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G.R. No. 151258. December 1, 2014.*

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 154954. December 1, 2014.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO
MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL
ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO
RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA
FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO
SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG,
JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE
GUZMAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 155101. December 1, 2014.*

FIDELITO DIZON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080. December 1, 2014.*

GERARDA H. VILLA, petitioner, vs. MANUEL

LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN
RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO
ADRIANO, respondents.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Though the

Supreme Court (SC) has recognized that the acquittal of the accused
may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion,

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certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the Court of

AppealsÊ (CAÊs) Decision dismissing the case was attended by a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.·Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the
accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion,

_______________

* SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION.

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certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the

CAÊs Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It
must be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes „a patent and
gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant
abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive
the court of its very power to dispense justice.‰ Thus, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it
allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.
Criminal Law; Penalties; The Revised Penal Code (RPC) has
carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies
committed by means of culpa on the one hand and felonies
committed by means of dolo on the other in the context of the
distinctions it has drawn between them.·Since the accused were
found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot
agree with the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable
penalty for intentional felony can also be applied to the present case
on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of
the accused was so gross that the felony already amounted to
malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the
imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of
culpa on the one hand and felonies committed by means of dolo on

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the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between

them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and
Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs
as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another.
Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261
(Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a
result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a
malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory,
mandatory, and not subject to the discretion of the court. We have
already resolved · and the OSG agrees · that the accused Dizon
and Tecson, et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus
iniuriandi in

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inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the

imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Finality of
Judgments; Probation; Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the
finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for
probation.·Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the
finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for
probation, viz.: SECTION 7. Modification of judgment.·A
judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to
appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 117 and Section 1 of Rule 122, it can
be culled from the foregoing provisions that only the accused may
appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief
being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein.
This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional
edict against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for

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the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be

exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal
judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase
criminal liability. Thus, the accusedÊs waiver of the right to appeal
· as when applying for probation · makes the criminal judgment
immediately final and executory.
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; The rule on double jeopardy is
not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the
state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the
criminal judgment.·It must be clarified, however, that the finality
of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket
invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in
our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and
that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the
very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment. The
reasoning behind the exception is articulated in People v. Nazareno,
595 SCRA 438 (2009), from which we quote: In such instance, how-

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ever, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the

manner done in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of
the review is on whether the judgment is per se void on
jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by
a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has
appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In
other words, the review is on the question of whether there
has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of
the decisionÊs error or correctness. Under the exceptional
nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden · a very heavy one · is on
the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the
presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation
of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.

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Criminal Law; Probation; Applicants are not at liberty to choose

the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement
under Section 4 of the Probation Law is substantive and not merely
procedural.·It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law
requires that an application for probation be filed with the trial
court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the
court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and
sentenced Tecson, et al. of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 ·
not Branch 130 · of the Caloocan City RTC. Neither the judge of
Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson, et al. in their pleadings have
presented any explanation or shown any special authority that
would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed
with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121.
While we take note that in a previous case, the CA issued a Decision
ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles
from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the
ruling was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners
therein, i.e., accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.
Tecson, et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their
probation applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not
with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to
choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as the require-

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ment under Section 4 of the Probation Law is substantive and

not merely procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation
proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of
authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never
acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; Any residual
jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease · including the
authority to order execution pending appeal · the moment the
complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court.·
Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the
criminal action has been properly instituted. If a party appeals the
trial courtÊs judgment or final order, jurisdiction is transferred to
the appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed

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insofar as the appealing party is concerned. The court of origin then

loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other partyÊs
time to appeal has expired. Any residual jurisdiction of the court of
origin shall cease · including the authority to order execution
pending appeal · the moment the complete records of the case are
transmitted to the appellate court. Consequently, it is the appellate
court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try,
and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and
resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall
remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case.
Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the
nature of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first place.
Same; Same; Same; If the case was previously appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA), a certified true copy of the judgment or final
order must be attached to the original record, which shall then be
remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken.
The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for
appropriate action.·According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal
Code, „[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final
judgment.‰ A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the
accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the
following conditions among others: after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to appeal;
upon the grant of a withdrawal of an appeal; when the sentence has
already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the
accused applies for

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probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or

final order is entered in the book of entries of judgments. If the case
was previously appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the
judgment or final order must be attached to the original record,
which shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which
the appeal was taken. The court of origin then reacquires
jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this
time that the court of origin may settle the matter of the execution

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of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof, including the

convictsÊ applications for probation.
Criminal Law; Probation; Words and Phrases; Probation is a
special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders
who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right
to appeal.·We find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act
on the probation applications of Tecson, et al. It had neither the
power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place them on
probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the
case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pas
is a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law or an
underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or
Tecson, et al., or both · to which this Court cannot give a judicial
imprimatur. In any event, Tecson, et al. were ineligible to
seek probation at the time they applied for it. Probation is a
special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders
who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right
to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to
be reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of
an incarceration record by making them undergo rehabilitation
outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help
offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and
self-respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their
reintegration with the community. It must be reiterated that
probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act
of grace or clemency conferred by the state.
Same; Same; All offenders who previously appealed their cases,
regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law
from seeking probation.·Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of
probation is that the offender must not have appealed the
conviction. In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA
298, this

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Court was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still

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apply for probation even after the trial court has imposed a non​-
probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the
original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In
that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term
of eight years of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of
the Probation Law. They only became eligible for probation after the
CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8
months and 21 days of prisión correccional. In deciding the case,
this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco v. Court of Appeals,
243 SCRA 384 (1995), and ruled that the accused was ineligible for
probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco,
we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no
ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or
exception. What is clear is that all offenders who previously
appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for appealing, are
disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this
Court enunciated in Lagrosa that the accused are disallowed from
availing themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a
genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as a
result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable
to probationable.
Same; Same; One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is
precisely to „suspend the execution of the sentence,‰ and not to
replace the original sentence with another.·A void judgment cannot
be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no judgment
had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders
of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation
proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do
not exist. In any event, Tecson, et al. cannot invoke Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case. One of
the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to „suspend the
execution of the sentence,‰ and not to replace the original sentence
with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v.
Mutia, 129 SCRA 148 (1984): An order placing defendant on
„probation‰ is not a „sentence‰ but is rather in effect a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final
judgment but is rather an „interlocutory judgment‰ in the
nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under
the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a
final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are
complied with, or by a final judgment of

