LABOR LAW REVIEW

LECTURE FOR JUNE 20, 25 & 27, 2019

In the study of labor laws, it is important to identify and recognize the

fundamental and basic principles specifically provided in the 1987
Constitution. These are:
Section 10, Article II that provides:
The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
It is commonly believed that social justice is intended for the
protection of the poor and underprivileged as they are considered as having
less in life and therefore they should have more in law. It may not be amiss
to stress that laws which have for their object the preservation and
maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and
underprivileged. They apply with equal force to those who, notwithstanding
their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of protection
from the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the
rich in the guise of defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is
being committed against them. For in the eyes of the Constitution and the
statutes, equal justice under the law remains the bedrock principle by which
our Republic abides. (Emerson B. Bagongahasa et al. v. Johanna L.
Romuladez, G.R. No. 179844, March 23, 2011)
Social justice — or any justice for that matter — is for the deserving,
whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true
that, in case of reasonable doubt, the Court is called upon to tilt the balance
in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy
and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor
simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are
rich, for justice must always be served for poor and rich alike, according to
the mandate of the law. Vigilance over the rights of the employers is equally
important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights
of employers owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled
to protection. (Buklod Nang Magbubukid Sa Lupang Ramos v. E. M. Ramos
and Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 131481, March 16, 2011).
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An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct that violates Article 282

(now Article 296) of the Labor Code should not be protected by the social
justice clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the term suggests, should
be used only to correct an injustice. As the eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel
observed, social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity
of interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force
in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
Section 18, Article II that provides:
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Section 1, Article III that provides:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied of the equal protection of
laws.
A worker’s employment is property in constitutional sense – he
cannot be deprived of his work without due process. (Asuncion v. NLRC,
362 SCRA 56)
Security of tenure of workers is not only statutorily protected. It is also a
constitutionally guaranteed right. Thus, any deprivation of this right must be
attended by due process of law. This means that any disciplinary action that
affects employment must pass due process scrutiny in both its substantive
and procedural aspects.
The constitutional protection for workers elevates their work to the status of
a vested right. It is a vested right protected not only against state action but
against the arbitrary acts of the employers as well. The Supreme Court in
Philippine Movie Pictures Workers' Association v. Premier Productions,
Inc. categorically stated that the right of a person to his labor is deemed to
be property within the meaning of constitutional guarantees. Moreover, it
is of that species of vested constitutional right that also affects an employee's
liberty and quality of life. Work not only contributes to defining the
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individual, it also assists in determining one's purpose. Work provides for

the material basis of human dignity.
Suspension from work is prima facie a deprivation of this right. Thus,
termination and suspension from work must be reasonable to meet the
constitutional requirement of due process of law. It will be reasonable if it is
based on just or authorized causes enumerated in the Labor Code.
The procedure can be summarized in this manner. First, the employer must
furnish the employee with a written notice containing the cause for
termination. Second, the employer must give the employee an opportunity to
be heard. This could be done either through a position paper or through a
clarificatory hearing. The employee may also be assisted by a representative
or counsel. Finally, the employer must give another written notice apprising
the employee of its findings and the penalty to be imposed against the
employee, if any. In labor cases, these requisites meet the constitutional
requirement of procedural due process, which "contemplates notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting one's person
or property." (Nancy S. Montinola v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No.
198656, September 8, 2014)
Due process is not a matter of strict or rigid formulaic process. The
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal or trial – type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential, as the due process requirements are satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. (Planters Products, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 78524, January 20, 1989; Primo E. Caong v.
Alexander J. Tresquio et al., G.R. No. 179428, January 26, 2011)

Section 8, Article III that provides:

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purpose not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Section 3, Article XIII that provides:

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The state shall afford protection to labor, local and overseas,

organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiation, and peaceful and concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall
be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work and a living
wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as maybe provided by law.
The state shall promote the shared responsibility between workers
and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes of settling
disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The state shall regulate the relations between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth.
The Constitution acknowledges the reality that capital and labor often
do not deal on equal grounds, requiring the state to protect labor from abuse.
To level the playing field, the framers of the Constitution incorporated
provisions therein to safeguard the employee's right to security of tenure and
enhance protection to employees' rights and welfare.
In the hierarchy of rights of employees, the right to security of tenure
is high, if not the highest. Its paramount value is recognized and guaranteed
under our new Constitution. Consequently, the first paragraph of Article
XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, extends the protective mantle of the
Constitution to all of labor including the promotion of full employment. The
second paragraph specifies the guaranteed right to security of tenure. All
other rights, e.g., the right to collective bargaining and negotiations, the right
to peaceful concerted activities, the right to strike and form unions, and the
right to due process, merely complement the right to job security. All these
complementary rights are meaningless to an unemployed worker. Thus, the
Supreme Court held in Rance v. National Labor Relations Commission, "it is
the policy of the State to assure the right of workers to 'security of tenure.'
The guarantee is an act of social justice. When a person has no property, his
job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood. Therefore
he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job."
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The law protects both the welfare of employees and the prerogatives
of management. Courts will not interfere with prerogatives of management
on the discipline of employees, as long as they do not violate labor laws,
collective bargaining agreements if any, and general principles of fairness
and justice. (The University of the Immaculate Conception vs. NLRC, G.R.
No. 181146, January 26, 2011)
The law, in protecting the rights of the laborers, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. While the Constitution is
committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute be automatically
decided in favor of labor. The management also has its own rights, as such,
are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out
of its concern for those with less privilege in life, the Supreme Court has
inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his
conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the
Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be
dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and
doctrine. (Solidbank Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 165951, March 30,
2010)

THE LABOR CODE

Article 218 (formerly 211) – Declaration of Policy

A. It is the policy of the State:

(a) To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective

bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation
and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes;

(b) To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the

enhancement of democracy and the promotion of social justice and
development;

(c) To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and

united labor movement;
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(d) To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their

rights and obligations as union members and as employees;

(e) To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the

expeditious settlement of labor or industrial disputes;

(f) To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; and

(g) To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-

making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare.

B. To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the

relations between the employers and employees by means of agreements
freely entered into through collective bargaining, no court or
administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages,
rates of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions of employment,
except as otherwise provided under this Code.

Sub – paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of paragraph A and the entire
paragraph B pertain to the constitutional rights of the employees to self –
organization while sub – paragraphs (e) and (f) guarantees the voluntary
mode of settling labor disputes. Sub – paragraph (g) recognizes the workers’
participation in the policy – making process affecting their rights, duties and
welfare. These are likewise provided in Sections 9 and 10 of Article II,
Sections 1 and 8 of Article III and Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.

Article 219 (formerly 212) – Definitions

(a) "Commission" means the National Labor Relations
Commission or any of its divisions, as the case may be, as provided under
this Code.

(b) "Bureau" means the Bureau of Labor Relations and/or the

Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices established under
Presidential Decree No. 1, in the Department of Labor.

(c) "Board" means the National Conciliation and Mediation

Board established under Executive Order No. 126.
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(d) "Council" means the Tripartite Voluntary Arbitration

Advisory Council established under Executive Order No. 126, as amended.

(e) "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an

employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor
organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as
employer.

(f) "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an

employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any
current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not
obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment.

(g) "Labor organization" means any union or association of

employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective
bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions
of employment.

(h) "Legitimate labor organization" means any labor

organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof.

(i) "Company union" means any labor organization whose

formation, function or administration has been assisted by any act defined
as unfair labor practice by this Code.
(j) "Bargaining representative" means a legitimate labor
organization or any officer or agent of such organization whether or not
employed by the employer.

(k) "Unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor practice as

expressly defined by this Code.

(l) "Labor dispute" includes any controversy or matter

concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
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(m) "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with the powers

or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise
of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires
the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of
the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes
of this Book.

(n) "Voluntary Arbitrator" means any person accredited by the

Board as such, or any person named or designated in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement by the parties to act as their Voluntary Arbitrator,
or one chosen with or without the assistance of the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board, pursuant to a selection procedure agreed upon in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, or any official that may be
authorized by the Secretary of Labor and Employment to act as Voluntary
Arbitrator upon the written request and agreement of the parties to a labor
dispute.

(o) "Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by the

concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.

(p) "Lockout" means any temporary refusal of an employer to

furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.
(q) "Internal union dispute" includes all disputes or grievances
arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the
constitution and by laws of a union, including any violation of the rights
and conditions of union membership provided for in this Code.

(r) "Strike-breaker" means any person who obstructs, impedes,

or interferes with by force, violence, coercion, threats, or intimidation any
peaceful picketing affecting wages, hours or conditions of work or in the
exercise of the right of self-organization or collective bargaining.

(s) "Strike area" means the establishment, warehouses, depots,

plants or offices, including the sites or premises used as runaway shops, of
the employer struck against, as well as the immediate vicinity actually used
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by picketing strikers in moving to and fro before all points of entrance to

and exit from said establishment.

