GABRIEL L.

DUERO

vs. Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he alleged that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the case since the value of the land is only P5,240, which is
CA, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, the RTC denied the MR.

Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari which the
latter granted.
G.R. No. 131282; January 4, 2002; QUISUMBING, J.:

ISSUES:
FACTS:
1) Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradel entered and occupied
petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San 2) WON the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed RTC after he has successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom
value of P5,240. Petitioner informed respondent that the land was his, and requested
the latter to vacate the land. However, despite repeated demands, private respondent
remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
HELD:
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against private 1) None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic Act 7691
respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. amending BP 129.

Petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial 2) No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and
court's basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.
Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership and possession of
Duero. Herein private respondent Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he was
declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was
merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a
Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was
judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to peacefully declared in default.
vacate and turn over the lot.

He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was denied. He filed
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his
been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for
that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion
landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any was again denied.
adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.

Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case
Private respondent then filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in
reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. The RTC again denied the default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied
Petition. likewise his two motions for reconsideration
 Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that expired
at the end of each month but were impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere
The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be acquiescence or tolerance; they stopped paying rent; thereupon, petitioner sent them a
waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their written demand to vacate; the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him
express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action to file the ejectment case against them.4
at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in Private defedants denied non-payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be
saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority
right to purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the purchase
of the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a passive stage, they
Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to decided to continue payment of rentals and tendered payment to petitioner’s counsel and
thereafter initiated a petition for consignation of the rentals in a civil case.
dismiss an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MeTC rendered
judgment several defendants, ordering them to vacate the premises. As to the the rest
the MeTC issued a separate judgment on the same day sustaining their rights under the
Land Reform Law, declaring petitioner’s cause of action as not duly warranted by the
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: facts and circumstances of the case and dismissing the case without prejudice.
Petitioner appealed to the RTC. The RTC sustained the decision of the MeTC.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition on
Thus, the ruling of the CA is affirmed. The decision of the RTC and its Order that private
two grounds: (a) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioner’s
respondent turn over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, counsel and not by petitioner himself, (b) the only annex to the petition is a certified copy
are annulled and set aside. of the questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the
record as would support the allegations of the petition are not annexed

ISSUE:
ANTONIO T. DONATO, petitioner, Whether or not the jugdement rendered by the lower and the appelate courts were
vs. within valid jurisdiction.
COURT OF APPEALS
Held: No.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Error of Judgment; Distinguished In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz32 and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations
from Error of Jurisdiction; In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is Commission33 that subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for
proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance which calls for the relaxation of the
jurisdiction.- rules of procedure.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of In dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion expense of a just resolution of the case.
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for
extraordinary writ of certiorari. review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of
the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court
Facts: with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper
Before us is a "petition for review on certiorari" filed on July 17, 1997 which should be a remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It assails the Resolutions1 said Rules.
dated March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 issued by the CA. In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is
Petitioner Donato is the registered owner of a real property. The petitioner filed a necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An
complaint before the MeTC for forcible entry and unlawful detainer against 43 named error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
defendants and "all unknown occupants" of the subject property.3 which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is
one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS.
certiorari. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners’ certificate of title was
Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS.
ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the
petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Sps. Gonzaga then offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from Lucky
The court refrains from ruling on the foregoing the issues that involvess factual Homes that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed
issues which inevitably require the weighing of evidence. These are matters that are with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However,
beyond the province of this Court in a special civil action for certiorari. These issues are private respondent refused. This prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an
best addressed to the CA in the petition for review filed before it. As an appellate court, it action for reformation of contract and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
is empowered to require parties to submit additional documents, as it may find necessary, Branch 36.
or to receive evidence, to promote the ends of justice, pursuant to the last paragraph of
Section 9, B.P. Blg. 129, to wit;
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that when Lot No. 19 was
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the foreclosed and sold at public auction, the reformation, or the swapping of Lot 18 and Lot
power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. 19, was no longer feasible considering that Sps. Gonzaga were no longer the owners of
Lot 19. Thus, Lucky Homes would be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Furthermore, the RTC ruled:

"The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the defendant. It is
SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA evident that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant is Lot 19 covered by TCT No.
28254 which parcel of land has been properly indicated in the instruments and not Lot
vs. 18 as claimed by the plaintiff. The contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect
the true intention of the parties, besides the plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on
CA, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, and LUCKY HOMES, INC.
mutual mistake, hence the same need no longer be reformed.”