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sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)

Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson, et al. remains.
Same; Penalties; Accessory Penalties; The applicable accessory
penalty is determined by using as reference the principal penalty
imposed by the court before the prison sentence is computed in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL).·By
operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a
corresponding accessory penalty automatically attaches every time
a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27
thereof. The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as
reference the principal penalty imposed by the court before the
prison sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL.
This determination is made in spite of the two classes of penalties
mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized
that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties
specifically allude to the actual „penalty‰ imposed, not to the „prison
sentence‰ set by a court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to
have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct sets of
accessory penalties for the same offense. The two penalties are only
relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is
concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole and
eventually seek the shortening of the prison term.

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OR

CLARIFICATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Alfredo Tadiar for complainant Gerarda Villa.
Quiason, Makalintal, Barrot, Torres & Ibarra for
Artemio Villareal.
Augusto S. Jimenez, Sr. for respondent Antonio
Mariano Almeda.
Ramon U. Braganza for respondent Junel Anthony
Ama.
De Guzman and Celis Law Office for respondent Ronan
de Guzman.

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Felipe Antonio B. Remollo for respondent Vincent

Tecson.
Gonzales, Batiller, David, Leabres and Reyes for
respondent Nelson Victorino.
Santiago & Santiago for Anselmo Adriano.
Tagle, Chua, Cruz & Aquino for Fidelito Dizon.
Farcon, Gabriel, Farcon and Associates for respondents
Renato Bantug, Jr. and Joseph Lledo.
Saguisag and Associates for respondent Zosimo
Mendoza.
Flores, Cabrera, Gonzales & Concepcion Law Offices for
respondent Jaime Maria Flores II.
Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Adel Abas for
themselves and collaborating counsel for Junel Anthony
Ama.
Benjamin C. Santos & Ofelia Calcetas-Santos Law
Offices for respondent Paul Angelo Santos.
Baterina, Baterina, Casals, Lozada & Tiblani for
Gerarda Villa.
Apostol, Gumaru & Balgua Law Office for respondent
Santiago Ranada III.
Jose Alberto C. Flaminiano for respondent Dalmacio L.
Lim, Jr.
Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr. for respondent Vicente
Verdadero.
Picazo, Buyco, Tan, Fider & Santos for respondent Jonas
Karl Perez.
The Barristers Law Offices for M.L. Escalona II.
Flaminiano, Arroyo and Dueñas for respondent Antonio
Mariano Almeda.

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Villareal vs. People

E.P. Martinez, Martinez, Alcudia Law Offices for Vincent

Tecson and collaborating counsel for Renato N. Bantug, Jr.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case

involving the death of Leonardo „Lenny‰ Villa due to
fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the
arguments raised by the parties in their respective Motions
for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few
remaining matters needing to be clarified and resolved.
Some of these matters include the effect of our Decision on
the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as
respondents Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda), Junel
Anthony D. Ama (Ama), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and
Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of who
are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity
of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of
a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
Before the Court are the respective Motions for
Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners People
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by
respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson
(collectively, Tecson, et al.) concerning the Decision of this
Court dated 1 February 2012.1 The Court modified the
assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)

_______________

1 Villareal v. People, G.R. Nos. 151258, 154954, 155101, 178057 &

178080, 1 February 2012, 664 SCRA 519.
2 CA Decision (People v. Dizon, C.A.-G.R. CR No. 15520, 10 January
2002), Rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 221-249; CA Resolution (People
v. Dizon, C.A.-G.R. CR No. 15520, 30 August 2002), Rollo (G.R. No.
154954, Vol. I), pp. 209-218. Both the Decision and the Resolution of the
CA were penned by Associate Justice

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in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents

Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had
the effect of lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from
the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict
against Tecson, et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA
Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan
City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of
the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide.3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but
related case docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153
and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against
Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos
(Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo
Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy
trial was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive
portion of our Decision:5

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101

finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment
in G.R. No. 154954 · finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries · is also MODIFIED

_______________

Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V.

Cosico and Eliezer R. de los Santos (with Concurring Opinion).
3 RTC Decision (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340[91], 8
November 1993), Rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 273-340. The
Decision of the RTC was penned by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.
4 CA Decision (Escalona v. Regional Trial Court, C.A.-G.R. S.P. Nos.
89060 & 90153, 25 October 2006), Rollo (G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080), pp.
12-51. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P.

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Punzalan-Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B.

Reyes Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
5 Villareal v. People, supra note 1 at pp. 598-599.

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and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio

Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized
under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED
jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity
ex delicto in the amount of P50,000, and moral damages in the
amount of P1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded
at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until
satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino,
et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED.
Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the
Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal
case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible
consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include
the fact of intoxication and the presence of nonresident or alumni
fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances
that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.

To refresh our memories, we quote the factual

antecedents surrounding the present case:6

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6 Id., at pp. 530-535.