This Article provides definition of the terms commonly used and

applied in labor relations. There are, however, important terms that cannot
be found in this Article but are defined and enumerated in the Amended
Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code. One of these is the
Collective Bargaining Unit.

For a better understanding of the term “collective bargaining unit”,

the Supreme Court, in several cases, has provided the fundamental factors in
determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit and these are: (1) the
will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); and (3) prior collective bargaining history, and similarity of
employment status. The existence of prior collective bargaining history is
neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an
appropriate bargaining unit. (Mechanical Department of Labor Union Sa
Philippine National Railways v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-
28223, August 30, 1968, citing Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 NLRB
294) applied in Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., L-
10321, 28 February 1958)

Just read and familiarize yourselves with the provisions of Articles

220 – 224 of the Labor Code. These provisions refer to the National Labor
Relations Commission.

Article 224 (Formerly 217) – The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters

and the National Labor Relations Commission

(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor

Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case
by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
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(1) Unfair labor practice cases;

(2) Termination disputes;

(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that

workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment;

(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations;

(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code,
including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
and

(6) Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security,

Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic
or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim
for reinstatement.

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over

all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.

(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of

collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall
be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided
in said agreements.

Jurisprudential References

Claims arising from an employer – employee relationship are not

limited to claims by an employee. Employers may also have claims against
the employee, which arise from the same relationship.
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In Bañez v. Valdevilla, the Supreme Court ruled that Article 217 (now
Article 224) of the Labor Code also applies to employers' claim for
damages, which arises from or is connected with the labor issue. Thus:
Whereas the Supreme Court in a number of occasions had applied the
jurisdictional provisions of Article 217 (now Article 224) to claims for
damages filed by employees, it hold that by the designating clause "arising
from the employer – employee relations" Article 217 (now Article 224)
should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual
damages against its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises
from or is necessarily connected with the fact of termination, and should be
entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case. (Emer Milan et al v.
NLRC and Solid Mills, G.R. No. 202961, February 4, 2015)
In addition to disputes enumerated in Article 224, the claims arising out of
an employer – employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages shall fall under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter as provided in Section 10, Republic Act
8042 as amended.

The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code that afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the
Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law
of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. The
Contract of Employment entered into and executed by and between the
parties here in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with
its implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply
in this case. (Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Joy C. Cabilles,
G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014.)
Under Article 224, it is clear that a labor arbiter has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over termination disputes. On the other hand, under Article 272,
a voluntary arbitrator has original and exclusive jurisdiction over grievances
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company policies. As a
general rule then, termination disputes should be brought before a labor
arbiter, except when the parties, under Art. 262 (now Article 273)
unmistakably express that they agree to submit the same to voluntary
arbitration. (Negros Metal Corp. vs. Armelo J. Lamayo, G.R. No. 186557,
August 25, 2010)
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However, if the disputes involving claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the

parties are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the dispute or
claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators. It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement that parties may opt to submit the dispute to either the NLRC or
to voluntary arbitration. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by
administrative bodies to interpret the law that they are entrusted to enforce,
have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they
have been written in the statute itself. (Estate of Nelson R. Dulay vs. Aboitiz
Jebsen Maritime, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 172642, June 13, 2012)

As we said, petitioners were already in default in the payment of their loan

obligations; thus, foreclosure of the mortgage property was resorted to by
respondents. Respondents were only enforcing the civil obligation of
petitioners under their mortgage contract. There is no labor aspect involved
in the enforcement of petitioners' obligation. In Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, Ltd. Staff Retirement Plan (HSBC SRP) v. Spouses
Broqueza, (G.R. No. 178610, November 17, 2010) which involved the
dismissed co – employees of herein petitioner Ana who were also unable to
pay the monthly amortizations of their respective loans, and despite HSBC
SRP's demand for them to pay their loan, they still failed to pay their loan
obligations, We said, among others, that the enforcement of a loan
agreement involves debtor – creditor relations founded on contracts and does
not in any way concern employee relations.

