The Limits of Intuition

D. N. Perkins

Leonardo, Vol. 10, No. 2. (Spring, 1977), pp. 119-125.

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Leonardo, Vol. 10, pp. 119-125. Pergamon Press 1977. Printed in Great Britain

THE L I M I T S OF I N T U I T I O N

D. N. Perkins*
Abstract-Popular lore suggests that intuitive value judgments guide artists in their work and that
judgments based on reasons couldnotprovide the sensitive insight needed. Coupled with this are other
informal beliefs about intuition. This paper assesses these beliefs. Intuition is analyzed as cognition
without reasons and argued to be closely related toperception. While some might think that intuition
represents a rare or special mode of cognition, much ofperceiving amounts to intuiting. Though
intuition often serves where reasons offer little help, just the oppositefrequently occurs. Intuition is
not endowed with special certainty. Intuition does bear a special kind ofrelevance, but not a special
degree ofrelevance, in making value judgments in the arts. A laboratory analysis of the thoughts
expressed by poets and artists while at work suggests that their value judgments most often carry
reasons; in this sense their work is nonintuitive. But intuition usually supports these reasons. Final!):,
farfrom being at odds, reasoning and intuition seem to be complementary in the complevprocess of
making art.
-

I. INTRODUCTION deserves a critical appraisal. Aiming neither to deify

nor discard intuition, in this inquiry I hope to map
During television coverage in the U.S.A. of the 1976
its myths and realities. The limits of intuition are
Summer Olympics, one advertising slogan went
best measured against the powers occasionally held
something like this: 'When it's right, you know it!'.
for it. The following notions are sometimes
Such a message relates to high matters of art and
encountered: (1) Intuition involves an unusual or
invention more than might be thought at first. One
could taste, the commercial claimed, that a certain rarely used mode of mental functioning; (2) it
provides for judgments where reasons do not
beer was 'right', much as an athlete knows when his
suffice; (3) it allows a surety and accuracy that
body achieves a 'right' passage through space. This
reasoning cannot approach; (4) it bears a special
appeal gives tacit testimony to the popular regard
relevance to judgments about aesthetic effective-
for intuition, that act of mind that offers truth
ness, a relevance that reasons cannot share; (5)
without the fuss and bother of deliberation.
intuitive judgments dominate the process of art
'When it's right, you know it!' could as easily be a
making-judgments based on reasons are the
maxim for artists as for athletes. It often is held that
concern of aestheticians and critics; and, most
artists, especially, possess a capacity for intuition.
sweepingly, (6) intuition and reasons are at odds-
Intuition guides poets choosing a 'right' word,
depending more on intuition implies depending less
painters preferring one hue or another, choreo-
on reasons and vice versa.
graphers distilling passion into gestures and
Perhaps the reader may think that most of these
composers devising surprise variations that conflict
notions are exaggerated. Yet such beliefs lie tacit in
with their themes. Both laymen and many
the attitudes of many artists and of their publics.
practitioners assert that art is a singularly intuitive Nor do the notions deserve to be scrapped
act. indiscriminately, for certain of them seem truer than
Two roles for intuition require attention. The first
others. A look at several reasoned considerations
casts intuition as judge, evaluating ideas and and some laboratory evidence may help to clarify
making sound choices among alternatives already
this muddled matter.
at hand. The second casts intuition as inventor,
producing ideas by unexplainable mental leaps.
Elsewhere, under other labels, I have commented on 11. REASONS AND INTUITION
intuition as inventor [l] and M. R. Westcott
describes an interesting series of relevant experi- Appraising the claims made for intuition demands
ments [2]. Here I am concerned with intuition as care about the meaning of the term. What
judge. Despite this focus, invention remains tacitly distinguishes those mental events called intuitions ?
considered, since judgmental intuition helps to Richard Rorty notes the ambiguity of the word;
sense whether a mental leap has landed in a several interpretations of it fit the general rubric of
promising place. 'immediate apprehension' [3]. But the particular
The function of intuition in producing art context of the term here can help. What meaning do
people intend when they suggest that the arts are
*Psychologist, Project Zero, Graduate School of Education,
intuitive?