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Villareal vs. People

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de

Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the
Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were
Caesar „Bogs‰ Asuncion, Samuel „Sam‰ Belleza, Bienvenido „Bien‰
Marquez III, Roberto Francis „Bert‰ Navera, Geronimo „Randy‰
Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo „Lenny‰ Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by
some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of
the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to RufoÊs Restaurant to
have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi,
also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect
during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there
would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time.
Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After
their „briefing,‰ they were brought to the Almeda Compound in
Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already
received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the
neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota
court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered
physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to
traditional forms of Aquilan „initiation rites.‰ These rites included
the „Indian Run,‰ which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of
two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the
neophytes; the „Bicol Express,‰ which obliged the neophytes to sit
on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs
outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their
legs; the „Rounds,‰ in which the neophytes were held at the back of
their pants by the „auxiliaries‰ (the Aquilans charged with the duty
of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the
latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee
blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the „AuxiesÊ Privilege
Round,‰ in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to in-

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flict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the

neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.
They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day · 9 February 1991 · the
neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play rough
basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the
Aquila FraternityÊs principles. Whenever they would give a wrong
answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The
neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they
endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused nonresident or alumni fraternity members
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded
that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson
Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon
and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The
fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected
the neophytes to „paddling‰ and to additional rounds of physical
pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so
strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard
him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk.
He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the
initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes
started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by
LennyÊs shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal
and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really
feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They
removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep
him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans

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rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead

on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed
against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)

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7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)

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8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)

9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-​-
38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial against
the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held
in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with
reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A
few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29
November 1993, Criminal Case No. C​-38340 against the remaining
nine accused commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (C.A.-G.R. No. 15520) set aside
the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case
No. C​-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of
the accused according to individual participation. Accused De
Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied
only to the remaining 25 accused, viz.:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants · Victorino, Sabban,
Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General,
Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima,
Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino, et al.) · were
acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants · Vincent Tecson, Junel
Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr.
(Tecson, et al.) · were found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They
were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
P30,000 as indemnity.

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3. Two of the accused-appellants · Fide​lito Dizon and

Artemio Villareal · were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA
sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prisión
mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum
of P50,000 and to pay the additional amount of P1,000,000 by way
of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340
dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of
violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the
respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in C.A.-G.R. S.P. Nos.
89060 & 90153 reversed the trial courtÊs Orders and dismissed the
criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the
basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated
Petitions were individually brought before this Court. (Citations
omitted)

Motion for Partial Reconsideration

filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial

Reconsideration7 in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 &
178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal
case

_______________

7 Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

(posted on 6 March 2012), Rollo (G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080), pp. 1607-
1660.

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against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano

(collectively, Escalona, et al.) in its assailed Decision and
Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that
the right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated,
since they had failed to assert that right within a
reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their
co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents Escalona, et
al. did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during
the time that the original records and pieces of evidence
were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the
prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12
years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there
were a number of incidents attributable to the accused
themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She
then insists that we apply the balancing test in
determining whether the right to speedy trial of the
accused was violated.

Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos.

155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that
accused Dizon and Tecson, et al. had neither the felonious
intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent
to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it
concedes that the mode in which the accused committed the
crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that
the penalty imposed should have been equivalent to that
for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the
Revised Penal Code. It argues that the nature and gravity
of the imprudence or negligence

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8 CA Decision dated 25 October 2006 (Escalona v. Regional Trial

Court), supra note 4; CA Resolution (Escalona v. Regional Trial Court,
C.A.-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153, 17 May 2007), Rollo (G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080), pp. 53-58.

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9 Motion for Reconsideration of OSG (posted on 7 March 2012), Rollo

(G.R. No. 155101), pp. 2085-2117.

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Villareal vs. People

attributable to the accused was so gross that it shattered

the fine distinction between dolo and culpa by considering
the act as one committed with malicious intent. It
maintains that the accused conducted the initiation rites in
such a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly
endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus
equivalent to malice aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino, et al.,
the OSG asserts that their acquittal may also be reversed
despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed
Decision (C.A.-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that
Victorino, et al. should have been similarly convicted like
their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of
Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to his death.

Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of

Tecson, et al.

Respondents Tecson, et al.,10 filed their respective

motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the
effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and
service of sentence are concerned. According to
respondents, they immediately applied for probation after
the CA rendered its Decision (C.A.​-G.R. No. 15520)
lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide,
which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight
physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence.
Tecson, et al. contend that, as a result, they

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10 Manifestation and Motion for Clarification of Almeda (filed on 2

March 2012), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1843-1860; Motion for
Reconsideration of Ama (filed on 5 March 2012), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101),
pp. 1883-1896; Motion for Clarification of Bantug (filed on 6 March
2012), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1953​-1966; and Motion for
Clarification of Tecson (filed on 6 March 2012), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101),
pp. 1930​-1941.

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Villareal vs. People

have already been discharged from their criminal

liability and the cases against them closed and terminated.
This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their
Applications for Probation on various dates in January
200211 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They
argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial
Court (RTC) had already granted their respective
Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon
their completion of the terms and conditions thereof,
discharged them from probation and declared the criminal
case against them terminated on various dates in April
2003.13
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified
true copies of their respective Applications for Probation
and the RTC Orders granting these applications,
discharging them from probation, and declaring the
criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they
maintain that the Decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 15520 had
already lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned,
when they waived their right to appeal and applied for
probation.

Issues

I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial;

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11 Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1861, 1897, 1942 & 1967.
12 RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 11
October 2002), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1872-1873, 1904-1905, 1950-
1951, 1977-1978.
13 RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 29 April
2003), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 1875; RTC Order (People v. Dizon,
Criminal Case No. C-38340, 10 April 2003), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp.
1906, 1952; RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 3
April 2003), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 1979.
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1861-1875, 1897-1906, 1942-1952,
1967-1979.

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Villareal vs. People

II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson, et al. should

have corresponded to that for intentional felonies; and
III. Whether the completion by Tecson, et al. of the terms
and conditions of their probation discharged them from
their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases
against them.

