Clearing Und Collateral PDF
Clearing Und Collateral PDF
This document is split into two main parts. While the first part deals with clearing the second part
focuses on collateralization. In both parts the current processes are described and gaps are
identified that need to be closed to ensure compliance with the new regulatory requirements. In
addition more detailed information is provided on certain relevant topics, e.g. legal documentation. At
the end of each part the Sapient offerings are described that relate to the topics covered.
This document is intended to provide a thorough overview of the collateralization and clearing
processes as well as new regulatory requirements. Above that it can be a sound foundation to ramp
up knowledge in this space.
It becomes obvious that the OTC derivative product as well as the counterparty status trigger
different mandatory processes or lead to exemptions. Because of that the interaction between
instrument static data and counterparty static data becomes more important. But not only the
interaction becomes more important but also data maintenance and data accuracy requirements will
increase as well as the timely / immediate availability of such data.
The new regulations will come into effect gradually. However market participants should evaluate
these changes timely and pro-actively not only to ensure compliance but also to look at process
optimization (IT and business). In addition these new regulations will have an impact on the trading
relationships and respective processes. It is fair to assume that these new regulations in sum will
change the way OTC derivatives are traded and processed.
Besides the new regulations market participants will need to review their existing clearing and
collateral processes and come up with a Target Operating Model. Process efficiency and costs
associated with clearing and collateral should be key aspects. Depending on the business model
market participants might also want to explore new growth opportunities and offer clearing and
collateral related services such as client clearing. These market participants will have to
differentiate their offerings from offerings of comparable market participants.
OTC Clearing means that a CCP steps into a bilateral OTC derivative transaction. After that
both counterparties have a separate transaction with the CCP and there is no bilateral transaction
between the initial bilateral counterparties anymore. The rationale behind OTC Clearing is to
mitigate credit and default risks as well as a standardization of process.
LCH.Clearnet, the International Derivatives Clearing Group, CME, Eurex and Intercontinental
Exchange (ICE) are among those who provide derivative clearing services in the U.S. and Europe.
While CCP is often used in Europe, the term Derivative Clearing Organization (DCO) is more
common in the US. Both terms are used equivalent, meaning exactly the same.
Clearing via CCPs shall ensure the following aspects with the CCP serving the following functions:
Reduce transaction costs
Post trade management functions
Financial management of clearing members collateral deposits
Final settlement of outstanding obligations through financial payment or physical delivery
Risk management of market participants
Financial guarantee of performance of its contracts
In order to fulfill all tasks mentioned above, a CCP is usually well capitalized, is highly regulated
and supervised by authorities and demands high financial ratios from financial institutions to
become a clearing member. Moreover, clearing members have to place a contribution to CCPs
default fund. This is usually a mixture of a base contribution (minimum requirement) and a risk-
1
based component, depending on clearing members risk towards CCP .
Condition of clearing membership like financial requirements and creditability is defined by each
CCP. It is common that there are different classes of clearing memberships, e.g. in case of Eurex
Clearing General Clearing Member (GCM) and Direct Clearing Member (DCM), which are
described in more detail in chapter 4.1.4.
Another possibility to access a CCP is via a Clearing Broker (CB) that is clearing member of a
CCP by itself. The different types of CB, like SCM or FCM, are explained in chapter 4.5.
1
For further information visit homepage of Eurex Clearing “http://www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-
en/resources/faqs/” or SwapClear “http://www.swapclear.com/service/becoming-a-member.html”.
© COPYRIGHT 2013 SAPIENT CORPORATION | CONFIDENTIAL 10
4.1.1 Overview of CCPs (TS)
In general, CCPs have to be certified by authorities (e.g. ESMA) meeting a bundle of functional
and organizational requirements, which are out of scope of this document.
Both, the new EMIR regime and the Dodd-Frank Act, require a full set of products across all asset
classes for mandatory clearing. Thereby, a bottom-up approach is applied whereby authorities
include derivative types in mandatory clearing list after CCPs ability for clearing is proven.
Nevertheless, a top-down approach is also foreseen where authorities determine independently
from CCPs ability that a specific product requires to be cleared. This could be because of traded
volumes or otherwise identified importance for financial stability.
An overview of currently available CCPs under EMIR regime with its specific offering of clearable
asset classes is given in the following figure.
