BSL-3 Laboratory

Design Resource
 © Copyright 2003
Phoenix Controls Corporation

Copyright 2003, American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning, Engineers, Inc.
www.ashrae.org. Reprinted by permission from ASHRAE 2003 Handbook-Fundamentals.

Copyright 2004, NSF International, 789 N. Dixboro Road, PO Box 130140, Ann Arbor, MI 48113-0140, (734) 769-8010
(phone), (734) 769-0109 (fax), [email protected], http://www.nsf.org.
The material in this paper is for information purposes only and is subject to change without notice. Phoenix Controls
Corporation assumes no responsibility for any errors or for consequential damages that may result from the use,
misrepresentation, or translation of any of the material in this publication.

Printed in USA
Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

Characteristics of Biological
Containment Facilities (BSL-3) .....................................................3

Ventilation Requirements .................................................................9

Airflow Control Solutions ............................................................. 13

System Components ............................................................................. 17

Standards and Guidelines .............................................................. 29

 Table of Contents

Containment Facilities (BSL-3)

• Classifications of Biocontainment

Characteristics of Biological
This chapter presents an overview of the features Laboratories, 4
and categories of biocontainment laboratories, • Biosafety Cabinets, 5
along with a brief discussion of the types of
biosafety cabinets used in these labs.

Characteristics of Biological Containment

Facilities (BSL-3)
An Overview of Biological Containment
Facilities (BSL-3)
There has been a considerable increase in the design and construction of biomedical and
microbiological laboratories.1 These types of laboratories may be found in clinical, diag-
nostic, teaching, research, or production facilities and often include containment or
biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) spaces. This specialized containment space or laboratory is used
when indigenous or exotic agents are present and may cause serious or potentially lethal
disease as a result of inhalation exposure. The features that distinguish a BSL-3 labora-
tory from lower level (BSL-1 and BSL-2) microbiological labs are:
• Provisions for access control
• A specialized ventilation system ensuring directional airflow
• Use of biosafety cabinets or fume hoods for all laboratory activities
A BSL-3 laboratory may be a single lab, a suite of labs or an entire building. The primary
objective of this type of facility is to provide the best possible physical containment of
hazardous microorganisms or biological agents. All laboratory manipulations should be
performed in a biosafety cabinet (BSC) or other enclosed equipment. The biosafety
cabinet is relied upon as the primary device in BSL-3 laboratories for protecting prod-
ucts, personnel or the environment. Contrast this with chemical fume hoods designed
to provide only personnel protection. The pressurized lab space serves as a secondary
containment barrier. General exhaust air from the laboratory is often treated with High
Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters before it is exhausted outdoors. A dedicated
exhaust system may be required, depending on the class/type of biosafety cabinet used.
One other functional aspect of a BSL-3 laboratory is the need for gaseous decontamina-
tion, essentially requiring a “tight” space. Penetrations must be capable of being sealed
for fumigation purposes.
Several authorities publish guidelines for the design and operation of BSL-3 laboratories,
primarily the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) Biosafety in Microbiological and Bio-
medical Laboratories (BMBL), the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-
Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), and Health Canada’s Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines.
Relevant excerpts from each may be found in the “Standards and Guidelines” section
starting on page 29.
1
Centers for Disease Control/National Since ventilation system design and operation play a key role in biological containment
Institutes of Health (CDC/NIH), Biosafety
in Microbiological and Biomedical
facilities, a thorough understanding of the specialized requirements is necessary to
Laboratories, 4th edition preface, http://
www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/
safeguard researchers and other building occupants from potential exposure through
bmbl4toc.htm. inhalation.

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 3

 Classifications of Biocontainment Laboratories
Although the focus of this document is BSL-3, a comparison of all four biocontainment
levels is helpful. Each represents a different combination of laboratory practices, safety
equipment, and laboratory facilities appropriate for increasing levels of protection. The
levels represent a hierarchy, with all practices and procedures delineated at the lower
levels carried forward to the next higher level. A primary barrier refers to safety equip-
ment, such as a BSC, and a secondary barrier refers to facility design and construction.

Figure 1-1. Contaminant levels

for biocontainment
laboratories.
BSL-4

BSL-3

BSL-2

BSL-1

Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1)

The most basic level of containment is level one, which uses standard microbiological
practices and no special primary or secondary barriers, other than a sink, for hand
washing. The type of microorganisms present is not known to cause disease in healthy
humans. Normally, this is the level at which water-testing, undergraduate and secondary
educational training and teaching laboratories operate.
Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2)
This level is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, teaching and other laboratories where
moderate risk agents are present but not known to be transmissible by the aerosol
route. The primary hazard to personnel is from exposures through the skin, mucous
membrane exposure or ingestion. Procedures with aerosol or high splash potential must
be conducted in primary containment equipment, such as a BSC. Secondary barriers,
such as hand-washing sinks and decontamination facilities, must be available to reduce
environmental contamination.
Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3)
At this level, the risk of respiratory transmission causing serious and potentially lethal
infections is present, and more emphasis is placed on primary and secondary barriers for
protection. All laboratory manipulations should be performed in a BSC or other en-
closed equipment. Secondary barriers include controlled access, often double-door en-
try through the use of an anteroom or airlock, and air movement that is directional and
single-pass.

4 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

 Containment Facilities (BSL-3)
Characteristics of Biological
A Note About Animal Biosafety Levels
Four biosafety levels also exist for activities involving infectious disease work with experimental animals and are
designated as Animal Biosafety Levels (ABSL) 1, 2, 3 and 4. While recommendations for facilities, practices and
operational requirements are comparable to non-animal biosafety level labs, the presence of animals can present
some unique problems. They may generate aerosols, bite, scratch and be infected with a zoonotic disease. More
information may be found in Section IV of the NIH document on Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical
Laboratories (http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4toc.htm), which states:
“Ventilation should be provided in accordance with criteria from Guide for Care and Use of Labora-
tory Animals, latest edition. The direction of airflow in the animal facility is inward; animal rooms
should maintain negative pressure compared to adjoining hallways.”
The Agricultural Research Service (ARS) classifies a Biosafety Level 3 Agricultural facility (BL3 Ag.) as one with
research involving Class 3 etiologic agents and recombinant organisms (animal or plant), large species of
animals, exotic strains of endemic diseases and exotic diseases of livestock. To accommodate this type of
research, BSL-3 facilities are modified to include select features from maximum BSL-4 facilities. Please refer to
Chapter 9, section 9.4.4, “Biosafety Level 3 Agriculture (BSL-3Ag)” of the ARS Facilities Design Standards (http:/
/www.afm.ars.usda.gov/ppweb/242-01m.htm) when designing this particular type of lab.
Canadian standards can be found in the publication, Containment Standards for Veterinary Facilities (http://
www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/lab/convet/convet1-2e.shtml). Published by the Animal and Plant Health Di-
rectorate (APHD) of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC), this document outlines “minimum design and
operational requirements for APHD laboratories and animal containment facilities.”

For Research Involving Recombinant DNA

The NIH publishes NIH GGuidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (http://www4.od.nih.gov/
oba/rac/guidelines_02/NIH_Guidelines_Apr_02.htm) and compliance is mandatory for investigators at institu-
tions receiving NIH funds and performing research involving recombinant DNA. Ventilation guidelines are
identical to those published by the NIH for biomedical and microbiological labs. Please refer to http://
www4.od.nih.gov/oba/, if necessary.

Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4)

At this level, dangerous and exotic agents pose a high individual risk of life-threatening
diseases, which may be transmitted via the aerosol route and for which there is no
available vaccine or therapy. All manipulations pose a high risk of exposure, not only to
laboratory personnel, but also to the community and the environment. Work is con-
ducted in a Class III biosafety cabinet or in a full-body, air-supplied positive-pressure
personnel suit. The facility is generally a separate building or a completely isolated zone.
Complex ventilation and waste management systems are used to prevent the release of
viable agents.
Biosafety Cabinets
The BSC is the primary containment barrier and all work involving infectious material
must be conducted within it. The cabinets are designed to protect personnel, products
and the environment from exposure to biohazards and cross contamination. There are
three classes of cabinets that may be used, depending on the level of protection desired.
While all classes may be found in BSL-3 spaces, Class II cabinets are the most common
and within this class, there are four types of cabinets. These types—known as A1, A2, B1
and B2—differ by their operating requirements, primarily in flow velocity and the per-
centage of air exhausted.

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 5

Figure 1-2. Classes and types of
biosafety cabinets. Although all
of these classes are found in BSL-
3 spaces, Class II cabinets are the
Class I Class II Class III
most common.

Type A1 Type A2 Type B1 Type B2

The National Sanitation Foundation (NSF) defines a Class II cabinet as: “A ventilated
cabinet for personnel, product, and environmental protection having an open front with
inward airflow for personnel protection, downward HEPA filtered laminar airflow for
product protection, and HEPA filtered exhausted air for environmental protection.”2
Class II cabinets are further subdivided into types A and B, depending on how exhaust is
handled. Type A cabinets, which are designed for working in the absence of toxic or
volatile chemicals, may exhaust HEPA-filtered air back into the laboratory, or thimbles
(canopies) may be connected to the building exhaust system to distribute air back to
the environment. “It is possible to duct the exhaust from a Type A cabinet out of the
building,” according to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). “However, it must be
done in a manner that does not alter the balance of the cabinet exhaust system, and
thereby disturbing the internal cabinet air flow. The typical method of ducting a Type A
cabinet is to use a ‘thimble’, or canopy hood, which maintains a small opening (usually 1
inch) around the cabinet exhaust filter housing. The volume of the exhaust must be
sufficient to maintain the flow of room air into the space between the thimble unit and
the filter housing. The thimble must be removable or be designed to allow for opera-
tional testing of the cabinet. The performance of a cabinet with this exhaust configura-
tion can be affected by fluctuations in the building exhaust system.”3
Type A cabinets should never be hard connected to an exhaust system. “‘Hard-ducting’
(i.e., direct connection) of Class II Type A cabinets to the building exhaust system is not
recommended unless a dedicated exhaust fan system with a dynamic flow balancing
mechanism is provided. The building exhaust system must be precisely matched to the
airflow from the cabinet in both volume and static pressure. However, fluctuations in air
volume and pressure that are common to all building exhaust systems make it difficult
to match the airflow requirements of the cabinet. A competent in-house maintenance
and engineering staff is required to achieve this.”4
Type B cabinets are to be hard ducted to the building exhaust system and vented outside
the building without recirculation. For this reason, low levels of volatile chemicals are
permitted in Type B cabinets.
When sizing exhaust fans, the NSF recommends allowing 2" WC (500 Pa) for a dirty HEPA
filter, in addition to the amount needed to produce the exhaust flow specified by the
2
National Sanitation Foundation/American cabinet manufacturer. The table below summarizes the requirements for the four types
National Standards Institute (NSF/ANSI),
Class II (laminar flow) biosafety cabinetry, of Class II biosafety cabinets.
NSF/ANSI 49-2004a, p. 4.
3
Centers for Disease Control (CDC),
Primary Containment for Biohazards,
Section III, http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/
biosfty/bsc/BSC2000sec3.htm.
4
Ibid.

