I'lther national brm.Ji'rs
bnrtlf'rs
witbout. Yet
from witbout Yt't jihad
Jihad and McWodd McWorld have havt this
Ihis ill commou:
cammon: they rnakt! war on the
they both ma.k<~
sn"'ercign natioll-stale
sovereign naUoll-statf' :md unt:iermi!l{'
undermint' the
and thus unt:iermilJ{' nation-state's demouatic
tilt' nation·state's in..,titulions"
oemouatic institutions"
(Kenjamin Barber, JillQd
(Benjamin jihad I'" I'>. Mcworld INew
I';;, jNew York; Timcs TImes Book;. 199;1. 6). David Held
Books. 1995i. Hf'IJ
similarly uppoSt!s "tradi!i\m::tl~
~imilarl~' OPP()St~S "tradilioJl:JI~ ,1Ild ami "glohal"
"global" in p<!$ilioning (()smopofjtanism
In p()sitioning between
'(l.qnlopl)litilni~m hetween
the'
Iht' two {op('ning
(op('ning remarks
(opt'lling rf'11I3r"" to the University UIliv~sily vI'
UniverSity 1)1' Warwick
Warwkk nmfert'llu', "TIlt' Fllt\JH:
C'Onferf'III.f'. "TIl{' FUIU ....' "I'
or
CosmupoJitantRlll").
CClsllJupolil:mislll").
(i Timoth)' Brennan,
(; Timothy Brennan. "Cosmopolitanism
"Cosmop"litanism Jlld JIKI fnlNn3lilmalism:'
fntt"rn.:ltil)fl;dism," Nr:w Nell' l.tjI Rcvi(1
Review, ll • !lO,
flD. 7

O;muJry-Febm:ny
(January-Ft'bmary 1.00>1): ~ooq: , ; .85; quotation fmrll from ;70, 0. Arguing
ArguiJl~ again~t ArchH:lllgi·i>
again~ l Al\:hibll!\i a(,l')Unt
'~ ilLl<)llIlt
o( th!'
of nathm·;;late, Bn:rllliHl
thl' nllti<llHitatt', Bn:nnilll rightly !1'.ltes 111)1..5 tlw imporlanc;c: .)f
thO' intrinllic imp01'hlfK<: ,)f imp<'riaii.o;m. a1- al-
though
thnllgh lw iw ascrib('ll rOlth.. r mnT<'
Jsuib('s rath,'f mOT,.. wmplclt' Lim>;!! L;Jusall"IWl"r
p"wer 10 to it rnan
Ihall history
hislory l,rJrr;mtll,
WJr"ill1~ .
., Tht'
The' Glll":311 tor wurld !!\iVemmellf
lur world l!uvcTIIlJlcnt i,;
!!\ivemmell1 is mDrt'
mort' impm:t:mt
imp"rt~l1t I.> 10 some u.srnupolita.Jl~ - o"tahly
SOll1l' co"",onol
"""",mom
Rkhard Falk ralk than liaan ullwrs.
utlwrs. S"I',
1IIh,..rs. St>1', fi)r
S"I', I:dll... 1I h,IH,H)
~Xd\llptl·, ""lk.
for ':X,Hll!lk, Uori:!cJm.
Rijlhl~ Hor;zIlWi.
htlth.llJ Hight,
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 419

