FIRST BATCH

2. G.R. No. 184823

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

October 6, 2010
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC., Respondent. DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right, privilege, or incentive in his favor, or under the principle of
solutio indebiti requiring the return of taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a refund but
also his compliance with the procedural due process as non-observance of the prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative and the judicial
claims would result in the denial of his claim.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the July 30, 2008 Decision 1 and the October 6, 2008
Resolution2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is engaged
in the manufacturing, producing, and processing of steel and its by-products.3 It is registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a Value-Added
Tax (VAT) entity4 and its products, "close impression die steel forgings" and "tool and dies," are registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a
pioneer status.5
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 in the total amount of
₱3,891,123.82 with the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax
Credit and Duty Drawback Center.6
Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA
On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review7 with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same input VAT. The case was docketed as CTA Case No.
7065 and was raffled to the Second Division of the CTA. In the Petition for Review, respondent alleged that for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002, it generated and recorded zero-rated sales in the amount of ₱131,791,399.00,8 which was paid pursuant to Section 106(A) (2) (a) (1), (2) and (3) of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC); 9 that for the said period, it incurred and paid input VAT amounting to ₱3,912,088.14 from purchases
and importation attributable to its zero-rated sales;10and that in its application for refund/credit filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit
and Duty Drawback Center, it only claimed the amount of ₱3,891,123.82.11 In response, petitioner filed his Answer12 raising the following special and
affirmative defenses, to wit:

4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative investigation by the Bureau; 5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input taxes for the
period in question;
6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export sales contemplated under Sections 106(A) (2) (a), and 108(B) (1) of the Tax Code of 1997;

7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed within the two (2) year period prescribed in Section 229 of the Tax Code;
8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to refund, and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for
refund; and
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake of the nature of exemption from taxation.13

Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision partially granting respondent’s claim for refund/credit.
Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to validly claim a refund, Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, provides:

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –

(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years
after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid
attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: x x x
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with the following requisites: (1) the taxpayer is engaged in sales which are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is VAT-registered; (3) the claim must be filed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when such sales
were made;

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and (4) the creditable input tax due or paid must be attributable to such sales, except the transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been
applied against the output tax.
The Court finds that the first three requirements have been complied [with] by petitioner.
With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by petitioner, such as the Sales Invoices (Exhibits "II" to "II-262," "JJ" to "JJ-431," "KK" to "KK-
394" and "LL") shows that it is engaged in sales which are zero-rated.

The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The Certificate of Registration with OCN 1RC0000148499 (Exhibit "C") with the BIR proves that
petitioner is a registered VAT taxpayer.
In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its administrative claim for refund on September 30, 2004 (Exhibit "N") and the present Petition for
Review on September 30, 2004, both within the two (2) year prescriptive period from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, which is
from September 30, 2002.
As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there are some documents and claims of petitioner that are baseless and have not been satisfactorily
substantiated.
xxxx
In sum, petitioner has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate representing unutilized excess input VAT
payments for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002, which are attributable to its zero-rated sales for the same period, but in the reduced amount of
₱3,239,119.25, computed as follows:
Amount of Claimed Input VAT ₱ 3,891,123.82
Less:
Exceptions as found by the ICPA 41,020.37

Net Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,850,103.45 Less:

Output VAT Due 610,984.20 Excess Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,239,119.25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED TO
REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner [in] the reduced amount of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN AND 25/100 PESOS (₱3,239,119.25), representing the unutilized input VAT incurred for the months
of July to September 2002.
SO ORDERED.14
Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,15 insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for
under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on
September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004.16 He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code,17 which
provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and
the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC. 18 According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a "condition
precedent"19 before a judicial claim can be filed. He explained that the rationale of such requirement rests not only on the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies but also on the fact that the CTA is an appellate body which exercises the power of judicial review over administrative actions of
the BIR. 20
The Second Division of the CTA, however, denied petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner thus elevated the matter to
the CTA En Banc via a Petition for Review.21
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s Decision allowing the partial tax refund/credit in favor of respondent. However, as to
the reckoning point for counting the two-year period, the CTA En Banc ruled:
Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims were filed beyond the period allowed by law and hence, the honorable Court has no jurisdiction
over the same. In addition, petitioner further contends that respondent's filing of the administrative and judicial [claims] effectively eliminates the authority
of the honorable Court to exercise jurisdiction over the judicial claim.
We are not persuaded.
Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or
receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered
persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
[x x x x ]
Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty five (25) days from the close of each taxable

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quarter within which to file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts. In the case at bar, the taxable quarter involved was for the period
of July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. Applying Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, respondent has until October 25, 2002 within which to file its quarterly
return for its gross sales or receipts [with] which it complied when it filed its VAT Quarterly Return on October 20, 2002.

In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period provided under Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC should start from the payment of tax subject claim
for refund. As stated above, respondent filed its VAT Return for the taxable third quarter of 2002 on October 20, 2002. Thus, respondent's administrative
and judicial claims for refund filed on September 30, 2004 were filed on time because AICHI has until October 20, 2004 within which to file its claim for
refund.

In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner's contention that the 1997 NIRC requires the previous filing of an administrative claim for refund prior to
the judicial claim. This should not be the case as the law does not prohibit the simultaneous filing of the administrative and judicial claims for refund. What
is controlling is that both claims for refund must be filed within the two-year prescriptive period.
In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to disturb the findings and conclusion spelled out in the assailed January 4, 2008 Decision and
March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second Division. What the instant petition seeks is for the Court En Banc to view and appreciate the evidence in
their own perspective of things, which unfortunately had already been considered and passed upon. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA
Second Division in CTA Case No. 7065 entitled, "AICHI Forging Company of Asia, Inc. petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent" are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En Banc denied23 his Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes the issue of whether respondent’s judicial and administrative claims for tax refund/credit were filed
within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of
the NIRC.24
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains that respondent’s administrative and judicial claims for tax refund/credit were filed in violation of Sections 112(A) and 229 of the
NIRC.25 He posits that pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code,26 since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on
September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004.27
Petitioner further argues that the CTA En Banc erred in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in determining the start of the two-year period as the said
provision pertains to the compliance requirements in the payment of VAT. 28He asserts that it is Section 112, paragraph (A), of the same Code that should
apply because it specifically provides for the period within which a claim for tax refund/ credit should be made. 29
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the fact that the administrative claim with the BIR and the judicial claim with the CTA were filed on the same day.30 He
opines that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior filing of an
administrative claim.31 He insists that such procedural requirement is based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the fact that the
CTA is an appellate body exercising judicial review over administrative actions of the CIR. 32
Respondent’s Arguments
For its part, respondent claims that it is entitled to a refund/credit of its unutilized input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 as a matter
of right because it has substantially complied with all the requirements provided by law. 33 Respondent likewise defends the CTA En Banc in applying
Section 114(A) of the NIRC in computing the prescriptive period for the claim for tax refund/credit. Respondent believes that Section 112(A) of the NIRC
must be read together with Section 114(A) of the same Code.34 As to the alleged simultaneous filing of its administrative and judicial claims, respondent
contends that it first filed an administrative claim with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF before it filed a
judicial claim with the CTA.35 To prove this, respondent points out that its Claimant Information Sheet No. 4970236 and BIR Form No. 1914 for the third
quarter of 2002,37 which were filed with the DOF, were attached as Annexes "M" and "N," respectively, to the Petition for Review filed with the CTA.38
Respondent further contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is
not fatal because what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period.39 In support thereof, respondent cites Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc.40where it was ruled that "[i]f, however, the [CIR] takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two
years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the [CTA] before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the
[CIR]."41 Lastly, respondent argues that even if the period had already lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of equity considering that it is not a
jurisdictional requirement.42
Our Ruling

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The petition has merit.

Unutilized input VAT must be claimed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made
In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, the Second Division of the CTA applied Section 112(A)
of the NIRC, which states:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years
after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid
attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in
the case of zero-rated sales under Section 106(A) (2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds
thereof had been duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where
the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero- rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or services, and the amount of
creditable input tax due or paid cannot be directly and entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of
the volume of sales. (Emphasis supplied.)
The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into consideration Sections 114 and 229 of the NIRC, which read:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax. –
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or
receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered
persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
Any person, whose registration has been cancelled in accordance with Section 236, shall file a return and pay the tax due thereon within twenty-five (25)
days from the date of cancellation of registration: Provided, That only one consolidated return shall be filed by the taxpayer for his principal place of
business or head office and all branches.
xxxx
SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. –
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any
manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained,
whether or not such tax, penalty or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without written claim therefor, refund or credit any
tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the CTA En Banc ruled that the reckoning of the two-year period for filing a claim for refund/credit of unutilized input VAT should start from the
date of payment of tax and not from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.43
The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the two-year prescriptive period, however, has already been resolved in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation,44 where we ruled that Section 112(A) of the NIRC is the applicable provision in determining the start of the two-
year period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, and that Sections 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as "both provisions apply
only to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes."45 We explained that:
The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly provides in no uncertain terms that unutilized input VAT payments not otherwise used
for any internal revenue tax due the taxpayer must be claimed within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter
when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT regardless of whether said tax was paid or not. As the CA aptly puts it,
albeit it erroneously applied the aforequoted Sec. 112 (A), "[P]rescriptive period commences from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made and not from the time the input VAT was paid nor from the time the official receipt was issued." Thus, when a zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays its input
VAT a year after the pertinent transaction, said taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for refund or tax credit of the unutilized creditable input VAT. The
reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales or transaction was made, regardless when the input VAT was paid. Be that
as it may, and given that the last creditable input VAT due for the period covering the progress billing of September 6, 1996 is the third quarter of 1996
ending on September 30, 1996, any claim for unutilized creditable input VAT refund or tax credit for said quarter prescribed two years after September 30,
1996 or, to be precise, on September 30, 1998. Consequently, MPC’s claim for refund or tax credit filed on December 10, 1999 had already prescribed.
Reckoning for prescriptive period under
Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable
To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either Sec. 204(C) or 229 of the NIRC which, for

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the purpose of refund, prescribes a different starting point for the two-year prescriptive limit for the filing of a claim therefor. Secs. 204(C) and 229
respectively provide:
Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. – The Commissioner may –

xxxx
(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they
are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund
their value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a
claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed showing an overpayment shall
be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
xxxx
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national
internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without
authority, of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or
proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit
any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive period, reckoned from date of payment of the tax or penalty, for the filing of a claim of
refund or tax credit. Notably too, both provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal revenue
taxes.
MPC’s creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is an indirect tax which can be shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee, or lessee of
the goods, properties, or services of the taxpayer. The fact that the subsequent sale or transaction involves a wholly-tax exempt client, resulting in a zero-
rated or effectively zero-rated transaction, does not, standing alone, deprive the taxpayer of its right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input VAT,
albeit the erroneous, illegal, or wrongful payment angle does not enter the equation.
xxxx
Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112 (A) of the NIRC, providing a two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the
close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales or transactions were made pertaining to the creditable input VAT, applies to the
instant case, and not to the other actions which refer to erroneous payment of taxes. 46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CTA En Banc erroneously applied Sections 114(A) and 229 of the NIRC in computing the two-year prescriptive
period for claiming refund/credit of unutilized input VAT. To be clear, Section 112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the refund/credit of input VAT.
Thus, the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.
The administrative claim was timely filed
Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine whether the administrative claim was timely filed. Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code,47
which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and taking into account the fact that the year 2004 was a leap year, petitioner submits that the two-
year period to file a claim for tax refund/ credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 29, 2004.48
We do not agree.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 49 we said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent
to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail following
the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.50 Thus:
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter – the
computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is
irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time
respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:

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Year 1 1st calendar month 2nd calendar month

3rd calendar month
4th calendar month

5th calendar month 6th calendar month 7th calendar month 8th calendar month 9th calendar month 10th calendar month 11th calendar month 12th calendar
month

April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998 September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998 October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998 November 15, 1998 to
December 14, 1998 December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999 January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999 February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999 March 15, 1999
to April 14, 1999

Year 2 13th calendar month 14th calendar month

15th calendar month
16th calendar month

April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999 September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999 October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999 November 15, 1999 to
December 14, 1999 December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000 January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000 February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000 March 15, 2000
to April 14, 2000

17th calendar month

18th calendar month
19th calendar month
20th calendar month
21st calendar month
22nd calendar month
23rd calendar month
24th calendar month
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its
final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period. 51

Applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on
September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s administrative claim was timely filed.
The filing of the judicial claim was premature
However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, we
are constrained to deny respondent’s claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation of Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which provides that:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
xxxx
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. – In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit
certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application
filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the
period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the
one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the
application [for tax refund/credit]," within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse is to file an
appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application
for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously, respondent did not wait for the
decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period. For this reason, we find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Respondent’s assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day period is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim as long as both the administrative and the
judicial claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period52 has no legal basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondent’s view. Subsection (A) of the said provision states that "any VAT-registered person,
whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales." The phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for
the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund" refers to

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applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in the first paragraph of subsection (D) of the same
provision, which states that the CIR has "120 days from the submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with
Subsections (A) and (B)" within which to decide on the claim.
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which already provides for a specific period
within which a taxpayer should appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph of Section 112(D) of the NIRC envisions two scenarios:
(1) when a decision is issued by the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2) when no decision is made after the 120-day period. In both
instances, the taxpayer has 30 days within which to file an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in filing an appeal with the
CTA.
With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc.53 relied upon by respondent, we find the same inapplicable as the tax
provision involved in that case is Section 306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. And as already discussed, Section 229 does not apply to refunds/credits of
input VAT, such as the instant case.
In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was
acquired by the CTA.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed July 30, 2008 Decision and the October 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Tax Appeals Second Division is DIRECTED to dismiss CTA Case No. 7065 for having been
prematurely filed. SO ORDERED.

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3. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014

WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner,

vs.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,1 Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure (Rules) are the April 30,
20082 and August 1, 20083 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which dismissed the petition and denied
the motion for reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 121 of Caloocan City, which annulled and set aside the Orders dated September 4, 20065 and November 16, 20066 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 50 of Caloocan City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634.

The facts are simple and undisputed:

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos.
206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were
raffled to the MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on
June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules). 7 Uy received a copy of
the June9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.8 On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel,
filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on
October 14, 2004 and denied Co’s motion for reconsideration.10 When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from
handling the criminal cases per Order dated January 10, 2005. 11The cases were, thereafter, raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan
City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases. 12 It was,
however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005.13 Co’s motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on December 16,
2005.14 Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No.
171096.15 We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. 16There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the
dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006.17

Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-raffled after the inhibition of Judge
Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on July 13, 2006. 18 Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the
same issues already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096.19In spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order
dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion.20 When the court subsequently denied Uy’s motion for reconsideration on November 16,
2006,21 Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the
RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006
and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. 22 Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for
TRO/WPI.

According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in this petition:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER ONTHE GROUND OF
DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL CONSTITUTES FINAL DISMISSAL OF THESE CASES;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH JURISDICTION IN REVIVING THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST
PETITIONER WHICH WERE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; and

3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTITHE CASES WERE ONLY PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED:

a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS COMPUTED FROM ISSUANCE OF THE
ORDER OF PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL;

b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE BASIS FOR COMPUTING THE ONE-
YEAR TIME BAR;

c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES AGAINST PETITIONER ARE REVIVED IPSO
FACTO BY THE FILING OF MOTION TO REVIVE THESE CASES.23

Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 should be
considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. He reasons out that from his arraignment on March
4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay, which is in violation of
Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) 24 and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure25 mandating that the entire trial period should not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed final,
Co contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion
because its revival would already put him in double jeopardy.

Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became permanent one year
after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to
revive and the trial court’s issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Lastly, even assuming that the
one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion
was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.

The petition is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this petition were also the meat of the controversy in Co’s previous petition in G.R.
No. 171096, which We dismissed per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. Such dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006.
While the first petition was dismissed mainly due to procedural infirmities, this Court nonetheless stated therein that "[i]n any event, the
petition lacks sufficient showing that respondent court had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon the finality of Our February 13, 2006
Resolution in G.R. No. 171096, the same already constitutes as res judicata between the parties. On this ground alone, this petition should
have been dismissed outright.

Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly raised in the present petition, Co’s arguments are nonetheless untenable on the
grounds as follows:

First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to show any evidence that the alleged
"vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or
justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and necessarily a flexible
concept."26 In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety
of the proceedings.27 The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or
failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. 28 Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice
as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular
regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 29 "While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial
and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute
criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused
to speedy trial."30

Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions
sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of
the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for
a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court
issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order
of provisional dismissal of the case.31 In this case, it is apparent from the records that there is no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon which was served on the private
complainant at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. 32 The fact is that it was only in open
court that Co moved for provisional dismissal "considering that, as per records, complainant had not shown any interest to pursue her
complaint."33 The importance of a prior notice to the offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly explained in People v.
Lacson:34

x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the
heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice
may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public
prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the
hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the
requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to
seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and
the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make
witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the accused from detention would enable
him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for
the destruction or loss of the prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on the
civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary
attachment against his property.35

Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co’s supposition that the dismissal of the cases became permanent one year after
the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and not after notice to the offended party. When the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally interpreted as such.
Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy the basic requirements of due process; thus, said in one case:

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance
thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the
criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy
of the order of dismissal.36

We hasten to add though that if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better rule is that the reckoning period should
commence to run from the time such private counsel was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal. When a party is
represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given address.37 Section 2,
Rule 13 of the Rules analogously provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon the former shall be made upon the
latter.38

Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be made prior to the
expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in the Rules. Moreover, to permit otherwise would
definitely put the offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice must be
taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal with clogged dockets in addition to their administrative duties
and functions. Hence, they could not be expected to act at all times on all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within the
prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible that some of them, motivated by ill-will or malice, may simply exercise their whims and
caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.

Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s motion to revive the criminal cases.
What is material instead is Co’s categorical admission that Uy is represented by a private counsel who only received a copy of the June 9,
2003 Order on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a motion to revive is
reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order of provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the
permanent dismissal is likewise the private counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.

And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a leap year and that the one-year period to
revive the case should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to
revive the criminal cases against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap
year.39 Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a yearis composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant.
This was our ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,40 which was subsequently reiterated in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 41 thus:

x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31.Legal Periods.- "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific
calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of
twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain." It is the "period of time
running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if
there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month." To illustrate, one calendar
month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be
from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008. 42

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the one-year period reckoned from the time
Uy received the order of dismissal on July2, 2003 consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:

1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003

2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003

3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2, 2003

4th calendar month October 3, 2003 to November 2, 2003

5th calendar month November 3, 2003 to December 2, 2003

6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004

7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004

8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004

9th calendar month March 3, 2004 to April 2, 2004

10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004

11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004

12th calendar month June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004

In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was filed as a dilatory tactic to prosecute Criminal Case Nos.
206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634. As correctly pointed out by Uy since the time when the "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" was filed,
the issues raised herein were already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. Verily, Co, acting through the guidance and
advice of his counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a worthless and vexatious legal maneuver for no purpose other than to delay the
trial court proceedings. It appears that Atty. Maglaque’s conduct contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well as not to
unduly delay a case or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyer’s Oath also upholds in particular:

x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients x x x.
1âwphi 1

This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the prompt termination of litigation is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice. In Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation,43 We said:

The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court, must see to it that the orderly administration of
justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of
the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the
latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.44

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121
of Caloocan City, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that permanently dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634, are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.

The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque for his acts
that appear to have violated the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rule on Forum Shopping.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**

Associate Justice
 JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES***
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Surnamed Yu in some parts of the records.

* Per Special Order No. 1707 dated June 17, 2014.

** Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014.

Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 1704 dated June 17,
***
2014.

2 Rollo, p. 36.

3Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Vicente S.E.
Veloso concurring; id. at 38-40, 307-309.

4 Rollo, pp. 243-246.

5 Id. at 172-174.

6 Id. at 206.

7 Id. at 44. Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules states:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount,
or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

8 Rollo, p. 57.

9 Id. at 50, 58.

10 Id. at 56-58, 69-71.

11 Id. at 244.

12 Id. at 72-87.

13 Id. at 116-117, 292-293.

14 Id. at 128, 294.

15 Id. at 129-144.

16 Id. at 147-148, 295-296.

17 Id. at 297-298.

18 Id. at 149-165.

19 Id. at 166-171.

20 Id. at 172-174, 299-301.

 21 Id. at 206.

22 Id. at 243-246, 302-305.

23 Id. at 12-13.

24 Section 6. Time Limit for Trial.- In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on
Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One
thousand pesos (₱1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with
the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial
calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant
to Section 3, Rule22 of the Rules of Court.

25SEC. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.—Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as
practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a
weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the
entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by
the Supreme Court.

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws or
circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.

26 Jacob v. Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 94, 106.

27 Id.; People v. Rama, 403 Phil. 155, 168 (2001).

28 Tan v. People of the Philippines, 604 Phil. 68, 81 (2009).

29 Id.; Jacob v. Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, supra note 26, at 106-107.

30 People v. Rama, supra note 27.

31 People v. Lacson, 448 Phil. 317, 370-371 (2003), as cited in Los Baños v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229 (2009).

