No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.

BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, petitioners, vs.
HON.JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ,MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, ARTURO LOGRONIO,RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO
VELASQUEZ,MIMIR DELLOSA,NICANOR ALCORDO,JOHN DOE,JOHN DOE,JOHN
DOE, and JOHN DOE, respondents.

Remedial law; Search warrant; Procedure for the issuance warrant; Examination of the
complainant and witnesses by the judge himself.—The examination of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, required by Art. 111, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Secs. 3
and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself and net
by others. The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more
emphatic and candid, for it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce. Personal
examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. 111, Sec. 1, par. 3,
of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit
the issuance of warrants except “upon probable cause.” The determination of whether or not a
probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and
should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.

Same; Same; Deposition taken by Deputy Clerk of Court does not comply with constitutional
mandate.—The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s reading of her
notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the
oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered as a personal examination. If
there was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by
the Deputy Clerk of Court. But the Constitution and the rules required a personal examination by
the judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses that the question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in examining
them came up before the Convention. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent judge
did not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that
manner respondent judge did not have opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant
and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on
account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a
sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.

Same; Same; Search warrant to issue for one specific offense.—The Supreme Court deemed it fit
to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court, that “a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense.” Not satisfied with this qualification, the Supreme Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that “no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense.”
Same; Same; Particular description of things to be seized.—Under Art. 111, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, the warrant should
particularly describe the things to be seized.

Same; Seizure; Seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions not a particular
description.—The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights—that
the things to be seized be particularly described —as well as tending to defeat its major
objective; the elimination of general warrants.

Same; Same; Purpose of particular description of things to be seized.—A search warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose
and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant—to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that “unreasonable searches and seizures may
not be made,—that abuses may not be committed.

Same; Same; Where there is a particular description of things to be seized.—A search warrant
may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact—not of law—by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued. If the articles desired to be seized have any
direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other
than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should
come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence.

Special civil action; Certiorari; When motion for reconsideration is not a prerequisite to the
institution of petition for certiorari.—When the questions raised before the Supreme Court are
the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of
a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in the Supreme Court
is no longer a prerequisite. The rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an
application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied without
considering the circumstances. The rule does not apply where, the deprivation of petitioners’
fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only
with irregularity but also with nullity.

Remedial law; Search and seizures; Right of corporation against unreasonable searches and
seizures.—A corporation is entitled to immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a
distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional
immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can
only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected against unlawful
discrimination.
Same; Same; Who can contest legality of seizure.—It is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations, since the right to object belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin for petitioners.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista, Solicitor
Pedro A. Ramirez and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for respondents.

VILLAMOR, J.:

This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its President,
Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
issued by respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from enforcing
the same and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by virtue thereof, as well as
from enforcing the tax assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have been
made on the basis of the said documents, papers and effects, and to order the return of the latter
to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition but did not issue the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for therein.

The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from the record, are as follows:

On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a
letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search
warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code,
in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209,
and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file
the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.

In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness,
respondent Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with
them the following papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application for search
warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent
Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant
already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.

At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed
his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After
the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been
taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes;
and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that
if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for search warrant and respondent
Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then signed by respondent Judge and
accordingly issued.

Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the
search warrant on petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati,
Rizal. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their
search which yielded six boxes of documents.

On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying
that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and
that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s
fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the
petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an
order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April
16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the
total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized.
Petitioners came to this Court.

The petition should be granted for the following reasons:

1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court
are:

“(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)
“SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice
of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

“No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

“SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant.—The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to
any affidavits presented to him.” (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)

The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec.
1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
should be conducted by the judge himself and not by others. The phrase “which shall be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce,” appearing in the said constitutional provision, was introduced by
Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven. The
following discussion in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine
Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is enlightening:

“SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al grano.

En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se frusten los fines de la
justicia mediante el registro inmediato y la incautación del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su Señorńa
que causarńa cierta demora el procedimiento apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma que podrńa
frustrar los fines de la justicia o si Su Señorńa encuentra un remedio para estos casos con el fin
de compaginar los fines de la justicia con los derechos del individuo en su persona, bienes
etcetera, etcetera.

“SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la práctica el caso hipotético que Su Señorńa preg unta por
la siguiente razón: el que solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y ese
escrito no aparecerá en la Mesa del Juez sin que alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o
petición de sucuestro. Esa persona que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo denunciante o
alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento de registro. Ahora toda la enmienda en esos
casos consiste en que haya petición de registro y el juez no se atendrá solamente a sea petición
sino que el juez examinerá a ese denunciante y si tiene testigos también examinerá a los testigos.

“SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señorńa que el tomar le declaración de ese denunciante po r escrito
siempre requerirńa algún tiempo?

“SR. FRANCISCO. Serńa cuestión de un par de horas, pero por otro lado minimizamos en todo
lo posible las vejaciones injustas con la expedición arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro.
Creo que entre dos males debemos escoger. el menor.
x x x x x

“MR. LAUREL. x x x The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are
incorporating in our constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge
could issue a search warrant, he must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath
the complainant and if he has any witness, the witnesses that he may produce. x x x.”

The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and
candid, for it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to “personally examine on oath
or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce x x x.”

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable
him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1,
par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which
prohibit the issuance of warrants except “upon probable cause.” The determination of whether or
not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts
and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.

In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that
the complainant’s application for search warrant and the witness’ printed-form deposition were
subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there
was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so
little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not
even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient facts. The transcript of
stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of
this case in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V.
Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his
witness, and that stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent
Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through with the hearing,
Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went
to respondent Judge’s chamber and informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions.
Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes.
Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as follows:

“A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or
instructed them, requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will
be found to be false and without legal basis, he can be charged criminally for perjury. The
Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio whether he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and
the affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.

“Q And thereafter?

“A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.

“A The Honorable Judge.

“Q The deposition or the affidavit?

“A The affidavit, Your Honor.”

Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.

The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s reading of her notes, to a
few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered as a personal examination. If there was
an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy
Clerk of Court. But, as already stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal
examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be consumed by the
judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the
proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not
constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and
his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account
of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.

Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for “[v]iolation of Sec. 46 (a) of the National Internal
Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73,
208 and 209.” The question is: Was the said search warrant issued “in connection with one
specific offense,” as required by Sec. 3, Rule 126?

To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code
referred to above. Thus we find the following:

Sec. 46 (a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.

Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.

Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and
fraudulent returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the
information required under the Tax Code.

Sec. 208 penalizes “[a]ny pers on who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures
any article subject to a specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids
or abets in the conduct of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any
article subject to specific tax x x x,” and provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or
association, the official and/or employee who caused the violation shall be responsible.

Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of
output removed, or to pay the tax due thereon.

The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code.
The first is the violation of Sec. 46 (a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns),
which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at
source). The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and
the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or
gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification
the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46 (a), 53, 72 and
73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on
Business and Occupation).

Respondents argue that Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA
383), is not applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for “violation of Central
Bank Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;” whereas, here Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 was issued for violation of only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code.
The distinction is more apparent than real, because it was precisely on account of the Stonehill
incident, which occurred sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on January 1,
1964, that this Court amended the former rule by inserting therein the phrase “in connection with
one specific offense,” and adding the sentence “No search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense,” in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:

“Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.’”

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-
70 in this manner:

“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks
and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business
communications; accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank
deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.”

The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec.
3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized.

In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said:

“The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and
seized, to wit:

‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

“Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights—that the things to be seized be particularly described—as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.”

While the term “all business transactions” does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the
said warrant nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include
all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its
business inoperative.

In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to
explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:

“x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant—to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable searches and
seizures’ may not be made,—that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct
interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities.”

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57
Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact—not of law—by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos,
J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is feeing issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein
search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized
have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some
evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search
and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the
description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates,
amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of
stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications,
checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others,
enumerated in the warrant.

Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In
the first place, when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were
squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration
in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo,
etc., et al. vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule requiring the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was
never intended to be applied without considering the circumstances. (Matutina vs. Buslon, et al.,
109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of the essence in view of the tax assessment sought to
be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner
corporation, on account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. (Matute
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case,
the deprivation of petitioners’ fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against
them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., supra.)

It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against

‘‘Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation
which is charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress
passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers
of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled
to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a
distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional
immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can
only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the 14th Amendment,
against unlawful discrimination, x x x.” (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
“In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule
applied to a corporation, on the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and
papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected
even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way.” (Silverthorne Lumber
Company, et al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)

In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a
corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:

“As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever, the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. x x x.”

In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents,
papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the
corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been
impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, petitioner corporation here stands on a different
footing from the corporations in Stonehill.

The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely—as claimed by
petitioners—at least partly—as in effect admitted by respondents—based on the documents
seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were
made some one and one-half months after the search and seizure on February 25, 1970, is a
strong indication that the documents thus seized served as basis for the assessments. Those
assessments should therefore not be enforced.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from
enforcing the said search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized thereunder are
ordered to be returned to petitioners; and respondent officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and their representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in
Annex “G” of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on the documents, papers
and effects seized under the search warrant herein nullified, and from using the same against
petitioners, in any criminal or other proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.
 Concepcion, CJ., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs with Mr. Justice Barredo.