8 111is is a ('cntral issul' in dl'lJatl's over gmup rights. St't', lQr t'xamptt'. will Kymlic.k.1, Multi.
cttltuml Citiunship (New York Oxtord University Pres~, 1995).
<) Ubcralh;m ofCOIlrSt' embraces a wicit' spcctrum of vlt'W$ in which emphases may faU mot{-
on propt'rty rights or more on democracy. So 100 cosmopolitanism can imply a global view
that is liberal, Ilot specifically democratic. Archibugi prefers cosnwpolitlcs to cosmopolitan
in order to signal just this departuff' from a more general imag€' of liberal g!obalunity.
See Daniele Archibugi, "Cusmopoliticai Democracy,ff Nelll'Left Review, no. 4 (July-August
20(0): 137-50.
10 On the predominance of nationalist und('fstandings in conccptiOOs of society. !Sec Cal-
houn. "Nationalism, PoHtkal Community. and the Representation of Society: Or, Why
Feeling at Home Is Not a Substitute for Puhlic Space; European Joumal of SodalT'hrory
2 (1999): 217-}1.
1\ John Rawls. Political Libemli~m (New York: C..olumbi3 University Prc$S, '993), 41.
12 See Craig Calhoun. Nationalism (Minn!.'lIpolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
'3 Daniele Archibugi, "Principles of Cosmopolitan Demo(;racy.~ in Archibugi. Held. and
Kohler, Re-lmagining Political Community, 198-228; quotation fronl 216.
14 Held. Democmcyan/J the Clcbal Order. 233. Held's hook remains the most system3tic and
sustained effort to develop a theory of cosmopolitan democracy.
15 Jilrgen Hahen-nas. The Inclusion oftire Other, ed. Claran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cam·
bridge: MIT Press. 1998), uS.
t6 Ibid., 117, Note that Habtmnas tends to equate ntltion with ethnic rwtion.
17 Charles Taylor. "Modem Sociallmaginarl!.'s." Public Culture (February 20(2): 1.
18 It is this last tendency that invites liberal rationalists occasioll4l11y to asc;rihe to communi·
tarians and advocate!; Qflocal culture c.omplicity in all man ner of illiberal political projects
from restrictiollS on immigration to excessive celebration of ethnic minorities to eco·
nomic protectionism. J have discussed this critically in Calhoun. "Nationalism, Political
Community. and the Reprt'sentation of Society."
'9 Richard Bellamy :ltId Dario Castiglione, "Between Cosmopolis and Community," in
Archibugi, HeJd. and Kohler, Rr.·/magit1ing Politlcol Community, 152-7~t
2.0 Sel.'. for example, Janna Thompson, "Community Identity and World Citizcnship: in
Archibugl. Held. and Kohler, Rr.lmogining Politit:al Community, 179-97·
21 Archibugi, "Cosmopolitical Democracy: 146.
:a2 I have developed this argument about public discourse:u; a form of or basis for solidarity
and its significance for transnational politics further in Craig Calhoun. "Constituti.onal
Patriotism and the Public Sphere: Interests. Identity. and Solidarity in the Integration of
EUfOpt'," in Gwlml Ethics and Tmnsrwtictl(t/ Politics, cd. Pablo De Greiff and Claran Cronin
(Cambridge: MIT Pres!!. 20(2). 275-312.
23 This hyper.Toc.qul'villiani,m appears famom;ly in R.oherl Putnam. Bowling Aioue (New
York: Simon and Schuster. 20(0). but has in fact been (crUral to discussions sine!.' at least
the 1980$, induding prominently RobC'rt Bellah. Richard Mad!\en. William M. Sullivan,
Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tiplnl1. I fabit5 of/he Hearl (Berkeley: Univt'rsity of California
Press, 19l'14). The embrace of 11 notiou ofcivil sOc!t"ty .IS centrally composed of a "voluntary
sector" compll'!mt'llting a capitalist market economy has of COUTS<' informed public policy
from Amf'rka's first Bush administration with its "thousand points of light" fi)lward.
420 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

