CASE STUDY

Satrucharla Vijaya Rama Raju vs Nimmaka Jaya Raju

& Ors

AIR 2006 SC 543

PART –1

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 FACTS OF THE CASE

The Facts of the case starts from the appellant successfully contested the
State Assembly Elections in 1999 from No.8 Naguru (ST) assembly constituency in
the State of Andhra Pradesh. His election was challenged by respondent No.1
herein, in Election Petition No. 13 of 1999, under Section 80 of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951 read with Sections 5 and 100 (1) (d) (i) of the Act. The
contention raised by the first respondent was that the appellant was not qualified to
contest from a constituency reserved for the scheduled tribes. According to
respondent No.1, the election petitioner, the appellant was a 'Kshatriya' and was not
eligible to contest from a constituency reserved for the scheduled tribes. His claim
that he belongs to the "Konda Dora" tribe, was not true. Since he was ineligible to
contest from the constituency, his election was liable to be declared void and set
aside. The first respondent also prayed that he may be declared elected instead.

The appellant resisted the election petition. He pleaded that he belongs to the
"Konda Dora" tribe which was a notified Scheduled Tribe. He was neither a
'Kondaraju' nor a 'Kshatriya'. Even otherwise, 'Kondaraju' and "Konda Dora" were
synonymous and the "Konda Dora" tribe was included in the list of Scheduled Tribes.
He further pleaded that his earlier election from No.8 Naguru (ST) assembly
constituency, the self-same constituency, was challenged by a voter in Election
Petition No. 13 of 1983 on the very same ground that he did not belong to the
"Konda Dora" tribe. That election petition, after contest, was dismissed by the
learned Judge to whom it was assigned after a regular trial and the said decision
barred a fresh enquiry into the same question in the present election petition and the
decision therein was conclusive on his status.

He also explained that his ancestors and himself described themselves as

'Kshatriyas' in view of the status enjoyed by them in their tribe and not because they
belonged to the 'Kshatriya' community. An ancestor of his had been conferred the
title "Satrucharla" and it was the surname of his family. His predecessors and his
cousin had all contested in prior elections from reserved constituencies and no
objection had ever been raised prior to 1983 regarding their status.
2

In a similar case, where the members of the family of a candidate had

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described themselves as 'Kshatriya', the Supreme Court had held in an election

petition that was filed challenging their status, that as a matter of fact that candidate
belonged to a Scheduled Tribe and was not a 'Kshatriya'. He raised a further
contention that the caste certificate issued by the competent authority under the
Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes)
Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 to the effect that he belongs
to the "Konda Dora" tribe was final and binding on the court.

Issues were raised, inter alia, on pleas that the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983
operated as res judicata with regard to the status of the appellant, that the judgment
therein was a judgment in rem and consequently conclusive on the status of the
appellant and that the present election petition was not maintainable, so long as the
community certificate issued by the Collector remained in force. At the instance of
the appellant, the above three issues were taken up for consideration as preliminary
issues.

The learned Judge, on an appreciation of the pleadings and the evidence in

the case, came to the conclusion that the appellant did not belong to "Konda Dora"
community, a Scheduled Tribe and was consequently ineligible to contest the
election from a constituency reserved for the scheduled tribes. Thus, the learned
Judge set aside the election of the appellant from No.8 Naguru (ST) assembly
constituency in the general elections held on 11.9.1999. The prayer of the first
respondent to declare him elected, was declined on the ground that such relief was
not liable to be granted at that point of time and in view of the dissolution of the
assembly itself.

Feeling aggrieved by the setting aside of his election on the ground that he
did not belong to a scheduled tribe, the appellant has filed this appeal under Section
116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

ISSUES

(1i) whether criminal appeal is maintainable?.

(2) whether the lower court judgement is proved beyionf reasonable doubt?

(3) whether the appeallent claim for representation maintainable?

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(4)whether fraudulent representation was made by the accussed?

(5) whether the accused is liable to be debarred from the election ?

PROVISION OF LAW

Section 80 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951

Election petitions.—No election shall be called in question except by an election

petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part.