6 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

 Containment Facilities (BSL-3)
Characteristics of Biological
Operating Requirements of Class II Biological Safety Cabinets

Inflow Exhaust Exhaust through

Type Velocity Amount HEPA Plenum Pressure
A1 75 fpm (0.38 m/s) 30% Optional May be positive or negative
A2 100 fpm (0.5 m/s) 30% Optional Negative
B1 100 fpm (0.5 m/s) 70% Yes Negative
B2 100 fpm (0.5 m/s) 100% Yes Negative

Operation of Biosafety Cabinets

In Class II cabinets, an internal blower draws airflow around the operator into the front
opening and then into the front grille. At the same time, downward laminar flow of
HEPA-filtered air minimizes the chance of product cross-contamination along the work
surface of the cabinet. The downward moving air divides as it approaches the work
surface, with the blower drawing part of the air to the front grille and the remainder
toward the rear grille. Cabinet air exhaust is discharged through the rear plenum into the
space between the supply and exhaust filters located at the top of the cabinet. The air
passes through a certified exhaust HEPA filter, making it contaminant-free for either
recirculation into the laboratory or extraction from the building (see Figure 1-3).
Characteristics of all Class II Biosafety Cabinets
• Leak-tight construction
• Requires two HEPA filters–supply and exhaust
• Airflow patterns
- Clean (filtered) air flows down to the work surface
- Downflow air splits 2-6" (5-15 cm) above the work surface
• Some to rear of front grille
• Some to rear of cabinet
- Intake air is drawn into the front of the front grille
- Air leaves work area and is HEPA filtered prior to being exhausted or recirculated
in the cabinet

Figure 1-3. Airflow pattern in a

Class II biosafety cabinet.

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 7

 Exhaust Systems for Biosafety Cabinets
Canopy Connection
• Air gap between duct and cabinet
• Exhaust flow is greater than cabinet flow (air is drawn from the room)
• Previously called a thimble connection
• Used with A1 and A2 biological safety cabinets
Hard Connection
• Air-tight joint between duct and cabinet
• Exhaust system flow equals cabinet exhaust flow
• Used with B1 and B2 biological safety cabinets
The illustrations and text in this section are provided courtesy of the Eagleson Institute (http://www.eagleson.org).

Figure 1-4. Exhaust system for Guidelines for the Placement of Biosafety Cabinets
a Class II biosafety cabinet. • Isolate from other work areas
• Not in high traffic areas
• Away from airflow ducts, cross drafts
• Away from laboratory entry doors

8 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

 Table of Contents
• Pressurization, 9
• Volumetric Offset vs. Differential
This chapter provides details on the ventilation Pressurization Control, 10
requirements that are unique to BSL-3 facilities. • Architectural Tightness, 11
• Ventilation Rates, 11
• HEPA Filtration, 12

Ventilation Requirements

Pressurization
Ventilation controls for critical laboratory environments function on multiple levels. For

Requirements
Ventilation
example, device level controls may be applied to BSCs, fume hoods or ventilated cage
systems (animal facilities), while room level controls ensure containment through direc-
tional airflow. At this level, you are likely to also find space temperature and humidity
controls. Finally, building-wide systems work to integrate the critical space controls with
the rest of the facility, which may contain areas in which pressurization control is not
needed. While these non-critical spaces still have control requirements, these are driven
primarily by comfort.
For the BSL-3 laboratory, air is drawn into the space from the surrounding areas to
maintain a negative pressure relationship. Airflow movement should always be in the
direction of increasing biological hazard or from “clean” to “dirty.” The ventilation sys-
tem shall be:
• Single-pass
• Non-recirculating
• Directional
• A ducted exhaust system

Figure 2-1. Biocontainment

laboratory with BSL-2 and
BSL-3 spaces.

BSL-3
BSL-2

Airlock

Active Pressure
Monitor

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 9

 At the device level, the NSF recommends interlocking hard-ducted cabi-
nets (Class II, Type B) with the blower in the duct or the building system
to prevent pressurization of the exhaust system. In addition, alarms should
be provided at the cabinet to indicate a loss of exhaust flow.4 Because
containment in this type of cabinet depends on the building’s exhaust
system, ASHRAE recommends using redundant backups on these ex-
haust fans.6
At the room level, pressure monitors with visual and/or audible indica-
tors may be installed at the entrance to the laboratory to confirm the
HVAC Systems pressurization status. At the system level, the supply air systems for BSL-
3 should be designed to prevent any sustained positive pressurization or
Because of the criticality of maintaining the reversal of airflow direction from the laboratory to the clean areas of
pressurization in the spaces and control of the building. Exhaust fans should be interlocked to supply fans. Controls
exhaust effluents, two features of the air and/or alarms should be provided to alert personnel of any exhaust air
handling system should be considered.
problem.
Separate Fan System
BSL-3 labs also have a requirement for restricting access using a series of
As many of the standards and guidelines two self-closing, typically interlocking, doors. This is usually accomplished
describe, the ventilation system should be through the use of an anteroom or an air lock creating an additional
independent of other laboratory zones, pressurization zone to balance and monitor.
while the system may utilize manifolds to
combine flows from other BSL-3 or lower
biological containment areas. The fan sys-
tem, in general, should be separate from
other types of laboratories.
Volumetric Offset versus Differential
Redundancy Pressurization Control
While not required by code, serious con- Maintaining correct room balances across cascaded pressurization zones
sideration should be given to redundant can be complex from a ventilation control standpoint. Volumetric offset
backups on any critical mechanical compo- control, however, has proven to be a very effective method of achieving
nents of the exhaust and/or supply system. pressurization control in laboratories. Differential pressure control, con-
This feature would include HEPA filtration
trolling to a specific pressure, has historically been more difficult and less
units on any device that cannot be turned
off for filter maintenance. stable. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the Ameri-
can Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) support the use of volumetric
offset over differential pressurization for laboratory environments. “Speci-
fying quantitative pressure differential is a poor basis for design…What is
really desired is an offset air volume.”7
“No specific pressure differential is required by the BMBL, and design
basis varies widely between laboratories…The basis for determining the
differential should be to create sufficient directional airflow to allow
5
National Sanitation Foundation/American National Standards Insti-
tute (NSF/ANSI), Class II (laminar flow) biosafety cabinetry, NSF/
containment to occur during planned or unplanned breaches in the bar-
ANSI 49-2004a, p. E2. rier.”8 A common differential used in BSL-3 laboratories is approximately
6
American Association of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Condition- .05" WC (12.45 Pa). “Directional inward airflow provided such that air will
ing Engineers, Inc. (ASHRAE), ASHRAE Handbook: 2003 HVAC
Applications, p. 14.7.
always flow towards areas of higher containment (e.g., ± 25 Pa differen-
7 tial),” states the third edition of Health Canada’s Laboratory Biosafety
American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA), American Na-
tional Standard for Laboratory Ventilation (ANSI/AIHA Z9.5-2003), Guidelines.9
section 5.1.1, pp. 27-28.
8
Crane, Jonathan T., AIA, “Hot Zone Laboratories,” ASHRAE Journal,
June 1999, p. 29.
9
Health Canada, Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, 3rd edition, p. 35.

10 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

For volumetric offset, the laws of physics govern air movement when the exhaust vol-
ume is greater than supply. Constant volume valves on the supply and exhaust are set
based on the total exhaust requirements of devices within the room (i.e., BSCs and
snorkels) with an offset of approximately 10%. This small amount of air will also flow
through undercuts in the door and/or door transfer grilles as designed in leakage. And,
this flow will still maintain the directional airflow desired when the door is open. For
example, note in Figure 3-1 that the total exhaust volume for lab “B” is 1560 CFM. This is
160 CFM more than the supply valve is providing, 1400 CFM. The offset of 160 CFM
represents 10% of the total exhaust and is compensated by the volume flowing under
the door. As a safeguard, proper room pressurization can be verified before entering the
space by checking the monitor.

Requirements
Ventilation
Architectural Tightness
Due to the need for gaseous decontamination, BSL-3 labs must be designed as “tight”
spaces. Air treatment systems for fumigation require that penetrations in walls, ceilings,
and floors be sealed. For the ventilation system, accommodation must be made to seal
the duct or reduce the airflow through the space, depending on the decontamination
agent. Specifically, significantly reduced airflows or conventional shut-off devices may be
required. For certain decontamination agents or other emergency conditions, bubble-
tight dampers may be installed.
Leaktight is a term that may also be used in reference to the duct system, which is
typically outside the containment barrier (room) and before any HEPA filtration or
ultraviolet (UV) decontamination. In the event the exhaust side becomes positively
pressurized, the concern exists that potentially contaminated air may leak into sur-
rounding areas. In this scenario, the definition of “leaktight” or “airtight” is based on a
given loss of pressure over a stated time period.
Please note that none of the leaktight definitions referring to outside the containment
barrier are required to be 100% leaktight. In any conversations using the word, “leaktight,”
it is highly recommended to clarify whether the reference is to the space or to the
ductwork/control device outside the space.