896 Craig Caihoun

CaUroun

Among otrn'T f(",jlm"", ,his

OtlWT frolulE'S, Ihis ;lpproach
approach negk'({slhe
ncgICC:ls tht' notion political public
nOlion of aJ poli!i(~l publil: sphl'rt·.Is an
institution,,1
instilullOlll1t fralTlt'wurk
framt'wtJrk Ill' dvil ~vdcty;
Olf civil ~odety; Sel.'set: li,irgl'l1
Jiirgl'n Iiabe.rmas,
l1ah~rm;ls, Stn Stru.;ru,."r
•.::mml Trallsjilrl1mtillll
TrllHsjprm"tjllll
nflhl: Public Spn(re (Camhridge':
/>ul>lk Sph~e (Camhridgl': Mrr Mn' Press,
Prf'S!'. 1989). It grants a high levI:'! Icvl'1 ofautonolllY
ofautnnoll1Y tu to
markets
markels and <Iud economic :It;tr)f!l;
3(tor~: it is nota!>l.·.. for the
ill ootabl tl~ absent:e
absente of polltil:alec()!lonlY
political ('(onomy from i1S ils
theoretical bases al1d and a!lalyses,
analyS('S. As one resull. rt'llUh. it inlrvduces
introduces a sharp st'paration
separatiun IImong
among mar· mar-
kt,t. govemment,
kt't. gO\'(,fIlment, and aJld volUnlary
YOluntary as!;odatioli 'nonprofit) aC1!vity
'lSj;odation (nonprofit) al1ivity th:lt
thaI obscures
obscutt'S thcthe qut:'s,
(lUt'!i-
lion of how sodal ltlovemerm;
MW lIOdill moV(!ment§ may dlallellge challenge ecollomic
t'((lllomic institutions.
institutions, and how Ihe the public
sphert' 11111)'
:;pherl' mubilizr! government to snalX'
may mubilizc shape economir
~conomir practices.
2.4
~ 00 how global
On glQool NCO;;
/llGOs a<;(uaily
8<;tUally work, sec Margaret Keel< Keck aod
and Kathr)'tl
Kalhr)'n Sikkink.
Sikkink·, AftlVist~
Afhvjsl.S
&jIOIUi
Bt-'}'ol1d Bordm
Borders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 19<J8).
Pfess. 1998).
2.5 Stephc-n Toulmin's anal}'sis
See Stephf."!l analysis of the seventeenth-century
seventCt"nth-century foots roots of the tht" modem
modern liberal
rationalist worldview
rdtionalisl woddview in Stephen Toulmio, COJlnopnli.~; The Hidden Agenda of Modernity
Toulmin, COlmopoiL\;
(New
rNew York: Free Fret'! Press. 1990). As Toulmin notes. the rationalism of Descartes and N_rOll
ofDe5ClIrt~ N&wtou
may bt- be tempt'red
tempt"l'l>d with more attention atten1ion to sixteenth-century
sixtccnth-c.:entury forebears. from From Erasmus.
Erasmus,
Montaiglle. and others
Montaillue, othrrs M' WIt may garnergarner;m all alternative but still humane and even humanist humanilo1'
t'mphaslzing wisdom that inclUded
approach rmphasaing induclrd a sellSI.'
sel\St~ of the limits of l)f ralionalism ilndand a
~iti\fe grasp of hurnJIl
more positive hum'ln passions and attachment~.
:1.6
26 Theodor W. Adorno,
111eodor Adomo. Minima Morolia Morplia (London: New Ldt 8ook~, 1974),
Lett Books, 197041. 103.
'J.7
)'7 Amarlya
Amart)'a Sen, Sen. Owdopm~lIt
Dt~vtlopmt:llt ,\$ As Fr«dOIH
[fYl1e.:10nl (New York: Knopf. 20(0).laY52ooo),lays out an account 3(oounl (If of
"upacities"
"capacities" as an altt'rrmtiv('
~ all altt'fnaliV(' 10 10 the
t~ discourse
discour~ of rights. Thi$ This is abo
al~o adopted by Marthil Martha
NU$.<;baum
Nu.~~baum ill in her most fea!nl cosmopolitan
m~1 le(cnl arguments in Martha Nussbaum.
(osmopolit.1n arguments: NUlISbaum, Women WomePl and
Hwmi» Oevdopmettl
HWIHan (C3mbridge: Cambridge University Press,