Section 5 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951

Qualifications for membership of a Legislative Assembly.—A person shall not be

qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly of a State unless—

(a) in the case of a seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes or for the Scheduled
Tribes of that State, he is a member of any of those castes or of those tribes, as the
case may be, and is an elector for any Assembly constituency in that State;

(b) in the case of a seat reserved for an autonomous district of Assam, 1[***] he is a
member of a 2[Scheduled Tribe of any autonomous district] and is an elector for the
Assembly constituency in which such seat or any other seat is reserved for that
district; and

(c) in the case of any other seat, he is an elector for any Assembly constituency in
that State: 3[Provided that for the period referred to in clause (2) of article 371A, a
person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill any seat allocated to the Tuensang
district in the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland unless he is a member of the
regional council referred to in that article.]

Section 100 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951

Grounds for declaring election to be void.

(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if 2[the High Court] is of opinion—

(a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified, or was
disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or this Act 3[***] 4[or
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the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963)]; or

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(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his
election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his
election agent; or

(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or

(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has
been materially affected—

Section 105 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951

Orders of the Tribunal to be final and conclusive.

Section 112 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951

Abatement of election petitions.—

(1) An election petition shall abate only on the death of a sole petitioner or of the
survivor of several petitioners.

(2) Where an election petition abates under sub-section (1), the High Court shall
cause the fact to be published in such manner as it may deem fit.

(3) Any person who might himself have been a petitioner may, within fourteen days
of such publication, apply to be substituted as petitioner and upon compliance with
the conditions, if any, as security, shall be entitled to be so substituted and to
continue the proceedings upon such terms as the High Court may deem fit.]

Section 11 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951

Removal or reduction of period of disqualification.—The Election Commission may,

for reasons to be recorded, remove any disqualification under this Chapter 1[(except
under section 8A)] or reduce the period of any such disqualification.

Section 40 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial.—The existence of any

judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Courts from taking cognizance
of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court
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ought to take cognizance of such suit, or to hold such trial.

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Section 41 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction.—A final judgment, order

or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial admiralty or
insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal
character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be
entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is
relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such
person to any such thing, is relevant. Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive
proof— that any legal character, which it confers accrued at the time when such
judgment, order or decree came into operation; that any legal character, to which it
declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when
such judgment, 1[order or decree] declares it to have accrued to that person; 3[order
or decree] declares it to have accrued to that person;" that any legal character which
it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment,
1[order or decree] declared that it had ceased or should cease; 3[order or decree]
declared that it had ceased or should cease;" and that anything to which it declares
any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which
such judgment, 1[order or decree] declares that it had been or should be his
property. 3[order or decree] declares that it had been or should be his property."

ARGUMENT BY APPEALANT

Learned senior counsel for the appellant made a strenuous attempt to

contend that the learned Judge of the High Court had wrongly placed the burden of
proof in the case. We cannot agree. The trial judge has rightly proceeded on the
basis that the initial burden was on the election petitioner to establish his plea that
the appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe.

Though in a prior statement, an assertion in one's own interest, may not be

evidence, a prior statement, adverse to one's interest would be evidence. In fact, it
would be the best evidence the opposite party can rely upon. Therefore, in the
present case, where the appellant is pleading that he is a Konda Dora, the statement
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in the series of documents, pre-constitution and post constitution, executed by his

ancestors and members of his family including himself describing themselves as
'Kshatriyas', would operate as admissions against the interest of the appellant in the
present case.

These admissions also strengthened the admission of the appellant that in

his school leaving certificate also, he is described as a 'Kshatriya' and his paternal
uncle's son is also described as a 'Kshatriya' in his school leaving certificate and that
uncle's son was also held to be a 'Kshatriya' on an enquiry made in that behalf.
Therefore, in our view, the trial judge was correct in holding that the election
petitioner had discharged the initial burden placed on him and the burden shifted to
the appellant to establish that he belonged to the 'Konda Dora' Tribe.

Appreciating the evidence on the side of the appellant, the trial judge held that
no document has been produced by him to show that the appellant belonged to a
Scheduled Tribe or that earlier, their claims have been recognized as a Scheduled
Tribe except the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983. The trial Judge having taken the view
that the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983 would not operate as a res judicata and could
not be taken to be a judgment in rem, proceeded to hold that even though in that
case an election petitioner therein had failed to establish that the appellant was not a
Konda Dora, in the present case, the available evidence indicated that the family of
the appellant did not belong to the Konda Dora Tribe.

