VOL.

123, JULY 25, 1983 745

Martin vs. Ver

*
No. L-62810. July 25, 1983.

EULALIA MARTIN, petitioner, vs. GEN. FABIAN VER,

CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES and GEN. HAMILTON DIMAYA, JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, respondents.

Military Law; Jurisdiction; A court-martial retains

jurisdiction in certain case even after a soldier has been
discharged from service, such as in case of malversation.—
Generally, court-martial jurisdiction over persons in the military
service of the Philippines ceases upon discharge or other
separation from such service. This however, is but a general rule.
The Articles of War in terms prescribe some exceptions designed
to enhance discipline and good order within the military
organization. Thus, court-martial jurisdiction as to certain cases
of fraud and misappropriation of military hardware and other
government property is not extinguished by discharge or
dismissal pursuant to the 95th Article of War.

Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; A discharged soldier charged

before a court-martial of illegal sale or disposition of military
hardware may still be detained by that court even after discharge
from military service.—We conclude that despite his discharge
from the military service, the petitioner is still subject to military
law for the purpose of prosecuting him for illegal disposal of
military property, and his preventive detention thereunder—
pending trial and punishment for the said offense committed
when he was in the military service—is lawful.

Constitutional Law; Habeas Corpus; Criminal Procedure;

Undue delay in trial is counted from the time the information is
filed not before.—There was no such denial. As stated by this
Court in a per curiam decision: “x x x the test of violation of the
right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay
from the time the

_______________

* EN BANC.
 746

746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Martin vs. Ver

information is filed, not before the filing. The delay in the filing of
the information, which in the instant case has not been without
reasonable cause, is therefore not to be reckoned with in
determining whether there has been a denial of the right to
speedy trial.” (People vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA 226 at 236.)

Same; Same; Same; Denial of right to speedy trial not

quantifiable.—At any rate, whether or not one has been denied
speedy trial is not susceptible to precise quantification. At best,
the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative, consistent with
reasonable delays, taking into account the circumstances of each
case.

Same; Same; Same; There can be undue delay in trial where

delay due to unavailability of witnesses who died by virtue of
grenade sold by petitioner.—Returning to the case at hand, the
criminal act imputed to the petitioner unfortunately resulted in
the death of three persons (including Rogelio Cruz who allegedly
bought the handgrenades from the petitioner) and very serious
injuries to three others whose testimony is vital to the preferment
of charges and prosecution of the petitioner. It is therefore not
unreasonable to heed the claim of respondents that the delay
complained of was occasioned by the unavailability of witnesses, a
claim which has not at all been challenged or denied by the
petitioner.

PETITION for Habeas Corpus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Arturo V. Romero for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.

PLANA, J.:

This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by Eulalia Martin

on behalf of her husband, Pvt. Francisco Martin.
Pvt. Martin was an enlisted man in the Philippine
Army. On or about April 14, 1981, when he was still in the
service, he allegedly sold two grenades to one Rogelio Cruz
at P50.00 each, one of which exploded during a picnic in
Laoag City on April 17, 1981 causing the death of three
persons, including Rogelio Cruz, and injuries to three
others.
747
 VOL. 123, JULY 25, 1983 747
Martin vs. Ver

According to respondents, Pvt. Martin has admitted to Cpl.

Lucio Tuppal, Philippine Army, having sold the grenades to
Rogelio Cruz in Laoag City, although this is denied by Pvt.
Martin.
After an initial investigation conducted by the Laoag
City PC and INP authorities, a report was submitted to the
Ministry of National Defense which referred the matter to
the Chief of Staff, AFP, who in turn directed the Inspector
General to conduct another investigation.
On May 5, 1981, Pvt. Martin was arrested and confined
(restricted to barracks) at Fort Bonifacio pursuant to
Article 70 of the Articles of War, infra. The following year,
he was discharged from the service effective as of May 5,
1982. On November 17, 1982 the instant petition was filed.
The following month, i.e., December 3, 1982, Pvt. Martin
was charged for violation of the 85th and 97th Articles of
War, which read:

“ART. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property

Issued to Soldiers.—Any soldier who sells or wrongfully disposes
of or willfully or through neglect injures or losses any horse, arms,
ammunition, accouterments, equipment, clothing, or other
property issued for use in the military service, shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct.
“ART. 97. General Article.—Though not mentioned in these
articles, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order
and military discipline and all conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the military service shall be taken cognizance of by
a general or special or summary court-martial according to the
hature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of
such court.”