315 Longfellow Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA First, any announcement of an intuition stands
02138, U.S.A. (Received 17 Sept. 1976.) distinct from the intuition itself. Such phrases as
120 D. N . Perkins

'that seems right' or 'somehow, the work appears rnan as an outlaw. There is a conscious reason but
unbalanced' often declare intuitive judgments. But no reasoning.
these phrasings report judgment more than make it. This example has a further point to make. If one
They echo a mental experience not necessarily recognizes the outlaw by reason of his black hat,
taking the form of words and one that is often much how does one recognize that the hat is black? One
richer and more specific than words could convey. just sees it as black intuitively, without conscious
This might hint that intuitions always come as reasons. In general, nonintuitive judgments may
feelings or images, words being only an aftermath. have intuitively grounded reasons. Thus, though by
But words that follow and describe an experience definition the same judgment cannot be based
must not be confused with words that constitute the directly on intuition and reasons, the two can
experience itself. For instance, I may realize a cooperate in other ways.
painting is 'parsimonious' by an inner voice
delivering that word as the apt term. Such an insight
111. PERCEPTION AND INTUITION
would certainly seem to be intuitive. The manner of
delivery, not the product delivered, makes it so, no But perhaps intuition has been defined too hastily
matter whether that product is a phrase, an image, a and simply. Should seeing that a hat is black really
muscular tension, a feeling, an emotion. The latter be considered intuitive? Indeed, perception usually
recalls Nelson Goodman's remark that 'in aesthetic occurs without conscious reasons and so the present
experience the emotions function cognitively' [4]. definition would call most perceptions intuitive. Is
That is, they function as a manner of knowing the this tolerable? Is it illuminating? In fact, it is both-
work. So, indeed, do all sound intuitions about art not only aligning sufficiently with common usage of
works, in whatever form they arrive. the terms but also revealing important characteris-
While the 'what' of an intuition is flexible, the tics of perception and of intuition.
'why' is not. Coming as a consequence of reasons Some might have the following misgiving about
seems to disqualify a judgment from being intuitive. calling perceptual events intuitive. It seems odd to
Or, as Rorty says, intuition is noninferential [3]. say 'I intuitively saw that the hat was black'. But this
One does not remark 'I felt intuitively sure that he can be explained. The misgiving signals puzzlement
was the outlaw; he wore a black hat', or 'I knew over the intended point. How would 'intuitively
intuitively he was the spy, because I caught him saw' differ from just, 'saw', when seeing is conceived
photographing the missile', or 'intuitively, the figure already as a reflexive, reasonless act? However, if
of the man should go here-it balances the tree that the context emphasizes that sometimes perception
way'. The following corollary applies: If, as noted could be mediated by reasons, the same sort of
earlier, intuitions do not always come as images or statement sounds better. An art criticism instructor
feelings, neither are all images or feelings intuitions. might say: 'I don't want you to think too much
After all, a geometer's thinking may be imagistic but about the colors in this painting yet. I just want you
full of reasons. Emotions often come with explicit to see them intuitively.'
reasons and one would not report an intuitive Another misgiving was mentioned in the
feeling of sadness when one had failed an Introduction. Sometimes it is thought that intuition
examination. involves a special psychological process and,
Then perhaps the following simple definition will therefore, a process quite different from those of
serve present purposes: Intuitions are those ordinary perception. But this too seems doubtful.
apprehensions for rvhich one has no conscious Rather, the most exotic examples of intuition have
reasons. In the Introduction. I mentioned the notion parallels in everyday perception and therefore
that reasons and intuition are at odds. This psychological mechanisms of memory and pattern
definition pinpoints one sense in which they are. In recognition in perception appear to be apt
doing so, it clarifies why throughout this paper I explanations for intuition. For instance, one may
speak of intuition versus reasons as grounds for intuit the fittingness of a poetic phrase, a musical
judgment and not intuition versus reasoning. The passage or a gesture in dance. But other and more
latter is not a true opposition. First, one may have mundane apprehensions of fit occur- that between
judgments based on both intuition and reasoning. a puzzle piece and its correct place, a handle and a
For example, it seems proper to say: 'I puzzled over hand, a noun's number and its verb. These often
the choice for an hour and gained a heightened involve immediate apprehensions without reasons,
sense of it; then I made an intuitive decision.' Such apprehensions that could be called intuitive. And, in
statements testify that reasoning may lay the the case of grammar at least, the features that allow
groundwork for intuitive judgments. Second, one such recognition and the processes that mediate it
may make judgments not based on reasoning, but are partially understood by modern psycholinguis-
nevertheless based on reasons and therefore tics.