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 brought to light that posted collateral was not where
it was supposed to be. Thus, market participants as well as global regulators focused on security
of collateral in case a clearing member fails. Besides stabilization of CCPs default funds,
segregation and portability of collateral has become very important.
Under DFA client collateral is quite simple, as there is only one approach allowed: Legally
separated, operationally commingled (LSOC).
In contrast EMIR requires at least two models that have to be provided by each CCP: omnibus
account and individual segregation. But, EMIR does not specify these approaches further and
2
Discussion Paper is available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/consultation/Discussion-Paper-
Clearing-Obligation-under-EMIR.
Nevertheless, each model has to be compliant to local bankruptcy laws and needs to be
approved by local regulators and by ESMA.
The three major models mentioned before will be described briefly in following passages.
The omnibus account provides the lowest level of security. The clearing member can commingle
client’s collateral with collateral from other clients and post margin on a net basis. Obviously, this
riskier approach is cost saving and operationally simpler. The omnibus account is available with
net and with gross approach. The problem with the omnibus account addresses the risk of a
double default in which a defaulting client takes down the clearing member. Thereby, client’s
collateral can be consumed.
The LSOC is a model, where client’s collateral can also be commingled, but besides posting
collateral on a net basis to CCP a detailed report has to be sent to CCP, too. In case of clearing
member defaults, the CCP guarantees that non-defaulting clients will receive mark-to-market
value of their assets. So client’s margin is not used to meet the margin obligation of another
defaulting client. Nevertheless, the client will not receive its posted collateral, what is problematic
for fund managers as they are bearing costs of reinvestment. A further shortage comes from the
restricted possibility of portability in case a clearing member is under stressed conditions. The
“LSOC with excess” is a subtype where client collateral is even more protected as it is hold directly
at CCP.
The highest level of protection is provided by the individual segregation, where collateral of each
client is segregated. With this model client collateral is segregated from both clearing member and
all other clients. Furthermore, the accounts are completely replicated at CCP, making portability
easy. This model is the most cost intensive one, as it has high requirements to account
management at CM and CCP side. Moreover, CM will lose netting effects making this model even
more expensive. This approach has not been tested in a default situation yet. The individual
segregation is the bases for two further models worth to mention: full asset segregation with the
client clearing directly with CCP and quad-party segregation where collateral remains with a
custodian. The last model is in discussion but already preferred option from fund managers. It is not
clear if custodians are allowed for quad-party segregation or if only central securities depositories,
such as Clearstream or Euroclear, can be used.
One central question with regards to CCPs market participant and clearing members are interested
in is what happens in case of a default of a clearing member. Although all clearing houses have
their own specific rules, a more or less similar default waterfall method in order to fund the debts of
defaulting clearing member applies as best practice at all major CCPs.
3
In general, the default waterfall presents mostly as follows :
1. Initial Margin of the Defaulter
2. Default fund contribution of the defaulter
3. Capital Reserves of CCP
4. Default fund contribution of other clearing members
3
More information can be found at relevant under Eurex Clearing
“http://www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-en/resources/faqs/”; LCH.Clearnet
“http://www.lchclearnet.com/Images/2a%20Default%20Waterfal-l%20Ltd%200.1_tcm6-63514.pdf”.
© COPYRIGHT 2013 SAPIENT CORPORATION | CONFIDENTIAL 12
5. Insurance, if any
6. Additional payment of other clearing members
7. Assets remaining within CCP
8. Closure of CCP
Deviations in the generic waterfall model described above are possible in the area usage of paid
Initial Margin of other clearing members (ICE Clear Europe) or an additional payment liability
(SwapClear) for other clearing member.
Please note that Dodd-Frank Act requires a separate default procedure for each company, leading
in case of LCH.Clearnet to four different default waterfalls with different and separated default
funds. This is because LCH.Clearnet operates with a subsidiary structure – one company for each
asset class.
Before a potential closure of CCP as a final solution is performed, the realistic opportunity of a
public bail-out exists by socializing costs with public. This solution might attract more interest in
the future as authorities are currently shifting risk from market participant to CCPs by clearing
obligation of OTC derivatives. Thereby, they create enormous systematic risks.