The charge sheet stipulates the following charges:

“CHARGE I: Violation of the 85th Article of War.

Specification: In that Private Martin assigned with the
Headquarters and Headquarters Service Battalion, First Infantry
Division, Philippine Army on or about 14 April 1981 at Laoag City
wrongly disposed of by sale to Rogelio Cruz two (2) grenades.
CHARGE II: Violation of the 97th Article of War.

748

748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Martin vs. Ver

Specification: In that Private Francisco Martin, x x x on or about

the month of April 1981 at Laoag City, unlawfully and without
authority had in his possession two (2) handgrenades thus
committing an act prejudicial to good order and military discipline
and of a nature that will bring discredit to the military
establishment.’’

The petitioner contends that having been discharged from

the military service, he is no longer subject to court-martial
even if the offenses of which he is charged were committed
while he was still subject to military law. He therefore,
concludes that his continued detention pursuant to Article
70 of the Articles of War (which authorizes the
arrest/confinement of any person subject to military law
who is charged with an offense under the Articles of War)
is illegal and he, accordingly, should be released. This
posture has no merit.
Generally, court-martial jurisdiction over persons in the
military service of the Philippines ceases upon discharge or
other separation from such service. This however, is but a
general rule. The Articles of War in terms prescribe some
exceptions designed to enhance discipline and good order
within the military organization. Thus, court-martial
jurisdiction as to certain cases of fraud and
misappropriation of military hardware and other
government property is not extinguished by discharge or
dismissal pursuant to the 95th Article of War.

“ART. 95. Frauds Against the Government.—Any person subject to

military law . . .
“Who steals, embezzles, knowingly and willingly
misappropriates, applies to his own use or benefit or wrongfully or
knowingly sells or disposes of any ordnance, arms, equipment,
ammunition, clothing, subsistence, stores, money, or other
property of the Government furnished or intended for the military
service thereof . . .
“Shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or
imprisonment, or by such other punishment as a court-martial
may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties. And if any person,
being guilty of any of the offenses aforesaid while in the service of
the

749

VOL. 123, JULY 25, 1983 749

Martin vs. Ver

Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary

receives his discharge or is dismissed from the service, he shall
continue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and sentence
by a court-martial in the same manner and to the same extent as if
he had not received such discharge nor been dismissed.” (Italics
supplied.)

It was on the basis of the foregoing legal provision, among

others, that this Court sustained the court-martial of the
petitioner in De la Cruz vs. Alcaraz, et al. after his
reversion to inactive status, for misappropriation of public
funds committed while he was still in the active military
service. The Court, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said:

“There is no question that although appellant had been reverted

to inactive (civilian) status in the reserve force of the Philippine
Army, he is still amenable to investigation and court-martial
under the Articles of War by the Philippine Navy for alleged acts
of misappropriation of government funds committed while he was
still in the active military service. As correctly held by the Court
below, appellant’s case falls within the provisions of Article 95 of
the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended),
which provides as follows: x x x
“The lower Court did not, therefore, err in refusing to enjoin
appellant’s investigation by the naval authorities on charges that
he had misappropriated public property while he was still in the
service of the Philippine Navy, specially since petitioner admits
that he is still a member of the Reserve Force.” (99 Phil. 130 at
131-132.).