nonintuitive. When one recognizes the outlaw by his Certain judgments of a connoisseur might be
black hat, there need be no conscious reasoning called intuitive, such as recognizing a work's style
where one first notices the black hat, then recalls the without being able to describe how one does so. But
cinematic tradition and, finally, deduces that this then, so may one recognize a spouse's handwriting,
person must be an outlaw. Rather, in seeing the manner of walking or voice. Furthermore, the
black hat, one may spontaneously recognize the process of style recognition, in the arts and
 The Limits o f Intuition 121

elsewhere, also has been analyzed and understood First, it is odd to claim certainty for intuitions
as reflecting fundamental perceptual processes [5]. when many intuitions are not accompanied by
Certainly the ability to recognize expressive feelings of certainty. For instance, a hunch is a
qualities in lines, forms, gestures, musical passages, tentative judgment for which one lacks reasons.
etc. is of special importance in the arts. Such Having a hunch means having an intuition of which
recognition could be called intuitive. Yet daily one one is not totally confident. But what about those
'reads' the feelings of others from their facial intuitions that do feel certain? Here it is helpful to
expressions, manner of walking and gestures. How remember the earlier conclusions that most
one does this also has been charted somewhat as a perceptions were intuitive and that the mechanisms
perceptual process [6]. of intuition were like those of perception.
In this spirit, perception is best taken broadly to Therefore, the reliability of perception indicates
include many intuitions. The expressiveness of a something about the reliability of intuition in
painting is just as much seen, just as much general. Seeing is not always believing. Trivial
perceptually manifested, as is the color of a hat. lapses testify to this. The celebrity thought to be
Likewise, intuition rightly includes many occasions recognized on the street may turn out to be someone
of perception, such as seeing that a hat is black. else. A magician systematically exploits the
However, not all perceptions can be considered weaknesses of perception. Sworn and sincere
intuitions nor vice versa. After all, some perceptions witnesses in courts of law may identify people or
come with reasons; apprehension results from report events erroneously [7]. If ordinary perceiv-
consciously detected features of the thing examined, ing, on the whole reliable enough, produces
be it a painting or a pathologist's slide under a disconcerting errors, one cannot expect better
microscope. And some intuitions concern not the results from intuitions of other sorts.
perceptual world but rather the world of ideas. In the arts, value judgments are often intuitive
and opposing judgments are commonplace. Since
IV. SPECIAL ACCESS there are some grounds to believe that value
judgments may be considered 'right' or 'wrong',
Traditionally, intuition mediates judgments not critical disagreement implies that someone is
amenable to reasons. It is that act of mind that cuts wrong, someone's intuition has failed [&lo]. The
more deeply, casts a finer net, subverts roundabout lack of public concensus demonstrates the unre-
logic for the sake of direct insight. In fact, this claim liability of intuitive value judgments in the arts.
seems true in many cases, though it requires Of course, some people may have many
qualification. As noted above, people recognize unusually sound intuitions. Individuals like
their friends, find grammatical errors, perceive the Beethoven or Einstein recognized artistic or
world around them or appreciate the flavor of ice scientific truths missed by most of their con-
cream with little, if any, recourse to conscious temporaries. But one cannot argue for the certainty
reasons. Not normally used, reasons may also be of intuition in general by appealing to special cases.
hard to find when one tries. For instance, one need Many mediocre figures of art and science were also
only attempt to describe one's father or sketch a guided by and felt sure about their intuitions.