Discussion

Findings on the Motion for Partial

Reconsideration of Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual

circumstances and legal assertions raised by petitioner
Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly
considered and passed upon in our deliberations, which led
to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that
in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona,
et al. to speedy trial, the CAÊs dismissal of the criminal case
against them amounted to an acquittal,15 and that any
appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a
violation of their right against double jeopardy.16 Though

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we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may

be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it

_______________

15 Villareal v. People, supra note 1 at p. 545 (citing People v.

Hernandez, 531 Phil. 289; 499 SCRA 688 [2006]; People v. Tampal, 314
Phil. 35; 244 SCRA 202 [1995]; Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, 508
Phil. 96; 471 SCRA 94 [2005]; People v. Bans, 239 SCRA 48 [1994]; People
v. Declaro, 252 Phil. 139; 170 SCRA 142 [1989]; and People v. Quizada,
243 Phil. 658; 160 SCRA 516 [1988]).
16 People v. Hernandez, id.
17 Villareal v. People, supra note 1 at p. 550 (citing People v. Court of
Appeals, 545 Phil. 278; 516 SCRA 383 [2007]; People v.

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Villareal vs. People

is convincingly established that the CAÊs Decision

dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment
constitutes „a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or
a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so
severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
justice.‰18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be
attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19We have taken
a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and
petitionerÊs arguments and found no basis to rule that the
CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the
right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its
findings were sufficiently supported by the records of the
case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of
petitioner Villa with finality.

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Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration

filed by the OSG

We likewise deny with finality the Motion for

Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R. Nos.
155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are
essentially a mere rehash of

_______________

Serrano, Sr., 374 Phil. 302; 315 SCRA 686 [1999]; and People v. De
Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550).
18 Villareal v. People, id., at p. 551 (citing People v. De Grano, id.; and
People v. Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169; 308 SCRA 687 [1999]).
19 Villareal v. People, id., at p. 552 (citing People v. Maquiling, id.;
and Teknika Skills and Trade Services v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment, 339 Phil. 218; 273 SCRA 10 [1997]).

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Villareal vs. People

the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for

Certiorari.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSGÊs theory
that even if the act complained of was born of imprudence
or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on
account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We
emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means
of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by
means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done
as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal
design. The Revised Penal Code expresses thusly:

ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence.·Any person

who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prisión correccional in its medium period; if it would have

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constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its

minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without
malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed
in those cases in which the damage im-

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pending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly

manifest. (Emphases supplied)

On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those

wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent to do an
unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion
on the matter:20

Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of

thought. x x x The identity of mens rea · defined as a guilty mind,
a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent · is the
predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what
the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist,
it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or
„malice.‰
The term „dolo‰ or „malice‰ is a complex idea involving the
elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of

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intent · on which this Court shall focus · is described as the state

of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It
refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which
a person proceeds. It does not refer to mere will, for the latter
pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act. While
motive is the „moving power‰ that impels one to action for a definite
result, intent is the „purpose‰ of using a particular means to
produce the result. On the other hand, the term „felonious‰
means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding
from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken
together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must
refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent
state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise,
intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus · that the
act or omission be done „willfully,‰ „maliciously,‰ „with deliberate
evil intent,‰ and „with malice afore-

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20 Villareal v. People, id., at pp. 556-593.

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Villareal vs. People

thought.‰ The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea ·
a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the
act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of
a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a
felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the
commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala
in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or
dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill · or animus interficendi
· cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the
victimÊs death must not have been the product of accident, natural
cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed

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without malice or criminal intent · but with lack of

foresight, carelessness, or negligence · the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence
resulting in homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under
Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the employment of
physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act
that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental,
since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer ·
iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent,
the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in
case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must
be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do
wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a
person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of
certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the required animus ini-

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uriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se

merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in
an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in
itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere
infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does
not make a person automatically liable for an intentional
felony. x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean,
however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid
of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3
thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary
act done without malice, from which an immediate personal
harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an

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inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the

person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and
consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple
imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault,
from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not
immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in
doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position
of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm
to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the
doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous
results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.

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As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged

with recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required
varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another
person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular
course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or
avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not
much care is required. It is thus possible that there are countless
degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, „from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant
effort.‰ The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care
will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted)

We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond

reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent or
dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for
committing an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony
by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the argument of
the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for

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intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on

the ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence
of the accused was so gross that the felony already
amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully
delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies
committed by means of culpa on the one hand and felonies
committed by means of dolo on the other in the context of
the distinctions it has drawn between them. The penalties
provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are
mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a
result of the imprudence or negligence of another.
Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261
(Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death
was a result of the commission of a forbidden act
accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable
penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subject to

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378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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the discretion of the court. We have already resolved ·

and the OSG agrees · that the accused Dizon and Tecson,
et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus
iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa.
Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is
applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Ruling on the Motions for Clarification

or Reconsideration filed by Tecson, et al.

We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of

the motions of respondents Tecson, et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).

The finality of a CA decision will not bar the state

from seeking the annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.

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In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the

previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty of slight
physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result
of their respective availments of the probation program and
their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that
they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.22 Respondents
allude to our Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their
contention that

_______________

21 Supra note 10.

22 In the annulled CA Decision (supra note 2), Tecson, et al. were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 20 days of arresto menor. On the other
hand, in the Decision of this Court (supra note 1), they were sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prisión correccional, as maximum.
23 430 Phil. 685; 381 SCRA 74 (2002). The accused was found guilty
of bigamy by the trial court, and was sentenced to suffer a

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the CA judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled

even by this Court.
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not
have attained finality, as the former had timely filed with
this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65
petition is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial
or reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorari also
prevents the case from becoming final and executory until
after the matter is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the
finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for
probation, viz.:

SECTION 7. Modification of judgment.·A judgment of

conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set

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aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except

where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final
after the lapse of

_______________

prison term of prisión correccional. He thereafter applied for

probation, as the sentence imposed on him was probationable.
Subsequently however, the trial court withheld the order of release from
probation in view of the filing by the prosecution of a motion for
modification of the penalty. The prosecution pointed out that the trial
court erred in imposing the sentence on the accused, as the legally
imposable penalty under the Revised Penal Code was prisión mayor,
which is non-probationable. The trial court reconsidered its order and
amended the sentence from a maximum period of 4 years and 2 months
to the maximum period of 8 years and 1 day, which had the effect of
disqualifying accused from applying for probation. This Court set aside
the amendatory judgment of the trial court and reinstated its original
decision, and ruled that the trial court judgment can no longer be
reversed, annulled, reconsidered, or amended, as it has already lapsed
into finality. It was then reiterated that the accusedÊs waiver of appeal
brought about by his application for probation amounted to a voluntary
compliance with the decision and wrote finis to the jurisdiction of the
trial court over the judgment.
24 Reply of OSG dated 25 November 2004, Rollo (G.R. No. 154954,
Vol. I), pp. 1098-1132.