To reiterate, respondent HSBC SRP and petitioners agreed in their mortgage

contract that HSBC SRP as mortgagee was authorized to foreclose the
mortgaged property in the event that the petitioners – mortgagors failed to
pay the sum of money secured by the mortgage. After petitioners failed to
pay upon demand, the civil obligation of the petitioners under the mortgage
contract must be enforced to protect HSBC SRP's interest in the housing
loan. (Ma. Ana M. Tamonte, et al. vs. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corp. Ltd., et al., G.R. No. 166970, August 17, 2011)

The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all

cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
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As a rule, labor arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission

have no power or authority to grant reliefs from claims that do not arise from
employer – employee relations. They have no jurisdiction over torts that
have no reasonable causal connection to any of the claims provided for in
the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to
award not only reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by
the Civil Code, these reliefs must still be based on an action that has a
reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or
collective bargaining agreements. (Evelyn Tolosa vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
149578, April 10, 2003)

Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the

employer or vice – versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter. A money claim by a worker against the employer or vice – versa is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a
"reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and employee –
employer relation. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by
the regular courts of justice. Actions between employees and employer
where the employer – employee relationship is merely incidental and the
cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. (Eduardo G. Eviota v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 152121, July 29, 2003)

The pertinent provision of Article 2176 of the Civil Code that governs
quasi – delict provides that:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre – existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi – delict.
Thus, to sustain a claim liability under quasi – delict, the following
requisites must concur: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
(INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., petitioner, vs. ENGR. SALVADOR
ADVIENTO, respondent, G.R. No. 171212, August 4, 2014)
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In Yusen Air and Sea Services Phils., Inc. v. Villamor the Supreme
Court held:
When the cause of action is based on a quasi – delict or tort, which has no
reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in
Article 217 (now Article 224), jurisdiction over the action is with the
regular courts.
A labor arbiter may only take cognizance of a case and award
damages where the claim for such damages arises out of an employer –
employee relationship. (Ronilo Sorreda vs. Cambridge Electronics Corp.,
G.R. No. 172927, February 11, 2010)
Article 225 (formerly 218) – Powers of the Commission

The Commission shall have the power and authority:

(a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and

disposition of cases before it and its regional branches, as well as those
pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Code;

(b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue

subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the
production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of
accounts, agreements, and others as may be material to a just
determination of the matter under investigation, and to testify in any
investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Code;

(c) To conduct investigation for the determination of a question, matter

or controversy within its jurisdiction, proceed to hear and determine the
disputes in the absence of any party thereto who has been summoned or
served with notice to appear, conduct its proceedings or any part thereof
in public or in private, adjourn its hearings to any time and place, refer
technical matters or accounts to an expert and to accept his report as
evidence after hearing of the parties upon due notice, direct parties to be
joined in or excluded from the proceedings, correct, amend, or waive
any error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or in form, give all
such directions as it may deem necessary or expedient in the
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determination of the dispute before it, and dismiss any matter or refrain
from further hearing or from determining the dispute or part thereof,
where it is trivial or where further proceedings by the Commission are
not necessary or desirable; and

(d) To hold any person in contempt directly or indirectly and impose

appropriate penalties therefor in accordance with law.

A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the

Chairman or any member of the Commission or any Labor Arbiter as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward said officials, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be
summarily adjudged in direct contempt by said officials and punished by
fine not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500) or imprisonment not
exceeding five (5) days, or both, if it be the Commission or a member
thereof, or by a fine not exceeding one hundred pesos (P100) or
imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a Labor
Arbiter.

The person adjudged in direct contempt by a Labor Arbiter may

appeal to the Commission and the execution of the judgment shall be
suspended pending the resolution of the appeal upon the filing by such
person of a bond on condition that he will abide by and perform the
judgment of the Commission should the appeal be decided against him.
Judgment of the Commission on direct contempt is immediately
executory and unappealable. Indirect contempt shall be dealt with by the
Commission or Labor Arbiter in the manner prescribed under Rule 71
of the Revised Rules of Court; and

(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or

all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a
particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or
render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: Provided, That
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no temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing

out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except after
hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-
examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under
oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a
finding of fact by the Commission, to the effect:

(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be
committed unless restrained, or have been committed and will be
continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining
order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful
act, except against the person or persons, association or organization
making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or
actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge
thereof;

(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property

will follow;

(3) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be

inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted
upon defendants by the granting of relief;

(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect
complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate
protection.

Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has
been served, in such manner as the Commission shall direct, to all
known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief
Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which
the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed, charged with the
duty to protect complainant's property: Provided, however, That if a
complainant shall also allege that, unless a temporary restraining order
shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to
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complainant's property will be unavoidable, such a temporary

restraining order may be issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if
sustained, to justify the Commission in issuing a temporary injunction
upon hearing after notice. Such a temporary restraining order shall be
effective for no longer than twenty (20) days and shall become void at
the expiration of said twenty (20) days. No such temporary restraining
order or temporary injunction shall be issued except on condition that
complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security in an
amount to be fixed by the Commission sufficient to recompense those
enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused by the improvident or
erroneous issuance of such order or injunction, including all
reasonable costs, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, and expense
of defense against the order or against the granting of any injunctive
relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by the
Commission.

