Jurisdiction Digest

JURISDICTION DIGEST
1. EVELYN TOLOSA vs NLRC

G.R. No. 149578. April 10, 2003
FACTS: Evelyn Tolosa, was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa who was hired by Qwana-Kaiun,
through its manning agent, Asia Bulk, to be the master of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. The
vessel departed for Long Beach California, passing by Hawaii in the middle of the voyage. At the
time of embarkation, CAPT. TOLOSA was allegedly shown to be in good health.
“During ‘channeling activities’ upon the vessel’s departure from Yokohama sometime on November 6,
1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was drenched with rainwater. The following day he had a slight fever and in
the succeeding twelve (12) days Nov. 7-18, 1992, his health rapidly deteriorated resulting in his
death. It was alleged that the request for emergency evacuation of Capt Tolosa was too late.
Because of the death of Capt. Tolosa, his wife, Evelyn filed a Complaint/Position Paper before the
POEA against Qwana-Kaiun, thru its resident-agent, Mr. Fumio Nakagawa, ASIA BULK, Pedro
Garate and Mario Asis, as respondents. The case was however transferred to the NLRC, when the
amendatory legislation expanding its jurisdiction, and removing overseas employment related claims
from the ambit of POEA jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi delict or tort, but on the failure
of private respondents -- as employers of her husband (Captain Tolosa) -- to provide him with timely,
adequate and competent medical services under Article 161 of the Labor Code.
Respondents aver that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, since her cause
did not arise from an employer-employee relation, but from a quasi delict or tort. Further, there is no
reasonable causal connection between her suit for damages and her claim under Article 217 (a)(4) of
the Labor Code, which allows an award of damages incident to an employer-employee relation.
LA: awarded the damages

NLRC: dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
CA: ruled that the labor commission had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action filed by
petitioner.
Hence, this petition for review of CA’s decision and MR denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RULING: NO. The SC held that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s
claim for damages, because that ruling was based on a quasi delict or tort per Article 2176 of the Civil
Code.
Time and time again, we have held that the allegations in the complaint determine the nature of
the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts.
Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 1 of 46
After carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, we are convinced that the
allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on a quasi delict or tort. It is evident that she
sued Pedro Garate and Mario Asis for gross negligence. Petitioner’s complaint/position paper refers
to and extensively discusses the negligent acts of shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no employer-
employee relation with Captain Tolosa. The SC stressed that the case does not involve the
adjudication of a labor dispute, but the recovery of damages based on a quasi delict. The
jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations.
Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and
the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of
labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from
an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code,
other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.”
While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only reliefs provided by
labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code, these reliefs must still be based on an
action that has a reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or
collective bargaining agreements. The central issue is determined essentially from the relief sought in
the complaint. It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in this
connection. Where such principal relief is to be granted under labor legislation or a collective
bargaining agreement, the case should fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
“Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a reasonable causal connection
with any of the claims provided for in the article in order to be cognizable by the labor arbiter. Only if
there is such a connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising
from employer-employee relations.” In the present case, petitioner’s claim for damages is not related
to any other claim under Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.
Petitioner cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor Code, which does not
grant or specify a claim or relief. This provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of
the same Code. The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor secretary. Thus, claims
for an employer’s violation thereof are beyond the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. In other words,
petitioner cannot enforce the labor standard provided for in Article 161 by suing for damages before
the labor arbiter.
It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in which the
employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from a
different source of obligation such as a tort. Since petitioner’s claim for damages is predicated on a
quasi delict or tort that has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in
Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies
with the regular courts -- not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters. Petition is denied.
Issue: Whether or not Evelyn is entitled to the monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter.

Ruling: No.
This argument cannot be passed upon in this appeal, because it was not raised in the tribunals a quo.
Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Thus, points of law, theories, and arguments not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals need
not·and ordinarily will not·be considered by this Court. Petitioners allegation cannot be accepted by
this Court on its face; to do so would be tantamount to a denial of respondents right to due process.
2. AUSTRIA v. NLRC
G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999
PRINCIPLE: Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee is purely
secular in nature because it has no relation with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the
church, such affairs are governed by labor laws. The Labor Code applies to all establishments,
whether religious or not.
FACTS:
The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner was
a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were terminated. On various
occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications form Ibesate, the
treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church
tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the
Negros Mission. The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was
Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very
ill to be able to do the collecting.
A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal
citing:
1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;
2) Willful breach of trust;
3) Serious misconduct;
4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and
5) Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative as
grounds for the termination of his services.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for
reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner. SDA
appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.
ISSUES:

1. Is the termination of the services of the petitioner an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such,
involves the separation of church and state?
2. Does the Labor Arbiter/NLRC have jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by
petitioner against the SDA?
RULING:
1. NO. An ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and
relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. Examples
of so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for
excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, and administration of sacraments. While the
matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister, it does not give the case a religious
significance. What is involved is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an
employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines of the church. Pastor Austria was not excommunicated or expelled from the membership of
the SDA but was terminated from employment. The grounds invoked for Austria’s dismissal are all
based on Article 282 of the Labor Code which enumerates the just causes for termination of
employment.
2. YES. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an
employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria was
expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.
As pointed out by the OSG in its memorandum, the grounds invoked for Austria’s dismissal are all
based on Article 282 of the Labor Code which enumerates the just causes for termination of
employment. It is palpable by this alone that the reason for Austria’s dismissal from the service is not
religious in nature. Coupled with this is the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with a copy of Austria’s
letter of termination which again is an eloquent admission by the SDA that NLRC has jurisdiction over
the case. Aside from these, SDA admitted in a certification issued by Mr. Ibesate that Austria has
been its employee for twenty-eight (28) years. SDA even registered petitioner with the Social Security
System (SSS) as its employee. As a matter of fact, the worker’s records of Austria have been
submitted by SDA as part of their exhibits. It is clear from all of these that when the SDA terminated
the services of Austria, it was merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an employee
which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
has the right to take cognizance of the case and to determine whether the SDA, as employer,
rightfully exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. This is in consonance with
the mandate of the Constitution to afford full protection to labor.
3. Eviota vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 152121, July 29, 2003
FACTS:
The respondent Standard Chartered Bank and petitioner Eduardo G. Eviota executed a contract of
employment under which the petitioner was employed by the respondent bank as Compensation and
Benefits Manager but petitioner abruptly resigned from the respondent bank barely a month after his
employment and rejoined his former employer. The respondent bank filed a complaint against the
petitioner with the RTC of Makati City. It alleges, by way of its causes of action against the petitioner
that first, Eviota’s actions constitute a clear violation of Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code for the
right to terminate employment was exercised clearly abusive and contrary to the rules governing
human relations. By his actions and representations, Eviota had induced the Bank to believe that he
was committed to fulfilling his
obligations under the Employment Contract. Second, he violated Article 285 of the Labor Code, an
employee may terminate without just cause the employer-employee relationship by serving written
notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance which was also provided in the employment
contract. Third, Eviota’s false and derogatory statements that the Bank had failed to deliver what it
had purportedly promised have besmirched the Bank’s reputation and depicted it as a contract
violator and one which does not treat its employees properly. Hence, the bank is praying damages for
actual, moral, exemplary, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
However, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action for damages
of the respondent bank was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under paragraph 4,
Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. The petitioner averred that the
respondent bank’s claim for damages arose out of or were in connection with his employer-employee
relationship with the respondent bank or some aspect or incident of such relationship. The
respondent bank opposed the motion, claiming that its action for damages was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint on the ground that the action for damages of the respondent bank was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
RULING:
No. Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. A money claim by a worker against the employer
or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a reasonable causal
connection between the claim asserted and employee-employer relation. Absent such a link, the
complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice.
Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely
incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, we held that the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended, is limited to
disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to
the Labor Code of the Philippines, other labor laws or their collective bargaining agreements. In
Singapore Airlines Limited v. Paño, the complaint of the employer against the employee for damages
for wanton justice and refusal without just cause to report for duty, and for having maliciously and with
bad faith violated the terms and conditions of their agreement for a course of conversion training at
the expense of the employer, we ruled that jurisdiction over the action belongs to the civil court.

In Medina v. Castro-Bartolome, we held that a complaint of an employee for damages against the
employer for slanderous remarks made against him was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular
courts of justice because the cause of action of the plaintiff was for damages for tortious acts
allegedly committed by the employer. The fact that there was between the parties an employer-
employee relationship does not negate the jurisdiction of the trial court.
4. DYNAMIC SIGNMAKER OUTDOOR ADVERTISING SERVICES, INC. VS. POTONGAN

G.R. No. 156589, June 27, 2005
FACTS: In 1987, Francisco Potongan started working for petitioner corporation as a Production
Supervisor at a monthly salary of P16,000.00. In early February 1996, the union of rank and file
employees of petitioner corporation, KMM-Katipunan, declared a strike on account of which
petitioner corporation replaced all its supervisors and designated, by letter memorandum dated
February 16, 1996, certain persons to take over the operations of the corporation including Rufino
Hornilla who took over petitioners functions. By February 21, 1996, respondents salary was withheld
and was advised to take a leave of absence until further notice. Respondent later received on
February 28, 1996 a letter from petitioner Filomeno P. Hernandez, President/General Manager of the
corporation, inviting him to answer the following charges:
1.) he caused to create fire by secretly switching on the idle plastic oven and grounded the 2 electric
machine welders while the strike was on-going outside the premises.
2.) he urged strongly the same group of contractors led by Mr. Luis Mimay, working on some left over
jobs at the factory, to slow down work or not to work at all in sympathy to the strikers who are in the
ranking files.
By letter of March 4, 1996, respondent through counsel, denied the charges proffered against him, he
insisting that they were fabricated to justify his termination due to suspicions that he was a strike-
sympathizer. In the same letter, respondent expressed his openness to the conduct of a full-blown
investigation of the case by the NLRC. Respondent later filed on January 29, 1997 a complaint
against herein petitioners for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, backwages and damages with
the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. By Resolution of June 30, 1997, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint on the ground that respondents cause of action was barred by prior
judgment, that was rendered on June 24, 1996 by Labor Arbiter Nieves V. De Castro which found
respondent among those guilty of committing prohibited acts and whose employment was
consequently declared lost.
Respondent appealed the dismissal of his complaint to the NLRC before which he argued that the
Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction over his person in the above-said consolidated cases since
service of summons to the therein respondents President of KMM-Katipunan and the President of the
local union Bigkis Manggagawa sa Dynamic Signmakers Outdoor Advertising Services, in either of
which he is not a member, cannot be considered proper service to him. Respondent thus concluded
that a void judgment such as one rendered without jurisdiction over the person of the party maybe
assailed at any time, either directly or collaterally.
ISSUE: Was the June 24, 1996 NLRC Decision final and executory such that it could only be
attacked through a direct action?
RULING: No. Contrary to petitioners position, the validity of a judgment or order of a court or quasi-
judicial tribunal which has become final and executory may be attacked when the records show that it
lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment. For a judgment rendered against one in a case where
jurisdiction over his person was not acquired is void, and a void judgment maybe assailed or
impugned at any time either directly or collaterally by means of a petition filed in the same or
separate case, or by resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding wherein it is invoked.
Petitioners in fact do not even dispute respondents claim that no summons was ever issued and
served on him either personally or through registered mail as required under Rule III, Sections 3 and
6 of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended by Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002.
Supplementary or applied by analogy to these provisions are the provisions and prevailing
jurisprudence in Civil Procedure.
Where there is then no service of summons on or a voluntary general appearance by the defendant,
the court acquires no jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment in the cause. At all events, even if
administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by procedural
requirements, they are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due
process. Res inter alios acta nocere non debet. Things done between strangers ought not to injure
those who are not parties to them. Thus, the judgment was properly attacked by the respondent.
5. METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION v. JOHNNY PASTORIN