portrait of him. Necessarily, one's mind possesses If intuitions are not certain, are they at least more
information about the features distinctive of people reliable than conclusions based on reasons? Not
whom one recognizes. Yet, without special even this can be said. Sometimes one challenges
experience as, for instance, a reporter or a portrait reasons with intuitions and tries to discover where
painter, one has little access to that information. the reasons went wrong. But also, one challenges
However, one seldom intuits the validity of intuitions with reasons. One does not believe the
mathematical proofs or the fastest horse in a race. magician's seeming magic, nor accept the sincere
Some matters invite intuition and resist judgments witness's report when it is inconsistent. In summary,
based on reasons, but others do just the opposite. intuitive judgments often feel uncertain, often prove
Why otherwise would one ever bother with reasons? unreliable even when they do feel certain and
Another qualification is that intuition depends on generally allow challenges by reasons. Little seems
familiarity. One does not expect a psychologist to be left of the idea that intuition offers a certainty to
intuitive in nuclear physics, an Australian aborigine which reasons cannot aspire.
in corporate law. If the psychologist switches fields
or the aborigine goes to law school, their initial
forays will be deliberate and labored. Intuition, if it VI. SPECIAL RELEVANCE
comes, will grow from accumulated experience.
Special certainty should not be confused with a
special relellance of intuition. Intuition appears to
V. SPECIAL CERTAINTY support aesthetic judgments in a way different from
Special certainty is another characteristic claimed reasons and so important a point deserves an
for intuition. Some argue that in aesthetics reasons example. The poet Elizabeth Bishop describes a
usually oversimplify and interfere with a sensitive baby rabbit fleeing from a fire as having 'fixed,
apprehension; but intuitions usually fathom the ignited eyes' [I I]. This apt, imaginative phrase
subtleties of art and yield sound judgments. This delights a reader, as perhaps it did the poet,
view is untenable. intuitively. If one cares to analyze why, reasons can
 D. N . Perkins

be given; the word 'ignited' expresses the reflection between two kinds of evidence for a judgment and
of the fire in the rabbit's eyes, indicates that the has nothing to do with intuition in particular.
rabbit sees the fire, signals the rabbit's fear and One might think that in the arts, or elsewhere, a
symbolizes the danger of the rabbit's being burned. sample always yields the better judgment. But this is
The reader's intuitive response reflects a covert not so. For instance, an artist constantly tests his
resonance to this surprising richness of the three work under way by using himself for an audience.
words. But sometimes his response may be very idiosyn-
Then do reasons or intuitive response confirm the cratic and he may not realize this [14]. Real
rightness of the phrase? Perhaps one feels intuitively audiences may offer no surer gauge. They often find
that it is the intuitive response. The reasons listed themselves unprepared for innovative statements
are related to the phrase's rightness quite differently [15]. On the other hand, reasons seek to estimate on
from those that justify a mathematical theorem or a general grounds a work's potential for engaging and
theory in physics, where reasons offer sufficient sustaining an aesthetic response. If the reasons are
deductive or inductive proof. In the poem, the comprehensive and well-founded, they sometimes
version 'fixed and flame-reflecting eyes' could lay may prove more reliable than the parochial
claim to the same list of reasons, but intuitively it response of a particular artist or audience.
does not make as strong a poetic statement. Indeed, In summary, intuition has a special relevance for
the merely descriptive 'flame-reflecting' lacks the value judgments in the arts. But 'special' means
metaphoric tension of falsely stating that the neither certain nor special to intuition. Rather,
rabbit's eyes are ignited. Also, 'ignited' signifies a 'special' signifies the peculiar relevance that a
suddenness that sharpens the sense of panic; 'flame- sample of something has to judging the something.
reflecting' sounds less appropriate because it is more A sample may be unrepresentative, but at least it
contemplative. So again, reasons can be found why gives substance to a reality that reasons can only
the poet's version is better, but. again they follow partially capture. But reasons may be more general,
and fathom the conclusion rather than mediate it. less tied to a particular sample. So intuitive
Many contemporary aestheticians agree that judgments and judgments based on reasons are
reasons usually do not force one by logic to accept a related to works in different ways and risk error
value judgment. But reasons are said to be relevant arising from different causes.
