LORENZO M. TAÑADA, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA (G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985)

FACTS: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view
is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected
or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said
petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they
are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.

ISSUES:

Whether the petitioners have legal standing in the present case. – YES (involves public right)

Whether publication in the Official Gazette is a requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

RULING: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then
the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity
of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at
hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude [prevent] the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have
not been published, shall have no force and effect.

LORENZO M. TAÑADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA (G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986)

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made effective
seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their
constitutional right to due process and to information on matter of public concern.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision.

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication."

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the
present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did
not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after
such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly
provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons
not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true
only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law
on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can
begin to operate.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
 Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued
by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head
of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with
Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.

MARCIAL KASILAG vs. RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and
IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO (G.R. No. 46623, December 7, 1939)

FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of improvements of
land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The
parties stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years., and in
such case, mortgage would not have any effect. They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would
execute a deed of sale if it would not be paid within 4 ½ years and that she would pay the tax on the
land. After a year, it turned out that she was not able to pay the tax. Hence, they entered a verbal
agreement whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on the condition that they
would not collect the interest of the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit
by the fruits of the land, & would introduce improvement thereof.
 These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a
contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. The contract of
antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and
valid.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith because he was
unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated

RULING: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor
presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside
from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good faith
may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible,
excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws
because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-
grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In
taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist
does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and
that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to the
conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and
may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (G.R. No. 104528, January 18,
1996)

FACTS: Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village,
Inc. Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed over said lots, the subdivision
developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this
mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed
their houses on the lots in question.

Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As
highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.

Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later consolidated), the HLURB
Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) ruled that PNB - without prejudice to
seeking relief against Marikina Village, Inc. - may collect from private respondents only the
"remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously
entered into with" Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again
for the lots they had already bought from said subdivision developer.
ISSUES:

1. Whether PD 957 can have retroactive application in this case.

2. Whether Petitioner bank’s defense of being not privy to the contract will prosper.

RULING: 1. Yes. While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same
can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from
scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial
institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law - as an instrument of social
justice - must favors the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast resources with
which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is presumed to have conducted the
usual "due diligence" checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection or other modes of
investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the property offered as
collateral. It could not have been unaware that the property had been built on by small lot buyers. On
the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerless to discover the attempt of the land
developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in order to deal with this
kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment being to provide a
protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed
"unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers."

Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly prospective
application of the law. Little people who have toiled for years through blood and tears would be
deprived of their homes through no fault of their own. Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of
P.D. 957, which themselves constitute strong arguments in favor of the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a
whole.

As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment clause, we find the following
statements of Justice Isagani Cruz enlightening and pertinent to the case at bench:

Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified
or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of the police
power, it will prevail over the contract.

Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police
power as long as the agreement deals with a matter, affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it
has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the legislature
as a postulate of the legal order.

2. No. As to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner avers that, in view of the provisions of Article
1311 of the Civil Code, PNB, being a "total stranger to the land purchase agreement," cannot be made
to take the developer's place.
We disagree, P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept the
payment of the remaining unpaid amortizations tendered by private respondents.

Sec. 18. Mortgages. - No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without
prior written approval of the Authority, Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that
the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or
subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan
value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any,
shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for
the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage
indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer
to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereof.(emphasis supplied)

Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer
the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner),
which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage
indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is without
prejudice to petitioner Bank's seeking relief against the subdivision developer.

JUAN G. FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE (G.R. No. 120295, June
28, 1996)

FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his
citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to
take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen. However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the
Court had already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship,
and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of
Sorsogon.

ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid.

RULING: Yes, his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of Presidential
Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run for
governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No.
725 are:

(1) filing the application;

(2) action by the committee; and

(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved.

It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing
of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to
be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship
as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given
retroactive effect? If so, from when?

The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a

qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor.