Ventilation Rates
While none of the guidelines indicate a specific room air change rate for higher level
biocontainment facilities, the Handbook of Laboratory Safety suggests a minimum of 6
air changes per hour (ACH) with a range from 10-20 air changes per hour for higher risk
laboratories.10 Designs for 10-12 air changes per hour for BSL-3 facilities appear to be
common and this may be lowered to 6 ACH at night when the lab is unoccupied. The air
change rate will likely be determined by equipment exhaust requirements.

10
Furr, A. Keith. CRC Handbook of Labora-
tory Safety, 5th Edition, 2000, p. 90.

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 11

 HEPA Filtration
Because the biosafety cabinet incorporates a HEPA filter in its exhaust and/or supply
system, additional filtering is optional in a BSL-3 laboratory. “The need for filtration
should be reviewed with the appropriate safety officers.”11 However, the use of HEPA
filtration on the room’s general exhaust is considered a prudent practice in most cases.
If the valve is located outside of the containment perimeter, consideration should be
given to isolation of valve casing leakage and HEPA filtration of pressure monitor lines,
including valve pressure switches and pressure monitor sensors. “If required, HEPA filters
should be equipped with provisions for bag-in, bag-out filter handling systems and gastight
isolation dampers for biological decontamination of the filters.”12

Summary of Biosafety Level Requirements13

Biosafety Level
1 2 3 4
*
Isolation of laboratory No No Yes Yes
Room sealable for decontamination No No Yes Yes
Ventilation:
• Inward airflow No Desirable Yes Yes
• Controlled ventilating system No Desirable Yes Yes
• HEPA-filtered air exhaust No No Yes/No** Yes
Double-door entry No No Yes Yes
Airlock No No No Yes
Airlock with shower No No No Yes
Anteroom No No Yes —
Anteroom with shower No No Yes/No*** No
Effluent treatment No No Yes/No*** Yes
Autoclave:
• On site No Desirable Yes Yes
• In laboratory room No No Desirable Yes
• Double-ended No No Desirable Yes
Biological safety cabinets No Desirable Yes Yes
Personnel safety monitoring capability**** No No Desirable Yes
* Environmental and functional isolation from general traffic.
* Dependent on locations of exhaust.
*** Dependent on agent(s) used in the laboratory.
**** For example, window, closed-circuit television, two-way communication.

11
American Association of Heating, Refrig-
erating and Air-Conditioning Engineering,
Inc. (ASHRAE), ASHRAE Handbook: 2003
HVAC Applications, p. 14.17.
12
Centers for Disease Control/National In-
stitutes of Health (CDC/NIH), Biosafety in
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories,
4th edition preface, http://www.cdc.gov/od/
ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4toc.htm.
13
World Health Organization (WHO), Labo-
ratory Biosafety Manual, Third Edition, p. 3.

12 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

 Table of Contents
• Biological Containment (BSL-3)
Laboratory, 13
This chapter describes ventilation control options and • Biosafety Cabinet Airflow Control, 14
applications with Phoenix Controls valves. These are • Room Ventilation Control, 14
designed to meet the special airflow requirements of BSL-3
environments. • Room Balance Control Options, 14

Airflow Control Solutions

Airflow Control Applications in Biological
Containment (BSL-3) Laboratories
A broad array of control sequences may be used to meet the specialized airflow require-
ments of BSL-3 spaces. This is just one example of an application using Phoenix Controls
valves. To maintain the integrity of the space, all valves should “fail to last position” or to
a coordinated fail-safe condition for the entire space.

Figure 3-1. An example of an

airflow control application in a
Supply
BSL-3 laboratory.
Exhaust

1085

Airflow Control
160 cfm 675 cfm 675 cfm 50 cfm 375 cfm cfm 100 cfm

Solutions
200 cfm 1440 HEPA filter 1400 Tightly closing
HEPA HEPA cfm HEPA
filter cfm filter isolation damper filter
Thimble

Exhaust
HEPA filter Exhaust
HEPA filter

Corridor Air Lock

M M M
A1 = 75 fpm A2 = 100 fpm B1 = 100 fpm B2 = 100 fpm
30% exhaust 30% exhaust 70% exhaust 100% exhaust

80 cfm 120 cfm 160 cfm

Lab A Lab B
Class II Type A cabinets Class II Type B cabinets
canopy and Phoenix valve hard connected

Assumptions:
Cabinets are nominally 6' wide with 10" sash openings.

NOTE: M is a room pressure monitor.

Due to the way they operate, Types A1, A2 and B2 cabinets may draw significant
amounts of additional room air beyond the flow at the cabinet face.

On the next two pages are several options to consider when using Phoenix Controls
Accel® II valve for device and room-level control of BSL-3 laboratories. For more details
about the features and performance of this valve, see Chapter 4.

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 13

Biosafety Cabinet Airflow Control Using a Phoenix Venturi Valve
Class II, Type A Cabinets in Addition to the Thimble
• Constant volume or two-state valves tied to cabinet controls A better solution than only a thimble
• Clean air or corrosion resistant valve, depending on intended use or (or canopy) connection
decontamination method
A thimble connection is normally used to
• Valve in addition to canopy or thimble provides known total room isolate the biosafety cabinet from fluctua-
exhaust under all operating conditions tions in the building exhaust. Because the
venturi valve is a pressure independent de-
Class II, Type B Cabinets vice, it automatically responds to system
• Constant volume or two-state tied to cabinet controls pressure changes keeping the cabinet ex-
haust, as well as room supply and general
• Corrosion resistant valves due to use of chemicals in cabinet exhaust, constant.
• Valve required to isolate and stabilize cabinet flows from building • Maintains accurate room pressurization
exhaust system fluctuations • Safer because it eliminates the potential
for leakage into the room (for example,
during chemical use in Class II, Type A2
cabinets)
Room Ventilation Control • Simplifies balancing
Supply
• May be constant volume valve, two-state or variable valve
• Centrally treated air (filtered and humidified)
• Local temperature control with reheat coils
Exhaust
• May be constant volume, two-state or variable valve
• Either a clean air or corrosion resistant valve may be used, depending
on intended use or decontamination method
Airlock Supply
• Constant volume or two-state valve switched from air lock door
opening
• Clean air valve

Room Balance Control Options

Room pressurization is maintained using constant volume airflow con- Exhaust
trol and volumetric offset. Designed leakage into the room is through
door or transfer grilles. There are several options for controlling the Airflow
space: HEPA
filter
• Phoenix room control system (either analog or digital)—May be inte-
Supply
grated with the building management system for monitoring pur-
poses Airflow
• Analog valves controlled by DDC system Reheat
Coil
• Straight constant volume control
Typical supply/exhaust valve and associated device arrangements are Figure 3-2. Typical supply/exhaust valve and
shown in Figure 3-2. associated device arrangements.

14 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

 Application Flexibility
Depending on the level of automation desired, Phoenix airflow control solutions can be config-
ured any number of ways. Below are a few examples of applications in bio-containment labora-
tories using two-state and variable valves, along with analog or digital room control platforms,
to provide the desired automation.

Remote Pressurization Tuning

Use a variable to remotely adjust room airflow to obtain the desired pressurization at commis-
sioning. During normal operation, this variable valve will be maintained at a constant command
flow.

Purge Mode
Use two-state or variable valves to modulate between a “normal” supply/exhaust level and one
that is at much higher volumes to quickly purge the space following decontamination.

Door Switch
Use a door switch to trigger an increase in the supply air into the airlock when either airlock door
is opened. (Remember that both doors will not be opened at the same time.) In addition, the
appropriate exhaust valve, corridor or bio-containment space will increase the exhaust level.
This increase in flow through the door opening ensures containment of the space.

Multi-state Cabinet

Airflow Control
Use a two-state or variable valve to accommodate varying states of operation of the biosafety

Solutions
cabinet. In addition, multi-state valves on the general exhaust will compensate for cabinet
exhaust level changes.

Bubble-tight Damper Operation

Actuated bubble-tight dampers can be controlled from discrete outputs for emergency modes,
such as fan failure or automated decontamination sequences.

Fan Failure
Two-state or variable valves can be used to react to exhaust or supply fan failures. For example,
in the event of exhaust fan failure, the supply valve can be driven to minimum flow and the
exhaust valve driven to maximum flow.

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 15

16 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource
 Table of Contents
This chapter provides information on the features • Accel II® Valve, 17
and performance of Phoenix Controls products • Active Pressure Monitor, 24
that are used in BSL-3 applications. These
• Local Display Unit, 25
components are engineered to deliver reliable,
effective airflow control. • Shut-off Valve, 26
• Temperature and Humidity Sensors, 27
System Components
Accel II® Valve
The Accel II valve is ideal for BSL-3 applications. The performance characteristics of the
patented Accel II venturi valve that prove reliable for laboratory environments—accu-
racy, stability, and pressure independence—are equally valued in BSL-3 labs and for
biosafety cabinet exhaust. This valve:
• Ensures sustained pressurization
• Isolates the cabinet from fluctuations in the exhaust system
• Provides stable flow, even as the HEPA filter becomes loaded
• Maintains airflows within NSF 49 guidelines
• Requires no emergency power to maintain flows
• Requires no preventative maintenance
The Phoenix Controls Accel II venturi valves use a mechanical pressure-independent
regulator to control airflow accurately and stably. These can be selected as constant
volume, two-state and variable valves to provide multistate constant airflow schemes.
Pressure Independence
All Phoenix Controls valves maintain a fixed flow of air by adjusting to changes in static
pressure. Each valve has a cone assembly with an internal stainless steel spring. The

System Components
custom engineered springs were selected based on passing one million cycles of full-
deflection testing. The cone assembly adjusts the open area of the venturi to system
pressure as described below so that the flow set point is maintained continuously and
instantaneously.
When there is low static pressure, less force is applied to the cone, which causes the
spring within the cone to expand and pull the cone away from the venturi. The combina-
tion of low pressure and large open area provides the desired flow.

Figure 4-1. The effects of low

static pressure on a venturi
valve cone. When there is low 0.6" wc
(150 Pa)
static pressure, less force is
applied to the cone, which
causes the spring within the
cone to expand and pull the
cone away from the venturi.
The combination of low 1000 cfm
(1700 m3/hr)
pressure and large open area
provides the desired flow.