32Sec. 4. Hearing of motion.– Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to
ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice.

33 See Order dated June 9, 2003 (Rollo, p. 44).

34 448 Phil. 317 (2003).

35 People v. Lacson, supra note 31, at 378-379.

36 Id. at 371.

37See Sy v. Fairland Knitcraft Co., Inc., G.R. No. 182915 and G.R. No. 189658, December 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 67, 100 and
Bello v. National Labor Relations Commission, 559 Phil. 20, 27 (2007), citing Ginete v. Sunrise Manning Agency, 411 Phil.
953, 957-958 (2001).

38 Id.

39 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 558 Phil. 182, 189 (2007).

40 558 Phil. 182 (2007).

41 G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 422.

42 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., supra note 39.

43 533 Phil. 645 (2006).

44 Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, supra, at 669.

4. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property
between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

The Case

The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11,
2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a
condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.

Antecedents

The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez &
Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10,
1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s
marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana
Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage,
ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to
which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber
of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican
Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY.
LUNA was the managing partner.

On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of
Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for
₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law
office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT
No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100);
GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison
(12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit
was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100);
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered
in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100
share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein
were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz &
Associates.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment became
the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on
September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD
became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in
the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament;
and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint
prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of
the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad
administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3
 Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts, 4 disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;

(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";

(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as
appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5

Decision of the CA

Both parties appealed to the CA.6

On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE
INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR
THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO
LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER
PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF
THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE
144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;

VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-
APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and

IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7

In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF
ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
(HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN
LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, 9 holding and ruling:

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree
obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIEDas follows:
 (a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna
and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna
while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;

(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the
entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan
Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be
the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.11

On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.13

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement executed by Luna
and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;

B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s approval of the Agreement;

C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the
acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and

D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law books. 14

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the
condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports).

The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage
entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court

We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia

subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in
force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow
the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. 15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed
thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated
their marriage.

From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses
has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the
Family Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under
our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the
declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce
Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if
voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on
July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it
as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. 20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among
Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a
ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the
marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.

2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement

was void for lack of court approval

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had
entered into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.

The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code,
the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered
into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil
Code, viz:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains.
The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has
been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

xxxx

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All
the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or
the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and
other third persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning
the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)

But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating
the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?

The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an incident ofthe action for divorce
instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds
raised in the action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to
Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.

3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,

was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous, 22 on the
ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

The Court concurs with the CA.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore,
1âwphi1

it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals:25

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties
to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is
without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties.
Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff
was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the
1âwphi1

defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only
after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence. 26

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate
amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from
Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30; 27 and that such aggregate contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded to
almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of
₱1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna
had even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna
could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.

Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual contributions through the following findings
and conclusions, namely:

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code
and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as
husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on
co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied
only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a
co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void
was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of
actual contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of
the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-
ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution
and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R.
No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:

xxxx

As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual
contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the
acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:

"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which was
thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the
amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty.
Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty.
Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not established.
x x x"

SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim
of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through
the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:

"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the
law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the
Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and
his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"

The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna"
was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding
"Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the
purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid
for the law office amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office
space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use
of the law firm that he headed.30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were substantiated by the records and because we
have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge
her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, 31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the
subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own
personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal
partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Rollo, pp. 34-51; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (later
Presiding Justice) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. concurring.

2 Id. at 198-210.

3 Id. at 37-39.

4 Id. at 198-210.

5 Id. at 210.

6 Id. at 211-214.

7 Id. at 217-219.

8 Id. at 283.

9 Supra note 1.
 10 Rollo, p. 44.

11 Id. at 50-51.

12 Id. at 52-53.

13 Id. at 54-65.

14 Id. at 17.

15 Article 15, Civil Code, which is a revision of Article 9.1, Spanish Civil Code, states:

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

16 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas(G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 277), the Court declares:

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.

17 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 446.

18 Rollo,p. 37.

19 Article XV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution.

20 Article 1, Family Code.

21 Id. at 74, 81-82.

22 Id. at 48.

23 Article 83, Civil Code; Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155, 158.

24 The Civil Coderelevantly states:

Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;

xxxx

25 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.

26 Id. at 686-687.

27 Rollo, pp. 23-24.

28 Id. at 25.

29 Id. at 27.

30 Id. at 45-50.

31 Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 593, 602.

5. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002
Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private
respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45, 4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing
Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and
Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented
by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and
"leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later,
the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement 10 they executed on
December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of
the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a
petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however,
later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she
and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on
the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v.
Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent
monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the
prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each
other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for
support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the
Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the
instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation
of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for
certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. 21 His petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
 Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED
in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the
amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the
preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2,
2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed
under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside
incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a
cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a
complaint or petition states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action, 28 Rebecca had no
cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been
dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was
dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still
a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status and having made
representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when
she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later
withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle,
Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her
citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004
Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the
proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final
resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND
ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE
MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT
AND CONCURRENT ACTS.
 IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF
THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No.
155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. 31 Second, the reckoning point
is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad.
And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall
not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss
by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what
are its consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and
remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting
American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport. 33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1)
during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine
Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-
emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's
recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and
partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per
order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by
Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B.
Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of
Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with
the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of
Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be
spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of
Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III,
Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws
governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino
citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its
Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary
of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently
indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice
Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of
close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The
same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-
002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the
affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1 st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did
not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from
the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil
Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal
of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after
Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the
petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex
"A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it
not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her
case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also
did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage
Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001) 36 did
Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly
made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later
recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during,
and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an
American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing
incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age,
married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before
this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine
nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared
before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the
19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him
to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows
divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement 38executed on December 14,
1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997.
Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree
is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. 39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American
citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach
the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law,
albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this
Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed
to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now
Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly
determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished
from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a
certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic
court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice
Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad
would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious
result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond
of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced:
"[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free
to remarry after completing the legal requirements."43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for
instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. 44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they
wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca
and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home,
thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consists onlyof the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of
Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No.
406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14 th day of December 1996 in
Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed
to comply with each and every provision of said agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce
court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang. 48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of
cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right
in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof,
with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has
been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie
binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do
not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that
Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her
petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered
by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as
well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support
includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to
support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively
mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review
in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
 LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 3-34.

2 Id. at 36-38. Penned by Associate, now Presiding, Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. and Mario L. Guariña III.

3 Id. at 40-41.

4 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 10-43.

5 Id. at 575-583.

6 Id. at 145.

7 See Certification of Birth from the Government of Guam issued on June 1, 2000; rollo (G.R. No. 155635), p. 213.

8 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 146-150.

9 Id. at 214-217.

10 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 151-158.

11 Id. at 154.

12 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 206-212.

13 Id. at 305-306. Per a motion to withdraw dated November 8, 1996.

14 Id. at 213. Per Order of Judge Josefina Guevara Salonga dated November 14, 1996.

15 Id. at 236-237.

16 Id. at 126-144.

17 Id. at 156-204.

18 Id. at 123-124. Penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma.

19 Id. at 338.

20 Id. at 125. Per Order dated November 20, 2001.

21 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 512-590.

22 Id. at 592-593.

23 Id. at 38.

24 Id. at 852-869.

25 Id. at 850-851.

26 Supra note 5, at 583.

27 G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 401, 409.

28 Enumerated in San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116825 March 26, 1998, 288 SCRA 115, 125: (1)
the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right.
 29 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 597.

30 Id. at 22-23.

31 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.

32 Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000, 345 SCRA 592, 600.

33 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 388-389, issued on January 18, 1995 with expiration date on January 17, 2005.

34 Supra note 15.

35 Adopted on April 15, 1999.

36 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 268-292.

37 Id. at 147, 214-215.

38 Supra note 10.

39 Supra note 31.

40 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139, 143.

41 G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 495, 502-503.

42 Id. at 501-502.

43 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 148, 216.

44 Van Dorn, supra note 40, at 144.

45 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 122.

46 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), p. 154.

47 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 215.

48 Van Dorn, supra note 44.

49 G.R. No. 165500, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 242, 251-252; citations omitted.

50 Azur v. Provincial Board, No. L-22333, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 50, 57-58.

6. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 190755 November 24, 2010

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO ONG, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the October 20, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-CV No. 84445 entitled Alfredo Ong
v. Land Bank of the Philippines, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17 in Tabaco City.

The Facts

On March 18, 1996, spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from Land Bank Legazpi City in the amount of PhP 16 million.
The loan was secured by three (3) residential lots, five (5) cargo trucks, and a warehouse. Under the loan agreement, PhP 6 million of the
loan would be short-term and would mature on February 28, 1997, while the balance of PhP 10 million would be payable in seven (7)
years. The Notice of Loan Approval dated February 22, 1996 contained an acceleration clause wherein any default in payment of
amortizations or other charges would accelerate the maturity of the loan. 1

Subsequently, however, the Spouses Sy found they could no longer pay their loan. On December 9, 1996, they sold three (3) of their
mortgaged parcels of land for PhP 150,000 to Angelina Gloria Ong, Evangeline’s mother, under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage. The relevant portion of the document2 is quoted as follows:

WHEREAS, we are no longer in a position to settle our obligation with the bank;
 NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P150,000.00) Philippine Currency, we hereby these presents SELL, CEDE, TRANSFER and CONVEY, by way of sale
unto ANGELINA GLORIA ONG, also of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Alfredo Ong, and also a resident of
Tabaco, Albay, Philippines, their heirs and assigns, the above-mentioned debt with the said LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and by reason hereof they can make the necessary representation with the bank for the proper restructuring
of the loan with the said bank in their favor;

That as soon as our obligation has been duly settled, the bank is authorized to release the mortgage in favor of the vendees
and for this purpose VENDEES can register this instrument with the Register of Deeds for the issuance of the titles
already in their names.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our signatures this 9th day of December 1996 at Tabaco, Albay,
Philippines.

(signed) (signed)
EVANGELINE O. SY JOHNSON B. SY
Vendor Vendor
Evangeline’s father, petitioner Alfredo Ong, later went to Land Bank to inform it about the sale and assumption of mortgage. 3 Atty. Edna
Hingco, the Legazpi City Land Bank Branch Head, told Alfredo and his counsel Atty. Ireneo de Lumen that there was nothing wrong with
the agreement with the Spouses Sy but provided them with requirements for the assumption of mortgage. They were also told that Alfredo
should pay part of the principal which was computed at PhP 750,000 and to update due or accrued interests on the promissory notes so
that Atty. Hingco could easily approve the assumption of mortgage. Two weeks later, Alfredo issued a check for PhP 750,000 and
personally gave it to Atty. Hingco. A receipt was issued for his payment. He also submitted the other documents required by Land Bank,
such as financial statements for 1994 and 1995. Atty. Hingco then informed Alfredo that the certificate of title of the Spouses Sy would be
transferred in his name but this never materialized. No notice of transfer was sent to him. 4

Alfredo later found out that his application for assumption of mortgage was not approved by Land Bank. The bank learned from its credit
investigation report that the Ongs had a real estate mortgage in the amount of PhP 18,300,000 with another bank that was past due.
Alfredo claimed that this was fully paid later on. Nonetheless, Land Bank foreclosed the mortgage of the Spouses Sy after several months.
Alfredo only learned of the foreclosure when he saw the subject mortgage properties included in a Notice of Foreclosure of Mortgage and
Auction Sale at the RTC in Tabaco, Albay. Alfredo’s other counsel, Atty. Madrilejos, subsequently talked to Land Bank’s lawyer and was
told that the PhP 750,000 he paid would be returned to him. 5

On December 12, 1997, Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Land Bank in Civil Case No. T-
1941, as Alfredo’s payment was not returned by Land Bank. Alfredo maintained that Land Bank’s foreclosure without informing him of
the denial of his assumption of the mortgage was done in bad faith. He argued that he was lured into believing that his payment of PhP
750,000 would cause Land Bank to approve his assumption of the loan of the Spouses Sy and the transfer of the mortgaged properties in
his and his wife’s name.6 He also claimed incurring expenses for attorney’s fees of PhP 150,000, filing fee of PhP 15,000, and PhP
250,000 in moral damages.7

Testifying for Land Bank, Atty. Hingco claimed during trial that as branch manager she had no authority to approve loans and could not
assure anybody that their assumption of mortgage would be approved. She testified that the breakdown of Alfredo’s payment was as
follows:

PhP 101,409.59 applied to principal

216,246.56 accrued interests receivable
396,571.77 interests
18,766.10 penalties
16,805.98 accounts receivable
----------------
Total: 750,000.00
According to Atty. Hingco, the bank processes an assumption of mortgage as a new loan, since the new borrower is considered a new
client. They used character, capacity, capital, collateral, and conditions in determining who can qualify to assume a loan. Alfredo’s
proposal to assume the loan, she explained, was referred to a separate office, the Lending Center. 8

During cross-examination, Atty. Hingco testified that several months after Alfredo made the tender of payment, she received word that the
Lending Center rejected Alfredo’s loan application. She stated that it was the Lending Center and not her that should have informed
Alfredo about the denial of his and his wife’s assumption of mortgage. She added that although she told Alfredo that the agreement
between the spouses Sy and Alfredo was valid between them and that the bank would accept payments from him, Alfredo did not pay any
further amount so the foreclosure of the loan collaterals ensued. She admitted that Alfredo demanded the return of the PhP 750,000 but
said that there was no written demand before the case against the bank was filed in court. She said that Alfredo had made the payment of
PhP 750,000 even before he applied for the assumption of mortgage and that the bank received the said amount because the subject
account was past due and demandable; and the Deed of Assumption of Mortgage was not used as the basis for the payment. 9

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC held that the contract approving the assumption of mortgage was not perfected as a result of the credit investigation conducted
on Alfredo. It noted that Alfredo was not even informed of the disapproval of the assumption of mortgage but was just told that the
accounts of the spouses Sy had matured and gone unpaid. It ruled that under the principle of equity and justice, the bank should return the
amount Alfredo had paid with interest at 12% per annum computed from the filing of the complaint. The RTC further held that Alfredo
was entitled to attorney’s fees and litigation expenses for being compelled to litigate.10

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a decision is rendered, ordering defendant bank to pay plaintiff, Alfredo Ong the amount of
P750,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum computed from Dec. 12, 1997 and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of P50,000.00.

Costs against defendant bank.

SO ORDERED.11

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

On appeal, Land Bank faulted the trial court for (1) holding that the payment of PhP 750,000 made by Ong was one of the requirements
for the approval of his proposal to assume the mortgage of the Sy spouses; (2) erroneously ordering Land Bank to return the amount of
PhP 750,000 to Ong on the ground of its failure to effect novation; and (3) erroneously affirming the award of PhP 50,000 to Ong as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.12 It held that Alfredo’s recourse is not against the Sy spouses. According to the appellate court, the
payment of PhP 750,000 was for the approval of his assumption of mortgage and not for payment of arrears incurred by the Sy spouses.
As such, it ruled that it would be incorrect to consider Alfredo a third person with no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation under
Article 1236 of the Civil Code. Although Land Bank was not bound by the Deed between Alfredo and the Spouses Sy, the appellate court
found that Alfredo and Land Bank’s active preparations for Alfredo’s assumption of mortgage essentially novated the agreement.

On January 5, 2010, the CA denied Land Bank’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, Land Bank appealed to us.

The Issues

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code does not apply and in finding that there is no
novation.

II

Whether the Court of Appeals misconstrued the evidence and the law when it affirmed the trial court decision’s ordering Land
Bank to pay Ong the amount of Php750,000.00 with interest at 12% annum.

III

Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it affirmed the award of Php50,000.00 to Ong as attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation.

The Ruling of this Court

We affirm with modification the appealed decision.

Recourse is against Land Bank

Land Bank contends that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code backs their claim that Alfredo should have sought recourse against the Spouses Sy
instead of Land Bank. Art. 1236 provides:

The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation,
unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.

Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will
of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor.
1avvphi1

We agree with Land Bank on this point as to the first part of paragraph 1 of Art. 1236. Land Bank was not bound to accept Alfredo’s
payment, since as far as the former was concerned, he did not have an interest in the payment of the loan of the Spouses Sy. However, in
the context of the second part of said paragraph, Alfredo was not making payment to fulfill the obligation of the Spouses Sy. Alfredo
made a conditional payment so that the properties subject of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage would be titled in his name.
It is clear from the records that Land Bank required Alfredo to make payment before his assumption of mortgage would be approved. He
was informed that the certificate of title would be transferred accordingly. He, thus, made payment not as a debtor but as a prospective
mortgagor. But the trial court stated:

[T]he contract was not perfected or consummated because of the adverse finding in the credit investigation which led to the disapproval of
the proposed assumption. There was no evidence presented that plaintiff was informed of the disapproval. What he received was a letter
dated May 22, 1997 informing him that the account of spouses Sy had matured but there [were] no payments. This was sent even before
the conduct of the credit investigation on June 20, 1997 which led to the disapproval of the proposed assumption of the loans of spouses
Sy.13

Alfredo, as a third person, did not, therefore, have an interest in the fulfillment of the obligation of the Spouses Sy, since his interest
hinged on Land Bank’s approval of his application, which was denied. The circumstances of the instant case show that the second
paragraph of Art. 1236 does not apply. As Alfredo made the payment for his own interest and not on behalf of the Spouses Sy, recourse is
not against the latter. And as Alfredo was not paying for another, he cannot demand from the debtors, the Spouses Sy, what he has paid.

Novation of the loan agreement

Land Bank also faults the CA for finding that novation applies to the instant case. It reasons that a substitution of debtors was made
without its consent; thus, it was not bound to recognize the substitution under the rules on novation.

On the matter of novation, Spouses Benjamin and Agrifina Lim v. M.B. Finance Corporation 14 provides the following discussion:

Novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or modificatory. It is extinctive when an old obligation is terminated by the
creation of a new obligation that takes the place of the former; it is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent it
remains compatible with the amendatory agreement. An extinctive novation results either by changing the object or principal conditions
(objective or real), or by substituting the person of the debtor or subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor (subjective or
personal). Under this mode, novation would have dual functions ─ one to extinguish an existing obligation, the other to substitute a new
one in its place ─ requiring a conflux of four essential requisites: (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned
to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. x x x

In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in
unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other. The test of incompatibility is
whether or not the two obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Furthermore, Art. 1293 of the Civil Code states:

Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one, may be made even without the knowledge or against
the will of the latter, but not without the consent of the creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives him rights mentioned in articles 1236
and 1237.

We do not agree, then, with the CA in holding that there was a novation in the contract between the parties. Not all the elements of
novation were present. Novation must be expressly consented to. Moreover, the conflicting intention and acts of the parties underscore the
absence of any express disclosure or circumstances with which to deduce a clear and unequivocal intent by the parties to novate the old
agreement.15 Land Bank is thus correct when it argues that there was no novation in the following:

[W]hether or not Alfredo Ong has an interest in the obligation and payment was made with the knowledge or consent of Spouses Sy, he
may still pay the obligation for the reason that even before he paid the amount of P750,000.00 on January 31, 1997, the substitution of
debtors was already perfected by and between Spouses Sy and Spouses Ong as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage executed by them on December 9, 1996. And since the substitution of debtors was made without the consent of Land Bank – a
requirement which is indispensable in order to effect a novation of the obligation, it is therefore not bound to recognize the substitution of
debtors. Land Bank did not intervene in the contract between Spouses Sy and Spouses Ong and did not expressly give its consent to this
substitution.16

Unjust enrichment

Land Bank maintains that the trial court erroneously applied the principle of equity and justice in ordering it to return the PhP 750,000
paid by Alfredo. Alfredo was allegedly in bad faith and in estoppel. Land Bank contends that it enjoyed the presumption of regularity and
was in good faith when it accepted Alfredo’s tender of PhP 750,000. It reasons that it did not unduly enrich itself at Alfredo’s expense
during the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, since it tendered its bid by subtracting PhP 750,000 from the Spouses Sy’s outstanding
loan obligation. Alfredo’s recourse then, according to Land Bank, is to have his payment reimbursed by the Spouses Sy.

We rule that Land Bank is still liable for the return of the PhP 750,000 based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Land Bank is correct
in arguing that it has no obligation as creditor to recognize Alfredo as a person with interest in the fulfillment of the obligation. But while
Land Bank is not bound to accept the substitution of debtors in the subject real estate mortgage, it is estopped by its action of accepting
Alfredo’s payment from arguing that it does not have to recognize Alfredo as the new debtor. The elements of estoppel are:

First, the actor who usually must have knowledge, notice or suspicion of the true facts, communicates something to another in a
misleading way, either by words, conduct or silence; second, the other in fact relies, and relies reasonably or justifiably, upon that
communication; third, the other would be harmed materially if the actor is later permitted to assert any claim inconsistent with his earlier
conduct; and fourth, the actor knows, expects or foresees that the other would act upon the information given or that a reasonable person
in the actor’s position would expect or foresee such action. 17

By accepting Alfredo’s payment and keeping silent on the status of Alfredo’s application, Land Bank misled Alfredo to believe that he had
for all intents and purposes stepped into the shoes of the Spouses Sy.