Development {Cambridge: 2.000). While Ihl~
Press. 20(0), thb $hitts
shifts
emphases in some useful ways (notably from "negative" "neg;Jtive" 10 to "positive' lil>erties
liberties.injn Isaiah
l~iah
Berlin's termli).
terms), it does not st!bst~ntlally "thicker" conception ()f
nol offer a substantially of the pt·rson
pt'rslm orOTlh Ill",...
social nature of humall co~;rnopolitan theorists.
life. Some cosmopolitan
hum'llI life, th~ori..~ts. notably David Held. lake
Hl'ld, also 1akl.'
acknowlrdg<.> that
cart:' 10 a(knowlrdge
cart" propll' inhabit
thai pi'opll' socia! relations as well as rights ;,Ind
inhJbit !IOCial <!nd obligations.
obligatiornl.
1.8
.t8 See. I!xample.)arg>:'n l1abefmas.
See, for example,la~n ~Strugglf'5 ror
Habemla5, ~Strugglt'l\ ror Recognition In in Iht' D<-mocralic Con-
Iht.' D('monalk
stitutional Stale."
Stale," H3bcrmas's surprisingly sharp-toned
H~bcrmils's surprisingJy sharp.tonc.>d fl'Spom:e
rt'Spon~e to Charles Taylor, "The tiThe-
Politics
Jlo!itks of Rt'\:ognltion: Mlliti(/.lit«railSm: Examining tile
Rt'tognitioll." both in Mld~~l4humllSm; Po/ilics of
the Polilin of RtcogllilioH,
Rtxogllitiotl.
;::d. Amy Gulman
,,-d. Gutman (Prince\on:
(Princt'lon: PrincNonPrincelon Uniwnhy Press. 1994); Of
Univo;orsit)' Press, or lanna Thomp!!on's
Janna Thomp::;on's
di~toning examination of "(ommunitarlan"
di:;tOllillg ",ommunitarian" argumt'flts. Thompson, "Commullily
arguments. Janna Thompson. 'Communily
Identity, ~nd
Idenlil~. Jnd World Citizenship,"
Citizenship; in An:hibugi. Archibugi, Held, Hl'ld, and Kohler, R~-lmagining
R,.lmagil;ing P()/il/t.{l/
Pulilicnl
Community. 179-97,
COlllrttullily. 1"79-97,
2.9
29 This has been an :m important tht>ll"(etill"Jnf.' in the work of Ashi;; Nalldy. St·
Ashij; N::mrly. ... .!tlllng
$,,<-, Iniln)', Ashis
illnclOg many. A~his
N;mdy. f:ri/tod
N,mdy. Hom.: (Oxford: Oxford
fxi/rd al UQ»«: Univcl'l'ily Pre5s,
Oxlord Univer~j!y Press. 1998),
1995). and A~hh; Nandy, Tmdi·
A~hi!l Nandy. T",di·
ti.,,,s, Tyrol/lily.
lion,. TyrwlH~" and W,Jpi<l;
Ut,}pill~ {Oxfurd:
(Olfurd: O"lindOllford University Press. I'rt'S~. 19931,
19CJ~I.
lO
~o Derm1cracr tmd
H"IJ, DcIflI1€TIlC)'
l'II'Id, mul the
t/Ui GI.'''al O,..la. J,p.
GI,)hal Orllt" 1.)2.
3C
)1 Ibid .. ::lB·
l!Jid .:\)1-
Hw;L.. .tH,
P Ibid 2.14.
n Ibid.,
H Ibid .. 273"74.
.t73-74.
H This point is.
TIli:; poilll i~ alsu uy liwC!:
maUl' by
a!;.u maUl" Bruce' Robhin::;
~obbins !11 hb Senllnl'
In hi~ Sendrlr \fon:lIitlm: illldlecliUih. l'roji'.\)/Ilu.
\rOt:l.,jl,)II~: Intdltc!.lJlIls.
"/ism. Clll/llrt' (I.ondon:
a/ism, Cullurf V"'r>;t, Buuks,
(l.omJoH: V,'!'>;" H),),) , 1S.I..
Ruok~, 19<);1. ~kt' ;Ibn Bl'ul:\;
18.1.. Swal:!O Rohbiru;, "TIll:
BUI\;(,' Robbin::;. "111l' Village
Villagl'
"f the LibC'ral
"I Li\x>raJ Managerial ClaS's," in
M.aIl;Jgerial Cl;H;S," C'}Jm"p<uilim GL~'f!,ruphills: Ntw
ill Cosm,)pnlir.iJl! L"Cf!ti,lIlS in Litcfi!/ure
Nt'\(' (".I1/;,'n$ /'il(rflhm~
.md Cu/lloIrf,
(:lIltU!'/', i'i.L
(.,j, Vin:.y DharwadkM' (\lew
Vin:ty t>harw"dk.·( KouHcUI~'? ~OOll, 's- Sol.
(/\lew York: Routl('dg~,
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 421