JULY 29, 2005
FACTS:
Johnny Pastorin (Respondent) was employed by Metromedia Times Corporation (Petitioner)
as a Field Representative/Collector. The respondent obtained a loan from one of the dealers whom
he dealt with, Gloria A. De Manuel (De Manuel), amounting to Nine Thousand Pesos (P9,000.00).
After paying One Thousand One Hundred Twenty-five Pesos (P1,125.00), respondent reneged on
the balance of his loan. De Manuel wrote a letter to petitioner, and seeking assistance for collection
on the remainder of the loan. Petitioner, through a Memorandum, imposed the penalty of suspension
on respondent for 4 days for violating Company Policy No. 2.17 and ordered his transfer to the
Administration Department. The respondent, however, sent a letter to petitioner communicating his
refusal to accept the transfer.
Respondent duly filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, non-payment of backwages and
other money claims with the labor arbiter. The latter concluded that respondent did not commit
insubordination or disobedience so as to warrant his transfer, and that petitioner was not
aggrieved by respondent’s failure to settle his obligation with De Manuel. Petitioner lodged an
appeal with the NLRC, raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over
respondent’s complaint. Significantly, this issue was not raised by petitioner in the proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter. the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the latter had no
jurisdiction over the case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator.
The motion for reconsideration having been denied respondent elevated the case before the Court of
Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The CA Fifteenth Division reversed the Decision of NLRC, and reinstated the earlier ruling of
the Labor Arbiter. Adopting the doctrines by this Court in the cases of Alfredo Marquez v. Sec. of
Labor and ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, the CA ruled that the active participation of the party against whom the action was
brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where
the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by
the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Was Metromedia estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over the
subject matter of the case for the first time in their appeal before the NLRC?
RULING:
No. There are divergent jurisprudential doctrines touching on this issue. On the one hand are
the cases of Martinez v. Merced, Marquez v. Secretary of Labor, Nogales, Jimenez v. Patricia,
Centeno v. Centeno, and ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members v. ABS- CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, all adhering to the doctrine that a party’s active participation in the actual
proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop him from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent heavily relies on this doctrinal jurisprudence. On the other hand, the cases of Dy v.
NLRC, La Naval and Union Motors buttress the position of petitioner that jurisdiction is conferred by
law and lack of jurisdiction may be questioned at any time even on appeal.
The Court of Appeals adopted the principles in the cases of Martinez, Marquez and ABS-CBN
in resolving the jurisdictional issue presented for its resolution. The notion that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel on the party invoking the same most prominently emerged in
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the Marquez case relied upon by the CA is in turn grounded on Tijam.
Tijam represented an exceptional case wherein the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after
fifteen (15) years, and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the Court of
Appeals. Even Marquez recognizes that Tijam stands as an exception, rather than a general rule. The
CA perhaps though felt comfortable citing Marquez owing to the pronouncement therein that the
Court would not hesitate to apply Tijam even absent the extraordinary circumstances therein . . where
the entertainment of the jurisdictional issue at a belated stage of the proceedings will result in a failure
of justice and render nugatory the constitutional imperative of protection to labor. In this case,
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter was questioned as early as during appeal before the NLRC, whereas in
Marquez, the question of jurisdiction was raised for the first time only before this Court. The viability of
Marquez as controlling doctrine in this case is diminished owing to the radically different
circumstances in these two cases. A more circumspect analysis would reveal that the cases cited by
respondent do not fall squarely within the issue and factual circumstances of the instant case.
The general rule is that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction. Petitioner, in this case, is not
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.
6. YUSEN AIR AND SEA SERVICE PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED v. VILLAMOR

G.R. No. 154060, August 16, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of freight forwarding. It hired respondent Villamor
as branch manager in its Cebu Office. Later, petitioner reclassified respondent’s position to that of
Division Manager, which position respondent held until his resignation on February 1, 2002.
Immediately after his resignation, respondent started working for Aspac International, a corporation
engaged in the same line of business as that of petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner Yusen Air filed
against respondent a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order in the RTC of Parañaque City, on the ground that respondent violated the
provision in his contract that he should not affiliate himself with competitors for a period
of two years from his resignation or separation from petitioner company. Respondent
also filed against petitioner a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Instead of filing an answer to
the case in the RTC, respondent moved for the dismissal of said case, arguing that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of said case because an employer-employee relationship is
involved. Petitioner contends that its cause of action did not arise from employer-employee relations
even if the claim therein is based on a provision in its handbook.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the present controversy.
HELD:
Yes. In Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing vs. Villarama, with a substantially similar factual backdrop,
we held that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. The Court held
that the claim for damages did not arise from employer-employee relations, to wit:
Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks to recover
damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for private respondent’s breach of his
contractual obligation to its damage and prejudice. Such cause of action is within the realm of
Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts. More so when we
consider that the stipulation refers to the post-employment relations of the parties.
While seemingly the cause of action arose from employer-employee relations, the employer’s claim
for damages is grounded on wanton failure and refusal without just cause to report to duty coupled
with the averment that the employee maliciously and with bad faith violated the terms and conditions
of the contract to the damage of the employer. Such averments removed the controversy from the
coverage of the Labor Code of the Philippines and brought it within the purview of Civil Law.
Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217, to be
cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims
provided for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can a claim for
damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.
When, as here, the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable
causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, jurisdiction over the
action is with the regular courts.
It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted

therein, which is a matter resolved only after and as a result of a trial. Neither can jurisdiction of a
court be made to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss.
If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.
7. DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES vs MOJICA

G.R. No. 166365, September 30, 2005
FACTS: The Discipline Committee of Duty Free Philippines (DFP) rendered a decision finding Stock
Clerk Rossano A. Mojica guilty of Neglect of Duty by causing considerable damage to or loss of
materials, assets and property of DFP. Thus, Mojica was considered forcibly resigned from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits except his salary and the monetary value of the accrued leave
credits.
Mojica was formally informed of his forced resignation. Thereupon, he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment of full back wages, damages, and attorneys fees,
against DFP before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Mojica was illegally dismissed. The
NLRC reversed the ruling of the arbiter. It found that the dismissal was valid and with just cause.
Mojicas motion for reconsideration was denied, hence he filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court agreed with the arbiter that
Mojica was not guilty of gross or habitual negligence that would warrant his dismissal. It found that
there was no convincing evidence to prove that Mojica connived with other personnel in pilfering the
stocks of DFP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case
RULING: Respondent Mojica is a civil service employee; therefore, jurisdiction is lodged not with
the NLRC, but with the Civil Service Commission.
DFP was created under Executive Order (EO) No. 46 on September 4, 1986 primarily to augment
the service facilities for tourists and to generate foreign exchange and revenue for the government. In
order for the government to exercise direct and effective control and regulation over the tax and duty
free shops, their establishment and operation was vested in the Ministry, now Department of Tourism
(DOT), through its implementing arm, the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). All the net profits from
the merchandising operations of the shops accrued to the DOT.
As provided under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 564,[10] PTA is a corporate body attached to the
DOT. As an attached agency, the recruitment, transfer, promotion and dismissal of all its
personnel was governed by a merit system established in accordance with the civil service
rules.[1 In fact, all PTA officials and employees are subject to the Civil Service rules and
regulations.
Accordingly, since DFP is under the exclusive authority of the PTA, it follows that its officials and
employees are likewise subject to the Civil Service rules and regulations. Clearly then, Mojicas
recourse to the Labor Arbiter was not proper. He should have followed the procedure laid down in
DFPs merit system and the Civil Service rules and regulations.
EO No. 292 provided that civil service employees have the right to present their complaints or
grievances to management and have them adjudicated as expeditiously as possible in the
best interest of the agency, the government as a whole, and the employee concerned. Such
complaint or grievances shall be resolved at the lowest possible level in the department or agency, as
the case may be, and the employee shall have the right to appeal such decision to higher authorities.
In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing
laws and procedure, the parties may jointly refer the dispute in the Public Sector Labor
Management Council for appropriate action.
In sum, the labor arbiter and the NLRC erred in taking cognizance of the complaint as jurisdiction
over the complaint for illegal dismissal is lodged with the Civil Service Commission. The Court of
Appeals likewise erred in sustaining the labor arbiter.
8. EASYCALL COMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. vs. EDWARD KING

G.R. No. 145901, December 15, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Easycall Communications Phils., Inc. was a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the
business of message handling. Petitioner, through its general manager, Malonzo, hired the services
of respondent as assistant to the general manager. He was given the responsibility of ensuring that
the expansion plans outside Metro Manila and Metro Cebu were achieved at the soonest possible
time. He was promoted to assistant vice president for nationwide expansion and later appointed to
the even higher position of vice president for nationwide expansion. Respondent’s promotion was
based on his performance during the six months preceding his appointment. As vice president for
nationwide expansion, he became responsible for the sales and rentals of pager units in petitioner’s
expansion areas. He was also in charge of coordinating with the dealers in these areas.
Thereafter, Malonzo reviewed the sales performance of respondent and scrutinized the status of
petitioner’s Nationwide Expansion Program (NEP) which was under respondent’s responsibility. He
found that respondent’s actual sales for the period October 1992–March 1993 was 78% of his sales
commitment and 70% of his sales target. Malonzo also checked the frequency and duration of the
provincial sales development visits made by respondent for the same period to expansion areas
under his jurisdiction. He discovered that the latter spent around 40% of the total number of working
days for that period in the field.
The management then confronted respondent regarding his sales performance and provincial sales
development visits. A series of dialogues between petitioner’s management and respondent ensued.
He was then informed that the general manager wanted his resignation. Respondent, however,
declared that he had no intention of resigning from his position. Consequently, respondent received a
notice of termination signed by Malonzo. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the NLRC.
Petitioner argues that since respondent was a “corporate officer,” the NLRC had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter under PD 902-A.
ISSUE:
1. Who has jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of corporate officers?
2. Does the NLRC have jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant case?
RULING:
1. The SC held that under Section 5 of PD 902-A, the law applicable at the time this controversy
arose, the SEC, not the NLRC, had original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the
removal of corporate officers. Section 5(c) of PD 902-A applied to a corporate officer’s dismissal for
his dismissal was a corporate act and/or an intra-corporate controversy.
2. The NLRC. It had to be first established that the person removed or dismissed was a corporate
officer before the removal or dismissal could properly fall within the jurisdiction of the SEC and not the
NLRC. Here, aside from its bare allegation, petitioner failed to show that respondent was in fact a
corporate officer.
“Corporate officers” in the context of PD 902-A are those officers of a corporation who are given that
character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws. Under Section 25 of the
Corporation Code, the “corporate officers” are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other
officers as may be provided for in the by-laws.
The burden of proof is on the party who makes the allegation. Here, petitioner merely alleged that
respondent was a corporate officer. However, it failed to prove that its by-laws provided for the office
of “vice president for nationwide expansion.” Since petitioner failed to satisfy the burden of proof that
was required of it, we cannot sanction its claim that respondent was a “corporate officer” whose
removal was cognizable by the SEC under PD 902-A and not by the NLRC under the Labor Code.
An “office” is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or
stockholders. On the other hand, an employee occupies no office and generally is employed not by
the action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also
determines the compensation to be paid to such employee.
In this case, respondent was appointed vice president for nationwide expansion by Malonzo,
petitioner’s general manager, not by the board of directors of petitioner. It was also Malonzo who
determined the compensation package of respondent. Thus, respondent was an employee, not a