A writ of execution was issued. The petitioners filed a motion to recall said writ on the
G.R. No. 144025; December 27, 2002; CORONA, J.: ground that the RTC lack jurisdiction as pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), it was vested in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. Consequently, Sps. Gonzaga filed a new complaint with the HLURB,
and also a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA, on the ground of lack of
FACTS: jurisdiction.
Sometime in 1970, Sps. Gonzaga purchased a parcel of land from private respondent
Lucky Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing an area of 240 square meters. Said
lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under a TCT and was mortgaged to the The CA dismissed the petition, relying on the doctrine of estoppel laid down in Tijam v.
Social Security System (SSS) as security for their housing loan. Sibonghanoy.

Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. ISSUE:
18, as Lucky Homes Inc mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing
its error, private respondent informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to WON the Sps Gonzaga are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the the RTC to try the case
construction of their house.

HELD:
Yes. The SC held that the doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in numerous Petitioner Escobal is a graduate of the PMA, a member of the AFP and the Philippine
cases, is still controlling. In explaining the concept of jurisdiction by estoppel, the Court Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On
quoted its decision in said case, to wit: March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug
trafficking at a café bar and restaurant in Naga City when he somehow got involved with
"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure a shooting incident that resulted to the death of Rodney Nueca.
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or Escobal was preventively suspended from the service. When arraigned, he pleaded not
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such guilty. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that the court
a practice can not be tolerated–– obviously for reasons of public policy." martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and
officers. RTC denied the motion.
Furthermore, the Court said that it was petitioners themselves who invoked the
jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against
private respondents. It must be noted that in the proceedings before the trial court,
Trial proceeded. The prosecution rested its case and petitioner presented his evidence.
petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once did
On July 20, 1994, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the
petitioners ever raise the issue of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire proceedings
Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he argued that since he committed the crime in the
which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and
performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of
The RTC dismissed the motion but ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to
jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them.
determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation
Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the court’s jurisdiction over the
to his office as a member of the PNP.
case they themselves filed.

On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court
added that nonetheless, upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue had become
moot and academic since the amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the
Escobal vs Garchitorena (Remedial Law) offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC. The petitioner did not have a
salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof.
ARNEL ESCOBAL

vs.
The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, xxx, Hon. to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion and R.A. No. 7975, and to include therein an
David C. Naval, RTC Judge allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the
performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.

(jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan vis-à-vis of the RTC)

The petitioner filed a MR of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and
those of his witnesses, the offense charged was committed by him in relation to his
G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004; CALLEJO, SR., J. official functions. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30,
1995, could not be applied retroactively.

FACTS:
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege
that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his
duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to
thereafter transmit the same to the Sandiganbayan. his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper
Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with
salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal.
The Sandiganbayan returned the records of the case to the RTC, contending that the
Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to
latter has jurisdiction over the case.
Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7691.

ISSUE:

Whether the case falls in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of the RTC

HELD: The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no
legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law, which
The case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. may be applied retroactively.

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan
had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
Agan, Jr. vs Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of G.R. Number: G.R. No. 155001
the Revised Penal Code;
Date: May 5, 2003
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
Ponente: Puno, J.
their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is Topic: A self-reliant and independent economic order
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of
P6,000.00 …. Rule of Law:

Sec. 19, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution

For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes “The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively led
committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts by Filipinos.”
showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of
official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the RA 6957 “AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE FINANCING, CONSTRUCTION,
Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY THE
because that would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC PRIVATE SECTOR, AND FOR THE OTHER PURPOSES”
against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation
Also known as the Build-Operate-Transfer law. This scheme allows the private sector to
between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over
bid for the opportunity to build and finance government infrastructure projects. The
the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the
chosen company will also operate the project and take its share in the profits. After the
Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in
contract has expired and the company has already recovered its investment along with
relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the
its profit, the operation is turned over to the government.
Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was
already in effect. RA 337 “General Banking Act”

