G.R. No.
177498 : January 18, 2012
STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC. AND CHUNG GAI SHIP
MANAGEMENT, Petitioners, v. SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR.,
Respondent.
PEREZ,J.:
FACTS:
Sulpecio Medequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before the Adjudication Office of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the petitioners for
illegal dismissal under a first contract and for failure to deploy under a second contract.
He prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees for his
illegal dismissal and in view of the Petitioners bad faith in not complying with the
Second Contract.
The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of the DOLE upon the effectivity of the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The parties were required to submit their respective position papers before the Labor
Arbiter. However, petitioners failed to submit their respective pleadings despite the
opportunity given to them.
Labor Arbiter Vicente R. Layawen rendered a judgment finding that the respondent was
constructively dismissed by the petitioners. The Labor Arbiter found the first contract
entered into by and between the complainant and the respondents to have been novated
by the execution of the second contract. In other words, respondents cannot be held
liable for the first contract but are clearly and definitely liable for the breach of the
second contract.
The petitioners appealed the adverse decision before the National Labor Relations
Commission assailing that they were denied due process, that the respondent cannot be
considered as dismissed from employment because he was not even deployed yet and
the monetary award in favor of the respondent was exorbitant and not in accordance
with law.
NLRC affirmed with modification the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC upheld
the finding of unjustified termination of contract for failure on the part of the petitioners
to present evidence that would justify their non-deployment of the respondent.
The petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Finding no
grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the Decision of the labor
tribunal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the first employment contract between petitioners and the
private respondent is different from and independent of the second contract
subsequently executed upon repatriation of respondent to Manila which justifies
termination of respondent?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.
CIVIL LAW
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the
obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by
changing the object or principal conditions, or, by substituting another in place of the
debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. In order for
novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable:
1. There must be a previous valid obligation,
2. There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract,
3. There must be the extinguishment of the old contract, and
4. There must be the validity of the new contract.
LABOR LAW
Equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have
acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence,i.e., the
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that
they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be
examined by the courts.In this case, there was no showing of any arbitrariness on the
part of the lower courts in their findings of facts. Hence, we follow the settled rule.
LABOR LAW
The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall commence
upon the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of
hire.We adhere to the terms and conditions of the contract so as to credit the valid prior
stipulations of the parties before the controversy started. Else, the obligatory force of
every contract will be useless. Parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has
been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
We rule that distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment
contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection
of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred
when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of
the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee
relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually
deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee
relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the
birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of
action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer
failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
DENIED
G.R. No. 93666 Case Digest
G.R. No. 93666 April 22, 1991
Gen. Milling Corp and Earl Cone, petitioners
vs Hon. Torres in his capacity as secretary of Labor and Employment,
et. al.
Ponente: Feliciano
Facts:
May 1989, the NCR-Dept.Labor and Employment issued Alien Employment
permit in favor of petitioner earl cone, a US citizen as sports
consultant and assistant coach for GMC. Dec. 1989 then GMC and Cone
entered into a contract of employment. Then January 1990, the board
of special inquiry of the commission and deportation approved Cone's
application for a change of admission status from temporary visitor
to pre-arranged employee. On Feb. 1990, GMC requested for renewal of
Cone's alien employment permit which was granted by DOLE regional
director. The alien employment is valid until December 1990.
Private respondent BCAP appealed the issuance of said alien employment
permit to the secretary of labor who issued a decision ordering the
cancellation of Cone's employment permit on the ground that there was
no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is
competent, able and willing to perform the services required nor that
the hiring of Cone redound to the national interest.
GMC filed a motion for reconsideration and 2 supplemental motions for
reconsideration but were bothe denied by acting secretary Laguesma.
Issue:
GMC before the court on a petition for certiorari alleging that: (1)
Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he revoked the
alien employment permit and (2) labor code does not empower secretary
to determine if the employment of an alien would redound to national
interest.
Ruling: Petition dismissed.
Court considers that petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of secretary. The alleged failure to notify
petitioners of the appeal filed by BCAP was cured when petitioners
were allowed to file their motion for reconsideration before secretary
of labor.
GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's
prerogative has no legal basis at all. Under article 40 of labor
code, an employment permit is required to hire a foreigner, as it
applies to "non-resident aliens".
GMS can't claim that Secretary's decision would amount to an
impairment of the obligations of contracts because Labor code requires
alien employment permits to enter a contract of employment for
foreigners.
GMC's contention that Secretary of labor should have deferred to the
findings of Comm. On Immigration and Deportation as to the necessity
of employing Cone is also without basis. The labor code specifically
empowers secretary to make a determination as to the availability of
the services of a person in the Philippines.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE),
petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity
as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO
B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and
Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
Superintendent of International School-Manila; and
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.,
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is
a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of
foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel
selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities,
such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations
attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for
the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as
members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2)
local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.
Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a
legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all
faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether
foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually
caused a deadlock between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the
NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local-
hires.
RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is
entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to
the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but include as
well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor
Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates
“to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate
the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts,
collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-
hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of
all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to
the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1)
the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of
employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will
best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their
intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective
bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that
these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited
tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform
similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires,
foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-
hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include
foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either
group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby
GRANTED IN PART.
NITO ENTERPRISES VS. NLRC G.R.
