L'antiquité classique

Young Pompey : 106-79 B.C

Arthur Keaveney

Résumé
Sont examinés certains épisodes importants du début de la carrière de Pompée. L'auteur discute le rôle qu'il jouait quand il
servait sous son père, Pompeius Strabo, puis fait une relation détaillée de son action sous les régimes de Cinna et Sylla.

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Keaveney Arthur. Young Pompey : 106-79 B.C. In: L'antiquité classique, Tome 51, 1982. pp. 111-139;

doi : 10.3406/antiq.1982.2063

http://www.persee.fr/doc/antiq_0770-2817_1982_num_51_1_2063

Document généré le 16/03/2016

 YOUNG POMPEY : 106-79 B.C.

In writing this paper I have had two objectives in mind. The first is
to critically examine certain episodes of Pompey's earlier career which,
in my opinion, have been misunderstood or have not been properly
examined so as to try and establish more fully the truth about them.
The second, which is naturally dependent on the successful
of the first, has been to put Pompey's part in the military and
political life of these times in a clearer light '.
Pompey began his military career as a contubernalis of his father in
89 B.C. 2. It is not, however, until 87 B.C. that he, still serving with his
father, becomes for us a person in his own right. Pompey Strabo had
been summoned to help the government against Cinna and Marius. He
had however played an ambiguous part in the proceedings negotiating
with both sides for his own advantage. He refused at first to fight for
Octavius until he had been promised a second consulship. Eventually
he did fight for the government engaging in a battle against Sertorius

1 The following works are referred to throughout by their author's surnames : E.

Badián, The date of Pompey's First Triumph, in Hermes, 83 (1955), pp. 107-1 18 ; H.
Bennett, Cinna and his Times, Menasha, 1923 ; B. Frier, Sulla's Propaganda .· The
Collapse of the Cinnan Republic, in AJP, 92 (1971), pp. 585-604 ; E. Gabba, Appiani
Bellorum Civilium Liber I, Florence, 1958 ; A. Garzetti, Plutarchi Vita Caesaris,
Florence, 1954 ; M. Gelzer, Cn. Pompeius Strabo und der Aufstieg Seines Sohnes
Magnus, in Abhandlungen der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Jahrgang
1941 (Berlin 1 942) ; A. H. J. Greenidge, Roman Public Life, London, 1 901 ; E. Gruen,
Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, Cambridge Mass., 1968 ; B. R. Katz, The
Siege of Rome in 87 B.C., in CP, 71 (1976), pp. 328-336 ; J. Leach, Pompey the Great,
London, 1978 ; R. E. Smith, Pompey's conduct in 80 and 77 B.C., in Phoenix, 14
(1960), pp. 1-13 ; L. R. Taylor, The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic, Rome,
1960 ; P. Willems, Le Sénat de la République Romaine, II, Aalen reprint 1968. -
These others are referred to by both the surnames and the abbreviations which are
given after them in brackets : E. Badián, Foreign Clientelae, Oxford, 1958 (F.C.) -, E.
Badián, Waiting for Sulla, in JRS, 52 (1962), pp. 206-234 (Waiting); M. Gelzer,
Caesar, Oxford, 1969 (Caesar).
2 Cf. Gelzer, p. 9 ; Leach, pp. 13-14.
112 Α. ΚΕΑ VEN ΕΥ

and then in one on the Janiculum. After this latter battle, though, he
began to negotiate with Cinna once more but his sudden death from
plague cut short his intrigues 3.
It was at some time during these events that there occurred the
adventure in which young Pompey played a prominent part. Our only
source for it is Plutarch (Pompey, 3). According to this account Cinna
planned to murder both Pompey Strabo and Pompey. Pompey's
assassin was to be a man called Terentius 4. Pompey foiled this plot but
a mutiny nevertheless broke out in the camp. Pompey Strabo was
afraid to venture from his tent but Pompey went about trying to quell
the mutiny and was able to prevent all but 800 from deserting.
Although this tale is plainly tendentious it requires careful
consideration. It cannot be dismissed out of hand 5. Like the other early
chapters of this Life it can be made to yield a core of truth despite all the
eulogy of Pompey. Katz has rightly pointed out the absurdity of
believing the story that Pompey Strabo kept to his tent through fear.
But there is another possible reason why he should be confined to
quarters. He was ill with plague and this would explain why there was
a mutiny. Without a leader to guide it, in a time of great military and
political uncertainty and with the terror of plague all about it is hardly
surprising that the temper of the army was, to say the least of it,
uncertain. In such circumstances it would require only a small incident
to spark off trouble. This hypothesis receives support from Lie, 22 F
who not only describes Pompey Strabo as being bed-ridden by his
illness, but adds the significant detail that during the general's illness
the army per aliquot dies sine duce fuit, which must have inevitably
meant a weakening of discipline. It also becomes clear now why Cinna
made his assassination bid at this time. If the general and his son were
removed then his army which was already showing signs of
would crumble away and the greatest obstacle to the capture of
Rome would be removed. Nor need we doubt Pompey's part in the
affair. In just a few years he was to show both in Picenum and Africa

3 For this sequence of events see A. Keaveney, Pompeius Strabo's second

consulship, in CQ, 28 (1978), pp. 240-241.
4 For him see Katz, p. 332.
5 As it is by Badián, F.C., p. 239, n. 6. Gelzer, p. 18 and Bennett, p. 15 rightly
emphasise its essential truthfulness. Neither, however, discusses it adequately. The
only attempt at a discussion I have seen, that of Katz pp. 332-333, is unsatisfactory.
 YOUNG POMPEY. 106-79 B.C. 113

the hold he could exercise over even difficult troops. It is not straining
credulity to believe that this was the first time he exercised those
talents. After all the fortunes of his family depended on keeping the
army together. With his father sick, who else could do this but he ?
And the detail of the plague enables us to pinpoint when this incident
occurred. It happened some time after the battle of the Janiculum while
Pompey Strabo was intriguing with Cinna. To the latter the plague and
the consequent unrest in Pompey Strabo's army must have presented a
heaven-sent opportunity to remove the general from his path without
the need for concessions which Pompey Strabo would, of course, have
been demanding in their negotiations and, as we have just seen, he took
it.
Plutarch's story, then, is to be believed since it accords well with the
evidence of Licinianus both as to the timing and the circumstances of
the incident. And given that timing and circumstance the part he
assigns to Pompey is perfectly credible 6.
Although the victorious Cinnans looted Pompey Strabo's house on
their entry into Rome, Pompey himself survived 7. With the death of
his father and the disintegration of his army Pompey had ceased to be a
threat to Cinna and indeed, he was regarded as being a valuable asset.
This is most clearly brought out in the affair of his trial.
Pompey Strabo was alleged to have embezzled the booty from the
siege of Asculum. The state of the treasury made it necessary for Cinna
to try and get it back and so Pompey was charged in 86 with peculatus.
It soon became obvious that although the money was to be recovered
no blot was to attach to Pompey himself. Leading figures in the
political life of the day, Philippus, Carbo and Hortensius spoke in his
favour. The presiding officer Antistius made a match between his
daughter and Pompey, Pompey was acquitted and the blame for the
embezzlement was shifted onto a freedman of his 8.

6 Both Bennett, p. 15 and n. 74 (followed by Katz, p. 332, n. 17) and Gelzer,

p. 1 8 place the incident before the battle on the Janiculum but neither gives reasons for
this choice and the evidence of the source would seem to be against them. For the place
of the Janiculum battle in the sequence of events in 87 see above n. 3.
7 Plut., Pomp., 4, 1.
8 Cf. Bennett, pp. 42-43 ; Gruen, pp. 244-246. The trial has another interest also.
It forms an episode in the history of the Quaestio de Peculatu. Gruen, p. 263 points out
that in 1 04 there was definitely no permanent quaestio as the case of Gaepio in that
year proves. He then went on to speculate that in 102 Lucullus was charged with
114 Α. ΚΕΑVEN ΕΥ

Now the concordia which Cinna established between various

interests which is so well illustrated by what happened at Pompey's
trial has often been commented upon and sometimes praised 9. What is
not so often stressed is why Cinna pursued this policy. It sprang in fact
from fear and necessity. He had declared Sulla a hostis, chased his wife
from Rome, murdered his friends, and burned his house 10. He had
done this while Sulla was waging, on Rome's behalf, a desperate war
against Mithridates, at this stage even without supplies from home
since Cinna had cut these off too. Small wonder then that the Cinnans
dreaded the day of Sulla's return. The lion would return to his den and
wreak havoc among those whom he found in possession n. It was
imperative therefore that Cinna should seek allies and he could not
afford to be too choosey about where he looked 12. Thus he sought the
alliance of young Pompey. Not only was the latter a man of military
experience, but his connections in Picenum would make him the ideal
person to recruit in that area as the day of reckoning came closer 13.
Thus it comes as no surprise to learn that Pompey was in the army
which Cinna assembled at Ancona in 84 14. Where the army was going
has been a subject for debate. Badián (Waiting, p. 59) was of the
opinion that nothing more than a brief toughening up exercise in Illyria

Peculatus since Plut., Luc, 1, 1, says he was accused of χλοπή ( = Peculatus).