A commercial bank cannot invest in any single enterprise in an amount more than 15%
of its net worth.
Doctrine: that was presented for bidding. The significance of the difference between the two
documents will be discussed in the latter parts of this digest.], which is the final version
The terms of the final concession agreement must not be substantially different draft of the contract awarding PIATCO the right to build and operate the NAIA Terminal 3.
concession agreement, which was given to all bidders at the start of the public bidding
for BOT projects.[ Alterations to an awarded contract must not be substantial, such as to oImportant: This amended version designates PIATCO as the exclusive concessionaire
render such executed contract to be an entirely different contract that was bidded upon. of NAIA.[ This means that the contracts of all the other concessionaires’ would not be
If the winning company will be allowed to substantially alter a contract for a project that renewed. Concessionaires render services such as in-flight catering, passenger
was awarded to them, other bidders would be deprived of the opportunity to bid on the handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling
same terms.] Substantial difference between the draft and the final concession and warehousing, and other services.]
agreement can lead to its nullification.
Petitioners are service providers and their workers, claiming that they stand to lose
o“Any government action which permits any substantial variance between the conditions their employment upon the implementation of the agreement.
under which the bids are invited and the contract executed after the award thereof is a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which warrants
proper judicial action.”
WON PIATCO is a qualified bidder - NO

oUnder the BOT scheme, a qualified bidder must put up the required minimum equity or
Facts: initial investment worth 30% [ The remaining 70% can be acquired through loans.](in
this case P2.7 billion) of the total project cost(projected to be at P9.1 billion); PIATCO is
August 1989 – Department of Transportation and Communications hired Aeroport de only capable of investing P558 million.
Paris (ADP) to conduct a study of NAIA and determine whether it can cope with the
traffic development up to the year 2010. While Security BankIssues and Holding:

oPart of the ADP’s proposal was a new terminal building has funds worth P3.5 billion, the General Banking Act (RA 337) limits what it can invest
to 15% of its net worth (which is P528 million)
1993 – John Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun, Henry Sy, Sr., George Ty, Lucio Tan, and
Alfonso Yuchgenco formed Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC). They met with Pres. WON the Concession Agreement signed by PIATCO and the Government is valid –
Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the construction and operation of a new NO
international airport terminal.
oThe signed Concession Agreement is substantially different from the draft Concession
October 1994 – AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal for the development of NAIA Agreement that was presented for bidding. Important differences:
Terminal 3 under the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme pursuant to RA 6957.
PIATCO may adjust different fees such as parking fees, terminal fees, etc. whenever it
1996 – the project was placed for bidding, while giving AEDC the benefit of matching deems necessary without need for consent from DOTC or the Manila International
the highest offer. Airport Administration.[ The draft Concession Agreement gave MIAA the right to
regulate fees.]
People’s Air Cargo & Warehousing Co. (Paircargo) won the bid, offering to pay the
government a total of P17.75 billion for 27 years in contrast to AEDC’s offer of P135 Government will assume the liabilities[ Unpaid loans and the penalties that arise from
million for the same period. AEDC failed to match. thereof] of PIATCO in the event of the latter’s default thereof (in other words, the
government will guarantee PIATCO’s loans and would be obligated to pay its
oAEDC complained that Paircargo was not financially capable of executing the project, creditors)[ This was not in the draft Concession Agreement]
but the government upheld Paircargo’s capability.
This defeats the rationale behind BOT scheme, which is to allow the government to
oPaircargo partnered up with Phil. Air and Grounds Services Inc. and Security Bank build infrastructure without having to appropriate funds and assume risk
Corp. to form the Paircargo Consortium.
BOT Law does not allow government guarantee
oThe Paircargo Consortium would later change its name to Philippine Airport Terminals
Co., Inc. (PIATCO) oThe difference between the draft and the signed Concession Agreement is substantial,
such that it is already a different document from what was bidded upon.
November 1998 – the Government and PIATCO signed an Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA)[ This is different from the draft Concession Agreement
 WON PIATCO can be the sole concessionaire of all NAIA Terminals after once NAIA 3 Petitioner Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines which
begins operation - NO pursuant to the Local Govt Code, constitutes the duly elected presidents of
highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, Metro Manila chapter, and metropolitan
oPIATCO cannot force the government to ignore its contractual obligations to other political subdivision chapters. On March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own
service providers Constitution and By-laws. Pursuant to its Constitution, it also adopted and ratified its
own Election Code. Thereafter, it came out with its calendar of activities and guidelines
oWhile other service providers do not automatically have a right to an extension or
for the implementation of its election code. The synchronized elections for
renewal, they should not be unduly prejudiced. The government cannot violate its
highly-urbanized city chapters was also set on Oct. 21, 2002.
contract with them.