The trial judge found that the evidence of RWs 1 to 9 was not adequate to
establish that the appellant was a Konda Dora. Having gone through the evidence of
RWs 1 to 9 we also agree with the trial judge that the evidence of RWs 1 to 9 is
totally insufficient to establish that the appellant belonged to the Konda Dora Tribe.
On a scrutiny of the evidence of PWs 1 to 8, also, we do not see anything in their
evidence that would justify our holding that the appellant has established his claim.

In this position, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the gazetteer
and the historical documents produced on the side of the appellant clearly showed
that the appellant belonged to the Konda Dora Tribe. We must say that the High
Court has considered these materials in detail and has found that even going by
those materials the best that could be said on behalf of the appellant was that the
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family of the appellant, the Marangi family, belonged to Konda Raju caste, but the
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very material relied by the appellant to show that he belonged to the 'Konda Raju'
tribe, also showed that the tribe 'Konda Raju' was different from the tribe 'Konda
Dora'. In paragraphs 84 and 85 of his judgment the trial judge has dealt with this
aspect. On going through the detailed discussion therein and the materials read out
to us by leaned counsel for the appellant, it is not possible to hold that these
documents establish that the appellant belonged to the 'Konda Dora' tribe.

As against the admissions contained in Exhibits A2 to A11 and the evidence

furnished by the other documents produced on behalf of the election petitioner, no
positive evidence could be adduced by the appellant to show that he belonged to the
Konda Dora Tribe. He relied on a caste certificate issued to him under the Andhra
Pradesh (Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribe and Backward Classes) Regulation of
Issue of Community Certificate Act, 1993 in support of his claim. The trial judge
found that there was no due enquiry on the application of the appellant for the issue
of a caste certificate as prescribed under this Act, and the certificate was issued to
him based on a recommendation made the same day as the date of the application,
by the concerned authority.

On an appreciation of the evidence of CW1 in the light of Ex. C.1 to C.10 the
trial judge found that even the application for issuance of the certificate was filled up
by the official concerned after obtaining the signature of the applicant therein, the
appellant, in a blank form and the certificate was issued without following the proper
procedure. CW1 in fact confessed in the court that the certificate was issued
because he was told that in view of the decision in E.P. 13 of 1983 he was bound to
issue the certificate asked for by the appellant. On going through the evidence of
CW1 and on scrutinizing Exhibits C1 to C10 and the reasoning adopted by the trial
judge, we are satisfied that the trial judge was fully justified in discarding the caste
certificate relied on by the appellant.

ARGUMENT BY RESPONDENT

Learned counsel for the first respondent, on the other hand, contended that it
has been found by the order dated 13.12.2002, that the decision in E.P. 13 of 1983
did not operate as res judicata and was not conclusive on the tribal status of the
appellant and that the certificate obtained under the State Act was not conclusive on
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the election tribunal and that those findings have become final and have been
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approved by this Court by dismissing the petitions for special leave to appeal filed by
the appellant challenging that order. He submitted that it was not open to the
appellant to raise those questions all over again in this appeal.

Even otherwise, the finding in E.P. 13 of 1983 was only to the effect that the
election petitioner therein, had failed to prove that the appellant did not belong to a
scheduled tribe or that he belonged to the 'Kshatriya' caste and that did not amount
to a declaration of the status of the appellant as belonging to the "Konda Dora" tribe.
He submitted that every election furnishes a fresh cause of action and the finding in
an election petition relating to an earlier election to which the present election
petitioner was not even a party, does not operate as res judicata and does not even
have any evidentiary value.

He submitted that a series of documents have been produced which

contained admissions by the predecessors of the appellant and by the appellant that
they were 'Kshatriyas' and those admissions were conclusive as against the
appellant, since he was not in a position to show that they were wrong or to explain
them away except stating that they wanted to claim a higher status for prestige. He
pointed out tht the documents were spread over for a number of years. He also
pointed out that the appellant had admitted that in his school leaving certificate book,
his caste has been shown as 'Kshatriya' and since that piece of evidence was almost
conclusive, there was no reason to interfere with the finding of the learned Judge
that the appellant did not belong to the "Konda Dora" tribe.

He finally submitted that in the face of the admissions contained in

documents of unimpeachable authenticity, the burden had shifted to the appellant to
show that he belongs to the "Konda Dora" tribe and that the admissions earlier
made, were wrong. He submitted that on a proper appreciation of evidence in the
case, the learned Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the appellant was
ineligible to contest from a reserved constituency and there was no reason for this
Court to interfere with that decision. He prayed for a dismissal of the appeal.