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the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has

been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused
has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)

Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of

Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the foregoing provisions
that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a
criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the

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correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was

instituted in order to give life to the constitutional edict27
against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the
accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state
appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an
acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the
accusedÊs waiver of the right to appeal · as when applying
for probation · makes the criminal judg-

_______________

25 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.·When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information. (Emphasis supplied)
26 Rules of Court, Rule 122, provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Who may appeal.·Any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double
jeopardy. (2a) (Emphases supplied)
27 1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 21.

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ment immediately final and executory. Our explanation

in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating:28

Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of

acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already
been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal
defendantÊs culpability; after failing to persuade the court to

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enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons

supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and
becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendantÊs
already established innocence at the first trial where he had
been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same
untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial
initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the
powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice
would necessarily result, as the government would then be
allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of
the defendantÊs guilt while strengthening any weaknesses
that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the
governmentÊs power and resources are once again employed against
the defendantÊs individual means. That the second opportunity
comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial
by the standards of reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases
supplied, citations omitted)

It must be clarified, however, that the finality of

judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer
blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have
already explained in our Decision that the rule on double
jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable
to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of
the court that issued the crimi-

_______________

28 G.R. No. 168982, 5 August 2009, 595 SCRA 438, 450.

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382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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nal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is

articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote:30

In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the

merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually takes
place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is

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per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict

was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the
court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of
whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on
the question of the decisionÊs error or correctness. Under the
exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden · a very heavy
one · is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show
the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation
of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied,
citations omitted)

While this CourtÊs Decision in Tan may have created an

impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as
soon as the accused applies for probation, we point out that
what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the
modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A
petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct
and separate from the main case. While in the main case,
the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or guilty
of the crime

_______________

29 People v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17 (citing People v. Serrano,

Sr., supra note 17 at p. 306; p. 690; and People v. De Grano, supra note
17).
30 People v. Nazareno, supra note 28 at p. 451.

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charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the

court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b)

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with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is no
modification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose
resolution does not call for a reevaluation of the merits of
the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal
responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any
resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a
consequence of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of
Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is inapplicable and
irrelevant where the courtÊs jurisdiction is being assailed
through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the
modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal
brought before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal
under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45,
and if that appeal would put the accused in double
jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the partial
annulment of the CA Decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 15520 in
spite of its finality, as the judgment therein was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

The orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 have no

legal effect, as they were issued without jurisdiction.

First, Tecson, et al. filed their Applications for

Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our
criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of
the court to adjudicate and decide the case before it.
Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal
to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before
it.31 That power and

_______________

31 People v. Mariano, 163 Phil. 625; 71 SCRA 600 (1976).

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capacity includes the competence to pronounce a

judgment, impose a punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33
the execution of a sentence in accordance with law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving
the probation applications of Tecson, et al. before Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not
have competence to take cognizance of the applications,
considering that it was not the court of origin of the
criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that
originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby
quoted for reference:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation.·Subject to the provisions of this

Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)

It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law

requires that an application for probation be filed with the
trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant,
meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that
originally convicted and sentenced Tecson, et al. of the
crime of homicide

_______________

32 Id.; and Antiporda v. Garchitorena, 378 Phil. 1166; 321 SCRA 551
(1999).
33 See: Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the
Probation Law, Sec. 4.
34 Reply of OSG dated 25 November 2004, Rollo (G.R. No. 154954,
Vol. I), pp. 1098-1132.

385

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was Branch 121 · not Branch 130 · of the Caloocan

City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders
nor Tecson, et al. in their pleadings have presented any
explanation or shown any special authority that would
clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been
filed with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC
Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the
CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was made
specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e.,
accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36
Tecson, et al. thus committed a fatal error when they
filed their probation applications with Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that
applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which
they may seek probation, as the requirement under Section
4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely
procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation
proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of
authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the case were still with the
CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted the
probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged
with the court in which the criminal action has been
properly instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial courtÊs
judgment or final

_______________

35 See: RTC Decision (People v. Dizon), supra note 3.

36 Concepcion v. Angeles, C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 32793 (CA, decided on 15
June 1994), slip. op., at p. 16.
37 See Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980), Sec. 20, for the applicable law on which
court has subject matter jurisdiction over criminal cases; and Rule 110,
Sec. 15, for the applicable rule on where the criminal action must be
instituted.

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order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court.

The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the
appealing party is concerned.39 The court of origin then
loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other
partyÊs time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual
jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease · including
the authority to order execution pending appeal · the
moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to
the appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court
that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear,
try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its
decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power
and authority shall remain with the appellate court until it
finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted
by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the
first place.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, „[n]o
penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final
judgment.‰ A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting
the accused of the offense charged becomes final under any
of the following conditions among others:42 after the lapse
of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the accused
waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal
of an appeal; when the sentence has already been partially
or totally satisfied or served; or when the accused applies
for probation. When the decision attains finality, the
judgment or final order is entered in the book of entries of
judgments.43 If the case was previously appealed to the CA,
a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be
attached to the original record, which shall then be
remanded to the clerk of the court

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38 Rule 122, Sec. 1; Rule 121, Sec. 7.

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39 Rule 122, Sec. 11(c).

40 Rule 41, Sec. 9 in relation to Rule 122, Sec. 6.
41 Rule 41, Sec. 9 in relation to Rule 122, Secs. 8 and 11(c).
42 Rule 120, Sec. 7; Rule 122, Sec. 12.
43 Rule 120, Sec. 8 in relation to Rule 36, Sec. 2; Rule 124, Sec. 17.