“corporate officer.” It is therefore correct that jurisdiction over the case was properly with the NLRC,
not the SEC.
9. San Miguel Foods, Inc. v. San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO

G.R. No. 168569. October 5, 2007
FACTS:
San Miguel Corporation Employees Union PTWGO (the Union), was the sole bargaining agent of
employees of petitioner San Miguel Foods, Incorporated (SMFI). Some employees of SMFI through
the Union brought a grievance against Finance Manager Montesa, for discrimination, favoritism,
unfair labor practices, not flexible, harassment, promoting divisiveness and sectarianism, before SMFI
Plant Operations Manager George Nava in accordance with Step 1 of the grievance machinery
adopted in the CBA.
At the grievance meeting, SMFI informed the Union that it planned to address the grievance through
a work management review which would be completed by March 1993, hence, it asked the finance
personnel to give it their attention and cooperation. The work management review was not completed
by March 1993, however, prompting the Union to, on March 26, 1993, elevate the grievance to Step
2. Almost nine months after the grievance meeting was held, SMFI rendered a Decision on Step 1
Grievance stating that it was still in the process of completing the work management review, hence,
the Union`s requests could not be granted. The Union filed a complaint before the NLRC, Arbitration
Branch, against SMFI, its President, and its Finance Manager Montesa for unfair labor practice, and
unjust discrimination in matters of promotion.
SMFI filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the issues raised in the complaint were grievance
issues and, therefore should be resolved in the grievance machinery provided in the CBA of the
parties or in the mandated provision of voluntary arbitration which is also provided in the CBA.
Labor Arbiter granted the motion to dismiss and ordered the remand of the case to the grievance
machinery for completion of the proceedings. The Union appealed to the NLRC by Motion for
Reconsideration/Appeal which its Second Division granted and accordingly ordered the Labor Arbiter
to continue the proceedings on the Union`s complaint. SMFI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
NLRC order but it was denied, hence, they filed a petition for certiorari with this Court but referred the
case to the Court of Appeals. The CA denied SMFI petition for certiorari. Thus, before this Court,
SMFI lodged the present petition for review on certiorari.
SMFI argues that the allegations in the Union`s complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter do not
establish a cause of action for ULP, the Union having merely contended that SMFI was guilty thereof
without specifying the ultimate facts upon which it was based. It cites Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court as applying suppletorily to the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Does the LA have jurisdiction over the case?
RULING:
YES. A perusal of the complaint shows that, indeed, the particular acts of ULP alleged to have been
committed by SMFI were not specified; neither were the ultimate facts in support thereof. In its
Position Paper, however, the Union detailed the particular acts of ULP attributed to SMFI and the
ultimate facts in support thereof. Section 7, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provides that the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the
requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the
courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto. Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court should thus not
be strictly applied to a case filed before a Labor Arbiter. In determining jurisdiction over a case,
allegations made in the complaint, as well as those in the position paper, may thus be considered.
As stated above, the Union, in its Position Paper, mentioned the particular acts of ULP and the
ultimate facts in support thereof. Thus, it alleged that petitioner committed large scale and wanton
unjust discrimination in matters of promotion, particularly upon their members, all assigned with the
Finance Department or respondent SMFI and gross and blatant violations by respondent SMFI of
Section 5, Article III (Job Security) and Section 4, Article VIII (Grievance Machinery) of the current
CBA between complainant and respondent SMFI, which provisions of said CBA are hereunder
quoted for easy reference.
On the questioned promotions, the Union did not allege that they were done to encourage or
discourage membership in a labor organization. In fact, those promoted were members of the
complaining Union. The promotions do not thus amount to ULP under Article 248(e) of the Labor
Code.
As for the alleged ULP committed under Article 248(i), for violation of a CBA, this Article is qualified
by Article the Labor Code which must be gross in character and shall mean flagrant and/or malicious
refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
The Union charges SMFI to have violated the grievance machinery provision in the CBA. The
grievance machinery provision in the CBA is not an economic provision, however, hence, the second
requirement for a Labor Arbiter to exercise jurisdiction of a ULP is not present.
The Union likewise charges SMFI, however, to have violated the Job Security provision in the CBA,
specifically the seniority rule, in that SMFI appointed less senior employees to positions at its Finance
Department, consequently intentionally by-passing more senior employees who are deserving of said
appointment. Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that “All doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor”. Since the seniority rule in the promotion of employees has a bearing on
salary and benefits, it may, following a liberal construction of Article 261 of the Labor Code, be
considered an economic provision of the CBA. As above-stated, the Union charges SMFI to have
promoted less senior employees, thus bypassing others who were more senior and equally or more
qualified. It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or flagrant violation of the
seniority rule under the CBA, a ULP over which the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.

10. Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Leyeco IV Employees Union-ALU
G.R. No. 157775. October 19, 2007.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Facts:
On April 6, 1998, Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. (petitioner) and Leyeco IV Employees Union-ALU
(respondent) entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering petitioner rank-and-file
employees, for a period of five (5) years effective January 1, 1998.
On June 7, 2000, respondent, through its Regional Vice-President, Vicente P. Casilan, sent a letter to
petitioner demanding holiday pay for all employees, as provided for in the CBA.
On June 20, 2000, petitioner, through its legal counsel, sent a letter-reply to Casilan, explaining that
after perusing all available pay slips, it found that it had paid all employees all the holiday pays
enumerated in the CBA.
While admitting in its Position Paper[7] that the employees were paid all of the days of the month
even if there was no work, respondent alleged that it is not prevented from making separate demands
for the payment of regular holidays concomitant with the provisions of the CBA, with its supporting
documents consisting of a letter demanding payment of holiday pay, petitioner's reply thereto and
respondent's rejoinder, a computation in the amount of P1,054,393.07 for the unpaid legal holidays,
and several pay slips.
Petitioner, on the other hand, in its Position Paper,[8] insisted payment of the holiday pay in
compliance with the CBA provisions, stating that payment was presumed since the formula used in
determining the daily rate of pay of the covered employees is Basic Monthly Salary divided by 30
days or Basic Monthly Salary multiplied by 12 divided by 360 days, thus with said formula, the
employees are already paid their regular and special days, the days when no work is done, the 51 un-
worked Sundays and the 51 un-worked Saturdays.
Voluntary Arbitrator Antonio C. Lopez, Jr. rendered a Decision in favor of respondent, holding
petitioner liable for payment of unpaid holidays from 1998 to 2000.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the Voluntary Arbitrator in a
Resolution.
Thirty days later, or on July 27, 2002,[13] petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[14] in the CA,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction to the Voluntary Arbitrator: (a) for
ignoring that in said company the divisor for computing the applicable daily rate of rank-and-file
employees is 360 days which already includes payment of 13 un-worked regular holidays under
Section 2, Article VIII of the CBA;[15] and (b) for holding the petitioner liable for the unpaid holidays
just because the payroll slips submitted as evidence did not show any payment for the regular
holidays.
CA dismissed outright petitioner's Petition for Certiorari for adopting a wrong mode of appeal.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution.
Hence, this petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
1. WON Leyte IV Electric Cooperative is liable for underpayment of holiday pay.
2. Procedural issue: WON it can be appealed in the ca
Ruling:
1. Leyte IV Electric Cooperative is not liable for underpayment of holiday pay.

The Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abused its discretion in giving a strict or literal interpretation of the
CBA provisions that the holiday pay be reflected in the payroll slips. Such literal interpretation ignores
the admission of respondent in its Position Paper that the employees were paid all the days of the
month even if not worked. In light of such admission, petitioner's submission of its 360 divisor in the
computation of employees' salaries gains significance.
2. It has long been settled in the landmark case Luzon Development Bank that a voluntary
arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency;
hence, his decisions and awards are appealable to the CA. This is so because the awards of
voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the lapse of the period to appeal; and since
their awards determine the rights of parties, their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a
court. Therefore, the proper remedy from an award of a voluntary arbitrator is a petition for review to
the CA, following Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which provided for a uniform procedure
for appellate review of all adjudications of quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied in Section 1,
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The general rule is that the proper remedy from decisions of voluntary arbitrators is a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy for one who complains that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions acted in total disregard of evidence material to or decisive of the controversy. As this Court
elucidated in Garcia v. National Labor Relations Commission
[I]n Ong v. People, we ruled that certiorari can be properly resorted to where the factual findings
complained of are not supported by the evidence on record. Earlier, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals, we
emphasized thus:
[I]t has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in certiorari
proceedings. The cases in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so would be to
destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is
not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the
exercise of our superintending control over inferior courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may require. So it is that the writ will be
granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
In addition, while the settled rule is that an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only
when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[37]
and certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal,[38] there are a few significant
exceptions when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of
an appeal, namely: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when
the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In this case, while the petition was filed on July 27, 2002, 15 days after July 12, 2002, the expiration
of the 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal under Rule 43, the broader interests of justice
warrant relaxation of the rules on procedure. Besides, petitioner alleges that the Voluntary Arbitrators

conclusions have no basis in fact and in law; hence, the petition should not be dismissed on
procedural grounds.
The Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abused its discretion in giving a strict or literal interpretation of the
CBA provisions that the holiday pay be reflected in the payroll slips. Such literal interpretation ignores
the admission of respondent in its Position Paper that the employees were paid all the days of the
month even if not worked. In light of such admission, petitioner's submission of its 360 divisor in the
computation of employees salaries gains significance.
In Union of Filipro Employees v. Vivar, Jr. the Court held that [t]he divisor assumes an important role
in determining whether or not holiday pay is already included in the monthly paid employees salary
and in the computation of his daily rate. This ruling was applied in Wellington Investment and
Manufacturing Corporation v. Trajano,[43] Producers Bank of the Philippines v. National Labor
Relations Commission and Odango v. National Labor Relations Commission, among others.
In Wellington, the monthly salary was fixed by Wellington to provide for compensation for every
working day of the year including the holidays specified by law and excluding only Sundays. In fixing
the salary, Wellington used what it called the 314 factor; that is, it simply deducted 51 Sundays from
the 365 days normally comprising a year and used the difference, 314, as basis for determining the
monthly salary. The monthly salary thus fixed actually covered payment for 314 days of the year,
including regular and special holidays, as well as days when no work was done by reason of
fortuitous cause, such as transportation strike, riot, or typhoon or other natural calamity, or cause not
attributable to the employees.
In Producers Bank,the employer used the divisor 314 in arriving at the daily wage rate of monthly
salaried employees. The divisor 314 was arrived at by subtracting all Sundays from the total number
of calendar days in a year, since Saturdays are considered paid rest days. The Court held that the
use of 314 as a divisor leads to the inevitable conclusion that the ten legal holidays are already
included therein.
In Odango v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that the use of a divisor that was
less than 365 days cannot make the employer automatically liable for underpayment of holiday pay.
In said case, the employees were required to work only from Monday to Friday and half of Saturday.
Thus, the minimum allowable divisor is 287, which is the result of 365 days, less 52 Sundays and less
26 Saturdays (or 52 half Saturdays). Any divisor below 287 days meant that the employees were
deprived of their holiday pay for some or all of the ten legal holidays. The 304-day divisor used by the
employer was clearly above the minimum of 287 days.
In this case, the employees are required to work only from Monday to Friday. Thus, the minimum
allowable divisor is 263, which is arrived at by deducting 51 un-worked Sundays and 51 un-worked
Saturdays from 365 days. Considering that petitioner used the 360-day divisor, which is clearly above
the minimum, indubitably, petitioner's employees are being given their holiday pay.
Thus, the Voluntary Arbitrator should not have simply brushed aside petitioner's divisor formula. In
granting respondent's claim of non-payment of holiday pay, a double burden was imposed upon
petitioner because it was being made to pay twice for its employees' holiday pay when payment
thereof had already been included in the computation of their monthly salaries. Moreover, it is absurd
to grant respondent's claim of non-payment when they in fact admitted that they were being paid all of
the days of the month even if not worked. By granting respondent's claim, the Voluntary Arbitrator