Class C(}nsciOU~neS5 of Frr:quent Travelers 891

J5 Karl Marx and Friedridl Engels, Matlift$/<JoJlh( Commlll1i5ll'arty, ill Colwct.:d W(lrk~ (Lon·
don: Lawrenct> and Wishart, 1976),477"519: quotation from 488.
36 Marx and Engels. remarkable as their insight is, Wet(' fallible observers, Not much later in
the Communist Manifesto. they reported that modern subjection to capital had already
stripped workers of "every trac() of national character" (ibid .. 494).
)7 This is a central point of Immanuel Wallerstein. The MCldern Wor[d·S~ltm, vo!. 1 (New
York; Academic Press. 1974).
38 Richard Sennett. TIre FaIt oJPublk Man (New York: Knopf, 1977). 17.
39 See the essays in Pierre Bourdicu, Acts of Resi$/flncr (New York: New Press, 1999). and
Pierre Bourdieu, Ctmtrt:-ftux 2 (paris; Raisons d'agir, 20(1).
40 See Charles T.1ylor. "Modem Sodallmaginarles,n Public Culture J4(2oor!: I.
This page intentionally left blank
Name Index

Aarts, Paul 326 Bendix. R. 253

Abercrombie, N. 246 Beneria, L. xix, xxi
Abu Lughod, L. xxxi Benhabib, S. xxiv
Acharya, Amitav 334 Bentham, Jeremy 246
Adler, Emanuel, 323, 333, 334 Berger, P.L. 254
Adorno, Theodor 247,408 Berger, S. xv, xxi, xxxvi
Agnew, John 323 Bergeron, S. xxi
Ainley, S.C. 254 Berlin, Isaiah 75
Alagappa, Muthiah 326 Bhabha, Jacqueline xvii. xxx-xxxiv. 289-318
Albrow. M. 384 Bhagwati, Jagdish 329
Althusser, Louis 256 bin Laden. Osama 395
Alvarez, Alejandro xxv, 106 Black, Eugene 98
Alvarez, S. 88 Black, Richard 269, 279, 280
Amin, Samir 328 Bloch. Ernst 257
Anand, R.P. ll5 Boidevaix. Francine 328
Anderson, Benedict xix, 67 Braunerhjelm, Pontus R. 339
Andre. Catherine 58 Breckenridge, C. xxx, xxxii
Anselin, Luc 329, 336 Bremmer, Ian 327
Appadurai, Al:iun xix Brenner, Neil 385
Arango, J. 270 Bretell. C.B. 271
Arendt. Hannah 371 Brezhnev, Leonid xxix, 233, 234
Aristotle xxxii Brune. N. xix
Aron, Raymond 213 Bunce, Valerie xi, xii, xxvii-xxx, 215-40
Ayoob, Mohammed 335 Burawoy, M. 385
Bums. Robert 258. 393
Bach. Daniel C. 338 Busch, Marc 329
Bagaza, Jean-Baptiste 51 Bush, George W. xx, xxxvi
Bailes, Alyson 327 Buyoya, Pierre 51, 55
Balcerowicz. Leszek 233 Buzan, Barry 324, 335
Baldwin. David A. 321. 330
Balibar, Etienne xvii,274 Calhoun, Craig xxxvi,393-421
Banss. W. 374 Camdessus. Michel 129
Barbalet. J. 243 Cameron. Maxwell A. 337.338
Barber, Benjamin 398 Cammack. Paul 326
Barnett. Michael 334 Carlyle, Thomas 393,396
Basch. L. 281 Carnoy, M. 10
Baudrillard. Jean 4 Carothers, Thomas xi, xxvi, 169-85
Bauer, Bruno 246 Carr. B. xviii
Bauman, Zygmunt 260, 270 Castells, Manuel 10,270,281,323
Bayoumi, Tamim 333 Castiglione, Dario 403
Beck, Ulrich xxxv, xxxvi, 20, 243, 258, 270, Castles, Stephen xxxi, xxxiv, xxxv, 267-87
369-91 Castro, Fidel 100, 110
Bellamy, Richard xvi, xxiv, 349-66, 403 Cernea. M.M. 269
424 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Chakrabarty, D. xxx. xxxii Eichengreen, Barry 333

Chase-Dunn, Christopher 321 Einhorn, B. xxix
Chatteziee, Partha 147 Einstein, Albert 73
Chavez, Hugo 175 Eisenhower, Dwight N. 104-5. 110
Cheung, Ting Ting 307-9 passim Eisenstein, Z. xxxi
Chimni, B.S. 282 Elster. Jon 71
Clausen. Alden W. 120 Engels, Friedrich 410-11
Cloward, R. xx Equivel, Gerardo 338
Cohen, Benjamin J. 334 Escobar. Arturo III
Cohen,R.275,279,281 Ethier, Wilfred J. 329
Comaroff, John L. xiii Ewing, K.D. 263
Comaroff, Jean xiii
Conable. Barber B. 117.120-21 Faist, T. 278,281
Connell. R. W. 277 Farrell, H. xiv
Connolly, W. xxvii Fatin. Parastoo 301
Cooper, Robert 41 Fawcett, Louise 324, 339
Corbacho, A. xix, xx Featherstone. M. 4
Corbridge, Stuart 323 Fein, Helen 61
Cornelius, Wayne A. xxxv Ferguson, James 97
Cottey, Andrew 327 Ferry, Luc 250
Cowling, Keith 339 Fichte, Johann G. 67, 250, 260
Creveld. Martin van 31 Filmer. Sir Robert 257
Croft, Stuart 328 Fine, Robert 376,390
Cromer. Lord 140 Fisher, J. 260
Cromwell, Oliver 258 Fisher, Saideh 302
Croucher, S. xix, xxiv Frankel, Jeffrey A. 322,329
Fraser, Nancy 261
Dahl, RobertA. xxvi, 155, 161, 162, 187, 188 Freeden, Michael 244
Dallmayr, F. xxxii, xxxvi Frisby, D. 260
d'Azeglio, Massimo 74 Fuchs, Gerhard 339
Delamaide, Darrell 337 Fujita, Masahisa 332, 339
Delanty, Gerard 389
Dell, Sidney 129 Gallagher, A. 269
Derrida, Jacques 254 Gandhi. Indira xxxii. 115
Desai. M. xviii Gandhi. Mahatma 70.75
de Senarclens. P. xix Garrett, G. xix
Dewey, John 377 Gearty, C.A. 263
de Wilde, Jaap 335 Geddes, Barbara xxvi, xxvii
Diamandouros. P. Nikiforos 195 Gehlen, Arnold 243,254,255,257,262
Dietz, M. 261 Gellner, Ernest xxix, xxx, 207-14
Dillon, Douglas 104 George, Susan 136
Dostoevsky, Fyodor 393 Giddens, Anthony 4
Douzinas. C. 254 Giersch, Carsten 328
Du Bois. W.E.B. xxxii Gilani. Mashid Mahmoudi 298-300 passim
Duffield, Mark 272, 273, 282 Goethe. Johann W. von 377
Dulles, John Foster 99-100 Goldberg, D. 278
Dunn, J. 244 Gonzalez, Guadalupe 338
Dunning, John H. 340 Goodin. R.E. 256
Durkheim, Emile xxx, 243, 244-5 passim, 250, Gorbachev, Mikhail xxx, 55,214,216,232,233
260,277,385,388,389 Gordon. M. 277
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 425