The undertaking herein mentioned shall be understood to constitute an

agreement entered into by the complainant and the surety upon which
an order may be rendered in the same suit or proceeding against said
complainant and surety, upon a hearing to assess damages, of which
hearing, complainant and surety shall have reasonable notice, the said
complainant and surety submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the
Commission for that purpose. But nothing herein contained shall
deprive any party having a claim or cause of action under or upon such
undertaking from electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law
or in equity: Provided, further, That the reception of evidence for the
application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission
to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such
places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their
witnesses and shall submit thereafter his recommendation to the
Commission.

The NLRC can promulgate its own rules, issue temporary restraining
orders that are valid for twenty (20) days, issue preliminary injunction, hold
any person in contempt directly or indirectly and impose appropriate
penalties therefor in accordance with law. That the reception of evidence for
 18

the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission

to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places
as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses and
shall submit thereafter his recommendation to the Commission.

The NLRC has the power to decide case certified for compulsory
arbitration by the Secretary of Labor and Employment as provided in Article
277 (g) of the Labor Code. The decisions of the NLRC in certified cases
cannot be reviewed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment but can be
brought to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

Article 226 (formerly 219) – Ocular Inspection

The Chairman, any Commissioner, Labor Arbiter or their duly

authorized representatives, may, at any time during working hours,
conduct an ocular inspection on any establishment, building, ship or
vessel, place or premises, including any work, material, implement,
machinery, appliance or any object therein, and ask any employee,
laborer, or any person, as the case may be, for any information or data
concerning any matter or question relative to the object of the
investigation.

Article 227 (formerly 221) – Technical Rules Not Binding and Prior
Resort to Amicable Settlement

In any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall u use every and
all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process. In any proceeding before the Commission or any
Labor Arbiter, the parties may be represented by legal counsel but it shall
be the duty of the Chairman, any Presiding Commissioner or
Commissioner or any Labor Arbiter to exercise complete control of the
proceedings at all stages.
 19

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Labor Arbiter

shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute
within his jurisdiction on or before the first hearing. The same rule shall
apply to the Commission in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
In proceedings before the NLRC or a labor arbiter, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not binding. Even under the revised rules of the
NLRC an expeditious procedure is provided for. Simplification of
procedure, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure and without
sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process, is mandated to insure a
speedy administration of social justice. This Court construed Article 221
(now Article 227) of the Labor Code as to allow the NLRC or a labor arbiter
to decide a case on the basis of position papers and other documents
submitted without resorting to technical rules of evidence as observed in
regular courts of justice. (Robusta Agro Marine Products, Inc. vs. Baltazar
Gorombalem, G.R. No. 80500, July 5, 1989)

In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has construed Article 221

(now Article 227) of the Labor Code as permitting the NLRC or the LA to
decide a case on the basis of position papers and other documents submitted
without necessarily resorting to technical rules of evidence as observed in
the regular courts of justice. Rules of evidence are not strictly observed in
proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC. (Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Moreno Dumapis, et al., G.R. No. 163210,
August 13, 2008)

Article 228 (formerly 222) – Appearances and Fees

(a) Non-lawyers may appear before the Commission or any Labor

Arbiter only:

1. If they represent themselves; or

2. If they represent their organization or members thereof.

(b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind

arising from any collective bargaining agreement shall be imposed
on any individual member of the contracting union: Provided,
 20

However, that attorney's fees may be charged against union funds in

an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement
or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void.

Article 222 (now Article 228) of the Labor Code requiring an

individual written authorization as a prerequisite to wage deductions seeks to
protect the employee against unwarranted practices that would diminish his
compensation without his knowledge and consent. However, for all intents
and purposes, the deductions required of the petitioner and the employees do
not run counter to the express mandate of the law since the same are not
unwarranted or without their knowledge and consent. Also, the deductions
for the union service fees in question are authorized by law and do not
require individual check-off authorizations. (Radio Communications of the
Phils. vs. Sec. of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 77959, January 9, 1989)

The Court reads Article 222(b) (now 228 (b)) of the Labor Code as
prohibiting the payment of attorney's fees only when it is effected through
forced contributions from the workers from their own funds as
distinguished from the union funds. (Bank of the Phil. Islands Employees
Union vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 69746-47, March 31, 1989)