In fact, learned senior counsel concentrated his fire on the contention that the
earlier judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983 is a judgment in rem. He referred to the decision
in Inamati Mallappa Basappa vs. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa and othersb (1959 SCR
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611). He relied on the portions of the judgment wherein their Lordships indicated the
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nature and scope of an election petition. Quoting from the decision in K. Kamaraja
Nadar vs. Kunju Thevar and others ( 1959 SCR 583) their Lordships held that an
election petition is not a matter in which the persons interested are the candidates
who strove against each other at the elections. The public also are substantially
interested in it and this is not merely in the sense that an election has news value.
An election is an essential part of democratic process. An election petition is not a
suit between two persons but is a proceeding in which the constituency itself is the
principal party interested. He also referred to the decision of the Madras High Court
in A. Sreenivasan vs. Election tribunal, Madras and anotherb (Vol.XI E.L.R. 278)
wherein the above two decisions were followed.

With respect to learned senior counsel, these decisions do not show that the
judgment in an election petition could be treated as a judgment in rem. Obviously,
the whole of the constituency concerned is interested in the outcome of an election
petition, since it either affects the choice they have already made, or their right to
have the freedom of a fresh choice. But since a challenge to an election petition is
only a statutory challenge under the Representation of the People Act and since the
acceptance of the challenge or the rejection of it in a given case would be based on
facts and law available therein, and since an adjudication therein is not one which
comes directly within the purview of Section 41 of the Act, the same could not be
treated as a judgment in rem.

In fact, if it were a judgment in rem, the ratio of the decision of this Court in
C.M. Arumugam Vs. S. Rajgopal and Ors. [(1976) 1 SCC 863] earlier referred to,
would not have been rendered, since the adjudication in the earlier election petition
would have barred the consideration of the question even if it be based on additional
facts. We, therefore, overrule the argument that the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983,
should be held to be a judgment in rem binding on the whole world including the
election petitioner herein, even though he was not a party to the earlier proceeding.

DECISION OF COURT[JUDGEMENT]

Thus, on the whole, on a re-appreciation of the pleadings and the evidence in

the case, in the light of the law governing the matter, we are satisfied that the
decision of the trial court does not call for any interference. We, therefore, confirm
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the decision of the trial court and dismiss this appeal with costs.
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 REASON FOR THE DECISION

The evidence of the appellant examined as RW1 clearly shows that the family
of the appellant had always considered itself to belong to a superior strata of society
and as a ruling or satrap family. The title of 'Satrucharala', conqueror of enemies,
had been conferred on an ancestor of the appellant and the members of the family
were using that title. The evidence of PWs 1 to 8 and RWs 1 to 9 shows that most of
the practices followed by the family differed from that of 'Konda Doras'. In fact,
learned counsel for the appellant could only emphasis that there was no evidence to
show that 'Homa' and 'Saptapadi', the essentials of a 'Kshatriya' marriage were being
performed in the marriages in the family. But learned counsel could not contradict
that the male members were having thread ceremony.

No doubt, mere assertion or a claim by a tribal that he is a 'Kshatriya' cannot

make him a 'Kshatriya'. But what is involved here is a series of assertions which are
admissions in terms of the Evidence Actand other evidence that tribal customs
differed from the practices of the family of the appellant. The position in V.V. Giri Vs.
Dippala Suri Dora and ors. [(1960) 1 SCR 426] differs, in that, in that case, Dora was
admitted to be originally a tribal and what was asserted was that subsequently, he
had become a 'Kshatriya', having adopted their customs and practices. That is not
the case here and there is no admission in this case that the family of the appellant
originally was tribal.

Evidence in the case on hand also indicates that the family of the appellant
had marital relationship mostly with the Zamindar families outside the present State
of Andhra Pradesh and their way of life was also not that of the tribals. No positive
acceptable evidence could also be adduced to show that the family entered into
marital relationship with 'Konda Dora' tribals. The evidence also shows that the
family of the appellant did not have any close relationship with the Konda Doras of
the locality.

The admissions of RW.1 show that quite a few of the customs the family was
following had no relations to the customs generally followed by the Konda Dora Tribe
and some of the practices clearly differed from that of the tribe and was more
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consistent with the practices followed by Kshatriya and higher castes. The trial judge
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has carefully analysed these aspects and we do not see any justification in differing
from his appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence in the case.