Gore.AI 42 Huntington, Samuel xi,215

Gottman, Jean 338 Hurrell, Andrew 324, 326, 339
Gramsci. Antonio 74 Hussein, King of Jordan 110
Grande, Edward 383, 389 Hussein. Saddam xxxi
Grieco, Joseph M. 336 Hveem, Helge 337
Griffiths. leuan 338
Grossman, Gene 329 Inotai. Andras 321. 337
Guibernau. M. xix Iran, Shah of 301
Gunther, Richard 195
Gurr, Ted R. 47,49 Jacobson. H. xxv
Jenks, Wilfred 113
Haas. P. xiv Joas, H. 254
Habermas, Jiirgen xvi,402 Jonas, Andrew 385
Habyarimana, Juvenal 51,52,53,54,55,56 Jones, Charles 324
Haftendorn, Helga 330 Jordan, B. 243
Haggard, Stephen 338
Hand, S. 257 Kakar, Sudhir 76
Hardin. Russell 72 Kakazu, Hiroshi 337
Hardt, M. xii Kaldor, Mary xxiii, xxiv, 31, 272, 282
Haq, Mahbub ul 114 Kant, Immanuel 260,377,384,389
Harff, Barbara 47, 61 Kaplan, Robert 41
Harley, Keith 328 Karl, Terry L. xxvii, 155-68
Harrison, M.L. 251 Kasinga, Fauziya 315,316
Harvey, David 4 Kasten. Robert Jr 120
Heidegger, Martin 67 Katzenstein, Peter J. 335
Held, David 31,270,281,401,403,409 Kayibanda, Gregoire 51
Helpman, Elhanan 329 Kearns,Ian 321,327,337
Henderson, Jeannie 334 Keck, M. xviii
Herder. Johann G. von 67.377 Kedourie. Elie 209
Herod the Great, King of Judea 307 Keller, Edmond J. 324
Hettne, Bjorn 321,328,333,335,337,339 Kellner. H. 254
Hill, Polly 142 Kelly, Dominic 335
Hill. S. 246 Kelsen. Hans J. 249
Hirst, Paul Q. xviii, xxiii, 29--44, 245 Kenen, Peter B. 333
Hitler, Adolf 36,68,210,214,411 Kennedy, P. 279
Hobbes, Thomas 73, 257-8 passim Kennan, George 101
Hobson, J. 16 Kent. J. 269
Holleman, W.L. 253 Keohane, Robert O. 330
Hollifield. J.F. 271 Khomeini, Ayatollah 301,302
Holmes, Stephen 230 Khong, Yuen Foong 324,334
Holton. R.J. 246 King, Charles 217
Honig, B. xxvii Koch, Andrew M. 339
Honneth, A. 254 Konidaris, Gerasimos 327
Hoogvelt, A. 271 Kontos. A. 253
Hook, Glenn 321,337 Kriesi. H. 383
Horkheimer. Max 247 Krueger, Anne O. 329
Hormats, Robert D. 329 Krugman, Paul 332, 339
Horowitz. Donald 68 Kundera, Milan 67
Humboldt, Alexander von 377 Kupchan, Charles A. 327
Hume. David 353 Kuper, Leo 47
426 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Kymlicka, W, xxiv Mayer, Frederick W. 338