However, this would appear to be an error of Plutarch's. Diod. Sic (XXXVI, 8, 5) tells
us that Lucullus neglected to do his duty δια βφστώνην είτε δια δωροδοχίαν ( = Res
Repetundae). As the name of the crime, as given by Diodorus, is perfectly consistent
with the circumstances in which it is said to have been committed we must, I think,
accept his evidence rather than Plutarch's and thus Gruen's attractive theory that we
have here evidence for a permanent Quaestio de Peculatu set up the previous year is
inadmissible. The next Peculatus Ιχλσπή trial of which we hear is that of Pompey.
Gruen suggested that here we have further proof that there was now a permanent
quaestio since nowhere in our sources is it called extraordinaria. This might very well
be so but we might recall Gruen's own words about Tubulus' Quaestio de sicariis
"since that is the only recorded occasion prior to Sulla it is likely that Tubulus presided
over a quaestio extraordinaria'' (p. 261).
9 Cf. e.g. Gruen, p. 243 ; Badián, Waiting, passim ; Frier, p. 604.
10 App., B.C., I, 77. Cf. R. Bauman, The hostis declaration of 88 and 87 B.C., in
Athenaeum, 51 (1973), pp. 270-293.
11 Plut., Mar., 45, 4-5 vividly illustrates how the Cinnans felt about Sulla.
12 I hope to have more to say about Cinna's ramshackle alliance in a future paper on
Sulla and the Italians.
13 Cf. Leach, p. 14.
14 Plut., Pomp., 5, 1-3. Cf. MRR, 2, 60.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 115

was planned. Balsdon in a review of Badian's Studies in Greek and

Roman History 15 rightly protested against this view saying that Cinna
had no time for Sulla by now was on his way to or already at Athens 16.
It would be madness to attempt such an exercise with the enemy so
close. But why then should he be headed for Liburnia which App.,
B.C., I, 77 clearly says was to be his base against Sulla ? The answer, I
would suggest, was to gather ships there. When some years before
Flaccus and Fimbria had mounted their expedition they had sent their
troops piecemeal which indicates a shortage of ships - a situation
which was worsened when some of their fleet was destroyed by
Mithridates and by storms. And Cinna too was obliged to ship his
troops piecemeal. Evidently he also was short of ships and intended to
remedy this defect in Liburnia before proceeding further against Sulla
who had a large fleet by now 17.
The sequel to the attempt differs according to the source we read.
Appian tells us that although the first detachment crossed safely the
second was caught in a storm and those who survived deserted because
they had no taste for a war against their fellow-citizens (i.e. Sulla).
When the rest heard this they refused to cross and a riot ensued in
which Cinna was killed 18. There is little need to doubt the veracity of
this account. Cinna and Carbo had recruited their soldiers among the
newly-enfranchised Italian nations 19. They claimed that they had now
to face Sulla because of what they had done on behalf of these nations.
Sulla however had already indicated in a letter to the senate that he
intended to respect the Italians' newly won rights. As he was not a man
who was in the habit of breaking his word and as he plainly had the
power to redeem his pledge some of the Italians were disposed to trust
him and could see no good reason for fighting on China's behalf. Italy
had seen enough fighting 20. A useful pointer as to the temper of the

15 JRS, 45 (1965), p. 232.

16 Plut., Sulla, 26, 1.
17 Flaccus and Fimbria: App., Mlth., 51 ; Cinna: App., B.C., I, 77. Sulla : App.,
B.C., I, 79. Frier, p. 593, thought that there were plans afoot to join Scipio in
Macedonia (cf. MRR , 2, 59, n. 2) - a manifest impossibility. The notion that Scipio was
to cooperate with Cinna against Sulla should not however be totally dismissed.
18 B.C. , I, 78. Brunt's discussion of the passage is not satisfactory {Italian Manpower,
Oxford, 1971, p. 310). I will have more to say about it elsewhere.
19 App., B.C. Λ, 76.
20 App., B.C., I, 77, cf. Plut., Sulla, 38, 4.
116 Α. ΚΕΑ VEN ΕΥ

country is provided by Livy, £>., 84 which is to be dated to a few

months after the death of Ginna. According to him Carbo wished to
take hostages from all the towns and colonies of Italy to secure their
loyalty against Sulla. Evidently many Italians did not wish to fight Sulla
and Cinna's attempt to make them, cost him his life.
The sequel narrated by Plutarch (Pomp., 5) differs in a number of
respects from that of Appian. According to this account Pompey joined
China's army only to find himself the object of accusations. He
therefore dropped out of sight. A rumour then got about that Cinna had
murdered him. A riot resulted and Cinna was killed. Although this
does differ from Appian it can nevertheless, I believe, be reconciled
with what he tells us. In the first place we need not doubt that Pompey
really was present in the army. He was a man of some military
experience and as such would be valuable to Cinna. Even more
important though he would make a valuable recruiting agent in
Picenum and we must assume that some of Cinna's troops came from
there. Nor need the story that he was under suspicion be dismissed.
Cinna's alliances were based on expediency not on a true harmony of
interests. Now with Sulla's approach so near Cinna might very well
suspect that Pompey was contemplating a move which he in fact did
make a year later namely desertion to Sulla. And we might also bear in
mind that the assassination attempt of 87 probably still rankled. With
the existence of a party in the republic who sought compromise with
Sulla 21 it is hardly surprising that Cinna should be suspicious and as
Pompey was a late-comer to his cause it is not straining credulity to
believe that suspicion should fall on him. He therefore went into hiding
to escape. Now if there were, as we have postulated, a number of
Picentine troops in the camp it is not to be wondered at that they should
be upset at the disappearance of their chief nor, that, in the absence of
any better information, they should believe all sorts of wild rumours
and in particular that which said that Cinna had made away with him.
It may also be true of course that previous to his departure Pompey had
urged them not to fight against Sulla n. Rapidly becoming an object of
suspicion to Cinna he must have been contemplating a change of sides
and he could hardly be unaware of the feelings of the rest of the army

21 Cf. App., B.C., I, 77, 79 ; Liv., Ep., 83, 84.

22 As Bennett p. 61, suggests.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 117

who swayed by Sulla's promises were beginning to show a marked

reluctance to fight.
We may harmonise the accounts of Appian and Plutarch then if we
accept that Pompey sowed disaffection among the Picentine troops in
Cinna's army. It was because of this disaffection and even more,
because of a rumour that Cinna had killed Pompey that they joined
with the rest of the army who shared their reluctance to fight Sulla 23.
We must beware however of attributing too great a part in Cinna's
death to Pompey. His agitation and subsequent disappearance was only
one factor among many which led to the fatal riot. He was suffered to
live on quietly on his Picetine estate for almost a year 24. Had the
government at Rome believe he was the chief culprit they would surely
have winkled him out of his bolt-hole ".
Quietly then he remained in Picenum for the rest of the year.
Although the recruiting agents of Cinna's successor must have come
that way we have no record of his opposing them 26. However in the
spring of 83 when the arrival of Sulla was imminent he stirred himself
and began to recruit an army with great rapidity 27. He was, however,
opposed by elements in Picenum who seem to have been friendly to
Carbo and were probably acting as his recruiting agents. A certain
Vedius challenged Pompey and was killed by a mob. When Pompey
himself set up a tribunal in the market place of Auximum he drove the
duoviri of the colony, two brothers named Ventidius who were
favourable to Carbo, out of the city. Indeed all of Carbo's partisans

23 I think it is important to emphasise that although the whole camp must have
heard the rumour about Pompey only his own Picentine contingent was likely to be
affected by it. This was however, as I have argued, only one of the factors which
caused them to join the mutiny. It is also worth considering that Pompey became
suspect simply because word of his spreading disaffection reached Cinna's ears. We
must emphasise too that whereas App. B.C. 1.78 is talking of the army as a whole
Plut., Sulla, 5 in the main seems only concerned with the Picetine contingent.
24 See below n. 27.
25 The dangerously disaffected mood of the country which we have noted (see
above) would not stop them mounting a punitive expedition against Picenum. They
were certainly able, with local support, to make some attempt at recruiting there in the
next year, cf. n. 28.
26 Carbo's recruiting : Liv., Ep., 84.
27 Dating : Plut., Sulla, 6, 1 ; Vell. Pat., II, 29, 1 . On the recruitment see also Val.
Max., V, 2, 9 ; Bell. Afr., 22, 2 ; Dio, fr. 107 ; Diod. Sic, XXXVIII, XXXIX, 9 (this
last source emphasises the rapidity with which the recruiting was done).
118 ?. ??? VEN ??