In a sense, the appellant wants the best of two worlds. Though, he would like
to contest from a constituency reserved for the Scheduled Tribes, he would want to
lead the life of a forward caste and have the trappings of that caste. The purpose of
reservation of constituencies is to ensure representation in the legislatures to such
tribes and castes who are deemed to require special efforts for their upliftment. The
person seeking election from such constituencies must be the true representative of
that tribe. The evidence shows that the appellant could not be considered to be a
true representative of a tribe included in the Presidential Order deserving special
protection.

What we are left with is the high evidentiary value that may be attached to the
judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983. It is true that some of the documents produced in the
present election petition, were also available before the judge assigned to try the
previous case. But ultimately the conclusion in the previous case was based on an
appreciation of the evidence adduced in that case. Some evidence may be common.
But, since it is not possible to accept the contention that the earlier judgment is a
judgment in rem or that it would operate as res judicata, we can at best proceed on
the basis that on an earlier occasion, it was adjudicated that he was not shown to be
disqualified to contest from a reserved constituency.

But as emphasized by learned counsel for the election petitioner-respondent,

that was a conclusion arrived at based on an appreciation of the evidence in that
case and once that judgment could not be held to be a judgment in rem binding on
the whole world or a judgment that bars the trial of the issue in the present election
petition or would operate as res judicata between the parties, that judgment by itself
is not sufficient to rebut the evidence available in the present case based on which
the finding has been rendered.
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 PART 2

CRITICAL COMMENT

The whole case of this revolves around the fact that In 1999, claiming to
belong to the Konda Dora community, Rama Raju contested and won elections from
Naguru, a (ST) reserved constituency in Vizianagaram district with 39,726 votes. He
served the full five-year-term.However, later in January, 30, 2004, the candidate from
Telugu Desam Party, Nimmaka Jayaraju alleged that Rama Raju belonged to a
Kshatriya caste and approached the High court, asking them to nullify his term.

Subsequently, it was proved that Rama Raju had indeed forged documents claiming
to be a Konda Dora, and his election was termed invalid.Notwithstanding the then
legal tussle, Rama Raju contested from the neighboring Parvathipuram constituency
in 2004. And this time, he contested from a general constituency in Vizianagaram.
Since public memory is short, he went on to win the elections and became a minister
in former Chief Minister YS Rajasekhar Reddy’s cabinet.

Dismissing the plea in 2005, the three-Judge Bench comprising Chief Justice R C
Lahoti, Justice C K Thakker and Justice P K Balasubramanyan said, "the appellant
wants the best of two worlds. Though he would like to contest from a constituency
reserved for the Scheduled Tribes, he would want to lead the life of a forward caste
and have the trappings of that caste." (The Hindu had reported).Following this Rama
Raju moved the Supreme Court, which dismissed his appeal and upheld the HC
verdict.

In a significant move in 2016, Justice P Naveen Rao said that the AP (SC, ST and
BC) Regulation of issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993, does not allow to
prosecute errant ones, but directed the government to recover the expenses.Despite
the court’s judgement, the former minister approached the High Court again,
challenging the verdict.

However, , bench comprising Ramesh Ranganathan and Justice J Uma Devi

dismissed Rama Raju’s appeal reiterated the earlier judgement, directing him to pay
Rs 500 for each Assembly sitting during his term, totalling Rs 2.25 lakh.
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 An election petition under Section 81 read with Section 5(a) and Section
100(1)(a) and (d)(i) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short “the
Act”) to declare the election of the 1st respondent to 130-Kurupam (S.T.) Assembly
Constituency to be null and void, set aside the same and declare the petitioner to
have been duly elected as Member from that Constituency under Section 84 of the
Act.

The petitioner claims to have contested the election to 130-Kurupam (S.T.)

Assembly Constituency held on 16-04-2009 as the candidate of Praja Rajyam Party,
while the 1st respondent contested as the candidate of Indian National Congress
Party and respondents 2 to 6 are the other contesting candidates from other parties
or as independents. While the 1st respondent secured 48,493 votes, the petitioner
secured 33,440 votes and the 1st respondent was declared elected on 16-05-2009.
The petitioner claims to be belonging to ‘Jatapu Tribe’ included in the Scheduled
Tribes Order, 1976 in relation to the State of Andhra Pradesh.