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 17

 As static pressure increases force on the cone, the spring compresses and the cone
moves into the venturi, reducing the open area. Higher pressure and the smaller opening
combine to maintain flow set point.

Figure 4-2. The effects of high

static pressure on a venturi 3" wc
valve cone. As static pressure (750 Pa)

increases force on the cone, the

spring compresses and the cone
moves into the venturi,
reducing the open area. Higher
1000 cfm
pressure and the smaller (1700 m3/hr)
opening combine
to maintain flow setpoint.

Valve Types
With the internal pressure independent cone assembly in operation, airflow can be
regulated by positioning the shaft/cone assembly. The following types of Accel II valves
are available:
• Constant Volume: The valve’s Pivot arm locked Position at
high pressure
shaft is locked into a specific
position, which provides the
scheduled airflow via factory
calibration.
Position at
low pressure

• Two-state: The valve’s actuator min flow

20 psi
positions the shaft to two distinct max flow

airflows. Mechanical clamps as-

sure precise minimum and maxi-
mum airflows via factory calibra-
tion. These valves are available
Potentiometer on 'B' control type
with either pneumatic or low- provides position output signal

speed electric actuation.

• Variable: Closed loop control of 20 psi

Input signal
PATENT NOS. 5,304,093 / 5,251,665 AND PATENTS PENDING
Newton, MA 02158 USA

Corporation
END VIEW

airflow via flow feedback to com-

Phoenix Controls
20 PSI

Access required after installation

DO NOT BLOCK COVER TAB
ACTUATOR
T

Phoenix Accel II Venturi Valve

mand. The shaft is positioned us-

®

ing direct potentiometer mea-

surement to produce a linearized
factory characterized feedback.
Potentiometer
These valves are available with ei-
ther pneumatic or low-speed elec-
tric actuation.

18 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

Valve Construction
Applications require that each valve be built to withstand unique environments. The
Accel II valves are available in three construction types:
• Class A: Non-corrosive atmosphere—supply air, return air, and many general exhaust
applications
• Class B: Corrosive environments—general chemical fume exhaust
• Class C: Consult the factory for special coatings
Constant Volume Boxes Compared to Phoenix Constant Volume Valves
A popular approach for controlling airflow uses single blade dampers with pitot tubes,
orifice plates or other flow or pressure measuring devices wired to a terminal unit
control module. These are most commonly known as constant volume boxes or termi-
nal boxes, and may be chosen because of first costs. Unfortunately, boxes lack the
advantages of other flow control devices that do not require rebalancing, recalibration,
cleaning, emergency power or straight runs of duct for proper operation. Ventilation
control components that solve these problems justify additional investment, especially
when research costs and future operating costs are factored into the value of the sys-
tem.

Functionality Constant Volume Boxes Phoenix Controls Valves

Balancing Require adjustment, more costly Factory set, saves time
Rebalancing/recalibration Required periodically None required
Regularly scheduled maintenance Require preventative maintenance None required
Dust and dander in airstream Measuring devices require cleaning Not affected by typical conditions
Straight duct 2-3 duct widths up and downstream None required up or downstream
Auto-zeroing Room goes temporarily out of control Not part of control sequence
Turndown ratio (max:min) 3-3.5:1 Approximately 20:1
Accuracy 15% of command at low end of range 5% of command
Emergency power Requires emergency power Auto-fails to correct flow w/out power
Cage rack ventilation options Lack accuracy and repeatability Proven accuracy and reliability
BMS data points BMS controller integral with box Points via room or building network

System Components
Corrosion protection
To accommodate the decontamination needs of BSL-3 spaces, Accel II valves may be protected from chemical
corrosion with a baked phenolic coating. Hydrogen peroxide fumes, tested at 30% concentration and room
temperature, had no effect on the Heresite coating. Immersion in a 5% formaldehyde solution produced an “A”
rating, meaning it had no effect.

Conditions Resistivity Levels

1N (30.8% concentration) hydrochloric acid Good/no effect
1N (26% concentration) sodium hydroxide No effect
1% quaternary ammonium compound Recommended
5% formaldehyde “A” rated
2% indophor (iodine mixed with phosphoric Limited recommendation
acid, weak acid) (phosphoric acid @ 10%)
5% phenol No effect
70% ethyl alcohol No effect

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 19

Accel® II Valves (digital)
The Phoenix Controls Accel II Venturi Valves combine a mechanical, pressure-independent regulator with a high-speed
position/airflow controller to meet the unique requirements of airflow control. These valves can be used in constant volume,
two-position, or VAV applications—all designed to maximize flow performance while reducing related noise. Valves for VAV
applications may be either electrically or pneumatically actuated.
• Pressure-independent operation: All valve types include an immediate response me-
chanical assembly to maintain airflow set point as duct static pressure varies.
• Airflow control: By positioning the flow rate controller assembly, the airflow can be
adjusted.
Accel II valves are available in: Phoenix Accel II Venturi Valve ®

ACTUATOR

T
COVER TAB
DO NOT BLOCK
• Constant volume (CVV series) for maintaining an airflow setpoint under variable static Access required after installation

20 PSI
END VIEW Phoenix Controls
Corporation
Newton, MA 02158 USA
PATENT NOS. 5,304,093 / 5,251,665 AND PATENTS PENDING

pressure conditions
• Two-position (PEV/PSV series) for high/low flow control (pneumatic only)
• Base upgradable (BEV/BSV series) for pneumatic flow control with feedback option (pneumatic only)
• VAV (EXV/MAV series) with VAV closed-loop feedback control (pneumatic or electric) with pneumatic for fume hood
applications or low-speed electric actuation for tracking pair applications.
• When networked with a twisted pair cable, Celeris valves form a room-level control system, providing ventilation,
volumetric offset, temperature, humidity, occupancy and emergency control.
Specifications
Construction • Available in flows from 35-6000 CFM I/O available for connecting field devices:
• 16 ga. spun aluminum valve body with (60-10,000 m3/hr)** • 3 universal inputs. Accepts volt, mA,
continuous welded seam • Response time to change in command ohms or NTC 2 or 3 thermistor signals.
• Valve bodies available as uncoated signal: • 1 digital input
aluminum or with corrosion-resistant • < 1 second (control type M and N) • 2 analog outputs. Provides volt or mA
baked phenolic coatings • < 1 minute (control type L) signals.
• Composite Teflon® shaft bearings • Response time to change in duct static • 1 digital output (Type C, 1 amp @ 24 Vac/
• Spring grade stainless steel spring and pressure: < 1 second Vdc)
PPS slider assembly Pneumatic Actuation Agency compliance:
• Supply valves* insulated with 3/8" (9.5 • CE
• Only applicable to PEV, PSV, BEV/BSV
mm) flexible closed-cell polyethylene. • UL 916 listed
and EXV/MAV-N (pneumatic control type)
Flame/smoke rating 25/50. Density is • FCC Part 15, Subpart J, Class A
• 20 psi (-0/+2 psi) with a 20 micron filter
2.0 lb/ft3 (32.0 kg/m3).
main air required (except for CVV) Room-level communcations:
Operating Range • Compressor sizing: Accel II valves are not FTT-10, 78 KB, bus topology, LonTalk™
• 32-122 °F (0-50 °C) ambient continuous air-consuming devices. For network
• 10-90% non-condensing RH compressor sizing, use: Building-level communications:
Sound • single and dual valves: 10 scim TP-1250, 1.2 MB, bus topology, LonTalk™
• triple and quad valves: 20 scim network
Designed for low sound power levels to
meet or exceed ASHRAE noise guidelines. VAV Controller
Performance Power:
• Pressure independent over a 0.6"-3.0" 24 Vac (±15%) @ 60 Hz
wc (150-750 Pa) drop across valve * Not applicable to CVV series.
Power Consumption:
• Volume control accurate to ±5% of ** Celeris triples and quads represent 2
Control Type Single Dual
airflow command signal L (low-speed electric) 13 VA 17 VA nodes on the system (main and booster).
• No additional straight duct runs needed N (pneumatic) 11 VA 11 VA
Teflon is a registered trademark of DuPont Co.
before or after valve M (high-speed electric) 48 VA 48 VA
LONWORKS is a registered trademark of Echelon Corp.

Constant Two-position Upgradable VAV

Feature/Option Volume (PEV/PSV) (BEV/BSV) (EXV/MAV)
(CVV) Celeris
C P B
Control type Constant Pneumatic Base L N M
Volume Upgradable
Actuator type — Pneumatic Pneumatic Low-speed electric Pneumatic High-speed elec.
Flow feedback signal — — Option 9 9 9
Failsafe Fixed NO/NC NO/NC Last Position NO/NC NO/NC, Last Posit.
Factory-insulated valve body (supply) — 9 9 9 9 9
Field-adjustable flow 9 9 9 9 9 9
Flow alarm via feedback circuit — — — 9 9 9
Flow alarm via pressure switch Option Option Option Option Option 9
Low-noise diffuser construction† 9 9 9 9 9 9

All valves include pressure independent, factory-calibrated position controllers, and are available in flows from 35-6000 CFM (60-10,000 m3/hr).**
†Accel II valves are designed to reduce sound over all frequencies, but significantly target the lower bands (125-500 Hz) to help eliminate the need for silencers.