Article 222 (b) (now 228) prohibits attorney's fees, negotiations fees
and similar charges arising out of the conclusion of a collective bargaining
agreement from being imposed on any individual union member. The
collection of the special assessment partly for the payment for services
rendered by union officers, consultants and others may not be in the category
of "attorney's fees or negotiations fees.” But there is no question that it is an
exaction which falls within the category of a "similar charge," and,
therefore, within the coverage of the prohibition in the aforementioned
article. (Carmelito L. Palacol vs. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 85333,
February 26, 1990)

Article 229 (formerly 223) – Appeal

Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and

executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or
orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
 21

(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of

the Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or
coercion, including graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would
cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed
or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of
a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided herein.
To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission or the
Labor Arbiter shall impose reasonable penalty, including fines or
censures, upon the erring parties.
In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of
appeal to the other party who shall file an answer not later than ten
(10) calendar days from receipt thereof.
The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20) calendar days
from receipt of the answer of the appellee.
The decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after ten
(10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
Any law enforcement agency may be deputized by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment or the Commission in the enforcement of
decisions, awards or orders.
 22

The Posting of the Bond

These statutory and regulatory provisions explicitly provide that

an appeal from the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC must be perfected within ten
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor
Arbiter. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be
perfected only upon (1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; (2)
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company; and
(3) filing of a memorandum of appeal.
In line with Sara Lee and the objective that the appeal on the
merits to be threshed out soonest by the NLRC, the Court holds that the
appeal bond posted by the respondent in the amount of P 100,000.00 which
is equivalent to around 20% of the total amount of monetary bond is
sufficient to perfect an appeal. With the employer's demonstrated good faith
in filing the motion to reduce the bond on demonstrable grounds coupled
with the posting of the appeal bond in the requested amount, as well as the
filing of the memorandum of appeal, the right of the employer to appeal
must be upheld. This is in recognition of the importance of the remedy of
appeal, which is an essential part of our judicial system and the need to
ensure that every party litigant is given the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause freed from the constraints of
technicalities. (Andy D. Balite et al v. SS Ventures International et al., G.R.
No. 195109, February 4, 2015)
In Philippine Touristers, Inc. v. MAS Transit Workers Union – ANGLO –
KMU, the Supreme Court held:
In this regard, it bears stressing that the reduction of the bond
provided thereunder is not a matter of right on the part of the movant and its
grant still lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon a showing of
meritorious grounds and the reasonableness of the bond tendered under the
circumstances.
In Nicol v. Footjoy Industrial Corp., the Court held that "meritorious
cases" for said purpose would include "instances in which (1) there was
substantial compliance with the Rules, (2) surrounding facts and
circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond, (3) a
liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the
desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits, or (4) the
 23

appellants, at the very least exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by
posting a partial bond during the reglementary period." Notably, in
determining whether the arguments raised by the petitioners in their motion
to reduce bond is a "meritorious ground," the NLRC is not precluded from
conducting a preliminary determination of the merits of the appellant's
contentions. And since the intention is merely to give the NLRC an idea of
the justification for the reduced bond, the evidence for the purpose would
necessarily be less than the evidence required for a ruling on the merits.
The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable
requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by
the provision that an appeal may be perfected "only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond." The word "only" makes it perfectly clear that the
lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to
be the exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be considered
completed. The law however does not require its outright payment, but only
the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should
the appeal fail. What petitioners have to pay is a moderate and reasonable
sum for the premium of such bond. (Accessories Specialist, Inc., et al. vs.
Erlinda B. Alabanza, G.R. No. 168985, July 23, 2008)

The posting of a cash or surety bond is a requirement sine qua non for
the perfection of an appeal from the labor arbiter's monetary award. The
posting of a bond within the period provided by law is not merely mandatory
but jurisdictional. Failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory. (Benjamin S. Santos vs. Elena Velarde, G.R.
No. 140753, April 30, 2003)

The requirement for posting the surety bond is not merely procedural
but jurisdictional and cannot be trifled with. Non-compliance with such legal
requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory. (Hilario S. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 182626,
December 4, 2009)

The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to

perfect its/his appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers that if they
prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon
the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It was intended to discourage
employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to
satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.
 24

While the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards

has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was
substantial compliance of the NLRC Rules of Procedure or where the
appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial
bond or where the failure to comply with the requirements for perfection of
appeal was justified. (Philux, Inc., et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 151854,
September 3, 2008)

