RESEARCH NOTE

DARK SHIP DETECTION AND MANAGEMENT

SYSTEM
SIDDHESH DALVI
A dark ship can be defined as any marine vehicle that cannot be detected by the
standard tracking systems used by maritime authorities. These vehicles include all
surface, subsurface and underwater vessels including but not limited to surface
ships, unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, drones etc.

A common but potentially unscrupulous practice is for vessel operators to “go

dark” to public maritime tracking systems. Some vessel operators may choose to
hide from public view for legitimate reasons, which may include hiding from
pirates or other navigational security purposes. Though sometimes justified,
disabling tracking systems can jeopardize the safety of a vessel and it’s crew,
possibly putting them at a higher risk of colliding with another vessel, especially at
night. However, this behaviour may indicate that a vessel is intentionally avoiding
detection to hide suspicious or illegal activity such as unauthorized fishing
activities, terrorism, piracy, hijacking or other illicit operations. [1]

Other than disabling the transponders of the tracking systems, certain ships may
not be detected due to reliability and manipulation issues. The reports received
may be unintentionally incorrect, jammed or deliberately spoofed or tampered with
[2] Any receiver relies on a constant supply of power and internet connection in
order to send a consistent stream of transmissions to a centralized server. Much
like any computer technology it can be subject to technical malfunctions. These are
especially pertinent in the more remote parts of the world, where internet
connections are poor and power outages are more common. Antennas used in the
tracking system can also be affected by adverse weather conditions such as
lightning strikes. This means that receivers can go offline and subsequently vessels
transmissions can be missed. Non-uniqueness of MMSI numbers and signal
interference in crowded areas also add to inaccurate data. [3]

AIS was developed by the IMO technical committees as a technology to avoid

collisions among large vessels at sea that are not within range of shore-based
systems [4]. Hence, incorrect AIS data is also harmful for the safety of the ship
itself. An effective management system can help to detect such dark ships and
prevent the illegal activities that may be intended. Due to the hazards posed by a
ship going dark, it is not only necessary to identify such ships but also create an
effective real time management system which enables continuous monitoring of a
particular area so as to avoid any threatening activities or navigational hazards. It
also provides a method for disaster response and management for the respective
authorities.

APPLICATIONS of the bigg

Environmental Protection: We can identify vessels engaged in illegal bilge
dumping. Oil spill information from satellites matched with the data from this
system will provide a mechanism to identify the polluting vessel and provide key
evidence for use in investigation and prosecution.
Sovereignty Protection: Such a system will allow us to detect naval vessels
encroaching on or transiting Exclusive Economic Zones, territorial waters, or
controlled areas. Satellite radar detects dark targets which may be indicative of
illegal activities or threats.
Fisheries Protection: This provides a mechanism to track illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing activities [5] in controlled fishing areas. Alerts can be defined
to notify users of ships that have crossed into these user defined geofenced areas in
order to protect national interests and preserve valuable fish stocks. This behavior
may indicate that a vessel is intentionally avoiding detection to hide suspicious or
illegal fishing activities, such as fishing in protected areas, transshipping illegally
caught fish, entering a country’s waters without authorization or violating other
fisheries laws.
Counter Trafficking and Counter Terrorism: It can find and identify suspicious
inbound vessels or those transiting territorial waters, for investigation or
interdiction. Such a system may provides key information such as altered course,
vessel rendezvousing, sudden speed changes, loitering, geofence crossing, and
spoofing, to allow users to analyze suspicious vessel behaviour. Accurate detection
and tracking enables efficient queuing of patrol assets to intercept targets and
maximize “eyes on target”, while minimizing resource and fuel usage.
Navigational aid: Tracking systems such as AIS were mainly incorporated by
maritime officers so as to avoid collision of vessels. A management system will
help in avoiding navigational hazards as it can prevent the collision of two vessels
out of which one cannot be “seen” due to AIS data not being transmitted by it.

TOOLS FOR SHIP SURVEILLANCE AND DARK SHIP DETECTION:

Automatic Identification System: The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a
tool for identifying and monitoring maritime traffic by sending and receiving
vessel information to nearby ships and coastal authorities on two dedicated VHF
radio frequencies [6]. AIS provides information such as unique identification,
position, course, and speed, which can be displayed on a screen or an Electronic
Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS). Primarily AIS was developed as a
tool for collision avoidance and was intended to assist a vessel's watch standing
officers and maritime authorities to track and monitor vessel movements [7,
8]. AIS was developed in the 1990s by the IMO technical committee as a high
intensity, short-range identification and tracking network. After 9/11 incident in
United States, vessels were deemed to have important roles in terrorism case so it
was crucial to develop a network that would help vessel monitoring [8]. Therefore,
in 2002, IMO SOLAS Agreement included a mandate that required vessels over
300GT on international voyages to fit AIS transponder [9].
Measurement of Radiated Shipping Noise Using AIS; The radiated shipping noise
generated by a vessel can be measured by it’s AIS data in conjunction with the
Donald Ross Model [10]. The Model states that propeller cavitation of the ship and
impact of bubbles on the cavitation as the dominant source within the ship
generating noise at lower frequencies and thus proposed a formula to estimate the
shipping radiated noise using Length, Speed and Draught of the ship, which can be
obtained from AIS data. [11] We can get an overview of the total radiated shipping
noise in a region of the ships with their AIS turned on, which can be mapped.
Measurement of Radiated Shipping Noise without AIS: Radiated shipping noise
can be measured without AIS as well and can in fact give a more accurate solution
than the Donald Ross Formula. The use of a network of hydrophones in
appropriate configurations can give us quantitative information about the radiated
vessel noise. A hydrophone is an underwater device that detects, measures and
records underwater sounds from all directions. [12] They are a unique type of
transducer intended to make non perturbing, absolute measurements of pressure
waves over an extremely wide bandwidth [13].When submerged in the ocean, a
ceramic hydrophone produces small-voltage signals over a wide range of
frequencies as it is exposed to underwater sounds emanating from any direction.
By amplifying and recording these electrical signals, hydrophones measure ocean
sounds with great precision. Using this information, we can create a map of the
radiated shipping noise in a particular region. A mismatch in this map and the map
created by AIS data can give us understanding of the dark ships present in a region.
Sound Surveillance System: In the mid-1950’s, during the Cold War, the US Navy
installed an underwater surveillance system to track submarines. The Sound
Surveillance System (SOSUS) is a multibillion-dollar network of hydrophone
arrays mounted on the seafloor throughout the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The
SOSUS system takes advantage of the sound channel that exists in the ocean,
which allows low-frequency sound to travel great distances. This channel is called
the SOund Fixing And Ranging, or SOFAR, channel. Low-frequency sound
generated by submarines can be detected at long ranges by hydrophone arrays
located on continental slopes and seamounts, and connected by undersea cables to
onshore facilities. These hydrophone arrays listen to the ocean, record sounds, and
transmit the data back to shore stations for analysis [14].
Fish-Hook System: The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has a
comprehensive architecture of ocean surveillance systems for monitoring the
disparate challenges it faces in supporting its defensive activities, including
SOSUS (sound surveillance system)-type submarine detection and tracking
systems, high frequency direction finding (HF DF) facilities, ocean surveillance
ships, and maritime surveillance aircraft. Information from all of these systems is
integrated into the JMSDF’s Ocean Surveillance Information System (JOSIS), the
current version of which is officially called the JMSDF OSIS Evolutionary
Development (JOED) system, at the JMSDF’s Fleet HQ at Yokosuka, in
Kanagawa Prefecture, on the western side of Tokyo Bay [15].
National Command Control and Communications Intelligence Network: India is
involved in the construction of an undersea network of seabed-based surveillance
sensors stretching from the tip of Sumatra right up to Indira Point. Once
completed, this network will be an integral part of the existing US-Japan ‘Fish
Hook’ sound surveillance (SOSUS) network that will play a pivotal role in
constantly monitoring all submarine patrols mounted by China’s PLA Navy
(PLAN) in both the South China Sea and the IOR. This network will in turn be
networked with the Indian Navy’s (IN) high-bandwidth National Command
Control and Communications Intelligence network (NC3I), which has been set up
under the IN’s National Maritime Domain Awareness (NMDA) project. At the
heart of the NC3I is the Gurgaon-based Information Management and Analysis
Centre (IMAC), whose systems integration software packages were supplied by
Raytheon and CISCO [16].
Satellite Detection: Certain commercial technologies use multiple satellites and
sensors efficiently to collect data for the purposes of detection of vessels that aren’t
broadcasting AIS information. This is done by using radar satellites to do broad
area imaging to get general patterns of marine traffic. Optical imagery satellites
would provide coverage for a smaller and more specific area, known as choke
points [17].

FUTURE SCOPE
1) Use of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Ship Detection and
Identification: Artificial intelligence and machine learning can be used to detect
anomalies in AIS data by exploiting radar data. [18] These solutions are based on
generating normality models from data gathered on vessel movement, mostly from
AIS [19]. While lots of work has been done in vessel identification and
classification, work still needs to be done in estimating shipping noise using ML,
based on sensor or AIS data.
2) Selection of Hardware and for a Shipping Radiated Noise Solution: Most
existing solutions to maritime surveillance involve the use of radar and satellite
detection. Not a lot of work has been done in identification of ships using radiated
shipping noise for security purposes rather than defence purposes. Research has to
be done on the sensors to be used for a particular region in which such a system
needs to be set up according to the geographical and environmental conditions
prevailing in that area and also when and how measurements will take place needs
to be decided. Other than just using hydrophones, a detection system can work in
conjunction with other methods of surveillance and give a combined, more
accurate description of the vessel traffic in the region.
3) Establishment of Command Centres: There needs to be a command centre
which collects, stores and analyzes the data incoming from the system. This
includes software for data processing and a data acquisition unit. The necessary
communication frameworks and response system need to be made. Such command
centres exist with nation-state surveillance systems such as NC3I, but work has to
been done on how to execute this for a specialized area for security reasons.
4) Robust Regulatory Framework: “Dark ship” is a relatively unused term and
there are not much references to it in common literature. The international
regulatory framework on how to handle darks hips is quite weak, with most focus
on the sharing and protection of data provided by tracking systems.. There are no
strong set of rules available. Dark ship may be a security as well as defence
problem so it is necessary to set up a robust framework as to tackle the issue of
dark ship and avoid international maritime discrepancies.
5) Creation of a Real Time System: In order to create an effective management
system, the dark ship management system needs to send data in real time. The
frequency in which AIS data is sent from the transponder and that of this
management system need to be in correspondence so as to get meaningful data.
Ships send AIS data at certain intervals depending on their speed and transponder
class. The detection system should be able to process and update the data at a
speed quicker than that of the AIS update frequency. If this is not achieved, old
AIS data will be used for comparison and thus the system will be faulty. For this
purpose, the system needs to be optimized appropriately, so that it can work in real
time.
REFERENCES
[1] Lacey Malarky and Beth Lowell (March 2018), Avoiding Detection: Global
Case Studies of Possible AIS Avoidance (Report)
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[3] Understanding AIS (February 2017) Lloyd’s List Intelligence (Informa)
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[4] Research Note-1, Automatic Identification System (AIS) Data Analysis,
Shridhar Prabhuraman & Arnab Das
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