20 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

Valve Sizes, Dimensions and Operating Ranges
Accel II digital valves are available in three specific model sizes: 8, 10 and 12. (For actual
dimensions, refer to the chart below.) In order to increase flow capacity, multiple valves may
be assembled to operate as a unit.
Single (Exhaust Dual (Pneumatic
Valve shown) Supply Valve shown)
®
Phoenix Accel
Acce l II Venturi
enturi Valve
ACTUATOR

COVER TAB
DO NOT BLOCK
Access required after installation
20 PSI

END VIEW Phoenix Controls

Corporation
Newton, MA 02158 USA

E
PATENT NOS. 5,304,093 / 5,251,665 AND PATENTS PENDING

D
E
B
B

C
F
F C A

Triple Quad
(Make-up Air (Constant Volume
Valve shown) Valve shown)

G
E B
D D

A
F C A F C

Valve Dimensions

A* B* C D E** F G
inches mm inches mm inches mm inches mm inches mm inches mm inches mm

8 — — 7.88 200 23.50 597 — — 14.13 359 28.00 711 10.13 257
10 — — 9.67 246 21.75 552 — — 16.13 410 26.20 665 11.20 284
12 — — 11.84 301 26.81 681 — — 18.13 461 32.56 827 12.13 308

System Components
2-10 20.13 511 10.13 257 24.75 629 1.5 38 16.77 426 27.70 704 21.52 547
2-12 24.13 613 12.13 308 29.81 757 1.5 38 18.75 476 34.60 879 24.76 629
3-12 37.06 941 12.13 308 29.81 757 1.5 38 18.75 476 34.60 879 36.77 934
4-12 48.26 1226 12.13 308 29.81 757 1.5 38 18.75 476 34.60 879 48.65 1236
* outer dimension ** maximum of all valve types (some configurations may be smaller)

Operating Ranges

Flow (CFM) Flow (m3/h) Flow (l/s)

0.6"-3.0" wc 150-750 Pa 150-750 Pa

8 35-700 60-1175 17-330

10 50-1000 85-1700 24-472
12 90-1500 150-2500 43-708
2-10 100-2000 170-3350 47-943
2-12 180-3000 300-5000 85-1415
3-12 270-4500 450-7500 127-2123
4-12 360-6000 600-10000 170-2831

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 21

 Accel® II Valve (analog)
The Phoenix Controls Accel II Venturi Valves combine a mechanical, pressure-independent
®
Phoenix Accel II Venturi Valve

regulator with a high-speed position/airflow controller to meet the unique requirements of

ACTUATOR

COVER TAB
DO NOT BLOCK
Access required after installation
20 PSI

Phoenix Controls

airflow control. These valves can be used in constant volume, two-position, or VAV applica-
END VIEW Corporation
Newton, MA 02158 USA
PATENT NOS. 5,304,093 / 5,251,665 AND PATENTS PENDING

tions—all designed to maximize flow performance while reducing related noise. Valves for
VAV applications may be either electrically or pneumatically actuated.
• Pressure-independent operation: All valve types include an immediate response me-
chanical assembly to maintain airflow set point as duct static pressure varies.
• Airflow control: By positioning the flow rate controller assembly, the airflow can be ad-
justed.
Accel II valves are available in:
• Constant volume (CVV series) for maintaining an airflow setpoint under variable static
pressure conditions
• Two-position (PEV/PSV series) for high/low flow control (pneumatic only)
• Base upgradable (BEV/BSV series) for pneumatic flow control with feedback option and
upgradability to VAV (pneumatic only)
• VAV (EXV/MAV series) with VAV closed-loop feedback control (pneumatic or electric)

Specifications
Construction Performance
• 16 ga. spun aluminum valve body with continuous • Pressure independent over a 0.6"-3.0" wc
welded seam (150-750 Pa) drop across valve
• Valve bodies available as uncoated aluminum or • Volume control accurate to ±5% of airflow
with corrosion-resistant baked phenolic coatings command signal
• Composite Teflon® shaft bearings • No additional straight duct runs needed before
• Spring grade stainless steel spring and PPS slider or after valve
assembly • Available in flows from 35-6000 CFM
• Supply valves* insulated with 3/8" (9.5 mm) (60-10,000 m3/hr)
flexible closed-cell polyethylene. Flame/smoke • Response time to change in command signal:
rating 25/50. Density is 2.0 lb/ft3 (32.0 kg/m3). < 1 second
• Response time to change in duct static
Operating Range
pressure: < 1 second
• 32-122 °F (0-50 °C) ambient
• 10-90% non-condensing RH VAV Controller
Sound Controller Power:
Designed for low sound power levels to meet • ±15 Vdc, ±5% @ 0.145 amp (pneumatic only)
or exceed ASHRAE noise guidelines. • 0-10 Vdc command signal
• 0-10 Vdc flow feedback signal
• 0-10 Vdc alarm signal
Constant Two-position Upgradable VAV VAV Pneumatic Actuation:
Feature/Option Volume (PEV/PSV) (BEV/BSV) (EXV/MAV) (EXV/MAV) • Only applicable to PEV, PSV, BEV/BSV and
(CVV) Pneumatic Pneumatic Pneumatic Electric EXV/MAV-N (pneumatic control type)
• 20 psi (-0/+2 psi) with a 20 micron filter main
air required (except for CVV)
C P B A A
• Compressor sizing: Accel II valves are not
Control type Constant Pneumatic Base Analog Analog
continuous air-consuming devices. For
Volume Upgradable
compressor sizing, use:
Flow feedback signal — — Option 9 9 • single and dual valves: 10 scim
Failsafe Fixed NO/NC NO/NC NO/NC NO/NC or • triple and quad valves: 20 scim
Last Posit. Electric Actuation:
• 24 Vac (±15%) @ 60 Hz
Factory-insulated
• single and dual valves: 48 VA
valve body (supply) Option 9 9 9 9
• triple and quad valves: 96 VA
Field-adjustable flow 9 9 9 9 9
Flow alarm via
feedback circuit — — — 9 9
Flow alarm via * Not applicable to CVV series.
pressure switch Option Option Option Option Option
Teflon is a registered trademark of DuPont Co.
Low-noise diffuser
construction† 9 9 9 9 9

All valves include pressure independent controllers, factory-calibrated position controllers, and are
available in flows from 35-6000 CFM (60-10,000 m3/hr).
†Accel II valves are designed to reduce sound over all frequencies, but significantly target the lower bands
(125-500 Hz) to help eliminate the need for silencers.

22 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

Valve Sizes, Dimensions and Operating Ranges
Accel II analog valves are available in three specific model sizes: 8, 10 and 12. (For actual
dimensions, refer to the chart below.) In order to increase flow capacity, multiple valves may
be assembled to operate as a unit.
Single (Exhaust Dual (Pneumatic
Valve shown) Supply Valve shown)
®
Phoenix Accel
Acce l II Venturi
enturi Valve
ACTUATOR

COVER TAB
DO NOT BLOCK
Access required after installation
20 PSI

END VIEW Phoenix Controls

Corporation
Newton, MA 02158 USA

E
PATENT NOS. 5,304,093 / 5,251,665 AND PATENTS PENDING

D
E
B
B

C
F
F C A

Triple Quad
(Make-up Air (Constant Volume
Valve shown) Valve shown)

G
E B
D D

A
F C A F C

Valve Dimensions

A* B* C D E** F G
inches mm inches mm inches mm inches mm inches mm inches mm inches mm

8 — — 7.88 200 23.50 597 — — 14.13 359 28.00 711 10.13 257
10 — — 9.67 246 21.75 552 — — 16.13 410 26.20 665 11.20 284
12 — — 11.84 301 26.81 681 — — 18.13 461 32.56 827 12.13 308

System Components
2-10 20.13 511 10.13 257 24.75 629 1.5 38 16.77 426 27.70 704 21.52 547
2-12 24.13 613 12.13 308 29.81 757 1.5 38 18.75 476 34.60 879 24.76 629
3-12 37.06 941 12.13 308 29.81 757 1.5 38 18.75 476 34.60 879 36.77 934
4-12 48.26 1226 12.13 308 29.81 757 1.5 38 18.75 476 34.60 879 48.65 1236
* outer dimension ** maximum of all valve types (some configurations may be smaller)

Operating Ranges

Flow (CFM) Flow (m3/h) Flow (l/s)

0.6"-3.0" wc 150-750 Pa 150-750 Pa

8 35-700 60-1175 17-330

10 50-1000 85-1700 24-472
12 90-1500 150-2500 43-708
2-10 100-2000 170-3350 47-943
2-12 180-3000 300-5000 85-1415
3-12 270-4500 450-7500 127-2123
4-12 360-6000 600-10000 170-2831

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 23

Active Pressure Monitor
The Phoenix Controls Active Pressure Monitor accurately measures the pressure differential between two rooms or spaces in
a building where pressurization is critical. Utilizing true differential pressure sensing, it is capable of measuring and alarming
to within 0.5% of full scale and displaying the pressure to 0.0001 inches of water gauge (0.0249 Pa). It can meet the stringent
requirements of laboratory animal facilities, hospital ar-
eas, research facility laboratories and cleanrooms. Active Pressure Monitor

Each Active Pressure Monitor consists of a room sensor, a Pressure Status

Normal
reference space sensor and a room pressure monitor panel. Alarm Flow Status
Caution
Inches of Water Column
Optional features include the ability to remotely switch Audible Alarm

the room pressure alarm set point from a dry contact and
Mute
to provide flow alarming when used with Phoenix Con-
trols Accel® airflow control valves, verifying both pressure
and volumetric flow requirements are being met.
Phoenix Controls
Specifications Corporation

Dimensions Alarm Output

Faceplate SPDT relay
9.5" (241.3 mm) W x 5.5" Contact UL/CSA Rating
(139.7 mm) H
Feature/Option APM APM100-
2.0 A @ 30 volts AC/DC
100 REM
Accuracy Alarm Deadband
• ±0.5% FS Terminal Point 0.1% FS Faceplates
• (±0.35% FS BFSL)
Alarm Delay Range Digital Display 9 9
Stability 0-30 seconds
< ±1.0% FS per year Pressure Alarm Status LEDs 9 9
Power
Temperature Effects 22-26 Vac Audible Alarm 9 9
< ±0.03% FS/°F (.05% FS/°C) 50/60 Hz
Over-pressure
Mute Button 9 9
Power Consumption
5 PSIG Proof (34.5 KPa) 4.0 VA Flow Caution LED 9
Response Operating Temperature Monitoring
< 0.25 seconds for full span 32-160 °F (0-70 °C)
input Analog Output (4-20 mA or 0-10 Vdc) 9 9
Storage Temperature
Standard Range -40-180 °F (-40-82 °C) SPDT alarm relay 9 9
±0.05" wc (±12.5 Pa)
Weight Control
Optional Ranges 2.1 pounds (0.95 Kg)
±0.1" wc (±25 Pa) Adjustable alarm time delay (0-30 seconds) 9 9
±0.2" wc (±50 Pa)
±0.5" wc (±125 Pa) Field reversible pressurization alarm 9 9
±1.0" wc (±250 Pa)
±2.0" wc (±500 Pa)
Remote reversible pressurization alarm 9
±5.0" wc (±1250 Pa) Remote flow alarm input 9
Display
4 digit LED
0.5" height
Analog Output
Field selectable: 4-20 mA, 12
mA at zero pressure
or
0-10 Vdc, 5 Vdc at zero
pressure

24 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

 Phoenix Controls
Local Display Unit
Corporation

Temperature:
77º F
Phoenix Controls Local Display Unit (LDU) is a networked-based user interface panel
Humidity:

Status:
55% intended to display data and/or edit set point variables for vivariums, biocontainment or
Occupied
Total Supply:
800 CFM
laboratory spaces maintained by the Celeris® Environmental Control System. The LDU may be
Total Exhaust:
1000 CFM
flush or surface mounted on a variety of electrical enclosures. It is intended to be installed in
corridors outside of critical environments to provide users with information related to oper-
ating conditions inside the space. Using a 128 x 128 pixel graphical display, the LDU can
display up to five parameters simultaneously. Each parameter includes a 16-character user
Local Display Unit (LDU). defined description and the present value, including units of measure.
The LDU connects to the Celeris room-level network and may be used to display flow,
temperature, humidity, control or set point variables available on the Celeris network.

