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June 22, 2019 Cases
A. CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES
1. De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together
with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known
as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986
but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other
respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be
declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of
the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which
shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected
and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to
designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that
the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six
years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
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Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8,
1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a
plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2,
Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of
office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
2. Angara v. Electoral Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for
the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in
session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua,
filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss
arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back
by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election
protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between
the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final
arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
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That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than
to any of the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
CONCEPT OF THE STATE
1. BACANI VS NACOCO G.R. No. L-9657 100 Phil 471 November
29, 1956
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO, Plaintiffs–Appellees,
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants, NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION and
BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, Defendants–Appellants.
Facts: Plaintiffs Bacani and Matto are both court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip vs. National
Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested
said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the
hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees.
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150
to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor General required the
plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a Department of Justice circular which stated that
NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. For
reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount of P25 per payday be deducted
from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto.
Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a government entity within the
purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the defendants set up a
defense that NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.
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Issues: Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which performs certain functions of
government, make them a part of the Government of the Philippines.
Discussions: NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from paying the
stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term “Government of the Republic of
the Philippines”. The term “Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions
by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to
enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those
who possess the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution,
when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established
composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the
powers and functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and
ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of
society, and are merely optional.
Rulings: No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of
“adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and
of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-
products”, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry. It
was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the
provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may
exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the
same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
government.
2. PVTA v CIR Digest
Facts: This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased
responsibility to provide for the general welfare. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking
relief for their alleged overtime services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in
accordance with CA No. 444. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and
lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for
certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt
from Commonwealth Act No. 444. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it
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is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No.
444.
Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has
become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of
the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government obsolete.”
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner
can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private
respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of
governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because
petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was
beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner
does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.
A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the
differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne
by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render
overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That
would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on
this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustaine
3. Government of the Phil. V. Monte de Piedad
FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions
provided $400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake.
The government used the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to
Monte de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount.
In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited
from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various
petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of
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the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refuse
to provide the money, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of
the people deposited in respondent bank.
HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement
against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government is the sole
protector of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which
promote public interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro people.
The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general
superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.
Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court ordered that
respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso.
4. Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh
Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with
the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation,
Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by
General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid
and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could
continue hearing the cases pending before them.
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Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government
are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and
deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the
conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and
war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration
of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come
out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other
government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of
courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto
governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it
could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of
international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief
done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not
intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate
international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial
proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the
occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did
not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by
some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of
course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and
courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and
conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may
continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the
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Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them
are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him
to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during
occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control
through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful
government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of
the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who
rise in insurrection against the parent state)
5. People v. Gozo
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and
some neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits
and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for
violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction
within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered
that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval
Base of a foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?
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HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under
the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not
granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own
decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State
through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US
Naval Base.
6. Laurel v. Misa
FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to
the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his
allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a
change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was
replaced already by the Republic.
HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance tohis
government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the
Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either
subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the exercise
of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of
government, there is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What
happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the
Philippines.
DISSENT: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the laws of the
land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasn’t
sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the United States. Hence, the acts of
treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the Philippines is now indeed sovereign.
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7. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff
FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated
camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner
and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain
Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the
new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus
allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was
committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed
Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an
occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th
Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating
officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.
In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition
is hereby DENIED.
PEOPLE
Moya Lim Yao v. Commission on Immigration
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February
1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter
the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired
to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among
others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration
of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated
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extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25
January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay,
she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her
arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except
for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She
did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance
of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
HELD: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a
parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied
the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat
them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no
such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen
to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called
upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise
a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of
marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the
situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
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Po Xo Bi V. Representative
Facts: Po Yo bi a Certified Chinese citizen who was born in the Philippines filed a petition for
naturalization in the CFI of Ilo-ilo, when approved and was scheduled for hearing, he moved to amend
his petition twice which resulted in the moving of the said hearing also twice. In his second amended
petition it contained inserted allegations, however there was no stating that he is a person of good
moral character. Upon the moving of his hearing to a final date of Feb. 26, 1962 with orders of
publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in Iloilo, however the
second Amended Petition itself was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation, but instead o nly the amended notice of petition was published. It was also not posted in a
public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court or in the building where such office is
located. After trial, the RTC granted the petition and declared Po Bi as a Filipino citizen, but in his
amended application, it failed to file a statement of intent to be naturalized as a Filipino citizen by
birth€in th is country which is the Philippines. On 30 October 1963 the Solicitor General filed a motion to
reconsider the above decision contending that petitioner is not exempt from filing his declaration of
intention, and has not complied with Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization La w, and that his witnesses
are not competent and credible persons within the cont emplation of law. On December 1, 1965
petitioner filed a motion alleging therein that more than t wo (2) years had elapsed since the decision
and that he has complied with all th e conditions and requisites, he then prays that after hearing, the
decision be e xecuted and he be allowed to take his oath as a Filipino citizen.
Issues: 1. Was the second amended petition published in accordance with Section 9 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, which requires that the petition itself must be pub lished?
2. Did the petitioner successfully stated that he is of good moral character by stating in his amended
petition “€I believe in the principles underlying the Philipp ine Constitution. I have conducted myself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines in my
relations with the constituted Government as well as with the community in which I am living” ?
3. €Did he sufficiently complied with the requirement of Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law that
the petitioner must allege therein his present and forme r places of residence?
4. Was he exempt from declaring his intention?
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5. Did the petitioner successfully renounced his Chinese Citizenship?
Held:. 1. The second amended petition was not published. Neither were the original and the amended
petitions. What the Office of the Clerk of Court did was to prepare and issue€notices€of the petition.
This is not sufficient compliance€contemplated in the legal provision. It was said notices alone which
were ordered to be publishe d and posted. Non-compliance with the requirements thereof,€constitutes
a fatal de fect. As a consequence, the lower court acquired no jurisdiction to hear this ca se and the
decision appealed from is null and void.
2. Petitioner did not specifically allege that he is of good moral character whi ch is one of the
requirements of Citizenship as provided for in Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law. He did not
refer to it in any manner in the answers he gave. It has been held that to establish the qualifications that
the applica nt must be of good moral character and must have conducted himself in a proper a nd
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence, the characte r witnesses must be in a
position to testify on the character and good moral con duct of the applicant during the entire period of
the latter's stay in the Phili ppines as provided by law. In the instant case, the witnesses utterly failed to
do that.
3. No, all his allegations were isufficent in specifications. He stated that he studied in Manila, but did not
revealed where in Manila he resided during that time. He also declared that he was in Manila from June
1939-1942 but just gave h is address as “Salazar Street” which is very vague where in Manila this street
is. T here is no way it would facilitate the checking up on the activities of the peti tioner which are
material to the proceedings. Petitioner deliberately suppressed vital information to make it extremely
difficult for the government authorities to locate his place of residence and check on his activities
therein during suc h time. Besides, a careful reading of the transcripts of the testimony of petiti oner on
direct examination reveals that petitioner did not mention Salazar Stree t at all. Thus, on this ground
alone, his petition should fail.
4. Petitioner was not exempt from filing a declaration of intention. Upon carefu l reading of his claim for
exemption, the facts revealed that it he cannot claim exemption from filing the declaration of intention.
5. Revised Naturalization Law requires that before a certificate of naturalizati on is issued, the petitioner
shall renounce "absolutely and forever all allegian ce and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state
or sovereignty." It is s ettled that a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philipp ines
unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previou s permission of its Minister
of Interior for the renunciation of his nationality .€In the instant case, petitioner did not offer any
evidence to prove that he obta ined such permission.