in other ways. One view emphasizes that reasons
guide people toward a more discriminating and VII. INTUITION AND MAKING
insightful appreciation ofworks of art [12]. Another
claims that at least some kinds of reasons count Considering intuition in principle, I have not yet
always for or always against a work, though to discussed to what extent intuitive judgments in fact
different degrees in different circumstances. For guide the making of art. To better understand the
instance, unity would always be an asset, confusion making of art, for several years I have been
a flaw [13]. conducting process tracing studies of novice and
In addition, reasons are relevant to evaluating professional poets and visual artists at work. The
aspects of a work that cannot be apprehended technique used may seem radical. The participants
intuitively. Some artists produce works to be were asked to report their thoughts in a telegraphic
puzzled over; one fails to grasp their richness unless stream-of-consciousness fashion while working.
one ferrets out the hidden significations. This is not Their speech was tape-recorded and, in the case of
just a matter of abstruse allusions. For instance, the visual artists, videotapes and color photographs
respect for a mystery novel may wax or wane as the were obtained.
scattered clues are checked against the detective's I began the investigation with an understandable
surprise conclusion: Has the author played fair? misgiving. Perhaps the technique would disturb the
If reasons appear relevant in many ways, the process being probed. However, prior uses of
latter example hints at a way in which they are not similar methods encouraged a try. C. Patrick, in
relevant. A reasoned inspection of the novel's text studies of poets and visual artists conducted a
was an apt approach to testing the detective's number of years ago and involving less frequent
reasoning. Likewise, and wholly unsurprisingly, speaking, found the technique satisfactory [16]. In
intuitive response becomes an especially relevant some contexts, talking aloud is known to enhance
estimate of aesthetic effectiveness when the work performance [17]. A. Newel1 and H. Simon have
depends for its effect on evoking an intuitive used reporting methods for a number of years to
response, as is very often the case. This does not study puzzle solving and game playing [IS]. W.
suggest a truth-divining power special to intuition. Reitman explored the process of musical com-
There are parallel cases that do not concern position in a similar manner [19].
intuition at all. For example, suppose one wonders I encountered one major difficulty-the first
how well an untried horse can race. One may participants often interrupted their process with
usefully consider the horse's stride, age, breeding excessive explanations. Therefore, they were asked
and so on. But also, one can race the horse and find not to ponder or probe any further than they would
out whether it wins. The first consideration ~redicts when working unobserved. They were to report
outcomes by means of reasons; the second actually simply what was on their minds. With this directive.
samples outcomes. This is a general difference the reporting soon became automatic as they
 The Limits of Intuition 123

became absorbed in their work. In almost all cases, something is black; both are intuitive. But in
they avowed that they followed approximately their contexts of art making, as in many others, noting
usual procedure and made approximately normal obscurity means more than merely recognizing. It
progress. connotes a value judgment, something like 'this is
What did the tests disclose about intuition, not as good as it might be, because it is obscure'. As
reasons and reasoning? Protracted periods of a tacit evaluation, 'obscure' is not intuitive; it
manifest reasoning were rare. For instance, long involves an integrated 'because', an integrated
chains of deductive reasoning occurred hardly at reason. One could not say correctly 'I knew
all. Seldom did any participant list a number of intuitively that this was wrong', if one perceived it to
reasons for or against choices, a process that might be obscure and wrong for that reason.
be called reasoning. Occasionally, extended de- Emerging quickly, such impressions still can arise
liberations occurred. For instance, one poet intuited in complex ways. For instance, one may have a
that 'something was wrong' and struggled at length sense of disturbance that one then spontaneously
to puzzle out what it was. Whether this should be identifies as obscurity. This resembles finding a
called reasoning is unclear. familiar face in a crowd and a moment later
Occasionally, judgments were uncertain and recalling the person's name. Recognizing a reason
work proceeded hesitantly. A color seemed only for a disturbance does more than adding needless
about right or a rhyme only possibly acceptable; a explanation. It changes the feeling itself, which
phrase might risk obscurity or a figure, unre- suddenly acquires more character and focus. It also
cognizability; a choice would do for now but tends to sanction the initial misgiving, which may be
warranted reconsideration. Earlier I noted that dismissed unless one perceives good cause for it.
intuition could leave one feeling uncertain as well as But this illustrates only one sequence of events.