Currently to enter into an OTC contract (meaning a derivative contract not traded on a derivatives
exchange) a dealer (counterparty) needs to be selected and before trading a legal framework such
as an ISDA Master Agreement, AFB/FBF or Deutscher Rahmenvertrag für Finanztermingeschäfte
with that counterparty needs to be negotiated and signed. In addition, the parties may include a
Credit Support Annex or other collateral agreement to collateralize positions, depending on their
perception of credit risk against each other. Transactions executed between the parties are then
governed by those arrangements. The key proposition is that these transactions are private
contracts between two parties, as follows:
This legal requirement poses various challenges to the industry operationally, technically and
legally. Central clearing of standardized OTC derivatives is an important aspect of these changes
The clearing obligation applies to all OTC derivatives contracts once the applicable thresholds
above are reached. For further information see chapter 4.4.2.
The relationship between the end-user and the dealer will continue, but the dealer, in its capacity as
a clearing member of the clearinghouse, will act as a clearing agent for the end-user. The
relationship between the end-user and the clearing member will continue under a new customer
agreement, e.g. modified ISDA Master Agreement, and the clearing member will be subject to the
clearinghouse rules:
The market participants are anticipating significant resource, infrastructure and cost
implications due to the OTC client clearing regulations.
Regulatory and business drivers and the resulting issues and considerations:
Central clearing / new capital, margin and segregation rules / exchange and clearing
memberships / cross-jurisdictional and border considerations => Target Operating Model
(TOM)
© COPYRIGHT 2013 SAPIENT CORPORATION | CONFIDENTIAL 14
Multiple CCP and exchange connectivity / trade reporting requirements => Infrastructure
changes
Trade and portfolio reconciliations / policies and strategies for margining / policies and
models for credit risk management => Risk Management
Client infrastructure requirements => Client onboarding
The clearing process places the clearinghouses in the middle of the trade, by a transfer
(commonly referred to as a “give up” or “novation”) of each cleared trade to the clearinghouse.
In the clearing process now the clearinghouse becomes the counterparty to both party’s (buyer and
seller), effectively guaranteeing performance of each party’s obligations under the transaction. The
clearinghouse reduces the credit risk (settlement netting, valuation, margining and the capital
requirement for clearing members), operational risk (by standardizing), systemic risk and the legal
risk. In the end, the centralized clearing of OTC derivative leads to more transparency, liquidity
and lower counterparty risk.
This chapter deals with the clearing obligations under DFA and EMIR. In order to define if a specific
transaction is subject to the relevant regulation, two perspectives are necessary: counterparty
attributes and product attributes.
The Dodd-Frank Act demands mandatory clearing obligation in case at least one of the
counterparties is a US person. Thereby, US person as per definition of DFA is any legal entity that
is incorporated in the US, not incorporated in the US but with its primary place of business in the
US or that is guaranteed by another US person. Moreover, there is an extension for funds in
place: a fund (legal entity) managed by a US fund manager is also a US person. Please note that
the status of a market participant (Swap Dealer, Major Swap Participant or Other) is subject to
entity requirements by DFA but irrelevant for clearing obligation as only compliance dates are
different for different subjects.
The product perspective is pretty more complex. The Dodd-Frank Act applies for all OTC traded
“swaps”, whereas the term “swap” can be interpreted as every derivative that is not a future.
Nevertheless, the regulative bodies, CFTC for swaps and SEC for security-based swaps, excluded
The attitude that a specific product type is in scope of DFA does not qualify automatically for the
clearing obligation. The clearing opportunity by CCPs has to be given as well (upstream
regulation). Besides, regulative bodies have also the possibility to force CCPs for clearing ability
(downstream regulation), e.g. when transaction volumes are high or the specific product type is
considered as systemic relevant for other reason. An overview about product types that are
currently subject to clearing obligation is provided on the CFTC homepage.5
In contrast to DFA EMIR clearing obligation is slightly different at least on a counterparty level:
besides the country of incorporation an EMIR classification becomes relevant too. In general,
EMIR is applicable to each legal entity within the EU, also if the other counterparty is located
outside the EU. Moreover, EMIR classifies legal entities in financial counterparties (FC), non-
financial counterparties above a clearing threshold (NFC+) and the ones below threshold (NFC-).