either fled or threw in their lot with him 28. The government at first did
not take Pompey and his rebellion (for that is what it was) seriously. No
doubt the fate of the Ventidii and others like them helped to change
their minds and strong measures were decided upon 29. We are told
that the Government had sent out its army to challenge ?at? µ???? 30.
Three of these divisions were sent against Pompey. They were
commanded by C. Carrinas, T. Cluilius and L. Iunius Brutus
Damasippus 3I. Pompey routed the army of Brutus and the other two
then withdrew n.
He then made his way to Sulla with one legion but was shortly after
sent back to Picenum to do some more recruiting. He returned some
time later with another two legions. This is Appian's story and it is to
be preferred to that of Livy and Plutarch both of whom merely remark
that he came to Sulla with three legions ". The discrepancy may be put
down to the compression of both of the latter authors. It is highly
unlikely that the epitomator would be bothered about drawing the
distinction between Pompey's two journeys. Plutarch himself declares
that he has only just touched on Pompey's early exploits so as to have
more room for the later more important ones 34. It is entirely in keeping
with this declaration that he should skip over such a nice point as the
one we have been considering.
It was, of course, as part of a general recruiting campaign that Sulla
sent Pompey back to Picenum once more. Crassus was sent on a
similar mission among the Marsi and indeed a large part of the winter
of 83 seems to have been spent in feverish recruiting up and down
Italy 35.

28 PLUT.,/Omp.,6,2-6. For Vedius, cf. R. Syme, Whowas VediusPollio ?,inJRS,5\

(1961), p. 30. Whether or not the Ventidii were related to Ventidius 'the muleteer' is a
matter for debate ; see the opposing views of Taylor, p. 264 and E. Badián, Notes on
Roman Senators of the Republic, in Historia, 12 (1963), pp. 141-142.
29 Diod. Sic, XXXVIII, XXXIX, 9. Both this passage and Plut., Pomp., 6, 6
indicate that Pompey's army grew very quickly. This may have caught the Cinnans by
surprise.
30 App., A.C., I, 82.
31 Plut., Pomp., 1, 1 withA/??, 2, 65.
32 Plut., Pomp., 1, 1-3 ; Diod. Sic, XXXVIII ; XXXIX, 9.
33 App., B.C., I, 80 ; Liv., Ep., 85 ; Plut., Pomp., 6, 6.
Pomp., 8, 7.
Plut., Crass., 6, 3-4 ; App., B.C., I, 87.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 119

However, before we can discover what befell Pompey on his return

to Picenum we must consider the difficulties presented by the following
sources, Plut., Pomp., 7-8, 3 and Diod. Sic, XXXVIII, XXXIX, 10
which supply us with much of our information about this episode 36.
Indeed chapter 7 of the Pompey is a supreme example of the
compression in Plutarch's account of Pompey's early life which we
have just been mentioning. It consists of the narration of a few
incidents drawn not only from different times in the year 83 but also
from 82 37 designed to highlight Pompey's prowess in war. As we have
already seen the battle against Brutus is to be assigned to the period
before he first came to join Sulla. Gelzer (p. 23) seems to favour the
view that Pompey made a leisurely march to Sulla. He cites in
particular Pomp. ,6,6 which certainly depicts a leisurely progress but as
he himself admits App., B.C., I, 80 would seem to indicate that Pompey
arrived at Sulla's camp soon after the latter arrived in Italy and this
would seem to be supported by Pomp., 8, 1-2 which tells us Sulla was
coming to help him. Brutus and his friends had been a very real threat ;
it is unlikely that Pompey can have made a leisurely march, at least not
until he had disposed of the government forces and by this time of
course, Sulla was near. It seems reasonable then to suppose that
Pompey did hurry to Sulla. The only time he could have dawdled on
the way was when in the final stages of his journey, with his enemies
vanquished, he knew Sulla was near (Pomp., 8, 2).
The next incident narrated by Plutarch is that involving Scipio. This
would seem to refer most plausibly to the time at which Pompey had
returned to continue recruiting 38. It is to this period too that we must
assign Diod. Sic, XXXVIII, XXXIX, 10. In the first place the words
?a??? . . . ??d?e?a? must be a reference to Sulla's calling him Imperator
on their first meeting 39. Then the words ????????? . . . S????: will, of
course, refer to something he had done after being called imperator and
which he reported. But what did he do ? The words ?a?µ??e?? . . .

36 Gelzer 's treatment (pp. 23-24) is not altogether satisfactory. Despite some
perceptive observations (see, e.g. n. 37) he seems mainly content to synopsise these
sources and some others without weighing them up properly. He also misdates the
Diodorus passage (cf. ?. 40).
37 As was seen by Gelzer, p. 24 but not Gabba, p. 226.
38 On all of this see Gelzer, pp. 23-24.
39 See below n. 41 and 42.
120 A. KEAVENEY

?f??pa?e? provide the answer and are in fact the very pivot of our
argument. I know of no other success of Pompey's which could be
described with the word ?f??pa?e? save that which he gained over
Scipio. He literally snatched his army away from him without a fight 40.
We can thus plausibly refer Plut., Pomp., 1, 5 and Diod. Sic,
XXXVIII, XXXIX, 10 to that period when Pompey had returned once
more to Picenum to recruit for Sulla. They are in fact our only sources
for this period in Pompey's life and they tell us that Pompey overcame
all obstacles to accomplish his mission. Was it therefore after this
second success that Sulla greeted him with the title Imperator ? The
answer appears to be no. The evidence of Plut., Pomp., 8, 1-3 on this
point would seem to be decisive. It was because of the flair he had
shown in overcoming the very grave threat posed by Brutus that Sulla
so hailed him. It meant of course that Sulla regarded him as one who
was worthy to give orders ; worthy to be a commander 41. It should not
be assumed, as it is by Plutarch, that Sulla's act was the equivalent of
the soldiers' acclamation of an imperator. This was the privilege of a
man with the full Imperium who had won a battle. Pompey was still a
private citizen 42. Sulla's action was nothing more than a gesture of
respect by one individual towards another. It must not be taken to
imply that Sulla regarded Pompey as the holder of an Imperium.
Some time towards the end of the year Pompey seems to have
returned to Sulla with the other two legions he had recruited. In the
new year he was sent by Sulla to serve as a legatus under Metellus Pius
in Cis-Alpine Gaul. While we may believe that Metellus was asked if
he wanted Pompey on his staff it seems highly unlikely that there is any
truth in the suggestion that the idea of Pompey's taking over the
command completely was mooted. Metellus' performance was not that

40 I cannot agree with either Gelzer, p. 23, who assigns the passage to a time prior
to Pompey's first meeting with Sulla and uses it to support his theory that Pompey
made a leisurely march or with the Loeb editor ad loc. , who tentatively assigns it to 82.
It should also be noted that the a???s?? fits in well with Pompey's recruitment of two
further legions.
citizen"
41 "An(S.imperator
Weinstock,
wasDivus
anyone
Julius,
whoOxford,
could give1971,
orders,
p. 103).
a ruler,
Cf. Diod.
an official
Sic, or
XXXVIII
a private;
XXXIX, 10.
42 Cf. Greenidge, p. 156. Plutarch also seems to think that Sulla was proclaimed
imperator for his victories over Scipio and Marius jr. In fact he was so proclaimed
because of his victory at Chaeronea as one of his coins (Crawford, no. 359) shows.
Leach, p. 25, thought that Sulla's greeting might be ironic but this seems unlikely.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 121

unimpressive and Sulla is unlikely to have committed such a gross

political blunder as to replace a pro-consul from a prominent family
with a comparatively unknown legatus however highly he may have
regarded him 43.
Metellus had to fight his way to his province and early in the next
year he engaged in battle against Carrinas at the river Aesis. He
emerged as victor and followed up his success by taking the enemy
camp 44. At some stage in the battle Pompey who seems to have been in
command of the cavalry put to flight some of Carbo's horse which had
presumably been sent to aid Carrinas 45.
Carbo now advanced south from Ariminum to oppose Metellus 46.
He succeeded in laying siege to Metellus in his camp but according to
Appian withdrew on hearing of the start of the siege of Praeneste 47.
According to Orosius Pompey was responsible for driving him from
his camp 48. Both sources do agree that as Carbo retreated Pompey
followed him and inflicted heavy casualties on his troops.
We next hear of Pompey when, in his advance along the coast, he
overcomes Marcius Censorinus and plunders the town of Sena
Gallica 49. The remainder of Pompey's actions down until the Sullan
victory are less obscure and may be narrated briefly. Once Metellus had
reached his province by bypassing Ariminum Pompey's presence in the
area was less vital and he was recalled to serve once more under Sulla.
It would appear that after the Aesis battle Carrinas had made his way to
Spoletium to check Crassus who, based on Tuder, was menacing
Carbo's flank as he operated against Sulla who had by now invaded

43 Plut., Pomp., 8, 5-6. For Metellus see MRR, 2, 68.

44 App., B.C., I, 87 ; Oros., V, 20, 5.
45 Plut., Pomp., 7, 6 - reading ??s?? see the Budé apparatus ; Oros., V, 20, 5.
Gelzer, p. 28 is surely right to identify the battle in Plutarch with that in Appian and
Orosius since both the location and the details are the same. Gabba, p. 229, needlessly
denies this identification ; it should be noted that this is part seems to be due to the fact
that he misinterprets the evidence of Oros., V, 20, 5 and 7, see n. 49.
46 Gabba, p. 230. Indeed the presence of his cavalry at the Aesis battle probably
indicates that he was already well on his way by then and probably quite close to
Metellus.
47 B.C., I, 87.
48 V, 20, 7.
49 App., B.C., I, 88 with Gabba, p. 233. I do not know why Gabba believes that
Oros., 20, 7 refers to this encounter. The detail of the fleeing Carbo being pursued by
Pompey contained therein surely refers to the battle we have noted in the previous
paragraph and there is no mention of Marcius.
122 ?. ??? VEN ??