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from which the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin

then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate
action. It is during this time that the court of origin may
settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the
suspension of the execution thereof,45 including the
convictsÊ applications for probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not
yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the
Applications for Probation of Tecson, et al. It shows that the
accused filed their respective applications47 while a motion
for reconsideration was still pending before the CA48 and
the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the
motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August
2002 denying it, or about seven months after Tecson, et al.
had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In
September 2002, or almost a month before the
promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11

_______________

44 Rule 124, Sec. 17.

45 Revised Penal Code, Arts. 78 to 88 (in relation to Rule 124, Sec. 17;
Rule 121, Sec. 8; Rule 36, Sec. 2; Rule 39, Sec. 1)
46 Probation Law, Sec. 4.
47 Tecson, et al. filed their applications on various dates in January
2002. See: Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1861-1863, 1897-1901, 1942-1944,
& 1967-1969.
48 See: CA Resolution dated 30 August 2002, supra note 2 at p. 6,
Rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 214.
49 See: CA Resolution (People v. Dizon, C.A.-G.R. CR No. 15520, 14

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February 2002), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 1972. In the Resolution, the
CA stated that „the records of this case cannot be remanded at this stage
considering the motions for reconsideration filed hereto.‰ See also: Letter
of Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, CA Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 2686-
2688; Transmittal Letter from the CA dated 19 February 2008, Rollo
(G.R. No. 155101), p. 918.
50 CA Resolution dated 30 August 2002, supra, Rollo (G.R. No.
154954, Vol. I), supra.

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October 2002 granting the probation applications,51 the

OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for
Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the
OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court
a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November 2002.54 We noted
the petition and then required respondents to file a
comment thereon.55 After their submission of further
pleadings and motions, we eventually required all parties
to file their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of the
case remained with the CA until they were elevated to this
Court in 2008.57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130
had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of
Tecson, et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to
suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order
their final discharge, and eventually declare the case
against them

_______________

51 RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 11

October 2002), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1872-1873, 1904-1905, 1950-
1951, 1977-1978.
52 CA Resolution (People v. Dizon, C.A.-G.R. CR No. 15520, 29
October 2002), CA Rollo, Volume II, pp. 2724-2725.
53 Supreme Court Resolution dated 25 November 2002, Rollo (G.R.
No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 10-A.
54 The Supreme Court granted the Motion for Extension filed by the

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OSG. See: Supreme Court Resolution dated 13 October 2003, Rollo (G.R.
No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 675.
55 Supreme Court Resolution dated 13 October 2003, Rollo (G.R. No.
154954, Vol. I), p. 675.
56 Supreme Court Resolution dated 21 October 2009, Rollo (G.R. No.
155101), pp. 1156-1160.
57 Transmittal Letter from the CA dated 19 February 2008, Rollo
(G.R. No. 155101), p. 918; See also Letter of Presiding Judge Adoracion
G. Angeles, Caloocan City RTC Branch 121, CA Rollo, Vol. II, pp.
2686​-2688. Judge Angeles informed the CA that the records of the case
had not yet been remanded to Branch 121, thus preventing her from
complying with the CA Resolution to release the cash bond posted by one
of the accused. The CA Third Division received the letter on 22 October
2002 · or 11 days after RTC Branch 130 granted the probation
applications.

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VOL. 743, DECEMBER 1, 2014 389

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terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pas is a

clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law or an
underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch
130 or Tecson, et al., or both · to which this Court cannot
give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson, et al. were ineligible to seek
probation at the time they applied for it. Probation58
is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent
qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability
and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their
acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the
state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an
incarceration record by making them undergo
rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major
purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually
develop themselves into law-abiding and self-respecting
individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration
with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right
enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace or
clemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of

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Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:

It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group

of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant
of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to
be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law
should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its
government of any of the latterÊs prerogatives, rights or
remedies, unless the

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58 Probation Law; Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 241; 243

SCRA 384 (1995); and Baclayon v. Mutia, 214 Phil. 126; 129 SCRA 148
(1984). See: Del Rosario v. Rosero, 211 Phil. 406; 126 SCRA 228 (1983).
59 Id., at pp. 254-255; p. 390.

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390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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intention of the legislature to this end is clearly

expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of
the law who is not clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)

The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the

probation applications of Tecson, et al.60 It points out that
when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by
the RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek
probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
968 (the Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text of Section 4 of the
Probation Law as follows:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation.·Subject to the provisions of this

Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem

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best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be

entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term
of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be
filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
(Emphases supplied)

_______________

60 Reply of OSG dated 25 November 2004, Rollo (G.R. No. 154954,

Vol. I), pp. 1098-1132.

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VOL. 743, DECEMBER 1, 2014 391

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Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that

the offender must not have appealed the conviction.61 In
the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was
faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for
probation even after the trial court has imposed a non-
probation​able verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers
the original penalty to a sentence within the probationable
limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to
a maximum term of eight years of prisión mayor, which
was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only
became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the
maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months
and 21 days of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in
Francisco and ruled that the accused was ineligible for
probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In
Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation
Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any
distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clear is that
all offenders who previously appealed their cases,
regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by
the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court

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enunciated in Lagrosa that the accused are disallowed from

availing themselves of the benefits of probation if they
obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on
appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence
from non-probationable to probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its various Orders
discharging Tecson, et al. from probation, the ruling in
Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning
of this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of
Appeals63 and Fran-

_______________

61 Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 453 Phil. 270; 312 SCRA 298 (2003);
and Francisco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 58.
62 Id. See also: Francisco v. Court of Appeals, id.
63 256 Phil. 328; 174 SCRA 566 (1989).

