IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U.

MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE

ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.

PADILLA, J.:

On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:

Hon. Marcelo Fernan

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila

Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea

Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Sir:

By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable

Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was
designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12
December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1,
1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member
of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith
machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.

Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the
powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte)
Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the
issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:

(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as

assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to
the said position;

(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither

violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation
of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of
Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will
not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present
position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial
 Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the
Judiciary; and

(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part

of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.

May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.

Very respectfully yours,

(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO

Judge

An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City

Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of
detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail
congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee
are—

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final
or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of
his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed

prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative

functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of
rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is
provided that—

Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall

be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly
accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary
of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of
the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be

enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-
judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a
plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in
him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice
Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that
there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to
be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility
no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied
with nothing less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As
incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity
and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure.
As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said
Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when
such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

DECISION
(En Banc)

LAUREL, J.:

I. THE FACTS
 Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as
member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3,
1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who
have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election

protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly.
The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own
resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on
or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner
sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied
his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution
of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members
of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules
of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is
also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have
been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA 166 SCRA 533

FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No.
2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas
workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given
the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation
of powers?

RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative
of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to
the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.

 Casibang v. Aquino 92 SCRA 642

Facts:

Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected

Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his
only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest against the election of the former
with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and
irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral
precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5)
excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic
of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial
Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the
1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935
Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people
of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme
Court declared that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect.

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed
presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the
election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the
same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally)
Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political
question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that “... the provisions in the
1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973
Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of
government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI.” He further submitted
that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They
are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution,
and under Section 9 of Article XVII.

The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973
Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like
him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue
in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same
has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the
Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National
Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local
government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of
which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still
continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to
take cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government.

Issue:

whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit

Held:

No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and
academic pending election protest cases. The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in
office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials
or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly
construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be
performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest” and that “subject
to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory
Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new
fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective
position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced
proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed
candidate-elect’s right to the contested office.

The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely

arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally
from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the
November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to
their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their
functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed
to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision.

Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of

respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has
been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the
electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or
presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII
of the 1973 Constitution.

There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and the ‘right’ to hold an office.
A‘term’ of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold
office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A ‘right’ to hold a
public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of
the office. In other words, the ‘term’ refers to the period, duration of length of time during
which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or
indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of
the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an
election protest, of the ‘right’ of the private respondents to continue holding their respective
office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the ‘term’ to the
office, although the ‘right’ of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-
extensive with the ‘term’ thereof,” and that “it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9,
Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired,
and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. They hold their
respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is
now indefinite.

The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance
to hear, try and decide election protests: “Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution
provides that ‘all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. ‘And there has been no
amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave
the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected,”
and “according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution ‘all courts existing at the
time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until
otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said
courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.’ Consequently, the
Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and
exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein
petitioners.”

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge
of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal
elective positions.
 General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his
powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend
thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision.

General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include
electoral contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the
jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the
Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply
removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as
the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President
or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and
orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein
involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been
interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative
Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the
election protest. The term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure”.

The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and
therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its
cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to
which deference must be paid. Political questions should refer to such as would under the
Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full
discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the
competence of the judiciary to pass upon.

 Tanada v. Cuenco 103 PHIL 1051

Facts:

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly
occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who
belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial
candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).
But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET
should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme
Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since
there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the
minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So
did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then
he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest.
Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot
take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power
to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada
and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before
the bar of public opinion.

Issue:

Whether or not the issue is a political question.

Ruling:

No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The
term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked
by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was
whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial
question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does
not perform legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority
members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,
apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though
those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members
of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET
may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
  Sanidad v. Comelec 73 SCRA 333

Facts:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976
for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the
issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the
President of his present powers.

20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related

decree,
Presidential Decree 1031, a m e n d i n g t h e p r e v i o u s P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c r e e 9 9 1 ,
b y d e c l a r i n g t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f Presidential Decree 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"(Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite
relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential
Decree 991.