Castro, J., concurs in the result.

Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur.

I agree with the ruling that the search warrants in question violates the specific injunction of
Section 3, Rule 126 that “No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.”
There is no question in my mind that, as very clearly pointed out by Mr. Justice Villamor, the
phrase “for violation of Section 46 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to all
other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209” refers to more
than one specific offense, considering that the violation of Section 53 which refers to
withholding of income taxes at the sources, Section 208 which punishes pursuit of business or
occupation without payment of the corresponding specific or privilege taxes, and Section 209
which penalizes failure to make a return of receipts sales, business or gross value output actually
removed or to pay the taxes thereon in connection with Title V on Privilege Taxes on Business
and Occupation can hardly be absorbed in a charge of alleged violation of Section 46 (a), which
merely requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations, so as to constitute with it a
single offense. I perceive here the danger that the result of the search applied for may be used as
basis not only for a charge of violating Section 46 (a) but also and separately of Section 53, 208
and 209. Of course, it is to be admitted that Sections 72 and 73, also mentioned in the
application, are really directly related to Section 46 (a) because Section 72 provides for
surcharges for failure to render returns and for rendering false and fraudulent returns and Section
73 refers to the penalty for failure to file returns or to pay the corresponding tax. Taken together,
they constitute one single offense penalized under Section 73. I am not and cannot be in favor of
any scheme which amounts to an indirect means of achieving that which is not allowed to be
done directly. By merely saying that a party is being charged with violation of one section of the
code in relation to a number of other sections thereof which in truth have no clear or direct
bearing with the first is to me condemnable because it is no less than a shotgun device which
trenches on the basic liberties intended to be protected by the unequivocal limitations imposed by
the Constitution and the Rules of Court on the privilege to secure a search warrant with the
aggravating circumstance of being coupled with an attempt to mislead the judge before whom
the application for its issuance is presented.

I cannot close this brief concurrence without expressing my vehement disapproval of the action
taken by respondent internal revenue authorities in using the documents and papers secured
during the search, the legality of which was pending resolution by the court, as basis of an
assessment, no matter how highly motivated such action might have been. This smacks of lack of
respect, if not contempt for the court and is certainly intolerable. At the very least, it appears as
an attempt to render the court proceedings moot and academic, and dealing as this case does with
constitutionally protected rights which are part and parcel of the basic concepts of individual
liberty and democracy, the government agents should have been the first ones to refrain from
trying to make a farce of these court proceedings. Indeed, it is to be regretted that the
government agents and the court have acted irregularly, for it is highly doubtful if it would be
consistent with the sacredness of the rights herein found to have been violated to permit the filing
of another application which complies with the constitutional requirements above discussed and
the making of another search upon the return of the papers and documents now in their illegal
possession. This could be an instance wherein taxes properly due the State will probably remain
unassessed and unpaid only because the ones in charge of the execution of the laws did not know
how to respect basic constitutional rights and liberties.

Petition granted.

Notes.—(a) Personal examination by judge.—The rule is the same, and even more explicit as to
warrants of arrest where the law commands that “No warrant of arrest shall be issued x x x
unless he first examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the examination shall be under
oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers (Section 87,
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828). It has, however, been
held with respect to warrants of arrest that the law is complied with where the judge adopts as his
own personal examination the questions asked by the PC or police investigator as appearing in
the written statements, which the judge read over again to the witnesses whether said answers
were theirs, and whether said answers were true, to which the witnesses replied in the
affirmative, there being no prohibition in the law against adoption by the judge of the previous
investigator’s questions (Luna vs. Plaza, L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 310). But there is no
compliance with the requirement where the judge issuing the warrant of arrest acted solely on the
basis of affidavits of the complainant and her one witness which were sworn to before another
judge, without personally examining the witnesses by asking questions (Doce vs. Branch II of
the the CFI of Quezon, L-26437, March 13, 1968, 22 SCRA 1028).

(b) Particular description of the things to be seized.—While it is true that the property to be
seized under a search warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be
taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only insofar as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow. Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given as this would mean that no
warrant could issue. Thus, a description of the property to be seized as “fraudulent books,
invoices and records,” was held sufficient (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384). In Alvarez vs. Court
of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, the description “books, documents, chits, receipts, lists,
and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender” was held
sufficient. See also Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda., 70 Phil. 141.

-----O0O0O----- Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, No. L-32409 February 27,
1971