Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &

VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN
MUNING respondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in
this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8
December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting
respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision,
on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and
Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates,
counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of
the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a
reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation
indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the
same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of
the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not
a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates
through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in
behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin
Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation
for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%

 Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but
his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that
the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and
considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for
review.2 The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et
al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for
the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees
with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An
award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present
case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be
required to be represented by legal counsel ...

is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —

it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross
examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
evidence.

thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members
of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on
behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be

entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for
his services, ...

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's

fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since
respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila
and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly
public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to
those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the
profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients
and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:

But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons
not licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind,
the great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot
be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the
jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5

No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he

has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time. 6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated;7 that acting as an
attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both,8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in
violation of law;9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition,
aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-
lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to
recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees
should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of
Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction;
such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which
are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union
PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union
members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the
present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas),
their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which
are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is
permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was
organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an
award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party,
under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:

Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order
of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court
of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their
appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious
situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by
positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo,
it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the
persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the
backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other
respects. Costs against respondent Muning.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ. concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, page 37.

2 Rollo, page 62.

3 Rollo, page 75.

4 22 SCRA, 1266.

5 4 A.L.R. 1088, Editorial note.

6 7 C.J.S 1022.

7 See also, Foundation Finance Co. vs. Robins, 153 So. 833 179 La. 259, reversing
(App) 149 So. 166.

8 Rule 71, Rules of Court.

9 Harris v. Clark, 142 N.E. 881, 81 Ind. App. 494.

10 Harriman v. Straham, 33 P. 2d 1067, 47 Wyo. 208.

11 4 A.L.R. 1089.

12 NLU v. Dinglasan, L-7945, 23 March 1956, 52 O.G. No. 4, 1933.

13 Section 1(a), Republic Act 875.

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN,
FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI
NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY
C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL
KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA,
WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO,
ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION,
ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC.,
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL
HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP.,
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO
REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC.,
SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand,
the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect
on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing
it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank. [1] It was later found by the
Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and
related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as
uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which
reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its
financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, and ordering its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from
March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying
for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29
of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and
his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents
Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee,
Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan
Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo,
Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking
Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings
Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel
Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and
Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms,
Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively
referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith, the
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named
persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.[7] After the filing of
the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al.
were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General[10] and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which
was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al.
when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks officials on
the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in
connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No.
107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. [11] It
found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendozas
former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It
noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central
Bank during his term as Solicitor General.[12] It further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section
prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation
from public office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling. [14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayans Second
Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent
[16]
Mendoza. It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that
the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The
PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December
5, 2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [18] The PCGG alleged that the Fifth
Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits
a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the
objection to respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil
Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import
and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the
government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern
codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were
comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation
conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any
obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific
pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement
alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality,
reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader
application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ
markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight,
and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the
pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the
variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony
and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards of
conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the
traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial
and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. [20]
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethicsin the United States. By
mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the
drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of
conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in
the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman
and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a
lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a
new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes,
other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the do
no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to
directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized
basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to
recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality.
Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal
law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did
not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more
comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American
legal ethics.[21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide
lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical
standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical
guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave
detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however,
the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time,
the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law.
Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves.
Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early
nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up
where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the
Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting
substantive standards of conduct for their members.[22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The
1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for
the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. [23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain
the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine
Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily
enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they
can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service. [25] These concerns
were classified as adverse-interest conflictsand congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest
conflicts exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private
practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
and the interests of the current and former are adverse. [26] On the other hand, congruent-interest
representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government
lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new
canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and
added thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon
36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest
representation conflicts.[29] The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government
lawyers largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of
the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private
practice clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he
has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after
his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46
and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation
of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The committee
recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to
distinguish between the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement.
The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in
matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility
were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer
must adhere.[34] In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)[35] became the applicable supplementary norm.
The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite
standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.
The Model Rules used the restatement format, where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with
comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for
enforcement because the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules. The Model Rules
eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing
comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The
Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of
interests.[37] In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the
concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite
nature.[38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The
Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with
new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former
government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2,
Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated and
passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both adverse-interest
conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there
exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing
respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in the
rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former government lawyer
on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete,
isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific
party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention by respondent
Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent
Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:[40]

The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in
issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty.
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising
the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for
its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy
Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then
Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B.
Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro,
Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General
(Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The
pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that
the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies
and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31,
1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so
 that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors
and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the
bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing
decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it
was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK
in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the banks liquidation. The
pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated
March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to

the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current
situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated
March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to

the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29
of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General

for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In fine, the Court should
resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
included within the concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black
and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of
the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the
condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall
be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary
Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head
to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an
official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as
receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible
collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to,
bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.

...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or
cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it
shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor
General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have
been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The
court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against
the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and
enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the
assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the
functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section.
The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell,
assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be
necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such
institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the
Monetary Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall
be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof
that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under
 this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing
proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and
the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the
court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved
upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central
Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or
plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may
suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the
New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or
injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they
fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not
include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands
induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment
of a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the
provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by
PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the drafting, enforcing or
interpretinggovernment or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the
said act of respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves.
It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by
law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812
in the then Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case
No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank
on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK.
Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized
Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK.
GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices
of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in
the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter
involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the interventioncontemplated by Rule 6.03.
Intervene means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or

come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay
on both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41]

On the other hand, intervention is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect

the interests of others.[42]

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under the first
interpretation, intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or
has no effect or little influence.[43] Under the second interpretation, intervene only includes an act of
a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings.[44]We hold that this second meaning
is more appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the
government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided
that a former government lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with
any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. As
aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed upon resulted in
unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in
DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government
service, had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the
rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter
in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory
pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For
another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent
proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties
pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type
of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK.
The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

II
 Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort
on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it
is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date,
the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and
application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal
importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment
of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by
the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation. The observation
is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer
present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income
in private practice.[45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service
would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the
practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which
they become associated to be disqualified.[46] Indeed, to make government service more difficult to exit
can only make it less appealing to enter.[47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass
opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the
rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has noted the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay
proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the
opponent, and observed that the tactic was so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt
frequent judicial and academic commentary.[48] Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel
with the Court of Appeals description of disqualification motions as a dangerous game. [49] In the case
at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years
and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact,
the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing
of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were
subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the
very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put
petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the
client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification
motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in
whom the client has confidence.[51] The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without
the benefit of the work done by the latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an
effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule
on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: An
individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the
government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be
in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private
employment does not enjoy such freedom.[53] He adds: Any system that affects the right to take a new
job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence.[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once
occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General
should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the
Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right
to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the
independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of
the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a
former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. [55] Former government lawyers
stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence
in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative
exercise at best[56] which can lead to untoward results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the
lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free
flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to
protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct[59] and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification
based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the
interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. [60]
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors
lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries the danger that former government
employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does
not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing
the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject
matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al.,
in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if
not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at bar.
For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not
working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of
the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests
coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the
lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There
is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.[61] The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who
plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to
prosecute less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960:
The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the period of
employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government policies.[63] Prof.
Morgan, however, considers this concern as probably excessive.[64] He opines x x x it is hard to imagine
that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client
the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the best government
lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates. [65] But
again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against
respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later
defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of
Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the excessive
influence of former officials or their clout. [66]Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this
concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of what appears to be an
employees influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates
quickly upon departure from government x x x.[67] More, he contends that the concern can
be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: x x x The idea that, present officials
make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the present
officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal
officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend
to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism. [68]

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest
prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period.
Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously,
and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor
General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to
disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard,
qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied
without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be
initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.
Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.
Chico-Nazario, J., No part.

[1]
Rollo, p. 240; Filcapital Development Corporation was a related interest of the Yujuico Family Group and the directors
and officers of GENBANK.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 240, 242.
[3]
Rollo, p. 7.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 7, 108, 248.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 110-114, 248.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 217-218.
[7]
Rollo, p. 143.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 216-220.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 44, 221- 225.
[10]
Atty. Mendoza served as Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986.
[11]
Rollo, p. 63.
[12]
Rollo, p. 61.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 57-63.
[14]
Rollo, p. 178.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 42, 44; The Motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners in Civil Case Nos. 0096-
0099 was filed with the Sandiganbayans Second Division. However, the motion was ultimately resolved by the
Sandiganbayans Fifth Division in its proceedings held on July 11, 2001.
[16]
Rollo, p. 42.
[17]
Rollo, p. 43.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 2-40.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 12-14.
[20]
Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Revolution, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1385 (2004).
[21]
Ibid.
[22]
Ibid.
[23]
Ibid.
[24]
Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 24-25 (2002); In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1927).
[25]
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 456 (1986).
[26]
Id. at 457.
[27]
Ibid.; The use of the word conflict is a misnomer; congruent-interest representation conflicts arguably do not involve
conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a private practice client even if the interests of the former
government client and the new client are entirely parallel.
[28]
Supra, note 20.
[29]
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 36 (1908); ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1963), DR 9-
101(b); ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, MR 1.11(a) and (b) (1983).
[30]
Supra, note 25 at 458.
[31]
Supra, note 20.
[32]
Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 25 (2002).
[33]
Canon 9 was adopted to replace Canon 36 because Canon 36 "proved to be too broadly encompassing." ABA Opinion
No. 342 (1975); Canon 9 states: A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.
[34]
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement (1983); "The Disciplinary Rules ... are mandatory in
character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being
subject to disciplinary action."
[35]
DR 9-101(b): A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while
he was a public employee.
[36]
Supra, note 20.
[37]
Ibid.
[38]
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.09 comment (1984): The other rubric formerly used for dealing with
disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. This rubric has a two-fold problem. First, the appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any
new client-lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted,
disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former client. Second, since
impropriety is undefined, the term appearance of impropriety is question-begging. It therefore has to be recognized
 that the problem of disqualification cannot be properly resolved . . . by the very general concept of appearance of
impropriety.
[39]
Supra, note 32.
[40]
See Dissent of J. Callejo, Sr., pp.19-20.
[41]
Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1183 (1993).
[42]
Id.
[43]
Id.; This may be inferred from the second definition of intervene which is to occur, fall, or come in between points of time
or events.
[44]
Id.; This may be inferred from the third definition of intervene which is to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification, and the second definition of intervention which is interference that may affect the interests of others.
[45]
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 461 (1986).
[46]
Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657 (1957).
[47]
Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Calvin Collier before Council on Younger Lawyers, 1976 Annual
Convention of the Federal Bar Association (September 16, 1976).
[48]
Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Board of Education of New York City v. Nyquist,
590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Williamsburg Wax Museum v. Historic Figures, Inc., 501 F.Supp. 326, 331
(D.D.C. 1980).
[49]
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985).
[50]
Rollo, p. 143; The petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction were filed sometime in August 1986. The motion for
disqualification in Civil Case No. 0096-0099 was filed on February 5, 1991.
[51]
United States v. Brothers, 856 F. Supp. 370, 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
[52]
First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978); EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d
1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Realco Serv. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
[53]
Morgan, Appropriate Limits on Participation by a former Agency Official in Matters Before an Agency, Duke L.J., Vol.
1980, February, No. 1, p. 54.
[54]
Ibid.
[55]
Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 292-293; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569 (1949).
[56]
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 320 (1986).
[57]
Id. at p. 321.
[58]
Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657 (1957).
[59]
Supra, note 38.
[60]
United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1983).
[61]
Supra, note 53 at 44.
[62]
Ibid.
[63]
Ibid., see footnote 207 of article.
[64]
Ibid.
[65]
Id. at 45.
[66]
Id. at 42.
[67]
Id. at 42-43.
[68]
Id. at 43.
 FIRST DIVISION

WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,

Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected thereon located
at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio
Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the
units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a
complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of
the 5th District of Manila[4]where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation

meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel
for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of
Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task
with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however,
were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It
was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her
case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of
a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating
the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. [7]

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided

over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against
Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the
ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and
signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice
of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section

7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
 constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach

of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis
supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the
practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.[9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors.[10]

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.

RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY
TO FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government
service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG
v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service.
 Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA

6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF
ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their
incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 [12]governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise
of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who
are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work
only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive
monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective
local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective
local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on
engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus
derogat generalibus.[13]

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the
members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise
of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time
service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their
official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city
mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a
week.[14]Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to
secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription
to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on
the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they
are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated
to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only
twice a month.[16]

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT

PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR
AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at
the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted
outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way
the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary
in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become
an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance
as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the
law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote
respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first
canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent
not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is
a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of
the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics
and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. [19]

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for
violation of the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of lawfor a period
of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall
furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

[1]
Particularly described as lot no. 19, block no. 3, Pas-14849.
[2]
Complainants sister-in-law.
[3]
Hereafter, Elizabeth and Pastor.
[4]
Hereafter, Barangay 723.
[5]
These were scheduled on March 15, 2001, March 26, 2001 and April 3, 2001.
[6]
Dated July 5, 2002. Rollo, pp. 2-23.
[7]
Report and Recommendation dated October 15, 2004 of Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila of the IBP-CBD. Id., pp. 103-106.
[8]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
[9]
Supra note 7.
[10]
CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-476 dated November 4, 2004. Rollo, p. 102.
[11]
G.R. Nos. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 526. (emphasis in the original)
[12]
The Local Government Code of 1992.
[13]
This rule of statutory construction means that a special law repeals a general law on the same matter.
[14]
Section 52(a), RA 7160. They may also hold special sessions upon the call of the local chief executive or a majority of the members
of the sanggunian when public interest so demands. (Section 52[b], id.)
[15]
This rule of statutory construction means that the express mention of one thing excludes other things not mentioned.
[16]
Id.
[17]
See Ramos v. Rada, A.M. No. P-202, 22 July 1975, 65 SCRA 179; Zeta v. Malinao, A.M. No. P-220, 20 December 1978, 87 SCRA
303.
[18]
Ducat v. Villalon, 392 Phil. 394 (2000).
[19]
Id.
[20]
See Section 27, Rule 138, RULES OF COURT.

EN BANC

[AC-5365. April 27, 2005]

Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty. VICTOR V.

DECIEMBRE, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the malevolent
act of respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing on
those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge that the loan
they were meant to secure had already been paid.

The Case

Before us is a verified Petition[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by Spouses
Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners charged
respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar. After he had filed his Comment [2] on the Petition, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held
several hearings. During those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003,[3] the parties were
able to present their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. After the filing of the parties
respective formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners Memorandum,[4] the case was considered
submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation dated
January 30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution
No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.

The Facts
 In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the
Central Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700,
and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.[5]
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela
Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to respondent
five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the
approved loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the future. [6]
On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan
plus surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt, [7] herein quoted as follows:
August 31, 1999
Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00taken earlier by
Lourdes Olbes.

(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre

8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99 [8]

Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB
Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with
different dates of maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15,
1999, respectively.[9]
On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-
Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein
that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached
him and requested that he immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241
and 0046242 totaling P100,000.[10]
Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit-
Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15,
1999, around two oclock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him and requested
that he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000.[11]
Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal,
or to Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the time,
as shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been physically impossible for them to transact
business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially
considering the heavy traffic conditions in those places. [12]
Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata
Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent. [13]
In his Comment,[14] respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called baseless and devoid of
any truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring their
commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had
allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to
ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed that the checks had
already been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that he
had given them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his previous satisfactory
transactions with them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.
 Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which were
not in any way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were
allegedly private actions intended to vindicate his rights against their deception and violation of their
obligations. He maintained that his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay
rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:

In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and
FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with
cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used
by them in their business venture.

Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both
LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to
immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00
then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.

The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony
before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:

ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)

Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed two
separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that
correct?
A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.
Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is that
correct?
A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two
checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).
COMM. DULAY:
Which are the first two checks?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
 The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And Check No. 46243
and 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with number 0046241
and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you?
A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00.
Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?
A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
Q. Is that your house?
A. No, its not my house?
Q. What is that, is that your law office?
A. That is my retainer client.
Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you these checks
have been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. Thats why I am asking your
client
COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued here in Pasig.
What building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.
COMM. DULAY:
What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The place, Your
Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is that client?
COMM. DULAY:
Your answer.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.
Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243
and 0046244, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in the place of
your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?
A. That is correct, sir.
Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the complainants.
As between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of complainant[s]
more credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the
transaction involving the four checks took place. Such distortion on a very material fact would
seriously cast doubt on his version of the transaction with complainants.

Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also
obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public
prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of respondents version of the transaction.

Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of a
loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed
upon appears to be more credible. Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post
Office in Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been
paid x x x. Respondent does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous
transaction between the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell
due such that they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by giving them
another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the amounts under
the circumstances described by respondent does not appear credible given the background of the
previous transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer
would not even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor bother to
verify and ask them what businesses they would use the money for contributes further to the lack of
credibility of respondents version. These circumstances really cast doubt as to the version of
respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of the public prosecutors notwithstanding
we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the complainants. Complainant
Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result of respondents filing of the criminal cases.
Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar cases against the co-employees of
complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent is facing similar complaints in the IBP for
his actions.[15]

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP
recommended.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.[16] It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral
character.[17] A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by
inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth
and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader. [18]
 By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.[19] Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the
publics faith in the legal profession.[20]
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

xxxxxxxxx

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxxxxxxx

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the bar.[21] Such
conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in their private
lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the highest
degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent
with truth and honor.[22]
The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest
degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust
that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct,
whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue
to be officers of the court.[23]
In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said that
they had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security
for the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondents assertion
that they had filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal.
After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings.
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable
conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners. According
to Franklin Olbes testimony on cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank checks after
the loan had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with him, [24] he was not
able to return them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in
him by petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him
with their blank checks.[25]
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by
his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon
at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had
already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his
material gain.
 And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent
had the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent
to have them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to
foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three
months[26] because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and
professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and
highly unbecoming, a member of the bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law.
It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege.[27] Good moral character includes at least common honesty. [28] No moral
qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor. [29] The rigorous ethics
of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. [30] Lawyers must
be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In
all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith. [31]
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable;[32] they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied
by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. [33]
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His
propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up
checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,[34] the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to
make it appear that he was authorized to sell anothers property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious
inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the
SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct of
herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously indicting petitioners
and thereby caused the detention of one of them.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules
1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from
the practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as
the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondents personal record. Let
another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-10.
[2]
Id., pp. 56-61.
[3]
Records, Vol. IV.
[4]
Petitioners Memorandum was received by the IBP-CBD on September 16, 2003; Records, Vol. II, pp. 182-192.
Respondent did not submit any Memorandum, but filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 4, 2004; Records, Vol. II, pp.
194-198.
[5]
Rollo, p. 1.
[6]
Id., p. 2.
[7]
Id., p. 3.
[8]
Annex A of Petition; id., p. 11.
[9]
Affidavit of Franklin Olbes, p. 3; Records, Vol. II, p. 21.
[10]
Rollo, p. 4.
[11]
Id., p. 5.
[12]
Id., pp., 7-8.
[13]
Id., p. 8.
[14]
Id., pp. 56-61.
[15]
Report and Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, pp. 10-14.
[16]
Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 228, July 1, 2003; Eustaquio v. Rimorin, 399 SCRA 422, March 24, 2003; Sebastian v. Atty.
Calis, 372 Phil. 673, September 9, 1999; Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1, September 18, 1992.
[17]
Ernesto L. Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1999), p. 22.
[18]
Re: Administrative Case No. 44 of the RTC, Br. IV, Tagbilaran City, Against Atty. Samuel C. Occea; 383 SCRA 636, 638,
July 3, 2002, per curiam.
[19]
Busios v. Atty. Ricafort, 347 Phil. 687, December 22, 1997.
[20]
Malecdan v. Pekas, 421 SCRA 7, January 26, 2004; Rivera v. Corral, 384 SCRA 1, July 4, 2002; Nakpil v. Valdes, 286
SCRA 758, March 4, 1998.
[21]
Sanchez v. Somoso, 412 SCRA 569, October 3, 2003; Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227, July 1, 2003; Eustaquio v. Rimorin,
399 SCRA 422, March 24, 2003.
[22]
Sanchez v. Somoso, supra; Sabayle v. Tandayag, 158 SCRA 497, March 8, 1988.
[23]
Garcia v. Manuel, 395 SCRA 386, January 20, 2003.
[24]
TSN, May 20, 2002, pp. 65-66.
[25]
TSN, February 4, 2002, p. 18.
[26]
TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 44-45.
[27]
Vda. de Espino v. Presquito, 432 SCRA 609, June 28, 2004; Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, 350 SCRA 138, January
24, 2001; Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 349 Phil. 8, January 28, 1998; Villanueva v. Sta. Ana, 315 Phil. 795, July 11,
1995.
[28]
Tan v. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473, February 24, 1992.
[29]
Constantino v. Saludares, 228 SCRA 233, December 7, 1993; Tan v. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473, February 24, 1992.
[30]
Custodio Sr. v. Esto, 81 SCRA 517, February 22, 1978.
[31]
Article 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. New Civil Code.
[32]
Sebastian v. Atty. Calis, 372 Phil. 673, September 9, 1999.
[33]
Sabayle v. Tandayag, supra citing In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399, 1928.
[34]
399 SCRA 422, March 24, 2003.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 2841. July 3, 2002.]

RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH

 IV, TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

"Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest
order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless
crusader." 1 These were the eloquent words of the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in
exalting the sacred and honorable legal profession. But he laments the pathetic and
deplorable fact that, "many a law practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn
public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a
mercenary purveying the benefits of his enlightened advocacy in direct proportion to a
litigant’s financial posture instead of a faithful friend of the courts in the dispensation of
equal justice to rich and poor alike." 2 Here, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as later shown by
his disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such lawyer who has become an apostate
to his exalted position as an officer of the court. He thus deserves to be weeded out
from the legal profession to protect its sanctity and nobility.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator William
C. Ogan which has since been pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 423.
In 1976, Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took over the case from Judge Paulino S. Marquez who,
in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting that the proceedings have been
pending for thirteen (13) years, Judge Ruiz then inquired into the principal causes of the
delay. He found out, as will be shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña caused
the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully prolonging the litigation
through his various maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that he will not
willingly sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any man’s cause for money
or malice.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and
Testament of the late William C. Ogan, his residuary estate was divided among his seven
children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, was named in the will as executrix of the
estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her lawyer.

The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States of
America), and real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left no debt.
Thus, the settlement of the estate should have been simple and speedy. However, since
the death of the testator on February 1, 1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet
been terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occeña.
Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix, Necitas
Ogan-Occeña, filed a project of partition on August 4, 1967. On September 22, 1967,
the probate court approved the project except certain portions. The executrix then
interposed an appeal. In view of the delay caused by the pendency of the appeal, the
other heirs filed several motions praying that the estate’s remaining P250,000.00 cash
as well as its shares of stocks in the Philippines and in the United States be distributed
among all the heirs. The executrix, through her husband Atty. Occeña, vehemently
opposed the motions, asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked
for her husband’s attorney’s fee and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could
not be distributed among the heirs because the stock certificates were not in her
possession. The dispute between the executrix, on the one hand, and the other heirs, on
the other, which delayed the proceedings, centered mainly on the P250,000.00 cash and
the shares of stocks.

Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, interposed numerous
appeals from the orders of the probate court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly prayed
in their motions for the release of the shares of stocks and the remaining cash. But the
executrix and Atty. Occeña opposed the same, thus prolonging the proceedings. In CA-
G.R. No. 48716-R (December, 1974), the Court of Appeals, in remanding the case to the
probate court, had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their differences
with the view to closing the estate which has been pending since 1963. The executrix,
the heirs, and the lawyers, are reminded that the prolongation of administrative
proceedings can only benefit the executor or administrator or the counsels for the
contending parties. It always results in the diminution of the share of each of the heirs
because the estate is burdened with the expenses of the administration proceedings, the
heir must have to pay attorney’s fee and the longer the proceedings the bigger the
attorney’s fee." 3

Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty. Occeña’s
claim for attorney’s fee in the amount of P250,000.00 and the executrix’s refusal,
through her husband, to account for the shares of stocks belonging to the estate which,
according to her, were not in her possession. The other heirs could not accept that
explanation because as executrix, she was charged with the responsibility of collecting
all the assets of the estate.

Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to comment
why the securities were not in her possession. She filed her comment, through her
husband, that some Philippine and American securities were not in her possession. To
determine which securities were in her possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977,
issued an order requiring her to submit within 30 days the latest inventory of all the
securities of the estate. However, she failed to comply with the order. Judge Ruiz then
issued another order on February 6, 1978, "directing her to take possession of all
certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make an up-
to-date inventory thereof with a statement of their nature and their value." Again, she
did not comply with the order.
Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix, through
Atty. Occeña, appealed the numerous interlocutory orders of the probate court to the
Court of Appeals, hence, adding to the delay. Because of the propensity of the executrix,
through Atty. Occeña, to elevate interlocutory orders to the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz
issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing her to "refrain from instituting any action or
proceeding without first informing the court." The executrix and her husband disobeyed
this order. In fact, he filed six cases with the Court of Appeals and one with this Court.

On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one of
the heirs, to go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the five parcels
of land owned by the estate and to submit a report to the probate court. To provide
money for the purpose, the court ordered the executrix to release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson
the sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund, the same to be liquidated with supporting
receipts upon her submission of her report on or before September 30, 1979. The
executrix assailed the order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for prohibition
and certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on
January 13, 1981 for lack of merit, the Court of Appeals said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such an order of the
court which is and would be for the benefit of the estate and the heirs. All the other
heirs completely agreed with what the trial court did. . .

"Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned orders he should be complimented in finding ways and means of promptly
and expeditiously determining the assets of the estate to be ultimately distributed
among the heirs."cralaw virtua1aw library

On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her failure to
obey the orders of October 22, 1977, December 8, 1977, February 6, 1978 and October
16, 1979 and directed her to report to the court which securities were and were not in
her possession and to give the reason therefor.

On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occeña were held in contempt of court
and fined P250.00 each for disobeying the court order of August 15, 1979 requiring the
executrix to release $1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both were given the chance to
explain their failure to comply with the order, but they did not submit any explanation.
On January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
SP-10326. It bears emphasis that this incident delayed the proceedings for four (4)
years.

On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to
distribute immediately among the heirs all the shares of stocks of the estate in the
Batangas-Laguna Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc. and the Motor Service Co.;
to report her compliance within 10 days from notice; and within the same period, to file
a written report to the court stating (a) what other certificates of stocks belonging to the
estate are in her possession; and (b) which certificates of stocks are not with her, giving
the reasons therefor. Again, the executrix and her husband, Atty. Occeña, did not
comply with the said order. The probate court thus ordered her to explain why she
should not be punished for contempt of court. After several postponements at her
instance and that of her husband, the incident was set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But
neither of them appeared, thus delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half.
Finding the executrix unfaithful in the performance of her duties, the probate court, on
May 12, 1981, adjudged her in contempt of court.

Forthwith, Atty. Occeña and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil Case
No. 14456 for damages (P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of litigation)
against Judge Ruiz. But, on October 13, 1981, the court dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit.

After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occeña filed with the Tanodbayan a
letter-complaint against Judge Ruiz, charging him with knowingly rendering unjust
interlocutory orders, in that without prior notice and hearing, he punished the executrix
for indirect contempt of court and censured her for non-compliance with the probate
court’s order of October 16, 1979. For lack of merit, Atty. Occeña’s complaint was
dismissed by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez in a Resolution dated November
19, 1984.

On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occeña filed with this Court Administrative Case No. 2345-
CFI against Judge Ruiz for gross inefficiency and dishonesty. In a Resolution dated
October 11, 1982, this Court dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Occeña to
substantiate his charges during the investigation.

Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said administrative
complaint, Atty. Occeña and his wife filed with the CFI of Davao City Civil Case No.
14957 for damages against the former. The couple alleged that they suffered damages
upon reading the judge’s comment filed with the Supreme Court. On June 11, 1982, the
CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, the comment being an
absolutely privileged communication.

By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints, found to
be groundless, Atty. Occeña further delayed with malice the probate proceedings and
inflicted hardship and pain upon Judge Ruiz.

More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty. Occeña has
inflicted greater harm to the other heirs, with the executrix herself as his willing partner.

From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed
with this Court and the Court of Appeals by Atty. Occeña, questioning the interlocutory
orders of the probate court. But most, if not all, were without merit.

Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the same
probate proceedings, was also harassed by Atty. Occeña with groundless administrative
charges and suits, both criminal and civil. These cases, while pending, were then utilized
by Atty. Occeña in securing restraining orders from the Court of Appeals or as grounds
for the judge’s inhibition.

Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter alia that
the CFI may suspend an attorney from the practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz, on May
26, 1982, filed with the same probate court Administrative Case No. 44 charging Atty.
Occeña with gross misconduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer and willful disobedience
of lawful court orders. Instead of filing an answer, he submitted a motion praying for the
inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This motion was denied. Atty. Occeña was then directed to file
his answer within 15 days from notice which was extended to another 15 days upon his
motion. Still, he did not file an answer. What he submitted was a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.

Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982, morning
and afternoon. Upon Atty. Occeña’s motion, he was given an extension of 15 days from
November 3, 1982 within which to file his answer. However, he did not comply. Neither
did he appear during the hearing.

Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court issued a
temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 62453, "Samuel Occeña v. District Judge
Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol" for prohibition. However, on August 15, 1983, this Court
dismissed Atty. Occeña’s petition for lack of merit. The hearing of the administrative
case was set on January 30 and 31, 1984, but again, he did not appear.

The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occeña failed to appear. Upon his
telegraphic request, the hearing was reset on December 13 and 14, 1984. On December
7, 1984, he filed his Answer and Motion for Referral to the Solicitor General or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion was denied. The hearing was reset on May
8 and 9, 1985. Upon another telegraphic request of Atty. Occeña, the hearing was
postponed to August 14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did not appear. Thus, in its order of
August 15, 1985, the probate court considered his failure to appear as a waiver of his
right to present evidence. 4

On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that Atty.
Occeña has "abused, misused and overused the judicial system," 5 Judge Ruiz rendered
a decision suspending 6 him from the practice of law for three (3) years. The decision 7
unfolded a long list of his administrative offenses, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court; gross misconduct in office

During the probate proceedings, respondent Occeña, on behalf of his wife executrix,
filed with the Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with the Supreme Court one (1) case,
assailing the order of the probate court directing the said executrix to provide Nancy
Ogan, authorized to determine the assets of the estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be
taken from the estate; and the order ordering the same executrix to report to the
probate court the securities belonging to the estate. Atty. Occeña’s refusal to obey the
said orders and elevating the same to the higher courts unnecessarily delayed the
probate proceedings.

II
Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless suits and gave aid or consent to the
same; delayed persons for money or malice

Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the probate court two
actions for damages which were both dismissed for lack of merit and lack of cause of
action. Respondent also filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint charging the judge
of the probate court with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders. The complaint
was likewise dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent also filed with this Court an
administrative complaint which was again dismissed for failure of respondent to
substantiate the charge.

By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative complaint and criminal
charge which were found to be groundless and unsubstantiated, respondent unduly
delayed the settlement of the estate proceedings by harassing Judge Ruiz who had to
spend time, effort and money to defend himself against said frivolous and unmeritorious
cases.

In fact, respondent’s propensity to file groundless administrative charges, as well as civil

and criminal suits, harassed not only Judge Ruiz but also the previous judges who
handled the case. As a measure of self defense, these judges were compelled to prepare
and file pleadings or comments thereby using time which could have been devoted to
expediting the closure of the estate proceedings.

Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were
filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals questioning the interlocutory
orders of the probate court. Most, if not all of these petitions, were determined to be
groundless and without merit.

III

Disobeying the laws

Respondent violated his lawyer’s oath of office by flagrantly disobeying the clear
provision of Rule 140, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court, entitled "Charges Against
Judges of First Instance," which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 6. Confidential — Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and
confidential."cralaw virtua1aw library

During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345-CFI, Exh.
"Z") filed by respondent against Judge Ruiz in the Supreme Court, he violated the
private and confidential nature thereof three (3) times, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition
and certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan, Et. Al. v. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, Et
Al., CA-G.R. No. SP-10604", questioning an interlocutory order of the probate court (No.
2, Exh. "V") to which he attached as Annex "AW" a complete copy of his aforesaid
administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz albeit the same is completely immaterial to
the issue raised in said petition.