Clearing obligation is only subject to FCs and NFCs+ incorporated in the EU. The thresholds are
based on notional value and are as follows:
Please note that only speculative OTC derivatives count towards the clearing threshold. In case a
clearing threshold is exceeded the non-financial counterparties has to start clearing all eligible OTC
derivative products in all asset classes on a group-wide basis.
The product perspective is similar to the DFA approach. All products that have to be cleared
mandatorily will be published in a register that is maintained and made public by ESMA.
Additionally, EC has to approve all product types added on this list. In total this can last up to 18
month. Therefore, ESMA is able to follow two approaches too: bottom-up and top-down, forcing
CCPs to develop clearing ability for certain products. Differences between DFA and EMIR are
significant in product scope as EMIR also includes ETD business. In order to define product
scope EMIR references to MiFID, Annex 1 Section C. Embedded options are also excluded like
covered bonds and FX asset class (still under discussion).
Although the clearing obligation has not become effective at time of writing (October 2013), a
proposal for products qualifying for clearing has been published by ESMA and is currently under
4
Please note that the provided list is not exhaustive.
5
More detailed information can be found at:
“http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6607-13”
6
Article is available for download at “http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/emir_for_non-
financials.pdf”
© COPYRIGHT 2013 SAPIENT CORPORATION | CONFIDENTIAL 16
7
discussion. Please note that intragroup transactions can be excluded from clearing obligation
too, what is described more detailed in chapter 4.4.4.
The combination of country of incorporation and EMIR classification on the one hand and the list
of qualified product types results in the following matrix describing clearing obligation under EMIR:
FC FC Y Y
FC NFC+ Y Y
NFC+ NFC+ Y Y
NFC+ NFC- Y N
FC NFC- Y N
NFC- NFC- Y N
Based on the before mentioned clearing obligations several new data is required in deal capture
systems in order to determine if a transaction has to be cleared or not:
Static data of counterparty
Flag, if product is subject for mandatory clearing
Accessible clearing houses
Whenever a financial institution registered as Swap Dealer or Major Swap Participant at CFTC or
SEC is entering into a transaction with a US person Dodd-Frank Act becomes applicable and
transaction has possible clearing obligation. Thereby, a legal entity is a US person either by
country of incorporation, by principal place of business, by guarantee of other US person or
by US fund manager in case of funds.
Along with the US person feature information about possible end-user exception (described in
next chapter) is needed. This information can only be provided by counterparty itself.
Similar information about EMIR classification is needed for clearing obligation under EMIR, as
only NFC- and intragroup transactions (conditions briefly described in next chapter) are exempted.
Additionally, Front Office has to know if counterparty signed in all relevant contracts in order to be
compliant and not infringing national laws. Usually, counterparties have to sign an ISDA or DRV
Annex for each regulation as well as other contracts which are described in chapter 4.7 more
detailed.
Static counterparty data in combination with product statics, i.e. officially subject to mandatory
7
ESMA, Clearing Obligation under EMIR, available at
http://www.esma.europa.eu/consultation/Discussion-Paper-Clearing-Obligation-under-EMIR.
Another data needed in Front Office is information about access to different clearing houses,
either as membership or via a Clearing Broker. As a transaction can only be cleared at one clearing
house contractual partners has to agree on a specific one. Thus, information about access is
needed. An established approach in financial market is that buy-side suggests a specific clearing
house and sell-side agrees.
The new regulations also introduced new transaction identifiers - Unique Swap Identifier (USI) for
Dodd-Frank Act and Unique Trade Identifier (UTI) for EMIR. In future, transactions are identified by
these identifiers only. Moreover, they are part of the confirmation. Thus, best practice would be to
agree on USI or UTI between traders or sales persons like all other trade details such as SSIs,
fixing dates or calendar.
Not only Front Office systems are affected by new regulations in terms of new data necessary, but
so are Back Office systems. In order to achieve timely confirmation and perform risk mitigation
techniques all data mentioned above have to be fed by Front Office systems to BO systems or
implemented in BO systems directly, e.g. counterparty statics, clearing data, transaction identifiers
or information about legal contracts.