The defense of Land Bank Legazpi City Branch Manager Atty. Hingco that it was the bank’s Lending Center that should have notified
Alfredo of his assumption of mortgage disapproval is unavailing. The Lending Center’s lack of notice of disapproval, the Tabaco Branch’s
silence on the disapproval, and the bank’s subsequent actions show a failure of the bank as a whole, first, to notify Alfredo that he is not a
recognized debtor in the eyes of the bank; and second, to apprise him of how and when he could collect on the payment that the bank no
longer had a right to keep.

We turn then on the principle upon which Land Bank must return Alfredo’s payment. Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience."18 There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person is unjustly
benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. 19

Additionally, unjust enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. In order that the accion in rem verso may prosper,
the following conditions must concur: (1) that the defendant has been enriched; (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (3) that the
enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract,
crime, or quasi-delict.20 The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the
person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.21
The principle applies to the parties in the instant case, as, Alfredo, having been deemed disqualified from assuming the loan, had no duty
to pay petitioner bank and the latter had no right to receive it.

Moreover, the Civil Code likewise requires under Art. 19 that "[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Land Bank, however, did not even bother to
inform Alfredo that it was no longer approving his assumption of the Spouses Sy’s mortgage. Yet it acknowledged his interest in the loan
when the branch head of the bank wrote to tell him that his daughter’s loan had not been paid. 22 Land Bank made Alfredo believe that
with the payment of PhP 750,000, he would be able to assume the mortgage of the Spouses Sy. The act of receiving payment without
returning it when demanded is contrary to the adage of giving someone what is due to him. The outcome of the application would have
been different had Land Bank first conducted the credit investigation before accepting Alfredo’s payment. He would have been notified
that his assumption of mortgage had been disapproved; and he would not have taken the futile action of paying PhP 750,000. The
procedure Land Bank took in acting on Alfredo’s application cannot be said to have been fair and proper.

As to the claim that the trial court erred in applying equity to Alfredo’s case, we hold that Alfredo had no other remedy to recover from
Land Bank and the lower court properly exercised its equity jurisdiction in resolving the collection suit. As we have held in one case:

Equity, as the complement of legal jurisdiction, seeks to reach and complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their
rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit
and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.23

Another claim made by Land Bank is the presumption of regularity it enjoys and that it was in good faith when it accepted Alfredo’s
tender of PhP 750,000.

The defense of good faith fails to convince given Land Bank’s actions. Alfredo was not treated as a mere prospective borrower. After he
had paid PhP 750,000, he was made to sign bank documents including a promissory note and real estate mortgage. He was assured by
Atty. Hingco that the titles to the properties covered by the Spouses Sy’s real estate mortgage would be transferred in his name, and upon
payment of the PhP 750,000, the account would be considered current and renewed in his name.24

Land Bank posits as a defense that it did not unduly enrich itself at Alfredo’s expense during the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties,
since it tendered its bid by subtracting PhP 750,000 from the Spouses Sy’s outstanding loan obligation. It is observed that this is the first
time Land Bank is revealing this defense. However, issues, arguments, theories, and causes not raised below may no longer be posed on
appeal.25 Land Bank’s contention, thus, cannot be entertained at this point. 1avvphi1

Land Bank further questions the lower court’s decision on the basis of the inconsistencies made by Alfredo on the witness stand. It argues
that Alfredo was not a credible witness and his testimony failed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of regular
duties on the part of Land Bank.

This claim, however, touches on factual findings by the trial court, and we defer to these findings of the trial court as sustained by the
appellate court. These are generally binding on us. While there are exceptions to this rule, Land Bank has not satisfactorily shown that any
of them is applicable to this issue.26 Hence, the rule that the trial court is in a unique position to observe the demeanor of witnesses
should be applied and respected27 in the instant case.

In sum, we hold that Land Bank may not keep the PhP 750,000 paid by Alfredo as it had already foreclosed on the mortgaged lands.

Interest and attorney’s fees

As to the applicable interest rate, we reiterate the guidelines found in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 28

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the
accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the
interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the
case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim
period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

No evidence was presented by Alfredo that he had sent a written demand to Land Bank before he filed the collection suit. Only the verbal
agreement between the lawyers of the parties on the return of the payment was mentioned. 29Consequently, the obligation of Land Bank
to return the payment made by Alfredo upon the former’s denial of the latter’s application for assumption of mortgage must be reckoned
from the date of judicial demand on December 12, 1997, as correctly determined by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court.
The next question is the propriety of the imposition of interest and the proper imposable rate of applicable interest. The RTC granted the
rate of 12% per annum which was affirmed by the CA. From the above-quoted guidelines, however, the proper imposable interest rate is
6% per annum pursuant to Art. 2209 of the Civil Code. Sunga-Chan v. Court of Appeals is illuminating in this regard:

In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., the Court held that the legal interest at 12% per annum under Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 416 shall be
adjudged only in cases involving the loan or forbearance of money. And for transactions involving payment of indemnities in the
concept of damages arising from default in the performance of obligations in general and/or for money judgment not involving a
loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, the governing provision is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing a yearly 6% interest.
Art. 2209 pertinently provides:

Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages,
there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal
interest, which is six per cent per annum.

The term "forbearance," within the context of usury law, has been described as a contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain,
during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due and payable.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the rules on the imposition of interest, if proper, and the applicable rate, as follows: The 12% per
annum rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only to loans or forbearance of money, goods, or credits, as well as to judgments
involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, while the 6% per annum under Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies
"when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the
performance of obligations in general," with the application of both rates reckoned "from the time the complaint was filed until the
[adjudged] amount is fully paid." In either instance, the reckoning period for the commencement of the running of the legal interest shall
be subject to the condition "that the courts are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the award of
interest."30 (Emphasis supplied.)

Based on our ruling above, forbearance of money refers to the contractual obligation of the lender or creditor to desist for a fixed period
from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due and for which 12% per annum is imposed as interest in the
absence of a stipulated rate. In the instant case, Alfredo’s conditional payment to Land Bank does not constitute forbearance of money,
since there was no agreement or obligation for Alfredo to pay Land Bank the amount of PhP 750,000, and the obligation of Land Bank to
return what Alfredo has conditionally paid is still in dispute and has not yet been determined. Thus, it cannot be said that Land Bank’s
alleged obligation has become a forbearance of money.

On the award of attorney’s fees, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation were awarded because Alfredo was compelled to litigate due to
the unjust refusal of Land Bank to refund the amount he paid. There are instances when it is just and equitable to award attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation.31 Art. 2208 of the Civil Code pertinently states:

In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

xxxx

(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest.

Given that Alfredo was indeed compelled to litigate against Land Bank and incur expenses to protect his interest, we find that the award
falls under the exception above and is, thus, proper given the circumstances.

On a final note. The instant case would not have been litigated had Land Bank been more circumspect in dealing with Alfredo. The bank
chose to accept payment from Alfredo even before a credit investigation was underway, a procedure worsened by the failure to even
inform him of his credit standing’s impact on his assumption of mortgage. It was, therefore, negligent to a certain degree in handling the
transaction with Alfredo. It should be remembered that the business of a bank is affected with public interest and it should observe a
higher standard of diligence when dealing with the public.32

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-CV No. 84445 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
the amount of PhP 750,000 will earn interest at 6% per annum reckoned from December 12, 1997, and the total aggregate monetary
awards will in turn earn 12% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Additional member per Special Order No. 913 dated November 2, 2010.

1 Rollo, p. 44.

2 Records, pp. 63-64.

3 Rollo, p. 45.

4 Id. at 45-46.

5 Id. at 46.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 92.

8 Records, pp. 162-163.

9 Id. at 160.

10 Id. at 168.

11 CA rollo, p. 87. Penned by Judge Virginia G. Almonte.

12 Rollo, p. 53. The CA Decision was penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.

13 CA rollo, p. 87.

14 G.R. No. 164300, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 556, 560-561; citing Fabrigas v. San Francisco del Monte, Inc., G.R. No.
152346, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 247, 258-259.

15 Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Mañalac, G.R. No. 145441, April 26, 2005, 457 SCRA 203, 218.

16 Rollo, p. 23.

17 Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109803, April 20, 1998, 289 SCRA 185, 186.

18 Car Cool Philippines v. Ushio Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 138088, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 404,
412.

19 H.L. Carlos Corporation, Inc. v. Marina Properties Corporation, G.R. No. 147614, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 428, 437;
citing MC Engineering, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104047, April 3, 2002, 380 SCRA 116, 138.

20 1 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines Commentaries and Jurisprudence 77 (1990).

21 Gil Miguel T. Puyat v. Ron Zabarte, G.R. No. 141536. February 26, 2001, 352 SCRA 738, 750.

22 CA rollo, p. 86.

23 LCK Industries Inc. v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 170606, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 634, 652; citing
Tamio v. Ticson, G.R. No. 154895, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 44, 55.

24 CA rollo, p.86.

25 Agra v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 133317, June 29, 1999, 514 SCRA 509, 528.

26 See Royal Cargo Corporation v. DFS Sports Unlimited Inc., G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 414, 421-422.

27 See Tugade v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120874, July 31, 2003, 407 SCRA 497, 508.

28 G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78, 95-97.

29 Records, p. 255.

30 G.R. No. 164401, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 275, 287-288 [citations omitted].

31 Trade & Investment Development Corporation v. Roblett Industrial Construction Corp., G.R. No. 139290, November 11,
2005, 474 SCRA 510, 540-541.

32 Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17.

7. G.R. No. 152411 September 29, 2004

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44209, as well as its
Resolution2 denying the petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration thereof. Themo1 mo2 Court of Appeals set aside the Decision3 of
Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which dismissed the complaint of the respondent against the petitioner for
sum of money and damages.

The Facts of the Case

Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an integrated system of research organization known as the
Research Complex. As part of the project, laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology
and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baños. Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward
and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the fabrication thereof.

Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a corporation to accomplish the project.
On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc.
(PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for the account of
the FEMF. Lirio directed Padolina to give the go-signal to PHILAB to proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, and
requested Padolina to forward the contract of the project to FEMF for its approval.

On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the purchase order and downpayment for the office and
laboratory furniture for the project, thus:

1. Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project

Amount : P2,934,068.90
Supplier : Philippine Laboratory Furniture Co.,
College, Laguna
Attention : Mr. Hector C. Navasero
President
Downpayment : 40% or ₱1,173,627.56
2. Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P573,375.00
Supplier : Trans-Oriental Woodworks, Inc.
1st Avenue, Bagumbayan Tanyag, Taguig, Metro Manila
Downpayment : 50% or ₱286,687.504
Padolina assured Lirio that the contract would be prepared as soon as possible before the issuance of the purchase orders and the
downpayment for the goods, and would be transmitted to the FEMF as soon as possible.

In a Letter dated July 23, 1982, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to proceed with the fabrication of the
laboratory furniture, per the directive of FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio. Padolina also requested for copies of the shop drawings and a
sample contract5 for the project, and that such contract and drawings had to be finalized before the down payment could be remitted to
the PHILAB the following week. However, PHILAB failed to forward any sample contract.

Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after having been duly inspected by their
representatives and FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio.

On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted ₱600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment for the laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH project, for
which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 253 to FEMF. On October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial payment of ₱800,000 to
PHILAB, for which the latter issued Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The remittances were in the form of checks drawn by FEMF and
delivered to PHILAB, through Padolina.

On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños and FEMF, represented by its Executive Officer,
Rolando Gapud, executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial support and donate sums of
money to UP for the construction of buildings, installation of laboratory and other capitalization for the project, not to exceed
₱29,000,000.00. The obligations of FEMF under the MOA are the following:

ARTICLE II

OBLIGATIONS OF THE FOUNDATION

2.1. The FOUNDATION, in carrying out its principal objectives of promoting philantrophic and scientific projects through
financial support to such projects that will contribute to the country’s economic development, shall grant such financial support
and donate such sums of money to the RESEARCH COMPLEX as may be necessary for the construction of buildings,
installation of laboratories, setting up of offices and physical plants and facilities and other capital investment of the
 RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its component Research Institutes not to exceed ₱29 Million. For this purpose, the
FOUNDATION shall:

(a) Acquire and donate to the UNIVERSITY the site for the RESEARCH COMPLEX; and

(b) Donate or cause to be donated to the UNIVERSITY the sum of TWENTY-NINE MILLION PESOS
(₱29,000,000.00) for the construction of the buildings of the National Institutes of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) and the installation of their laboratories and their physical plants and other facilities to
enable them to commence operations.

2.2. In addition, the FOUNDATION shall, subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees of the FOUNDATION, continue to
support the activities of the RESEARCH COMPLEX by way of recurrent additional grants and donations for specific research
and development projects which may be mutually agreed upon and, from time to time, additional grants and donations of such
amounts as may be necessary to provide the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its Research Institutes with operational
flexibility especially with regard to incentives to staff purchase of equipment/facilities, travel abroad, recruitment of local and
expatriate staff and such other activities and inputs which are difficult to obtain under usual government rules and regulations.6

The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA on November 25, 1982.7

In the meantime, Navasero promised to submit the contract for the installation of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH, by January 12, 1983.
However, Navasero failed to do so. In a Letter dated February 1, 1983, BIOTECH reminded Navasero of the need to submit the contract
so that it could be submitted to FEMF for its evaluation and approval. 8Instead of submitting the said contract, PHILAB submitted to
BIOTECH an accomplishment report on the project as of February 28, 1983, and requested payment thereon.9 By May 1983, PHILAB
had completed 78% of the project, amounting to ₱2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of ₱2,934,068.90. The FEMF had already paid forty
percent (40%) of the total cost of the project. On May 12, 1983, Padolina wrote Lirio and furnished him the progress billing from
PHILAB.10 On August 11, 1983, the FEMF made another partial payment of ₱836,119.52 representing the already delivered laboratory
and office furniture after the requisite inspection and verification thereof by representatives from the BIOTECH, FEMF, and PHILAB.
The payment was made in the form of a check, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 202 to FEMF through Padolina. 11

On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No. 01643 in the amount of ₱702,939.40 for the final payment of laboratory
furniture. Representatives from BIOTECH, PHILAB, and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a verification of the accomplishment of the
work and confirmed the same. BIOTECH forwarded the invoice to Lirio on December 18, 1984 for its payment.12 Lirio, in turn,
forwarded the invoice to Gapud, presumably sometime in the early part of 1985. However, the FEMF failed to pay the bill. PHILAB
reiterated its request for payment through a letter on May 9, 1985. 13 BIOTECH again wrote Lirio on March 21, 1985, requesting the
payment of PHILAB’s bill.14It sent another letter to Gapud, on November 22, 1985, again appealing for the payment of PHILAB’s
bill.15 In a Letter to BIOTECH dated December 5, 1985, PHILAB requested payment of ₱702,939.40 plus interest thereon of
₱224,940.61.16 There was, however, no response from the FEMF. On February 24, 1986, PHILAB wrote BIOTECH, appealing for the
payment of its bill even on installment basis.17

President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA Revolution. On March 26, 1986, Navasero wrote BIOTECH
requesting for its much-needed assistance for the payment of the balance already due plus interest of ₱295,234.55 for its fabrication and
supply of laboratory furniture.18

On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her help to secure the payment of the amount due from the
FEMF.19 The letter was referred to then Budget Minister Alberto Romulo, who referred the letter to then UP President Edgardo Angara
on June 9, 1986. On September 30, 1986, Raul P. de Guzman, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños, wrote then Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga, submitting PHILAB’s claim to be officially entered as "accounts payable" as
soon as the assets of FEMF were liquidated by the PCGG.20

In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant contract and the MOA for its perusal. 21

Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy of the contract executed between PHILAB and FEMF. In a Letter dated
October 20, 1987, Navasero informed De Guzman that PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any contract regarding the fabrication and
delivery of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH.

Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. In the complaint, PHILAB prayed that it be paid the
following:

(1) PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE & 40/100 (₱702,939.40) plus an
additional amount (as shall be determined during the hearing) to cover the actual cost of money which at the time of transaction
the value of the peso was eleven to a dollar (₱11.00:$1) and twenty seven (27%) percent interest on the total amount from
August 1982 until fully paid;

(2) PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00) exemplary damages;

(3) FIFTY THOUSAND [PESOS] (₱50,000.00) as and for attorney’s fees; and

(4) Cost of suit.22

PHILAB alleged, inter alia, that:

3. Sometime in August 1982, defendant, through its officials, particularly MR. WILLIAM PADOLINA, Director, asked plaintiff
to supply and install several laboratory furnitures and equipment at BIOTECH, a research laboratory of herein defendant located
at its campus in College, Laguna, for a total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE
THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (₱2,939,058.90);
 4. After the completion of the delivery and installation of said laboratory furnitures and equipment at defendant’s BIOTECH
Laboratory, defendant paid three (3) times on installment basis:

a) ₱600,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 253 dated August 24, 1982;

b) ₱800,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 256 dated October 22, 1982;

c) ₱836,119.52 as per Official Receipt No. 202 dated August 11, 1983;

thus leaving a balance of PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE & 40/100
(₱702,939.40).

5. That notwithstanding repeated demands for the past eight years, defendant arrogantly and maliciously made plaintiff believe
that it was going to pay the balance aforestated, that was why plaintiff’s President and General Manager himself, HECTOR C.
NAVASERO, personally went to and from UP Los Baños to talk with defendant’s responsible officers in the hope of expecting
payment, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay whatsoever right from the start on a misplaced ground of
technicalities. Some of plaintiff’s demand letters since year 1983 up to the present are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D, E,
F, G, and H hereof;

6. That by reason of defendant’s malicious, evil and unnecessary misrepresentations that it was going to pay its obligation and
asking plaintiff so many red tapes and requirements to submit, compliance of all of which took plaintiff almost eight (8) years to
finish, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay, defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff no less than
PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00) exemplary damages, so that other government institutions may be
warned that they must not unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the people they serve. 23

In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action against it because it was merely the donee/beneficiary
of the laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH; and that the FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for the purchase
price of the laboratory furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB.

After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice to PHILAB’s recourse against the
FEMF. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit without prejudice to plaintiff's recourse to the assets of the
Marcos Foundation for the unpaid balance of ₱792,939.49.

SO ORDERED.24

Undaunted, PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the trial court erred in finding that:

1. the contract for the supply and installation of subject laboratory furniture and equipment was between PHILAB and the
Marcos Foundation; and,

2. the Marcos Foundation, not the University of the Philippines, is liable to pay the respondent the balance of the purchase
price.25

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there was never a contract between FEMF and PHILAB.
Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the MOA between the FEMF and UP since it was never a party thereto. The appellate
court ruled that, although UP did not bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture; nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim:
"No one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another."

The Present Petition

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, UP, now the petitioner, filed its petition for review
contending that:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW ON CONTRACTS BETWEEN PHILAB
AND THE MARCOS FOUNDATION.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE MARCOS FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE TO PHILAB.26

Prefatorily, the doctrinal rule is that pure questions of facts may not be the subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as this mode of appeal is generally restricted to questions of law. 27However, this rule is not absolute. The Court may
review the factual findings of the CA should they be contrary to those of the trial court. 28 Correspondingly, this Court may review
findings of facts when the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts.29

On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the CA overlooked the evidentiary effect and substance of the corresponding letters
and communications which support the statements of the witnesses showing affirmatively that an implied contract of sale existed between
PHILAB and the FEMF. The petitioner furthermore asserts that no contract existed between it and the respondent as it could not have
entered into any agreement without the requisite public bidding and a formal written contract.

The respondent, on the other hand, submits that the CA did not err in not applying the law on contracts between the respondent and the
FEMF. It, likewise, attests that it was never privy to the MOA entered into between the petitioner and the FEMF. The respondent adds that
what the FEMF donated was a sum of money equivalent to ₱29,000,000, and not the laboratory equipment supplied by it to the petitioner.
The respondent submits that the petitioner, being the recipient of the laboratory furniture, should not enrich itself at the expense of the
respondent.

The petition is meritorious.

It bears stressing that the respondent’s cause of action is one for sum of money predicated on the alleged promise of the petitioner to pay
for the purchase price of the furniture, which, despite demands, the petitioner failed to do. However, the respondent failed to prove that
the petitioner ever obliged itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by it. Hence, the respondent is not entitled to its claim against
the petitioner.

There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed by the petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not bound by the said
agreement. Contracts take effect only between the parties and their assigns. 30 A contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced
against one who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. 31 Likewise admitted by
the parties, is the fact that there was no written contract executed by the petitioner, the respondent and FEMF relating to the fabrication
and delivery of office and laboratory furniture to the BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the petitioner and the
respondent entered into a contract of sale over the said laboratory furniture. The parties are in accord that the FEMF had remitted to the
respondent partial payments via checks drawn and issued by the FEMF to the respondent, through Padolina, in the total amount of
₱2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of the project of ₱2,934,068.90 and that the respondent received the said checks and issued receipts
therefor to the FEMF. There is also no controversy that the petitioner did not pay a single centavo for the said furniture delivered by the
respondent that the petitioner had been using ever since.