Specifications
Power Battery
Voltage CR 2032 Lithium battery; retains clock time
24 Vdc/Vac; ±15%, 50/60 Hz for 1 year with no power applied
Consumption Communication
8 VA (13 VA maximum) LonTalk ® protocol

Protection Transceiver
1.5 amp auto reset fuse TP/FT-10, 78 kbps
Environmental Enclosure
• Material: ABS resin
Operating Temperature • Color: Off-white
32-158 °F (0-70 °C) • Dimensions:
Storage Temperature • Flush mount: 6" x 6" x 1.5"
-4-158 °F (-20-70 °C) (151 x 151 x 38 mm)
Temperature Relative Humidity • Din rail mount: 4.5" x 4.5" x 1.5"
0-90%, non-condensing (113 x 113 x 38 mm)
• Weight: 0.73 lbs (0.33 kg)
General
Display
Processor • Type: Backlit LCD
Neuron® 3158, 8 bits, 10 MHz • Definition:
Memory • 128 x 128 pixels
Flash 64 K (APB applications) • 10 lines (5 variables) x 13 characters
Flash 64 K (storage) • Display area: 2.1" x 2.1 (5.5 cm x 5.5 cm)
Clock
Real-time clock chip, accurate to ±1 minute

System Components
per month

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 25

 Shut-off Valve
Phoenix Controls Shut-off Valves are intended for use in critical airflow applications, where
isolating the HVAC system from the room is necessary. Under normal operation, it provides
the critical airflow control performance demanded by a modern research facility. In the shut-
off mode, it provides low leakage isolation of the HVAC system from the room. An example
of a typical application is a laboratory research building space using gaseous
Shut-off Valve (shown in shut-off
position). biodecontamination.
• The shut-off sequence can be initiated either locally through a universal input or remotely
via the Celeris network—either from the building management system (BMS) or Local
Display Unit (LDU).
• Shut-off confirmation is available through a local digital output (DO) or an integrated
point.
• Can operate as a standalone device or in a fully Feature/Option EXV/MAV
integrated system. Actuator type Low-speed electric
Response time < 1 minute
• Celeris valve controllers provide room pressur- Control platform Celeris
ization, temperature, humidity, occupancy and Failsafe Fail to last position
emergency control functions. Shut-off mode activation Local UI or remote via
Celeris network
• Precise airflow control—The flow rate control-
Flow alarm via feedback Yes
ler assembly is factory calibrated, allowing accu- circuit
rate operation throughout its operating range. Flow alarm via pressure Option
• Self-balancing pressure independent opera- switch
Shut-off function Yes
tion—Automatically compensates for system
Factory-insulated valve Supply valve only
static pressure fluctuations to maintain the air- body
flow set point.

Specifications
Construction Operating Range VAV Controller
• 16 ga. spun aluminum valve • 32-125 °F (0-50 °C) ambient I/O:
body with continuous welded • 10-90% non-condensing RH • 3 universal inputs. Accepts
seam Performance volt, mA, ohms or NTC 2 or 3
• Valve bodies available as • Pressure independent over a thermistor signals.
uncoated aluminum or with 0.6"-3.0" wc (150-750 Pa) • 1 digital input
corrosion-resistant baked drop across valve • 2 analog outputs. Provides
phenolic coatings • Volume control accurate to volt or mA signals.
• Composite Teflon® shaft ±5% of airflow command • 1 digital output (Type C,
bearings signal throughout normal 1 amp @ 24 Vac/Vdc)
• Spring grade stainless steel operating range • Input accuracy
spring and polyester or PPS • No additional straight duct Voltage, current, resistance:
slider assembly runs needed before or after ±1% full scale
• Supply valves insulated with valve • Output accuracy
3/8" (9.5 mm) flexible closed- • Available in flows from 50- • 0 to 10 Vdc: ±1% full scale
cell polyethylene. Flame/ 2600 CFM (85-2888 m3/hr) into 10 kW minimum
smoke rating 25/50. Density • Shut-off leakage: See chart • 4 to 20 mA: ±1% full scale
2.0 lb/ft3 (32.0 kg/m 3). below. into 500 W +0/-50 W
Agency compliance:
Electric Actuation • CE
Response time: <1 minute • UL 916 listed
Shut-off Leakage Rates*
Power consumption: • FCC Part 15, Subpart J,
• 13 VA (single valves) Class A
Static Pressure
(in Pa)
• 17 VA (dual valves) Room-level communications:
249 498 747 996 1245 Power: FTT-10, 78 KB, bus topology,
6 10
9
24 Vac (±15%) @ 50/60 Hz LonTalk™ network
5 8
7 Building-level communications:
(in m3/hr)
Leakage
(in CFM)

4
Leakage

6
3 5
4
TP-1250, 1.2 MB, bus topology,
2 3
2
LonTalk™ network
1
1
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 Teflon is a registered trademark of DuPont Co.
Static Pressure
LONWORKS is a registered trademark of Echelon Corp.
(in inches wc)

* Leakage refers to expected airflow through the valve in the shut-off position.

26 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

Temperature and Humidity Sensors
Phoenix Controls temperature, humidity and air quality sensors provide a stable, secure environment for those facili-
ties that need it the most, such as hospitals, clean rooms, and laboratory animal facilities. These sensors also simplify
room balancing by eliminating the need for a certified person to accompany the balancer during the commissioning
process.
• Teflon-insulated wires ensure resistance to moisture, corrosive elements, and abrasion.
• A three-position test and balance (T&B) switch allows for overrides into full heating or cooling modes, as well as for
normal operation.

LCD
Window

www.phoenixcontrols.com
Duct sensor.

Temperature sensor. Humidity sensor.

Outside air unit.

Specifications
Temperature Humidity and Combination

Room Duct Room Duct Outside

Signal 10 K, Type 2 thermistor 10 K, Type 2 thermistor 4 to 20 mA (output) 4 to 20 mA (output) 4 to 20 mA (output)
Supply Voltage 5 to 25 Vdc (LCD only) 15 to 24 Vdc
(current or voltage
output)
Power Consumption < 0.2 VA < 1.1 VA
Operating Temperature -67 to 302 °F -67 to 302 °F 32 to 158 °F -10 to 160 °F -10 to 160 °F
Range (-55 to 150 °C) (-55 to 150 °C) (0 to 70 °C) (-23 to 71 °C) (-23 to 71 °C)

System Components
Environmental 32 to 122 °F -40 to 212 °F 32 to 122 °F -22 to 150 °F -22 to 158 °F
Temperature Range (0 to 50 °C) (-40 to 100 °C) (0 to 50 °C) (-30 to 70 °C) (-30 to 70 °C)
Environmental 0 to 95% RH 0 to 100% RH 0 to 95% RH 0 to 100% RH 0 to 100% RH
Humidity Range (non-condensing) (non-condensing) (non-condensing)
Housing Material ABS plastic Steel ABS plastic Weatherproof Weatherproof
Cast Aluminum Cast Aluminum
Accuracy ±0.2 °C (0 to 70 °C) ±0.2 °C (0 to 70 °C) ±2% from 15 to ±2% from 15 to ±2% from 15 to
95% RH @ 25 °C 95% RH @ 25 °C 95% RH @ 25 °C
Dissipation Constant 3 mW/C 3 mW/C
Stability < 0.02 °C/year < 0.02 °C/year
Reference Resistance 10 kW @ 25 °C 10 kW @ 25 °C
Sensing Element Thermistor Thermistor Impedance Type
Humidity Sensor
Response Time 20 seconds for a 20 seconds for a
63% step 63% step

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 27

28 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource
 Table of Contents
• Level 3 Biocontainment Laboratory
Guidelines, 30
• Biological Safety Cabinet Guidelines, 34
• Bibliography, 36