2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan,
Et. Al. v. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, Et Al., CA-G.R. No. SP-13162" (No. 4, Exh. "V"),
impugning an interlocutory order of the probate court, he attached as Annex "C" thereof
a true and complete copy of the said administrative complaint although not relevant to
the question therein raised; and

3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint with the
Tanodbayan (Exh. "Y"), he also attached as Annex "A" thereof a true and complete copy
of said administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz even if said administrative complaint
is not germane to the charge (Page 2, No. 1, Exh. "Y").

By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent, as an officer of

the court, put to naught one of the principal purposes thereof which is to protect the
personal and professional reputation of judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled,
vindictive and irresponsible clients, litigants and counsels (In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668;
Murillo v. Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March 23, 1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963
Ed., Vol: VI, page 260). Respondent committed gross misconduct in office and has not
conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion.

IV

Did falsehood and consented to the doing of same in court.

In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh. "W"),
respondent alleged in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. "W-1") that his wife-executrix
Necitas Ogan Occeña was held in contempt and censured, "without any hearing," for not
obeying the probate court’s order of October 16, 1979 (Exh. "N").

However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423) would show
that in the order of February 26, 1980, the probate court directed said executrix to
explain within 5 days from notice why she should not be cited for contempt (Exh. "O").
In the order of April 8, 1980, the contempt charge was set for hearing on June 23, 1980,
at 9:00 o’clock in the morning (Exh. "P") but was reset to October 22, 1980 after the
lifting of the restraining order of the Court of Appeals (Exh. "Q"). This was again reset to
April 20, 1981, subsequent to the denial by the Supreme Court of the respondent’s
petition for review impugning the Court of Appeals’ decision. As stated in the order of
May 12, 1981, page 2, paragraph 3 (Exh. "R"), copies of the order setting the hearing of
the contempt charge on said date (April 20, 1981) were received by the respondent and
his wife-executrix on March 24, 1981. On the date of the hearing, neither the executrix
nor respondent appeared. The following day (April 21, 1981), the court received
executrix’s motion for postponement of the hearing, which was denied for lack of merit.
Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981 (Exh. "R") was rendered holding the executrix
in contempt and penalized with censure.
In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel did not attend.

Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he subsequently alleged

under oath in his letter-complaint to the Tanodbayan, dated March 29, 1982, against
Judge Ruiz (Exh. "Y") that "without prior notice and without any hearing," Judge Ruiz
adjudged executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña guilty of contempt and censuring her (page 2,
paragraph 2, Exh. "Y-2" ; page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. "Y-3").

Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of August 15,
1979 (Exh. "C"), directing said executrix to remit immediately the sum of $1,000.00 to
her co-heir Nancy Ogan-Gibson with which to meet whatever necessary expenses that
she might incur in inquiring into the status of the 5 parcels of land owned by the estate
at Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., respondent and his wife-executrix committed falsehood
when they stated in their petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-
10326 that the said order was issued "without hearing" and thus a violation of
procedural due process. The Court of Appeals, in its decision which has become final
(Exh. "E"), confirmed this falsehood when it held that the petitioner-executrix "was not
deprived of her right to be heard when the respondent judge issued the two orders in
question" (Page 6, Exh. "E").

In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 138 8 and Section 9, Rule 139 9 of
the Revised Rules of Court, Judge Ruiz, on November 26, 1985, transmitted to this
Court a certified true copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of facts. 10

On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeña’s motion, restrained Judge Ruiz
from enforcing his decision of November 14, 1985. The case then has remained pending
so that on May 30, 1989, this Court issued an Order 11 requiring "the parties to move in
the premises, by informing the Court about the status of the decision or order
suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law, Judge Ruiz particularly
indicating if he still pursues the instant case, within ten (10) days from notice."cralaw
virtua1aw library

On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for this Court’s
action on his decision suspending Atty. Occeña.

On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occeña filed an Explanation and Motion praying that the case
be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and
recommendation. This Court denied the motion and instead referred the case to Atty.
Emilio Rebueno (now deceased), then Bar Confidant, for evaluation, report and
recommendation. After going over the records, he recommended "that the temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the decision dated
November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law for a
period of three years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña be
DISBARRED from the practice of law for grave violation of his oath of office as attorney;
likewise, that his name be DROPPED from the roll of attorneys."cralaw virtua1aw library

We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the same being supported by the facts on record.
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault
or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 12 His guilt,
however, cannot be presumed. 13 It must indicate the dubious character of the acts
done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have
been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him,
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel. 14 All
these requirements have been complied with in the case at hand.

In fact, it was Atty. Occeña who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the
administrative case against him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times so
that he could be accorded the full measure of due process. The court a quo, therefore,
appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex parte as Atty. Occeña deliberately failed to
appear and answer the accusations against him.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar
may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3)
gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath, (7) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority to do so. Not only did Atty. Occeña commit deceit, malpractice,
grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these
transgressions, he violated the lawyer’s oath whereby he imposed upon himself the
following duties, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I, _____________________, of ____________________, do

(place of birth)

solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion,
with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself
these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God."cralaw virtua1aw library

As shown by the records, Atty. Occeña gravely violated his oath of office in his handling
of Special Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show that through his
atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the disposition of the case for the last
thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also
to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For respondent’s part and that of his
wife, such prolonged litigation obviously benefited them. As aptly declared by the Court
of Appeals, the delay "can only benefit the executor or administrator" and "the longer
the proceedings, the bigger the attorney’s fees." But the more tragic reality is the fact
that Atty. Occeña has caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury
to the administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly
immoral conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law.

This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for
the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use
his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial
processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice. 15

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed
only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. 16 A lawyer
must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. 17 He must
faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A
violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to
administrative sanctions by this Court which includes suspension and disbarment.

Clearly, Atty. Occeña’s conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession
even for a single moment.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the legal profession. 18 Atty. Occeña has definitely fallen below the moral bar when
he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court has
repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a
lawyer’s equipment in the practice of his profession, 19 because it cannot be denied that
the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member
of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. 20 Thus, for his serious administrative
offenses, punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occeña deserves the ultimate
penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His
name is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts throughout the country.cralaw : red

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., abroad, on leave.

Endnotes:
1. "Apostasy In The Legal Profession," address delivered by the late Chief Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro to the Delegates to the IBP Greater Manila Regional Convention, held at the
Magsaysay Hall, SSS Building, Quezon City on June 22, 1975; 64 SCRA 784, 790
(1975).

2. Ibid..

3. Records, p. 10.

4. Rollo, pp. 2-4; Decision on Administrative Case No. 44, pp. 1-2.

5. Rollo, p. 11; Decision on Administrative Case No. 44, p. 12.

6. Pursuant to Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. —
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice
for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension,
such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court
in the premises."cralaw virtua1aw library

7. Rollo, p. 2; Decision on Administrative Case No. 44 dated November 14, 1985.

8. "SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further
proceedings in Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the
Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was
based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall
make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending
the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant."
See also Tajan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154 (1974).

9. "SEC. 9. Procedure in Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance. — As far as may be

applicable, the procedure above outlined shall likewise govern the filing and
investigation of complaint against attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in Courts of First
Instance. In case of suspension of the respondent, the judge of first instance or Justice
of the Court of Appeals shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same is
based."cralaw virtua1aw library

10. Rollo, p. 1.

11. Rollo, p. 33.

12. Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408 (1997); Mabuhay v. Garcia, 330 SCRA 236,
240, 241 (2000).
13. Manubay v. Garcia, ibid., citing Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty.
Primo R. Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406 (1999) and Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978).

14. Sec. 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

15. Marcias v. Uy Kim, 45 SCRA 251 (1970); Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 273
(1976).

16. Resurreccion v. Sayson, Adm. Case No. 1037, December 14, 1998, 300 SCRA 129,
137; People v. Santocildes, Jr., G. R. No. 109141, December 21, 1999, 321 SCRA 310,
316.

17. Resurreccion v. Sayson, ibid..

18. People v. Tuned, 181 SCRA 692 (1990); Lead v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 (1992).

19. Rivera v. Angeles, 339 SCRA 149 (2000), citing Fernandez v. Garcia, 223 SCRA 425
(1993).

20. Busiños v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 (1997), cited in Rivera v. Angeles, ibid.

EN BANC

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused
initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial
pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on
each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted
by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation
 On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath
based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had
been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family
and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was
deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused
took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior
strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went
to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and
begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died
of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a
loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels
the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f
justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace
to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the
lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the
bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character." [1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred
to above.
 Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan.
The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even
more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or
accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle
between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no
less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this
cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally
fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic
with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing
law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes
when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be
faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving
to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to
the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the
lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice
the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-
1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang22, entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad,
Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused,
tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account
with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her
client.Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid
upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a
check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept
the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case,
which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the
reason: Account Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that
she pay the face value of the check.[1] However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he
instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September
22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva. [2]
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of
respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyers Oath. [3]
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo Compound,
Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten
(10) days from notice.[4] However, it was returned unserved with the notation Moved. [5] The Assistant
National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street,
Pasig City.[6]
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with
the notation: Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
for investigation, report and recommendation.[7]
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found
respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which
adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two (2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by
way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check
will have sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into
withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a closed
account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted
to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized. [8] Such
an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138,
Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral
character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law,
the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of
the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render
her unfit to continue in the practice of law. [9]
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or
disbarment,[10] because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the
highest standards of morality.[11] Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession,
whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be
disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not
speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times
be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.[12]
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her
betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal
profession.[13] Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to
the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her
moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of
her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice
because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would
respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple
directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could
not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with
not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty
of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this
by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients. [14] We can not
tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let
copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, andTinga, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.
[1]
Rollo, p. 4.
[2]
Id., pp. 5-6.
[3]
Id., pp. 1-3.
[4]
Id., p. 7.
[5]
Id., p. 16.
[6]
Id., p. 21.
[7]
Id., p. 27.
[8]
Cesar A. Espiritu v. Atty. Juan Cabredo IV, A.M. No. 5831, 13 January 2003.
[9]
Balinon v. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277 [1954].
[10]
Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865 [1963]; In re De los Angeles, 106 Phil. 1 [1959]; Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586 [1956].
[11]
Pangan v. Ramos, 194 Phil. 1 [1981].
[12]
Constantino v. Saludares, A.M. No. 2029, 7 December 1993, 228 SCRA 233.
[13]
Sencio v. Calvadores, A.M. No. 5841, 20 January 2003.
[14]
Reyes v. Javier, A.C. No. 5574, 2 February 2002.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.

Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.

Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically
directed against the following observation therein made:

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners
resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their
counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which
has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or
 withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those
who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.

Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".

The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while
submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects
adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged
against their clients.

At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation
and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the
protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause
delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent.

After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez'
position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by
the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts
but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.

Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal
property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-
R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation
with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion,
causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after the
finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.

In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels,
sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil
case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or
ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene
following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth
Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the
said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the
proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts
of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4,
1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out
the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or
ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to
issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently
issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil
case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as
justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso
Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence
in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the
scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:
 When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing,
counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the
motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present
evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is
therefore deemed submitted for resolution.

Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez,
now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another
injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch
which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and
their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the
preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by
injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very
day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was
already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the
basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which
denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.

The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963,
which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied
"Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace
the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the
Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the
counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the
promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the
said motion for reconsideration.

The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the
avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular
counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that
the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies"
projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they
foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before,
one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the
second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are
persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.

The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as
the "proper remedy" when we said that.

In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are
unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not
the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the
projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established
as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful
claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed
of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought
other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt.
(Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having
been instituted for delay.

The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be
considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the
suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted
to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the
word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the
controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases
were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch
XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have
jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside
of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in
civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in
each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have
done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the
above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on
the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was
dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses
virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of
preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the latter
was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then
of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.

The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened
to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the
law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is
his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client;
its primacy is indisputable.

The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation
of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs
are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word
"counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant
the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the
execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered
its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such
counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about
the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case
No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-
mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he
filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila
presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ
of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the
signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs.
Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above, which,
curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in civil case 7532.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is
hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and
severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1See "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration," Annex "G" of Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.
2See "Manifestation," Annex "2" of Answer.
3On February 4, 1961, Damaso Perez and Gregorio Subong elevated the judgment in the
basic civil case 39407 to this Court on a petition for certiorari, which was denied for lack of
merit.
4Acosta,et al. vs. Alvendia, et al., L-14598, October 31, 1960; Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs,
Arnado, L-17109, June 30, 1961; Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs.
The National Administrator of Regional Office No. 2, etc., et al., L-20491, August 31, 1965, and
the cases cited therein.
5Cabigao vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; Philippine National Bank vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525;
Araneta vs. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 522.

EN BANC

[Adm. Case. No. 1392. April 2, 1984.]

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, Complainant, v. GENEROSO B. OBUSAN,

JR., Respondent.

Roger Castuciano for complainant.

Roemo J. Callejo for Respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DISBARMENT; ABANDONING LEGAL
WIFE AND COHABITING WITH FORMER PARAMOUR CONSTITUTE GROSS IMMORAL
CONDUCT. — Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was
guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one’s wife and resuming casual relations
with a former paramour, a married woman, falls within "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga v. Maniwang, Adm.
Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591). Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he
abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a
child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a
member of the bar (Toledo v. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso
B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted
to the bar in 1968.

In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and
Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to
him that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was
born on November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to
know that Natividad’s marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.chanrobles
law library

Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married
Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held
on December 30, 1972 (Exh. C and C-1).

The couple lived with the wife’s mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more
than one year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the house,
lawyer Obusan asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a
vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to
the conjugal abode.

Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation
and surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an
apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his
car to that place.

The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda
Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a
plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the
affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their testimonies.

Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head
of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list
(Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio, the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as
Mr. Estabillo. She identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D, where respondent
Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.

Respondent’s defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he
married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo
Street but only for the purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer
Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent’s testimony.

He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that
they were paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided
with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.

On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home
because he could not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences
from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street)
and her interference with his professional obligations.

The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for
disbarment against the Respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived
the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any
memorandum.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the
burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations
with a married woman separated from her own husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of
grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one’s wife and resuming casual relations with a
former paramour, a married woman, falls within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga v. Maniwang, Adm. Case
No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).

Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another woman who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of
morality expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo v. Toledo, 117 Phil.
768).

WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.

Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REGALA, J.:

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno,
a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all
the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein
do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former
Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the
complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The
respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent
likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on
June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and
disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with
immorality. The complaint recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando
Puno were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a
movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before
going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila;
that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent
proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway
we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of
respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before
they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and
Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the
room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and
 respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent
not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you';
and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again
assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that
thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed
himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent
was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to
respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00
o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together;
that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to
have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they were
married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already
on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of
marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth
to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a
promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute
a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine
Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the
complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that
on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however,
admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November,
1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice
law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence,
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor
Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral
argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional
evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo,
Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of
Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She
testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register
as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of
marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and
Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to
Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a
telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a
letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant
and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City
in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to
marry her.1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met
in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was
likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which
was duly identified by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital.
This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's
Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter
testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated
by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated
November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed
to discredit complainant's testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and
complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were
sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp.
12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise
of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual
passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the
old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license
or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and
the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In
re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies
the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of
morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took
complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did
not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17
Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet
the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is
 hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly
so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very
means by which it may assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment
or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of
Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a
lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number,
our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In
re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G.
583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact,
"grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule
138, Rules of Court).

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act
and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is
important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and
to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is
ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 145 December 28, 1956

JOSEFINA MORTEL, petitioner,

vs.
ANACLETO F. ASPIRAS, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres
and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for petitioner.
Anacleto F. Aspiras, in his own behalf.

BENGZON, J.:

On March 17, 1953, Josefina Mortel complained before this Court against Attorney Anacleto F.
Aspiras, alleging substantially that:

1. Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent, representing as single, courted her and eventually won
her affection; 2. on December 22, 1952, following his instructions, she came to Manila so they could
get married, and she stayed with her sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City; 3. on and after December
31, 1952 upon being assured of marriage she allowed him to live with her as her husband; 4. on
January 3, 1953, a marriage license was applied for, with the son of the respondent, Cesar Aspiras,
as one of the applicants; 5. upon suggestion of respondent, she was married to said Cesar Aspiras,
although she was not in love with the latter; 6. after the marriage, she and respondent continued
cohabiting together, the ceremony being a mere formality performed at the indication of respondent,
who was a married man and who used his knowledge and education to abuse and destroy her.

On April 9, 1953 the petitioner filed a motion to "withdraw and/or dismiss" alleging the contents of her
complaint did not "represent her true sentiments", the respondent acted in good faith, and her
marriage to respondent's son, Cesar Aspiras, was "without any fraud or deceit whatsoever".

Believing that the matter was not a mere private affair of petitioner, but that it affected the legal
profession 1, this Court denied the motion to dismiss, and required the respondent to answer.

On May 6, 1953, the respondent made his answer, asserting that petitioner had really married his son
Cesar Aspiras, and denying having had any amorous or sexual relations with her. He also said she
knew all the time he was a married man.

On May 13, 9153, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On November 2, 1953, the Solicitor General reported that in view of the motion to withdraw filed by
the petitioner, he found no other alternative but to recommend the dismissal of the case.

Of course, for lack of evidence, the complaint was dismissed on November 5, 1953.

However, on December 17, 1953, the petitioner filed a motion to re-open the matter, alleging that she
had asked for dismissal before the office of the Solicitor General pursuant to an amicable settlement
with the respondent; but that the truth was, petitioner and respondent lived together as husband and
wife, from April to November, 1953 at No. 383 Int. 5 Tajeron, Sta. Ana, Manila and that as a result
she was on the family way. She also charged the respondent with having ordered his son, Cesar, to
live with them for purpose of "camouflaging their living together".

On January 5, 1954, this Court granted the above petition to re-open and referred the papers to the
Solicitor General for re-investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting the proper inquiry, and based on the evidence adduced before him, the Solicitor
General filed in accordance with the Rules a complaint against the respondent, praying for his
disbarment, on the ground that he seduced Josefina Mortel by a promise of marriage, and to cover up
his illicit relations, he made his son, Cesar, a minor to marry the said Josefina Mortel on January 14,
1953; and, what it worse, after the marriage, the respondent continued having sexual relations with
the spouse of his own son.

On May 6, 1955, this Court ordered the respondent to reply to the official charges of the Government
prosecutor.

He replied in due time repeating the same denials he had previously made in this Court. Then he
asked for, and was granted, a chance to introduce evidence in addition to the proofs submitted to,
and forwarded by, the Solicitor General. Yet he failed to produce any.

At the oral argument he did not appear to defend himself, but asked for permission to file a
memorandum--which he afterwards presented. Therein he maintains that the complaint's allegation
were not supported by the evidence, that the petitioner is in pari delicto and deserves no remedy, and
that the alleged misconduct is not sufficient ground for disbarment.

In regard to the first point, the oral and documentary evidence at hand establish beyond reasonable
doubt the following facts:

In the year 1952 Josefina Mortel, 21 years of age, single, was a teacher residing with her widowed
mother in Sawang Barrio School, Romblon, Romblon. Sometime in August, of that year she met the
respondent. Atty. Anacleto P. Aspiras, an employee of the Cebu Portland Cement Co., who
represented himself as single, although he was already married to Carolina Bautista Aspiras with
whom he had seven children.

A reckless Lothario, he wooed her personally and by correspondence until he finally conquered her
trusting heart. He visited her at her house and must have charmed even the mother, because without
much ado she approved of him. The climax came when on a certain night of November, 1952, he was
invited to stay and spend the night at her house, due to a typhoon which was raging. About 3 or 4
a.m., while the mother was in the kitchen, he crept into Josefina's room and after glibly promising
marriage, succeeded in seducing her. From that time on, and without the benefit of marriage she
gave him the privileges of a husband. Thereafter yielding to his invitation, Josefina came to Manila in
December, 1952, for the purpose of marrying him, despite her mother's desire to have the marriage
celebrated the following month of April, so as to enable he to continue teaching until the end of the
school term. She stayed with her sister at 10 Espiritu Street, Pasay City.

Accompanied by the respondent, she went on January 3, 1953 to the Manila City Hall, where for the
first time, she met his son Cesar, who was introduced (by respondent) as his nephew, and her
bridegroom-to-be. She says respondent again told her to follow his "instructions", and left the two of
them (with Atty. Espino) at the City Hall. He then departed for Cebu. She filled up the application for
marriage (Exhibit 7,8 Respondent) and wrote the name of Cesar as her husband-to-be.

In connection with the above "instructions", it is probable that before filing the application Josefina
discovered or was told that respondent was a married man. But she was persuaded by respondent to
enter into a sham marriage with his "nephew" Cesar, so that she may rightfully claim to be Mrs.
Josefina Aspiras and save her face before the relatives and acquaintances who had known her
amorous relations with Attorney Aspiras.
Accordingly on January 14, 1953, Josefina and Cesar were married 2 at the Manila City Hall before
Judge Aragon, with the respondent and Rosario R. Veloso (Cesar's Aunt) as witnesses. After the
ceremony, the two contracting parties separated, never to live together as husband and wife.
However, the respondent continued up to November, 1953 his adulterous relations with Josefina, as
a result of which she gave birth to a baby boy on January 24, 1954.

Josefina's sworn testimony that herein respondent pretended to be single and promised marriage, is
confirmed by his love letters, portions of which say:lawphil.net

. . . You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world . . . I will bring you along with
me before the altar of matrimony . (Exhibit A-6, September 22, 1952.)

Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always
be the first, middle and the last in my life. In short, you will be the only woman to me as I used
to say to you. (Exhibit A, November 2, 1952.)

And her testimony that after her marriage to Cesar she continued living, as wife, with herein
respondent is borne out by his letters to Josefina's mother dated February 9, 1953 and March 6, 1953
— Exhibits A-19 and A-21.