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is therefore

incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when
the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or
private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by
reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They
operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, on the
other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of
enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and)
reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective
attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable
that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective
operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly
appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof." It is obvious to the
Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not
otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that
citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode,
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the
fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it
effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past
transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not
in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional
guaranty." This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or
qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR. (G.R. No. 162894, February
26, 2008)

FACTS: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized & existing under the laws
of Connecticut, & Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract. BMSI hired Rouzie
as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the
Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. Rouzie secured a service
contract w/ the Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption
& mudflows.

Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International (Rust) for alleged
nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination, & breach of employment contract. The Labor
Arbiter ordered BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s money claims. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed &
dismissed affected Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Rouzie filed an action for
damages before the RTC of La Union (where he was a resident) against Raytheon International. He
reiterated that he was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project w/c he
secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI, RUST and Raytheon had combined
& functioned as 1 company.

Raytheon sought the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of
action & forum non conveniens & prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim. The RTC
denied Raytheon’s motion. The CA affirmed.

Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice
of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It
also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, namely that the parties & witnesses
involved are American corporations & citizens & the evidence to be presented is located outside the
Philippines that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. The foreign elements of the dispute
necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the RTC had jurisdiction.

2. Whether the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.

RULING:

1. Yes. On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res,
it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the
parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the
case is filed.
 Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution
and the law & by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is entitled
to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The case file was an action for damages
arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Rouzi upon the
filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by
its voluntary appearance in court.

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws
of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal
for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action.

Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant
case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

2. No. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient” or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the RTC of its
jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While
it is w/c the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the
court’s desistance.

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res,
it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the
parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the
case is filed.

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution
and the law and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. Civil Case No. 1192-
BG is an action for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of
the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator vs. ANDRE BRIMO (G.R. No. L-
22595, November 1, 1927)

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, an alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines stated in the will
thathis property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation.

The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a scheme of partition. However,
one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition.

The appellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that the
deceased was a Turkish citizen, which his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his
nationality.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.

RULING: No. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will,

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of
his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern
it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of
this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other
respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO

C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA (G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963)

FACTS: Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided
and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to
the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire
period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.

In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who,
in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter
of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied,
the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that
the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under
Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art,
16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal
law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently
a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

ISSUE: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

RULING: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia
said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.

1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California, and

2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that “if there is no law
to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of
its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.”

Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be
followed.

Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with
instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum
refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the
law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense.

CLARISSA U. MATA v. ALEXANDER M. AGRAVANTE, et. al. (G.R. No. 147597, August 6, 2008)

FACTS: Respondents Eddie E. Santillan et al. were former security guards of the Bessang Pass Security
Agency, owned by herein petitioner Clarissa Mata. The respondents filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Cebu City for non-payment of salaries/wages and
other benefits. Subsequently, they filed an affidavit-complaint with the Philippine National Police
(PNP) in Cramp Crame, requesting an investigation of the Bessang Pass Security Agency and
cancellation of its license to operate as security agency for violation of labor laws. Copies of this
affidavit-complaint were likewise sent to the following offices: (1) Office of the President, (2) Office
of the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, (3) Office of the PNP Director General, (4) PNP Chief
Superintendent, (5) Office of the DILG Secretary, (6) Ombudsman and (7) Office of the Vice-
President. Petitioner instituted an action for damages against the respondents averring that
respondents filed unfounded, baseless complaints before the NLRC for alleged violation of the labor
laws and with the PNP for cancellation of its license to operate. She further alleged that by furnishing
the government offices copies of these complaints, especially the Department of Public Works and
Highways which was its biggest client, the agency's reputation was besmirched, resulting in the loss
of contracts/projects and income. Petitioner then declared that respondents' deliberate and
concerted campaign of hate and vilification against the Bessang Pass Security Agency violated the
provisions of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
 The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and found preponderant evidence
enough to justify petitioner's cause of action. It gave credence to the petitioner's contentions that the
respondents had no other motive in sending the letter to the seven (7) government offices except to
unduly prejudice her good name and reputation. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial
court's decision. It dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled for damages in violation of Article 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code