Etruria50. Crassus and Pompey defeated Carrinas but ultimately he

managed to escape their clutches 51.
By now the relief of Praeneste which had been closely besieged by
the Sullans for some months became of paramount concern to the
Cinnans. Relief attempts from the north and the south were made by
the Cinnans and their Italian allies and Sulla himself went to Praeneste
to strengthen the besieging force. One of the armies from the north
under the command of Censorinus was routed somewhere between
Narnia and Ocriculum by Pompey 52. After the failure of three attempts
to lift the siege and with the news that Cis-Alpine Gaul was in the
hands of Metellus, Carbo lost all hope and abandoning his army at
Clusium fled to Africa. This was presumably the army with which he
had earlier opposed Sulla. It was now attacked and defeated by
Pompey. It would appear not only from this but also from the rout of
Censorinus earlier that Pompey, as Sulla's legatus, had taken over the
direction of the war in Etruria once the pro-consul had departed for
Praeneste 53.
A final effort was now made to break the siege. The Italians
advanced on the town from the south while Carrinas and his allies
came from the north. Pompey started from Clusium in pursuit of this
latter force but was unable to catch them or prevent their joining forces
with the Italians to engage Sulla at the Colline Gate 54.
With the battle of the Colline Gate the Sullan cause had triumphed in
Italy but there were still Cinnans holding out in Sicily and Africa.
Sulla's difficulty was to be Pompey's opportunity. The great proconsul
had, as we have seen, been much impressed by the young man's

50 App., B.C., I, 89-90 with Gabba, p. 237-239, cf. Plut., Crass., 6, 6. Gabba, p. 238
hesitantly suggests that Pompey followed Carrinas immediately after the Aesis battle
but the fact that he engaged in battle with Censorinus makes this impossible.
51 App., A.C., I, 90.
52 Sources for the siege of Praeneste = Greenidge and Clay, p. 206. Pompey's
victory : App., B.C., I, 90 with Gabba, p. 239.
53 App., B.C., I, 92. Gabba, p. 244 points out that three attempts at raising the siege
had now been made.
54 Last attempt at relief: App., B.C., I, 92. Pompey's part : I follow the plausible
interpretation of Plut., Sulla, 29, 3 given by Gabba, p. 246. Taken literally, as it is by
Geijzer, p. 29 and H. E. Malden, The Battle of the Colline Gate B.C. 82, in Journal of
Philology, 39 (1886), pp. 106-107, the passage yields no sense and contradicts the
whole narrative of Appian. MRR, 2, 73, n. 1, wrongly assumes that Pompey had left
Italy before the Colline Gate battle.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 123

abilities. He was clearly the man most suited for the task of crushing
the remaining Cinnans and he was to do it as the holder of an
imperium. Both Cic, Leg. Man., 61 and Livy, Ep., 89 tell us that the
Imperium was conferred by the senate. Lie. 31 F tells us that the
imperium was pro-praetore 55. Pompey, it is true, had held no office
previous to this but there were precedents in Roman history for such
an appointment56. Plutarch indeed tells us that Sulla drew a
comparison between Pompey's imperium and that held by Scipio
Africanus in Spain in 210 57. It must be emphasised that only the senate
conferred this imperium on Pompey. Sulla played no part in the
business since it was beyond his competence as a proconsul to have
any. At the outset Pompey's provincia was confined to Sicily. When,
however, he had cleared the island of Cinnans this provincia was
widened to take in Africa. This time both the senate and Sulla
authorised this extension. And Sulla's participation was perfectly legal
for, after the death of the consul Carbo at the hands of Pompey in
Sicily, he had assumed the title of dictator with the widest possible
powers. He was therefore entitled now to add his decree to that of the
senate's - something he was unable to do when Pompey first set out for
Sicily 58.
Smith's discussion (pp. 1-2) seems to me to be inadequate on this
matter. Despite the evidence to the contrary he appears to assume that
correct constitutional procedure was not followed. He also toys with
the idea that Pompey may have been Sulla's legatus although again this
is contradicted by our sources. He further suggests that Pompey's status
was the same as that of L. Licinius Murena but I believe that it can be
demonstrated that this was not so.
Broughton (MRR, 2, 62, n. 4) tentatively suggests that Murena held
the praetorship before 87. He bases this view on Cic, Mur., 15 who
says Murena triumphed ex praetura (lit : out of his praetorship).
However as a consideration of the following passages of Velleius

55 Servius also has something to tell us about this imperium cf. ?. 8 1 .

56 Willems, p. 569.
57 Pomp., 14, 1 and there were others which would have been equally valid for the
purposes of comparison cf. Willems, pp. 554-557.
58 Sulla becomes dictator after the death of Carbo : App., B.C., I, 98. Sources for
Sulla's powers in Gabba, pp. 341-342 and Willems, p. 517, n. 10, Sulla and the senate
extend Pompey's provincia : Plut., Pomp., 11,1.
124 ?. ???VEN ??

Paterculus will show it is almost certain that he held the praetorship in

88 and the imperium pro-praetore thereafter :
II, 33, 1 : L. Lucullus ... ex consulatu sortitus Asiam.
II, 59, 1 : Hie (the father of Augustus) Praetor ... ex eo honore sortitus
Macedoniam .
II, 78, 3 : Calvinus Domitius, cum ex consulatu obtineret Hispaniam.
Velleius is clearly telling us about the provinciae these men obtained
as a result of holding the offices of consul or praetor (from the
consulship /praetorship he obtained ...) and thus that they were
or propraetors. It also appears from the passages that for
Velleius ex-praetura means a pro-praetorship obtained by the
of one's praetorian imperium when the year of the praetorship
is up. Cicero is surely using ex-praetura in the same way. "From his
praetorship he triumphed" - he triumphed while holding the imperium
propraetore which he had obtained by the pro-rogation of his
praetorian imperium immediately after his year of office was up. But
this must mean that the date of Murena's praetorship is 88 since from
87 onwards he was with Sulla in the East. It is unlikely that if such a
staunch Sullan had gone out as praetor in 87 that the Cinnans would
have obliged him with a pro-rogation in 86 59.
When Sulla left him in charge of Asia it was probably because his
imperium was the next greatest to his own 60. And we have other clues
as to his status. We know that he was hailed as imperator, an honour
reserved for dictators, consuls and praetors61. Memnon (3B, p. 354
Jacoby) tells us that he was made ???µ?? by the senate. This probably
means that he was made governor of Asia, i.e. this responsibility was
added to the original provincia which he had been assigned in 87 ".
And we know that he triumphed. Again this is an honour reserved for
dictators, consuls and praetors 63. And we might also remember that
one cannot triumph Alieno auspicio et in aliena provincia 64.