Obviously the courtship and seduction by respondent was morally wrong, and this obliquity became
worse when he made use of his minor son Cesar to "redeem" his promise of marriage and/or to cover
up his illicit relations, as the Solicitor General alleged. He corrupted his own descendant by turning
him into an accomplice of his marital infidelities.

But he says, the marriage was a true marriage, the contracting parties being actually in love with each
other. Granted. Then his moral deliquency becomes all the more unpardonable: the cohabited with
the wife of his own son after the marriage which he himself arranged and witnessed.

It is immaterial that Josefina Mortel the complainant was also at fault — in pari delicto, respondent
suggests -- because this is not a proceeding to grant her relief, but one to purge the profession of
unworthy members, to protect the public and courts 3. So much so that even if she should presently
ask for dismissal, the matter may not dropped, the evidence at hand being sufficient to warrant
disciplinary action. Anyway, pari delicto is not always a complete defense 4

Supposing that respondent's conduct is not one of those mentioned in the Rules for which an attorney
may be disbarred 5, still, in this jurisdiction, lawyers may be removed from office on grounds other
than those enumerated by the statutes. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567.) And we recently applied that
principle in Balinon vs. De Leon, 50 Off. Gaz., 583.

In the United States wherefrom our system of legal ethics derives, "the continued possession . . . of a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law . . .
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a
ground for disbarment. (5 Am. Jur. 417.)

As stated by Mr. Justice Owen of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,

One of the requisite qualifications for one who holds the office of an attorney at law is that he
or she shall be good moral character, in so far as it relates to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney at law. This is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one
to admission to the bar, and the loss of such qualification requires his suspension. The
respondent is a member of the bar of this court. The charges preferred against him challenge
 his moral integrity. Just as it was the duty of this court to refuse him admission in the first
instance upon a showing that he lacked the necessary qualification, so is its duty now to
remove him upon like proof." (Re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602; 55 A. L. R. 1361.)

Perhaps mere moral transgression not amounting to crime will not disbar, as some cases hold 6 and
on this we do not decide. But respondent's moral deliquency having been aggravated by a mockery of
the inviolable social institution of marriage, and by corrupting of his minor son or destruction of the
latter's honor, the undersigned all agree he is unfit to continue exercising the privileges and
responsibilities of members of the bar. 7

Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to strike, as it does hereby strike his name from the Roll
of Attorneys. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix,
JJ., concur.lawphil.net

Footnotes

1 Proceeding may be taken for removal of attorney by the Supreme Court on its own motion.
(Section 1, Rule 128.).

1 Proceeding may be taken for removal of attorney by the Supreme Court on its own motion.
(Section 1, Rule 128.).

2 Went through the motions of a marriage ceremony.

3 That is why Solicitor General intervenes.

4 Cf. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209.

5 Concubinage is not considered now, because his wife has not complained, and no criminal
conviction has been obtained.

6 See People vs. Smith, 9 A.L.R. 183 (Ill.) and note at page 202.

7 See 7 C.J.S. p. 735

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre
charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct,"
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant,
while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.

The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully
evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving
from one place to another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of
employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no
answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the
complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan
Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against
him" in the instant
case. 3

On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift
Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he
subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968;
that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal
residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and
that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in
good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with
Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4

In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and
insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth
Certificate and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had
given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had
done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to
be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by
respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and
hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.

The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred;
by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 5

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He
set the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant
Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The
Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put
clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do
so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another
hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should
he fail once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not
appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have
waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were
given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986.
Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.

On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation"
to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:

Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows:
she and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates
in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito
Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital
status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started courting her but nothing
happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent] moved to
Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at
the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting
her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it
since she was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was
void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced
by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage
license, despite her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her
status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to
court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares
of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17);
Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p.
18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981,
complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting
from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance
until she found out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit
C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the
City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of
the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986,
p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina Malicdem
with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was
found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an
administrative case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic
when respondent was considered automatically separated from the service for having
gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7

There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre
contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over
the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol,
Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration
obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that
his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a
judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the
first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which
underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the
same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first
cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent
Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the
prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own
argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that
his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other
circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null
and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and
respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported
by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his
law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support
and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently
displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to
uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9

In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a
member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership
in the legal profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a
trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's
moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11

In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct"
because he made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his
schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,
marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while
continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a
character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant
Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after
she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe
delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of
respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will
correct this error forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his
name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of
respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Resolution, 16 June 1992. Rollo, p. 6.

2 Three (3) attempts were made by registered mail: the first two (2), at respondent's
address at Abelardo Street, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, and the third, at
respondent's employment address at Commission on Audit, Cadiz City. Another attempt
was made at respondent's address at Bliss Project Daga, Cadig City, through the
assistance of the P.C. Command at Bacolod City; and another at Lumbunao Calinog
Sugar Mill, Iloilo (Court's Resolution dated 24 April 1985, Rollo, p. 47).

3 Resolution, 24 April 1985. Rollo, p. 52.

4 Rollo, p. 53.

5 Id., p. 70.

6 In his Answer with Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order, respondent
Jordan Terre stated his address as "c/o 4th Floor, PAIC Building, 105 Paseo de Roxas,
Makati, Metro Manila." Court papers sent to him at that address were, however,
returned unserved with the notation "not known at given address" (Rollo, p. 63). It thus
appears that Jordan Terre once more submerged to evade service of legal papers on
him.

7 Rollo, p. 73.

8 Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615 (1970); Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service

Insurance System, 37 SCRA 316 (1971); Wiegel v. Hon. Alicia Sempio-Diy, etc., et al,
143 SCRA 499 (1986). This rule has been cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the
Family Code (Executive Order No. 209, dated 6 July 1987).

9 Arroyo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 96602 and 96715, 19 November 1991.

10 133 SCRA 309 (1984).

11 133 SCRA at 316. See also Cordova v. Cordova, 179 SCRA 680 (1989) and
Laguitan v. Tinio, 179 SCRA 837 (1989).
 12 16 SCRA 623 (1966).

13 16 SCRA 630.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1334. November 28, 1989.]

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, Respondent.

Federico A. Blay for complainant.

Luciano Babiera for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT; IMMORALITY; RESPONDENT HAVING TAKEN

ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION IN COLLEGE TO HAVE CARNAL KNOWLEDGE OF
STUDENT IS DISBARRED. — After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees
with the finding of the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated
in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral
conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). It was
highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of
his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the
threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused. Respondent Jose B.
Aznar is therefore DISBARRED and his name ordered stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT KEEP SILENT WHILE HIS MORAL
CHARACTER IS PUT IN ISSUE. — While respondent denied having taken complainant to
the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not
present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal
proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt
unjustly traduced. It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in
issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued
membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting
moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT THAT LAWYER DOES NOT PRACTICE HIS PROFESSION DOES NOT
RENDER HIM A PERSON OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER; GOOD MORAL CHARACTER IS A
CONTINUING QUALIFICATION. — Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it
"worthwhile to inform the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very
rich man in his own right and in fact is rot practicing his profession before the court"
(Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no
redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession
as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of
good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and
such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is
a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The
ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of
morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

4. ID.; ID.; CONCEPT OF IMMORAL CONDUCT. — In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591,
[1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:
"A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity. "It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an
inflexible standard as to what is ‘grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of
the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross
immorality.

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu),

alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of
said university, had carnal knowledge of her for several times under threat that she
would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent’s lustful
desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent,
through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his
Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations
contained in the complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a
woman of loose morality.

On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw

library
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the Chairman
of the Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);

2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach
respondent in the latter’s house who assured her that she would pass the said subject
(pp. 15, 16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him to
Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975);. . .

5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same plane
(Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905,
9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to
"K-6" ; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1975);

6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San
Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp. 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);

7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o’clock midnight, where respondent had
carnal knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6,
1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);

8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she
would sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p. 61, tsn, June 6,
1975); . . .

9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was suspecting
pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); . . .

10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of medicine)
that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her (p. 82, tsn, July 17,
1975); . . .

11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Mansanto fetched her at
her boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp.
87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);

12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an inhalation
mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1975);

13) as a result she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had already
been performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body
(pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); . . . Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant
introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10,
1975; Rollo, p. 41)

Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that
abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of
complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).chanrobles law library : red

The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Edilberto Caban testified that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife
and children; respondent never came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,
tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);

2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn,
Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).

Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had
male companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman companion of respondent
Aznar;

2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside
the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).

The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made
against him.

In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the
allegations in the complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the
charge levelled against him is in furtherance of complainant’s vow to wreck vengeance
against respondent by reason of the latter’s approval of the recommendation of the
Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974
because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the defense did
not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal
knowledge of the complainant.

Contrary to respondent’s averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to

the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with
respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in
all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6,
1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant had every
reason to believe him.

"It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to
Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of
her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in
her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6,
1975;).

x x x

"On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true
that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent
usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is
not much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and
slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel . . .
Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his
wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however, are February 12
to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban’s) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present
case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent
Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence, both testimonial and documentary;
while finding insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The
Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for a period of not less than three (3) years.cralawnad

On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to
determine whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot
and academic (Rollo, p. 69).

On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that
the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and
recommendation previously submitted together with the record of the case and the
evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor
General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the
investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may
therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of

the offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self serving testimonies of two
witnesses presented on respondent’s behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to
exonerate respondent of the act complained of, much less contradict, on material points,
the testimonies of complainant herself.

While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there
had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where
he was at that date. While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have
done more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this
Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He
cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law
profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the
Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator
(Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him . . . In the
case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court,
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy
things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to
help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but
actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him" (Quingwa
v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).

The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for
having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married
man with children, respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for
not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989
alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time
the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a three (3) year suspension and
respondent is not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the
respondent as having been suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for
being moot and academic.

We disagree.

Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a
promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly, complainant’s knowledge
of respondent’s marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted
to respondent’s solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual
gratification but because of respondent’s moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she
would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of
medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that
respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would
deem it "worthwhile to inform the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family
and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is rot practicing his profession before the
court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve
no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his
profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character.
Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of
Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral
character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice
of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest
standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

Under Section 27, Rule 138," (a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice . . ." In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591,
[1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity.

"It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
‘grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render
a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.

"Immoral conduct has been defined as ‘that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of
the community’ (7 C.J.S. 959).

"Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant
by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children,
disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks,
20 Pac. 2nd 896)."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children,
to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she
refused.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan (C.J.), took no part.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.

BARRERA, J.:

In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong
charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly
committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the
respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not
disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.

On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation
that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from
the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:

The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster
mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about
1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the
respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with
one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced
her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her
family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with
her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue
her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster
parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing
clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the
first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave
birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that
she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that
she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was
alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on
November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his
house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n.,
hearing of August 5, 1959).

The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the
Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of
the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against
Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).

The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from
January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the
complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he
limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her
eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had
reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place
before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times,
mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He
intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents'
intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for
her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of
their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia,
explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-
16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).

xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The
complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation,
but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but
repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she
appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor
....

