NAVARRO VS.

DOMAGTOY, 259 SCRA 129

FACTS:

1) On October 27, 1994, respondent Judge Hernando performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in the judge’s residence in the municipality of Dapa, outside his court’s
jurisdiction
2) Respondent holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
del Norte
3) Complainant, Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte Mr. Navarro, filed an administrative case against
respondent for gross misconduct and ignorance of the law
4) Respondent’s claim: solemnizing the marriage did not violate Art. 7 (1) because he was exercising Article 8 as
justification for having solemnized outside his court’s jurisdiction

ISSUE:

W/N an incumbent member of the judiciary has the authority to solemnize marriage outside his jurisdiction?

RULE:

No. An incumbent member of the judiciary has no authority to solemnize marriage outside his jurisdiction.

RATIO:

Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing officer”. Under Article 7,
marriage may be solemnized by among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”.
The said provision expressly provides that judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. In the same manner that a priest is only allowed within the area of the diocese.

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Art. 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official
to administrative liability.

Moreover, Article 8 is a directory provision which refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony. Marriage can only
be done outside of the judge’s chambers only when 1) point of death; 2) remote places; and 3) upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn statement. No pretense that either spouses was at the point of death or in a remote place.

CONCLUSION:

Respondent judge is hereby suspended for 6 months and given a stern warning that a repetition of such will be
dealt more severely.
 ARANES VS OCCIANO

FACTS:

1) Respondent Judge Salvador Occiano, presiding Judge of municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur
solemnized the marriage of the petitioner, Mercedita Aranes, to her late groom Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction
2) Then spouses lived together until her husband passed away but since the marriage was declared null,
petitioner’s right to inherit the vast properties and left by Orobia was not recognized
3) Petitioner charged the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law before Office of the Court
Administrator
4) Judge claimed that he solemnized the marriage out of human compassion; due to the earnest please of the
parties, influx of visitors, and feared that if the wedding be reset, it might aggravate the condition of Orobia who
just suffered from a stroke
5) Office of the Court Administrator found the respondent guilty of solemnizing a marriage without marriage
license and for doing so outside of his jurisdiction and a fine of 5K

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction?

HELD:

Yes, the respondent judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction.

RATIO:

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and
judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefor is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of law for he allegedly solemnized
the marriage out of human compassion but he still cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

CONCLUSION:

Fine of 5K with stern warning that repetition shall be dealt more severely.
 ELADIO D. PERFECTO VS. JUDGE ESIDERA

Facts:

1. Judge Esidera was 1st married to Richard Tang on 1987 which was later void on January 1992.
2. On October 1990 Judge Edales-Esidera gave birth to a daughter with Renato Esidera
 Based on certification of marriage records: both were married on June 1992
3. Complainant (Perfecto) alleged that Judge falsified her daughter’s birth certificate to make it appear that she
and Renato were married on March 1990 and that their daughter was a legitimate child. No marriage took place.
4. Judge’s response: motion to dismiss and argued that Perfecto’s allegations were hearsay or “tsismis” ; indeed
she was married to her second husband on March 18, 1990 but only under recognized Catholic rites. The
marriage was merely a sacramental marriage entered into only to comply with the requirements of their
religious beliefs.
5. Court of Administrator: Juge be found guilty in engaging in an “illicit affair” and contracted a marriage while
another marriage subsisted

Issue:

W/N the 2nd marriage solemnized by a religious sector is a valid marriage to constitute an illicit affair.

Held:

No. The 2nd marriage is invalid and does not constitute bigamy.

Ratio:

SC held that religious marriages are recognized in and may be governed by our laws only if the conform to legal
requirements. Religious marriages that lack some or all the requirements under the law are invalid.

In the case at bar, the lack of authority of the officer (not license by National Archives of from Civil government) that
solemnized respondent judge’s marriage in 1990 renders such marriage invalid. It is not recognized in our law and are
not considered to have been entered into. They do not enjoy the benefits, consequences, and incidents of marriage
provided under the law. Hence, no second marriage can be imputed against the respondent judge while her first
marriage subsisted.

Conclusion:

SC held the respondent guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended
for 1 month and was sternly warned.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS & CASTRO, 236 SCRA 257

Facts:

1. Angelina Castro and Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Malvar which was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents
2. Cardenas personally attended to the processing of marriage license
3. Only when the wife got pregnant did the 2 lived together but the cohabitation only lasted 4 months and they
parted ways
4. Daughter was adopted by Castro’s brother now in US and Castro wanting to follow her baby, wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving.
5. Consulted a lawyer re: possible annulment and then discovered no marriage license was issued
6. Castro filed a petition to RTC with certificate from Civil Registrar that the license did not appear on their record
7. TC: denied ; basis: certificate was inadequate and the inability of the official to locate is not proof that there was
no marriage license
8. Castro appealed to Appellate Court; AC: reversed the decision and declared Marriage as null and void
9. Petition for certiorari; RP: AC erred in decision; basis: AC relied on the self-serving testimony of private
respondent and AC disregarded that it was solemnized before Judge Malvar

Issue:

W/N the marriage between contracting parties is null and void for the lack of marriage license?