In general, internal (e.g. back-to-back trades) and intragroup transactions are excluded from
clearing obligation in both regulations. While internal transactions are legally no transactions as
counterparties are the same, intragroup transactions are treated differently. They are out of scope
for Dodd-Frank Act by definition, but within EMIR preliminary registration at and agreement from
ESMA is required. Please note that there is still the reporting obligation for intragroup transactions
under EMIR.
In case one of the counterparties qualifies for end-user exception the transaction can be cleared
bilaterally as before. Nevertheless, higher capital and margin requirements make the transaction
drastically more costly.
In contrast EMIR doesn’t know any clearing exceptions. Whenever a transaction or more precisely
a product type is qualified for mandatory clearing this product has to be cleared even if the
counterparty is incorporated outside the EU. This has to be managed by a bilateral contract or an
ISDA agreement.
Besides some few supranational or national organizations like IMF or KfW, which are explicitly
mentioned in regulations, only Non-financial Counterparties below the clearing thresholds (NFC-)
are exempted from EMIR’s clearing obligation. In case of intragroup transactions the clearing
obligation is also not applicable. This covers the “Sparkassenverbund” and “Genossenschafts-
verbund” too, meaning that clearing or collateral obligation between “Sparkassen” or “Volks- und
Raiffeisenbanken” is not a topic.
In summary, new OTC derivatives regulations do not allow many exceptions from clearing
Several legal agreements between clearing broker and client have to be made, what is described
more detailed in chapter 4.7.
Two essential clearing models are established in global financial markets: SwapClear Clearing
Member (SCM) and Futures Commission Merchant (FCM). Whereas the SCM model is the
preferred model in Europe, the FCM model is dominating the US market. All available clearing
models are derivative from these two models. Which model a CB can use, depends on regulation
and membership types of CCP. Both models are described in next chapters.
Using a clearing broker doesn’t guarantee that a transaction is really cleared at a CCP. It’s more
that both, the CCP and the CB can refuse to clear a specific transaction with a specific
counterparty. In case the specific transaction is subject to mandatory clearing it will be cancelled,
otherwise the transaction remains in place and has to be cleared bilaterally. This means that three
limit checks are needed in Front Office:
Limit with CCP
Limit with CB
Limit with Counterparty
The FCM model could be also described as an agent model, whereby CCP becomes contractual
partner of both, the buyer and the seller. Thereby counterparty credit risk is reduced.
The main vehicle for clearing is the novation process, meaning that the counterparties are
substituted by CCP. Technically, two new transactions are created (β and γ), whereas the original
transaction (α) is terminated.
Within the FCM model the CB is responsible for settlement, margining and above all, guarantees
client’s obligation of the transaction to CCP. The complete performance of end-user’s obligation
has to be guaranteed.
The FCM model becomes more popular as Dodd-Frank Act requires client domiciled in the US to
clear with CB registered with the CFTC as FCMs. This is the reason why SwapClear, an entity of
LCH.Clearnet responsible for clearing IRD, introduced FCM model along with already existing SCM
8
model .
Moreover, FCM model allows client to clear directly at CCP, substituting counterparty risk with risk
of CCP.
8
Further information can be found at “http://www.swapclear.com/service/becoming-a-member.html”
© COPYRIGHT 2013 SAPIENT CORPORATION | CONFIDENTIAL 20
4.5.2 SCM (TS)
The SCM model, mainly used in Europe, is a principal model. The CB becomes a real
counterparty towards its client. Thus, CB has no longer the function of a guarantor, but is directly
involved into the transaction.
Although novation process to CCP remains almost the same, three transactions are created now:
Client and CB (β1), CB and CCP (β2) and finally, CCP and other counterparty (γ).
As demonstrated there is no difference in novation process compared to FCM model. The only
change is the contractual partner – CB instead of CCP from client’s perspective.
The SCM model is easier to handle as no connectivity or legal agreements are needed with
CCP. Moreover, the model is more flexible as one CB (β1) can provide access to several CCPs
(β2) with one standardized process and connection. Only free limit for CB is necessary (besides
limit for contractual partner as CB still has right to refuse clearing).
Due to the disadvantages of SCM model as well as the requirement for FCM model by DFA, it is
expected that SCM model will be abolished in medium-term, forcing clients and CB to change their
clearing offerings and legal documentation. All notable CCPs are offering FCM model to their
members in the meantime.