We conclude that despite his discharge from the military

service, the petitioner is still subject to military law for the
purpose of prosecuting him for illegal disposal of military
property, and his preventive detention thereunder—
pending trial and punishment for the said offense
committed when he was in the military service—is lawful.
Alternatively, petitioner maintains that even assuming
that the jurisdiction of the military authorities to try and
punish him was not abated by his discharge from military
service, the denial to him of his constitutional right to
speedy trial (he having been confined from the date of his
arrest on May 5, 1981 up to December 3, 1982 when he was
formally charged—a
750

750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Martin vs. Ver

period of 1 year and 7 months) entities him to be released

on habeas corpus.
The fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution
apply to all persons, including those subject to military law.
(Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546;
Cayaga vs. Tangonan, 66 SCRA 216; Go vs. Olivas, 74
SCRA 230; Romero vs. Ponce Enrile, 75 SCRA 429.) To
quote Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2:

“The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war
and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes
of men at all times and under all circumstances.”
It would indeed be parodoxical if military men who are
called upon in times of the gravest national crises to lay
down their lives in defense of peace and freedom would be
the very people to be singled out for denial of the
fundamental rights for which they risk their lives.
For denial of a constitutional right to the accused, the
hearing tribunal may lose its jurisdiction to conduct further
proceedings. In such a case, habeas corpus would lie to
obtain the release of the accused. (Gumabon vs. Director,
37 SCRA 420; Acevedo vs. Sarmiento. 36 SCRA 247;
Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183; Flores vs. People,
61 SCRA 331; Dacuyan vs. Ramos, 85 SCRA 487; Ventura
vs. People, 86 SCRA 188; Romero vs. Ponce Enrile, 75
SCRA 429; Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, supra; Go vs. Olivas,
supra.)
In the case at bar, the petitioner claims that he has been
denied his constitutional right of speedy trial because the
charges against him were filed only about 1 year and 7
months after his arrest.
There was no such denial. As stated by this Court in a
per curiam decision: “x. . . the test of violation of the right
to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay
from the time the information is filed, not before the filing.
The delay in the filing of the information, which in the
instant case has not been without reasonable cause, is
therefore not to be reckoned with in determining whether
there has been a denial
751

VOL. 123, JULY 25, 1983 751

Martin vs. Ver

of the right to speedy trial.” (People vs. Orsal 113 SCRA

226 at 236.)
At any rate, whether or not one has been denied speedy
trial is not susceptible to precise quantification. At best,
the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative,
consistent with reasonable delays, taking into account the
circumstances of each case. As expressed in Barker vs.
Wingo, 33 L. Ed 2d 101:

“. . . the right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically

different concept than other constitutional rights guaranteed to
accused persons and cannot be quantified into a specified number
of days or months, and it is impossible to pinpoint a precise time
in the judicial process when the right must be asserted or
considered waived . . .
“. . . a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial is subject to a balancing test, in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and courts
should consider such factors as length of the delay, reason for the
delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, in
determining whether defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been
denied . . .”

Returning to the case at hand, the criminal act imputed to

the petitioner unfortunately resulted in the death of three
persons (including Rogelio Cruz who allegedly bought the
handgrenades from the petitioner) and very serious
injuries to three others whose testimony is vital to the
preferment of charges and prosecution of the petitioner. It
is therefore not unreasonable to heed the claim of
respondents that the delay complained of was occasioned
by the unavailability of witnesses, a claim which has not at
all been challenged or denied by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is
dismissed, without prejudice to the petitioner seeking his
provisional release on bail from the military authorities or
the Ministry of National Defense. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,

Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera,
Escolin,
752

752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Martin vs. Ver

Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

     Teehankee, J., in the result.

Petition dismissed.

Notes.—The remedy of habeas corpus lies in case of loss

of jurisdiction by a military tribunal due to the denial to
the accused of his constitutional rights. (Dacuyan vs.
Ramos, 85 SCRA 487.)
A military commission is not a court required under the
Constitution to state the facts and law on which it bases its
decision. (Buscayno vs. Ponce Enrile, 102 SCRA 7.)
The President has the power to create military tribunals
to try military as well as civilian offenders. (Buscayno vs.
Ponce Enrile, 102 SCRA 7.)
The judicial review of presidential acts is continuous
even during the period of martial rule. (Mitra, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, 104 SCRA 17.)
Under martial rule claims of denial of speedy trial are
not available. (Luneta vs. Special Military Commission No.
1, 102 SCRA 56.)
 The President is authorized to cause the arrest of
persons involved in crimes against national security during
martial rule. (Sison vs. Ponce Enrile, 102 SCRA 33.)

——o0o——

753

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.