sanctioned unjust enrichment in favor of the respondent and caused unjust financial burden to the
petitioner. Obviously, the Court cannot allow this.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute would automatically be decided in favor of
labor. Management also has it own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in
the interest of simple fair play.
11. Garcia vs. Eastern Telecommunications
G.R. No. 173115. April 16, 2009
FACTS: Atty. Virgilio Garcia was the Vice-President and Head of Business Support Services and
Human Resource Departments of the Eastern Telecommunications Philippines Inc. (ETPI). Atty.
Salvador Hizon is the President and Chief Executive Officer of ETPI. Atty. Garcia was placed under
preventive suspension based on three complaints for sexual harassment filed by female employees
of ETPI. An investigation was conducted where Atty. Garcia was given copies of the affidavits
against him and a chance to defend himself and to submit affidavits of his witnesses. Based on the
recommendation of the Committee, Atty. Hizon advised Atty. Garcia that he was terminated effective
April 21, 2000. A complaint affidavit was filed by Atty. Garcia for illegal dismissal with prayer for full
backwages and recovery of moral and exemplary damages with the NLRC. ETPI, however, raised the
question of jurisdiction. The Labor Arbiter (LA) found the preventive suspension and the dismissal
illegal. The NLRC ruled that the dismissal of Atty. Garcia, being ETPI’s VP, partook of the nature of
an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by RTC and not by the LA. It added that ETPI and Atty. Hizon
were not barred by estoppel by challenging the jurisdiction of the LA over this case.
ISSUE: Whether the termination or removal of an officer of a corporation is an intra-corporate
controversy that falls under the original exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
HELD: The SC has decreed that a corporate officer’s dismissal or removal is ALWAYS A
CORPORATE ACT AND/OR AN INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY over which the RTC has
original and exclusive jurisdiction. An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the
following relationships:
(1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public;
2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as the former’s franchise,
permit or license to operate is concerned;
(3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or
officers; and
(4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves
Presidential Decree No. 902-A confers on the SEC (now RTC) original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide controversies and cases involving intra-corporate and partnership relations between
or among the corporation, officers and stockholders and partners, including their elections or
appointments Before a dismissal or removal could properly fall within the jurisdiction of the SEC (now
RTC), it has to be first established that the person removed or dismissed was a corporate officer.
"Corporate officers" in the context of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are those officers of the
corporation who are given that character by the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws.
There are three specific officers whom a corporation must have under Section 25 of the Corporation
Code. These are the president, secretary and the treasurer. The number of officers is not limited to
these three. A corporation may have such other officers as may be provided for by its by-laws like,
but not limited to, the vice-president, cashier, auditor or general manager. The number of corporate
officers is thus limited by law and by the corporation’s by-laws. In the case before us, the by-laws of
ETPI provide:
ARTICLE V
Officers
Section 1. Number. – The officers of the Company shall be a Chairman of the Board, a President, one
or more Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, a Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, and such other officers as
may be from time to time be elected or appointed by the Board of Directors. One person may hold
any two compatible offices.
Garcia tries to deny he is an officer of ETPI. Not being a corporate officer, he argues that the Labor
Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case. One of the corporate officers provided for in the by-laws of ETPI
is the Vice-President. It can be gathered from Atty. Garcia’s complaint-affidavit that he was Vice
President for Business Support Services and Human Resource Departments of ETPI when his
employment was terminated effective 16 April 2000. It is therefore clear from the by-laws and from
Atty. Garcia himself that he is a corporate officer. One who is included in the by-laws of a corporation
in its roster of corporate officers is an officer of said corporation and not a mere employee. Being a
corporate officer, his removal is deemed to be an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the SEC and
not by the Labor Arbiter. The Court agrees with both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that Atty.
Garcia’s ouster as Vice-President, who is a corporate officer of ETPI, partakes of the nature of an
intra-corporate controversy, jurisdiction over which is vested in the SEC (now the RTC). The Labor
Arbiter thus erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case filed by Atty. Garcia, because he had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy.
12. Patricia Halagueña Vs Katindig, et al.

G.R. No. 172013 October 2, 2009.
Facts:
Petitioners were employed as female attendants of PAL prior to November 22, 1996, and are
members of Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor
organization certified as the sole and exclusive certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers of respondent.
On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a CBA incorporating the terms and conditions
of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter referred to as PAL-FASAP CBA. Section
144, Part A of the CBA provides that for cabin attendants hired before November 22, 1996, shall have
a compulsory retirement of 55 for females and 60 for males.
In a letter petitioners manifested that the aforementioned CBA provision on compulsory retirement is
discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male counterparts.
The RTC upholds its jurisdiction over the case, and ruled that the case does not involve a labor
dispute, but rather, this case seeks a declaration of the nullity of the questioned provision of the CBA,
which is within the Court's competence.

The Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order with the CA praying that the order of the RTC, which denied its objection to its jurisdiction, be
annuled and set aside for having been issued without and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The CA ruled that the RTC have no jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners' action challenging the legality or
constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between
respondent PAL and FASAP.
Ruling: RTC have jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the allegations in the petition for declaratory relief
plainly show that petitioners' cause of action is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-
FASAP CBA. From the petitioners' allegations and relief prayed for in its petition, it is clear that the
issue raised is whether Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional.
Here, the petitioners' primary relief in Civil Case No. 04-886 is the annulment of Section 144, Part A
of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight
attendants. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by
the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary
civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.
Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where
the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a
different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the
employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action
ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW (Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).
Issue: Won the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrators do not have the power to determine
and settle the issues at hand.
Ruling: No, they have no jurisdiction and competence to decide constitutional issues relative to the
questioned compulsory retirement age. Their exercise of jurisdiction is futile, as it is like vesting power
to someone who cannot wield it.
The change in the terms and conditions of employment, should Section 144 of the CBA be
held invalid, is but a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the principal relief sought, i.e.,
nullification of the alleged discriminatory provision in the CBA. Thus, it does not necessarily follow
that a resolution of controversy that would bring about a change in the terms and conditions of
employment is a labor dispute, cognizable by labor tribunals. It is unfair to preclude petitioners from
invoking the trial court's jurisdiction merely because it may eventually result into a change of the
terms and conditions of employment. Along that line, the trial court is not asked to set and fix the
terms and conditions of employment, but is called upon to determine whether CBA is consistent with
the laws.
Although the CBA provides for a procedure for the adjustment of grievances, such referral to the
grievance machinery and thereafter to voluntary arbitration would be inappropriate to the petitioners,
because the union and the management have unanimously agreed to the terms of the CBA and their
interest is unified.

Outcome: Case remanded to RTC
13. Leslie Okol vs Slimmer’s World International

G.R. No. 160146, December 11, 2009
FACTS: Respondent Slimmer’s World employed petitioner Leslie Okol as a management trainee on
15 June 1992. She rose up the ranks to become Head Office Manager and then Director and Vice
President from 1996 until her dismissal on 22 September 1999.
On 28 July 1999, prior to Okol’s dismissal, Slimmer’s World preventively suspended Okol. The
suspension arose from the seizure by the Bureau of Customs of seven Precor elliptical machines and
seven Precor treadmills belonging to or consigned to Slimmer’s World. For being undervalued, the
equipment was seized.
Okol received memorandum from Slimmer’s World requiring her to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her in connection with the equipment seized by the Bureau of Customs.
Okol filed her written explanation. However, Slimmer’s World found Okol’s explanation to be
unsatisfactory. Through a letter signed by its president Ronald Joseph Moy, Slimmers World
terminated Okol’s employment.
Okol filed a complaint with the Arbitration branch of the NLRC against Slimmer’s World, Behavior
Modifications, Inc. and Moy for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, damages
and attorney’s fees, with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages. Respondents filed a
Motion to Dismiss the case with a reservation of their right to file a Position Paper at the proper time.
Respondents asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.
The labor arbiter granted the motion to dismiss. The labor arbiter ruled that Okol was the vice-
president of Slimmer’s World at the time of her dismissal. Since it involved a corporate officer, the
dispute was an intra-corporate controversy falling outside the jurisdiction of the Arbitration branch.
Okol filed an appeal with the NLRC. In a Resolution, the NLRC reversed and set aside the labor
arbiter’s order.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC. The NLRC denied the motion for lack
of merit.
Respondents then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, the appellate court set aside the NLRC’s
Resolution and affirmed the labor arbiter’s Order. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case, being an
intra-corporate dispute, falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts pursuant to Republic Act No.
8799. Okol filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case filed by petitioner?
RULING: No.
The issue revolves mainly on whether petitioner was an employee or a corporate officer of Slimmer’s
World. Section 25 of the Corporation Code enumerates corporate officers as the president, secretary,
treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws. On the other hand, an
“employee” usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or
stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to
be paid to such employee.
In the present case, the respondents, in their motion to dismiss filed before the labor arbiter,
questioned the jurisdiction of the NLRC in taking cognizance of petitioner’s complaint. In the motion,
respondents attached the General Information Sheet (GIS), Minutes of the meeting of the Board of
Directors and Secretary’s Certificate,15 and the Amended By-Laws of Slimmer’s World as submitted
to the SEC to show that petitioner was a corporate officer whose rights do not fall within the NLRC’s
jurisdiction. The GIS and minutes of the meeting of the board of directors indicated that petitioner was
a member of the board of directors, holding one subscribed share of the capital stock, and an elected
corporate officer.
Clearly, from the documents submitted by respondents, petitioner was a director and officer of
Slimmer’s World. The charges of illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions,
reinstatement and back wages imputed by petitioner against respondents fall squarely within the
ambit of intra-corporate disputes.
Prior to its amendment, Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A19 (PD 902-A) provided that
intra-corporate disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Subsection 5.2, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8799, which took effect on 8 August 2000, transferred
to regional trial courts the SEC’s jurisdiction over all cases listed in Section 5 of PD 902-A.
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. The determination of the
rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the corresponding
liability of a corporation, if any, is an intra-corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular
courts.
14. Hugo et. al., vs Light Rail Transit Authority