RULING: It has been held that Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. The object of
this article is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights
but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis is any act evincing bad faith or
intent to injure. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonos mores and has the following elements: (1) an
act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy; and
(3) is done with intent to injure. The common element under Articles 19 and 21 is that the act
complained of must be intentional and attended with malice or bad faith. There is no hard and fast
rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be
invoked. The question of whether or not this principle has been violated, resulting in damages under
Articles 20 and 21or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.
The circumstances do not warrant an award of damages. We agree with the appellate court that in
the action of the respondents, there was no malicious intent to injure petitioner's good name and
reputation. The respondents merely wanted to call the attention of responsible government agencies
in order to secure appropriate action upon an erring private security agency and obtain redress for
their grievances. In applying the basic postulate that in the absence of proof that there was malice or
bad faith on the part of the respondents, no damages can be awarded.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA” (G.R.
No. 154259, February 28, 2005)

FACTS: In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,
respondent was invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of
the hotel’s manager. During the party and when respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was
stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and
embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was herself a guest. Not long
after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted him out of her party.
 Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstances painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish
of the celebrant to keep the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when
she saw him by the buffet table with no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave
the party after he finished eating. After she had turned to leave, the latter screamed and made a big
scene.

Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she invited Mr. Reyes to
the party.

Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
trial court, consequently imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees. On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant
petition for review.

ISSUES: Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in asking
Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel
Nikko, as the employer of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her.

RULING: No. Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave
the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the
necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the
party.

Art. 19. of the Civil Code states that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith”. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are
the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Art. 21 of the Civil Code also states that: “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.” Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements:
(1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
 As applied to herein case Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity
against him. The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and
humane under the circumstances. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein
being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the
party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him
only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him.

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not
invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of
its employees.

SAPIERA vs CA (G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999)

FACTS: On several occasions, petitioner Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from Monnico
Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de
Guzman. These checks were signed at the back by the petitioner.

When presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the drawer’s account was
already closed. Private respondent Roman Sua informed De Guzman and petitioner about the
dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4) charges of estafa were filed
against petitioner but consequently she was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence but the court a
quo did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private
respondent. On appeal, the respondent court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the
remaining P210, P150. After deducting the amount already collected by the latter as civil indemnity
in the criminal cases against De Guzman. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether Sapiera is still liable to pay civil indemnity after being acquitted of the criminal
charges

RULING: Yes. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only
civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of
which the accused is acquitted.

The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the
dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact
from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless
be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be
adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.

Bobis vs. Bobis (GR 138509, July 31, 2000)

FACTS: October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce.
Without said marriage having been annulled, Isagani contracted a second marriage with petitioner
Imelda on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia. An information for
bigamy was filed against Isagani based on Imelda's complaint. Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated
a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it
was celebrated without a marriage license. Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in
the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal
case.

ISSUE: Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy?

RULING: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but
also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of
the criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to
the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the
latter action may proceed. Its two essential elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The
clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the
validity or invalidity of the marriage.

Isagani, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage,
cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. He was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.
Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

Respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have
his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article
40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v.
Relova:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy.

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. CITIBANK, N.A. and BANK OF AMERICA, S.T. &
N.A., (G.R. No. 170290, April 11, 2012)

FACTS: Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) and Bank of America, S.T. & N.A. (BA) are duly organized
corporations and existing under the laws of the United States of America and duly licensed to do
business in the Philippines, with offices in Makati City. Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) conducted an examination of the books of account of Citibank and BA in 1977and
1979 respectively. It discovered that Citibank in the course of its banking business, received from its
head office and other foreign branches a total of P11,923,163,908.00 in dollars from September 30,
1974 to June 30, 1977 covered by Certificates of Dollar Time Deposit that were interest-bearing with
corresponding maturity dates. And BA a total of P629, 311,869.10 in dollars, covered by Certificates
of Dollar Time Deposit that were interest-bearing with corresponding maturity dates and lodged in
their books under the account Due to Head Office/Branches. For failure to report the said amounts
as deposit liabilities that were subject to assessment for insurance, PDIC sought the remittance of
deficiency premium assessments for dollar deposits.

