Prblie Salty Sécurité publque Canada Canada BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER CANADA'S APPROACH TO TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM Strategic Objectives © The Government of Canada is committed to ensuring its national security framework responds to the terrorist threat, while safeguarding our values, our rights and freedon and the open, inclusive and democratic character of our country. Key Messages Approach to Countering Terrorism + The current terrorist threat in Canada is dominated by individuals radicalized to violence that either seek to conduct terrorist activities abroad or here in Canada, * Critical to combatting the threat of terrorism is the collaboration among Government partners including the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). + National securit inal investigations are conducted primarily by the RCMP-led Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSET), strategically based in locations across Canada, who work with policing and government partners to investigate threats to national security. + The RCMP also established the National Security Joint Operations Centre (NSJOC) in. 2014 to enhance the Government of Canada’s (GOC) response to high-risk travelers (HRTs) who pose a threat of terrorism-related violence in Canada and abroad. + The NSJOC is an example of interdepartmental collaboration with several key partner agencies that facilitates real-time exchange of information and supports the coordination of operational responses. Participating a, clude the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), CSIS, and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), + Police of Jurisdiction (POJs) are critical to the RCMP’s counterterrorism efforts. As the primary police force in their communities, POJs are uniquely placed to identify local and regional threats, including individuals becoming radicalized to violence, given their strong ties and experience within the community. POJs are also the first line of defence to respond quickly to contain a threat, or respond to a terrorist incident. +The RCMP also relies on its international law enforcement partners — as terrorism is not solely a Canadian issue. The RCMP must learn from the best practices and experiences of its law enforeement partners to improve its efforts. Countering Radicalization to Violence * Collaboration at the communit efforts to keep Canadians safe. + The RCMP recognizes that the best way to mitigate the threat of terrorism is to prevent someone from being radicalized to violence in the first place. + Radicalization to violence is not limited to a single ethnic group, religion, socio- economic class or political world-view. Vy) -level also critical to law enforcements” collective RDIMS #2382669 000001UNCLAS Prevention is a core RCMP mandate, and the RCMP has a robust national security approach that includes prevention activities in parallel to operations RCMP CRV efforts form part of three key activities ~ outreach, training and intervention. This includes outreach awareness sessions to build community trust, and directly training law enforcement and other front line personnel. These efforts include supporting POJ community outreach and engagement initiatives which help build trust and relationships with the community. This trust helps to maintain open communication between law enforcement and the community. RCMP training efforts are focused on first responders, training front line personnel across the country to identify the early signs of radicalization to violence. The RCMP has trained more than 2500 first responders through the Counter Terrorism Information Officer (CTIO) and dedicated CRY training sessions. ‘The RCMP also provides direct support, through a dedicated intervention team, to front line investigators to assess the risk of individuals at various stages of the radicalization to violence process, ‘The Intervention team ean also assess the potential to apply alternative approaches, outside the criminal justice system, to support those who are at risk or have been radicalized to violence. Alternative approaches could include facilitated engagement with human service professionals in the community. This allows to the individual to be managed through a collective community effort, while being monitored and assessed as they receive support. Returnees Leaving Canada to participate in the activity of terrorist group is an offence under Canadian law. It is also an offence for any Canadian citizen or permanent resident to commit an act outside of Canada that would be considered a terrorism offence if committee in Canada, However, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees Canadian citizens the right to return to Canada, ‘Therefore, even if'a Canadian engaged in terrorist activity abroad, the government of Canada must facilitate their return to Canada. ‘The government of Canada manages the risk of returning high risk travelers through the High Risk Retumee Interdepartmental Taskforce and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) National Security Joint Operation Centre (NSJOC), ‘The NSJOC allows for operational coordination and real time information sharing to ensure an effective inter-agency response. RCMP is also proactively working with Canada’s diplomatic missions overseas to identify HRTs before they begin their journey back to Canada, Once RCMP is made aware of a possible returnee, they exchange what information they have through the NSJOC and existing mechanisms and make an assessment of what risk they may pose. Following that, the Taskforce will meet to discuss as a community, what measures can be taken to control the return of the individual. There are standard operating procedures in place for this process, including what measures can be put in place to address returnees. RDIMS #2313192 2 ‘000002UNCLAS For instance, RCMP may use undercover officers to engage with the HRT to collect, evidence, o to monitor them during their flight home. They could also be subjected to secondary customs screening and in some cases, oF detention by police, when they reach Canada. We have seen high risk travelers that have retumed to Canada. However, the approach used has been different based on the level of threat they pose, and the extent of information obtained as part of the investigation. RCMP has pursued a number of options upon their return, including ongoing active investigation as they collect evidence and criminal charges. RCMP has also used peace bonds in an attempt to mitigate the threat an individual may pose. RCMP have also used countering radicalization to violence (CRV) efforts, such as having their intervention team work with the returnee’s family to open up dialogue with the individual and to help support the returnee’s disengagement from their radical ideology and past behavior. Moving forward, we must continue to work to identify how to best address retumees. While they may have been engaged in terrorism abroad and broken the law, not all returnees continue to pose a threat ~ they may now be disillusioned with the cause ‘The government of Canada must focus its investigative resources on those that continue to post a threat to Canada, and leverage efforts such as CRV to work with those who ‘may no longer be interested in violenes Additional Information to Include in Background Materials (For bilateral Meeting with the U.K) RDIMS #2313192 The criminal threat in the UK is similar to any of the Western European countries and. centers primarily in the larger cities (London, Birmingham, Manchester). ‘The threat in the UK is clear— several high profile attacks have taken place in both London and Manchester. Drug trafficking, money laundering and fraud continue in London and throughout the UK. The RCMP are engaged with active investigations in all noted areas and are working very closely to assist our foreign partners with Canadian based investigative inquiries. ‘The RCMP have two Liaison Officers based in London, an analyst embedded within the National Crime Ageney and a second analyst embedded Analysis Centre (INAC).. ‘The Primary interlocutors for the Liaison Officers are the Metropolitan Police (Counter Terrorism), the National Crime Agency, the Greater Manchester Police (North West Counter Terrorism Unit), City of London Police, UK Serious Fraud Office, Police Service of Northern Ireland and Police Scotland. Cooperation with each of the organisations is exceptional good. As the UK law and policing closely mirrors Canadian there are rarely any issues with ‘cooperation, However, an issue has arisen due to the UK’s reaction to failures in the US to respect disclosure caveats from Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism (SO15). This has resulted in delays and limitations to information sharing by the UK following the recent terrorist attacks. The RCMP is working closely with SOIS to resolve this the Joint Narcotics. ‘000003