sure. The study disclosed that this logical point Sometimes a feeling and its explanation may come
often proved a real and troublesome fact about virtually simultaneously. Or, what becomes the
making art. Neither intuitions nor reasons always reason for the feeling may arrive first, say an
allowed sure and steady progress. unintended rhyme noticed in a poem, followed by a
But what about those fleeting moments of quickly developing sense of a happy or unhappy
judgment-the impressions that seem so much to happenstance. Whatever the mental process, all
guide and govern art making? Two sorts of reports these occasions involve the rapid development of a
occurred. Often a poet would note that a word or a state where a feeling of rightness or wrongness and a
phrase felt right or wrong or that a line break reason for it abide together and influence the
seemed apt or awkward; a painter would say that a maker's further actions.
shape or color did or did not seem satisfactory. Such Such judgments I shall call rational evaluations.
remarks most likely reflected reasonless appraisals, They differ from intuitive evaluations, where no
intuitive evaluations of 'rightness' or 'wrongness'. Of reasons are recognized, and also from reasoned
course, in some cases participants may have had evaluations, which follow from extended reasoning.
reasons they did not state, but this only risks Rational evaluations involve reasons, but it remains
underestimating, not overestimating, the role of intuitive both that the reasons hold true of the work
reasons. (for instance, that the work is indeed obscure) and
Another sort of judgment proved considerably that the reasons warrant the judgment (for instance,
more frequent. Typical were such statements as 'the that obscurity in a work is indeed a significant flaw).
phrase is obscure', 'the rhyme seems forced', 'the Rational evaluations guide the maker in a way that
word is cliched' or 'the figure is too tall', 'the red intuitive evaluations do not. This matters little to
needs more yellow', 'there's a problem of balance'. simple 'keep' or 'reject' decisions; but often
They differed from the above evaluations in rectification rather than rejection is in order.
specifying just how something seemed 'right' or Evaluations with integrated reasons specify what
'wrong'. needs to be corrected. Intuitive evaluations, on the
It is fair to presume that judgments of the latter other hand, demand that the maker diagnose the
sort, too, arose rather quickly in consciousness, problem before attempting to solve it.
since participants avoided silences of more than I have pointed out that the making of art involves
about five seconds. If some judgments were reasons as well as intuitions, uncertainties as well as
pondered for a longer period, then the contrary certainties, hesitation as well as flow. But, of course,
presumption could only underestimate the role of many individual differences appeared among the
reasoning. Such quick judgments appear in participants. The description could be seriously
everyday experience also. When one finds a amiss if those artists who proved to be the most
statement obscure, for instance, one 'feels' its intuitive, sure and quick were consistently the best
obscurity. It does not just jar, but jars in a as well. But nothing in my study indicates that. Nor
characteristic way, by resisting understanding. need the point depend only on my findings.
Likewise, forced rhymes, lack of balance, etc. are Beethoven is the classic testimony that artistry may
failings with particular flavors. not be quick or sure. His notebooks record how he
Are such apprehensions intuitions? In one sense shaped his finest works through laborious effort
yes, in another no. Simply recognizing that [201.
something is obscure is like simply recognizing that Then what becomes of the notion that intuitive
judgments guide the making of art? The answer 'be intuitive' by command? This is like urging a
depends on what one means. If intuitive guidance sleepy student to 'be alert!'.
implies that most evaluations are intuitive, then this But perhaps both the method of and the motive
is false. If it means making rational evaluations, for being more intuitive become clearer in more
which mix reasons with intuitions, then this seems specific circumstances. For example, a classic
closer to the truth. If intuitive guidance suggests a confrontation between the intuitive and the
sure spontaneity, then this fails also, since nonintuitive concerns explicit evaluative standards
irresolution and reconsideration proved frequent. If in the arts. I do not want to argue that explicit
the point is that art making does not proceed like a standards have no place, but certainly their use
reasoned argument, that is true. But neither does often arouses demands for a more intuitive
the framing of reasoned arguments themselves, approach and certainly explicit standards present
which, like works of art, are products whose very some real dangers. An artist may judge by standards
success often lies in making order out of fertile but that not only limit his scope but also nourish an
confused beginnings. In short, reasons and illusion of effectiveness simply because the rules
intuitions alike play important roles and evidence have been obeyed. He is like the cook who always
does not suggest that making art works is any more follows an old recipe and never tastes the soup. The
or less intuitive than are many other human dictates of the 19th-century French academies
activities, including scientific enquiry. inevitably come to mind.