59 Murena in 87 : MRR, 2, 50.

60 MRR, 2, 61.
61 SIG \ 745. Cf. Greenidge, pp. 156-157.
62 Cf. D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor, I, (Princeton, 1950), p. 240.
63 MRR, 2, 77, cf. Greenidge, p. 157.
64 Cf. S. Jameson, Pompey's Imperium in 67 .· Some Constitutional Fictions, in
Historia, 19 (1970), p. 559 after Mommsen.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 125

It would appear then that there is no basis for Smith's suggestion that
Murena's imperium resembled that of Pompey or that either of them
were in any way illegal.
Here we must return once again to a point on which we touched
earlier. It was only after the Colline Gate battle that Pompey obtained
an imperium. This is worth emphasising since the contrary view has
received a fair deal of support 65. It should be carefully noted that
Cicero (Leg. Man., 61) knows nothing of any imperium before the one
given at the end of 82 66. Is it credible that if constitutional niceties
were, as we have seen, so scrupulously observed after the Colline Gate
they should be ignored before especially by Sulla ? He had been at
pains, for the previous two years, to emphasise the legitimacy of his
own imperium and to make it plain that as Rome's lawfully appointed
pro-consul he was defending her integrity and that of her constitution -
a constitution he as dictator was soon to labour to restore 67. Would he
now set all of this at nought ? Would be make a mockery of his own
protestations simply to confer on a junior officer (however greatly be
admired him) an imperium which was not his to bestow ? Would he
the defender of mos maiorum treat the Roman constitution in such a
cavalier fasion ? As we shall shortly see he was to have scruples about
granting Pompey a triumph because the act was unprecedented; It is
highly unlikely that he was any less careful a couple of years before 68.
Pompey swiftly cleared the Cinnans from Sicily 69. Two details of the
campaign do require some comment however. The first concerns the
role of M. Perperna, praetor 82 70. If any credence at all is to be placed
in Plut., Pomp., 10, 1 it would appear that Perperna had only recently
arrived on the island. Some support for this view is to be found in
Diod. Sic, XXXVIII, XXXIX, 14. He tells us that at some stage in the
Civil War Sulla had made overtures to Perperna in Sicily inviting him
to come over to his side. Perperna not only spurned the overture but
threatened to come with his army to relieve Praeneste. This threat was
made, Diodorus tells us, when Marius jr. the commander at Praeneste

65 Cf. Gelzer, p. 26 and MRR, 2, 64, which gives him an imperium in the year 83.
66 Cf. also Bell. Afr., 22.
67 On this see my Sulla augur .· Coins and Curíate Law (forthcoming).
68 Sulla throughout his career seems to have had a scrupulous reverence for the
Roman constitution cf. e.g. App., B.C., I, 63 ; Plut., Sulla, 10.
69 A sketch of the campaign will be found in Badián, pp. 112-113.
70 MRR, 2, 67.
126 A. KEAVENEY

?p? t?? st?at??t?? ?ate???e?pt? which could, I think, be taken as

referring to the situation after the Colline Gate when it must have been
clear to all that the Cinnan cause in Italy was lost.
Broughton tells us that on Pompey's arrival Perperna fled from Sicily
and went to Sertorius in Spain. A few pages further on however he tells
us again that Perperna fled to Sertorius but this time it is after the
collapse of Lepidus' revolt71. Badián (F.C., p. 270, n. 3) noted the
discrepancy and took Broughton to task for passing over it without
comment or discussion. And when R. Seager added notes to the
Penguin translation of some of Plutarch's Lives he drew the reader's
attention to this discrepancy and referred him to Broughton and
Badián 72. This then is the story of the birth and growth of the 'problem'
of M. Perperna. But in reality there is no problem. Of all the sources
that deal with Pompey's Sicilian expedition n only one, Plut., Pomp.,
10, 2 tells us what happened to Perperna - he fled. It does not say
where or to whom he fled. Only the sources which speak of the failure
of Lepidus' revolt several years later mention Perperna fleeing to
Sertorius 74. It would appear therefore that Broughton's statement is
based on nothing more than an erroneous inference from Plut., Pomp.,
10, 2. It is also clear that Badián did not look too deeply into the matter
for it is obvious that in taking Broughton to task he has based himself
on what he found in the MRR and not on what is in our sources.
Seager of course merely copied what the two previous scholars had to
say - ironically enough he did it in a note on the very passage of
Plutarch which shows that Perperna did not flee to Setorius in 8 1 .
But if Perperna did not join Sertorius until 77 where was he in the
interval ? We have several clues. If he evacuated Sicily on Pompey's
approach this would seem to indicate that he had a fleet at the disposal
and we may suspect that he added part of Carbo's to it in due course 75.
He had in brief become a kind of earlier version of Sextus Pompey. But
where did he establish his base ? Our sources offer two possibilities. He
may have spent some time in Sardinia which had taken the Marian side

71 MRR, 2,67, 91.

72 Plutarch .· Fall of the Roman Republic, translated by R. Warner, revised edition
with notes by R. Seager, Harmondsworth, 1972, p. 166, n. 20.
73 MRR, 2, 70.
74 Plut., Sert., 15, 2 ; App., B.C., I, 107-108 ;Exup., 7 ; Oros., V, 23, 12.
75 Plut., Pomp., 10, 1.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 127

in the Civil War 76. It was certainly from here that he set out to join
Sertorius after the collapse of Lepidus' rebellion 77. And we may
suspect that he had been on the island for some time. Certainly there is
no record in any of our sources of his actually taking part in the
fighting on the Italian mainland and it was surely with the aid of his
fleet that Lepidus was able to get away with part of his army to
Sardinia78. Another source, Oros., V, 24, 16, tells us that Perperna
spent some time in Liguria before going to Spain. This may be
reconciled with our information about Sardinia in two ways. We could
assume that with his fleet Perperna, from his base in Sardinia, was in a
position to hold Liguria for a time. It seems more likely to me,
however, that Perperna first occupied Liguria after leaving Sicily.
Sardinia at the time was probably firmly in Sullan hands having been
subdued recently by M. Philippus 79. When, however, the first news of
Lepidus' revolt was received it was no doubt welcomed by the still
disaffected inhabitants. It was no doubt around about now that
Perperna moved to occupy the island.
Badián p. 1 1 3 suggested that perhaps Perperna abandoned Italy to
Pompey by a pre-arranged agreement. This seems to me unlikely.
Perperna's threat to march on Praeneste may have been bluff but it
does at least show defiance - something that is also prominent in the
rest of his career. We might also note that although Perperna was
something of a loud-mouth he showed a marked reluctance to get
involved in a real fight. We have just seen how he sat on the sideline
whilst Lepidus fought in Italy. An earlier strategic withdrawal in the
face of Pompey is entirely to be expected from such a character.
The other matter to be discussed concerns one of the men Pompey
put to death in Sicily. According to Plut., Pomp., 10, 7-8 he put a man
called Quintus Valerius to death. As Plutarch says the latter was a
learned man this makes his identification with the Q. Valerius Soranus
mentioned by Cicero plausible 80. Although the story as narrated by

76 Cf. Liv., Ep., 86. On the length of time he spent there see further below.
77 Exup., 7.
78 App., B.C. Λ, 107.
79 Liv., Ep., 86.
80 De Orat., 3, 43 ; Brut., 169, cf. Gell., Π, 10, 3. He could be identified with the
poet Valerius Aedituus - so E. Gabba, Republican Rome .· The Army and the Allies,
Oxford, 1976, p. 235, n. 190. T. P. Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate, Oxford,
1971, p. 269 seems less sure but Aug., Civ. Dei, 7, 9 makes it at least likely.
128 Α. ΚΕΑ VEN ΕΥ

Plutarch shows Pompey in a bad light, being drawn from Gaius Oppius
one of his enemies, we need not disbelieve it since it is confirmed by
Servius who puts a more favourable aspect on Pompey's action 81.
According to this latter account Soranus while tribune (almost certainly
in 82 - MRR, 2, 68) revealed the true name of Rome. To escape the
death penalty for such sacrilege, Servius tells us, he fled to Sicily but A
praetore praecepto senatus occisus est. Now this passage of Servius is
valuable for two reasons. Firstly it provides a confirmatory source for
the nature of Pompey's Imperium. It also lends support to a theory of
Taylor's 82. She argued that Q. Valerius Orea, praetor 57 83, was the son
of this man. Now this would be impossible if Soranus were declared a
hostis because of opposition to Sulla. The sons and grandsons of such
people were barred from political life 84. But Servius' account seems to
suggest that Soranus was not put to death for opposition to Sulla but
because he had broken a solemn religious taboo and thus his son would
be free to enter political life.
As with the Sicilian campaign, it will not be necessary for us to
sketch Pompey's African wars. These have already been investigated
elsewhere 85. What we must concern ourselves with is the sequel to
them. When Pompey returned victorious to Utica he found waiting for
him a letter from Sulla in which he was ordered to send home all of his
army with the exception of one legion. With this legion he was to
remain in the province until the arrival of his successor. Once these
orders became generally known the soldiers mutinied and refused to go
home without their general. It was only with the greatest difficulty that
Pompey managed to quell the disturbance 86.
Although Plutarch is surely right to suggest that Pompey was
disappointed by Sulla's orders we should not, however, accept the view
expressed by some moderns that Pompey engineered the whole
mutiny 87. The troops he commanded had already shown a tendency to