Standards and Guidelines

While many respected authorities provide safety guidelines, even the National Institute of Health’s Biosafety in Bio-
medical and Microbiological Laboratories (BMBL) states that “These recommendations are advisory…the application
of these recommendations to a particular laboratory operation should be based on a risk assessment of the special
agents and activities, rather than used as a universal and generic code applicable to all situations.”14
Individuals should consult all relevant local, state and federal building codes to determine which guidelines apply for a
particular facility. The safety officer or laboratory director should also be consulted on all questions relating to risk
assessment and the commensurate protection needed. The following is a compilation of excerpts from several sources
whose guidelines are relevant to BSL-3 laboratory design and operation.
About the reference sources:
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and National Institutes of Health (NIH), Biosafety in Microbio-
logical and Biomedical Laboratories, 4th edition—“This publication describes the combinations of standard and
special microbiological practices safety equipment, and facilities constituting Biosafety Levels 1-4, which are
recommended for work with a variety of infectious agents in various laboratory settings.”15
• NSF/ANSI 49-2004a Class II (laminar flow) biosafety cabinetry: NSF International Standard/American National
Standard (2004)—This is the international standard for biosafety cabinetry. “NSF Standards provide basic criteria
to promote sanitation and protection of the public health...Unless otherwise referenced, the annexes are not
considered an integral part of NSF Standards. The annexes are provided as general guidelines to the man-
ufacturer, regulatory agency, user, or certifying organization.”16
• Health Canada, Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, 3rd edition (2004)—“Since publication of the 2nd edition in 1996,
adherence to the Gudelines has become mandatory for many laboratories handling human pathogens in
Canada.”17 The third edition describes the latest principles and practices in biocontainment and biosafety.
• United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Agricultural Research Service (ARS), ARS Facilities Design
Standards (2002)—“This manual provides design policies and criteria to guide the design of ARS construction
projects.”18
• ASHRAE Handbook: 2003 HVAC Applications, Chapter 14, Laboratories—This handbook describes a wide variety of
applications used in the HVAC industry, including biosafety. The latest edition includes new data on biological
safety cabinets.
Standards & Guidelines

14
Centers for Disease Control/National Institutes of Health (CDC/NIH), Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 4th edition preface, http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/
bmbl4toc.htm.
15
Ibid.
16
National Sanitation Foundation/American National Standards Institute (NSF/ANSI), Class II (laminar flow) biosafety cabinetry, NSF/ANSI 49-2004a, p. iii.
17
Health Canada, Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, 3rd Edition, first paragraph on home page, http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/ols-bsl/lbg-ldmbl/index.html.
18
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Agricultural Research Service (ARS), ARS Facilities Design Standards home page, http://www.afm.ars.usda.gov/ppweb/242-01m.htm.

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 29

Guidelines Applying to Level 3 Biocontainment Laboratories
Ventilation Systems
2003 ASHRAE Applications Handbook, p. 14.17, Biosafety Level 3 section
“The ventilation system must be single-pass, nonrecirculating and configured to maintain the laboratory at a negative
pressure relative to surrounding areas.”
CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, p. 34, D.9.
“A ducted exhaust air ventilation system is provided. The system creates directional airflow which draws air into the
laboratory from ‘clean’ areas and toward ‘contaminated’ areas. The exhaust air is not recirculated to any other area of
the building. Filtration and other treatments of the exhaust air are not required, but may be considered based on site
requirements, and specific agent manipulations and use conditions. The outside exhaust must be dispersed away from
occupied areas and air intakes, or the exhaust must be HEPA-filtered.”
USDA ARS Facilities Design Standards, Section 9.4.3 Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3), items C.3-4
“3) A specialized ventilation system to control air movement is a requirement for a BSL-3 facility. A ducted exhaust air
ventilation system must be provided. The exhaust air may not be recirculated to any other area of the building. In
general, exhaust air may not require filtration or other treatments, but special site requirements, or certain activities
with, or uses of, hazardous agents may dictate the use of HEPA filtration...
“4) Balance of the supply air and exhaust air should provide a directional airflow with the air drawn into the facility
through the entry area. Recommendations to create this infiltration include: a 15 percent airflow differential between
exhaust and supply, or sufficient exhaust to create a 0.05” water column differential between the containment area and
the access area. With either method, it is recommended that the infiltration of air into the containment area be at least
50 CFM per doorway, at all times. Within the BSL-3 facility, the supply and exhaust systems should be distributed and
balanced so that the flow of air between functional spaces is always in the direction of areas of increasing biological
hazard potential.”
NSF Class II (laminar flow) biosafety cabinetry, p. E2, Annex E, E1.2.2
“Types B1 and B2 cabinets are to be vented outside the building without recirculation.”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 35, Matrix 3, items 1-2
“100% outside air to be supplied.
“Directional inward airflow provided such that air will always flow towards areas of higher containment (e.g., ±25 Pa
differential) (0.1" WC).”

Relation to the Building’s Mechanical System

Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 36, Matrix 3, item 8
“Supply air system to be independent of other laboratory areas. CL3 (containment level 3) supply can be combined
with areas of lower containment when provided with backdraft protection (i.e., HEPA filter, bubble tight backdraft
damper) downstream from the connection.”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 37, Matrix 3, item 16
“Exhaust air system to be independent of other laboratory areas. CL3 exhaust can be combined with areas of lower
containment when provided with a HEPA filter upstream from the connection.”

30 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

Maintaining Laboratory Pressurization
USDA ARS Facilities Design Standards, Section 9.4.3 Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3), sixth sentence of
item C.3
“Supply air systems must be designed to prevent the positive air pressurization of the space and the reversal of airflow
from the containment areas to the noncontainment areas of the building.”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 36, Matrix 3, item 9
“Supply air system to be interlocked (i.e., fans, dampers, electrical) with exhaust air system, to prevent sustained
laboratory positive pressurization.”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, pp. 37-38, Matrix 3, items 19 and 22
“Where backdraft protection is required in accordance with local risk assessment, supply air ductwork that is outside
the containment perimeter (e.g., between containment perimeter and HEPA filter or bubble tight backdraft damper)
to be sealed airtight in accordance with SMACNA Seal Class A...
“Bubble tight backdraft dampers and HEPA filters to be located in close proximity to the containment perimeter.
“(CL3 laboratories manipulating organisms, such as HIV, that are not infectious via inhalation are not required to fulfil
this criterion.)”
CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, pp. 34-35, D.9.
“Consideration should be given to installing an HVAC control system to prevent sustained positive pressurization of
the laboratory. Audible alarms should be considered to notify personnel of HVAC system failure.”

Monitoring
2003 ASHRAE Applications Handbook, p. 14.17, Biosafety Level 3 section
“Audible alarms and visual monitoring devices are recommended to notify personnel if the laboratory pressure
relationship changes from a negative to a positive condition. The user may wish to have alarms reported to a remote
constantly monitored location.”
USDA ARS Facilities Design Standards, Section 9.4.3 Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3), fifth sentence of item C.3
“A visual monitoring device should be provided at the space's entry to confirm the inward direction of the airflow.”
CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, p. 34, D.9.
“Laboratory personnel must verify that the direction of the airflow (into the laboratory) is proper. It is recommended
that a visual monitoring device that indicates and confirms directional inward airflow be provided at the laboratory
entry.”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 35, Matrix 3, items 2-3
“Visual pressure differential monitoring devices to be provided at entry to containment laboratory.
“Room pressure differential monitoring devices penetrating the containment barrier to be provided with filters of
efficiency equal to that of HEPA filtration.”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 35, Matrix 3, item 5
“Alarm (visual or audible) to be provided in the laboratory and outside laboratory area (i.e., to warn others and
Standards & Guidelines

maintenance personnel) to signal air handling systems failure.”

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 31

Access
USDA ARS Facilities Design Standards, Section 9.4.3 Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3), first sentence of item C.1
“For access control, the BSL-3 laboratory or facility should be completely separated from areas that are open to the
public, and from corridors used by laboratory personnel who do not work in the BSL-3 facility.”
CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, p. 33, D.1.
“The laboratory is separated from areas that are open to unrestricted traffic flow within the building, and access to the
laboratory is restricted. Passage through a series of two self-closing doors is the basic requirement for entry into the
laboratory from access corridors.”
2003 ASHRAE Applications Handbook, p. 14.17, Biosafety Level 3 section
“The Biosafety Level 3 laboratory uses a physical barrier of two sets of self-closing doors to separate the laboratory
work area from areas with unrestricted personnel access.”

Leakage Factor
USDA ARS Facilities Design Standards, Section 9.4.3 Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3), item C.6
“The BSL-3 space must be constructed with sealed finishes and penetrations and sealable doors to permit gaseous
biological decontamination. All furnishings and equipment must be able to be decontaminated by some proven means,
or be able to be disposed of. All utility pipe and duct penetrations, electrical conduits, utility access and other passages
through floors, walls and ceilings must be sealed to assure isolation of the space environment.”
2003 ASHRAE Applications Handbook, p. 14.17, Biosafety Level 3 section
“Gastight dampers are required in the supply and exhaust ductwork to allow decontamination of the laboratory. The
ductwork between these dampers and the laboratory must also be gastight. All penetrations of the Biosafety Level 3
laboratory envelope must be sealed for containment and to facilitate gaseous decontamination of the work area.”
CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, p. 33, D.3.
“Penetrations in floors, walls, and ceiling surfaces are sealed. Opening such as around ducts and the spaces between
doors and frames are capable of being sealed to facilitate decontamination.”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 38, Matrix 3, items 20-21
“Exhaust air ductwork that is outside the containment perimeter (e.g., between containment perimeter and HEPA
filter or bubble tight backdraft damper) to be sealed airtight in accordance with SMACNA Seal Class A.
“(CL3 laboratories manipulating organisms, such as HIV, that are not infectious via inhalation are not required to fulfil
this criterion.)
“Airflow control devices and duct sensors to be located downstream of the exhaust HEPA filter and upstream of the
supply bubble tight backdraft damper or HEPA filter, or if located upstream, duct penetrations to be sealed in accor-
dance with SMACNA Seal Class A.
“(CL3 laboratories manipulating organisms, such as HIV, that are not infectious via inhalation are not required to fulfil
this criterion.)”

Verification
CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, p. 36, D.15.
“The Biosafety Level 3 facility design and operational procedures must be documented. The facility must be tested for
verification that the design and operational parameters have been met prior to operation. Facilities should be re-
verified, at least annually, against these procedures as modified by operational experience.”