But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience

recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live
maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the
spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after
more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that
she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years
of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was
accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he
knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that
he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her.
From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
 undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she
was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him.

The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated
May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that
the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday
of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."

But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From
1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage
still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had
it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar
examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then
permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous
relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient
ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one
for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.

xxx xxx xxx

RECOMMENDATION

Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent
Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be
stricken from the roll of attorneys.

In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the
alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another
complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately
alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of
living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the
complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and
unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment
ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation
of his name from the roll of attorneys."

In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint
does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from
the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for
in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for
additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.

On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional
evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On
September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on
October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been
proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or
fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to
the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles,
who testified as follows:

... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December
16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were
evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro
Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24).
Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores
asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia,
were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent
asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She
told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living
together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when
they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after
their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a
good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her
hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her
and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her
legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara
(t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with
respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact,
she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6,
1962, pp. 5-6]."

Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was
also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others,
the following:.

... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because
the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place
on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with
his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began
courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the
crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter
accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him
that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date
(February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband
and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she
was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not
then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join
her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate
from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his
expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to
live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was
ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to
molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no
choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of
 his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact
in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the
fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good
moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so;
and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take
the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).

After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did,
that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent
committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became
a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in
his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation
with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended
that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one year.

Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of
record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to
file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum
was duly filed.

It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the
complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he
likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the
present.

The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and
the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the
respondent's disbarment.

It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations
with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not
been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the
disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this
enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members
of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may
be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively
prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be
disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698,
citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme
Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require
disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar
instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court
over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7
C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued
possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its
loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of
disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct
in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the
decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as
to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In
the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before
complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her,
so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he limited himself merely to
kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with
his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.

Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his
common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her
uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her.
From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17
or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see
why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the
complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his
acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself
to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.

The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for
disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where
this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas
in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would
seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty
in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession,
has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give
sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor General puts it — recognizing "a
double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment
from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his
simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with
his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite
for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and
character degeneration of the members of the bar.

The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly
committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common
sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the
noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his
adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies,
and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his
admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral
dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament
he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his
conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he
could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to
continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining
promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned.
Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal
profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he
may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).

The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present
complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses
different from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as
authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.

SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if
the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall
submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion,
whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.

SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. — If the Solicitor
General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the
corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation,
with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court
with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.

The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor
General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the
complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find
sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at
liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the
investigation..

The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954
since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good
moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a
gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to
objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he
is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to
show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where
he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which should
be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables
them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty
(3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744
B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v.
Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time
he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that
people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good
moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly
not fit to remain a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J.
Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989

PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR F. TINIO, respondent.

Joanes G. Caacbay for respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21 May 1987, petitioner Perla Y. Laguitan charged Atty.
Salvador F. Tinio with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.

After answer was filed on 27 October 1987, the Court, in its Resolution dated 16 November 1987,
referred the Petition to the Solicitor General for Investigation, Report and Recommendation.

During the initial hearing of this case by the Solicitor General on 17 February 1988, only respondent
and his counsel appeared; it turned out that complainant had not been duly served with notice of the
hearing. The hearing scheduled for 24 March 1988 was likewise reset to 27 April 1988 upon motion of
respondent and upon failure of complainant to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General.

This case was eventually transmitted by the Solicitor General to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) for investigation and proper action. Thus, in an order
dated 18 August 1988, the Commission set the case for hearing on 9 September 1988 and required
both complainant and respondent to submit additional copies of their pleadings within ten (10) days
from notice.

The initial hearing set by the Commission for 9 September 1988 was reset to 20 September 1988
because only complainant appeared, respondent having failed to present himself despite due notice
to him. The hearing of 20 September 1988 was again reset to 20 October 1988 because neither
complainant nor her counsel appeared. The hearing for 20 October 1988 was once again reset to 14
November 1988 as only complainant appeared, Finally, the hearing for 14 November 1988 was
rescheduled two (2) more times, first to 15 December 1988 and second to 17 January 1989.

In its Order dated 27 January 1989, the Commission, upon the unexplained failure of respondent to
appear at the hearing on 17 January 1989, required petitioner to make a formal offer of evidence ex
parte, and thereafter submit the case for resolution. The Order was duly received by respondent's
counsel on 31 January 1989.

On 9 February 1989, petitioner formally offered her exhibits as follows:

1. Exh. 'A' — Certificate of Live Birth of Sheila Laguitan

Tinio.

Purpose: To show and prove the filiation of the child as

shown on the document;

2. Exh. 'B' —Certificate of Live Birth of Benedict Laguitan.

Purpose: To show and prove likewise the filiation of the child

as shown on the document:

3. Exh. 'C' to 'C-6' — Receipts issued by the Mt. Carmel

Maternity and Children's Hospital.

Purpose: To prove that petitioner herein gave birth to a baby

girl at the Mt. Carmel Maternity and Children's Hospital and
for which respondent paid the bills for the hospitalization,
medicines and professional fees of doctors;

4. Exh. 'D' to 'D-2' — Receipts issued by the Paulino Medical

Clinic.

Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner again gave birth to a baby boy
at said clinic and for which respondent paid the bill for hospitalization,
medicines and professional fees of doctors;

5. Exh. 'E' to 'E-l' — Baptismal certificates of Sheila L. Tinio

and Benedict L. Tinio, respectively

Purpose: To show and prove that respondent admits his paternity of the
children:

6. Exh. 'F' to 'F-4' — The family pictures showing respondent

either singly or with the rest of the family during happier
times.

Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner and respondent really lived
together as husband and wife and begot two children and the respondent
admits these through the pictures:
 7. Exh. 'G' to 'G-3' — The school records of Sheila L. Tinio at
the St. Mary's Academy.

Purpose: To show and prove that respondent was supporting the

schooling of the children as he himself signed the correspondence and
was marked as Exh. 'G-2-A'. 1

Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
submitted to us its findings and recommendation, which may be summed up as follows:

Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each other and in time became
lovers. Beginning in 1976, the parties lived together as husband and wife. As a result, complainant
bore respondent two (2) children: Sheila, now about ten (10) years old and Benedict, now
approximately nine (9) years old. In the course of this relationship, petitioner discovered that
respondent Tinio, before meeting her, had contracted marriage with someone else and that the prior
marriage was subsisting. Nonetheless, complainant continued living in with respondent until
eventually, ten (10) years later, she and her children by respondent Tinio were abandoned by the
latter in November 1986. Feeling helpless and aggrieved, she sought the help of respondent's
parents in supporting her children who were then already in school. Respondent's parents gave her
P400.00 and advised her not to see them again.

After examination of the record of this case and noting that respondent Tinio appeared before the IBP
Investigating Commissioner and candidly admitted his illicit relationship with complainant and his
having begotten two (2) children by her, and promised the Commissioner that he would support his
illegitimate children but had not lived to his promise, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP
Board. The IBP Board recommends that respondent Tinio be suspended from the practice of law "not
for having cohabited with the complainant, but for refusal to support his illegitimate children," the
suspension to remain in effect until respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of support.

The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the practice of law but not
merely because he has failed in his obligation to support the children complainant bore him but also
because for a prolonged period of time, he lived in concubinage with complainant, a course of
conduct inconsistent with the requirement of good moral character that is required for the continued
right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar, 2Concubinage imports moral turpitude and
entails a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Salvador F. Tinio from the practice of
law until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting the suspension upon evidence
satisfactory to the Commission and to this Court that respondent is supporting or has made provision
for the support of his illegitimate children and that he has given up his immoral course of conduct.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on Leave.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 28.

2 Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865 (1963); and
Cordova v. Cordovan Adm. Case No. 3249, promulgated 28 November 1989.
 EN BANC

[A.C. No. 3249. November 29, 1989.]

SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, Complainant, v. ATTY. LAURENCE D.

CORDOVA, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR; GOOD

MORAL CHARACTER, A REQUISITE; REQUIREMENT IS A CONTINUING CONDITION. —
We agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent,
assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and
immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely
reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An
applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is
possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed
with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement
persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES CONDUCT THAT OUTRAGES THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED
MORAL STANDARD OF THE COMMUNITY. — It is important to note that the lack of moral
character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character
relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social
institution or marriage."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IS SUSPENDED FOR DISREGARDING THE FUNDAMENTAL
INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE. — Respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years
an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general
public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on
the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform", respondent took
up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her, and bringing along his
young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the
fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own
daughter and the community at large. The Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from
the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court. The Court will
consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to
the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of
his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has
clung to.
 RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence
D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-
complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a

verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant complied and
submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of
her long and detailed complaint against her husband charging him with immorality and
acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.

In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in

default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice.
The same Order required complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex
parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the
resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing
on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two
(2) more times - first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The
hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never
moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled
were sent to him.

In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that
she and her husband had already "reconciled." In an order dated 17 April 1989, the
Commission required the parties (respondent and complainant) to appear before it for
confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file a
formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither
party responded and nothing was heard from either party since then.chanrobles law
library : red

Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the
IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report reprimanding respondent for
his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt
with more severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a responsible
parent should.

The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:chanrob1es

virtual 1aw library

Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this
marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino
Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to
Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself
married and left her own husband and children to stay with Respondent. Respondent
Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with
respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using
the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to
establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to
support his legitimate family.

On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent
reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and
brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however,
frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the
support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning
from a trip to Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that
respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant’s) children in their
conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita
Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent
and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complainant, compelling complainant to go to
court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig,
gave her custody of their children.

Notwithstanding respondent’s promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita

Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.

Finally, the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant,

stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.

After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also
agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent,
assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and
immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely
reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An
applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is
possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed
with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement
persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.

In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the
continued possession . . . of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the
rightful continuance in the practice of the law . . . and its loss requires suspension or
disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment." 2
It is important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential
is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a
mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent
being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who
subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent’s conduct in
Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his
own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he
had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.chanrobles law library

In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of

the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to
have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a
son; and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with
another woman.

In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an
adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general
public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on
the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took
up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her, and bringing along his
young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the
fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own
daughter and the community at large.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his
suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and
this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family
and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung
to.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Endnotes:

1. 100 Phil. 586 (1956).

2. 100 Phil. at 592.

3. 100 Phil. at 593.

4. 117 Phil. 865 (1963).