81 On Aen., I, 277.
82 P. 261.
83 MRR, 2, 201.
84 Greenidge and Clay, p. 201.
85 Sketched in Badián, pp. 1 13-1 14. On the campaigns in both Sicily and Africa see
also C. Lanzani, Lucio Cometió Silla Dittatore, Milan, 1936, pp. 25-45.
86 ?un.,Pomp., 13, 1-4.
87 E.g. by Badián, p. 115 and Smith, p. 2.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 129

undiscipline in both Sicily and Africa 88. A new outburst therefore need
not cause surprise. It does, however^ seem likely that once the mutiny
had begun he used it for his own advantage. We are told that the
soldiers could scarcely be stopped (μόλις) despite all of Pompey's
entreaties and displays of histrionics reminiscent of 87. That word^oAiç
provides the vital clue as to what had happened. He had allowed the
troops to wring a concession from him. They were to go home to Italy
and he would accompany them although this was contrary to his
orders. He could plead in extenuation that this was the only way in
which he could get the troops to go home. At this point we must
consider the views of Smith pp. 3-8 on the incident in question since it
seems to me that he has misunderstood some of the issues involved.
Smith loosely translates άφιέναι (Lat. demittere) as "discharges" but as
he himself recognises this causes problems. It might be better to
translate it as "send away" since it seems to cover more than merely
"discharge". If an army were demissus in the provinces it would seem
that the process was carried out in two stages. The first stage would be
demobilisation. The soldiers would surrender their arms and stand
down from active service. They would still however be under military
discipline. This is clearly shown by the army of the ill-fated consul of
86 Valerius Flaccus. These, as Smith points out, still clearly retained a
corporate identity in Asia although they were demissi 89. The
explanation for this is surely that they were waiting for the second part
of the process, namely, the actual discharge itself which would take
place when they had been given land in the province or had been sent
back to their homes in Italy. This explanation removes the spectre,
conjured by Smith, of "wretched men ... expected either to find their
own way back to Italy or to eke out an existence in the province of
their 'discharge' " 90. άφίέναι./ demittere thus covers both demobilisation
and discharge 91. And the case of Pompey himself lends further weight

88 Cf. Plut., Pomp., 1 0, 1 4 ; 1 1 , 4-5. And they were to get out of hand again shortly
see n. 95.
89 Smith, pp. 12-13.
90 Smith does recognise what he calls 'an intermediate status' between the act
of 'demittere' and final discharge. He does not however seem to realise the full
implication of this stage. He also rightly emphasises the absurdity of supposing that the
troops were simply just dumped on the province but he does not draw any conclusions
from this.
91 Of course these two words could mean solely discharge in one special instance. A
general could bring his army still fully mobilised to the shores of Italy. One he landed.
130 A. KEAVENEY

to this theory. Smith, presumably misled by his own misinterpretation

of αφιέναιΙ demittere thought that Sulla had ordered Pompey to
discharge his legions in Africa but this is not so. He does not appear to
have noticed that when the mutiny began Pompey asked the solders to
go before him (προελθεϊν - Plut., Pomp. , 13,2). This can only mean that
they were to go back to Italy. They were demissi but they had not yet
received their full discharge. We must remember that Sulla was busy
planting military colonies in Italy. These men were surely destined, on
discharge, to go to some of these settlements.
It was therefore with a demobilised army that Pompey set out from
Africa92. Smith would then appear to be in error in suggesting that
Pompey had committed treason in bringing the army out of Africa.
After all that is what Sulla had ordered, and to violate the lex Cornelia
de provinciis in this way, he would not only have to bring back an
army still under arms but would have to do it contrary to the wishes of
the senate ". And Pompey did neither. Nevertheless, Pompey's action
was illegal and he did breach the lex Cornelia but not in the way Smith
thinks. It was illegal because he left his province without permission ;
something Sulla had strictly forbidden in his law94. He could
claim in extenuation that this had been forced on him by
circumstances. Only by accompanying the troops could be persuade
them to go home to Italy. He had fulfilled his mandate in so far as he
could. Faced with a choice it must have seemed to him that to go home
with demobilised troops was a far safer course of action than remaining
with them, in a state of mutiny, in Africa.
And these demobilised troops soon became discharged - probably
immediately on landing but certainly before Pompey's triumph which
must have occurred very soon after Pompey's return. For Plutarch
{Pomp., 14, 7) tells us that Pompey's troops threatened to disrupt the
triumph, μη τυχόντες ήλίκων προσεδόκησαν which surely indicates that

however, it was normal practise to discharge (demittere) them and there would be no
need for any intermediate stage of demobilisation since they would be going to their
homes. Cf. Plut., Sulla, 27, 5.
92 I cannot agree with Smith that Cic.Leg. Man., 61 tells us anything about the
status (i.e. demissus or not) of Pompev's army. It merely records the fact that he
brought back a victorious army.
93 Sources in MRR, 2, 75.
94 Cic. ,In Pis., 50.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 131

they had already received their donatives before the triumph and not
after as Smith thinks 95.
Sulla's first reaction to the affair, we are told 96, was to remark that it
looked as if he would have to fight with boys in his old age for he
believed that Pompey was in revolt. This story is quite credible. The
situation was confused and no doubt the reports coming back from
Africa were equally confused. But when Sulla heard the truth he must
have realized how well Pompey had handled a difficult situation and he
gave him a warm welcome even though the story that he rushed out to
greet the hero is not credible 97. Pompey now asked for a triumph. Sulla
at first refused, since it was unprecedented for someone in Pompey's
position, but eventually gave way 98.
Now the question is how long did Pompey's campaigns take and
when did he celebrate his triumph ? It seems to me that the arguments
of Badián on these points are persuasive. He favours the view that
Pompey's campaigns took place between November 82 and February
8 1 (with the likelihood that the latter year was intercalary) and that the
triumph was held on the 1 2th March 8 1 . Since his theory has
been questioned " I should like here to consider a hitherto-
neglected piece of evidence which I believe will help to confirm it. It
concerns the date of Pompey's second marriage. After his acquittal in
87 Pompey had, as we have noted, married Antistia, daughter of
Antistius the judge who had presided at his trial 10°. After Sulla came to
power he forced Pompey to divorce this woman and marry his own
stepdaughter Aemilia I01. Now in the main scholars have shown
remarkably little curiosity about when this happened. It is usually
assumed, without any discussion of sources, that the marriage took
place in 82 after the Colline Gate 102. 1 would suggest that a look at the
ancient authorities for this incident is long overdue. We know that

95 Front., Strat., 4, 5 probably refers to the same incident, cf. Badián, pp. 108-109.
96 Plut., Pomp., 13, 5.
97 Plut., Pomp., 13,6-7.
98 Plut., Pomp., 14, 1-5.
99 Badián himself answered some criticisms in Servilius and Pompey's first
Triumph, in Hermes, 89 (1961), pp. 254-256. The most recent work on Pompey, that
of Leach, accepts Badián 's theory with some hesitation (pp. 237-238).
100 Plut., Pomp., 4, 4.
101 Plut., Pomp., 9 ; Sulla, 33, 4.
102 Cf. e.g. Badián, F.C., p. 268 and Leach, p. 27.
132 A. KEAVENEY

Metella was very keen for Pompey to marry her daughter 103. But we
also know that she died sometime around the end of October 8 1 and
thus we are provided with a terminus ante quern for the marriage 104.
Now one of our sources (Plut., Pomp., 9, 1) which is a narrative seems
to put the marriage between Pompey's operations with Metellus and
his departure for Sicily 105. There are, however, good reasons for
rejecting this. It is highly unlikely that Pompey would have had time to
contract a marriage alliance between the Colline Gate and his
departure. Sulla had despatched him in great haste after the battle. He
could at most have had no more than a few days to spare before leaving
and these must have been taken up with military preparations and not
nuptials. Further, our second source (Plut., Sulla, 33) which is not a
narrative gives this marriage alliance as one of the examples of Sulla's
heinous acts as δικτάτωρ. And when we turn back to Pomp., 9 we find
that Sulla there too is a δικτάτωρ when he makes the match. Yet we
have seen (n. 58) that Sulla did not become dictator until after Pompey
had already gone to Sicily and killed Carbo there 106. Plutarch's
narrative sequence must be rejected then. Not only is it improbable but
it also contradicts itself by the use of the words δικτάτωρ άνηγορεύθη 107
the force of which words is confirmed by Plut., Sulla, 33, i.e. that it
was at some time during Sulla's dictatorship that the marriage took
place and not during the remaining few week of Sulla's pro-consulship.
And if the marriage were to have taken place before Metella's death it
must mean that at sometime in 81 Pompey was in Rome and thus
March 1 2th of that year would seem to be the correct date for his
triumph.