Mearsheimer, John J. 330
Laitin. D. xxx Medvedev, Sergei 324
Lakatos. 1. 374 Meinig, Donald W, 323
Lake. DavidA. 321,325,330-31,332,336 Meja, V. 247
Lash. Scott 4 Mestrovic, Stjepan 260
Lau. C. 374 Meyer, John xiv, xxxvi, 384
Lawrence, Robert Z. 329 Michel, Robert 406
Leca. J. xvii Micombero, Michel 50, 51
Lee. James 114 Mill. James 246
Lee. Karen 307.308 Mill, John Stuart 74,246,410
Lefort, C. 246 Miller, M.J. 278
Le Gales, Patrick xiv, 339 Milner, Helen V. 321,322,329,337,338
Lenin. Vladimir 1. 214 Milosevic, Siobodan 42
Lequesne, Christian 339 Mitchell, Tim xxiv, xxv, 135-52
Levine. D.N. 256 Mittelman, James H. 328
Levis, Martin W. 321 Mommsen. w,J. 248
Levy, D. 381,383 Moore, Barrington 258
Lijphart, Arend 75 Moravscik. A. 362
Linz. Juan J. xxvi. 190 Morgan, Patrick M. 321,324,325,330
Little, Richard 324 Morrison, R. xxxii
Lobell, Steven A. 324 Morse. Bradford 124
Locke, John xxxii,257 Murphy, Alexander B. 323, 333
Luckman. T. 255 Museveni. Yoweri 53
Luhmann, Niklas 384 Myers, N. 269
Lutz. H. 274
Lyotard, Jean-Fran<;ois 4,371 Narlikar. A. xxv
Ndadye, Melchior 56
McDowell, C. 269 Negri, A. xii
Macedo. S. 246 Nehru. Jawaharlal 75
MacIntyre, Alasdair 245, 246 Neuhouser, F. 260
McNamara. Robert 114.119 Newman, David 323
McNerney, P. xxiii Newman, Peter 339
Macpherson, C.B. 253 Nicholson, L. 261
McRobbie, Angela 376,389 Nietzsche, Friedrich 248,249,254,377
Madison, James 158 Nischalke, Tobias 334
Mahmood. S. xxiii Nixon. Richard 148
M~ione, G. 362, 364, 365 Nussbaum, Martha xxxi, xxxii
Mandela, Nelson xi,71 Nyangoma, Leonard 56
Mann, Michael xxi, xxii, xxiv, 3-27, 253
Mannheim, Karl 247,397 O'Donnell. Guillermo xi, xxvi, 170, 174,
Mannin, Mike 328 187-204
Mansfield, Edward D. 321,322,337 Offe, Claus xvi, xvii
Marcusen, Martin 333 O'Loughlin, John 322,329,336
Mares, David R. 326 Ong,A. xii
Marshall, T.H. xxx, 250, 252 Oye, Kenneth A. 329
Marx, Karl xxx, 212, 243, 246, 247, 277, 377,
410-11. 414 Paasi. Anssi 333
Massey, Doreen S. 271 Page, Sheila 321,322
Mastanduno. Michael 324 Painter. Joe 333
Mattli, Walter 321,331,333,337 Panagirya, Arvind 329
 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three 427