The initial margin is the amount required to open a position, the losses during the day must be
met by depositing of future collateral – known as variation margin (also known as MTM), which is
required by the close of business on the following day. Any profits on the contract are credited to
the client’s variation margin account. The variation margin needs to be paid in cash. The
maintenance margin is required in order to keep an open position. This is the minimum required
amount for a margin account. The additional margin covers all possible additional costs of closing
a position and the premium margin is used for all options where the premium must already be
paid by the seller when the option transaction takes place.
The following figure illustrates changes in value between transaction date and the date of the
margin call:
An effective CCP will clear many OTC derivatives. Typically this will result in significant net
positions and hence calls for large amounts of margin. Thus for instance in 2010 LCH had cleared
$248 trillion notional of interest rate swaps, and had taken € 58.5 billion of margin.
There are two different initial margin calculation methods, which are usually VaR based (can use
The VaR (Value-at-risk) margin is a margin intended to cover the largest loss that can be
encountered. The SPAN (Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk) margin system was developed to
replace the so-called strategy-based margin system. SPAN calculates the maximum loss for a
position and references the margin rate to calculate the gain or loss in the position. A further
system of margin requirements called portfolio margining, whereby combined positions of stock
and options on that stock can be offset each other, and is only available for large customers. With
the cross margining agreements the allocated margin can be more efficient used on different
exchanges/clearinghouse, the collateral savings can be as high as 50-75% with the effect of lower
costs and greater financial flexibility. Eurex is planning to use the portfolio based margin approach
called Prisma, which will cover all products and permits cross margining between products.
CCP Recalculation:
Basic: Manually intensive process using ad-hoc calculators and excel driven. Calculations are
overnight or T+1.
Maturing: Semi-automated process with periodic feeds from CCPs and calculators provided to
some clients in a non-sustainable manner.
Best-in-class: Fully automated process with predictive modeling to project next day’s margin calls.
Offered through portals or integrated within client applications.
Scale-Up/Down:
Basic: Scale-Up/Down calculated on a per-CCP/per legal entity basis.
Maturing: Scale-Up/Down calculated across some CCPs and some legal entities taking into
account netting opportunities.
Best-in-class: Single Scale-Up/Down margin calculated across all CCPs and legal entities taking
into account netting opportunities.
The margin requirements will change significantly for products that become centrally cleared.
Variation margin is typically required to account for changes in the prices of the contract in bilateral
trades but initial margin, which protects against counterparty or credit risk, is used with much
variation where it is used at all. This use has, in part, depended on the nature of the counterparty; a
long-only buy-side fund does not carry the same risks as a hedge fund engaging in speculation.
Under the central clearing process, both counterparties will be required to post both initial margin
In the area of margin management there have been two different workflows until now. For
exchange-traded derivatives, there is a well-established procedure with the exchange making
the margin calls overnight. Due to the long-standing nature of these arrangements, they are
processed using relatively old technology in many firms, with a report produced once a day. On the
other side, bilateral OTC derivatives trade, requiring more up-to-date technology used for
collateral management and with a function to dispute margin calls where needed.
Under the new rules, both initial and variation margin are applicable to all centrally cleared trades.
The way that margin calls need to be handled for cleared derivatives is a hybrid between the two
existing models.
The margin account is updated on a daily basis and the maximum loss that must be made up on
any morning is the maximum price movement that occurred the previous day.
If a clearing member is unable to meet the margin call the exchange will order it to cease
further trading and will close open positions in the account; any losses will be met out of the
firm’s margin account. If the levels of funds in the margin account are insufficient, the losses will
be made good from funds paid out of a general fund run by the clearing house, which is maintained
by all members of the exchange. Client positions will be transferred to a back-up clearing
member.
The payment of margin is made by electronic funds transfer between the trading party’s bank
account and the clearing house. Initial margin is often paid in cash, although clearing houses will
also accept highly quality securities, to the value of the margin required. The realized variation
margin is only paid in cash.
The following table shows the legal documentation that is required from a Clearing Member
perspective to clear own transactions.
Clearing Counter-
CCP
Member party
The following table shows the legal documentation that is required to set up a Client Clearing
relationship. The setup involves the following parties: Client (of a Clearing Member), Execution
Broker (Counterparty of the Client), Clearing Member as well as CCP (e.g. LCH).