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392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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cisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson, et al.,

therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch
130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We
recall that respondents were originally found guilty of
homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if
the CA later downgraded their conviction to slight physical
injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor,
which made the sentence fall within probationable limits
for the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found
them ineligible for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as
an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so gross that it
divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a
consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for
Probation of Tecson, et al. and thereafter discharging them
from their criminal liability must be deemed to have been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

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excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction or for grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we
declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation
applications of Tecson, et al. null and void for having been
issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in
Galman v. Sandigan​bayan64 applicable, viz.:

A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By

it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be
attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are
equally worthless. It nei-

_______________

64 228 Phil. 42, 90; 144 SCRA 43, 89 (1986). E.g., People v. Jardin,
209 Phil. 134, 140; 124 SCRA 167, 174 (1983) (citing Gomez v.
Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717 [1925]; Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 133 Phil.
661; 24 SCRA 663 [1968]; Paredes v. Moya, 158 Phil. 1150; 61 SCRA 526
[1974]).

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VOL. 743, DECEMBER 1, 2014 393

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ther binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all
claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)

The ultimate discharge of Tecson, et al. from

probation did not totally extinguish their criminal
liability.

Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their

criminal liability has already been extinguished as a result
of their discharge from probation and the eventual
termination of the criminal case against them by Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites
the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished.

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·Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all
its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article
344 of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the

source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no
judgment

_______________

65 Motion for Clarification of Bantug, supra note 10.

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394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villareal vs. People

had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of

the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to
the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim
benefits that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson, et al. cannot invoke Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this
case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is
precisely to „suspend the execution of the sentence,‰66 and
not to replace the original sentence with another, as we
pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:67

An order placing defendant on „probation‰ is not a

„sentence‰ but is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
„interlocutory judgment‰ in the nature of a conditional order

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placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court

for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge,
if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final
judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases
supplied)

Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson, et al.

remains.

In light of our recent Decision in Colinares v. People,

Tecson, et al. may now reapply for probation.

Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our

ruling in Francisco and modified our pronouncements
insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal
their conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-
6, the Court

_______________

66 Probation Law, Sec. 4.

67 Supra note 58 at p. 132; p. 154.
68 G.R. No. 182748, 13 December 2011, 662 SCRA 266.

395

VOL. 743, DECEMBER 1, 2014 395

Villareal vs. People

En Banc in effect abandoned Lagrosa and settled the

following once and for all:69

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who
appeals „from the judgment of conviction‰ is disqualified from
availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a
conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now
set aside; and two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the
Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinionÊs hard
position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial

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courtÊs annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to

probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment
imposed on him. More, the Supreme CourtÊs judgment of conviction
for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over
to the trial courtÊs judgment · even if this has been found in error.
And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial courtÊs
erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw
(the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that
allowing Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this
Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals that the probation law
requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge
difference between Francisco and this case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that
would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not
have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a
position to say, „By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for
probation.‰ The stiff

_______________

69 Id., at pp. 279-282.

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396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villareal vs. People

penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that
choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek
probation under this CourtÊs greatly diminished penalty will
not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that
those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when
they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right
to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the CourtÊs finding that Arnel was guilty,
not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide,
is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on

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him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from
the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and
imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months
maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for
probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his
right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying
philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law
must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the
accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its
letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many
cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of
the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve
its beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was
right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years
and four months maximum, he would have had the right to
apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he

397

VOL. 743, DECEMBER 1, 2014 397

Villareal vs. People

would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right
by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely
since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it
fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the
new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the
one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to
probation? (Emphases supplied)

In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA

judgments and found Tecson, et al. ultimately liable for the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the

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offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum

period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión
correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months,
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Considering that the
new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson, et al.,
we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation.
Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same
crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for
probation.
While we cannot recognize the validity of the Orders of
RTC Branch 130, which granted the Applications for
Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson, et al.
have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous
probation program and have eventually been discharged
therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the
trial court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent
probation service in resolving whether to place them under
probation at this time and in determining the terms,
conditions, and period thereof.

398

398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Final clarificatory matters

We now take this opportunity to correct an

unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of
the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson, et al.
While this issue was not raised by any of the parties before
us, this Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex
proprio motu in the interest of justice. In the first
paragraph of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1
February 2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:

They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison

term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
correccional, as maximum.

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As we had intended to impose on the accused the

maximum term of the „penalty next lower‰ than that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance
with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase
„and one (1) day,‰ which had been inadvertently added,
must be removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of
the dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should now
read as follows:

They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison

term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.

In this instance, we further find it important to clarify

the accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty
imposed on Dizon and Tecson, et al.

_______________

70 See, e.g.: People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 17 December

2008, 574 SCRA 258; People v. Gabres, 335 Phil. 242; 267 SCRA 581
(1997); and People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933).

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Villareal vs. People

By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised

Penal Code, a corresponding accessory penalty
automatically attaches every time a court lays down a
principal penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof.71
The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as
reference the principal penalty imposed by the court
before the prison sentence is computed in
accordance with the ISL.72 This determination is made
in spite of the two classes of penalties mentioned in an
indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized that the
provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties

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specifically allude to the actual „penalty‰73 imposed, not to

the „prison sentence‰74 set by a court. We believe that the
ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the
convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same
offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar as
setting the

_______________

71 Revised Penal Code, Art. 73. People v. Silvallana, 61 Phil. 636, 644
(1935). According to Silvallana: „It is therefore unnecessary to express
the accessory penalties in the sentence.‰
72 See, e.g.: Moreno v. Commission on Elections, 530 Phil. 279; 498
SCRA 547 (2006); Baclayon v. Mutia, supra note 58.
73 Article 73 of the Revised Penal Code provides: „Presumption in
Regard to the Imposition of Accessory Penalties.·Whenever the courts
shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other
penalties, according to the provisions of Articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45
of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also
imposed upon the convict.‰
74 Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended,
provides: „Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term
of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x.‰
75 The law should not apply if its application would be unfavorable to
the accused. See generally Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code,
Vol. I, pp. 720-721 (1987).