Time and again, however, this Court, considering the substantial

merits of the case, has relaxed this rule on, and excused the late posting of,
the appeal bond when there are strong and compelling reasons for the
liberality, such as the prevention of miscarriage of justice extant in the case
or the special circumstances in the case combined with its legal merits or the
amount and the issue involved. After all, technical rules cannot prevent
courts from exercising their duties to determine and settle, equitably and
completely, the rights and obligations of the parties. This is one case where
the exception to the general rule lies. (Marticio Semblante, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, 19th Division, et al., G.R. No. 196426, August 15, 2011)

While Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC's New Rules of Procedure

allows the Commission to reduce the amount of the bond, the exercise of the
authority is not a matter of right on the part of the movant, but lies within the
sound discretion of the NLRC upon a showing of meritorious grounds. It is
daylight-clear from the foregoing that while the bond may be reduced upon
motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion
to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a
reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the
appellant; otherwise, the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop
the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The qualification effectively
requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within
the 10-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the
cash or surety bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period.
(Hilario S. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 182626, December
4, 2009)

The Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows the filing of a motion to

reduce bond subject to two conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground, and
(2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted. The filing of a motion to reduce
bond and compliance with the two conditions stop the running of the period
 25

to perfect an appeal. The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny the
motion to reduce bond, and it may rule on the motion beyond the 10-day
period within which to perfect an appeal. Obviously, at the time of the filing
of the motion to reduce bond and posting of a bond in a reasonable amount,
there is no assurance whether the appellant's motion is indeed based on
"meritorious ground" and whether the bond he or she posted is of a
"reasonable amount." Thus, the appellant always runs the risk of failing to
perfect an appeal. (Cesar V. Garcia, et al. vs. KJ Commercial, et al., G.R.
No. 196830, February 29, 2012)

To clarify, the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter provides that the

filing of a motion to reduce bond, coupled with compliance with the two
conditions emphasized in Garcia v. KJ Commercial for the grant of such
motion, namely, (1) a meritorious ground, and (2) posting of a bond in a
reasonable amount, shall suffice to suspend the running of the period to
perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter's decision to the NLRC. To require
the full amount of the bond within the 10 – day reglementary period would
only render nugatory the legal provisions which allow an appellant to seek a
reduction of the bond.

Although the general rule provides that an appeal in labor cases from
a decision involving a monetary award may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond, the Court has relaxed this requirement
under certain exceptional circumstances in order to resolve controversies on
their merits. These circumstances include: (1) the fundamental consideration
of substantial justice; (2) the prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust
enrichment; and (3) special circumstances of the case combined with its
legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved. Guidelines that are
applicable in the reduction of appeal bonds were also explained in Nicol v.
Footjoy Industrial Corporation. The bond requirement in appeals involving
monetary awards has been and may be relaxed in meritorious cases,
including instances in which (1) there was substantial compliance with the
Rules, (2) surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious
grounds to reduce the bond, (3) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of
an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies
on the merits, or (4) the appellants, at the very least, exhibited their
willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the
reglementary period. (McBurnie v. Ganzon, G.R. Nos. 178034, 178117 &
186984-85, October 17, 2013 citing Garcia v. KJ Commercial, G.R. No.
196830, February 29, 2012)
 26

The Period to Perfect the Appeal

With respect to the period within which to perfect the appeal, the
Supreme Court, in the case of Judy Phils., Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 111934,
April 29, 1998 has ruled that:

Since the 10-day period provided in Article 223 (now Article 229) of
the Labor Code refers to ten calendar days and not to ten working days,
this means that Saturdays, Sundays and Legal Holidays are not to be
excluded, but included, in the computation of the 10-day period. This is in
line with the objective of the law for speedy disposition of labor cases with
the end in view of protecting the interest of the workingman. In subsequent
cases, We ruled that if the tenth day to perfect an appeal from the decision
of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC falls on a Saturday, the appeal shall be
made on the next working day, as embodied in Section 1, Rule VI of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure promulgated on January 14, 1992. This
conclusion arrived at by the Court recognizes the fact that on Saturdays the
offices of NLRC and certain post offices are closed.

The Reinstatement Aspect of the Decision of the Labor

Arbiter

Article 223 (now Article 229) (3rd paragraph) of the Labor Code, as
amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, and Section 2 of the
NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor
Code, provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is
immediately executory even pending appeal. (Alejandro Roquero vs.
Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 152329, April 22, 2003)

For better understanding, the Supreme Court has elucidated the rule
on reinstatement aspect pending appeal in the case of Froilan M. Bergonio,
Jr. v. South East Asian Airlines, G.R. No. 195227, April 21, 2014. The
Supreme Court held:

Otherwise stated, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably

decided by the LA is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon
reinstatement, which reinstatement is immediately executory. Unless the
 27

appellate tribunal issues a restraining order, the LA is duty bound to

implement the order of reinstatement and the employer has no option but to
comply with it.