The 1st respondent is ‘Kshatriya’, which is not included in the List of

Scheduled Tribes concerning the State of Andhra Pradesh. The family of the 1st
respondent who is a permanent resident of Parvathipuram, Vizianagaram district,
hails from Addapusila in Parvathipuram Mandal and is originally a zamindari family of
Belgam Estate. In the Manual of the District of Vizagapatnam in the Presidency of
Madras, published by the State Editor, District Gazette, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh
in Chapter-XII relating to Belgam Family and Estates at page 327, it is mentioned
that the family belongs to ‘Hill Rajah’ (Konda Raju) caste. In 2004(4) ALT 14, the
High Court referred in paragraph 84 to the Manual of District of Vizagapatnam in the
Presidency of Madras, compiled and edited by D.F. Carmichael, which was reprinted
in 1869 and referred to Hill Zamindaris from pages 322 to 332 mentioning the caste
to which the respective zamindars belong. Belgam Zamindar was shown as ‘Konda
Raju’ and the 1st respondent is, therefore, not qualified to contest from 130-Kurupam
(S.T.) Assembly Constituency, reserved for Scheduled Tribes, since he is not a
member of any of the Tribes in the State of Andhra Pradesh.

The family of the 1st respondent described themselves as ‘Kshatriyas’ in

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registered documents Nos.132 of 1945, 419 of 1945 and 1294 of 1947 executed by
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the real brother of the 1st respondent’s grand father, 821 of 1948 executed by the
great grand father of the 1st respondent, 1909 of 1962 executed by the great grand
father of the 1st respondent and another registered document, dated 07-05-1957
executed by the 1st respondent’s ancestor. In the last two documents, the 1st
respondent’s father was a signatory.

The mother of the 1st respondent also hailing from ‘Kshatriya’ caste is the
sister of Sri Satrucharla Vijaya Rama Raju, who was declared in Election Petition
No.13 of 1999 as not belonging to any Scheduled Tribe in Andhra Pradesh State, but
belonging to ‘Kshatriya’ caste. This petitioner is the petitioner therein and the
judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision reported in 2005 AIR
SCW 6197. The 1st respondent’s mother is the Chairperson of the Parvathipuram
Municipality, having been elected from Ward No.26, reserved for Scheduled Tribe,
on which the petitioner filed a petition before the District Collector, Vizianagaram to
enquire into the social status of the mother of the 1st respondent under the Andhra
Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes & Backward Classes) Regulation of
issue of Community Certificate Act, 1993 and Rules 1997 and the petitioner filed
W.P. No.27217 of 2008 complaining against the inaction of the Collector.

The High Court directed on 28-01-1999 the District Collector, Vizianagaram to

take final decision before 15-05-2009 and the enquiry is pending. Though the
petitioner objected to the nomination of the 1st respondent, the 7th respondent
rejected the said objection and ‘Kshatriya’ caste was not included in part-I of the
Schedule relating to the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976 or the 1993 State Act or in the
earlier List prepared in 1950. The 1st respondent styling himself as a person
belonging to Scheduled Tribe, deprived the people of 130-Kurupam (S.T.) Assembly
Constituency of getting a Scheduled Tribe person elected as their representative, by
playing fraud and hence, the election petition.

The 1st respondent in his written statement claimed that originally he belongs
to ‘Konda Dora’ community, which is one of the several sects in Scheduled Tribes.
Jagannadha Patro was the prepositor of the family, whose son Somasundara
Narayana Patro was granted Sannad/grant making him the then zamindar of Belgam
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Estate from 1803 to 1814. His son Dhanunjaya-I was the zamindar from 1814 to
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1849. His younger brother Vishwambara was the zamindar since his death till 1865.
Narayana Ramachandra, his son, was the zamindar from 1865 to 1882 and his
adopted son Shiva Narayana was the zamindar from 1882 till his death. Then
Dhanunjaya-II was the zamindar till his death in 1888 issueless and there was a
dispute regarding succession to the Estate between the children of
Chandrashekhara Thatraj, the second son of Shivanarayana.