Execution Clearing
Client CCP
Broker Member
Above that market participants should assess how clearing will affect them from a cost perspective.
To assess the “cost of clearing” different scenarios should be applied (e.g. ratio of clearable
products in comparison to un-cleared products, use of a clearing member (as clearing broker)
against direct CCP membership) and measured against the current costs (un-cleared
environment).
The user can navigate via the Dashboard to further detailed pages with more information about the
client reporting, margin calls, reconciliations (internal or external), valuations and portfolio analytics
(Initial margin scenarios).
Sapient has helped various clients to become a clearing member of a CCP. In addition Sapient has
supported clients defining a client clearing strategy as well as the related implementation.
The clearing houses have rules regarding collateral eligibility apply depending on whether the
collateral is posted as initial or variation margin. For initial margin they accept generally cash or
other highly liquid collaterals (U.S. treasuries or GSE securities) and for variation margin they
only accept cash. The investor must transfer eligible collateral with the value at least equal to the
delivery amount. The collateral must meet the eligibility criteria (currency, type of bond, haircut).
Basic requirements:
Liquidity (The securities must be highly liquid.)
Easy to settle (Treasury bonds, AAA corporate bonds, large-cap equities, mortgage-
backed bonds)
High quality (The collateral should not have a significant embedded risk itself)
Approval from the credit department (Guidance from the CSA)
Types of collateral:
Cash
Fixed income securities
Bank guarantees
Equities (stock)
Mortgage-backed securities
Convertible Bonds
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs)
Mutual Fund Shares
The following list shows the acceptable collaterals for the clearinghouses:
CME OTC IRS Acceptable Collateral IRS Information regarding haircuts can be
found on the same page (Acceptable
Collateral)
The requirements to collaterals are the use of cash, securities or precious metals to cover
margin requirements at the clearing house. Note that the variation margin can only covered in
cash. To facilitate the delivery, the counterparties may lodge securities either directly or
using a tri-party mechanism.
A centralized collateral management system is optimizing collateral among the business and have
following benefits:
Efficiency: Duplicated functionalities across business silos are removed.
Risk modeling: Enhanced risk modeling techniques can be used in credit exposure
calculations
Single view of capital utilization and liquidly risk and enable a single counterparty view
and provides the view of the collateral pool, balance sheet and collateral obligations.
Real time platform with the funding margin for securities based on real risk, creation of
mutually beneficial funding options for clients and the transformation of collateral
management to a revenue center.
Straight Through Processing (STP): A STP workflow engine will enable the advanced
processing of the margin calls, more efficient reconciliations and the reduction of operational risk
and to offer clients collateral options which have been turned to their overall business
requirements.
Furthermore software vendors like Acadiasoft14 providing a platform called Marginsphere which is
focused on automated communication for collateral and for margin calls.
9
http://www-01.ibm.com/software/analytics/algorithmics/
10
http://www.omgeo.com
11
http://www.lombardrisk.com/products/risk-management/colline
12
http://www.calypso.com/solutions/collateral-securities-finance.php
13
http://www.4sight.com/products/4sight-collateral-management
14
http://www.acadiasoft.com/
© COPYRIGHT 2013 SAPIENT CORPORATION | CONFIDENTIAL 32
5.4 Margining for non-cleared derivatives under EMIR (TS)
In response to the financial crisis, the Group of Twenty (G20) initiated a program to reduce
systematic risk in OTC derivatives markets. Thereby, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) were
assigned to develop a framework that establishes global minimum standards for margin
requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives. This final policy was published in
15
September 2013 .
The overall goal on margining is to globally reduce systematic risk and to promote central
clearing.
Moreover, the standards have to be implemented globally. Otherwise financial institution would
gain possibility for regulatory arbitrage and the one operating in a low-margin location would
benefit from a competitive advantage.
The advantages of a margin system over capital requirements are obvious: targeted to a specific
portfolio/transaction, dynamic in dealing with actual market situation and the feature that margin is
“defaulter-pay” where the surviving party is not charged for counterparty’s default.
The policy framework published by BCBS and IOSCO is organized in principles which are more
specified in requirements. Key elements are described in this chapter.