On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033,
stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's
continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their
desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the
October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C.
Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking toenjoin the Commission on Elections from holding
and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without
force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as
it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold,
and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend
that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutionst h e r e i s n o g r a n t t o t h e i n c u m b e n t P r e s i d e n t t o e x e r c i
s e t h e c o n s t i t u e n t p o w e r t o p r o p o s e amendments to the new Constitution.

As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has

no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by
Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention,a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e p o w e r t o p r o p o s e a m e n d m e n t s t o , o r r e v i
s i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n d u r i n g t h e transition period is expressly conferred
on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5October 1976
by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714,
to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to
the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue:

Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Ruling:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the
1 9 7 3 C o n s t i t u t i o n o n A m e n d m e n t s o r d a i n s t h a t " ( 1 ) A n y amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may,
by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority
voteof all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in
an election.

"Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such
amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National
Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending
power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified
in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods
contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of a l l i t s
members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-
t h i r d s o f a l l t h e Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a
Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times
of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the
interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court
in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the
i n c u m b e n t P r e s i d e n t i s v e s t e d w i t h t h a t prerogative of discretion as to
when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional
Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the
same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene
the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the
interim National Assembly soon found support from the
peoplet h e m s e l v e s . I n t h e p l e b i s c i t e o f J a n u a r y 1 0 -
1 5 , 1 9 7 3 , a t w h i c h t h e r a t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e 1 9 7 3 Constitution was s
ubmitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim Nation
a l Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays")
reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly.
Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether
the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because
some of the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members o
f t h e i n t e r i m N a t i o n a l Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that
referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu
striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of
amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not
legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a
peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that
power is provided for Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National
Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate
for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of
theC o n s t i t u t i o n i s n o t l e g i s l a t i v e i n c h a r a c t e r . I n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e a d i s
t i n c t i o n i s m a d e b e t w e e n constitutional content of an organic character and
that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law.
Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer.
The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases
of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments
to the Constitution.

 Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496

Facts:

The House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally
resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and
correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its

representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by
the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber
elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner
and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the
Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting
initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued
a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the
respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the
Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent. His claim is that
the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.

Issue:

whether the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Held:

No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is
not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us
because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the
act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.

The term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, it refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1,
of the Constitution clearly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.





  Abakada Guro Party List v. Hon. Cesar V. Purisima, August 14, 2008

Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A.
9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials
and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through
the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the
law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards
and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is
no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides
that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the
target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the
fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR
or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.

Discussions:
1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the State.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as
in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “

2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment
on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in
the executive branch.

Rulings:

1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed
public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection
of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through
which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
protection.

2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets
and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the
said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,”
“justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In
this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA
9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered
moot and academic.

DELEGATION OF POWERS

 Garcia v. Executive Secretary 211 SCRA 219

Facts:
The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and other
oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings
on said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and
appropriate action. The President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied
a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil
products.
Issue:
Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in the
nature of revenue-generating measures?
Ruling:
The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff
bills is within the province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in
question, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited
to the President, that they must be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“The Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix… tariff rates and other duties or
imposts…”
The relevant Congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and
Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof.

 People v. Vera 65 PHIL 112-125

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated
to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower
court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging
that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI
directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be
set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to
place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221
which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that
the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of
laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also
constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an
encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:
1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule
or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the
force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or
guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by
Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act,
the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
 Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification
of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA supra

FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No.
2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas
workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given
the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation
of powers?

RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative
of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to
the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.

 Ynot v. IAC 148 SCRA 659

Facts:

Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these were
confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which
prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to
another. Confiscation will be a result of this.

The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of
the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer
be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity.

The same result was decided in the trial court.

In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the
outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court
as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power
by the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was
given emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.

Issue:

Is the E.O. constitutional?

Ruling:

The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.

The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.

Justice Laurel's said, “courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should
probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the
affliction.”

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential

decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the
grant of legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.

Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the
due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This
was due to the avoidance of an “iron rule “laying down a stiff command for all circumstances.
There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection
for the changing conditions.

Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be confined
to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.

There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection
between facts proved and fact presumed. An examplesis a passport of a person with
a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both
restrains and is restrained bydure process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to
626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception. While 626-A has the same lawful
subjectas the original executive order, it can’t be said that it complies with the existence of a
lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap.Summary action
may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical only due
to the urgency needed to correct it.