Citibank and BA each filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Court of First Instance
stating that the money placements they received from their head office and other foreign branches
were not deposits and did not give rise to insurable deposit liabilities under Sections 3 and 4 of R.A.
No. 3591 (the PDIC Charter) and, as a consequence, the deficiency assessments made by PDIC were
improper and erroneous. RTC ruled in favor of Citibank and BA which reasoned that there was no
depositor-depository relationship between the respondents and their head office or other branches.
Also, the placements were deposits made outside the Philippines which are excluded under Section
3.05(b) of the PDIC Rules and Regulations and Section 3(f) of the PDIC Charter likewise excludes from
the definition of the term deposit any obligation of a bank payable at the office of the bank located
outside the Philippines.

PDIC argues that the head offices of Citibank and BA and their individual foreign branches
are separate and independent entities hence not exempt in Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3591.

PDIC appealed to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the dollar deposits are money placements, thus, they are not subject to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6426 otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the
Philippines.

2. Whether or not the Philippine branch of a foreign corporation has a separate legal personality from
its foreign head office for the purpose of PDIC.

RULING: The court ruled that the funds in question are not deposits within the definition of the PDIC
Charter and are, thus, excluded from assessment. Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the PDIC Charter, the
term deposit means unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received by a bank in the usual course
of business and for which it has given or is obliged to give credit to a commercial, checking, savings,
time or thrift account or which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, and trust funds held by such
bank whether retained or deposited in any department of said bank or deposit in another bank,
together with such other obligations of a bank as the Board of Directors shall find and shall prescribe
by regulations to be deposit liabilities of the Bank; Provided, that any obligation of a bank which is
payable at the office of the bank located outside of the Philippines shall not be a deposit for any of the
purposes of this Act or included as part of the total deposits or of the insured deposits. As explained
by the respondents, the transfer of funds, which resulted from the inter-branch transactions, took
place in the books of account of the respective branches in their head office located in the United
States. Hence, because it is payable outside of the Philippines, it is not considered a deposit.

The Court in resolving the controversy in the relationship of the Philippine branches of
Citibank and BA to their respective head offices and their other foreign branches examined the
manner by which a foreign corporation can establish its presence in the Philippines. It may choose to
incorporate its own subsidiary as a domestic corporation, in which case such subsidiary would have
its own separate and independent legal personality to conduct business in the country. In the
alternative, it may create a branch in the Philippines, which would not be a legally independent unit,
and simply obtain a license to do business in the Philippines. It is apparent that the respondent banks
did not incorporate as a separate domestic corporation to represent its business interests in the
Philippines. Thus, being one and the same entity, the funds placed by the respondents in their
respective branches in the Philippines should not be treated as deposits made by third parties subject
to deposit insurance under the PDIC Charter.

Valdez v. Republic (G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009)

FACTS: Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money.
In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they
decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in
October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that
effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio
was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for
naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in
March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

RULING: Yes. Petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio.

Pursuant to Article 83 of the Civil Code, any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

Therefore, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court
declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by
the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. Consequently, at
the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to
marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007)

FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, born and registered as a male, underwent sex reassignment
in Bangkok, Thailand, the fact of which was certified here in the Philippines by virtue of a medical
certificate issued by one Dr. Marcelino Reysio Cruz. He then lived his life as a woman. On November
26, 2002, Rommel filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex before the RTC of Manila.
The court having underwent the jurisdictional requirements, and there having no opposition, the
court proceeded with the hearing where Rommel presented his American Fiance as witness. RTC
gave due course to his petition, ruling based on equity, that “petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in
a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be taken against him” and that “no harm, injury or
prejudice will be caused to anybody” if the petition were to be granted. His name was thus changed
to Mely, and sex “female.” Republic filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. The appellate court
reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048.