G.R. No. 181866, March 18, 2010
FACTS: Respondent Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government-owned and controlled
corporation, constructed a light rail transit system which traverses from Baclaran in Parañaque City to
Monumento in Kalookan City, Metro Manila. To effectively carry out its mandate, LRTA entered into a
ten-year Agreement for the Management and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System
with Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (METRO). METRO thus hired its own employees including
herein petitioners-members of the Pinag-isang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa METRO, Inc.-National
Federation of Labor, otherwise known as PIGLAS-METRO, INC.-NFL-KMU (the Union), the certified
exclusive collective bargaining representative of METRO’s rank-and-file employees.
On account of a deadlock in the negotiation for the forging of a new collective bargaining agreement
between METRO and the Union, petitioners filed a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board, National Capital Region (NCR). On even date, the Union went on strike,
completely paralyzing the operations of the light rail transit system. By LRTA’s claim, the striking
employees including petitioners defied the return-to-work order. Contradicting such claim, petitioners
alleged that upon learning of the order, they attempted to comply with it but the security guards of
METRO barred them from entering their workplace for security reasons, the latter being afraid that
they (the striking employees) might sabotage the vital machineries and equipment of the light rail
transit system.
When the Agreement expired on July 31, 2000, LRTA did not renew it. It instead took over the
management and operations of the light rail transit system, hiring new personnel for the purpose.
METRO thus considered the employment of all its personnel terminated effectively.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with prayer for reinstatement
and damages against METRO and LRTA before the NCR Arbitration Branch, National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). In impleading LRTA in their complaint, petitioners alleged that the
“non-renewal of the Agreement is but an ingenious, albeit unlawful, scheme carried out by the
respondents to get rid of personnel they perceived as activists and troublemakers, thus, terminating
the complainants without any just or lawful cause.”
LRTA filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have
no jurisdiction over it, for, by petitioners’ own admission, there was no employer-employee
relationship between it and petitioners.
Labor Arbiter - granted the motion of LRTA and accordingly dismissed petitioners’ complaint for lack
of jurisdiction.
NLRC - reversed the Labor Arbiter’s dismissal of petitioners’ complaint and rendered a new one
“declaring that the Labor Arbiter and this Commission can exercise jurisdiction over the person of
Respondent LRTA,” LRTA being considered an “indirect employer” on account of the Agreement and
that LRTA is a “necessary party” which ought to be joined as party for a complete determination of
petitioners’ claims that the non-renewal of the Agreement by LRTA and the cessation of business by
METRO were carried out with the intent to cover up the illegal dismissal of petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over LRTA?
RULING: No. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC do not have jurisdiction over LRTA. Petitioners
themselves admitted in their complaint that LRTA “is a government agency organized and existing
pursuant to an original charter (Executive Order No. 603),” and that they are employees of METRO.
In Light Rail Transit Authority v. Venus, Jr., which has a similar factual backdrop, holds that LRTA,
being a government-owned or controlled corporation created by an original charter, is beyond the
reach of the Department of Labor and Employment which has jurisdiction over workers in the private
sector:
Employees of petitioner METRO cannot be considered as employees of petitioner LRTA. The
employees hired by METRO are covered by the Labor Code and are under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Labor and Employment, whereas the employees of petitioner LRTA, a government-
owned and controlled corporation with original charter, are covered by civil service rules. Herein
private respondent workers cannot have the best of two worlds, e.g., be considered government
employees of petitioner LRTA, yet allowed to strike as private employees under our labor laws.
It is inappropriate to pierce the corporate veil of petitioner METRO. In the instant case, petitioner
METRO was originally owned by the Manila Electric Company and registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission more than a decade before the labor dispute. Even if petitioner LRTA
eventually purchased METRO in 1989, both parties maintained their separate and distinct juridical
personality and allowed the agreement to proceed. In 1995, METRO’s separate juridical identity was
again recognized when it entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the workers’ union. All

these years, METRO’s distinct corporate personality continued quiescently, separate and apart from
the juridical personality of petitioner LRTA.
The labor dispute only arose in 2000, after a deadlock occurred during the collective bargaining
between petitioner METRO and the workers’ union. This alone is not a justification to pierce the
corporate veil of petitioner METRO and make petitioner LRTA liable to private respondent workers.
15. Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation vs Coros

G.R. No. 157802 October 13, 2010
FACTS: After his dismissal by Matling as its Vice President for Finance and Administration, the
respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against Matling and some of
its corporate officers in the NLRC. The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint, raising the
ground, among others, that the complaint pertained to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) due to the controversy being intracorporate inasmuch as the respondent was a
member of Matlings Board of Directors aside from being its Vice-President for Finance and
Administration prior to his termination. The respondent opposed the petitioners motion to dismiss,
insisting that his status as a member of Matlings Board of Directors was doubtful, considering that he
had not been formally elected as such; that he did not own a single share of stock in Matling,
considering that he had been made to sign in blank an undated indorsement of the certificate of stock
he had been given in 1992; that Matling had taken back and retained the certificate of stock in its
custody; and that even assuming that he had been a Director of Matling, he had been removed as the
Vice President for Finance and Administration, not as a Director, a fact that the notice of his
termination dated April 10, 2000 showed. The LA granted the petitioners motion to dismiss, ruling that
the respondent was a corporate officer because he was occupying the position of Vice President for
Finance and Administration and at the same time was a Member of the Board of Directors of Matling;
and that, consequently, his removal was a corporate act of Matling and the controversy resulting from
such removal was under the jurisdiction of the SEC, pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (c) of
Presidential Decree No. 902.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is a corporate officer within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts.
RULING: No. As a rule, the illegal dismissal of an officer or other employee of a private employer is
properly cognizable by the LA. This is pursuant to Article 217 (a) 2 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Article 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. – (a) Except as otherwise provided
under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without
extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural: xxx
2. Termination disputes; xxx
Where the complaint for illegal dismissal concerns a corporate officer, however, the controversy falls
under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), because the controversy
arises out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between and among stockholders, members, or
associates, or between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which
they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between such corporation,
partnership, or association and the State insofar as the controversy concerns their individual
franchise or right to exist as such entity; or because the controversy involves the election or
appointment of a director, trustee, officer, or manager of such corporation, partnership, or association.
Such controversy, among others, is known as an intra-corporate dispute. Effective on August 8, 2000,
upon the passage of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code, the
SECs jurisdiction over all intra-corporate disputes was transferred to the RTC, pursuant to Section 5.2
of RA No. 8799.
Thus, pursuant to the above provision (Section 25 of the Corporation Code), whoever are the
corporate officers enumerated in the by-laws are the exclusive Officers of the corporation and the
Board has no power to create other Offices without amending first the corporate By-laws. However,
the Board may create appointive positions other than the positions of corporate Officers, but the
persons occupying such positions are not considered as corporate officers within the meaning of
Section 25 of the Corporation Code and are not empowered to exercise the functions of the corporate
Officers, except those functions lawfully delegated to them. Their functions and duties are to be
determined by the Board of Directors/Trustees.
Moreover, the Board of Directors of Matling could not validly delegate the power to create a corporate
office to the President, in light of Section 25 of the Corporation Code requiring the Board of Directors
itself to elect the corporate officers. Verily, the power to elect the corporate officers was a
discretionary power that the law exclusively vested in the Board of Directors, and could not be
delegated to subordinate officers or agents. The office of Vice President for Finance and
Administration created by Matlings President pursuant to By Law No. V was an ordinary, not a
corporate, office. The criteria for distinguishing between corporate officers who may be ousted from
office at will, on one hand, and ordinary corporate employees who may only be terminated for just
cause, on the other hand, do not depend on the nature of the services performed, but on the manner
of creation of the office. In the respondents case, he was supposedly at once an employee, a
stockholder, and a Director of Matling. The circumstances surrounding his appointment to office must
be fully considered to determine whether the dismissal constituted an intra-corporate controversy or a
labor termination dispute. We must also consider whether his status as Director and stockholder had
any relation at all to his appointment and subsequent dismissal as Vice President for Finance and
Administration.
16. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. LIM

G.R. No. 184769, October 5, 2010
FACTS: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door
of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which
respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO
MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG
MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it,
respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National
Police.
By Memorandum dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human
Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa
as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of reports that there were
accusations and threats directed against her from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise her safety and security.
Respondent appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and
misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due
process. She cited that the transfer would entail a grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to
Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their CBA. Respondent
thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the
issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. She alleged
that petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide
her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received
concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty
and security, correctible by habeas data.
ISSUE: Is respondent correct in filing a writ of habeas data in the RTC?
RULING: No. Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum
directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data
allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. The
habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a
remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
Writs of amparo and habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment
constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is
evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern
respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law
with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the
threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-
quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they
existed at all. And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betrays the real intent
of management and could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is
labor-related.
Thus, it was incorrect for Lim to file such petition in the RTC.
17. HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP., LTD. STAFF RETIREMENT PLAN v.
SPOUSES BIENVENIDO AND EDITHA BROQUEZA
G.R. No. 178610. November 17, 2010.
FACTS:
Editha Broqueza is an employee of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) and
a member of respondent Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. Staff Retirement Plan.
On October 1, 1990, she obtained a car loan in the amount of Php175,000.00. On December
12, 1991, she again applied and was granted an appliance loan in the amount of Php 24,000.00.
These loans are paid through automatic salary deduction. Meanwhile in 1993, a labor dispute arose
between HSBC and its employees. Majority of HSBC’s employees were terminated, among whom is
Editha Broqueza. The employees then filed an illegal dismissal case before the National Labor
Relations Commission against HSBC. Because of the dismissal, Broqueza was not able to pay the
monthly amortizations of her respective loans. Thus, respondent HSBCL-SRP considered her
account delinquent. Demands to pay the obligation were made, but Broqueza failed to pay.
Subsequently, HSBCL-SRP filed a civil case against the spouses Broqueza. The
MeTC promulgated its Decision in favor of HSBCL-SRP. The MeTC ruled that the nature of HSBCL-
SRP’s demands for payment is civil and has no connection to the ongoing labor dispute. The RTC
ruled that the termination of Broqueza from employment disqualified them her availing of benefits
under their retirement plans. As a consequence, there is no longer any security for the loans. HSBCL-
SRP has a legal right to demand immediate settlement of the unpaid balance because of Editha
Broqueza’s continued default in payment and failure to provide new security for her loans. The CA
reversed the Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Which court has jurisdiction to hear and decide matters involving enforcement of a loan
agreement between the employer and employee?
RULING:
The enforcement of a loan agreement involves a debtor-creditor relations founded on contract
and does not in any way concern employee relations. As such it should be enforced through a
separate civil action in the regular courts and not before the Labor Arbiter.
18. REAL v. SANGU PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 168757, January 19, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner was the Manager of respondent corporation Sangu Philippines, Inc., a corporation engaged
in the business of providing manpower for general services. This was a consolidated case of illegal
dismissal, but with regard to petitioner, he was removed from his position as Manager through Board
Resolution adopted by respondent’s Board of Directors. He was neither notified of the Board Meeting
during which said board resolution was passed nor formally charged with any infraction. He just
received from respondents a letter stating that he has been terminated from service due to (1)
continuous absences at his post at Ogino Philippines Inc. for several months which was detrimental
to the corporation’s operation; (2) loss of trust and confidence; and, (3) to cut down operational
expenses to reduce further losses being experienced by respondent corporation. Respondents
claimed that the illegal dismissal was because petitioner committed gross acts of misconduct
detrimental to the company including the staged of strike and barricaded the premises of respondent
corporation. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Real and ordered for his reinstatement with full
backwages. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the case holding that Real is a stockholder and
corporate officer of the respondent company and therefore it is an intra-corporate dispute over which
the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal constitutes an intra-corporate controversy
and thus, beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
HELD:
With the elements of intra-corporate controversy being absent in this case, we thus hold that
petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents is not intra-corporate. Rather, it is a
termination dispute and, consequently, falls under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to
Section 217 of the Labor Code.
It is worthy to note, however, that before the promulgation of the Tabang case, the Court provided in
Mainland Construction Co., Inc. v. Movilla, a better policy in determining which between the SEC and
the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over termination disputes through two tests which was also adopted
in the recent case of Speed Distribution Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the parties, and (2) the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy.
In this case, first, no intra-corporate relationship existed between the parties. The first element
requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between any or
all of the parties and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are not stockholders,
members or associates, between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of
which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation,
partnership, or association and the State insofar as it concerns the individual franchises.