32 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 46, section 5.1, Introduction
“’Certification’ is defined as the successful completion of commissioning and verification that the facility and opera-
tional protocols meet the requirements outlined in the current edition of the Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines.”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 48, Matrix 6, item 1
“Integrity of containment surfaces to be tested visually and with a smoke pencil or other visual aid. Inspect floors, walls,
and ceiling for cracks, chips and wear. Verify integrity of wall/floor and wall/ceiling joints.
“Acceptance criteria: to confirm the integrity of all penetrations (i.e., equipment, services, etc.) and seals (i.e., around
doors, windows, autoclaves, etc.) on the containment barrier.”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 51, Matrix 7, items 1-4
“Classes I and II BSCs to be tested in situ in accordance with NSF/ANSI 49-2002 or CSA Z316.3-95.
“Class III BSCs to be tested in situ in accordance with the Laboratory Safety Monograph, NIH 1979 and BS EN 12469-2000.
“Interlocks (i.e., Class II Type B2 BSC internal cabinet supply fan and exhaust fan) to be tested in accordance with NSF/
ANSI 49:2002 to ensure that internal supply fan shuts off whenever exhaust fan fails.
“Alarms to be tested for detection of BSC and/or exhaust fan failure by simulation of alarm conditions.”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 52, Matrix 7, item 11
“Control systems to be tested for fail-safe operation by failure of system components (i.e., exhaust fan failure, supply
failure, power falure [where possible], Class II B2 BSC exhaust failure). This is to include audible/visual alarm testing.
“Acceptance criteria: inward directional airflow. The sustained reversal of airflow across containment barrier is to be
prevented.”

Certification
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 46, section 5.1, Introduction
“’Certification’ is defined as the successful completion of commissioning and verification that the facility and opera-
tional protocols meet the requirements outlined in the current edition of the Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines. ‘Recer-
tification’ is verification that that facility continues to comply with the current edition of the Laboratory Biosafety
Guidelines and has undergone recommissioning process as outlined (in the guidelines).”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 48, Matrix 6, item 1
“Integrity of containment surfaces to be tested visually and with a smoke pencil or other visual aid. Inspect floors, walls,
and ceiling for cracks, chips and wear. Verify integrity of wall/floor and wall/ceiling joints.
“Acceptance criteria: to confirm the integrity of all penetrations (i.e., equipment, services, etc.) and seals (i.e., around
doors, windows, autoclaves, etc.) on the containment barrier.”
Health Canada Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, p. 51, Matrix 7, items 1-4
“Classes I and II BSCs to be tested in situ in accordance with NSF/ANSI 49-2002 or CSA Z316.3-95.
“Class III BSCs to be tested in situ in accordance with the Laboratory Safety Monograph, NIH 1979 and BS EN 12469-2000.
“Interlocks (i.e., Class II Type B2 BSC internal cabinet supply fan and exhaust fan) to be tested in accordance with NSF/
ANSI 49:2002 to ensure that internal supply fan shuts off whenever exhaust fan fails.
“Alarms to be tested for detection of BSC and/or exhaust fan failure by simulation of alarm conditions.” Standards & Guidelines

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 33

Guidelines Applying to Biological Safety Cabinets
Airflow Requirements
CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, p. 205

Comparison of Biological Safety Cabinets

Face
velocity Radionuclides/ Biosafety Product
Type (lfpm) Airflow Pattern Toxic Chemicals Level(s) Protection
Class I* 75 In at front; rear and top through HEPA filter No 2, 3 No
open front
Class II 75 70% recirculated through HEPA; exhaust No 2, 3 Yes
Type A through HEPA
Type B1 100 30% recirculated through HEPA; exhaust via Yes (Low 2,3 Yes
HEPA and hard ducted levels/volatility)
Type B2 100 No recirculation; total exhaust via HEPA and Yes 2, 3 Yes
hard ducted
Type B3 100 Same as IIA, but plena under negative Yes 2, 3 Yes
pressure to room and exhaust air is ducted
Class III NA Supply air inlets and exhaust through 2 HEPA Yes 3, 4 Yes
filters

* Glove panels may be added and will increase face velocity to 150 lfpm; gloves may be added with an inlet air pressure release that will allow work with chemicals/
radionuclides.

NSF Class II (laminar flow) biosafety cabinetry, Class II (laminar flow) biohazard chemistry, p. 27
“6.10 Inflow velocity
6.10.1 The minimum directly measured and calculated inflow velocities of Type A1 cabinets shall be 75 ft/min
(0.38 m/s).
6.10.2 The minimum inflow quantity per 1 ft (0.3 m) of work area width of Type A1 cabinets shall be 45 ft3/min
(0.02 m3/s).
6.10.3 The minimum directly measured and calculated inflow velocities of Type A2 cabinets shall be 100 ft/min
(0.5 m/s).
6.10.4 The minimum inflow quantity per 1 ft (0.3 m) of work area width of Type A2 cabinets shall be 65 ft3/min
(0.03 m3/s).
6.10.5 The minimum directly measured and calculated inflow velocities of Type B1 and B2 cabinets shall be
100 ft/min (0.5 m/s).
6.10.6 The minimum inflow quantity per 1 ft (0.3 m) of work area width of Type B1 and B2 cabinets shall be
65 ft3/min (0.03 m3/s).”
Also according to section 6.10, directly measured inflow velocities must be within ±5 ft/min of the nominal set point
velocities to meet acceptance criteria for either production or field use.

34 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

2003 ASHRAE Applications Handbook, pp. 14.6-14.7
Class II (biological safety category)
Type A1 70% recirculation within the cabinet; 30% exhaust through a HEPA filter; common plenum configuration;
can be recirculated into the laboratory
Type B1 30% recirculation within the cabinet; 70% exhaust through a HEPA filter; separate plenum configuration;
must be exhausted to the outside
Type B2 100% exhaust through a HEPA filter to the outside
Type A2 70% recirculation within the cabinet; 30% exhaust through a HEPA filter; common plenum configuration;
must be exhausted to the outside
“The different biological safety cabinets have varying static pressure resistance requirements. Generally, Class II Type
A1 cabinets have pressure drops ranging between 1 and 25 Pa (0-0.1" WC). Class II Type B1 cabinets have pressure drops
in the range of 150 to 300 Pa (0.6-1.2" WC), and Class II Type B2 cabinets have pressure drops ranging from 370 to 570 Pa
(1.5-2.3" WC). The manufacturer must be consulted to verify specific requirements.
“The pressure requirements also vary based on filter loadings and the intermittent operation of individual biological
safety cabinets. Exhaust systems for biological safety cabinets must be designed with these considerations in mind.
Care must be exercised when manifolding biological safety cabinet exhausts to ensure that the varying pressure
requirements are met.”

Exhaust
NSF Class II (laminar flow) biosafety cabinetry, p. E1, Annex E, E.1.2.1
“Type A1 and A2 cabinets are designed to return air to the laboratory and do not generally require external venting...
“When it is desirous to exhaust air to the atmosphere, it should be via a 100% exhaust system (i.e., a system that does
not recirculate its exhaust air into other parts of the building). The recommended exhaust system connection for
types A1 and A2 cabinets is an exhaust canopy connection…No type A cabinet should ever be hard connected to an
exhaust system.”
NSF Class II (laminar flow) biosafety cabinetry, p. E2, Annex E, E.1.2.2
“Types B1 and B2 cabinets are to be vented outside the building without recirculation. The venting system should
include a leak-tight duct, a damper in the duct near the cabinet to permit flow adjustment closure and decontamina-
tion, and an external exhaust fan as the final system component.”
2003 ASHRAE Applications Handbook, p. 14.17, Biosafety Level 3 section
“All procedures involving the manipulation of infectious materials are conducted inside biological safety cabinets. The
engineer must ensure that the connection of the cabinets to the exhaust system does not adversely affect the
performance of the biological safety cabinets or the exhaust system.”
2003 ASHRAE Applications Handbook, p. 14.7
“In Class II Type A2 cabinets, exhaust air delivered to the outlet of the cabinet by internal blowers must be handled by
Standards & Guidelines

the laboratory exhaust system. This arrangement requires a delicate balance between the cabinet and laboratory
exhaust system, and it may incorporate a thimble connection between the cabinet and the laboratory exhaust ductwork.
“Class II Type B1 and Type B2 cabinets rely on the building exhaust system to pull the air from the cabinet's work space
and through the exhaust HEPA filters. The pressure resistance that must be overcome by the building exhaust system
can be obtained from the cabinet manufacturer. Because containment in this type of cabinet depends on the building's
exhaust system, the exhaust fan(s) should have redundant backups.”

Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource 35

Alarming
NSF Class II (laminar flow) biosafety cabinetry, p. E2, Annex E, E.1.2.2
“An alarm should be provided at the cabinet to indicate loss of exhaust flow.”

Bibliography
American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA). American National Standard for Laboratory Ventilation (ANSI/AIHA
Z9.5-2003). Fairfax, VA: AIHA, 2003.
American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. (ASHRAE). ASHRAE Handbook: 2003
HVAC Applications (SI Edition). Atlanta, GA: ASHRAE, 2003.
Animal and Plant Health Directorate (APHD) of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC). Containment Standards
for Veterinary Facilities, October 15, 2000. Available online at http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/lab/convet/convet1-
2e.shtml.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and National Institutes of Health (NIH). Biosafety in Microbiological
and Biomedical Laboratories, 4th edition (BMBL). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. Also available
online at http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4toc.htm.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), The Office of Health and Safety Information System (Ohasis).
Primary Containment for Biohazards, Section III. Available online at http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bsc/
BSC2000sec3.htm.
Crane, Jonathan T. “Hot Zone Laboratories.” ASHRAE Journal, June 1999, pp. 28-31.
Furr, A. Keith. CRC Handbook of Laboratory Safety, 5th Edition. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press LLC, 2000.
Health Canada. Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, 3rd edition. Ottawa: Minister of Health Population and Public Health
Branch, Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, 2004. Also available online at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/
ols-bsl/lbg-ldmbl/index.html.
National Institutes of Health (NIH). NIH GGuidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules. Available
online at http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/rac/guidelines_02/NIH_Guidelines_Apr_02.htm.
National Sanitation Foundation/American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Class II (laminar flow) biosafety cabinetry,
NSF/ANSI 49-2004a. Ann Arbor, MI: NSF International, 2004.
United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service (ARS). ARS Facilities Design Standards. Wash-
ington, DC: USDA, 2002. Available online at http://www.afm.ars.usda.gov/ppweb/242-01m.htm.
World Health Organization (WHO). Laboratory Biosafety Manual, Third Edition. Geneva: WHO, 2004.

36 Phoenix Controls BSL-3 Laboratory Design Resource

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