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on 1970, the law governing marital relations was the new Civil
Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage
void ab initio.

Conclusion:

Petition is denied & no error committed by the appellate court.

Facts:

1. Marilou filed a complaint against Judge Bernabe for grave misconduct and ignorance of the law
2. Complainant’s alleged:
(1) She and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge Bernabe
(2) Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be released 10 days after October 4, 1993; Marilou
visited the office of the Judge only to find out that she could not get a marriage license; claims that
Judge conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her
3. Respondent denies the allegation and contends that:
(1) LCR has actually prepared the marriage license but was not released due to the objection of the father
(2) That he did not violate any law and had acted in good faith when he solemnized the marriage as he was
moved by desire to help a begging and pealing complainant who wanted an assurance due to her
pregnant condition
(3) In order to pacify the complainant, Marcelo requested him to perform the marriage ceremony
(4) Both parties were fully apprised the effects of a marriage performed without a marriage license

Issue:

W/N the act to solemnize marriage without the requisite marriage license constitutes misconduct on the part of the
Judge?

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

Respondent Judge by his own admission that he solemnized the marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno
without the required marriage license has dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the “embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence” and to his promise to be “faithful to the law”.

Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which at most, would serve only to mitigate
his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of the law.

Family Code declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the forma requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

Conclusion:

Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of 10K and is sternly warned.

Facts:

1. At high noon on July 1981, 4-year-old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to the mother of Susana that
Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias was killing her
2. Susana’s father called the Mabolo police and later the police arrived and found Susan dead, her intestine having
spilled out of her abdomen, small kitchen bolo was at her side and beside her 1-month old child
3. Accused contents that the trial court erred in:
(1) They were legally and validly married with the deceased in a church wedding ceremony because there was
no marriage contract executed, hence he could only be liable for homicide

Issue:

W/N the marriage between the accused and the deceased victim is valid or not.

Held.

Yes, it is valid.

Ratio:

The Court held that there is no better proof of marriage in the admission of the accused of the existence of such marriage.
In addition, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said
marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites.

Conclusion:

Appealed decision is hereby affirmed with indemnity from 12K to 30K.

Facts:
 Tomasa Vda. de Jacob vs. CA (Presumption of Marriage)

Nature of the Case: This is a Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration

Facts: Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and
was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage
Contract between herself and the deceased.

Respondent Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo, purportedly
supported by an Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.

Pedro sought to intervene during the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Alfredo, claiming his share of
the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and sole surviving heir. Pedro likewise questioned the validity of the
marriage between Appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.

Appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana,
CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract
stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In
lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
Several irregularities on the reconstructed Marriage Contract were observed by the court such as: (1) no copy of the
Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer; (2) a mere “thumbmark” was
purportedly placed by the late Alfredo Jacob on said reconstructed marriage contract on 16 September 1975 (date of
the marriage), instead of his customary signature as affixed in their Sworn Affidavit; (3) inconsistencies in the
circumstances and personalities surrounding the lost Marriage Contract mentioned in the affidavit executed by Msgr.
Yllana and in the testimony admitted by the appellant; and (4) appellant admitted that there was no record of the
purported marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee Pilapil, sustaining his claim as the
legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious
and non-existent. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court.

Issues: 1. WON the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was indeed
valid

Held: Yes. The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid.

Ratio: Pilapil’s claim that the marriage was void due to absence of a marriage license was misplaced. An affidavit executed
by the appellant and the late Dr. Jacob that they lived together as husband and wife for at least five years exempted them
from the marriage license requirement (Article 76 of the Civil Code).

Also misplaced was Pilapil’s argument that the marriage was void because of the absence of a marriage contract and the
absence of entry of such in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar and in the National Census and Statistics
Office. A marriage contract is the best evidence of a marriage ceremony. However, “the contents of a document may be
proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and
its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the
marriage contract.” In the instant case, appellant provided competent evidence to prove that a marriage ceremony was
solemnized between her and the late Dr. Jacob. Such evidence was supplied by appellant Tomasa, witness Adela Pilapil
and the solemnizing officer Msgr. Yllana through their sworn testimonies both in open court and in writing, and through
the photographs taken during the ceremony.

The absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the
National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO) does not invalidate the marriage. It is primary duty of the solemnizing
officer, not the petitioner, to send a copy of the marriage certificate to these offices in order to be duly recorded.

In the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. As the fact that Dr. Jacob and
appellant Tomasa lived together as husband and wife was not disputed in this case, but was in fact even accepted, it
would follow that the presumption of marriage was not likewise rebutted.