There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of
justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution. The challenged measure was
an invalid exercise of police power because the method to confiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his defense
and punished immediately. This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against
the separataion of powers. The policeman wasn’t liable for damages since the law during
that time was valid.

 Tablarin v. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730

Facts:

Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought
admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they
either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission
into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board
of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5
(a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23
August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional
requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of
the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking
and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission,
from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering
the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for
issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly
filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the
RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation
is invalid and/or unconstitutional.

Ruling: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the
“Medical Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c)
the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The
Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements
for applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps
to make quality education “accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to
enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all
who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.”
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks
of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations
requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to
the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state.
.
 Pelaez v. Auditor General 15 SCRA 569

Facts:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on
November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as
taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960
and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except
under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan

Issue:

Whether or not the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can create
a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
Ruling:

On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case involved,
not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already
existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at
the time of and prior to said transfer. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix
such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption
of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority
to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other
courts, it is “strictly a legislative function” or “solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative
power”

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself
— it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law;
and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the
law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements
for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give
a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.

The power of control under the provision Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Consti implies
the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by
law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution
to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said
local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the
same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance
which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a
duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial
officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul
an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how
patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of
the corresponding provincial board.
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the
barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become
vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had
it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him
by the Constitution.

 Pacific Stream Laundry Inc. v. Laguna Lake Devt. Authority, Dec. 18, 2009
Facts:

Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services.
On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection
report on the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioner’s plant located at 114 Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City. On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation and found that untreated
wastewater generated from petitioner’s laundry washing activities was discharged directly to
the San Francisco Del Monte River. Furthermore, the Investigation Report stated that
petitioner’s plant was operating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from
LLDA. On 5 September 2001,the Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted
wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent. The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-
compliance with effluent standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand
(BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of
Violation. Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA
that it would undertake the necessary measures to abate the water pollution. No compliance followed. It was
reported that petitioner’s wastewater treatment facility was under construction. Subsequently,
another wastewater sampling was conducted but the results still failed.

A Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against petitioner before the LLDA. Petitioner requested
another test. This time, it showed compliance. Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30
October 2001 and its corresponding daily penalty beset aside and that the imposable penalty be reckoned
from the date of actual hearing and not on 5 September 2001. It is respondent’s position that the
Notice of Violation and the imposition of the penalty had no legal and factual basis because it had already
installed the necessary wastewater treatment to abate the water pollution. This Public Hearing
Committee finds respondent’s arguments devoid of merit. Presidential Decree No. 984 prohibits
the discharge of pollutive wastewater and any person found in violation thereof shall pay a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00) [sic] forevery day during which such violation continues. The
mere discharge of wastewater not conforming with the effluent standard is the violation referred to in PD
No. 984.CA held that LLDA has the power to impose fines.

Issue:

Whether or not LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984?

Ruling:

YES.

Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to impose penal sanctions,
which was once lodged with the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), is now assumed by the
Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192). SC disagree. Presidential
Decree No. 984 (PD 984) created and established the NPCC under the Office of the President. EO 192, which
reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary
which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.
Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927), LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to effectively
perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and enforcement.

Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may "exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may
be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities." In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of
Appeals, the Court upheld the power of LLDA to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order even if such
power is not expressly conferred by law, holding that an administrative agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The Court ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of its
express power sunder its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in
the Laguna Lake region, has the implied authority to issue a "cease and desist order." In the same manner,
we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function asa regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Republic Act No. 6735 August 4, 1989
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
I. — General Provisions
Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum
to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or
the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election
called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part
thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected
by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of
signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections,
hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod,
Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay,
as the case may be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all
registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per
centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for
the purpose and register the same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of
the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and
only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly
of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by
at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;
Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at
least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least three
per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated
if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the
municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed
by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at
least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of
the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
II. — National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission shall call and supervise
the conduct of initiative or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining
the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of
general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier
than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission
of the sufficiency of the petition.
Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The Proposition of the enactment,
approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of
the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the
national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days
following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by
a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become
effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the
certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall
remain in full force and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called
for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the
Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum
petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress
by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.
Section 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The
petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization
proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative
measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence
over the pending legislative measures on the committee.
Section 12. Appeal. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency
of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30)
days from notice thereof.
III. — Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in
case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in
case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly
or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any
law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation,
the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of
initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local Government
or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety (90)
days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case
of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of
signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in the
presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local
legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the
case may be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office in the
local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures
has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the
initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government
unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the
Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case
of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of
barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be
certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes
cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action
thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain
said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. — (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised
more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local
legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition
presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire,
apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.
Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any proposition or ordinance or resolution
approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed,
modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date
therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3)
years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of
barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local
legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or
approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days
in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of
barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or
want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
IV. — Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The Omnibus Election Code and other
election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of
this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current
year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included
in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional,
the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper
of general circulation.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."
Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means
of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated
in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition
already registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or
coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition
for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before
the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-
list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the
date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency
in which it has registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before
election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and
distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of
the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list
system shall not be considered resigned.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for
candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote
for the party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of Representatives:
Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall
not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May
1998.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the
electorate on the matter of the party-list system.
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those
under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the
votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the
number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by
the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions
to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election. No party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political
party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy
shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted
to the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If
the list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same
salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.
Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided
in the regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the
General Appropriations Act.
Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for
purposes of its information campaign on the party-list system.
Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts
or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.
Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary
December 8, 1994
Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition
questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the
constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third,
Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section
5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the minimum
population requirement was attained.
Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?
Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first
contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong
is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical
consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably
adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the
provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise
provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is
not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show
that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to
justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were
not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative district.The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC, digested

342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law – Party List Representatives, 20% Allocation)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38
additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as
provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the filling up of
the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-
list representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.
HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a policy to
promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would
benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system
to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have “additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes.”
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x
additional seats for concerned party

Issue: Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
7941 constitutional?

Held: Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the
law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But
to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation
of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.
Issue: How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well
as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number
of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be
able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation,
the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party
is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-
list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec
acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.
RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where
the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Tha facts
attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.
2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the
Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the
Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented”, the
criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of
the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the
pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist
the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine
compliance by the party lists.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC

FACTS: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of
the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case
of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes
cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat,
must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by
the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the
2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share
of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in
the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides
that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will
be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections,
there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to
Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-
list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the
ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million
votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60
seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties
get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get
a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing
for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-
lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each.
The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats
for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available
for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of
seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for
the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total
votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional
seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter
which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so
happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in
the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections
as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations
deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his
separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of
the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution
– and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the
party-list system.

Aquino III V. Comelec

Apr. 7, 2010
FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional
of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
From Such Reapportionment.” Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009
creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing
first and second legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four
(4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province.
Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando
were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue: w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province?
Held: We deny the petition.
Ruling: There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
“each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province”
point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but
not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the
Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. –
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections
558 SCRA 700 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions
(ARMM) – Population Requirement
FACTS: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite
held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato
City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces,
municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff
Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district
of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of
Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained;
however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as
a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato
(1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and
that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from
there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of
a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S.
Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the
HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan
being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay
must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria
fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress
to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However,
under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision
of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils,
the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established
in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province,
once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a
legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the
population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly
create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally
possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can
create are barangays not cities and provinces.
COMELEC vs AKB
694 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party-List System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against
COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-
lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who
lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have
a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that
it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system
which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people
should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is
also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them
cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in
the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then
pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during
1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman
of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served
as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for
the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and
also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite
her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new
one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that
she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained
her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences
in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC
is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
 AQUINO vs. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)
Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition
for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13
days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the
election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the
Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Issue: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant thedi
squalification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
Held: The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is
that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The
purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community
from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community
for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that
election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident
in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident
of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila)
indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence
or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.
Facts:
 The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
 The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
 On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
 Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
 Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
 The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
 The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
  A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
 Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.
On Jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)

The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.

