Case of People of the R.P. vs.

Pugay
No. L-74324 17November1988

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) & 8(2) OF THE R.P.C.

"A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it."

"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful and
prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment."

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together.
On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight
accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of
Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter,
Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch
out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal responsibilities
of the accused?

There is no: CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to
commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were
united in its executed.

Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene of
the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda.

Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising
from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only for the act that
was committed by him.

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.

Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act
committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying circumstances
(treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a
wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 74824 September 15, 1986

LEONCIO BAYACA, SIMEON BAYACA and JUDITH BAYACA, RAMOS VALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, PERFECTO TEBANGIN and ROSALINA
MALLARI, respondents.

Ernesto M. Tomaneng for petitioners.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners allege that respondent Appellate Court acted with grave abuse
of discretion when it denied their "Urgent ex-parte Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration" of
its Decision despite the fact that at the time of the denial they had already filed their Motion for Reconsideration.

The records disclose that petitioners' former lawyer received a copy of respondent Court's Decision under date of
January 31, 1986 on February 13, 1986 so that they had up to February 28, 1986 within which to file a Motion for
Reconsideration. A new counsel having appeared on February 27, 1986, the latter, on the same date, prayed for an
extension of fifteen (15) days from February 28, 1986, or up to March 15, 1986, within which to seek reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration was actually filed on March 12, 1986. Private respondents opposed both the
extension of time and the reconsideration of the Appellate Court Decision, which petitioners had prayed for.

On May 26, 1986, respondent Court "Resolved to Deny the motion for extension, under the authority of the ruling set
forth by the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of 'Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc., et al., vs. Judge Japson, et al.,'G.R. No.
70895, promulgated on August 5, 1985."

We originally upheld respondent Appellate Court by denying this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit.
Petitioners now move for reconsideration.

In the original Habaluyas case (138 SCRA 46-47 [19851), we held that:

... the trial Court erred in granting the motion for new trial. The fifteen day period for appealing or for
filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. Even under the existing Rules of Court the
thirty-day period cannot be extended (Roque vs. Guinigundo Adm. Case No. 1664, March 30,
1978, 89 SCRA 178, 182; Gibbs vs. Court of First instance of Manila, 80 Phil. 160, 164).

Since then, however, or on May 30, 1986, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Jose Y. Feria, restated and
clarified the rule on this point as follows:

1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the
court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested."

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in
the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file
Motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their Motion for Extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which
expires on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

ACCORDINGLY, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby granted predicated on this Court's Resolution in
the clarificatory Habaluyas case promulgated on May 30, 1986.

Respondent Appellate Court's Resolution of May 26, 1986 is SET ASIDE and said Court is hereby directed to grant
petitioners' "Urgent ex-parte Motion for Extension of Time . to File Motion for Reconsideration" filed before it on
February 27, 1986, and thereafter to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration already filed.

SO ORDERED.