We agree with the petitioner that, based on the records, an implied-in-fact contract of sale was entered into between the respondent and
FEMF. A contract implied in fact is one implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to contract. It arises where the
intention of the parties is not expressed, but an agreement in fact creating an obligation. It is a contract, the existence and terms of which
are manifested by conduct and not by direct or explicit words between parties but is to be deduced from conduct of the parties, language
used, or things done by them, or other pertinent circumstances attending the transaction. To create contracts implied in fact, circumstances
must warrant inference that one expected compensation and the other to pay.32 An implied-in-fact contract requires the parties’ intent to
enter into a contract; it is a true contract.33 The conduct of the parties is to be viewed as a reasonable man would view it, to determine the
existence or not of an implied-in-fact contract.34 The totality of the acts/conducts of the parties must be considered to determine their
intention. An implied-in-fact contract will not arise unless the meeting of minds is indicated by some intelligent conduct, act or sign. 35

In this case, the respondent was aware, from the time Padolina contacted it for the fabrication and supply of the laboratory furniture until
the go-signal was given to it to fabricate and deliver the furniture to BIOTECH as beneficiary, that the FEMF was to pay for the same.
Indeed, Padolina asked the respondent to prepare the draft of the contract to be received by the FEMF prior to the execution of the parties
(the respondent and FEMF), but somehow, the respondent failed to prepare one. The respondent knew that the petitioner was merely the
donee-beneficiary of the laboratory furniture and not the buyer; nor was it liable for the payment of the purchase price thereof. From the
inception, the FEMF paid for the bills and statement of accounts of the respondent, for which the latter unconditionally issued receipts to
and under the name of the FEMF. Indeed, witness Lirio testified:

Q: Now, did you know, Mr. Witness, if PHILAB Industries was aware that it was the Marcos Foundation who would be paying
for this particular transaction for the completion of this particular transaction?

A: I think they are fully aware.

Q: What is your basis for saying so?

A: First, I think they were appraised by Dr. Padolina. Secondly, there were occasions during our inspection in Los Baños, at the
installation site, there were occasions, two or three occasions, when we met with Mr. Navasero who is the President, I think, or
manager of PHILAB, and we appraised him that it was really between the foundation and him to which includes (sic) the
construction company constructing the building. He is fully aware that it is the foundation who (sic) engaged them and issued
the payments.36

The respondent, in its Letter dated March 26, 1986, informed the petitioner and sought its assistance for the collection of the amount due
from the FEMF:

Dear Dr. Padolina:

May we request for your much-needed assistance in the payment of the balance still due us on the laboratory furniture we
supplied and installed two years ago?

Business is still slow and we will appreciate having these funds as soon as possible to keep up our operations.

We look forward to hearing from you regarding this matter.

Very truly yours,

PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.37

The respondent even wrote former President Aquino seeking her assistance for the payment of the amount due, in which the respondent
admitted it tried to collect from her predecessor, namely, the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos:

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

At the instance of the national government, subject laboratory furnitures were supplied by our company to the National Institute
of Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH), University of the Philippines, Los Baños, Laguna, in 1984.

Out of the total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT &
90/100 (₱2,939,058.90), the previous administration had so far paid us the sum of ₱2,236,119.52 thus leaving a balance of
PESOS: ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT & 61/100
(₱1,412.748.61) inclusive of interest of 24% per annum and 30% exchange rate adjustment.
 On several occasions, we have tried to collect this amount from your predecessor, the latest of which was subject invoice
(01643) we submitted to DR. W. PADOLINA, deputy director of BIOTECH. But this, notwithstanding, our claim has remained
unacted upon up to now. Copy of said invoice is hereto attached for easy reference.

Now that your excellency is the head of our government, we sincerely hope that payment of this obligation will soon be made as
this is one project the Republic of the Philippines has use of and derives benefit from.38

Admittedly, the respondent sent to the petitioner its bills and statements of accounts for the payments of the laboratory furniture it
delivered to the petitioner which the petitioner, through Padolina, transmitted to the FEMF for its payment. However, the FEMF failed to
pay the last statement of account of the respondent because of the onset of the EDSA upheaval. It was only when the respondent lost all
hope of collecting its claim from the government and/or the PCGG did it file the complaint against the petitioner for the collection of the
payment of its last delivery of laboratory furniture.

We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for the claim of the respondent based on the maxim that no one should enrich
itself at the expense of another.

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be
shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.39

Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received
something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the
benefit.40 Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits
received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must
confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. 41 Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite
for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.42

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:

Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. (Boldface supplied)

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the
plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other
action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.43

An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract,
crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the
principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.44

The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not obtain in this case. The respondent had a remedy
against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. The petitioner legally
acquired the laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario*, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* On leave.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria (retired), with Associate Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. (retired) and Jose L.
Sabio, Jr., concurring.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Oswaldo Agcaoili (retired) and Sergio L. Pestaño,
concurring.

3 Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.

4 Rollo, p. 104.

5 Exhibit "I."

6 Rollo, p. 65.

7 Exhibit "24."

8 Exhibit "2."

9 Exhibit "3."

10 Exhibit "4."

11 Rollo, p. 109.

12 Ibid.
 13 Exhibit "8."

14 Exhibit "7."

15 Exhibit "9."

16 Exhibit "10."

17 Exhibit "11."

18 Exhibit "12."

19 Exhibit "14."

20 Exhibit "15."

21 Exhibit "16."

22 Rollo, p. 45.

23 Id. at 43-44.

24 Id. at 58.

25 Records, p. 52.

26 Rollo, p. 11.

27 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wong, 359 SCRA 608 (2001).

28 Tando v. Court of Appeals, 372 SCRA 321 (2001).

29 Spouses Constante Firme and Azucena E. Firme v. Bukal Enterprises and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 146608,
October 23, 2003.

30 Article 1311, New Civil Code.

31 Manila Port Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 1214 (1967).

32 17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Contract, pp. 559-560.

33 G. T. Fogle & Co. v. United States, 135 F.2d 117 (1943).

34 Roebling v. Dillon, 288 F.2d 386 (1961).

35 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592 (1923).

36 TSN, 17 August 1992, p. 14.

37 Exhibit "12."

38 Exhibit "14."

39 Mon-Ray, Inc. v. Granite Re, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 434 (2004) citing First National Bank of St. Paul v. Ramier, 311 N.W. 2d 502,
504 (1981).

40 ServiceMaster of St. Cloud v. GAB Bus. Services., Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 306 (1996).

41 Callaway Golf Company v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Americas, Inc., 318 F.Supp.2d 216 (2004); Dinosaur Dev., Inc. v. White,
216 Cal.App.3d 1310, 265 Cal.Rptr. 525 (1989).

42 Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, 926 P.2d 1130 (1996).

43 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, pp. 77; In Albrecht v.
Walter, 572 N.W.2d 809 (1997), it was held that:

… (1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) some connection between enrichment and impoverishment; (4) the
absence of justification for enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) the absence of a remedy provided by law.

44 Id. at 82.

mo1

mo2

8. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 dated
November 24, 2010 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744.

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:

[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed this present complaint for damages for unfair competition
with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation ([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing
and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of [respondent].

[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products, with
principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992, [respondent] has been manufacturing
in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of [respondent].
[Respondent] further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent’s] office, and in view of the fact
that some of the [respondent’s] employeeshad transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent’s]
products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.

That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing the same automotive
parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these products at a lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-made
automotive parts and to the same customers.

[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture ofautomotive underchassis parts such
as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorberbushing, center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the
same automotive parts with plastic materialwas taken from [respondent’s] idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner]
deliberately copied [respondent’s] products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and public policy and have caused [respondent] damages in terms oflost and unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO MILLION
PESOS as of the date of [respondent’s] complaint.

Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to institute this action and thereby to incur expenses in the way of
attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00).

In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent] except for the following facts: that it is engaged in the manufacture
and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal and that there’s physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to
[respondent]’s office, and that someof [respondent’s] employees had transferred to [petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner] had
developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially its plastic made automotive parts.

As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive parts are mere
reproductions of original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms to the specificationsof the original parts of motor
vehicles they intend to replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it "originated" the use of plastic for these automotive parts. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that [respondent] indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it still has no exclusive
right to use, manufacture and sell these as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only exclusive
manufacturer of these plastic-made automotive parts as there are other establishments which were already openly selling them to the
public.3

After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest of respondent
by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC further opined that under the circumstances, in
order for respondent’s property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts such as
those of respondent’s and the selling of the sameproducts to respondent’s customers, which it cultivated over the years, will have to be
enjoined. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million (₱2,000,000.00) Pesos, as actual
damages, One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees and One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary
damages. The court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts as those manufactured
by plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.4

Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.

On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property protecting a good belonging to another,the copying thereof for
production and selling does not add up to unfair competition as competition is promoted by law to benefit consumers. Petitioner further
contends that it did not lure away respondent’s employees to get trade secrets. It points out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent
are traded in the market and the copying of these can be done by simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial for an unfair competition case to prosper under
Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are present in the instant case as the parties are trade
rivals and petitioner’s acts are contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying its products and employing its former employees.

In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions of said decision read:

Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in advancing its business interest against Jesichris, however, the Court
finds no basis for the award by the RTC of actual damages. One is entitled to actual damages as one has duly proven. The testimony of
Quejada, who was engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business, only revealed that there was a discrepancy between the sales of
Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No amount was mentioned. As for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative income statement of
Jesichris for 1999-2002, it shows the decline of the sales in 2002 in comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this
pertains to the subject automotive parts or to the other products of Jesichris like plates.

In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part of Willaware that prejudiced Jesichris. It is only proper
that nominal damages be awarded in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in order to recognize and vindicate
Jesichris’ rights. The RTC’s award of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages is also maintained.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, in
Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual damages is deleted and in its
place, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos nominal damages is awarded.

SO ORDERED.5

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was denied for lack of merit by the CA in a Resolution dated
February 10, 2011.

Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:

(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not competitors and there is actually
no damage on the part of Jesichris?

(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and attorney’s fees?

(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have been established?

(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on automotive parts, should it be considered in the light of the said
copyrights were considered to be void by no less than this Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?

(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not Jesichris has established "goodwill?" 6

In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of
the Civil Code.

Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on humanrelations, and not unfair
competition under Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the present suit is a damage suit and the products are not covered by patent registration. A
fortiori, the existence of patent registration is immaterial in the present case.

The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the
present article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions, the term coverseven cases of
discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a
competitor’s contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s business.8

With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting tounfair competition under Article 28
of the Civil Code.

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the
use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by
the person who thereby suffers damage."

From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not competitionper sebut the use of unjust, oppressive or high-
handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is
unfair competition and not competition where the means usedare fair and legitimate.

In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival,
and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise
unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by
unconscionable means.9

Here, both characteristics are present.

First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the
acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed respondent’s formeremployees,
deliberately copied respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling these products to respondent’s customers.10
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioner’s hiring of the former employees of respondent and petitioner’s act of
copying the subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to unfair competition, viz.:

The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in competing with the business of [respondent]. [Petitioner’s]
1âwphi1

acts can be characterized as executed with mischievous subtle calculation. To illustrate, in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court
observes that [petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of plasticautomotive spare
parts, it engaged the services of the then mold setter and maintenance operator of [respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by
the latter. De Guzman was hired by [petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic automotive spare parts were not being
made. It baffles the Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold setter and maintenance operator to remedy its problem.
[Petitioner’s] engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is banking on his experience gained from working for [respondent].

Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and delivery man of [respondent], was fired because he was blamed
of spying in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for
the same position he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of events relating to his employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like
the situation with De Guzman.11

Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business from
manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ and
trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.12

Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss and for the sole
purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is
guilty of wanton wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in
competing with the business of respondent, to wit: [Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas, Jr., admitted that it was never
engaged in the business of plastic-made automotive parts until recently, year 2000:

Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic) not? Manufacturer of kitchenware and
distributor ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: And you said you have known the [respondent] Jesichris
Manufacturing Co., you have known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In
fact, you have been (sic) physically become familiar with these products, plastic automotive products of Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.

How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of color, size, shape and composition as those sold by Jesichris was
due largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris’ employees to Willaware.

Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris Manufacturing Company?

Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.

Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4) years. I don’t know the exact date.

Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your company, is it not?

Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.

Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?

Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).

Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you?

Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.

Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?

Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the other one, just one month ago.

That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business was buttressed by the testimony of [petitioner’s] witness, Joel Torres:

Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware Product Corporation (sic)?

A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.

Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you kindly inform this court what unusual even (sic) transpired
between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?

A: There was, sir.

Q: What is that?

A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the market and then I passed by the place where they were having a
drinking spree, sir.

Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time?

A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.

Q: And who else was there?

A: William Salinas, sir.

Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon them drinking?

A: Jun Molina called me, sir.

Q: And what happened after that?

A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered something, sir.

Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?

A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"

Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?

A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin ko na siya."

Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did you gather to be referred to as your "amo"?

A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14

In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and in its place Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated February 10, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be lowered
to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairerson, Third Division

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTIONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

*Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No. 1777 dated September 1,
2014.

1Penned by Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino, with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.,
concurring; rollo, pp. 128-135.

2 Id. at 145-146.

3 Id. at 38-39.

4 Id. at 45.

5 Id. at 134-135. (Emphasis in the original)

 6 Id. at 14-15.

7AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE AND ESTABLISHING THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY OFFICE, PROVIDING FOR ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

8 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 117.

9 Id. at 116-117.

10 Rollo, p. 41.

11 Id. at 133-134.

12 Id. at 44.

13 Supranote 8.

14 Rollo, pp. 41-44. (Citations omitted)

9. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated 27 February 2008 and
the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution 3 dated 20 November
2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death
benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms
(Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

xxxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of
the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

xxxx

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

xxxx

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his
family in the following manner:

xxxx

4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate
dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters
only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate). 4

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5
January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. 5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female
fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. 6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death
benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.7

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted
to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their
dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). 9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the
Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave
and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve
said issue.11

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective
Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained
that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been
born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The
Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister
companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their
CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely
delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and
voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died
before labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the
representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the
representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a
fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status
as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 16 of the Civil
Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery
was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that
was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be
supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms
used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to
have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have qualified the parent-
employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred
to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could
the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn
child constituted "company practice."

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution 17 ruling that Hortillano was
entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as provided under
Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of
employee’s "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".

On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph
(4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee’s
"dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be presented. 18

Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to
be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not
have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was
already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were
lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P.
Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the
amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of ₱16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death
benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded
from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did
not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was
qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth,
otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and other
death benefits under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The
appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the
Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is
intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is
conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be
contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee,
with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term
"death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental
Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply
cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and
death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act
conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for
statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.20

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November
20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21

In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration 23 of Continental Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal
meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must
be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the
employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must
be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and
(4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.

It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its
fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper
interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous,
then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither
management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of
the CBA.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40
provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article
42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in
relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in
issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that
were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical
personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of
the unborn from conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who
relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general
definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational
life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that
the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA
did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn
fetus in the mother’s womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have
expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is
strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
"Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two
classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon
his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was
conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception. 1avvphi1

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and accident insurance
under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same
should have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief
of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising
from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that
of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to
give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of
any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. 29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should
be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings
to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts
in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which
is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our
Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should
be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the
death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Sesinando E. Villon
concurring; rollo, pp. 32-40.

2 Id. at 42.

3 Penned by Atty. Allan S. Montaño, Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator; records, pp. 381-392.

4 CA rollo, p. 26.

5 Rollo, pp. 84-92.

6 Id. at 93.

7 Id. at 86.

8 Id. at 33.

9 CA rollo, p. 60.

10 Id. at 67.

11 Id. at 46.

12 Id. at 25.

13 Id. at 62-65.

14 Id at 66-72.

15 Records, pp. 46-53.

16 Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable
to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s
womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-
four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is
determined by law, by contract and by will.

17 CA rollo, pp. 24-34.

18 Id. at 32.

19 Id. at 2-18.
 Art. 262-A of the Labor Code as amended in relation to Section 7, Rule XIX of Department Order No. 40-03 series of 2003
provides that the decision, order, resolution or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties and that it shall not be subject of a motion for
reconsideration.

20 Rollo, pp. 38-39.

21 Id. at 39.

22 Id. at 153.

23 Id. at 136-143.

24 Black’s Law Dictionary

25 Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution reads in full:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.

26 As opposed to the more limited or precise definition of a dependent child for income tax purposes, which means "a
legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted child chiefly dependent upon and living with the taxpayer if such dependent is not
more than twenty-one (21) years of age, unmarried and not gainfully employed or if such dependent, regardless of age, is
incapable of self-support because of mental or physical defect."

27 G.R. No. 153798, 2 September 2005, 469 SCRA 363, 369.

28 483 Phil. 483, 491 (2004).

29 Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164060, 15 June 2007, 524
SCRA 709, 716.

30 325 Phil. 618, 634-635 (1996).

SECOND BATCH
3. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC).
declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and
to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence
of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of
both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the
schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as
void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent
as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated
that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed
to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States
and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for
citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family
life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The
RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as
a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was
similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to
live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain
foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR
THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties
freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential
to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented
to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered
futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way
of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of
availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire
specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely
for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage
solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the principal test for determining the presence
of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together
at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986
(IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining
the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and,
therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally
void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable
case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry
but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to
convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms
or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be
proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without
subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside
world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really
agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as
merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely
for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being that in
order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied
annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the
OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to
be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent
is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage
void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely
given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud,
force, intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should
not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given
is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply
with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in
jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and
with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to
enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for
a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or
for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in
1âwphi1

order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship.
There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The
possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such
as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it
is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. 28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit,
to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus, marriages entered into for
other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage.
Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage
void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab
initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances
listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for
an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the
listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would
only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for
immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be
allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage
of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot
leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no
longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is
ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO* ARTURO D. BRION**

Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITER J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

*Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen per Special Order No. 1570 dated
October 14. 2013.

**Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad. Per Special Order No. 1554dated September 19,
2013.

1 Rollo. pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez. Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato. Jr.
and Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino of the Fifth Division. Manila.

2 Id. at 38-39.

3 Id. at 37.

4 Id. at 33-35.

5 Id. at 38-39.

6 Id. at 39.

7 Id. at 48-49.

8 Id. at 13.

9 Id. at 61-71.

10 Id. at 89-95.

11 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956.

Lutwak v. United States , 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).

12 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956;

citing Schibi v. Schibi , 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married only to give a name to a
prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop , 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Erickson v. Erickson , 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(holding similarly to Schibi ); Delfino v.Delfino , 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment where purpose of
marriage was to protect the girl’s name and there was an understanding that the parties would not live together as man and
wife); Bove v. Pinciotti , 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v. Moore , 189 S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an annulment
where parties entered marriage for the purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander v. Chander , No.2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721
(Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married husband to get his pension with no intention to
consummate marriage because husband knew that was the purpose of the marriage).

13 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G) (2000).

14 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage ; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132 CONG.REC. 27,012,
27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep Mc Collum) (promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986).

15 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).

16 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.

17 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).

18 United States v. Rubenstein , 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).

19 Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff’d , 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).

20 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956;

citing Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff’d, 440F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).

21 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).

22 Lynn D. Wardle and Laurence C. Nolan, Family Law in the USA, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2011) p. 86.

23 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956.

24 Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, (Quezon City, Philippines: Joer Printing Services,
2005), p. 4.

25 Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, (Quezon City, Philippines: Rex Printing Company, Inc.,
2010), Fifth Edition, p. 121.
 26 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, (Manila, Philippines: Central
Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231.

27 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, (Manila, Philippines: Central
Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231; citing McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. 225.

28 Article 4, Family Code.

29 Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).

30 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire v. McGuire , 59
N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).

31 Article 4, Family Code.

32 Const. ( 1987), Article XV, Section 2.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008 decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac,
Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the
Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr.
Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey,
who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded
to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest,
to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the
groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests. 4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. 5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while
Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple
exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document. 6She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the
marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the
wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they take each other as husband
and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R.
Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a
solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to
Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony
without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No.
3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its
provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC
imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00. 12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple
unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses
deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section
39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.:
(1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age. 14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these
requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony. 15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether
Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it covers violation
of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define
what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article
55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take each other as
husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and
attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the
State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing"
into a "marriage ceremony."19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to the
couple.20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of
the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage
Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter. 22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal
marriage ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be
resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal"
performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55 23 of the New
Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 24 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 6 25 of the Family
Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however,
for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly
defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite
for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements
constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer;
and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the
second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that
the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge may examine or
cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may
seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other
party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the
theory of one party.28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly
invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony,
support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The
testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence.
Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the
petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the State from qualifying the church
"blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the
Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement
gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core
requirements of law be observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family
law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within
its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in
the disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set
by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law
constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family
Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the
present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their
relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage
set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements
negates his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present case. For
purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided
by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in
accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as
follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized by the Director of
the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do
so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church,
religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in
accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any
officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor
more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be
promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present
case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case. As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was
1âwphi1

not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty
for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of
Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 3-26.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Ramon M. Bato,
Jr.; id. at 28-55.