THIRD DIVISION
 [A.C. No. 5252. May 20, 2004]

PRISCILLA Z. ORBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. HENRY ADAZA, respondent.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

On 27 March 2000, Mrs. Priscilla Z. Orbe charged respondent Atty. Henry Adaza with gross
misconduct and as being unfit to continue his membership in the Bar. In a three-page complaint-affidavit
complainant averred that respondent obtained a loan from the former and, to secure the repayment
thereof, drew and issued two BPI Family Bank checks. When the first check (No. 0350973) was
presented for payment upon maturity, the same was dishonored for insufficient funds. According to
complainant, respondent, acting with malice and deceit, dated the second check January 24, 1996, so
that, once presented for payment, it would be, considering, in passing, that the loan was incurred on 23
November 1996, a stale check. She alleged that, despite repeated verbal and written demands,
respondent had failed to make good his obligation.
Acting on the complaint, the Court required respondent to comment thereon within ten (10) days
from notice. In a letter, dated 26 September 2000, complainant asked that the complaint be now
considered submitted for resolution in view of the failure of Atty. Adaza to comply with the order of the
Court requiring him to file his comment. In a resolution, dated 06 December 2000, the Court noted the
letter of complainant, and it directed that the complaint be thereby referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Despite proper notice to respondent requiring him to file his answer to the complaint, respondent
continued to ignore the matter. Finally, on 20 February 2002, the case was set for hearing by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline.The complainant appeared. Respondent did not show up despite his
having been duly notified of the hearing by personal service effected on 12 February
2002. Respondents failure to appear prompted the Commission on Bar Discipline to grant the request
of complainant to allow her to adduce evidence ex-parte. An order was issued setting the proceedings
on 18 March 2002 for such reception of evidence. A copy of the order was served on respondent on 28
February 2002 at his given address.
On 21 February 2002, the Commission received a letter from Atty. Adaza, sent via the facilities of
PTT, requesting for a resetting of the hearing from 18 March to 18 April 2002, claiming that he was
already committed to attend a hearing at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, of Dipolog City on 20
March 2002.
The proceedings set for 18 March 2002 for the reception of complainants evidence ex-parte was
held, but the same was without loss of right on the part of respondent to conduct, if desired, a cross-
examination of the witness.The evidence of complainant showed that complainant used to avail of the
notarial services of Atty. Adaza at his law office at Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila. In 1995, respondent
requested complainant, and the latter agreed, to be the primary sponsor in the baptismal of his
daughter. In November 1996, respondent accompanied by a certain Arlene went to the residence of
complainant to seek a loan. The latter lent respondent the sum of P60,000.00 payable with interest at
5% a month. Respondent issued two (2) BPI Family Bank Checks No. 35073 and No. 35076, each for
P31,800.00, dated 23 December 1996 and 24 January 1996, respectively. When presented for
collection Check No. 035073 was dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. The other check, Check No. 035076, bearing the date 24 January 1996, was not
accepted for being a stale check.
 Efforts were exerted by complainant to see respondent but her efforts proved to be futile. Several
demand letters were sent to the respondent by Atty. Ernesto Jacinto, complainants lawyer, but these
letters also failed to elicit any response. A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City for Check No. 035073. Finding probable
cause, the complaint was subsequently elevated to the Metropolitan Trial Court. A warrant of arrest
was issued by the court, but respondent somehow succeeded in evading apprehension. Sometime in
November 2000, respondent went to the house of complainant and promised to pay the checks within
a months time. Complainant agreed to have the service of the warrant of arrest withheld but, again,
respondent failed to make good his promise.
The cross-examination of complainant Priscilla Orbe was set on 22 May 2002. The stenographer
was directed to transcribe the stenographic notes as soon as possible for the benefit of Atty. Adaza. An
order was issued to this effect, and a copy thereof was served upon respondent on 09 April 2002.
On 22 May 2002, the complainant appeared for cross-examination but Atty. Adaza did not appear
despite due notice. In light of the manifestation of complainant that she had no other witness to present
and was ready to close her evidence, she was given a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a
formal offer and respondent was given a like period to thereupon submit his comment and/or opposition
thereto. The order, dated 22 May 2002, was served on Atty. Adaza on 28 May 2002. The formal offer
of complainants evidence was deemed submitted for resolution on 25 June 2002 pending proof of
service of a copy thereof upon respondent and the filing of the necessary comment or opposition thereto
by the latter.
In an order, dated 16 October 2002, the Commission set the reception of evidence for respondent
on 13 November 2002 in order to give him another opportunity to rebut the evidence of
complainant. Respondent again failed to appear on the date set therefor, prompting the Commission
to rule on the admissibility of Exhibits A to D with their submarkings. There being no appearance on
the part of respondent despite due notice, the case was considered submitted for resolution by the
Commission in its order of 26 February 2003.
The Commission submitted its report and recommendation, dated 28 May 2003, recommending
the suspension of respondent Atty. Henry Adaza from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
and that he be ordered to pay to complainant the value of the two unpaid checks he issued to
complainant.
The Court adopts the recommendation.
A member of the bar may be so removed or suspended from office as an attorney for any deceit,
malpractice, or misconduct in office.[1] The word conduct used in the rules is not limited to conduct
exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyers professional duties but it also refers to any
misconduct, although not connected with his professional duties, that would show him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. The grounds
expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court are not limitative [2] and are broad enough to
cover any misconduct, including dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. [3] Such
misdeed puts his moral fiber, as well as his fitness to continue in the advocacy of law, [4] in serious doubt.
Respondents issuance of worthless checks and his contumacious refusal to comply with his just
obligation for nearly eight years is appalling[5] and hardly deserves compassion from the Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Henry M. Adaza is found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is hereby
ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt
hereof. This decision is without prejudice to the outcome of the Criminal Case for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 filed against him. Let copies of this decision be spread on his record in the Bar
Confidants Office and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts.
 SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rule 138, Sec. 27.
[2]
Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, 30 April 1963 (7 SCRA 859).
[3]
In re: Pelaez, 03 March 1923 (44 Phil. 567).
[4]
Melendrez vs. Decena, Adm. Case No. 2104, 24 August 1989 (176 SCRA 662); Balinon vs. De Leon, Adm. No. 104, 28
January 1954 (94 Phil. 277).
[5]
Castillo vs. Taguines, Adm. Case No. 2024, 11 March 1996 (254 SCRA 554); People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No.
3360, 30 January 1990 (181 SCRA 692).

EN BANC

ROSARIO T. MECARAL, A.C. No. 8392 [ Formerly CBD

Complainant, Case No. 08-2175]
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
ATTY. DANILO S. VILLARAMA, JR.,
VELASQUEZ, PEREZ, and
Respondent. MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:

June 29, 2010

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DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) [1] with Gross
Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct which she detailed in her Position Paper [2] as follows:

After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and common-law
wife. In October 2007, respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran,
Biliran where he left her with a religious group known as the Faith Healers Association of
the Philippines, of which he was the leader. Although he visited her daily, his visits became scarce
in November to December 2007, prompting her to return home to Naval, Biliran. Furious,
respondent brought her back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers tortured,
brainwashed and injected her with drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the
members of the group tied her spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers
and fed stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the women members including a certain
Bernardita Tadeo.

Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received information that she
was weak, pale and walking barefoot along the streets in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought
the help of the Provincial Social Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two women
volunteers to rescue her. The religious group refused to release her, however, without the
instruction of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1
Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her mother.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent.Additionally, complainant charges
respondent with bigamy for contracting a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996,
despite the subsistence of his marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.

In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including the

following: Affidavit[3] of Delia dated February 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and PO1
Robedillo[4] dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the Certificate of Marriage[5] between
respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy of the Marriage Contract[6] between respondent and
Shirley G. Yunzal; National Statistics Office Certification [7] dated April 23, 2008 showing the
marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on April 27, 1990 in Quezon City and the
marriage of Leny H. Azur to respondent on August 2, 1996 in Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified
machine copy of the Resolution[8] of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran and
the Information[9] lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval, Biliran, for Serious Illegal
Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on complaint of herein complainant.

Despite respondents receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order[10] of the Director for Bar
Discipline for him to submit his Answer within 15 days from receipt thereof, and his expressed
intent to properly make [his] defense in a verified pleading,[11] he did not file any Answer.

On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008of which the parties
were duly notified, only complainants counsel was present. Respondent and his counsel failed to
appear.

Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and
Recommendation[12] dated September 29, 2008, found that:

[respondents] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley and
Leny, are grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world can countenance. The
subsequent detention and torture of the complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast may
be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

xxxx

In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed severe penalty for
grossly immoral conduct of a lawyer like the case at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano
Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the [Court] ordered the disbarment of the respondent for
maintaining extra-marital relations with a married woman, and having a child with her. In the
instant case, not only did the respondent commit bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley
Yunzal in 1990 and Leny Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made his secretary (complainant)
his mistress and subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All these circumstances showed
the moral fiber respondent is made of, which [leave] the undersigned with no choice but to
recommend the disbarment of Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez.[13](emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution [14]dated December 11, 2008,
ADOPTED the Investigating Commissioners findings and APPROVED the recommendation for
the disbarment of respondent.

As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioners evaluation and
recommendation well taken.
 The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.[15]When a lawyers moral character is assailed, such that his right to
continue

practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and
present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally
fit to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys. [16]

Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the hearings before the IBP
to rebut the charges brought against him, suggesting that they are true. [17] Despite his letter
dated March 28, 2008manifesting that he would come up with his defense in a verified pleading,
he never did.

Aside then from the IBPs finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he also violated theLawyers Oath reading:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines,
do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God, (underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
 The April 30, 2008 Resolution[18] of the Provincial Prosecutor on complainants charge
against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo for Serious Illegal Detention bears special noting, viz:

[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the complaint) has the

effect of strengthening the allegations against Atty. Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that
there was really physical restraint employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario
Mecaral. Even as he claimed that on the day private complainant was fetched by the two women
and police officers, complainant was already freely roaming around the place and thus, could not
have been physically detained. However, it is not really necessary that Rosario be physically kept
within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact, she was always accompanied
wherever she would wander, that it could be impossible for her to escape especially considering
the remoteness and the distance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran
where she is a resident. The people from the Faith Healers Association had the express and implied
orders coming from respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not
to let her go freely. That can be gleaned from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita
Tadeo. The latter being reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez would learn that complainant had
untangled the cloth tied on her wrists and feet.[19] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the criminal complaint against

respondent, his therein co-respondentcorroborated the testimonies of complainants witnesses, and
that the allegations against him remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him
by clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case
against a lawyer.[20]

In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute
gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a lawyer.[21]

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his

name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately
executory and ordered to be part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines.

Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated
to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-2.
[2]
Id at 28-31.
[3]
Id at 7-8.
[4]
Id at 9-10.
[5]
Id at 15.
[6]
Id at 16.
[7]
Id at 61.
[8]
Id at 52-58.
[9]
Id at 59-60.
[10]
Id at 17.
[11]
Id at 18.
[12]
Id at 64-69.
[13]
Id at 67-68.
[14]
Id at 63.
[15]
Mendoza v. Deciembre, A.C. No. 5338, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 26, 36; Yap-Paras v. Paras, A.C. No. 4947, February 14, 2005, 451
SCRA 194, 202.
[16]
Narag v. Narag, A.C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 451, 464.
[17]
Arnobit v. Arnobit, A.C. No. 1481, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 247, 254.
[18]
Supra note 8.
[19]
Id at 57.
[20]
Guevarra v. Eala, A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007, 529 SCRA 1.
[21]
Rollo, p. 68.