No. 114337 September 29, 1995
Apprenticeship
NOVEMBER 2, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner Nito Enterprises hired Capili as an apprentice machinist under an apprenticeship
agreement for six months for a daily wage, which was 75% of applicable minimum wage.
However, shortly 2 months after he started work, Capili was asked to resign for the reason that
he had been causing accidents, that he has been doing certain things beyond the scope of his
duty, and that he had even injured himself in handling one of the machines, to the financial
prejudice of the company as his medication would be shouldered by Nito Enterprises.
Capili later filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which the Labor Arbiter dismissed. This
decision was reversed by the NLRC, holding that Capili was a regular employee. With this, Nito
came to the Supreme Court. Nito Enterprises assails the NLRC decision on the ground that no
apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement was executed.
ISSUE:
Is Capili a regular employee or an apprentice?
RULING:
Capili is a regular employee. Apprenticeship needs DOLE’s prior approval, or apprentice
becomes regular employee.
Petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship
agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with
the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship
program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be
validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give
rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no
force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE,
private respondent’s assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy
(“kargador” or “pahinante”) deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular
employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code and pursuant to the
constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
ATLANTA INDUSTRIES VS. SEBOLINO
DIGEST
G.R. No. 187320, January 26, 2011
ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. and/or ROBERT CHAN, petitioners, vs.
APRILITO R. SEBOLINO, KHIM V. COSTALES, ALVIN V. ALMONTE,
and JOSEPH H. SAGUN, respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Sebolino et al. filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization,
underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money claims as well as
damages. They alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed
to work with Atlanta for more than six (6) months from the start of a purported
apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They claimed that
they were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired.
In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to
regularization and to their money claims because they were engaged as
apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The
company offered to hire them as regular employees in the event vacancies for
regular positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They
also claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master
List) prior to their engagement as apprentices.
The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal to be illegal with respect to nine out of the
twelve complainants. Atlanta appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed
the illegal dismissal decision with respect to Sebolino and three others. They
moved for reconsideration but this was denied. They then brought the case up to
the Court of Appeals, which held that Sebolino and the three others were illegally
dismiised.
The CA ruled that Sebolino and the three others were already employees of the
company before they entered into the first and second apprenticeship
agreements. For example, Sebolino was employed by Atlanta on March 3, 2004
then he entered into his first apprenticeship agreement with the company on
March 20, 2004 to August 19, 2004. The second apprenticeship agreement was
from May 28, 2004 to October 8, 2004. However, the CA found the
apprenticeship agreements to be void because they were executed in violation of
the law and the rules. Therefore, in the first place, there were no apprenticeship
agreements.
Also, the positions occupied by the respondents machine operator, extruder
operator and scaleman are usually necessary and desirable in the manufacture of
plastic building materials, the companys main business. Sebolino and the three
others were, therefore, regular employees whose dismissals were illegal for lack
of a just or authorized cause and notice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Sebolino and three
others were illegally dismissed.
HELD: The petition is unmeritorious.
LABOR LAW - Illegal dismissals
The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying the NLRC decision and in
affirming the labor arbiters ruling, as it applies toCostales, Almoite, Sebolino and
Sagun. Specifically, the CA correctly ruled that the four were illegally dismissed
because (1) they were already employees when they were required to undergo
apprenticeship and (2) apprenticeship agreements were invalid.
The following considerations support the CA ruling.
FBased on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales,
Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the company as
employees before they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The company itself
recognized the respondents status through relevant operational records in the
case of Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly report for December 2003 which
the NLRC relied upon and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the production and work
schedule for March 7 to 12, 2005 cited by the CA.
The CA correctly recognized the authenticity of the operational documents, for
the failure of Atlanta to raise a challenge against these documents before the
labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA itself. The appellate court, thus, found the
said documents sufficientto establish the employment of the respondents before
their engagement as apprentices.
The fact that Sebolino and the three others were already rendering service to the
company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship (as established by the
evidence) renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the four are
concerned. This reality is highlighted by the CA finding that the respondents
occupied positions such as machine operator, scaleman and extruder operator -
tasks that are usually necessary and desirable in Atlantas usual business or trade
as manufacturer of plastic building materials. These tasks and their nature
characterized the four as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor
Code.Thus, when they were dismissed without just or authorized cause, without
notice, and without the opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under
the law.
DENIED.
Bernardo vs NLRC DIGEST
DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ
Bernardo vs NLRC
GR 122917 07/03/99
Facts:
Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods from
1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and
Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called ‘Employment Contract for
Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their
task as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of
respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude
the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as
“special workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular
complement of the Bank.”[12] Rather, they were “special” workers under Article 80
of the Labor Code.
Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.
Held:
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be
trained for a period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether
or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore,
the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable
cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically
expire at the end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped
workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from
1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the
hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to
the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them
unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled
employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as
a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:
“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled person shall be denied
access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall
be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same
compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a
qualified able bodied person.”
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords
them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280
of the Labor Code, which provides:
“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement
to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, x x x”
“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former
is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The
connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its
relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the
employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is
not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need
for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of
that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only
with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.”
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped
workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from
1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the
hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to
the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them
unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to
the business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners
performed these tasks for more than six months.
Petition granted