The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak,
to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or
not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a
matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668
[1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of
the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
On Citizenship
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in
the case ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should
have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the
municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412
[1965])

Dimaporo vs. Mitra (1991)

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO,
petitioner
vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and HON. CAMILO L. SABIO
Secretary,House of Representatives,
respondents

Facts: Petitioner Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur
during the 1987 congressional elections. In January 1990, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of the ARMM with the Comelec. Upon being informed of this development,
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives (HOR) excluded petitioner’s name
from the Roll of Members of the HOR pursuant to Sec. 67, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg.
881) enacted in 1985. He was excluded from all proceedings of the House, was not paid the emoluments
due his office, and his office suites were occupied by other persons. When he lost his bid for the
gubernatorial race, petitioner expressed his intention to resume performing his duties and functions as
an elected Member of Congress. He is now claiming that Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is not operative
under the present Constitution which provides specific grounds by which the term of members of the
House can be shortened
Issues:
1.W/N Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is operative under the 1987 Constitution
2.W/N the respondent Speaker and/or respondent Secretary by administrative act could exclude
petitioner from the rolls of the HOR

Ruling: Yes. Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution as the voluntary
act of resignation contemplated in the said provision falls within the term “voluntary renunciation of
office” in Sec. 7(2), Art. VI of the Constitution. “Term” is different from “tenure” of office. The term of
office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature. However, the
period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within
or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not even exist at all.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy
for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, NOT his term. The term remains
and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.

Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution provides that all public officers to the exclusion of the President,
Vice-President, Members of the Supreme Court, Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office as provided by law. This clearly recognizes that the 4 grounds
found in Art. VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are NOT
exclusive. The legal maxim should not be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a
statute because the maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. It serves
only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest.
Petitioner failed to discern that the purpose of the statutory provision is not to cut short the term
of office of public officials but rather to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another public office. Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 makes it clear
that should incumbent public officials fail in their candidacy for another office, they cannot go back to
their former position. This is in perfect consonance with the constitutional edict that all public officials
must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received
from their constituents.
The ground for forfeiture in Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed
in Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Sec.
7, Art. VI of the Constitution. As discussed by Constitutional Commissioners, the filing of the certificate
of candidacy is already an overt act of an intention to relinquish the office currently held. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore
the ousted official. A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people.
As such, the holder of such an office is subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and
he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.
Since the legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy have already been spelled out in Sec. 67, Art. IX
of BP Blg. 881, respondents cannot be said to have indulged in any statutory interpretation. Both of them
perform ministerial functions as administrative officers and it was their duty to remove petitioner’s name
from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881. They cannot refuse to
perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing such duty because it
might hinder the transaction of public business. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest
are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome Cabangbang

17 SCRA 876 – Political Law – Freedom of Speech and Debate
FACTS: Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter
addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That
such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas,
was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez,
among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used
as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general
circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang
alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed
because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by
the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and
for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made,
or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at
the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court
the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
 PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House
of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

POBRE vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

(A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009)
PETITIONER
Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the court the contents of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s
speech delivered on the senate floor. The following excerpts are the ones in question:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country
of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded
by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
According to Pobre, the words of the lady senator were disrespectful and requested that the latter be
disbarred or be subjected to disciplinary action.
RESPONDENT
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statements she made were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge
of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. She claims to have made those comments to expose
anomalies with regard to the selection process of the Judicial Bar Council for the next Chief Justice.
The argument of the respondent is based on Article VI Section 11 which states that:
"A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof."
ISSUE: WON Miriam Defensor-Santiago can be charged for her comments on the Judiciary
SUPREME COURT: NO.
The court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case. The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal
of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
Despite this, the court feels that the lady senator has gone beyond the limits of decency and good conduct
for the statements made which were intemperate and highly improper in substance. The court is not
hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on her, but the factual and legal circumstances of
this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her.
Petition is DISMISSED

Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon

208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President
FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
“repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain
retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress
felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials.
However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law
should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking
the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644)
because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera.
Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed.
The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for
1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the
allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included
therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government; among such
obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary. However, President Aquino
again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the
GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and
override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item
and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed
some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill
in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this
case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed
the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering
obligations to the other departments of the government.