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400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which

the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the
shortening of the prison term.76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the
prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence

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resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum

period to prisión correccional in its medium period. As this
provision grants courts the discretion to lay down a penalty
without regard to the presence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty must
also be within the aforementioned range.77 Hence, before
applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and
Tecson, et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years
and two months of prisión correccional.79 Pursuant to
Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión
correccional automatically carries with it80 the following
accessory penalties:

_______________

76 See ISL, Sec. 5; Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, id., at, pp. 718-
720.
77 Article 365 provides: „In the imposition of these penalties, the
courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.‰
78 People v. Temporada, supra note 70; People v. Ducosin, supra note
70. See, e.g.: Bongalon v. People, G.R. No. 169533, 20 March 2013, 694
SCRA 12; Guinhawa v. People, 505 Phil. 383; 468 SCRA 278 (2005);
People v. Dy, 425 Phil 608; 375 SCRA 15 (2002); People v. Darilay, 465
Phil. 747; 421 SCRA 45 (2004); People v. Bustamante, 445 Phil. 345; 397
SCRA 326 (2003); People v. Catuiran, 397 Phil. 325; 343 SCRA 293
(2000); People v. Barro, 392 Phil. 857; 343 SCRA 238 (2000); Austria v.
Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 408; 327 SCRA 668 (2000); Ladino v. People,
333 Phil. 254; 265 SCRA 422 (1996); People v. Parohinog, 185 Phil. 266;
96 SCRA 373 (1980); and People v. Dimalanta, 92 Phil. 239 (1952).
79 People v. Temporada, id. The case explained the difference between
a „prescribed penalty,‰ „imposable penalty,‰ and „penalty actually
imposed.‰
80 See: Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 193237 and
193536, 9 October 2012, 683 SCRA 1; Aratea v. Commission on

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ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional · Its accessory penalties.·

The penalty of prisión correccional shall carry with it that of
suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed
eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification
provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.

The duration of their suspension shall be the same as

that of their principal penalty sans the ISL; that is, for four
years and two months81 or until they have served their
sentence in

_______________

Elections, G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012, 683 SCRA 105; and People
v. Silvallana, supra note 71.
81 See Art. 27 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: „Prisión
correccional, suspensión, and destierro.·The duration of the penalties of
prisión correccional, suspensión, and destierro shall be from six months
and one day to six years, except when the suspension is imposed as
an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of
the principal penalty‰ and Art. 33, which states: „Effects of the
Penalties of Suspension from Any Public Office, Profession or Calling, or
the Right of Suffrage.·The suspension from public office,
profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall
disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such
profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the
sentence. The person suspended from holding public office shall not
hold another having similar functions during the period of his
suspension.‰ (Emphases supplied) Cf: Lacuna v. Abes, 133 Phil. 770; 24
SCRA 780 (1968). The Court En Banc explained therein that then Mayor-
elect Benjamin Abes was released from confinement on 7 April 1959 by
virtue of a conditional pardon granted by the President of the
Philippines, remitting only the unexpired portion of the prison term and
fine. It then clarified that without the pardon, his maximum sentence
would have been served on 13 October 1961. Accordingly, the Court said
that the accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification would
have barred

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Villareal vs. People

accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect

immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes
final.82
We further point out that if the length of their
imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall furthermore
suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage. Under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, if
this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive
them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular
election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that office;
and (c) to hold any public office.83 Any public office that
they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of the
judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can
only be wiped out if expressly remitted in a pardon.85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are
without prejudice to a grant of probation, should the trial
court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in Bacla​-
yon,86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the
accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point in
Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing

defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a
suspension of the imposition of

_______________

him for seeking public office and for exercising his right to vote until
13 October 1961.
82 Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80.
83 See: Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, id. (citing Lacuna v.
Abes, supra note 81); Aratea v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80;
People v. Silvallana, supra note 71.
84 Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, id.
85 Revised Penal Code, Art. 36. See: Jalosjos v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205033, 18 June 2013, 698 SCRA 742; Monsanto v.

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Factoran, 252 Phil. 192; 170 SCRA 190 (1989); Lacuna v. Abes, supra
note 81.
86 Supra note 58.
87 Supra note 72.

403

VOL. 743, DECEMBER 1, 2014 403

Villareal vs. People

sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner

suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the
order granting probation the paragraph which required that
petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its
minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly
suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the
probationer is not even disqualified from running for a
public office because the accessory penalty of suspension
from public office is put on hold for the duration of the
probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer
does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is
merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for

Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in
connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby
DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101
and 154954 is also DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or

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Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel

Anthony D. Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson
are likewise DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan
City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in

404

404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villareal vs. People

taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for

Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation
proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or
judgments issued in connection thereto. We, however,
CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
D. Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito
Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view
of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the
Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil
liability, if any.
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the
dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012
and hereby delete the phrase „and one (1) day‰ located in
the fourth sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The
sentence shall now read as follows: „They are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.‰
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr.,** Perez and

Reyes, JJ., concur.

Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda

H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080
denied; Motion for Reconsideration of Office of the Solicitor
General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 also
denied. Respective Motions for Clarification or
Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr. and Vincent Tecson
likewise denied; entire probation proceedings before

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Caloocan City Regional Trial Court, Br. 130 annulled and

all orders, resolutions or judgments issued in connection
thereto set aside; however, Antonio Mariano Almeda,

_______________

8 8 Supra note 68.

* * Designated additional member, in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo
D. Brion, per S.O. No. 1888 dated 28 November 2014.

405

VOL. 743, DECEMBER 1, 2014 405

Villareal vs. People

Junel Anthony D. Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent

Tecson and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply
for probation, without prejudice to their remaining civil
liability, if any.

Notes.·The grant of probation does not justify a public

employeeÊs retention in the government service. (Dimapilis-
Baldoz vs. Commission on Audit, 701 SCRA 318 [2013])
The application for probation is an admission of guilt on
the part of an accused for the crime which led to the
judgment of conviction. (Almero vs. People, 718 SCRA 698
[2014])
··o0o··

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