Guided by this recent jurisprudence, we thus find no merit in respondents’ contention that the fact
alone that petitioner is a stockholder and director of respondent corporation automatically classifies
this case as an intracorporate controversy. To reiterate, not all conflicts between the stockholders and
the corporation are classified as intracorporate. It has been consistently held that an Office is created
by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected (or appointed) by the directors or
stockholders. Clearly here, respondents failed to prove that petitioner was appointed by the board of
directors. Thus, we cannot subscribe to their claim that petitioner is a corporate officer. Having said
this, we find that there is no intracorporate relationship between the parties insofar as petitioner’s
complaint for illegal dismissal is concerned and that same does not satisfy the relationship test.
Corporate officer in the context of Presidential Decree No. 902- A are those officers of the corporation
who are given that character by the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws. There are
three specific officers whom a corporation must have under Section 25 of the Corporation Code.
These are the president, secretary and the treasurer. The number of officers is not limited to these
three. A corporation may have such other officers as may be provided for by its by-laws like, but not
limited to, the vice-president, cashier, auditor or general manager. The number of corporate officers is
thus limited by law and by the corporation’s by-laws.
Second, the present controversy does not relate to intra-corporate dispute.
The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the
regulation of the corporation. If the nature of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil in
character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy.
The reasons given by respondents for dismissing petitioner have something to do with his being a
Manager of respondent corporation and nothing with his being a director or stockholder. For one,
petitioner’s continuous absences in his post in Ogino relates to his performance as Manager. Second,
respondents’ loss of trust and confidence in petitioner stemmed from his alleged acts of establishing a
company engaged in the same line of business as respondent corporation’s and submitting proposals
to the latter’s clients while he was still serving as its Manager. The respondent’s claim that this is an
act of disloyalty of petitioner as director and stockholder, is a mere afterthought on their part to make
it appear that the present case involves an element of intra-corporate controversy because before the
Labor Arbiter, respondents did not see such acts to be disloyal acts of a director and stockholder but
rather, as constituting willful breach of the trust reposed upon petitioner as Manager. Third, in saying
that they were dismissing petitioner to cut operational expenses, respondents actually want to save
on the salaries and other remunerations being given to petitioner as its Manager. When petitioner
sought for reinstatement, he wanted to recover his position as Manager, a position which we have,
however, earlier declared to be not a corporate position. He is not trying to recover a seat in the board
of directors or to any appointive or elective corporate position which has been declared vacant by the
board. Certainly, what we have here is a case of termination of employment which is a labor
controversy and not an intra-corporate dispute.

19. Portillo vs. Rudolf Lietz, Inc.
G.R. No. 196539. October 10, 2012
FACTS:
In a letter agreement dated 3 May 1991, signed by individual respondent Rudolf Lietz (Rudolf) and
conformed to by Portillo, the latter was hired by the former.
On her tenth (10th) year with Lietz Inc., specifically on 1 February 2002, Portillo was promoted to
Sales Representative and received a corresponding increase in basic monthly salary and sales
quota. In this regard, Portillo signed another letter agreement containing a Goodwill Clause:
It remains understood and you agreed that, on the termination of your employment by act of either
you or [Lietz Inc.], and for a period of three (3) years thereafter, you shall not engage directly or
indirectly as employee, manager, proprietor, or solicitor for yourself or others in a similar or
competitive business or the same character of work which you were employed by [Lietz Inc.] to do
and perform. Should you breach this good will clause of this Contract, you shall pay [Lietz Inc.] as
liquidated damages the amount of 100% of your gross compensation over the last 12 months, it being
agreed that this sum is reasonable and just.
Three (3) years thereafter, on 6 June 2005, Portillo resigned from Lietz Inc. During her exit interview,
Portillo declared that she intended to engage in business―a rice dealership, selling rice in wholesale.
In a subsequent letter dated 21 June 2005, Lietz Inc. wrote Portillo and supposed that the exchange
of correspondence between them regarding the „Goodwill Clause in the employment contract was a
moot exercise since Portillo`s articulated intention to go into business, selling rice, will not compete
with Lietz Inc.`s products. Subsequently, Lietz Inc. learned that Portillo had been hired by Ed Keller
Philippines, Limited to head its Pharma Raw Material Department. Ed Keller Limited is purportedly a
direct competitor of Lietz Inc. Meanwhile, Portillo`s demands from Lietz Inc. for the payment of her
remaining salaries and commissions went unheeded.
On 14 September 2005, Portillo filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for nonpayment of 1½ months` salary, two (2) months` commission, 13th month pay, plus
moral, exemplary and actual damages and attorney`s fees. In its position paper, Lietz Inc. admitted
liability for Portillo`s money claims in the total amount of P110,662.16. However, Lietz Inc. raised the
defense of legal compensation: Portillo`s money claims should be offset against her liability to Lietz
Inc. for liquidated damages in the amount of P869,633.097 for Portillo`s alleged breach of the
Goodwill Clause in the employment contract when she became employed with Ed Keller Philippines,
Limited.
LA granted. NLRC affirmed. CA affirmed but later modified its decision allowing compensation.
ISSUE:
Was the filing of petitioner a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 proper?
RULING:
NO. Portillo committed a procedural error by filing a petition for certiorari, a special civil action under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, instead of a petition for review on certiorari, a mode of appeal, under
Rule 45 thereof. On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright. Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals may file a verified petition for review on
certiorari. Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to Portillo, that available
recourse foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari, a limited form of review
and a remedy of last recourse, which lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Be that as it may, on more than one occasion, to
serve the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures―attaining substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible―we have accepted procedurally incorrect petitions and decided them on the merits. We do
the same here.
ISSUE:
May Portillo`s money claims for unpaid salaries may be offset against respondents` claim for
liquidated damages?
RULING:
NO. Not all disputes between an employer and his employee(s) fall within the jurisdiction of the labor
tribunals. Money claims of workers referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money claims
which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship, or some aspect or
incident of such relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers which now fall within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some
reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. A noncompete clause, as in
the Goodwill Clause referred to in the present case, with a stipulation that a violation thereof makes
the employee liable to his former employer for liquidated damages, refers to post-employment
relations of the parties.
There is no dispute as to the cessation of Portillo`s employment with Lietz Inc. She simply claims her
unpaid salaries and commissions, which Lietz Inc. does not contest. At that juncture, Portillo was no
longer an employee of Lietz Inc. The Goodwill Clause or the Non-Compete Clause is a contractual
undertaking effective after the cessation of the employment relationship between the parties. In
accordance with jurisprudence, breach of the undertaking is a civil law dispute, not a labor law case.
It is clear, therefore, that while Portillo`s claim for unpaid salaries is a money claim that arises out of
or in connection with an employer-employee relationship, Lietz Inc.`s claim against Portillo for
violation of the goodwill clause is a money claim based on an act done after the cessation of the
employment relationship. And, while the jurisdiction over Portillo`s claim is vested in the labor arbiter,
the jurisdiction over Lietz Inc.`s claim rests on the regular courts.
In the case at bar, the difference in the nature of the credits that one has against the other,
conversely, the nature of the debt one owes another, which difference in turn results in the difference
of the forum where the different credits can be enforced, prevents the application of compensation.
Simply, the labor tribunal in an employee`s claim for unpaid wages is without authority to allow the
compensation of such claims against the post-employment claim of the former employer for breach of
a post-employment condition. The labor tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the civil case of
breach of contract.
20. ACE NAVIGATION CO., INC., VELA INTERNATIONAL MARINE LTD., and/or
RODOLFO PAMINTUAN, v. TEODORICO FERNANDEZ, assisted by GLENITA
FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 197309 : October 10, 2012

FACTS: Respondent, filed with the NLRC a complaint for disability benefits, with prayer for moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees, against petitioners. The petitioners moved to dismiss the
complaint, contending that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the dispute. They argued that
exclusive original jurisdiction is with the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, pursuant
to Section 29 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), since the parties are
covered by the AMOSUP-TCC or AMOSUP-VELA (as later cited by the petitioners) collective
bargaining agreement (CBA). Under Section 14 of the CBA, a dispute between a seafarer and the
company shall be settled through the grievance machinery and mandatory voluntary arbitration.
Fernandez opposed the motion. He argued that inasmuch as his complaint involves a money claim,
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case is vested with the labor arbiter.
Labor Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss, holding that under Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the labor arbiter has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over money claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary The petitioners appealed
to the NLRC, but the labor agency denied the appeal. It agreed with the labor arbiter that the case
involves a money claim and is within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter, in accordance with Section
10 of R.A. No. 8042. Additionally, it declared that the denial of the motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which is not appealable. Accordingly, it remanded the case to the labor arbiter for
further proceedings. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion,
prompting the petitioners to elevate the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
The CA denied the petition on procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, it found the
petitioners to have availed of the wrong remedy when they challenged the labor arbiters denial of
their motion to dismiss by way of an appeal to the NLRC. It stressed that pursuant to the NLRC rules,
an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. The CA stressed
that the jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrators is limited to the seafarers claims which do not fall within
the labor arbiters original and exclusive jurisdiction or even in cases where the labor arbiter has
jurisdiction, the parties have agreed in unmistakable terms (through their CBA) to submit the case to
voluntary arbitration. The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA decision, but the appellate
court denied the motion, reiterating its earlier pronouncement that on the ground alone of the
petitioners wrong choice of remedy, the petition must fail.
ISSUE: Who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over Fernandez’s disability claim —
the labor arbiter under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended, or the voluntary arbitration
mechanism as prescribed in the parties’ CBA and the POEA -SEC?
RULING: The State’s labor relations policy laid down in the Constitution and fleshed out in the
enabling statute, the Labor Code (Art. 260, 261 and 262) and the POEA-SEC1 provide that the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Fernandez’s disability claim. There is no dispute that the claim arose out of Fernandez’s employment
with the petitioners and that their relationship is covered by a CBA — the AMOSUP/TCC or the
AMOSUP-VELA CBA. The CBA provides for a grievance procedure for the resolution of grievances
or disputes which occur during the employment relationship and, like the grievance machinery

created under Article 261 of the Labor Code, it is a two-tiered mechanism, with voluntary arbitration
as the last step.
Contrary to the CA’s reading of the CBA’s Article 14, there is unequivocal or unmistakable language
in the agreement which mandatorily requires the parties to submit to the grievance procedure any
dispute or cause of action they may have against each other. What might have caused the CA to
miss the clear intent of the parties in prescribing a grievance procedure in their CBA is, as the
petitioners’ have intimated, the use of the auxiliary verb "may" in Article 14.7(a) of the CBA which
provides that "if by reason of the nature of the Dispute, the parties are unable to amicably settle the
dispute, either party may refer the case to a MANDATORY ARBITRATION COMMITTEE."
While the CA did not qualify its reading of the subject provision of the CBA, it is reasonable to
conclude that it viewed as optional the referral of a dispute to the mandatory arbitration committee
when the parties are unable to amicably settle the dispute.
We find this a strained interpretation of the CBA provision. The CA read the provision separately, or in
isolation of the other sections of Article 14, especially 14.7(h), which, in clear, explicit language,
states that the "referral of all unresolved disputes from the Grievance Resolution Committee to the
Mandatory Arbitration Committee shall be unwaivable prerequisite or condition precedent for bringing
any action, claim, or cause of action, legal or otherwise, before any court, tribunal, or panel in any
jurisdiction"29 and that the failure by a party or seaman to so refer the dispute to the prescribed
dispute resolution mechanism shall bar any legal or other action. Read in its entirety, the CBA’s
Article 14 (Grievance Procedure) unmistakably reflects the parties’ agreement to submit any
unresolved dispute at the grievance resolution stage to mandatory voluntary arbitration under Article
14.7(h) of the CBA. And, it should be added that, in compliance with Section 29 of the POEA-SEC
which requires that in cases of claims and disputes arising from a seafarer’s employment, the parties
covered by a CBA shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
Since the parties used unequivocal language in their CBA for the submission of their disputes to
voluntary arbitration, we find that the CA committed a reversible error in its ruling. It bears stressing at
this point that we are upholding the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators over the present dispute, not only because of the clear language of the parties’ CBA on the
matter; more importantly, we so uphold the voluntary arbitrator’s jurisdiction, in recognition of the
State’s express preference for voluntary modes of dispute settlement, such as conciliation and
voluntary arbitration as expressed in the Constitution, the law and the rules.
It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to
submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed.
21. RAUL C. COSARE vs BROADCOM ASIA, INC.