But is it really so that an artist deluded by limiting
VIII. INTUITION AS GOOD TACTICS standards needs to be more intuitive-and, if so, in
what sense? First, suppose that the artist applies the
I have discussed intuition as it serves value standards deliberately. Then his judgments would
judgments in art. I have denied that intuition be neither intuitive evaluations nor even rational
involves a special, exotic mental process; rather, evaluations. In rational evaluations: intuition tells
many ordinary perceptions are intuitive and one that the reason indeed supports the judgment.
intuitions are arrived at in the same general way as But in applying standards, the fact that the reason
perceptions. Intuition often provides an answer for supports the judgment is a convention, even if the
which reasons are difficult to find, but vice versa convention was established earlier by intuition.
also. Intuition does not offer certainty, but it does Therefore, the artist would benefit from being more
bear a relevance to aesthetic judgments not shared intuitive in the sense of relying more on rational
by reasons. On the other hand, reasons are relevant evaluations with their intuitive reasons.
in another way, so that the weaknesses ofeither tend This case presumes deliberately applied stan-
to be offset by the strengths of the other. Intuition dards. The situation is different when recipes have
and reasons alike prove prominent in making art. If become thoroughly ingrained. Presumably, 19th-
intuitive evaluations do not dominate, then neither century academic painters did not just insist
do long chains of reasoning. If reasons aplenty mechanically on old conventions; the art of the
appear, then they seem most often intuitively impressionists looked intuitively wrong to them. An
apprehended. artist limited by ingrained standards needs to begin
Popular lore proposes intuition as an explanation by being not more, but less intuitive. He needs to
for artistry, but intuition's role appears con- challenge deliberately his old evaluative reflexes.
siderably more complex than the lore acknow- Sometimes, even, he may do this by proposing new
ledges. Popular lore also proposes intuition as a rules to take their place. Thus Schonberg developed
good tactic. Young artists presumably are well the twelve tone system of composition both to
advised to be intuitive, follow their intuitions, trust exclude classical tonality and to provide a substitute
their intuitions, etc. But, if the more intricate formalism within which the composer could work.
character of intuition is taken into account, does Whether history will count his system a success or
any value rest in such directives? For instance, is it not, it represents a remarkable attempt to break old
clear what 'being more intuitive' means? Are the patterns of perception and thought.
results of being so necessarily positive? And, Then, can it sometimes be clear what 'being more
harking back to the Introduction, does 'being more intuitive' requires one to do? Yes, when sweeping
intuitive' imply relying less on judgments based on generalizations are avoided and specific situations
reasons? considered. Does emphasizing intuition mean
Most doubtful are such sweeping assertions as 'be relying less on judgments based on reasons? Not in
intuitive!'. What does this mean? What is intended? general, because being more intuitive may simply
If this promises that being so will disclose all the mean making more rational rather than con-
subtleties one has been missing, the suggestion will ventional evaluations, and both depend on reasons.
deceive. Respect for one's own intuitions may help Is 'being more intuitive' always useful? No.
one to better utilize the discriminatory capacities Sometimes doubting and challenging one's in-
one has, but cannot muster sensitivities that one tuitions may contribute more. The aim is always to
does not have. If 'be intuitive!' means to banish achieve as sensitive and comprehensive and appre-
reasoning, this runs counter to what artists and hension of the work as possible. Either more or less
poets in fact do; it also deprives the maker of the reliance on intuitions, reasons or reasoning may
guidance of rational evaluations. Finally, can one help in different circumstances.
 The Lintits of Intuition 125

Thus, the concept of intuition comes from this Gardner, Style Sensitivity in Children, Human Development
discussion both chastened and strengthened. The 15, 325 (1972).