The dispute between Suryanarayana and Sundara Narayana was resolved

making both the persons succeed to their Estate with Suryanarayana succeeding to
the Parvathipur Estate (HUNDA) and Sundaranarayana succeeding to Belgam
Estate (HUNDA). Sundaranarayana was succeeded to the Estate by Janardhana,
the eldest son, while the second son Bhavanarayana had a son Venkateshwara
Prasad who died issueless. Janardhana is the great grand father of the 1st
respondent, whose son Pratap Chandra succeeded him and during the life time of
Pratap Chandra, the grand father of the 1st respondent, the estates were abolished
under a Statute. Pratap Chandra had two sons, Satya Prasad-the father of the 1st
respondent, and Ananth Narayana-the father of Laxmi Kumar.

The 1st respondent has four brothers including himself and two sisters--
Sundaranarayana, Chandrasekhar, Janardhan, Naresh Kumar, Jyothsna, Hari Priya
and himself. The 1st respondent, thus, belongs to ‘Konda Dora’ sect/tribe, which is a
Scheduled Tribe. The 1st respondent stated that he belongs to ‘Konda Raju’ caste,
which is enumerated as a sub-caste of ‘Konda Dora’ community under the
Scheduled Tribes category.

The rites and customs of the community from times immemorial would also
indicate that the 1st respondent is a member of Scheduled Tribe, like re-marriage of
the elder brother’s widow to the younger brother or the lady members of the family
wearing beads or customary divorce by the caste elder or acceptance of ‘Gandharva’
form of marriage or speaking in Oriya and Telugu languages or worshiping
Goddesses like Durga, Talupulamma Thalli, Lappala Polemma and Jakari or eating
pork and mutton or drinking in family occasions or burning dead bodies or observing
‘Menarikam’ marriages.

The 1st respondent further submitted that one Nishada was the prepositor of
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the Scheduled Tribes, who had five sons, the inter-marriages between whose
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descendents led to formation of different castes and sub-castes, one of which being
‘Konda Dora’, which has several sub-castes, including ‘Konda Raju’, which is a
Scheduled Tribe. The 1st respondent further claimed that Vishwambora Deo of
Jaipur (Jeypore) was the main zamindar with several fiefs under him recognized as
incharges of different hill areas, which were subsequently recognized and developed
into estates by virtue of grants.

The family of Belgam Estate belongs to ‘Konda Raju’ caste and Veeravara
Thodaramallu That Raj Jagannath Patro was the Dewan of Ramachandra Deo of
Jaipur (Jeypore) and in 1796, fourteen villages in the neighbourhood of Parvathipur
were taken from contiguous hill zamindars and were given for life to his son
Somasundara Narayana Patro in acknowledgement of his father’s services. The
same was converted into a Hill Zamindari tenure and the successors of
Somasundara Narayana Patro succeeded to the Hill Zamindari till its abolition under
the Andhra Pradesh Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1948. The
1st respondent, thus, belongs to ‘Konda Raju’ sub-caste in ‘Konda Dora’ community,
which is a Schedule Tribe community.

The 1st respondent and his family were always treated as members of
Scheduled Tribe and were issued caste certificates by the concerned authorities as
such and after the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes &
Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificate Act, 1993 and
Rules 1997, all the family members of the 1st respondent were given permanent/life
certificates.

The status of the 1st respondent and all other family members was shown as
‘Konda Dora’ by caste in all the school and college records and certificates. Fee
concessions and scholarships were extended to them as such and in various suits
filed by the family members, exemption from paying Court fee was claimed and
given as per G.O.Ms. No.381 of 1968. In O.S. No.21 of 1989, one of the family
members of the agnates of the 1st respondent filed a suit for declaration about
belonging to ‘Konda Dora’ family and a consequential injunction specifically claiming
through the Hill Zamindar of Belgam. It was specifically pleaded that the description
of the plaintiffs therein and other family members as ‘Kshatriyas’ was only a
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description of status as rulers of the Hill zamindaris and they referred to “Caste and
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Tribes of South India” by Edgard Thurston referring to the Hill zamindars as the Hill
Tribes, also called as ‘Konda Rajus’, while the District Collector and the Mandal
Revenue Officer defending the suit denied the claim in their written statements.

The suit was decreed after an elaborate enquiry on 06-07-1993 holding the
plaintiffs therein to be belonging to ‘Konda Dora’ community and the suffix by name
‘That Raj’ was not Raju. The persons belonging to the community of the 1st
respondent have similarly approached the High Court with writ petitions for similar
reliefs, which were granted and even the documents executed by the 1st
respondent’s family members, their pattadar passbooks and title deeds mentioned
them to be belonging to ‘Konda Dora’ caste.

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