RULING: Petitioner’s contention is not meritorious. The Supreme Court ruled that, an ale person who
had a surgical reassignment where she become biologically a woman cannot use that ground as
reason to change his name as person’s sex is immutable from birth.
 Section 1 of RA 9048 provides in essence that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors, which can be changed
by concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The jurisdiction therefore is
primarily lodged with these officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108(Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. Hence, the venue
to which petitioner filed is improper.

RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: 1) petitioner
finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce; 2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or 3)
The change will avoid confusion.

From these grounds, it can be gleaned that RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying.

No law allows the change of entry in the Birth Certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. By virtue RA 9048, Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections
in the entries in the civil register, excluding the clerical or typographical error. Section 2 of RA 9048
provides expressly that no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of
petitioner.

Abbas vs. Abbas (689 SCRA 646)

FACTS: The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria). Syed alleged the absence of a
marriage license as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria. In the Marriage Contract of
Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January
8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution
of this case.

Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and
they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines
in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-
in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with
two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During
the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony
was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite
to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.

In July of 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage
license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license
issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

Furthermore, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that
he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not
there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof. She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a
marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and
said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application
for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage
license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria
testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage. Gloria stated that she and Syed
had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage
had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese,
and those around them at the time were Chinese.

RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified
that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. It also took into account the fact that
neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued. As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack
of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a “diligent search” for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that
Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law.

CA denied Syed’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was valid

RULING: NO. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of
said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the Office of the Municipal
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested
Certification that no such license was issued. It is worth noting that in a particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the
Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage
license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification
was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a “diligent search”, nor is a categorical
declaration absolutely necessary.
 It is worth telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location
where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the
best witness to testify to the validity and existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied
for the license in Carmona, Cavite. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of
the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the
marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court.
However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid
marriage license issued for her and Syed.

This marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions. Thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab
initio.

Beso vs. Daguman (323 SCRA 566)

FACTS: An administrative complaint against respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty
and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged
Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in
not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar.

Respondent Judge averred that:

1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized
by respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita,
Samar due to the following circumstances:

a. first, because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to fly from Manila
for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to another town for the marriage would be
expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer; third, if they failed to
get married on August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their
marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go
beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her
employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were
considered impracticable by the parties.

b. The contracting parties were ready with the desired documents for a valid marriage, which
respondent found all in order.

c. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent realized,

deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy.

2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that
by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive
and complicated for citizens to get married.

3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the following
circumstances beyond the control of respondent.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998 found that
respondent Judge ". . . committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or future acts will be
dealt with more severely.

ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction

RULING: YES. The Judge solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction.

There are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a marriage may
be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:

(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case. In this case, there is no pretense that
either complainant Beso or her fiancé Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither
was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the
marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala.

What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who,
respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed
in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be
too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married." Considering that respondents Judge's
jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.

Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when failed to register the
marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman. It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only
has the respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation
of marriage which is the basic social institution in our society whose nature, consequences and
incidents are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate
and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he should have exerted more effort to locate or
reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is expected to be conscientious in
handling official documents. His imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were
taken by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not deserve consideration for
being devoid of proof.

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY (259 SCRA 129, July 19, 1996)

FACTS: Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed this case to the Supreme
Court against respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC of Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte,
for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borja despite his knowledge that Tagadan has a subsisting marriage with Isa Penaranda
and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has
not returned and not been heard for almost seven years. Domagtoy contended that he merely relied
on the affidavit issued by the RTC Judge of Basey, Samar, which stated that Tagadan and his wife have
not seen each other for almost seven years. However, the certified true copy of the marriage contract
between Tagadan and Borja showed that his civil status was “separated”.
 Second, he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del
Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction in October 1994. Respondent Judge holds his office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao Del Norte but he
solemnized said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, located 40 to 50km away.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

(2) Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage of a husband who was merely separated
from his wife for almost seven years.