G.R. No. 201298, February 5, 2014
FACTS:
In 1993, Cosare was employed as a salesman by Arevalo, who was then in the business of selling
broadcast equipment needed by television networks and production houses. In December 2000,
Arevalo set up the company Broadcom, still to continue the business of trading communication and
broadcast equipment. Cosare was named an incorporator of Broadcom, having been assigned 100
shares of stock with par value of P1.00 per share. In October 2001, Cosare was promoted to the
position of Assistant Vice President for Sales (AVP for Sales) and Head of the Technical
Coordination.
Sometime in 2003, Alex F. Abiog (Abiog) was appointed as Broadcoms Vice President for Sales and
thus, became Cosares immediate superior. Cosare sent a confidential memo to Arevalo to inform him
of the anomalies which were allegedly being committed by Abiog against the company. Cosare ended
his memo by clarifying that he was not interested in Abiogs position, but only wanted Arevalo to know
of the irregularities for the corporations sake.
Apparently, Arevalo failed to act on Cosares accusations. Cosare claimed that he was instead called
for a meeting by Arevalo on March 25, 2009, wherein he was asked to tender his resignation in
exchange for "financial assistance" in the amount ofP300,000.00.Cosare refused to comply with the
directive, as signified in a letter which he sent to Arevalo.
Cosare received from Roselyn Villareal (Villareal), Broadcoms Manager for Finance and
Administration, a memosigned by Arevalo, charging him of serious misconduct and willful breach of
trust. He was given forty-eight (48) hours from the date of the memo within which to present his
explanation on the charges. He was also "suspended from having access to any and all company
files/records and use of company assets effective immediately."Thus, Cosare claimed that he was
precluded from reporting for work and was instead instructed to wait at the offices receiving section.
Upon the specific instructions of Arevalo, he was also prevented by Villareal from retrieving even his
personal belongings from the office until he was totally barred from entering the company premises.
Cosare filed a labor complaint, claiming that he was constructively dismissed from employment by the
respondents. He further argued that he was illegally suspended, as he placed no serious and
imminent threat to the life or property of his employer and co-employees.
In refuting Cosares complaint, the respondents argued that Cosare was neither illegally suspended
nor dismissed from employment. They also contended that Cosare committed the following acts
inimical to the interests of Broadcom.Furthermore, they contended that Cosare abandoned his job by
continually failing to report for work beginning April 1, 2009, prompting them to issue on April 14,
2009 a memorandum accusing Cosare of absence without leave beginning April 1, 2009.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground of Cosares failure to establish that he was
constructively dismissed.
Cosare appealed the LA decision to the NLRC. It reversed the LA decision.

The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied.Dissatisfied, they filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA on the issues of constructive dismissal and intra-corporate controversy which was within
the jurisdiction of the RTC, instead of the LA. They argued that the case involved a complaint against
a corporation filed by a stockholder, who, at the same time, was a corporate officer.
The CAgranted the respondents petition. It agreed with the respondents contention that the case
involved an intra-corporate controversy which, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as
amended, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence, this petition filed by Cosare.
ISSUES:
1. Who is a corporate officer?
2. Is Cosare, an officer of Broadcom for being its Assistant Vice-President for Sales, considered a
corporate officer?
3. Does the instant case involve an intra-corporate dispute considering Cosare was a stockholder of
Broadcom at the time of the filing of the case?
4. Was the case instituted by Cosare an intra-corporate dispute that was within the original jurisdiction
of the RTC, and not of the LAs?
RULING:
1. There are three specific officers whom a corporation must have under Section 25 of the
Corporation Code. These are the president, secretary and the treasurer. The number of officers is not
limited to these three. A corporation may have such other officers as may be provided for by its by-
laws like, but not limited to, the vice-president, cashier, auditor or general manager. The number of
corporate officers is thus limited by law and by the corporations by-laws.
In Tabang v. NLRC, the Court also made the following pronouncement on the nature of corporate
offices: there are two circumstances which must concur in order for an individual to be considered a
corporate officer, as against an ordinary employee or officer, namely: (1) the creation of the position is
under the corporations charter or by-laws; and (2) the election of the officer is by the directors or
stockholders. It is only when the officer claiming to have been illegally dismissed is classified as such
corporate officer that the issue is deemed an intra-corporate dispute which falls within the jurisdiction
of the trial courts.
2. NO. The Court disagrees with the respondents and the CA. The only officers who are specifically
listed, and thus with offices that are created under Broadcoms by-laws are the following: the
President, Vice-President, Treasurer and Secretary. Although a blanket authority provides for the
Boards appointment of such other officers as it may deem necessary and proper, the respondents
failed to sufficiently establish that the position of AVP for Sales was created by virtue of an act of
Broadcoms board, and that Cosare was specifically elected or appointed to such position by the
directors. No board resolutions to establish such facts form part of the case records.

The CAs heavy reliance on the contents of the General Information Sheets, which were submitted by
the respondents during the appeal proceedings and which plainly provided that Cosare was an
"officer" of Broadcom, was clearly misplaced. The said documents could neither govern nor establish
the nature of the office held by Cosare and his appointment thereto.
3. NO. The mere fact that Cosare was a stockholder of Broadcom at the time of the cases filing did
not necessarily make the action an intra-corporate controversy. Not all conflicts between the
stockholders and the corporation are classified as intra-corporate. There are other facts to consider in
determining whether the dispute involves corporate matters as to consider them as intra-corporate
controversies.
4. NO. As regards the issue of jurisdiction, the Court has determined that contrary to the ruling of the
Court of Appeals (CA), it is the labor arbiter (LA), and not the regular courts, which has the original
jurisdiction over the subject controversy. An intra-corporate controversy, which falls within the
jurisdiction of regular courts, has been regarded in its broad sense to pertain to disputes that involve
any of the following relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the
public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise,
permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and
its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or
associates, themselves.
Settled jurisprudence, however, qualifies that when the dispute involves a charge of illegal dismissal,
the action may fall under the jurisdiction of the LAs upon whose jurisdiction, as a rule, falls termination
disputes and claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations as provided in Article 217
of the Labor Code. Consistent with this jurisprudence, the mere fact that Cosare was a stockholder
and an officer of Broadcomat the time the subject controversy developed failed to necessarily make
the case an intra-corporate dispute.
In Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation v. Coros, the Court distinguished between a
“regular employee” and a “corporate officer” for purposes of establishing the true nature of a dispute
or complaint for illegal dismissal and determining which body has jurisdiction over it. Succinctly, it
was explained that “[t]he determination of whether the dismissed officer was a regular employee or
corporate officer unravels the conundrum” of whether a complaint for illegal dismissal is cognizable by
the LA or by the RTC. “In case of the regular employee, the LA has jurisdiction; otherwise, the RTC
exercises the legal authority to adjudicate.
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the LA had the original jurisdiction over the complaint for
illegal dismissal because Cosare, although an officer of Broadcom for being its AVP for Sales, was
not a “corporate officer” as the term is defined by law.
22. Amecos Innovations, Inc. vs. Lopez

G.R. No. 178055, July 2, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner Amecos is a corporation duly incorporated under Philippine laws engaged in the business
of selling assorted products. Amecos received a Subpoena from the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City in connection with a complaint filed by the SSS for alleged delinquency in the remittance
of SSS contributions and penalty liabilities in violation of Section 22(a) and 22(d) in relation to Section
28(e) of the SSS law, as amended. By way of explanation, Amecos attributed its failure to remit the
SSS contributions to herein respondent Eliza R. Lopez. Amecos claimed that it hired respondent as
Marketing Assistant to promote its products; that upon hiring, respondent refused to provide Amecos
with her SSS Number and to be deducted her contributions; that on the basis of the foregoing,
Amecos no longer enrolled respondent with the SSS and did not deduct her corresponding
contributions up to the time of her termination. Amecos eventually settled its obligations with the SSS;
consequently, SSS filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint which was approved by the Office of the
City Prosecutor. Thereafter, petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent for P27,791.65
representing her share in the SSS contributions and expenses for processing, but to no avail. Thus,
petitioners filed the instant Complaint for sum of money and damages against respondent docketed
as Civil Case No. 04-27802 with the MeTC. Petitioners claimed that because of respondent`s
misrepresentation, they suffered actual damages. Mateo also allegedly suffered extreme
embarrassment and besmirched reputation as a result of the filing of the complaint by the SSS.
Hence, they prayed moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneyÊs fees, and costs of the suit.
Respondent filed her Answer with Motion to Dismiss claiming that the regular courts do not have
jurisdiction over the instant case as it arose out of their employer-employee relationship. MeTC
dismissed and RTC affirmed ruling that damages arising from employer-employee relationship are
under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters or the NLRC; that since petitioners and respondent were in
an employer-employee relationship at the time, the matter of SSS contributions was thus an integral
part of that relationship; and as a result, petitioners` cause of action for recovery of damages from
respondent falls under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. CA affimed.
ISSUE:
Does the LA have jurisdiction over the case?
RULING:
YES. The SC held that as between the parties, Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code is applicable. Said
provision bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages
arising from employer-employee relations. The observation that the matter of SSS contributions
necessarily flowed from the employer-employee relationship between the parties, shared by the lower
courts and the CA is correct; thus, petitioners` claims should have been referred to the labor tribunals.
In this connection, it is noteworthy to state that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the
reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code. At the same time, it
cannot be assumed that since the dispute concerns the payment of SSS premiums, petitioners` claim
should be referred to the Social Security Commission (SSC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8282. As far as SSS is concerned, there is no longer a dispute with
respect to petitioners` accountability to the System; petitioners already settled their pecuniary
obligations to it. Since there is no longer any dispute regarding coverage, benefits, contributions and
penalties to speak of, the SSC need not be unnecessarily dragged into the picture.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioners have a cause of action against the respondent?
RULING:
NO. petitioners alleged that respondent misrepresented that she was simultaneously employed by
another company; consequently, they did not enroll her with the SSS or pay her SSS contributions.