103 Plut., Pomp., 9, 2.

104 Plut., Sulla, 35, 2, cf. J. Carcopino, Sylla ou la Monarchie Manquee, Paris,
1931, p. 117.
105 Cf. Chs. 9 and 10 of the Pompey.
106 This in itself is a further argument for a swift departure by Pompey. If Sulla
became dictator in December 81 after the death of Carbo (cf. Badián, p. 113) then it
must mean that Pompey left in a hurry. Military business would come first ; dynastic
marriages could wait.
107 Sulla would, of course, be still a pro-consul at the time at which Plutarch's
narrative sequence implies the marriage took place - hence the contradiction in the use
of the word δίχτάτωρ. It is the use of this latter word (and the evidence of Plut., Sulla,
33, 1) which reveals that Plutarch has put the marriage in the wrong place in the
Pompey.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 133

It was probably this marriage alliance which helped win Pompey his
triumph 108. We have already seen that Sulla was reluctant to grant it
because there was no precedent (n. 61). But Pompey now had a major
asset. He was a marketable commodity and he could pitch his price
high. If Sulla wanted to harness this young man to his faction - and this
was plainly a dynastic match - then he would have to pay the price.
And as Pompey was going to have to divorce his first wife - no doubt
quite a wrench - then he was going to make sure that he got his
triumph in return. It was no doubt during the haggling over this
marriage alliance that he reminded Sulla that he was a 'rising sun' 109. If
Sulla wanted him to marry into the family then he would have to give
him a triumph.
It has often been suggested that Sulla wanted to make a suitable
dynastic match for Caesar just as he did for Pompey no but this is a
seductively misleading comparison. Pompey's career to date had been a
series of dazzling successes which would make an alliance with him
highly desirable to Sulla and his group. On the other hand Caesar had
not in any way distinguished himself so far. He was in fact destined to
be Flamen Dialis and as a result had not played any great part in the
political life of the Cinnan Republic m. How inconspicuous he must
have been is demonstrated by the fact that Sulla did not regard him as
prominent enough to declare a hostis - his part in political life was so
small 112. When Sulla finally did turn his attention to him it was to ask
him to divorce his wife but not for the same reason as he asked
Pompey. Caesar was married to a daughter of Cinna and Sulla
evidently made a point of forcing all who had ties of marriage with the
Cinnans to break them 1I3. Nor is there any reason to suppose Sulla felt
it necessary to find Caesar an alternative mate. Quite simply Caesar was

108 I think I have already shown why it is unlikely that Pompey would have used
his troops to get what he wanted.
109 It is unlikely to have been uttered in the circumstances described by Ρι.υτ.,
Pomp., 14, 4. Not even Pompey the prodigy would have gotten away with such
impudence.
110 E.g. by Gelzer, Caesar, p. 21.
111 Cf. L. R. Taylor, The Rise ofJulius Caesar, in Greece and Rome, 4 (1 957), p. 1 2
and Gelzer, Caesar, p. 20.
112 Sources for this and what follows : Plut., Caes., 1 ; Suet., Div. JuL, 1 with the
other notices in Garzetti, pp. 5-8.
113 Cf. the case of M. Pupius Piso who had married the widow of Cinna and was
forced to divorce her (Vell. Pat., II, 41, 2).
134 A. KEAVENEY

being told that if he wished to continue to live he must get rid of his
wife and in fact when he did refuse Sulla now proscribed him 114. Nor
need the argument that divorce without remarriage would leave Caesar
in a political vacuum upset this view. Sulla had already consigned the
sons and grandsons of the proscribed to limbo. He would hardly have
any qualms about doing the same to Caesar. After all the young man
was still free to continue in politics and free to find a new wife for
himself. His position might be lowly but then so had Sulla's once upon
a time 115. All in all Sulla might very well conclude that Caesar was
getting off lightly.
There is then only a superficial resemblance between the divorce
Sulla forced on Pompey and that he attempted to force on Caesar. In
the case of Pompey Sulla made him divorce the daughter of a man who
in the 80s had been a conspicuous moderate 116. Whatever feelings of
gratitude he might have felt for the dead Antistius were overridden by
his desire to forge dynastic tries with the most brilliant young general
of the day. No such considerations swayed him when he came to
demand Caesar's divorce. Caesar was still a nonentity. His sole
importance derived from his marriage and Sulla was determined that
he and all others who had forged such links with the Cinnan family
should break them. So far from offering Caesar an alternative match as
an inducement Sulla in fact made it clear that his very existence
depended on his divorcing his present wife 117.
As a kind of foot-note to this period of Pompey's life it is worth
spending a little while discovering what his contemporary Marcus
Crassus thought about him. Like Pompey Crassus had thrown in his lot
with Sulla in 83. Unlike Pompey he does not appear to have impressed

114 Pace Garzetti, p. 6, Caesar was formally proscribed when he proved obdurate.
Suetonius says Diversorum Partium Habebatur, which can only mean one thing.
Further we know that he did suffer in the same way as those proscribed. His goods
were seized, he had to flee and he was pursued by Sullan agents. The latter would
hardly have bothered about him unless there was a price put on his head.
115 Plut., Sulla, 1.
116 App., B.C., I, 88.
117 After he had pardoned Caesar Sulla is said to have made a prophetic remark
about his future greatness. While it would be absurd to believe that in 82 Sulla could
foresee Caesar the dictator it would be equally absurd to dismiss the story as baseless.
It is surely not beyond the bounds of possibility that Sulla, after such a display of bold
obstinacy from such an unexpected quarter, ruefully remarked "many Mariuses
there".
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 135

the great dictator and relations could hardly be called cordial. At least
one sharp verbal exchange is on record. And Crassus had enemies in
Sulla's camp who were prepared to report his plundering in Tuder.
Under the circumstances it is not surprising to learn that Crassus
envied and disliked Pompey who in contrast to himself basked in the
warmth of Sulla's praise and admiration. And when during the
proscriptions, Sulla discovered that Crassus had killed a man simply to
get his hand on his property he was furious. Being a man with a strict
sense of justice he found this behaviour intolerable and never
used Crassus in any public office 118.
And if Crassus envied and disliked Pompey before he did so with
renewed force now. Consigned to the scrap heap by Sulla he had to
watch while Pompey paraded his surname 'Magnus' and celebrated a
glorious and unprecedented triumph 119.
After his triumph we hear no more of Pompey until he appears at
the elections in 79 for 78. In essence the story as given by Plutarch 120,
is as follows : Pompey supported M. Aemilius Lepidus for the
consulship. Sulla, however, opposed him. When Lepidus nevertheless
topped the poll beating Sulla's candidate Q. Catulus into second place
Sulla himself warned Pompey that he had exalted his enemy at his own
expense.
Unlike R. Syme I see no reason to disbelieve this story m. It is not
improbable in itself since it resembles a normal factional clash.
Factional politics had resumed m, Sulla was now aprivatus and he had
come from his retirement to Rome to influence the election by
exercising his auctoritas 123. There is nothing in the story that is out of
harmony with the free political life of 79. Nor is there any reason to
doubt the authenticity of Sulla's warning to Pompey about Lepidus.
After all, he knew more about the man than we do. It is salutary to
recall that in 88 Cinna had worried him although there is apparently

118 Plut., Crass., 6, 3-9. We hear rather less about how Pompey felt about Crassus
but cf. Plut., Pomp., 12, 1. In general on the topic of their rivalry in these years see
LCM, June 1978, pp. 147-148, 165-167.
119 Plut., Crass., 7,1. This should not be dismissed as 'a biographer's fabrication' as
it is by E. Gruen, The Last Generation ofthe Roman Republic, California, 1 974, p. 41 .
What other reaction would one expect from a man in Crassus' position ?
120 Sulla, 34, 7-9; Pomp., 15.
121 Sallust, California, 1964, pp. 184-185 followed by Gruen, p. 276.
122 Cf. Gruen, pp. 265-274.
123 On Sulla's retirement see App., B.C., I, 104.
136 A. KEAVENEY

nothing in our scant knowledge of his background to suggest why this

should be so 124. Sulla obviously knew something about Cinna which
we don't and I would suggest that it is not straining credulity to say that
the same is true of Lepidus. If it comes to that we can make a better
guess as to why Sulla should consider Lepidus untrustworthy in 79.
The man was an ex-Marian 125 and the examples of Lucretius Ofelia
and Granius of Puteoli showed that such men were not to be trusted 126.
With the dictatorship at an end it would appear that yet another ex-
Marian, Lepidus, was preparing to show his true colours. But would he
be strong enough to make the consulship if opposed by a man of Sulla's
auctoritas ? The answer is that he would with the prestigious backing
of that rising sun Pompey who would seem to have split with Sulla
soon after his triumph. His second wife who was to cement the alliance
with Sulla and his group died soon after he married her and thus the
bonds that held him to Sulla were weakened. Sulla himself may have
become disillusioned with the youthful prodigy. He can hardly have
been too pleased about being made to give way over the triumph. Thus
when the marriage bond that held the two together snapped each went
his separate way and when they came face to face again, as it were,
they found themselves on opposite sides.
Lepidus had been a member of Pompey Strabo's concilium and this
connection may have moved Pompey to support him 127. Even more he
may have felt that this was an excellent opportunity to embarrass Sulla.
The latter without a doubt had come to dislike Pompey intensely by
the end of his life for we know that he made no mention of him in
his will 128. Admiration for the precocious general had turned to
detestation of the arrogant upstart. This theory that there were two
contending parties in the elections of 79, that of Sulla and that of
Lepidus and Pompey is supported by the explicit testimony of
Appian 129. Only one of Sulla's two candidates, Catulus, was elected ;
the other who was probably Mam. Lepidus was defeated 13°. With the