Moreover, and equally worth emphasizing, is that an order of

reinstatement issued by the LA is self – executory, i.e., the dismissed
employee need not even apply for and the LA need not even issue a writ of
execution to trigger the employer's duty to reinstate the dismissed employee.
In Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, et al., decided in 1997, the Court
clarified once and for all this self – executory nature of a reinstatement
order. After tracing back the various Court rulings interpreting the
amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 6715 on the reinstatement
aspect of a labor decision under Article 223 (now Article 229) of the Labor
Code, the Court concluded that to otherwise "require the application for and
issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a
reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very
object and intent of Article 223 (now Article 229), i.e., the immediate
execution of a reinstatement order."

In short, therefore, with respect to decisions reinstating employees,

the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its
immediate and automatic execution even pending appeal. The employer is
duty-bound to reinstate the employee, failing which, the employer is liable
instead to pay the dismissed employee's salary. The Court's consistent and
prevailing treatment and interpretation of the reinstatement order as
immediately enforceable, in fact, merely underscores the right to security of
tenure of employees that the Constitution protects.

The reversal by a higher tribunal of the LA's finding (of illegal

dismissal), notwithstanding, an employer, who, despite the LA's order of
reinstatement, did not reinstate the employee during the pendency of the
appeal up to the reversal by a higher tribunal may still be held liable for the
accrued wages of the employee, i.e., the unpaid salary accruing up to the
time the higher tribunal reverses the decision. The rule, therefore, is that an
employee may still recover the accrued wages up to and despite the reversal
by the higher tribunal. This entitlement of the employee to the accrued
wages proceeds from the immediate and self – executory nature of the
reinstatement aspect of the LA's decision.
 28

By way of exception to the above rule, an employee may be barred

from collecting the accrued wages if shown that the delay in enforcing the
reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer.
To determine whether an employee is thus barred, two tests must be
satisfied: (1) actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending
appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be
due to the employer's unjustified act or omission. Note that under the second
test, the delay must be without the employer's fault. If the delay is due to the
employer's unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the
salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LA's decision.

Article 230 (formerly 224) – Execution of Decisions, Orders, or Awards

(a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional

Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or Med-Arbiter or
Voluntary Arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested
party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from
the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly
deputized officer to execute or enforce final decisions, orders or awards of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment or Regional Director, the
Commission, the Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. In any case, it shall be the duty of the
responsible officer to separately furnish immediately the counsels of
record and the parties with copies of said decisions, orders or awards.
Failure to comply with the duty prescribed herein shall subject such
responsible officer to appropriate administrative sanctions.

(b) The Secretary of Labor and Employment, and the Chairman

of the Commission may designate special sheriffs and take any measure
under existing laws to ensure compliance with their decisions, orders or
awards and those of Labor Arbiters and Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators, including the imposition of administrative fines
which shall not be less than Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) nor more than
Ten Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00).
 29

The Jurisprudential References

We thus cannot agree with petitioners' contention that a decision that

has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. The re-
computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the
decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision
being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the
computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this
is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.
(Metroguards Security Agency Corporation v. Alberto N. Hilongo, G.R. No.
215630. March 9, 2015)
As discussed above, no essential change is being made by a
recomputation because such is a necessary consequence that flows from the
nature of the illegality of the dismissal. To reiterate, a recomputation, or an
original computation, if no previous computation was made, as in the present
case, is a part of the law that is read into the decision, namely, Article 279 of
the Labor Code and established jurisprudence. Article 279 provides for the
consequences of illegal dismissal, one of which is the payment of full
backwages until actual reinstatement, qualified only by jurisprudence when
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed, where the finality of the
illegal dismissal decision instead becomes the reckoning point.
The nature of an illegal dismissal case requires that backwages
continue to add on until full satisfaction. The computation required to reflect
full satisfaction does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final
decision being implemented as the illegal dismissal ruling stands. Thus, in
the present case, a computation of backwages until actual reinstatement is
not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments. (Conrado
A. Lim v. HMR Philippines Inc., G.R. No. 201483, August 4, 2014)

Article 231 (formerly 225) – Contempt Powers of the Secretary of

Labor and Employment

In the exercise of his powers under this Code, the Secretary of

Labor may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the
appropriate penalties therefor.