Papasotiriou, Harry 328, 329 Russell, S.S. 270

Papayoanou, Paul A. 325 Russet, Bruce M. 322
Park, Robert E. 277 Rustow, Dankwart 172, 219
Parsons, Talcott 245,257,260,277, 384 Rwagasore, Louis 50
Pelagidis, Theodore 328, 329
Pervin, David J. 324,326 Sack. Robert D. 338
Petchesky, R. xxxi Sadowski, Y. xxiii
Peter, Laszl6 333 Said, Edward xxiv
Pettman, Ralph 328 Sandel. Michael 246
Phillips, Nicola 326 Sandler. Tom 328
Pinochet, Augusto 411 Sassen. Saskia xx. xxii. 281
Piven, Francis F. xx Savitch, H. xiii
Platteau, Jean-Philippe 58 Scheler, Max 243, 250, 260
Plessner, Helmut 254 Schelling, Thomas 70
Pogge, T. xxxi, xxxii Schleifer. Andrei 234
Polanyi, Karl 107 Schmitter, Philippe C. xxvii, 155--68, 170
Pollack, M. xvi Schochet. G.J. 257
Pollock, S. xxx, xxxii Schopenhauer, Arthur 250, 260
Portes,A. 271,279,281 Schott, Peter 325
Preuss, Ulrich K. xvi, xvii Schreurs, M. xiv
Prunier, Gerard 52, 60 Schultz, T. W. 142
Przeworski, Adam 194, 239 Scott, Allen J. 321,339,340
Puhle, Hans-Jlirgen 195 Searle, John R. 323
Putin, Vladimir 228,231,324 Sen, Arnartya xix
Sennett, Richard 412
Rabushka, Alvin 71-2 Shaw, Martin xxii, 5, 7, 23, 372
Rajagopal, Balakrishnan xxv, 85-134 Shepsle, Kenneth 71-2
Rawls, John xxxi, 353, 400-401 passim Shevtshova. Lilia 325
Reagan, Ronald 169 Shihata, Ibrahim 112, 113, 120
Regan, T. 259 Shirk, Susan L. 326
Reno, William 338 Shore. Sean M. 334
Rhodes, Matthew 333 Shultz, George 170
Richards, Alan 143 Sikkink. K. xviii
Riggins, W. Howard 337 Silliman, J. xxxi
Risse, Thomas 333 Simmel, Georg 256,377
Robertson. R. 244 Simmons, P. xxv
Robinson. J. xi Singer, Peter xiv
Roche, M. 243 Singh, Hari 335
Rodriguez-Pose, Andres 332.339 Smith. Adam 377
Rodrik. Dani 332 Smith. Alan xix
Roeder, Philip G. 324 Smith. Anna Marie xi-xl
Roett, Riordan 326 Smith. James C. xviii
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 358,364 Snyder, J. xxxi
Rosecrance, Richard 324, 325 Solingen, Etel 321,332
Rosenblum. M. xxxv Solomos, J. 274
Rosenstein-Rodan. Paul 100 Sontag, Susan 258
Rotberg, R. xiv Spencer, Herbert 277
Rotte, Ralph 337 Speth, J.G. xiv
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques xxvii, xxxii, 389 Spruyt, H. xiv
Roy,A. 269 Srinivas. M.N. 74
Rushdie, Salman 393,412 Stalin. Josef 210.214
428 New Critical Writings in Political Sociology, Volume Three

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo 47 Van Hear, N. 271,275,281

Stehr, N. 247 Varshney, Ashutosh xxiv, 67-81
Stein, Arthur A. 324 Vasta. E. 274
Stent, Angela 325 Vayrynen, Raimo xv, 321--47
Stepan, A. xxvi Venables, Anthony J. 332. 339
Stiglitz, Joseph 273 Vertovec, S. 281
Storper, Michael 340 Vinjamuri, L. xxxi
Strauss, Leo 247,250,262 Volkan. Vamik D. 60
Sugen, Roger 339
Sum, Ngai-Ling 337 Wacquant, Lois xx
Summerfield, D. 272 Wade, Robert xix, 10, 12
Sunkel. Osvaldo 321. 337 Waever, Ole 325, 335
Szelenyi, 1. 247 Walby, S. xix
Szerszynski, Bronislaw 389 Walesa. Lech 220
Sznaider, N. xxxv, xxxvi, 369-91 Wallander. Celeste A. 330
Wallerstein, Immanuel xiii, xiv, xvii, 274, 384
Tang, Min 337 Wapner, P. xiv
Tarrow. S. xviii Warrington, R. 254
Taylor, Charles 74,402 Weber, Max xxiv, xxx, 67, 69, 77, 197,243,
Taylor, Paul 337 244,247-9 passim, 369, 370, 372, 383,
Taylor, Thomas G. 4 389
Tester. K. 259 Wei, Shang-Jin 329
Teune, Henry 239 Weiner, M. 270
Thant, Myo 337 Weiss, Linda xx, 16
Thompson, Edward P. 395 Wieviorka, M. 277
Thompson, Graham XVlll Wigen, Karen E. 321
Thompson, William 321 Wilde, Oscar 406
Tilly, Charles 338 Winters. L. Alan 322
Tocqueville,Alexis de 159,377 Wohlfort, William C. 324
Tomlin, Brian W. 337,338 Wood. Adrian 332
Tornell, Aaron 338 Woodiwiss, A. 251
Treisman. Daniel 234 Woods, N. xxv
Truong, T-D. xxxii Wrench. J. 274
Tsing, A. 385
Turner, Bryan S. xxx, xxxi, xxxii, 243-66, 373, Xenos. N. 255
385.389
Turner. F. xix. xx Yeltsin, Boris 188,214,228,231,233,235
Young, I.M. xxiv, xxxi, xxxii
Udall, Lori 123 Yuan. Lee Tsao 337
Ungar, R.M. 246 Yue. Chia Siow 337
Urry, John 4,389
Uvin, Peter xxiv, 47-65 Zlotnik. H. 269
Zolberg, A.R. 271, 282
van der Wusten, Herman 322 Zukrowska, Katarzyna 333