The margining requirements apply in general to all derivative transactions that are not cleared
by a CCP. Exceptions are only made for physically settled FX forwards and swaps.
Nevertheless, IOSCO recognized that variation margining of this derivatives is a common practice
among certain market participants.
Covered entities by margin requirements are financial institutions (FC) and important non-
financial entities (NFC+). All margin transfers may be subject to minimum transfer amount which
is capped at € 500,000, in order to reduction transfers.
Eligible collateral should be defined in detail by national supervisors, but BCBS and IOSCO still
provide a guide of collateral that appear adequate, including:
Cash
High-quality government securities
High-quality corporate bonds
High-quality covered bonds
Equities included in major stock indices
Gold
Furthermore, national supervisors should avoid duplicative regulatory margin requirement. Thus,
cross-border guidance, such as substitute compliance, has to be developed by each regulator.
The variation margin should be calculated on a daily mark-to-market valuation and full amount
should be transferred, i.e. zero threshold. As variation margin will be paid in cash, there is no
major difference in handling compared to central cleared derivatives.
15
The document is available for download: “https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs261.htm”.
For calculation of initial margin two approaches are outlines: a statistical risk-based approach
(including stress scenarios defined by regulators) that has to be accepted by national authorities
(proposed calibration of model: 99% confidence level, 10 days holding period, 5 year time horizon)
and a standardized approach based on schedule.
The standardized approach is calculated for each asset class separately and uses the following
schedule:
ISDA has established a working group in order to provide a market-wide accepted, risk-based
approach that fulfills all requirements set by BCBS and IOSCO. Thereby, ISDA focuses on a
single, risk-sensitive metric. This model is called “standard industry margin model (SIMM)” and
would join the advantages of both proposed models. A final solution is outstanding.
Also haircuts, that have to be used when securities are used for collateral, are recommended, but
need to be proven by national authorities:
Initial margin in the area of OTC markets is fairly new to market participants. BCBS and IOSCO
propose a stepwise introduction, beginning with biggest and thus most systematic relevant
participants. Collateral obligation depends on gross outstanding notional amount:
st
By 1 Dec 2015, any firm with a portfolio over € 3 trillion to exchange IM
st
By 1 Dec 2016, inclusion threshold down to € 2.25 trillion
st
By 1 Dec 2017, inclusion threshold down to € 1.5 trillion
By 1st Dec 2018, inclusion threshold down to € 750 billion
st
By 1 Dec 2019, inclusion threshold down to € 8 billion
Calculation bases on a group aggregated month-end average for June, July and August. Subject
to initial margin are only new transactions done from December of the year the firm hits the
threshold until November of following year and only if the firm trades with another firm meeting this
condition. Please note that FX forwards and swaps (initially out of scope of margin requirements)
are included in threshold calculation.
st
In contrast the variation margin becomes mandatory for all market participants by 1 of
December, 2015. All transactions done after the compliance date are subject to variation margin,
whereas old transactions are not affected.
Most of OTC derivative transactions are executed under an ISDA master agreement. The
collateral agreement is defined by a Credit Support Annex (CSA) which supplements the ISDA
master agreement (per counterparty) and covers the same product scope except when otherwise
agreed. Although standard CSAs exist most CSAs are negotiated bilaterally defining key
collateral terms and conditions (e.g. eligible collateral, haircuts, independent amounts). Please
note that similar documentation is available for German Master Agreements (Deutscher
Rahmenvertrag + Besicherungsanhang).
Although not identical to the margining of CCP cleared transactions similarities exist. The total
credit support amount consists of the exposure amount and the independent amount. While the
independent amount is similar to the initial margin, the exposure amount is similar the
variation margin - threshold.
The new collateralization requirements under EMIR will have a significant impact on CSAs.
According to the final policy framework published by BCBS and IOSCO regarding margin
requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives certain aspects of established CSAs will have
to be amended, e.g. initial margin (independent amount) will have to be posted by both
counterparties and held separately.
Sapient has a proven track record, and robust methodologies, in defining powerful operating
models for its clients. Our track record for “on-time and to-plan” delivery success derives from our
ability to couple deep business expertise with innovative technology studies.
Firms have to select and align with the solutions that have the best fit and ROI as well as align
to the evolving Target Operating Model.