3From the testimonies of Joseph Yere, id. at 89-90; Mary Anne Yere, id. at 182-183; the petitioner, id. at 118-123, 129 and 133-
136; Joey Umadac, id. at 145-153; and Dominador Umadac, id. at 166-167.

4 Id. at 30.

5 Id. at 29.

6 Id. at 35.

7 Id. at 36-37.

8 Id. at 85-86 (TSN dated August 5, 2004 of Florida Umadac, p. 14).

9 Id. at 31.

10 Id. at 49-50.

11 Id. at 60-61.

12 Id. at 62-63.

13 Id. at 68.

14 Id. at 46.

15 Id. at 51.

16 Ibid.

17 Id. at 12-14.

18 Id. at 15.

19 Id. at 15-16.

20 Id. at 18.
 21 Ibid.

22 Id. at 19.

23Art. 55. No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage
must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other
as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the
contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage.

24Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties with legal capacity to
contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that
they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or
mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage.

25Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however,
for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage
certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

This provision was taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which was, in turn, a reproduction of Section 3 of the
26
Marriage Law.
27

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.

28 People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68, 115 (2000).

29Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

5. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS
IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion
S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez &
Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio
Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C.
Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor &
Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita
Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho &
Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho,
Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro,
Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M.
BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON
WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato
Marcos,Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal
capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in
his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G.
NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M .
Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap,
Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno
and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J.
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General,
National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G.
MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO
collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of
the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the
rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal
capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A.
MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA
ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE
VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a
state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy,
the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The
government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and
the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact
laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring
concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an
inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet
reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital
and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in
every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media.
From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep
division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors
of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that
its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-
intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their
personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn
(ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in
their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity
as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia,
Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens
(Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others, 31in their capacities
as citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
 • The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against
abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. 35

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the
RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health
problems.36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners,
the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate
ensuring religious freedom.37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and
2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical
specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with
the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. 40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an
affront to their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the
"clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and
the right to free speech.42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects
medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment.43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to
render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer
be able to avail of the practitioners services.44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it
makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce
the number of the poor.45

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of
imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the
right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It
ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment.

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly
to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is
granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare
facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any
real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of
their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental
authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
 • The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution. 52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level
and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No.
9054.54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of
the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan,
and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and
Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator
Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal
reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the
effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent
issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013,
and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until
further orders of the Court.63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several
questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-
conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of
provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person
without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population problem
should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and
tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled
"An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law
envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples
desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, 68 dated December 8,
1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part
of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of
spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under that policy, the country gave
priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments
made in the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or
"The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for
women, including family planning and sex education. 71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry
number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92
million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH
Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family
planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more
effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning
methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes
certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's
health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of
life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of
the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and
Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a
physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and
provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and
universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies. 74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following
principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural
impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom
of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic
process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and
positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress. 77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in
Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to
assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced
and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the
RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought
that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the
principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. 81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b) the executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of
powers among the three branches of government.85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper
restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the
Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution
are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect
the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the
line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative
branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the
Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction
as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is
simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive
branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their
respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations
of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
(to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the
definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz :
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. 96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to
be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has
been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not
merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication,
it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must
show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has
no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the
intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate
ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail
the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. 106 These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights
of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes
not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. 109 The underlying reason for
this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its
duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions
on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge"
lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, 111 and the government has
yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in
establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he
asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of
the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury
to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with
the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time
and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked.
The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may
not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially
the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must
be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the
freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and
reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions
raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life
of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to
be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. 121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population
control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124 and that the concepts of
"responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable. 125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus
of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children
healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods.
These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers
the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality
reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the
central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-
natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna
Carta for Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections
and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the
title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a
liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of
the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act."129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally
sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that
prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take
effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the
fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that
contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life. 131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use
contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or
supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective
patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes. 133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of
abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient"
reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public. 134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law.
As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and
other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only
when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive. 135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various
studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is
constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent
upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the
enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, 138 to the promotion of male
vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to
promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years,
however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to
one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's
well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will
be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should
not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the
individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no
unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life
begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held
in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable
and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization
that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents. 145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon
resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally
with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at
all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision,
the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the
following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum
alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it
processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it
multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is
no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and
the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46
chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as
night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. 151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because of
doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized
ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception." 152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the
moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to
Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be
very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So
we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise
during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are
abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization
has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is
proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and
should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are
abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient. 154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal
protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In
fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action
prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life
of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured
of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of
these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question
again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no,"
not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does
it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which
actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception,"
what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments.
There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor,
yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable
zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that
human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a
new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and female
gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the
contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the
sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid
cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process,
fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed....
The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is
restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible
Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is
sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and
that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human
embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this
objective scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of
any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. 165 According
to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and
46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it
would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the
implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to
prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This
intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by
the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to
make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from
the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to
protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. 170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction
or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
 xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive
health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the
enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have
children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination,
coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter
of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act
No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines
an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law,
first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces
the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an
abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests.
It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it
recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected
the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and
afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or
destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion.
To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine
wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the
RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in
the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as
an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that
the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included
in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used
as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills,
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning
of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health product,
whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from
being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word
"primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section
4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the
way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be
considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized
ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients
because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this,
together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable
conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the
primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a
manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting
abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively
"open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the
regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit
that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women
who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that
the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased
risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction. 177 Given the definition of "reproductive health"
and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to
ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that
contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting
and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health,
manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and
their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per
se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not
prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no
intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with
the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives
since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician.
With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made
available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and
Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729
which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without
consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing
fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the
primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five
hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or
device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a
prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that
the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage
of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and
implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current
levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of
this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still
in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible
means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive
drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves
the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food
and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the
RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick
as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe
and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not
Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient.
The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from
the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not
mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those
who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil.
Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the
willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely
opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms
true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life." 188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives
violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a
conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector
the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the
patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do
without violating his/her religious beliefs.190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although
it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information -
no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures.
They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in
Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools
referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize. 191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care
service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the
act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to
disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-
bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care services
to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission
of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the
RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it
mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-
discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to
justify the impairment of religious freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible
parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine
and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide,
support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be
it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the
public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with
the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those
acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee
informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the
constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. 200 In other words, by
seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's
sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it
being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is
required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional
in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient
accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an
opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition.
It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to
accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State. 204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics
and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on
contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and
religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious,
cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the
religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they
conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the
present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to
ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom,
love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a
people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect
the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards
religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-
versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal
1âwphi1

affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against
another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision
utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which
metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular
objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions.
It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the
use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 207 Under this part of
religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect,
thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88
L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said
that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate
invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the
state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144;
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two
parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the
same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the
rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has
been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution." 215 In the same case, it was
further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not
to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.
"The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion." 216 "What is
sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218Underlying the compelling
state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In
Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause,
American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to
be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is
whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as
well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German
went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly
recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not
surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or
another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set
the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority
cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case
that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present
danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and
German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this
jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest"
test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects
may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over
the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is
an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such
higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a
government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere
balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling
interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a
compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state
interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state.
This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest"
test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be
preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the
support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to
one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee
of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the
nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood."
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective natural
and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding
support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing
laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious
convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies,
plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is
likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their
children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however,
the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can
or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor
can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the
RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes
simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the
Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions
commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law
to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest
test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor,
there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.
As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health
providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly
what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's
thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the
protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the
religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. 224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the
other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health
providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from
compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be
violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater
Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's
Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or '
indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if
it would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health
care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with
their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of
religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service
providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for
either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health
procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot
allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act
and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the
religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates
of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction
whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe
that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to
think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and,
thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom
of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association. 229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of
the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law,
the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in
upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read,
I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health
professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others,
who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot
be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the
religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1]
demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the
burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of
a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to
his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the
Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a
conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation
involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship
between medical doctors and their patients.231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors,
however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one
believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's
belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject
provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is
contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she
even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and
occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it
takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. 234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only
be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious
freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without
violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may
perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform
an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other
legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and
R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and
programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive,
culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the
major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be
accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and
the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the
primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV,
and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be
provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal
interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition,
healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the
prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate,
timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government
education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
 (1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the
enrichment and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per
day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete
facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48
percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that
such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers
cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be
made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother
should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to
unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested:
"the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of
double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a
conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct
harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because
both their lives are equally valuable.238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is
against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this
case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a
reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether
they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable,
and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into
marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and
total development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article
XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a
solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common
future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had
suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent
or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures
shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should
require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family.
Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot
found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would
undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife,
possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a
marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any
decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly
matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as
they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any
compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women,"
provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the
number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility
between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen
the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach
into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v.
Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection." 244 Marje adopted the ruling of
the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy
rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." 246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not
be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor
is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are
excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental
authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot
replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is
clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this
regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is
superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to
mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life,
would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino
tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of
marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not
the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental
authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the
consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information
about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of
her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of
the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the
protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental
guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put
at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently
needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of
parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the
first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of
this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom .
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they
believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical
data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births;
divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and
promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate
on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the
religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the
Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution
and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by
recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building. 253 Considering that
Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of
gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights;
responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and
Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional
changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than
supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction
with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line
with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section
14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health education
program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According
to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who
is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private
health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering
reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time
fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone,
but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to Section
4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted
primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2)
public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of
health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and
who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local
health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider,"
should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are
broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold,
restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision
is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate,
faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand,
the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information
in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own
personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide
public health and safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor
because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than
promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the
poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the
RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis
of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly
constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of
the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.
"The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class
should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those
covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in
the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address
the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their
number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains,
the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who
intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if
they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide
priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under Section
14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not
amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public
educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to
render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires
medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to
slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover,
the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth
being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of
the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is
not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the
power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public
health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such
right altogether.264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other
similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and
non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no
penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy
the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of
such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden,
but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this
provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is
to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register
and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so.
It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions,
powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend standards
of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x
 "(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure
safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer
users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed
to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered with
the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be
extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious
illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly
deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the
appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates
of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA
was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the
mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service"
and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines
that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government
units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining
to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties
and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and
offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge
such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects,
facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except
in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, 271 the hiring of
skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national
priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the
wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot
be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.
The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does
not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to
by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for
the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be
exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the
regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted
to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal
basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is
perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it
is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by
theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the
actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike
down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to
examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. 279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form.
It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed
out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After
all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest
of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-
minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of
rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the
unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the
hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked
on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with
adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one,
Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an
ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the
fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down
below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of
the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking
body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the
province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to
enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the
Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of
settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the
law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and
reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be
the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of
Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-
coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without
the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent
only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service
in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED,
insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Tingnan ang aking opinyong

Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Concurring Opinion

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

With Separate concurring opinion See: Separate Concurring Opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Concurring and dissenting See Concurring Opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See concurring and dissenting See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
See Separate dissent
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
 C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003; 405
SCRA 497, 504.

2See <http://wn.com/pro-rh_ bill_vs_anti-rh_ bi ll>, last visited on November 5, 20 13; See also <http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/nation/04/ 19/ I O/h ontiveros-tatad-debate-rh-bill>, last vi sited on November 5, 201 3.

3 See <http ://news info .inqu irer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/ 20110321-326743/Stickers-spread-anti-RH-bill-message>,

last visited on November 5, 2 01 3; See also <http ://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/ 218169/news/nation/carlos-celdran-
distributes-pro-rh-stickers-in-quiapo>, last visited on November 5, 201 3.

4See <http ://newsinfo. inquirer.net/241 737/massive-church-rally-set-against-rh-bill>, last visited November 5, 201 3; See also
<http://www.splendorofthechurch.eom.ph/201 3/04/29/fi lipino-catholics-flex-muscles-in-poll-clout/>, last visited November 5,
2013.

5 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 2048 19;
rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 3-32.

6With Prayer for the Urgent Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R.
No. 204934; rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 3-76.

7 Also proceeding in her personal capacity a citizen and as a member of the Bar.

8 Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C .
Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho &
Traquilina Racho, Femand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel Fernando C . Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C.
Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor &
Raphae l C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves a nd on behalf of their minor chi ldren
Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Franc ine Y. Racho
for themse lves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, C hessie
Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of the ir minor child Gabrie
l Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah General Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M.
Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R. Laws & Katrina R. Laws

9 With Prayer for Injunction; docketed a s G.R. No. 204957.

10 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 204988;
rollo (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 5-3 5.

11 Through and together with its president Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.

12 Through and together with its representative/ member of the school board Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D.

Rosemarie R. Alenton, Imelda G. Ibarra, Cpa, Lovenia P. Naces, Phd. , Anthony G. Nagac, Earl Anthony C. Gambe And,
13

Marlon I. Yap.

14Docketed as G.R. No. 205003; Petition is entitled "Petition (To Declare As Unconstitutional Republic Act No. 10354)." The
petition fails to provide any description as to nature of the suit under the Rules of Court; rollo (G.R. No. 205003), pp. 3-40.

15With prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order; docketed as G.R. No. 205043 ; rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp.
3-16.

16 Through its vice president and co-founder, Eduardo B.Olaguer.

17With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Prel iminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 205
138; rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 3-50.

18 Through and together with its president Atty. Ricardo M. Ribo.

19Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly
Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio 0. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno And Baldomero
Falcone.
20With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Pre lim inary Injunction; The petition fails to provide
any description as to nature of the suit under the Rules of Court; docketed as G.R. No. 205478; rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 3-
26.

21Jacqueline H. King, M.D., Cynthia T. Domingo, M.D., Josephine Millado-Lumitao, M.D., Anthony Perez, Michael Anthony
G. Mapa, Carlos Antonio Palad, Wilfredo Jose, Claire Navarro, Anna Cosio, Gabrie l Dy Liacco

22 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Prelim inary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 20549
1; rollo (G.R. No. 20549 1), pp. 3-13.

23 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 205720;
rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 3-90.

24 Through and together with its executive director, Loma Melegrito.

Joselyn B. Basilio, Robert z. Cortes, Ariel A. Crisostomo, Jeremy I. Gatdula, Cri stina A. Montes, Raul Antonio A. N idoy,
25
Winston Conrad B. Padojinog, Rufino L. Policarpio III.

26 Docketed as G.R. No. 206355, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 3-32.

27Through and together with its co-petitioners, Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni
Cataluna Causing .

28 With prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 207 111 ; rollo (G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 3-51.

29 Mary M. lmbong, Anthony Victorio B. Lumicao, Joseph Martin Q. Verdejo, Antonio Emma R. Roxas and Lota Lat-Guerrero.

30 With prayer for a Writ of Pre liminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 207 172; rollo (G.R. No. 207 172), pp. 3-56.

31Spouses Juan Carlos Artadi Sarmiento and Francesca Isabelle Besinga-Sarmiento, and Spouses Luis Francis A. Rodrigo, Jr.
and Deborah Marie Veronica N. Rodrigo.

32 Docketed as G.R. No. 2 07563; rollo (G.R. No. 2 07563), pp. 3-1 5.

33 Rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 138-1 55.

34 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 124 8-1 260.

35 Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 20481 9), pp. 8-1 O; Petit ion, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v.
Ochoa, rol!o (G.R. No. 20493 4), pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988),
pp. 13-1 5; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11 ; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX)
v. Ochoa, rol!o (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. N o. 205478), pp. 10-1 3; Petition,
Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No . 20635 5), pp . 11-15 ; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 17- 18; Petition, Buhay Party-list (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 1255- 1256.

36Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 26-28; Petition, Serve Life
Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G. R. No. 204988), pp. 15-1 6; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. N o.
205478), pp. 13- 14; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 30-35.

37Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 26-27; Petition, Philippine
Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 39-44; Petition, Tatad v. Office of the President, rol/o
(G. R. No. 205491), pp. 8-9; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp . 59-67;
Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 2 06355), pp. 25-26.

38Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 I 9), pp. 20-22; Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, inc. (ALFI) v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 34-38; Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
204957), pp. 26-27; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 6-7; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation,
Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 56-75; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo
(G.R. No. 206355), pp. 16-22; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 111), pp.28-33 ; Petition, Couples for Christ
Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, ro/lo (G.R. No. 207 172), pp. 12- 16.

39Section 5.23 Skilled Health Professional as a Conscientious Objector. ln order to be considered a conscientious objector, a
skilled health professional shall comply with the following requirements:

a) Submission to the DOH of an affidavit stating the modem family planning methods that he or she refuses to provide
and his or her reasons for objection;

b) Posting of a notice at the entrance of the clinic or place of practice, in a prominent location and using a clear/legible
font, enumerating the reproductive health services he or she refuses to provide; and c) Other requirements as
determined by the DOH. xxx.

Provided, That skilled health professionals who are pub lic officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or
Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public
health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors. xx x (Emphases Ours)

40 Joint Memorandum, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 26 17-26 19.
41Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, ro/lo (G.R. No. 204934), p. 40; Petition, Echavez v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp.6-7; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, In c. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), p.
81.

42Petition, Pro-l ife Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205720), pp. 63-64; Petition, Couples for Christ
Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 20-23.

43 Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, In c. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No . 204988), pp. 16-48 ; Petition , Echavez v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 2 05478), pp. 7-9.

44 Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 16-48; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 7-9.

45Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 30-3 1; Memorandum,
Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 1247- 1250; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the
President, rollo (G.R. No. 2063 55), pp. 25; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 172 ),
pp. 43-45.

46Joint Memorandum, Im bong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 2626-2637; Petition, Alcantara, pp. 9-1 3; rollo, (G.R.
No. 204934), pp. 146- 150; Petition, Pro-l ife Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 78-81.

47 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, ro//o (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 32-34.

48Petition, l mbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 2623-2626; Petition, Alcantara, pp.5-9; rollo, (G.R. No. 204934),
pp. 142- 148; Petition, Serve life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 20-21; Petition, Bugarin v.
Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No. 205003), pp. 14- 16; Petit ion, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the
President, rollo (G. R. No. 206355), p. 16; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, In c. v. Ochoa, ro//o (G. R. No. 207 172), pp.
16-20.

49Petition, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 2 0481 9), pp. 14- 19; Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 42-44; Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
204957), pp. 21-25; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 23-25;
Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 23 -28.

50Jo int Memorandum, Jmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No . 204819), pp. 257 1-2574; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No.
205043), pp. 11-1 2; Petition, Tatad v. Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No. 205491), pp. 7-8; Petition, Couples for Christ
Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 207172), pp. 28-32.

51Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 28-33; Petition, Philippine
Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205138), pp. 37-38.

52Section 26. ( I) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof;
Task Force for the Family and l ife Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 6-1 O; Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R.
No. 205478), pp. 9-10.

53 Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 14-30.

54Memorandum, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 894-900; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 45-48; Petition, Tillah v. Executive Secretary, rollo (G.R. No. 207563) pp. 6-12.

55 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 362-480.

56 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 195-353.

57 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 487-528.

58 Rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 871-1007.

59 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp.1 306-1334; rollo, (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 98-132.

60 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 736-780.

61 In her Motion for Leave to Intervene, Senator Pilar Ju liana S. Cayetano manifested that she was adopting as her own the
arguments raised by respondents Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez in their Petition for
Intervention; See rollo (G..R. No. 20481 9), pp. 173 1-1 783. After being directed by the Court to file their respective
memoranda, intervenors Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez manjfested on November
18, 201 3, that they were adopting the arguments raised by Congressman Lagman in his Joint Memorandum; See rollo (G..R.
No. 20481 9), pp. 3061-3070. On November 26, 201 3, Senator Pilar Juliana S. Cayetano file d her separate Memorandum ; see,
rollo (G. .R. No. 204819), pp. 3032-3059.

62 Resolution dated March 15, 201 3.

63 Resolution, dated July 16, 201 3.

64In its Resolution, dated August 27, 201 3, the Court required the parties to also include the following in their respective
memoranda:

1. What is the relation of the first portion of Section 7 on Access to Family Planning to the theory that R.A. No. I 0354
is an anti-poor program that seeks to reduce the population of the poor?
 2. How is the second paragraph of the same section related to the proposition that R.A. No. 10354 encourages sex
among minors?