124 Plut., Sulla, 10, 4-7. On Cinna's background see Bennett, p. 3.

125 Cf. Ε. Gruen, The Dolabellae and Sulla, in AJP, 88 (1966), pp. 392-393.
126 App., B.C., 1, 101 ; Plut., Sulla, 37, 5 ; Val. Max., 9, 3, 8. Sulla's alleged
opinion of Verres is probably equally applicable to other ex-Marians (2 Verr., 1, 38).
127 Gruen, pp. 274-276, who also suggests that he had recently aided Lepidus in a
court case - an attractive hypothesis which unfortunately cannot be confirmed.
128 Pi.ut., Pomp., 15, 3.
129 B.C., I, 105.
130 Cf. Badián, Waiting, p. 61, n. 17.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 137

resumption of normal political life in Rome opposition to Sulla began

and its two principal leaders were a Marian whom he had forgiven and
a young man whom he had first honoured and with whom he then
quarrelled.
This then is what we know of the early part of the career of Pompey
the Great.

Darwin College, Arthur Keaveney.

University of Kent, Canterbury, England.

Appendix

Since this article was accepted for publication, some further work with a
bearing on its subject matter has appeared which I would like to consider here.
In an important paper B. L. Twyman [The date ofPompeius Magnus' first
triumph, in C. Deroux (ed.), Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History,
Brussels, 1979, pp. 174-208] has examined at some length the evidence for the
date of Pompey 's first triumph. Although he prevents his case with great
learning and much ingenuity I am not convinced that his conclusion, that
Pompey triumphed on the 12th March 80, is the correct one. I propose to
outline here my main reasons for disagreement. Twyman has adduced further
evidence which almost certainly rules out 1 2th March 79 as the correct date. In
particular, he has shown that Front., Strat., 4, 5, cannot refer to the consuls of
that year and has thus removed the principal argument for that date. However,
he unfortunately assumes that, in whatever year Pompey triumphed, the
consuls must have had something to do with its granting, since he holds that
the senate must have debated the matter l. In fact, the senate is nowhere
mentioned in our sources. Throughout Sulla is depicted as acting as dictator
and the decision seems to be his alone 2. This would then seem to favour the
earlier date since Sulla ceased to be dictator on January 1st, 80 3.
Equally, his discussion of Pompey's campaigns in Sicily and Africa appears
to be flawed in places. He adopts, without discussion, Broughton's erroneous

1 This misconception runs through the paper cf. e.g. p. 183, 189. It is also found in
Twyman 's earlier paper, The Metelli, Pompeius and Prosopography, in Aufstieg und
Niedergang der Römischen Welt, 1, 1 (New York-Berlin, 1972), pp. 819-820.
2 My attention was drawn to this by Mr. R. Seager in correspondence. It would
appear that Twyman's interpretation (p. 180) of Plut., Pomp., 14, 5 is not correct.
3 Cf. A. Keaveney, Deux dates contestées de la carrière de Sylla, in Les études
Classiques, 48 (1980), pp. 157-159.
138 Α. ΚΕ AVENΕΥ

assumption that Pompey left Italy before the Colline Gate battle 4. His attempt
to explain away Plutarch's statement that the campaign was fought in forty
days is not wholly convincing and seems less attractive than Badian's. There is
no reason to suppose, as Twyman does, that Pompey was expected to stay in
Africa and settle its affairs. Our sources seem to imply that he was sent there
simply to rout the Cinnans and when this was done he was recalled 5. The
administrative tasks would seem to have been left to the new praetorian
governor 6. Although some of his arguments are plausible, I still feel that
Badián was correct in assigning the lex de redil u of Sall., Hist., II, 21 M to 88
rather than 80, as Twyman proposes. We cannot accept Twyman's view that
there was no need for such a lex in 88 especially as the combined evidence of
Val. Max., IX, 7, Mil. Rom. 2 and App., B.C., I, 59, 63 harmonises well with
Sallust 7. Further, if Sulla acted as dictator throughout the business, as I have
argued, then there would be no need for a lex. What could be more natural
than that the man who granted Pompey his imperium should now revoke it 8 ?
Twyman naturally devotes much time to a long and complex discussion of
the vexed questions of when Pompey was born and what age he was when he
triumphed. He first of all points out that the Livian traditions gave his age as 24
at the time of the triumph while Licinianus says it was 25. He then seeks to
reconcile these differing accounts by suggesting that the Livian tradition
thought Pompey was born in 1 05 while Licinianus thought the correct date
was 106. Thus both traditions will be speaking of a triumph which they both
believed happened in 80. Twyman then further asserts that 105 is to be
preferred to 106 as the date of Pompey's birth. This is by no means certain, to
say the least. His attempt to argue away the very explicit evidence for 106,
which is contained in Velleius Paterculus (II, 53, 3-4), an author who clearly
looked into this question for himself, by some highly speculative source-
criticism can hardly be called successful. Nor, indeed, can his attempt to show
that Livy himself thought Pompey was born in 105 be so described either.
Indeed, it can be shown from one telling instance that those who believed he
was born in 105 are demonstrably wrong. Diodorus Siculus XXXVIII ;
XXXXIX, 20 says Pompey was twenty two years of age when in Sicily. This,
as Twyman points out, must mean that Diodorus thought he was born in 105
and reached Sicily before September 29th 82. However, since he did not go
there until after November 1st 9 it must mean that the tradition Diodorus
followed was incorrect and that Pompey was not born in 105.

4 For the further significance of this error see below.

s See in particular Plut., Pomp., 13, 1.
6 Who could, of course, have been elected in 82 just as easily as 81.
7 I shall present a detailed justification of this view elsewhere.
8 App., B.C., I, 80 ; Plut., Pomp., 11,1.
9 Cf. n. 4 above.
 YOUNG POMPEY: 106-79 B.C. 139

So it would seem that 106 must still be accepted as the date of Pompey's
birth. How, then, are we to explain the discrepancy between the Livian
tradition and Licinians as to his age when he triumphed ? One is forced to the
conclusion that Badian's solution is still the best : Licinianus is talking of the
year of Pompeius' life while the epitomator is talking of his actual age.
C. Tuplin, Caelius or Cloelius ? The third general in Plutarch Pompey, in
Chiron 9 (1979), pp. 137-145 deals with a topic of lesser importance. Do we
read Κοίλιος or Κλοίλιος in Plutarch, Pomp., 7, 1. With his main thesis that
Κοίλίος should be read I am in agreement. He would then be identified with C.
Caelius' Antipater who is, as Tuplin says, also mentioned in App., B.C., I, 91 .
However, I must disagree with some of the conclusions he reaches in his
subsidiary discussion of Pompey's campaigns at the time (83 and 82). Although
Tuplin finds no difficulty in accepting that Scipio was twice deserted by his
army the spectre of generic composition is then invoked and we are then told
that the cavalry battle with Brutus (Plut., Pomp., 7, 1-2) may be a doublet of
Orosius, V, 20, 5. I however, have no difficulty in believing that Pompey
fought two separate cavalry battles in the course of the war, especially when
they are against different commanders. Nor can we accept that the events of
Plut., Pomp., 7, 1-3 are to be assigned to Pompey's second foray into Picenum
for reasons I have set out in the main body of this article. It is this mistaken
assumption which vitiates much of the discussion which follows (p. 1 44) on
the events of 83.
Two biographies of Pompey have also been recently published, R. Seager,
Pompey .A Political Biography, Oxford, 1979 10 and P. Greenhalgh, Pompey .·
the Roman Alexander, London, 1980 n. Obviously, a detailed critique is out of
place here, especially as I agree with much of what both authors have to say. A
few points may be touched upon. For instance, it seems to me that Seager,
unlike Greenhalgh, does not sufficiently stress the importance of the Terentius
episode and neither author sees its possible connection with the plague.
Seager's treatment of the mutiny in which Cinna was killed does not appear
altogether satisfactory. Much the same criticism may be applied to
Greenhalgh's account of Pompey's part in the war in Italy and this seems to
arise from a failure to examine the sources closely. On the other hand, he does
rightly stress Caesar's unimportance at this time. Seager takes a much more
cynical view of Pompey's part in the African mutiny than I do and it is a
position which has much to commend it. I certainly share his opinion, against
Greenhalgh's, that Pompey was never a military threat to Sulla.

10 Pp. 1-14 deal with the period covered by my paper.

11 Pp. 1-34 deal with Pompey's early life.