oIt is MIAA’s responsibility to ensure that whoever by contract is given the right to
operate NAIA Terminal 3 will do so within the bounds of law and with due regard to the On June 28, 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance providing
rights of third parties. among other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City
Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters 30 days after the barangay
Ruling:
elections.
Award of the contract for construction, operation, and maintenance of NAIA Terminal 3
is null and void for PIATCO’s lack of requisite financial capacity.
Upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to Mayor Atienza for his
Substantial amendments to the Concession Agreement had converted it into an
approval, the Liga sent him a letter requesting that said ordinance be vetoed considering
entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon, and is therefore null and
that it encroached upon or even assumed the functions of the Liga through legislation.
void for being contrary to public policy.
However, Atienza stillapproved and signed the ordinance, and issued an executive
order for its implementation.

Dissenting Opinion:

Vitug, J. (concurred by Quisumbing, J., Azcuna, J.) This prompted the Liga to file a petition for certiorari with the SC. Respondents defend
the validity of the assailed ordinance and executive order and prays for the dismissal of
RTC has jurisdiction, not SC. the petition on the ff grounds: 1) certiorari under Rule 65 is unavailing; 2) two actions
were pending before the RTC Manila questioning the ordinance and executive order; 3)
oThe SC only deals with jurisdictional issues. Since it is not a trier of facts, it must only
petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; 4) act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli; and 5)
deal with cases with undisputed facts. Being that the parties allege conflicting facts,
the city council does not fall within the ambit of “tribunal, board, or officer exercising
the SC cannot exercise original jurisdiction.
judicial or quasi-judicial functions”

ISSUE:
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL
WON the City Council of Manila and Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when
vs. they enacted and approved the ordinance purposely to govern the elections of the
Manila Chapter of the Liga, and which provides a different manner of electing its officers,
THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY despite the fact that the law mandates such elections to be governed by the Liga
COUNCIL OF MANILA Constitution and By-laws

G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004 HELD:

The SC ruled that the action, in its essence, seeks to declare the
unconstitutionality/illegality of the ordinance. Thus it partakes of an action for declaratory
FACTS: relief of which the SC has only appellate and not original jurisdiction.
 November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila Bankers Life
Insurance Corporation, petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a condominium
Rule on Hierarchy of Courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken, as unit at Valle Verde Terraces.
according to parties seeking any of the writs, an absolute unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which the application therefore will be directed. There is after all a December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000.00 for the
hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also purchase of a 46-square meter condominium unit (Unit 703) valued at P860,922.00. On
serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the purchase price in the sum of
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates P729,830.00.
that petitions for issuance of extraordinary writs against the first level (inferior) courts
should be filed with RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat, executed a Contract to Sell in
the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue the writs should be allowed only when there are favor of the respondent
special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
The contract expressly states that the subject condominium unit shall substantially be
This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands
completed and delivered to the respondent within fifteen (15) months from February 8,
upon the Court’s time and attention, which are better devoted to those matters within its
1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that (S)hould there be no substantial completion and
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prvent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.
fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid
(by respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner).

Forum Shopping; Exists if elements of Litits Pendentia are present. Forum shopping respondent returned to the Philippines sometime in April, 1990.
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one
April 5, 1990, petitioner, through its Senior Assistant Vice-President, Mr. Mario G.
case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the following
Zavalla, informed respondent of the substantial completion of his condominium unit,
requisites must be present: 1) identity of the parties, or at least such parties as are
however, due to various uncontrollable forces (such as coup d etat attempts, typhoon
representing the same interest in both actions; 2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
and steel and cement shortage), the final turnover is reset to May 31, 1990.
prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; 3) identity with respect to the @
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioners notice of delivery dated May 31, 1990,
the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata respondent again flew back to Manila. He found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of
in the other case. water and electric facilities.

petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its building administrator

advising the latter that respondent is scheduled to move in on August 22, 1990.
Requisites for filing of a Writ of Certiorari. For the Writ of Certiorari to issue, the following
requisites must concur: 1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have condominium unit was still unlivable. he was constrained to send petitioner a letter dated
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to November 21, 1990 demanding payment for the damages he sustained. But petitioner
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and ignored such demand,
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint against the former for
specific performance and damages,
MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORP. vs. EDDY NG KOK WEI during the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit
and on April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus, respondents cause of action has been
limited to his claim for damages.
FACTS:
December 18, 1992, the trial court found the petitioner liable for payment of damages
due to the delay in the performance of its obligation to the respondent.

Eddy Ng Kok Wei (respondent) is a Singaporean businessman who ventured into

investing in the Philippines.
CA - affirmed in toto the trial courts award of damages in favor of the respondent.

petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the CA

 2ND ISSUE :

ISSUE : WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the instant case; and that the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts finding that petitioner incurred unreasonable
delay in the delivery of the condominium unit to respondent. On petitioners claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual issue.
Time and again, we have ruled that the factual findings of the trial court are given weight
when supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight when affirmed by the
Court of AppealsWhether or not petition. er incurred delay and thus, liable to pay
HELD : damages as a result thereof, are indeed factual questions.

The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law,
On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case,
not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on
Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, provides:
record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. These
exceptions are not present here.

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)][ shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 26, 1999
xxx and Resolution dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.

x x x.
[G.R. No. 151149. September 7, 2004]
Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant
case. We have consistently held that complaints for specific performance with damages GEORGE KATON, petitioner,
by a lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. vs.

MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN

FRESNILLO, respondents.
While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners
active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We
have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings FACTS:
and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

On August 2, 1963, petitioner Katon filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau
of Forestry for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island
petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the
in Palawan for the purpose of eventual conversion or reclassification from forest to
Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction
agricultural land, and thereafter for Katon to apply for homestead patent.
over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial courts
jurisdiction.
Then, in 1965, the Director of Forestry informed the Director of Lands, that since the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking residual
subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified prerogative.
and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.

However, there were also several favorable endorsements that were made to survey the
island under the request of herein respondents. Then, the records show that, on ISSUE:
November 8, 1996, one of the respondents Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent
Whether or not it is correct for the CA to invoke its alleged residual prerogative under
application for the portion of the island consisiting of 8.5 hectares and the respondent
Sec. 1, Rule 9 in resolving the petition on an issue not raised in the petition.
Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8, 1972. The respondent
Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued a Homestead Patent No. 14527 and OCT No. G-7098
on March 3, 1875 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
HELD: YES.

Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title
covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its residual prerogatives under
ground that the same were obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for the Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the Petition for
reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual prerogative refers to the
exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since it power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly
was he who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land. exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not
possessed by an appellate court.

Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective
portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they have been Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives under
faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years. Respondents contend that the petitioner Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial courts over
has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned because an action for cases appealed to the CA.
reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant
and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the
land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4)
Timeline: prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four
excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.
June 30, 1999. Respondents filed a Motion to Dimiss on the ground of the alleged

defiance by petitioner of the trial court’s Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus
effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased Respondent Gapilango. The motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the
court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not
July 29, 1999. RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss. appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or
neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of
December 17, 1999: RTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29,
1999 order for being a third and prohibited motion. these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of
the plaintiff to be heard.

In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the
for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when
there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners’ Complaint could not have been based,
or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal
was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the
disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were
the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the
On the other hand, “residual jurisdiction” is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the
grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of
Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 2 of Rule 14 of the same rules.

SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is

Sidenote: SC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint due to lack of jurisdiction and lack of
deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
cause of action (Sec. 2, Rule 3). Petitioner is not a proper party in the case because the
contested land was not privately owned by him prior to the issuance of the assailed
certificate of title to the defendant. He had never been privately titled in his name. A
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest, has no cause of action in
subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time. a suit for reconveyance.

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties.

In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter
thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of
the time to appeal of the other parties.

In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the
court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties
which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section
2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.

The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in
the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or
upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original
records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its
so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal
of the appeal.