(3) Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his residence.

RULING: (1) The marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous, there being a
subsisting marriage between Tagadan and his wife, notwithstanding, the latter was gone for seven
years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead. Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the said marriage was solidified and
valid. Albeit, Judge Domagtoy was not authorized to solemnize the marriage of Sumaylo and Del
Rosario as against Article 3 (1) of the Family Code with regard to irregularity of formal requisites of
marriage, Article 4 (3) states that formal requisites shall not affect the vaidity of marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly and administratively liable.

(2) NO, since there was no institution of summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains to be married to Peñaranda. Wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error
on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by Tagadan. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous and therefore void marriage.

(3) NO. Article 7 provides that “A marriage may be solemnized by (1) any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction xxx.” Article 8, however, states that marriages shall be
solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or
in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice consul, as the case maybe, and not elsewhere, except
in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article
29 of the Family Code; or the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by both
parties as stipulated in a sworn statement to that effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or
Del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented
addressed to the respondent judge is the “authority of the solemnizing officer”.

Under Article 8, which is only a discretionary provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided
in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. Judges who
are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in marriages only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, it may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Judge Domagtoy was
suspended for six months for demonstrating gross ignorance of the law.

PEOPLE VS SANTIAGO (G.R. No. L-27972, October 31, 1927)

FACTS: The deceased wife of Appellant Santiago was the aunt of Felicita Masilang, aged 18, who was
the injured girl in this case. Masilang is therefore appellant's niece by marriage, and she calls him
uncle. Both are residents of the municipality of Gapan, in the Province of Nueva Ecija.

On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked Felicita, who was then about 18 years of age, to
accompany him across the river on some errand, to which the latter agreed. After crossing the river,
the appellant conducted the girl to a place about twenty paces from the highway where tall grass and
other growth hid them public view. In this spot the appellant manifested a desire to have sexual
intercourse with the girl, but she refused to give her consent, and he finally notwithstanding her
resistance, accomplished his purpose by force and against her will.
 After the deed had been done, the appellant conducted the girl to the house of his uncle,
Agaton Santiago, who then brought in a protestant minister who went through the ceremony of
marrying the couple. After this was over, the appellant gave the girl a few pesos and sent her home.
Her father happened to be away that night, but upon his return the next day, she told him what had
happened, and this prosecution for rape was started.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was valid.

RULING: NO, the marriage was not valid. The trial court found that the offense of rape had been
committed, and the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape from
the criminal consequences of his act.

The manner in which the appellant dealt with the girl after the marriage, as well as before, shows
that he had no bona fide intention of making Masilang his wife or living maritally with her, and the
ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because her consent to the performance of the
marriage was vitiated by duress and the ceremony had been performed as a mere device of the
accused to escape punishment. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it
supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.

GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (G.R. No.
186571, August 11, 2010)

FACTS: Petitioner Corpuz is a former Filipino Citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. He married the Filipina respondent on January 18, 2005 in Pasig City. Soon after the
wedding, petitioner left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. Corpuz
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise respondent, only to discover her
having an affair with another man.

Corpuz returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce, which was granted on December
8, 2005 effective January 8, 2006. Two years after, petitioner moved on and found a new Filipina and
with the desire to marry his new fiancée, petitioner went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office (CRO)
and registered the divorce decree granted by the Canadian Court.
 The divorce decree has been registered but petitioner was informed by an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO), now the Philippine Statistics Authority, that the marriage between
him and the Filipina respondent still subsists under Philippine laws, and the divorce decree, to be
enforceable, must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.

Petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Respondent was summoned and thru a notarized
letter/manifestation offered no opposition to the petition, and that she could have filed a same case
but was prevented by financial/personal constraints and requested that she be considered a party-
in-interest with the same prayer as the petitioner.