6. See, for instance, P. Ekman, W. V. Friesen and E. Phoebe,
role of intuition in making art appears crucial but Emotion in the Human Face: Guidelinesfor Research andan
hardly total. Reasons function just as centrally and Integration of Findings (New York: Pergamon Press, 1972);
essentially. Though intuitive conclusions exclude P. Ekman, ed., Darwin and Facial Expression (New York
conscious reasons, the two support each other in and London: Academic Press, 1973); R. L. Birdwhistell,
Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Com-
many ways. By expecting less of intuition, one munication (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
gleans from it a better understanding of the intricate Press, 1970).
process of making art. On analysis, intuition's 7. R. Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, Scienti$c American
relevance might have amounted to folk fiction; 231, 6 (1974).
instead, its relevance just seems complex rather than 8. D. Perkins, Talk about Art. (To appear in the Proceedings
of the conference The Arts and Aesthetics: An Agenda for
simple, subtle rather than sweeping, shared rather the Future, June 22-25, 1976, Aspen, Colorado.)
than singular. 9. M. C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of
Criticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1958) Sec.
27.
10. A. G. Pleydell-Pearce, Objectivi?~ and Value in the
Judgements of Aesthetics, Brit. J. Aesth. 10, 1 (1970).
This article was prepared at Project Zero. Harvard 11. From E. Bishop, The Armadillo, Questions of Travel
Graduate School of Education, with support from (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1967).
National Institute of Education Grant G-003-0169 and 12. P. Ziff, Reasons in Art Criticism, in Art and Philosophy, W.
the Spencer Foundation. The opinions expressed here do E. Kennick, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964);H. G.
not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the Blocker, The Oilcan Theory of Criticism, J. Aesth. Ed. 9 , 4
supporting agencies. (1475).
13. M. C. Beardsley, The Possibility of Criticism (Detroit:
Wayne State Univ. Press, 1970) pp. 75-84; M. Weitz,
Reasons in Criticism, J . Aesth. and Art Crit. 20, 4 (1962).
14. D. Perkins, Probing Artistic Process: A Progress Report
1. D. Perkins, Noticing: An Aspect of Skill, in Conference on from Harvard Project Zero, J.Aesth. Ed. 8,3 (1974) esp. pp.
Basic Mathematical Skills and Learning, Vol. I: Contributed 49-51.
Position Papers (Washington, D.C.: Nat. Inst. of Ed., 15. D. Perkins, New Art and the Abominable Snowman, Art
1975); D. Perkins, Theory in Arts Education, J . Aesthetic Education 30, (1977).
Ed. (in press). 16. C. Patrick, Creative Thought in Artists, J. Psychology4, 35
2. M. R. Westcott, Toward a Contemporary Psychology of (1937); C. Patrick, Creative Thoughts in Poets, XX (R.
Intuition (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968). Woodworth, ed.), Archives Psychology 178, 5 (1935).
3. R. Rorty, Intuition, in The Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, Vol. 17. R. M. Gagne and E. C. Smith, A Study of the Effects of
4, P. Edwards, ed. (New York: Macmillan and The Free Verbalization on Problem Solving, J. Exp. Psychology 63,
Press, 1967) pp. 204-212. 12 (1962).
4. N. Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis and New 18. A. Newell and H. Simon, Human Problem Solving
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968) p. 248. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
5. H. Gardner, The Development of Sensitivity to Artistic 19. W. Reitman, Cognition and Thought: An Information
Styles, J . Aesth. and Art Crit. 29. 515 (1971); H. Gardner, Processing Approach (New York: Wiley, 1965).
The Development of Sensitivity to Figural and Stylistic 20. A. W. Thayer, The Life of Ludwig Von Beethoven (New
Aspects of Paintings, Brit. J. Psychology 63,605 (1972); H. York: The Beethoven Society, 1921).
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The Limits of Intuition
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The Development of Sensitivity to Artistic Styles
Howard Gardner
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Summer, 1971), pp. 515-527.
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12
The Oilcan Theory of Criticism
H. Gene Blocker
Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 9, No. 4. (Oct., 1975), pp. 19-28.
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Reasons in Criticism
Morris Weitz
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 20, No. 4. (Summer, 1962), pp. 429-437.
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New Art and the Abominable Snowman
David Perkins
Art Education, Vol. 30, No. 1. (Jan., 1977), pp. 13-16.
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