3. In relation to Section 23 on Prohibited Acts, where in the law can you find the definition of the term ' health care
service provider' ? Is the definition of a ' public health care service provider ' found in Section 4, paragraph (n) of the
law sufficient for the Court to understand the meaning of a 'private health care service provider' or should the Court
refer to the Implementing Rules and Regulations which refer to 'health care providers'?

4. With respect to ' health care providers' under the Implementing Rules and Regulations, does it make a difference
that they are called ' health care providers' and not ' health care service providers'? Does the fact that there is a missing
word indicate that there is a difference or that the tautology being proposed actually refers to different objects? If in
the affirmative, is there enough basis to say that the law is a criminal statute that has sufficient definitions for purposes
of punitive action?

5. In relation to Section 23(a)(l), how will the State be able to locate the programs and services on which the health
care service provider has the duty to give information? If the terminology of ' health care service provider ' includes '
private health care service provider', which includes private hospitals and private doctors, is the State duty-bound to
consequently provide these providers with information on the programs and services that these providers should give
information on?

6. As regards programs, is there a duty on the part of the State to provide a way by which private health care service
providers can have access to information on reproductive health care programs as defined in Section 4, paragraph (r)?
What is the implication of the fact that the law requires even private parties with the duty to provide information on
government programs on the criminal liability of private health care service providers?

7. As regards services, what is the distinction between 'information' and 'services' considering that 'services' in
different portions of the statute include providing of information?

8. What are the specific elements of every sub-group of crime in Section 23 and what are the legal bases for the
determination of each element?

9. Are there existing provisions in other statutes relevant to the legal definitions found in R.A. No. 10354?

10. Why is there an exemption for the religious or conscientious objector in paragraph (3) of Section 23 and not in
paragraphs ( 1) and (2)? What is the distinction between paragraph (3) and paragraphs ( 1) and (2)?

11 . Section 23(a)(3) penalizes refusal to extend quality health care services and information 'on account of the
person's marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature of work.' What if the
refusal is not on account of one's marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature
of work, or what if the refuser simply does not state the reason for the refusal? Will there still be a criminal liability
under Section 23(a)(3)?

12. Still on Section (23 )(a)(3) on referring a person to another facility or provider, is this the same or analogous to
referral of a person to seek second opinion? What is the medical standard for the provision of a second opinion? In
referring to another professional or service provider for a second opinion, is it the patient who is not comfortable with
the opinion given by the first doctor that triggers the duty or option to refer? How is it different with the situation in
Section 23(a)(3) when it is the doctor who is not comfortable about giving an opinion? Is the difference legally
material?

13. How does Section 23, paragraph (c) relate to Article 134 the Labor Code which requires employers to provide
family planning services?

14. Section 24 provides that in case the offender is a juridical person, the penalties in the statute shall be imposed on
the president or any responsible officer. For each offense in Section 23, how will the corporate officer be made
responsible if there is no actual participation by the hospital board directors or officers of such action? Does Section
24 in relation to Section 23 require corporate action? What is the situation being contemplated in the second paragraph
of Section 24 before there can be accountability for criminal violations?

15. Section 7 provides that access of minors to information and family planning services must be with the written
consent of parents or guardians. Is the re a penalty in the law for those who will make these information and services
(e.g. , contraceptives) available to minors without the parent's consent? How does this relate to Section 14 which
requires the Department of Education to formulate a curriculum which 'shall be used by public schools' and ' may be
adopted by private schools'? Is there a penalty for teaching sex education without the parents' or guardians' written
consent? Correlatively, is there a penalty for private schools which do not teach sex education as formulated by the
DepEd considering the use of the word ' may'?

65 Section I , R.A. No. 4729

66 Entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines."

67 See http://www.pop.org/content/coercive-population-ploys-in-ph ilippines-1428, last visited October 17, 2013.

68 Entitled "Revising the Population Act of Nineteen Hundred And Seventy-One."

69<http://www.senate.gov.ph/publications/PB%202009-03%20-%20Promoting%20Reproductive%20Health.pdf->, last visited

October 17, 2013.
70 Held in Cairo, Egypt from September 5- 13, 1994.

71 Section 17, R.A. 97 10.

72 See <www. nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d)pop.asp>; last accessed February 2 0, 2014.

73 Alliance /or the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), p. 1408.

74 Id.

75 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 376.

76 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 377.

77 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 378.

78 G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 20 10, 632 SCRA 146, 166.

79 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 385, 387-388.

80 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp .3 81-384.

81 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 ( 1936).

82 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. I.

83 Constitution, Art. Vll , Sec. I.

84 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.

85 Supra note 81.

86 See Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc., et al. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 799 (1989).

87Francisco, Jr. v. Th e House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 , November I 0, 2003, citing Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

88 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 77-78 (2009).

89 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G. R. No. 19627 I, October 18, 20 I I, 659 SCRA 270, 326-327.

90 Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G. R. No. I 92935 & G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 7 8, I 77.

91 Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 575 (I997).

92 453 Phil. 586 (2003).

93 G.R. No. 188078, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA137.

94 G.R No. 187 167, July 16, 2011 , 655 SCRA 476.

95Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 83 0, 882-883 (2003), citing Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of
Law: Some Recurring Aspects Of The Process Of Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37 A MJJUR 17, 24 (1 992).

96Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G. R. No . 192935, December 7, 20 10, 637 SCRA 78, 148 ; Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 20 10, 632 SCRA 146, 166-1 67; Senate of
the Philippines v. Ermita, 522 Phil. I, 27 (2006); Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 83 0, 892 (2003).

97 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 2 04819), pp. 375-376.

98 Comment-In-Intervention, Hontiveros, et al., rollo, (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 106- 109; Comment-In-Intervention, Cabral et al.,
rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 500-501.

99 Republic Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v. Santiago, 556 Phil. 83, 9 1-92 (2007).

100 Jriformation Technology Foundation of the Philipp ines v. Commission on Elections , 499 Phil. 281, 304-305 (2005).

101Lawyers Against Monopoly And Poverty (LAMP) v. Th e Secretary of Budget and Management, G. R. No. 164987, April
24, 201 2, 670 SCRA 373 , 383.

102 The Province Of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 589 Phil. 387, 481 (2008).

103 Id. at 483 .

104 Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 574 ( 1997).

105 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 381.

106 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 ( 1987).

107The First Amendment of the US Constitution reads: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
108Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phi l. 357 (2008); Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265 (2004 );
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phi I. 290 (200 I).

109 Resolution, Romualdez v. Commission on Elect ions, 594 Phil. 305, 3 16 (2008).

110 Constitution, Article VIII , Section 1.

111 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 375-376.

112 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), p. 384.

113 Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. Th e Executive Secretary, 558 Phil. 338, 350 (2007).

114 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 633 (2000), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 ( 1962).

115 Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio; Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phil. 357, 406 (2008).

116Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 591 Phil. 393, 404 (2008);
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321 (1997); De Guia v. COMELEC, G .R . No. 104 71 2, May 6, I
992, 208 SCRA 420, 422.

117 503 Phil. 42, 53 (2005).

118 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).

119 464 Phil. 375, 385 (2004).

120 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 388-389.

121The Province Of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, supra note 102; Ortega v. Quezon
City Government, 506 Phil. 373, 380 (2005); and Gonzales v. Comelec, 137 Phil. 471 (1969).

122 Section 26. (I) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Petition, Task Force for the Family and life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 6-10; Petition, Echavez v.
123
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 9-10.

124 Joint Memorandum, Lagman, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819) pp. 212-214.

125 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819, pp.389-393.

126 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. N o. 204934), p. 1396.

127 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. No. 204934), p. 1396.

128 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. No. 204934), p. 1396.

129 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 Edition, pp. 15 7-1 58; citing 82 CJS 365.

130Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rol/o (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 8-10; Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988),
pp. 13-1 5; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, ro/lo (G. R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11 ; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX)
v. Ochoa, ro/lo (G.R. No . 2051 38), pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2 05478), pp. 10-13; Petition,
Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No. 206355), pp. 11-15; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay Partylist (BU HAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 1255 -1256.

131 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life
Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 13-1 5; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043),
pp. 10-11; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez
v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No . 205478), pp. 10-13; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo
(G.R. No. 206355), pp. 11-1 5; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207111), pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay Partylist (BUHAY)
v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 1255-1256.

132 Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 14-30.

133 Memorandum, Alcantara, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2133; Reply, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 339-340.

134Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 393-396; Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rollo, (G.R. No.
204819), pp. 230-233; Comment-In-Intervention, C4RH, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 1091-11 92; Hontiveros, rollo (G.R. No.
204934), pp. 111-1 16; Memorandum, Cayetano,, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 3038-3041.

135 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 396-410.

136 Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 225-342.

137 Article 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

138 See Republic Act No. 4729, dated June 18, 1966.

139 See http://www.pop.org/content/coerci ve-population-ploys- in-philippines- 1428 , last visited October 17, 2013.
140<http://www.senate.gov.ph/publications/PB%202009-03%20-%20Promoting%20Reproductive%20 Health.pdt>, last visited
October 17, 2013.

141 <http://www.pop.org/content/ coercive-population-p loys-in-ph ii ippines-1428>

During the deliberation, it was agreed that the individual members of the Court ca n express their own views on this matter.

142 Petition, Alliance/or the Family Foundation, Inc. (AL FI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp . 15-25; Petition, Serve Life
Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 2 04988), pp. 13- 15; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043),
pp. 10-11 ; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205 138), pp. 8-36 ; Petition,
Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 10-13 ; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President,
rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 11-15; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 111), pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay Party/isl
(BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 1255-1256.

143 Comment-ln-lntervention, Lag man, rollo, (G. R. No. 204819), pp. 225-342.

144 G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 201 2, 676 SCRA 579.

145 Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 469.

146 Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 262.

147 G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 618 Phil. 634 (2009).

148 Gonzales v. Carhart (Nos. 05-380 and 05-1382), No. 05- 380, 413 F. 3d 791 ; 05- 1382, 435 F. 3d 1163,

149 http: //www.law.comell.edu/supct/html/05-380.ZO.html, last visited February 15, 2014.

150 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 16, 1986, p. 668.

151 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 12, 1986, p. 596.

152 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 12, 1986, p. 669.

153 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 19, 1986, p. 800.

154 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 17, 1986, p. 711 .

155 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 17, 1986, p. 711.

156 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4 , September 17, 1986, p. 745 .

157 TSN, July 9, 2013 , pp. 23-24.

158 Id.

159 4th Edition, p. 375

160 Id, p. 609

161 Sumpaico, Gutierrez, Luna, Pareja, Ramos and Baja-Panlilio, 2"d Edition, (2002), pp. 76-77.

162Moore, Persaud, Torchia, The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryo logy, International Edition, 9th Edition
(2013), pp. 1-5, 13.

163O'Rahilly, Ronan and Muller, Fabiola, Huma n Embryo logy & Teratology. 2nd edition. New York: Wiley-Liss, 1996, pp. 8,
29, cited at: http://www.princeton.edu/-prolife/articles/embryoguotes2.html, last visited February 15, 2014.

From https://www.philippinemedicalassociation .org/downloads/circular-forms/ Position-Paper-on-the-Republic-Health-Bill-

164
%28Responsible-Parenthood-Bill%29.pdf. last visited March 26, 2014.

165 Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rol/o, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 225-342.

166 Id.

167 Id.

168 See <http://americanpregnancy.org/duringpregnancy/ fetaldevelopment I .htm>, last visited April 7, 2014.

169Joint Memorandum of the House of Representatives and Respondent- Intervenor Rep. Edee I C. Lagman), Section 40, Rollo,
G.R. No. 2048 19, p. 2343.

170 Concurring Opinion (Justice Carpio), p. 3.

171 See TSN, July 9, 2013, p. 100.

172 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), pp. 17-19; Separate Opinion (Justice Brion), p. 25.

173 Section 3.01 For purposes ofthese Rules, the terms shall be defin ed as fo llows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertil ized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Admini stration (F DA) .
 xxxx

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern fam ily planning method, device,
or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized
ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as
determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) .

174 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), pp. 17-19; Separate Opinion (Justice Brion), p. 25 .

175 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), p. 19 .

176Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI} v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 26-28; Petition, Serve l ife
Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rolfo, (G. R. No . 204988), pp. 15-16; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205478), pp. 13- 14; Petition, Pro-life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rolfo (G.R. No. 205 720), pp. 30-35.

177 Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, rollo, (G.R. No . 204934), pp. 1419-1445.

178 Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxxx

(p) Reproductive Health (RH) refers to the state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes.
This implies that people are able to have a responsible, safe, consensual and satisfying sex life, that they have the
capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when , and how often to do so. This further implies that women
and men attain equal relationships in matters related to sexual relations and reproduction.

179 Section 4. Definition of Terms . - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxxx

(w) Sexual health refers to a state of physical, mental and social well-being in relation to sexuality. It requires a
positive and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual relationships, as well as the possibility of having pleasurable
and safe sexual experiences, free from coercion, discrimination and violence.

180 Me morandum, Alcantara, rollo, (G.R. No. 204934)p. 2136; Memorandum , PAX, rollo (G.R. No. 205 138), pp. 2154-2155.

181 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 415-416.

182 Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011 , 6 52 SCRA 690, 738-739.

183 335 Phil. 82 ( 1997).

184 Memorandum , Alliance for the Family Foundation, In c. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rol/o (G.R. No. 204934), p. 1408.

185 Id.

186 Memorandum, Lagman, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 2359-2361.

187 Separate Opinion (Justice Leonardo-De Castro) p. 54.

188 Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205138), pp. 40-41.

189Petition, Task Force/or the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 26-27; Petition, Philippine
Alliance of XSem inarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 39-44; Petition, Tatadv. Office of the President, rollo
(G.R. No. 205491), pp. 8-9; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp . 59-67;
Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 2063 55), pp. 25-26.

190 Joint Memorandum, lmbong/Luat, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2615.

191 Joint Memorandum, Imbong/Luat, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp . 2616-2621.

192 Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (GR. No. 205478), pp. 6-7.

193 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 20-23.

194 Petition, Coup les for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 I 72), pp. 20-23.

195Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 35-37.; Petition,
Millennium Saint Foundation, In c. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 17- 18.

196Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 3050; Comment-in-Lntervention, Cabral, rollo (G.R. No. 2 04819), p.
5 11.

197 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 2677.

198 Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), p. 3050.

199 Joint Memorandum Lagman, rol!o (G.R. No. 2048 19), p. 2361.

200 Memorandum . C4RH, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2189; Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 3050-305 1.
201 Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204 819), p. 3050 .

202 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2677.

203 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p . 2679.

204 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2679.

205 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2000 ed ., p. 179, citing Justice Laurel in Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421.

206 Gorospe, Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. I 007

207 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed. , p. 330

208 Gorospe, Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. I 066

209 59 SC RA 54 (1974).

210 Escritor v. Estrada, A.M. No. P-02-1651 , June 22, 2006, 525 Phil. 110, 140- 141 (2006).

211 106 Phil. 2 (1959).

212 Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 9- 10 ( 1959).

213 Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools, 219 SCRA 25 6 ( 1993 ), March 1, 1993.

214 525 Phil. 110 (2006).

215 Id. at 137.

216 Id. at 148.

217 Id . at 149.

218 Id. at 175.

219 Id. at 168- 169.

220 Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 4 11 , 560 (2003).

221 Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, pp. 178-1 79.

222 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed. , p. 330.

223 Separate Opinion, Cruz, Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools, 219 SCRA 25 6 ( 1993 ), March 1, 1993.

224 Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 220, at 537.

225 20 130 CSIH 36.

226 http://www. skepticink.com/tippling/201 3/05/0 5/conscientious-objection-to-abortion -cathoIic-midwives-win-appeal/; last

visited February 22, 2014

227http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/20 13/05/03/conscientious-objection-to-abortion-catholic-midwives-win-appeal; last visited

February 22 , 2014

228 453 Phil. 440 (2003).

Fernando on the Philippine Constitution, 1974 ed. , p. 565; See Dissenting Opinion Makasiar, Garcia v. The Faculty
229
Admission Committee G. R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975.

230 TSN , August 13, 201 3, pp. 52-54.

231 TSN, August27, 201 3, pp. 71-72

232Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines v. Office of the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President of the
Philippines, supra note 228 at 450.

233 http://fatherbemasblogs. blogspot.com/2011 _02_0 !_archive.html ; last vi sited February 15, 2014.

234 Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 210.

235 TSN , Aug ust 27 , 201 3, p. 130.

236 http ://www. lifenews.com/2011 /09/01 /philippines-sees-matemal-mortalitv-decline-without-abortion; last visited March 9,

2014 [Researchers from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation of the University of Washington in Seattle examined
maternal mortality rates in 181 countries and found the rate (the number of women's deaths per 100,000) dropped by 81 percent
in the Philippines between .1980 and 2008. The decrease comes as the largely Catholic nation has resister efforts to legalize
abortions, even though the United Nations and pro-abortion groups claim women will supposedly die in illegal abortions and
increase the maternal mortality rate if abortion is prohibited.

The 2010 study, published in Lancet, shows the Philippines outpaced first-world nations like Germany, Russia and
Israel - where abortions are legal - in cutting maternal mortality rates.
 Meanwhile, the National Statistical Coordination Board in the Philippines, according to Spero Forum, has shown the
same results. From 1990-2010, the daily maternal mortality rate dropped 21 percent, its figures indicated. The World
Health Organization also found that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped 48 percent from 1990 to 2008.

237 TSN, July 23, 2013 , p. 23.

238 Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. {ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), p. 1407.

239SEC. 15. Certificate of Compliance. - No marriage license shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar unless the applicants
present a Certificate of Compliance issued for free by the local Family Planning Office certifying that they had duly received
adequate instructions and information on responsible parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition.

240 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, In c. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 172), p. 29.

241 80 CONST. Art XV, §2 .

242 Separate Opinion (Justice Leonardo-De Castro), p. 42-43.

243 130 Phil. 415 (1968).

244 Id . at 436.

245 81 Griswold v. Connecticut,3 81U.S. 479, June7, 1965.

246 Id.

247 Section 12, Article II , 1987 Constitution.

248 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., p . 85.

249 (ii) Parental consent or that of the person exercising parental authority in the case of abused minors, where the parent or the
person exercising parental authority is the respondent, accused or convicted perpetrator as certified by the proper prosecutorial
office of the court. In the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising
parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures and in no case shall consent be required in
emergency or serious cases as defined in Republic Act No. 8344.

250 Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 15- 16.

251 Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 1453- 1496.

252 Records, 1986 Constitutional Convention, Volume IV, pp. 401-402 .

253 Article II , Section 13, 1987 Constitution.

254 Petition, Task Force for the Family and life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204957), pp. 24-25.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010; People v.
255
Nazario, No. L-44 143, August 3 1, 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195.

256 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, G.R. No. 1835 17, June 22, 2010, 621 SC RA 461, 469.

257 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 1145 .

258 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 1252.

259 SEC. 3. Guiding Principles for Implementation. - Th is Act declares the following as guiding principles:

xxxx

(d) The provision of ethical and medically safe, legal, accessible, affordable, non-abortifacient, effective and quality
reproductive health care services and supplies is essential in the promotion of people's right to health, especially those
of women, the poor, and the marginalized, and shall be incorporated as a component of basic health care;

(e) The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning,
including effective natural and modem methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and
effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and
approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide fun ding support to promote
modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and the irreligious convictions;

(f) The State shall promote programs that: (I) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they
desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them
and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions: Provided, That no one shall be
deprived, for economic reasons, of the rights to have children; (2) achieve equitable allocation and utilization of
resources; (3) ensure effective partnership among national government, local government units (LGUs) and the private
sector in the design, implementation, coordination, integration, monitoring and evaluation of people-centered
programs to enhance the quality of life and environmental protection; (4) conduct studies to analyze demographic
trends including demographic dividends from sound population policies towards sustainable human development in
keeping with the principles of gender equality, protection of mothers and children, born and unborn and the promotion
 and protection of women's reproductive rights and health ; and (5) conduct scientific studies to determine the safety
and efficacy of alternative medicines and methods for reproductive health care development;

xxxx

(g) The provision of reproductive health care, information and supplies giving priority to poor beneficiaries as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization must be the primary
responsibility of the national government consistent with its obligation to respect, protect and promote the right to
health and the right to life;

xxxx

(i) Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs), women's and people's organizations, civil society,
faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and
population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the
marginalized;

xxxx

(l) There shall be no demographic or population targets and the mitigation, promotion and/or stabilization of the
population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health ;

xxxx

(n) The resources of the country must be made to serve the entire population, espec ially the poor, and allocations
thereof must be adequate and effective: Provided, That the life of the unborn is protected;

(o) Development is a multi-faceted process that calls for the harmonization and integration of policies, plans,
programs and projects that seek to uplift the quality of life of the people, more particularly the poor, the needy and the
marginalized;

260 SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxxx

(r) Reproductive health care program refers to the systematic and integrated provision of reproductive health care to
all citizens prioritizing women, the poor, marginalized and those invulnerable or crisis situations.

xxxx

(aa) Sustainable human development refers to bringing people, particularly the poor and vulnerable, to the center of
development process, the central purpose of which is the creation of an enabling environment in which all can enjoy
long, healthy and productive lives, done in the manner that promotes their rights and protects the life opportunities of
future generation s and the natural ecosystem on which all life depends.