The petition was denied by the RTC on the ground that petitioner is not the proper party to
institute the case, as only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under Par. 2, Art. 26 of the
Family Code.

The RTC stated that the decision is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment
of the disputed provision, determined by the Court in Republic vs. Orbecido III, such that it is “to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse”.

ISSUE: Whether Par. 2, Art. 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a Philippine Court for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING: The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an
alien, Executive Order No. (EO) 227 was enacted, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:

“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well
as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency
of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
DAVID A. NOVERAS vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS (G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014)

FACTS: David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who acquired properties in the USA and in the
Philippines during their marriage. They have 2 children. According to Leticia, sometime in September
2003, David abandoned his family and lived with his mistress. Further, she claimed that they
executed a joint affidavit where he renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real
properties situated in the Philippines.

After learning of David’s extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce before the
Superior Court of California. Divorce was granted and judgment was duly entered on June 29, 2005.
The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s
properties in the USA.

Leticia then filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of
Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply with
his obligation under the same. David demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also
include the USA properties, be liquidated since a divorce decree was already entered.

The RTC regarded that since the parties are US citizens, their marriage is hereby declared
DISSOLVED pursuant to the divorce decree. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by
Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of property instead of an action for judicial
separation of conjugal property. Their property was classified as absolute community because they
did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to
Article 75 of the Family Code.

Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption,
Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the
parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The court adjudicated the Philippine properties
to David subject to the payment of the children’s legitimes.

On appeal, the CA modified the decision and directed the equal division of the Philippine properties
between the spouses and both should pay their children the amount of P520,000.00.
 In the present petition, David insists that CA should have recognized the California Judgment
which awarded the Philippine properties to him and allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine
properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment considering that she was already granted all US
properties by the California court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved pursuant to the divorce
decree issued by the Superior Court of California.

2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper in accordance with the Family
Code.

RULING: 1. NO. The trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of
marriage between the parties. Foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. A copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record
is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
 Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not
presented. Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption, divorce is not recognized
between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it
follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in
proceeding directly to liquidation.

2. YES. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: Any of the following shall be considered sufficient
cause for judicial separation of property:

xxx

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that both parties had indeed separated for more
than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, it is undisputed that the spouses had
been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own
business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita
Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital
where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David
in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was
granted by the California court in June 2005. Having established that Leticia and David had actually
separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property
should be granted.

VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE (G. R. No. 183622, February 08, 2012)

FACTS: Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen, allegedly obtained a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with petitioner.
 When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate.
While the case was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from
his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of
litis pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified
to file the petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando
despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.

However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the
marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action for declaration
of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the
pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of
bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.

The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed
by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-
A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting
when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file
said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the marriage with
Bristol was still valid.

2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.

HELD: It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the
rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando. Petition is partially
granted. Case is remanded to RTC.
1. NO. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case
that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that, because petitioner was
acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid.

2. YES. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by
a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce
must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s
divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to
establish the fact of divorce.

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM (GR No. 193707, 2014-12-10)

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. On
January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time
of the filing of the... instant petition was 16 years of age.
 Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only 18 months old. Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son.
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son.

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business
known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To
date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the

Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of
R.A. No. 9262 for the latter's unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.

The Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent. Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.

Without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2)
prescription of the crime charged.

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine
law

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

RULING: We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner's
contentions.

We agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens.
By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law
with respect to family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he
is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.

This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's son
altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
 It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after
the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine
of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign
land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle
on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not
completely show that he is not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued.
Emphasis is placed on petitioner's allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant,
respondent's obligation to... support his child is specifically stated, which was not disputed by
respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent
states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not
punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank of America,
NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, to wit:

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of the forum.
MINORU FUJIKI, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE (G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)

FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the
lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:
1. NO. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.

Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only
the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment
in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.

2. YES, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

3. YES, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize
the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and
duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.