261 Biraogo v. Th e Philippine Truth Commission, supra note 90.

262 Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G. R. No. 204988), pp. 16-48; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa,
rollo (G. R. No. 205478), pp. 7-9.

263 Except the practice of law which is under the supervision of the Supreme Court.

264 United States v. Jesus, 3 1 Phil. 218, 230 (1915).

265 Petition , Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. N o. 205478), p. 8.

266With reference to Section 2 , 3(E), 4(L), 9 and I 9(C) of the RH La w; Petition, ALFI, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 28-33;
Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 37-38.

267 358 Phil. 410 (1998) .

268 Pimentel, Jr. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 201 2, 676 SCRA 551, 559.

269 Id . at 559-560.

270 Id. at 561.

271 See Section 6, R.A. No. 10354.

272 See Section 5, R.A . No. 10354.

273 See Section 16, R.A . No. 1354.

274 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270, 306.

275 Id. at 305.

276 Petition, Pro-life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (GR. N o. 205 720), pp. 14-30.

277 Gettel , Political Science, Revised Edition, p. 180.

278 454 Phil. 504 (2003).

 279 Separate Opinion, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phi l. 504 (2003).

280 https://www.cia.gov/ library/ publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html ; last visited March 21, 2014

281 St. Josephs College v. St. Josephs College Workers' Association (Samahan), 489 Phil. 559, 572-573 (2005) ; and Cebu
Institute of Technology v. Opie, G.R. No. L-58870, 18 December 1987, 156 SCRA 629.

6. G.R. No. 167746 - Restituto M. Alcantara v. Rosita A. Alcantara, et al.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 167746 : August 28, 2007]

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, v. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14
February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage 3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the
required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee,
arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. 4 They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982.
Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither
party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave
birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage
void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract 5 and its entry on file.6

Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced
by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner's representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann
Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992. 7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three
children.8Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. 9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5)
days of each month; and cralawlibrary

3. To pay the costs.11

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner's appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.12

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the
presumption. Moreover, the parties' marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.13

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the
evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same
was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy v.
 Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the
substantial rights of the party litigants.14

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the
Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them. 15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where
Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs. 16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license
from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
cannot be given weight because the certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 but
their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in
relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19

Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and cralawlibrary

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested.21

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a
ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that
Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage
license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that
the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has
no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the
petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that
the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto
Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita
Almario on December 8, 1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.26

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official
business.27 The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite. 29

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still
hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. 30 An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.31

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license
issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to
sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and
1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage
license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, 32 petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration
which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an
educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through
a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable
to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith. 34

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through
the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner. ςηαñrοb lεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrà ¿

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding
ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner's testimony as follows'

WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.

COURT

What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.

WITNESS

I don't remember your honor.

COURT

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License? cralaw library

WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don't know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage Contract? cralaw library

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS

Yes your honor.35

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their
civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. 36

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner - - that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel - - will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage
ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. 37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage
license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and
it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.38

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. 39 Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:
1 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, p. 25-32.

2 Penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos; CA rollo, pp. 257-258.

3 Docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1325.

4 Crusade of the Divine Church of Christ.

5 Annex A, Records, p. 5; Annexes B to C, Records, pp. 6-7.

6 Rollo, pp. 33-36.

7 Id. at 185.

8 TSN, 14 October 1999, p. 34.

9 Rollo, p. 39.

10 Id. at 46.

11 Id. at 68-69.

12 Id. at 21.

13 Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

14 Rollo, p. 206.

15 Id. at 209.

16 Records p. 1.

17 Id. at 15-a.

18 (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.

19 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.

20 Now Article 3 of the Family Code.

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and cralawlibrary

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35.

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

21 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 667-668 (2000).

22 G.R. No.103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.

23 G.R. No.132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133.

24 386 Phil. 760, 769 (2000).

25 Article 70 of the Civil Code, now Article 25 Family Code, provides:

The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a register book strictly in the order
in which the same shall be received. He shall enter in said register the names of the applicants, the dates on which the marriage license
 was issued, and such other data as may be necessary.

26 Records, p. 15-a.

27 Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. - x x x

xxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed. (Rule 131, Rules of Court.)

28 Magsucang v. Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224-225 (2003).

29 TSN. 23 November 1999, p. 4.

30 Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, p. 125.

31 Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, p. 8; Moreno v. Bernabe, 316 Phil. 161, 168 (1995).

32 Abacus Securities Corporation v. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, 27 February 2006, 483 SCRA 315, 337.

33 TSN, 1 October 1998, p. 96.

34 Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes, Jr., 312 Phil. 939, 944 (1995).

35 TSN, 1 October 1998, pp. 33-35.

36 Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 662 2003).

37 Goshen v. New Orleans, 18 US 950.

38 People v. Janssen, 54 Phil. 176, 180 (1929).

39 Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 436; Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, 31 July 2006, 497
SCRA 428, 443.

7. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property
between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

The Case

The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11,
2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a
condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.

Antecedents

The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez &
Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10,
1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s
marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana
Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage,
ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to
which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber
of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican
Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY.
LUNA was the managing partner.

On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of
Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for
₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law
office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT
No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100);
GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison
(12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit
was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100);
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered
in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100
share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein
were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz &
Associates.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment became
the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on
September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD
became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in
the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament;
and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint
prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of
the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad
administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3

Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts, 4 disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;

(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";

(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as
appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5

Decision of the CA

Both parties appealed to the CA.6

On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
 I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE
INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR
THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO
LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER
PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF
THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE
144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;

VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-
APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and

IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7

In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF
ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
(HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN
LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, 9 holding and ruling:

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree
obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIEDas follows:

(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna
and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna
while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;

(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the
entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan
Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be
the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.11

On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.13

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement executed by Luna
and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
 B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s approval of the Agreement;

C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the
acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and

D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law books. 14

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the
condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports).

The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage
entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court

We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia

subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in
force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow
the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed
thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated
their marriage.

From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses
has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the
Family Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. 17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under
our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the
declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce
Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if
voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on
July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution, 19 and regards it
as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. 20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among
Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a
ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the
marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.

2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement

was void for lack of court approval

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had
entered into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.

The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code,
the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered
into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil
Code, viz:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

 (3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains.
The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has
been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

xxxx

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All
the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or
the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and
other third persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning
the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)

But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating
the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?

The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an incident ofthe action for divorce
instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds
raised in the action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to
Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.

3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,

was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous, 22 on the
ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

The Court concurs with the CA.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore,
1âwphi1

it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals:25

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties
to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is
without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties.
Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff
was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the
1âwphi1

defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only
after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence. 26

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate
amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from
Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30; 27 and that such aggregate contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded to
almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of
₱1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna
had even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna
could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.

Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual contributions through the following findings
and conclusions, namely:

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code
and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as
husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on
co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied
only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a
co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void
was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of
actual contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of
the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-
ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution
and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R.
No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:

xxxx

As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual
contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the
acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:

"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which was
thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the
amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty.
Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty.
Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not established.
x x x"

SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim
of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through
the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:

"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the
law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the
Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and
his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"

The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna"
was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding
"Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the
purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid
for the law office amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office
space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use
of the law firm that he headed.30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were substantiated by the records and because we
have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge
her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, 31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the
subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own
personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal
partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Rollo, pp. 34-51; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (later
Presiding Justice) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. concurring.

2 Id. at 198-210.

3 Id. at 37-39.

4 Id. at 198-210.

5 Id. at 210.

6 Id. at 211-214.

7 Id. at 217-219.

8 Id. at 283.

9 Supra note 1.

10 Rollo, p. 44.

11 Id. at 50-51.

12 Id. at 52-53.

13 Id. at 54-65.

14 Id. at 17.

15 Article 15, Civil Code, which is a revision of Article 9.1, Spanish Civil Code, states:

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

16 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas(G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 277), the Court declares:

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.

17 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 446.

18 Rollo,p. 37.

19 Article XV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution.

20 Article 1, Family Code.

 21 Id. at 74, 81-82.

22 Id. at 48.

23 Article 83, Civil Code; Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155, 158.

24 The Civil Coderelevantly states:

Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;

xxxx

25 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.

26 Id. at 686-687.

27 Rollo, pp. 23-24.

28 Id. at 25.

29 Id. at 27.

30 Id. at 45-50.

31 Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 593, 602.

8. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition
for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29,
2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for
divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée
in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with
the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the
trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able
to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly
asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file
with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s
position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is
in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the
Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of
marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a
wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to
this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens –
with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor
of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national
law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s
(Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the
res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the
alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34 We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s
legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In
fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;
 (b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do
not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the
foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series
of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 – both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect. 1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by
itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located;38that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; 39and
that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements
have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a
foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the applicability
of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
 LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

*Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special
Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.

1 Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.

2 Id. at 3-20.

3 Id. at 27.

4 Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.

5 Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.

6 Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:

It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of Annulment of Marriages in
Manila, unless and until final order of execution of such foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.

7 Supra note 1.

8 Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.

9 Rollo, p. 31.

10 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.

11 Id. at 121.

12 Gerbert’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an order dated February 17,
2009; rollo, p. 32.

13 Supra note 2.

14 Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.

15 The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article 52 of the
Family Code.

16 The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code.

17 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.

18 Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with the Family
Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.

19 Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.

20 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

21 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

22 Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.

23 Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.

 24 The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien
spouse to do so.

25 See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

xxxx

Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

26 Parenthetically, we add that an alien’s legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her respective
diplomatic and consular officials, which he or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code). The
Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial action for a declaration of authority to remarry.

27 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.

28 Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.

29 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.

30 Rollo, pp. 38-41.

31 The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the Canadian court.
The full text of the court’s judgment was not included.

32 Literally means "a thing adjudged," Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule that a final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits,
on points and matters determined in the former. Supra note 28 at 462.

33 See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110, where the
Court said:

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not
necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is
essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its
efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem,
a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.

34 On the face of the marriage certificate, the word "DIVORCED" was written in big, bold letters; rollo, p. 37.

35 Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114
(1964).

36 Rollo, pp. 47-50.

37 Id. at 51.

38 Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

39 Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

40 Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

41 When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is deemed
adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.

9. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
 The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of the
RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper
venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara
were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara
and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its
active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may
be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of
nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status
and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment
declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese
judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition
by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd
because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party
interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had
material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is
the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of Rule 108
provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition
based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is
lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held
that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing
the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of
impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be
taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized that the
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and
not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x." 27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that
this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the
petition was not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The public respondents, the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General
argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay
and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from
the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly
the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but
most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the
spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family
Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires
the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The
Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule
108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De
Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara
wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any
form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife
can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such
as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the
parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the
public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the
effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may
require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if
it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen
who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the
rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled
on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of
a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the
Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment
is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108
creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not
only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise
by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the
union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither
the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any
citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage.
The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the
purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose,
he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the
"validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage.
A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of
1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign
judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of
a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino,
whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied
to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse
"should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on
the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino
spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under
foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who
is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only
decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy
in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy
nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between
the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines. 1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and
form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.

2 In Pasay City, Metro Manila.

3 See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage between Maria Paz Galela
Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010. Translated by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Office
(see rollo, p. 89).
4 Id.

5 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as amended):

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

xxxx

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

6 Rollo, pp. 79-80.

7 The dispositive portion stated:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and WITHDRAWN from the active civil docket of this Court.
The RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to refund to the petitioner the amount of One Thousand Pesos (₱1,000) to be taken
from the Sheriff’s Trust Fund.

8 Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action.

(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime governing their
property relations, as well as the properties involved.

If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional
order for spousal support, custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration of community or
conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.

(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and certification
must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated
by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular
agent in said country.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General
and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court
proof of such service within the same period.

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.

9 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration).

10 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).

11 FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

xxxx

12 Rollo, p. 56.

13 FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

14 Rollo, p. 68.

15 Enacted 26 November 1930.

16 CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

17 Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil officers and priests or ministers authorized to solemnize marriages
shall send a copy of each marriage contract solemnized by them to the local civil registrar within the time limit specified in the
existing Marriage Law.
 In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the successful petitioner for divorce or
annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local civil registrar of the municipality
where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized.

In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address of each of the contracting parties, their ages,
the place and date of the solemnization of the marriage, the names and addresses of the witnesses, the full name,
address, and relationship of the minor contracting party or parties or the person or persons who gave their consent to
the marriage, and the full name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the marriage.

In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the names of the parties divorced or whose
marriage was annulled, the date of the decree of the court, and such other details as the regulations to be issued may
require.

18 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

19 273 Phil. 1 (1991).

20 Id. at 7. See rollo, pp. 65 and 67.

21 Rollo, p. 47.

22 Id. at 46.

23 Id. at 48.

24 Id.

25 G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.

26 Id. at 641.

27 Id. at 643.

28 See rollo, p. 49.

29 Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:

Contents and form of petition. – x x x

xxxx

(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and certification
must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated
by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular
agent in said country.

xxxx

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.

30 Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.

31 Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.

32 Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of the "Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Comment)" of the Solicitor General
stated:

In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with the requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus, respectfully prayed that Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further
proceedings.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.

33 G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.

34 Id. at 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor General, pp. 8-9. See rollo, pp. 132-133.

35 Rollo, p. 133.

36 G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.

37 Id. at 287.

38 Rollo, p. 133.

39 G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162.

40 384 Phil. 661 (2000).

41 De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at 169.

42 Supra note 30.

43 See rollo, p. 120.

44 Id.

45 See rollo, p. 146.

46 Id.

47 Supra note 33.

48 Supra note 33 at 655.

49 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph
(a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office.

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose
of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order, is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of
the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

50 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, supra note 36 at 282.

51 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.

52 Id., Sec. 6.

53 Id., Sec. 9.

54 Id., Sec. 11-15.

55 Id., Sec. 17-18.

56 Id., Sec. 19 and 22-23.

57 Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005) citing Eugene Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982).

58 Id.

59 Id. at 386.

60 Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x

xxxx

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

61 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 386. "Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations
resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s
Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: ‘rest and quietness.’" (Citations omitted)

62 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 382. "The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage
among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries." (Citations omitted)

63 43 Phil. 43 (1922).
64 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 280; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee, supra.

65 FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

66 Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall
be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h)
acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of name.

Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths;
(d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election,
loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

67 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.

68 FAMILY CODE, Art. 35-67.

69 FAMILY CODE, Art. 74-148.

70 FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.

71 See supra note 69.

72 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law x x
x."

73 FAMILY CODE, Art. 68-73.

74 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. x x
x

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

75 Emphasis supplied.

76 Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

77 See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.

78 RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.

xxxx

79 Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

80 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.

81 Supra note 25.

82 Supra note 25.

83 See supra note 68.

84 FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement
between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common
children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the
parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the
other parent.
 Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.

85 FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall
also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.— (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution
of Properties.

xxxx

86 FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. — (1) Within one month after receipt of the
court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file
their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report The court
shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty
of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

87 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.

88 509 Phil. 108 (2005).

89 Id. at 114.

90 223 Phil. 357 (1985).

91 Id. at 363.

92 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c).

93 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — x x x

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal
action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated
criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot
be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based
on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

10. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]

REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.

Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code of
Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.1

Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly
solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation2 and issued them to the
contracting parties.3 He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage.4 These "package marriages" are allegedly common
in Bacolod City.5

Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All affidavits were notarized on the
day of the contracting parties’ marriages.6 The affidavits contained the following jurat:

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City, Philippines.

(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge7

For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated
February 26, 1990.8 Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only
if connected with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official
functions and duties as solemnizing officer.9 Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage he solemnized.

Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to present their competent pieces of
evidence of identity as required by law.

These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x simple and elementary to ignore."10

Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.11 He argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a
pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making false statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against
Judge Rojo to delay Frialyn’s case.12

Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was connected with
his official functions and duties as a judge.13 The Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary14 does
not prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize. 15 Thus, Judge Rojo did not
violate Circular No. 1-90.

Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was not
required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized. 16

Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their competent pieces of evidence of identity.
Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed the
affidavit.17 The parties’ identities are "unquestionable."18

Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
they solemnized.19 He pleaded "not to make him [complainant Tupal’s] doormat, punching bag and chopping block"20 since other judges
also notarized affidavits of cohabitation.

In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. The Office of
the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be fined ₱9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating the same offense will be
dealt with more severely.

The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with municipal trial court judges’
official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, 21 a judge’s duty is
to personally examine the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing the marriage ceremony. 22 Nothing in the
Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.

Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of cohabitation, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended a fine of
₱1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized.23

The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo violated
Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in their ex officio
capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties.
Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990 provides:

Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the function of notaries public ex
officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the
Revised Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope of this power:

MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents connected only with the exercise of their
official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private
documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges. The
1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict
with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).

They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They
must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio:

However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries public,
rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries
public ex officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the
account of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982,
114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit.24

Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties
as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his
court’s territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.

Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting parties and examine the requirements they
submitted.25 The parties must have complied with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a
marriage license.26

A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications to
contract marriage.27 Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented. 28

If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry, they are
exempt from the marriage license requirement.29 Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the
parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each
other.31 The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and found no
legal impediment to the marriage.32 Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary also provides:

Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal ratification of cohabitation. — In the case of
a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer shall (a) personally interview the contracting parties to
determine their qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to the fact of having lived
together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of any legal impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a
sworn statement showing compliance with (a) and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the
contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage.

As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived
together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’
affidavit of cohabitation.

Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing
officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements before performing the
marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be
expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation.

Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation
are documents not connected with their official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he solemnized their marriages]."33 He
notarized documents not connected with his official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-
90.

Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not expressly prohibit
judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.

To accept Judge Rojo’s argument will render the solemnizing officer’s duties to examine the affidavit of cohabitation and to issue a sworn
statement that the requirements have been complied with redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot objectively examine a document he
himself notarized. Article 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary
assume that "the person authorized by law to administer oaths" who notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer"
who performs the marriage ceremony are two different persons.

Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from notarizing "private documents x x x [bearing]
no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges."34 Since a marriage license is a public document, its "counterpart," the
affidavit of cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he notarizes a public document.
He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.

An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a private document into a public document,
"[rendering the document] admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity." 35 The affidavit of cohabitation, even if it serves a
"public purpose," remains a private document until notarized.

Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents. As discussed, affidavits of
cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official duty to solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.

Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is to "eliminate competition between judges and private lawyers in transacting legal
conveyancing business."36 He cited Borre v. Judge Moya37 where this court found City Judge Arcilla guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90
for notarizing a deed of sale. Judge Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he did "not compete with private
law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business."38 Thus, he did not violate Circular No. 1-90.

In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the context in which this court stated that "[judges] should not compete with
private [lawyers] or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business."39

At any rate, Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal conveyancing business." So long as a judge
notarizes a document not connected with his official functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-90.

Thus, in Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,40 this court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a certificate of candidacy. In Ellert v. Judge
Galapon, Jr.,41 this court fined Judge Galapon for notarizing the verification page of an answer filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board. The documents involved in these cases were not used to transact "legal conveyancing business."
Nevertheless, this court found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90.

Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were not connected with his official function and duty to solemnize
marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.

Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in Bacolod City.
Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in the municipality or circuit of the judge’s court constitutes violation of
Circular No. 1-90.42

That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they solemnized does not make the practice legal.
Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the contrary. 43

All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.

Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must
require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity:

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. – x x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.

A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the instrument or
document to be notarized. If the notary public does not personally know the signatory, he must require the signatory to present a
competent evidence of identity.

In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their affidavits
before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of
evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the affidavits of cohabitation. They personally appeared before him to subscribe
to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also interviewed them on their qualifications to contract marriage. Thus, the parties to the affidavit
of cohabitation need not present their competent pieces of evidence of identity. 44
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties personally known to him. The parties
are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be
acquainted with them.45 Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the notary public.

For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos v. Judge How 46where this court held that
"[g]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations x x x" 47were defenses against gross ignorance of the law
charges. His good faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not hold him administratively liable.

However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres] only within the parameters of tolerable
judgment x x x."48 Good faith "does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be
beyond possible margins of error."49

Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction before
notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires notaries public to personally know the signatory to the document they
will notarize or require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. These are basic legal principles and procedure Judge
Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements nine times is not good faith.

Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity,50 "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer."51 If the law involved is basic, ignorance constitutes "lack of
integrity."52 Violating basic legal principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.

This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it being a serious charge: 53

a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations;54

b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; 55 or

c. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. 56

This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for gross ignorance of the law. However,
Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges’ practice of notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City and Talisay City.
Thus, this court finds suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months sufficient sanction.

Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the requirements of the law. They should act with caution with respect to affidavits
1âwphi1

of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical requirements as in this case will be dealt with strictly.

WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS. His suspension is effective upon
service on him of a copy of this resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in Bacolod City and Talisay City.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* AssociateJustice Lucas P. Bersamin was designated as Acting Member of the Third Division, vice Associate Justice Roberto
A. Abad, per Special Order No. 1640 dated February 19, 2014.

1 Rollo, pp. 3-20, letter of complaint with complaint-affidavit notarized on May 24, 2012.

2 FAMILY CODE, Art. 34 states:

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer
shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

3 Rollo, p. 6.
4 Id.

5 Id. at 9.

6 Id. at 21-40, complaint-affidavit, Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I", and "J".

7 Id.

8POWER OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT JUDGES AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT JUDGES TO ACT
AS NOTARIES PUBLIC EX OFFICIO

9 Rollo, p. 6.

10 Id. at 7.

11 This comment was dated July 23, 2012.

12 Rollo, p. 52.

13 Id. at 79, 84, and 92-93.

14 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007.

15 Rollo, pp. 92-93.

16 Id. at 62.

17 Id. at 94-95.

18 Id. at 95.

19 Id. at 87.

20 Id. at 90.

21 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007.

22 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007, Sec. 5.

23Rollo, p. 456, Office of the Court Administrator’s report, citing Simon v. Judge Aragon, 491 Phil. 9, 14-15 (2005) [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

24 Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.

25 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007, Sec. 4.

26 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007, Sec. 4.

27 FAMILY CODE, Art. 9.

28 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007, Sec. 4.

29 FAMILY CODE, Art. 34.

30 FAMILY CODE, Art. 34.

31 FAMILY CODE, Art. 34; ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007, Sec. 5.

32 FAMILY CODE, Art. 34; ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007, Sec. 5.

33 Rollo, p. 94.

34 Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.

35Tigno v. Sps. Aquino, 486 Phil. 254, 267 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]; Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr., 449
Phil. 1, 6 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, First Division], citing Coronado v. Atty. Felongo, 398 Phil. 496, 502 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First
Division].

36 Rollo, p. 92.

37 188 Phil. 362 (1980) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].

38 Id. at 369.

39 Id.

40 449 Phil. 1 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].

41 391 Phil. 456 (2000) [Per J. Buena, Second Division].

42 Fuentes v. Judge Buno, 582 Phil. 20, 27-28 (2008) [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division]; Simon v. Judge Aragon, 491
Phil. 9, 13-14 (2005) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr., 449 Phil. 1, 5 (2003) [Per J.
Vitug, First Division]; Gravela v. Judge Villanueva, 444 Phil. 109, 115 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Barbarona
v. Judge Canda, 409 Phil. 1, 12-13 (2001) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr., 391 Phil. 456, 464
 (2000) [Per J. Buena, Second Division]; Doughlas v. Judge Lopez, Jr., 382 Phil. 8, 14 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division];
Guillen v. Judge Nicolas, 360 Phil. 1, 13 (1998) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., First Division].

43 CIVIL CODE, Art. 7.

44 Rollo, pp. 94-95.

45 Lustestica v. Atty. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258, August 24, 2010, 628 SCRA 613, 623-624 [Per Curiam, En Banc].

46 542 Phil. 22 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].

47 Id. at 36.

48 Id.

49 Id.

50 A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, Canon 2.

51 A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, Canon 2, sec. 1.

52Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 348, 378 [Per
Curiam, En Banc].

53 RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, sec. 8 (9).

54 RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, sec. 11 (A) (1).

55 RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, sec. 11 (A) (2).

56 RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, sec. 11 (A) (3).

11. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and
Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by
Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, 3 also dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that
his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in
1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi
Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa
cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship.
Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered
that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house.
When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter
feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose
was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an
action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since
Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively
liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without
emolument.7

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the
[C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs
against [Jose].9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986
was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have
already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was
made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the
fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more
or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem
to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]

[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he
wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered
the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person
to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was
because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he
would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the
marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the
name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on
November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her
brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article 87 11 of the New Civil Code which
requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the
fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could
have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged
sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x. 12

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court
of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article
8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the
ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the
following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the
annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on
the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years
after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was
allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of
marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 16 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing
an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period
required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements
contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity
of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect
to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that either
one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was
established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the
1avvphi1

requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant
in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and
Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated
7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage
between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City. 19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog, 20 and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that
they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry
each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment
to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character,
shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of
a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license. 21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution 22 dated 10 May 2007,
denying Felisa’s motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this
Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for
lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review,
docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to
consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal. 25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by
reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with
Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative
case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate
Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle
the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose
and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this
Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and
Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu
of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the
marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to
whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement
in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage
contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their
witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following
documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2)
Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa
had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as
his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A
survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code,
but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by
the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these
marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages,
and (6) mixed marriages.34

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such
persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status. 36

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other." 37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus:
whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly 38 but reasonably construed.39 They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age
of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The
exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of
cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material
fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character.
It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts 42 in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment
to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before
the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor,
Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. 44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own
testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house. 45

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of
fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. 46Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not
subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when
the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does
not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court
of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a
marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of
marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be
denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and
Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so
as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar.
Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not
salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior
license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow
an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at
least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not
to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to
the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by
the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.
Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he
perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity
finds no room for application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage
is without prejudice to their criminal liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack
of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage
to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set
in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. 56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage
license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not
prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76
means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal
liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA* PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.**

Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

*Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno designating Associate Justice Dante
O. Tinga to replace Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave under the Court’s Wellness Program
and assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez as Acting Chairperson.

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per
**
Raffle dated 12 September 2007.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Santiago Javier Ranada,
concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 65-70; rollo, (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.

2 Records, p. 170.

3 Id.

4 Id. at 1-8.

5 The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration of the parties’ marriage, Jose was 27 years old, while Felisa
was 37.

6 The Administrative complaint before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman was docketed
as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp. 252-258.

7 Id. at 257.

8 Id. at 313-323.

9 Id. at 323.

10 Id. at 321-322.

11 ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the periods as follows:
 (1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her
consent, within four years after attaining the age of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the parent or
guardian or person having legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age of twenty or eighteen
years;

(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or
by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;

(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's
insanity; or by any relative or guardian of the party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;

(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four years after the discovery of the fraud;

(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased;

(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight years after the marriage.

12 Records, p. 322.

13 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.

14 ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty
imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband;

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.

16 ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

17 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;

(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;

(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;

(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;

(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;

(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in
Article 92; and

(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-consuls in special cases provided in
Articles 74 and 75.

18 ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;

(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect
and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him by his
church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's
church or religious sect;

(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article 31;

(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military
operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; or

(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.

19 CA rollo, p. 279.

20 384 Phil. 661 (2000).

21 CA rollo, pp. 278-279.

22 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.

23 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.

24 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.

25 Erroneously cited as Niño v. Bayadog; rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 18.

26 377 Phil. 919 (1999).

27 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.

28 ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the
Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration
of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.

29 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.

30 People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082.

31 The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the following essential requisites: (1) legal capacity of the
contracting parties; and (2) their mutual consent.

32 Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.

33 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article
75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides.

34 Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984 Eleventh Ed.), pp. 302-310.

35 In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court articulated the spirit behind Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:

"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one
of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may
discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement."

36 The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years desire to
marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons from legalizing their
status," Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

37 Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as an "Affidavit on (sic) Marriage Between Man and Woman
Who Haved (sic) Lived Together as Husband and Wife for at Least Five Years."

38 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001).

39 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137 (1999).

40 Id.

41 Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.

42 The first part of Article 76 states, "No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other x x x."

43 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.

44 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-4143), 15 April 1999.

45 Id. at 159.

46 First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 166616, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.

47 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605.
 48 Id.

49 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999).

50 Id.

51 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or fact leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property
during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of
unlawful aggression.

52 People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at 4083.

53 Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).

54 Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96,
108 (2000).

55 Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote
that "If the parties falsify their affidavit in order to have an instant marriage, although the truth is that they have not been
cohabiting for five years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage license, and they will also be criminally liable."
Article 76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code, which reads:

ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

56 Niñal v. Bayadog, supra note 20 at 134.

57 Id. at 130-131.

58 Id.

14. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007

LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M.
ARTICULO, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order,1 dated 3 May 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order,2 dated 11
October 2005, and reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with
the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged,
inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3 They begot seven children, herein respondents,
namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26 August 2004,
Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed
away.7

In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the requisite marriage license.
They argued that Article 348 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years
without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have
lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was
dissolved only upon the latter’s death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to
petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their
cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance
impossible.

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and
publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco
Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the marriage
ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense,
she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the
following manner:

The Complaint should be dismissed.

1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section
2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The
language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear
and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The
reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of
the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and void. 12 (Emphasis supplied.)

The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint
filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. 13

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC
rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the
ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog, 15 which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a
deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife,
applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living.16 Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs
may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:

The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First
Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The Order subject
of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by
approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only
parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon
the death of the parties.

It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the
Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of
the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to
their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the said parents.
Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to
declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a vested right over whatever property left by the
parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights
granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.

If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and
feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of
the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death of
the parent.

For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when
both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a
petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the
ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable. 17

Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case. 18

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said
motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein.19

Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law as embodied
in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.

At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.

We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for
writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised
against taking a direct recourse to this Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of
last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of
hierarchy of courts.21However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction. 22 Moreover,
notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will
proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.

Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal which is
applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death.

We grant the Petition.

In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned
marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to
determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.23 What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during
the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004. 1âwphi1

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. 24

Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus,
contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Niñal, because
they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely
falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)
(Emphasis supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is
required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation
and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3,
paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief
that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not
mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right,
for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in
a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is
ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Penned by Judge Rolando R. Velasco; rollo, pp. 12-13.

2 Penned by Judge Virgilio M. Alameda, id. at 15-20.

3 Id. at 4.

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 5.

7 Id.

8 ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath
that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediments to the marriage.

9 Rollo, pp. 15-20.

10 Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages And Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

11 Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife.

12 Rollo, p. 17.

13 Id. at 20.

14 Id. at 12-13.

15 384 Phil. 661, 672-675 (2000).

16 Rollo, p. 13.

17 Id. at 12-13.

18 Id.

19 Id. at 14.

20 Pearson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 356 Phil. 341, 355 (1998).

21 Id.
 22 Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670, 700 (1997); Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 400
Phil. 307, 326-327 (2000), citing Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona, 352 Phil. 461, 480 (1998);

23 Niñal v. Bayadog, supra note 15 at 667, citing Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, 353 Phil. 775 (1998).

24 Modequillo v. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, 31 May 1990, 185 SCRA 766, 772. It must be noted that Article 257 of the Family
Code provides that, "This Code shall take effect one year after the completion of its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, as certified by the Executive Secretary, Office of the President." The Code was published on 4 August 1987 in the
Manila Chronicle, and took effect one year after its publication, or on 3 August 1988, considering that 1988 is a leap year; See
Sempio-Diy, "Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines," 1995 Ed., p. 393, citing Memorandum Circular No. 85 of the
Office of the President dated 7 November 1988.

25 Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders.

IMBONG VS. OCHOA KEY TAKE-AWAY: The Reproductive Health Law is a consolidation and
enhancement of existing reproductive laws. It seeks to enhance the population control program of the
government in order to promote public welfare. However, when coercive measures are found within the
law, provisions must be removed or altered in order to ensure that it does not defy the Constitution by
infringing on the rights of the people. PONENTE: MENDOZA, J. CONSOLIDATION OF 14 CASES
Petition: to declare provisions of Republic Act No. 10354 as unconstitutional •

Factual Antecedents
December 21, 2012: Congress enacted RA No. 10354 also known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH LAW)
The president’s imprimatur and support for the said law lead to a range of petitions against the law
leading to iuris controversy in court. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were placed by numerous
parties. All in all, 14 petitions and 2 petitionsin-intervention were filed.
March 15, 2013: the RH-IRR or enforcement of the law took place
March 19, 2013: After deliberating the issues and arguments raised, the court issued Status Quo Ante
Order (SQAO) which lead to a 120 day halt on the implementation of the legislation
Due to further arguments and debates from opposing parties, the SQAO was extended until further
orders of the court last July 16, 2013 • Statute Involved: Republic Act 10354, “The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012”
Position of Petitioner: o Petitioners claim that the provisions of RA 10354 are unconstitutional as they
violate the rights to life, to health, to freedom of expression and speech, to the privacy of families, to
academic freedom, to due process of law, to equal protection, and against involuntary servitude. They
also intrude on the autonomy of local governments and the ARMM, and violate natural law.
Furthermore, they claim that Congress’ delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which should
be included in the EDL is invalid.
Position of Respondent
There is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination
Some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law
The petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.
• ISSUES
Procedural
o Whether or not the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
o Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy
o Whether the Court may apply facial challenge
o Whether or not the petitions are praying for declaratory relief
o Whether the petitions violate the One Subject/One Title Rule

Substantive
o Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates
Right to Life Right to Health Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech The Family
Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom Due Process Equal Protection Involuntary
Servitude Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM Natural Law
o Whether or not Congress’ delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which should be
included in the EDL is valid •

HELD Procedural o Whether or not the court may exercise its power of judicial review -
YES While the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law,
it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
The following requisites for judicial review were met:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case

o Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy – YES

Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute. Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.

o Whether the Court may apply facial challenge – YES

The scope of application of facial challenges extends to the regulation of free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. Consequently, considering that the
foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation,
the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.
o Whether or not Locus Standi applies – YES
Regardless of whether the petitioners are directly injured of affected by the RH Law or not, the Court
leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest." The RH Law falls under transcendental importance as it
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion
and expression and other constitutional rights.
o Whether or not the petitions are praying for declaratory relief - YES
Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs, not declaratory reliefs, and so the Court would
just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction.
Where the case has farreaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
o Whether the petitions violate the One Subject/One Title Rule – NO
In a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law, both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
Thus, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress had the intention to deceive the public
regarding the contents of the said law.

Substantive
o Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates Right to Life – NO

Constitution intended that 1.) conception to refer to the time of fertilization and 2.) the protection of the
unborn upon said fertilization
Not all contraceptives are to be banned (only those that kill a fertilized ovum)
Contraceptives that prevent union of sperm and egg are thus permissible
It is the intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to prevent the enacting of a law that legalizes
abortion.
RH law prohibits abortion
RH law recognizes that abortion is a crime
RH law prohibits abortifacients
Right to Health - NO
With the provisions of RA 4729 still in place, the status quo on the sale of contraceptives is maintained
and the Court believes that there are adequate measures that ensure that the public has access to
contraceptives that have been determined safe following testing, evaluation, and approval by the FDA

Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech – NO and YES

RH law does not violate guarantee of religious freedom via the statesponsored procurement of
contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of the people including the petitioners. This is
because in doing so, the state would be adhering to one religions, making a de facto state religion
which is contrary to religious freedom.
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable
There limits to the exercise of religious freedom (compelling state interest test)
Benevolent neutrality
RH law does not violate the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition (sec.7, 23, 24)
However, RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health
practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other
institutions despite their conscientious objections
The Family - YES
Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which needs only the consent of the spouse undergoing the
provision in order to undergo reproductive procedures intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and
goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Not only that,
but the exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution, which declares that the rearing of children by parents is a natural right.
Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom – UNDECIDED
The court decided that making a ruling on Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education, is premature. The
Department of Education has not yet created a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education, thus the constitutionality of the specifics in such a curriculum still cannot be determined.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.
Due Process - NO
The definitions of several terms pinpointed by the petitioners in the RH Law are not vague.
Private health care institution = private health care service provider.
“service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include giving information and performing medical
procedures, so hospitals run by religious groups can be exempted.
“incorrect information” connotes a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead the public.

Equal Protection - NO
It is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize
the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor
to provide medical care to paupers.
Involuntary Servitude - NO
The State has the power to regulate the practice of medicine in order to ensure the welfare of the public.
Not only that, but Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to
give pro bono service; they do not incur penalties if they refuse. Conscientious objects are exempt if
their religious beliefs do not allow them to provide the said services.
Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM – NO
The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Under paragraph (c) of
Section 17, unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing
agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual General Appropriations Act, even if the program involves the delivery of
basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGUs. Not only that, but LGUs are merely encouraged and
not compelled to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not mandatory. Lastly, Article III,
Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 deor the Organic Act of the ARMM merely outlines the powers that
may be exercised by the regional government and does not indicate the State’s abdication to create laws
in the name of public welfare.
Natural Law – disregarded
Natural law, according to the Court, is not recognized as proper legal basis for making decisions o
Whether or not Congress’ delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which should be included
in the EDL is valid- YES
Under RA 3720, the FDA, being the primary and sole premiere and only agency that ensures the safety
of food and medicines available to the public, has the power and competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods
Final Ruling o Petitions partially granted. The RA 10354 is declared constitutional, and Status Quo
Ante Order lifted with respect to provisions of RA 10354 that have been declared as constitutional.
However, the following provisions and their corresponding provisions in the RH-IRR have been
declared unconstitutional:
Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group
to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;
Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious
beliefs.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in
an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;
Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall
do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;
Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation;
Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

Dissenting Opinion Leonen, J. I. Preliminary Considerations • None of the petitions properly present an
“actual case or controversy” which deserves the exercise of judicial review. The consolidated petitions
do not provide the proper venue to decide on fundamental issues. The law in question is needed social
legislation.
• An actual case or controversy is “one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based
on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.”
• No locus standi. Petitioners, by no stretch of the imagination, cannot be representative of the interests
of “the entire Filipino nation.” Not all Filipinos are Roman Catholics. Not all Filipinos are from the
Visayas. Certainly not all Filipinos have a common interest that will lead to a common point of view on
the constitutionality of the various provisions of the RH law. II. Substantive Discussions
• The court cannot make a declaration on the beginning of life. Any declaration on this issue will be
fraught with contradictions. Even the Constitutional Commissioners were not in full agreement; hence,
the use of the word “conception” rather than “fertilized ovum” in Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution. There were glaring factual inaccuracies peddled during their discussion.
• The Constitutional Commission deliberations show that it is not true that the issue of when life begins
is already a settled matter. There are several other opinions on this issue. The Constitutional
Commissioners adopted the term “conception” rather than “fertilized ovum.” • Insisting that we can
impose, modify or alter rules of the Food and Drug Administration is usurpation of the executive power
of control over administrative agencies. It is a violation of the principle of separation of powers, which
recognizes that “[e]ach department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.” The system of checks and balances only allows us
to declare, in the exercise of our judicial powers, the Food and Drugs Administration’s acts as violative
of the law or as committed with grave abuse of discretion. Such power is further limited by the
requirement of actual case or controversy.
• The petitions have failed to present clear cases when the provisions for conscientious objection would
truly amount to a violation of religion. They have not distinguished the relationship of conscience and
specific religious dogma. They have not established religious canon that conflict with the general
provision of Sections 7, 17 and 23 of the law. The comments in intervention in fact raise serious
questions regarding what could be acceptable Catholic doctrine on some issues of contraception and
sex as only for procreation.

Separate Concurring Opinion Carpio, J. I.

Preliminary Considerations The court is not competent to declare when human life begins. The issue
with regards to this must be settled within the scientific and medical community.
II. Substantive Discussions RA No. 10354 protects the ovum upon its fertilization (without actually
saying that life begins here). The issue then, of whether life begins during fertilization or when the
ovum plants itself on the uterus wall, is covered as this protects at both stages. Although the law does
not provide a definition of conception, it has provisions that embody the policy of the state to protect
the travel of the fertilized ovum to the uterus wall. The law states that it will provide means which do
not prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined by the Food and Drug Administration.
Separate Concurring Opinion Brion, J. I.
Preliminary Considerations
• The petitions are ripe for judicial review. The petitions allege actions by the legislature and by the
executive that lie outside the contemplation of the Constitution. A controversy exists appropriate for
this Court's initial consideration of the presence of grave abuse of discretion: and consequent
adjudication if the legislative and executive actions can be so characterized.
II. Substantive Discussions

•While the RH Law generally protects and promotes the unborn’s right to life, its Section 9 and its IRR
fail in their fidelity to the Constitution and to the very terms of the RH Law itself. It fails to adopt the
principle of double effect under Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
• The Court should formulate guidelines on what the government can actually procure and distribute
under the RH law, consistent with its authority under this law and Section 12, Article II to achieve the
full protection the Constitution envisions.
• The attack on Section 14’s constitutionality is premature because that the lack of an implementing
curriculum by the Department of Education makes it premature to rule on constitutionality. The court
cannot determine yet how parental rights will be affected since the specifics of what would be taught
under the RH education program do not yet exist.
• The RH Law’s implementation could have political and economic consequences. It could also
produce social consequences by ushering in behaviors and perceptions about sex, marriage, and family
that are vastly different (in a negative way) from the norm.
• Section 23(a) (l) of the RH Law is an unconstitutional subsequent punishment of speech. It has
overreached the permissible coverage of regulation on the speech of doctors and other health
professionals. The existing information dissemination program found in the RH law is sufficient in
providing information about available reproductive health services and programs, and the existing
regulatory framework for their practice already sufficiently protects against such negligence and
malpractice. Furthermore, the said section can create a chilling effect for those in the profession.