Likewise, when petitioners eventually paid respondent`s SSS contributions as a result of the filing of a
complaint by the SSS, respondent was unjustly enriched because the amount was not deducted from
her wages in Amecos. The evidence, however, indicates that while respondent was employed,
Amecos did not remit premium contributions · both employer and employees` shares · to the SSS;
the SSS demand letter sent to it covers nonpayment of SSS premium contributions from January
2001 up to April 2002, amounting to P85,687.84. The Amecos payroll covering the period from
January 30 to November 29, 2001 likewise shows that no deductions for SSS contributions were
being made from respondent`s salaries. This can only mean that during the period, Amecos was not
remitting SSS contributions · whether the employer or employees` shares · pertaining to respondent.
As such, during her employment with Amecos, respondent was never covered under the System as
SSS did not know in the first instance that petitioners employed her, since the petitioners were not
remitting her contributions. Petitioners were forced to remit monthly SSS contributions only when SSS
filed I.S. No. 03-6068 with the Quezon City Prosecutor`s Office. By that time, however, respondent
was no longer with Amecos, as her employment was terminated sometime in mid-February of 2002.
Given the above facts, it is thus clear that petitioners have no cause of action against the respondent
in Civil Case No. 04-27802. Since Amecos did not remit respondent`s full SSS contributions, the latter
was never covered by and protected under the System. If she was never covered by the System,
certainly there is no sense in making her answerable for the required contributions during the period
of her employment. And it follows as a matter of consequence that claims for other damages founded
on the foregoing nonexistent cause of action should likewise fail.
23. INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC. v. ENGR. SALVADOR ADVIENTO

G.R. No. 171212 August 4, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing thread for weaving. On August 21, 1990, petitioner hired respondent Engr. Salvador
Adviento as Civil Engineer to maintain its facilities in Lambakin, Marilao, Bulacan. On August 7, 2002,
respondent consulted a physician due to recurring weakness and dizziness. Few days later, he was
diagnosed with Chronic Poly Sinusitis, and thereafter, with moderate, severe and persistent Allergic
Rhinitis. Accordingly, respondent was advised by his doctor to totally avoid house dust mite and
textile dust as it will transmute into health problems.
Distressed, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), San Fernando, Pampanga, for alleged illegal dismissal and for the payment of
backwages, separation pay, actual damages and attorney’s fees. The said case is still pending
resolution with the NLRC at the time the instant petition was filed.
Subsequently, respondent filed another Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri,
Cagayan, alleging that he contracted such occupational disease by reason of the gross negligence of
petitioner to provide him with a safe, healthy and workable environment.
In his Complaint, respondent alleged that as part of his job description, he conducts regular
maintenance check on petitioner’s facilities including its dye house area, which is very hot and emits
foul chemical odor with no adequate safety measures introduced by petitioner. According to
respondent, the air washer dampers and all roof exhaust vests are blown into open air, carrying dust
thereto. Concerned, respondent recommended to management to place roof insulation to minimize, if
not, eradicate the health hazards attendant in the work place. However, said recommendation was
turned down by management due to high cost. Respondent further suggested to petitioner’s
management that the engineering office be relocated because of its dent prone location, such that
even if the door of the office is sealed, accumulated dust creeps in outside the office. This was further
aggravated by the installation of new filters fronting the office. However, no action was taken by
management. According to respondent, these health hazards have been the persistent complaints of
most, if not all, workers of petitioner. Nevertheless, said complaints fell on deaf ears as petitioner
callously ignored the health problems of its workers and even tended to be apathetic to their plight,
including respondent.
Respondent averred that, being the only breadwinner in the family, he made several attempts to
apply for a new job, but to his dismay and frustration, employers who knew of his present health
condition discriminated against him and turned down his application. By reason thereof, respondent
suffered intense moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings, praying for
the recovery of the following: (1) Five Million Pesos (₱5,000,000.00) asmoral damages; (2) Two
Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and (3) Seven Million Three Thousand and
Eight Pesos (₱7,003,008.00) as compensatory damages. Claiming to be a pauper litigant, respondent
was not required to pay any filing fee.
In reply, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that: (1) the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the complaint because the same falls under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter (LA) under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code; and (2) there is
another action pending with the Regional Arbitration Branch III of the NLRC in San Fernando City,
Pampanga, involving the same parties for the same cause.
RTC: denying the aforesaid Motion and sustaining its jurisdiction over the instant case. It held that
petitioner’s alleged failure to provide its employees with a safe, healthy and workable environment is
an act of negligence, a case of quasi-delict. As such, it is not within the jurisdiction of the LA under
Article 217 of the Labor Code.
MR: denied denying the aforesaid Motion and sustaining its jurisdiction over the instant case. It held
that petitioner’s alleged failure to provide its employees with a safe, healthy and workable
environment is an act of negligence, a case of quasi-delict. As such, it is not within the jurisdiction of
the LA under Article 217 of the Labor Code.
CA: dismissed petitioner’s Petition for lack of merit
MR: denied
Issue: whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent’s complaint
praying for moral damages, exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored on petitioner’s
alleged gross negligence in failing to provide a safe and healthy working environment for respondent
Ruling: Yes, jurisdiction is within the regular courts.

The jurisdiction of the LA and the NLRC is outlined in Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6715, to wit:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission-- (a) Except as otherwise provided
under this Code the Labor Arbiter shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without

extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or nonagricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involvingwages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee
relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code including questions involving the
legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all
other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (₱5,000.00) regardless of
whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
x x x.
While we have upheld the present trend to refer worker-employer controversies to labor courts in light
of the aforequoted provision, we have also recognized that not all claims involving employees can be
resolved solely by our labor courts, specifically when the law provides otherwise. For this reason, we
have formulated the "reasonable causal connection rule," wherein if there is a reasonable causal
connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within
the jurisdiction of the labor courts; and in the absence thereof, it is the regular courts that have
jurisdiction. Such distinction is apt since it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which
do not arise out of or in connection with their employer-employee relationship, and which would
therefore fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by the
legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters
on an exclusive basis.
Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor
Code, to be cognizable by the LA, must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims
provided for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can a claim for
damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.
In the case at bench, we find that such connection is nil.

True, the maintenance of a safe and healthy workplace is ordinarily a subject of labor cases. More,
the acts complained of appear to constitute matters involving employee-employer relations since
respondent used to be the Civil Engineer of petitioner. However, it should be stressed that
respondent’s claim for damages is specifically grounded on petitioner’s gross negligence to provide a
safe, healthy and workable environment for its employees −a case of quasi-delict. This is easily
ascertained from a plain and cursory reading of the Complaint, which enumerates the acts and/or
omissions of petitioner relative to the conditions in the workplace, to wit:
1. Petitioner’s textile mills have excessive flying textile dust and waste in its operations and no effort
was exerted by petitioner to minimize or totally eradicate it;
2. Petitioner failed to provide adequate and sufficient dust suction facilities;

3. Textile machines are cleaned with air compressors aggravating the dusty work place;
4. Petitioner has no physician specializing in respiratory related illness considering it is a textile
company;
5. Petitioner has no device to detect the presence or density of dust which is airborne;
6. The chemical and color room are not equipped with proper safety chemical nose mask; and
7. The power and boiler plant emit too much smoke with solid particles blown to the air from the
smoke stack of the power plant emitting a brown rust color which engulfs the entire compound.
In addition, respondent alleged that despite his earnest efforts to suggest to management to place
roof insulation to minimize, if not, eradicate the health hazards attendant in the workplace, the same
was not heeded.
It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in
the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted
therein, which is a matter resolved only after and as a result of a trial. Neither can jurisdiction of a
court be made to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss.
In this case, a perusal of the complaint would reveal that the subject matter is one of claim for
damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court's jurisdiction.
The pertinent provision of Article 2176 of the Civil Code which governs quasi-delict provides that:
Whoever by act or omission causes damaget o another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict.
Thus, to sustain a claim liability under quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or someother person for whose acts
he must respond; and (c) the connection of causeand effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
In the case at bar, respondent alleges that due to the continued and prolonged exposure to textile
dust seriously inimical to his health, he suffered work-contracted disease which is now irreversible
and incurable, and deprived him of job opportunities. Clearly, injury and damages were allegedly
suffered by respondent, an element of quasi-delict. Secondly, the previous contract of employment
between petitioner and respondent cannot be used to counter the element of "no pre-existing
contractual relation" since petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in maintaining a hazardous work
environment cannot be considered a mere breach of such contract of employment, but falls squarely
within the elements of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code since the negligence is direct,
substantive and independent.
When, as here, the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, jurisdiction over the action is with the
regular courts.
It also bears stressing that respondent is not praying for any relief under the Labor Code of the
Philippines. He neither claims for reinstatement nor backwages or separation pay resulting from an
illegal termination. The cause of action herein pertains to the consequence of petitioner’s omission
which led to a work-related disease suffered by respondent, causing harm or damage to his person.

Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to
the regular courts.
As it is, petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code. It merely seeks to recover
damages based on the parties' contract of employment as redress for respondent's breach thereof.
Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to
the regular courts. More so must this be in the present case, what with the reality that the stipulation
refers to the post-employment relations of the parties.
Where the resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage
structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general
civil law, such claim falls outside the area of competence of expertise ordinarily ascribed to the LA
and the NLRC.
Guided by the aforequoted doctrines, we find no reason to reverse the findings of the CA. The RTC
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent's complaint praying for moral damages,
exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored on petitioner's alleged gross negligence in
failing to provide a safe and healthy working environment for respondent.
24. Honda Cars Philippines, Inc. vs. Honda Cars Technical Specialists and Supervisors
Union
G.R. No. 204142 November 19, 2014
Facts:
On December 8, 2006, petitioner Honda Cars Philippines, Inc., (company) and respondent Honda
Cars Technical Specialists and Supervisory Union (union), the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the company’s supervisors and technical specialists, entered into a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) effective April 1, 2006 to March 31, 2011.4
Prior to April 1, 2005, the union members were receiving a transportation allowance of 3,300.00 a
month. On September 3, 2005, the company and the union entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement5 (MOA) converting the transportation allowance into a monthly gasoline allowance
starting at 125 liters effective April 1,2005. The allowance answers for the gasoline consumed by the
union members for official business purposes and for home to office travel and vice-versa. The
company claimed that the grant of the gasoline allowance is tied up to a similar company policy for
managers and assistant vice-presidents (AVPs), which provides that in the event the amount of
gasoline is not fully consumed, the gasoline not used may be converted into cash, subject to
whatever tax may be applicable. Since the cash conversion is paid in the monthly payroll as an
excess gas allowance, the company considers the amount as part of the managers’ and AVPs’
compensation that is subject to income tax on compensation.
Accordingly, the company deducted from the union members’ salaries the withholding tax
corresponding to the conversion to cash of their unused gasoline allowance.
The union, on the other hand, argued that the gasoline allowance for its members is a "negotiated
item" under Article XV, Section 15 of the new CBA on fringe benefits. It thus opposed the company’s
practice of treating the gasoline allowance that, when converted into cash, is considered as
compensation income that is subject to withholding tax.

The disagreement between the company and the union on the matter resulted in a grievance which
they referred to the CBA grievance procedure for resolution. As it remained unsettled there, they
submitted the issue to a panel of voluntary arbitrators as required by the CBA.
Voluntary Arbitration Decision: rendered a decision/award7 declaring that the cash conversion of the
unused gasoline allowance enjoyed by the members of the union is a fringe benefit subject to the
fringe benefit tax, not to income tax. The panel held that the deductions made by the company shall
be considered as advances subject to refund in future remittances of withholding taxes.
MR: denied
CA Ruling: denied the petition and upheld with modification the voluntary arbitration decision. It
agreed with the panel’s ruling that the cash conversion of the unused gasoline allowance is a fringe
benefit granted under Section 15, Article XV of the CBA on "Fringe Benefits." Accordingly, the CA
held that the benefit is not compensation income subject to withholding tax.
MR: denied
Issue: Whether VA has jurisdiction to settle tax matters
Ruling: No. The Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to settle tax matters
The Labor Code vests the Voluntary Arbitrator original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies. Upon agreement of the parties, the Voluntary Arbitrator shall also hear and decide
all other labor disputes, including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
In short, the Voluntary Arbitrator’s jurisdiction is limited to labor disputes. Labor dispute means "any
controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee."
The issues raised before the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators are: (1) whether the cash conversion of
the gasoline allowance shall be subject to fringe benefit tax or the graduated income tax rate on
compensation; and (2) whether the company wrongfully withheld income tax on the converted gas
allowance.
The Voluntary Arbitrator has no competence to rule on the taxability of the gas allowance and on the
propriety of the withholding of tax. These issues are clearly tax matters, and do not involve labor
disputes. To be exact, they involve tax issues within a labor relations setting as they pertain to
questions of law on the application of Section 33 (A) of the NIRC. They do not require the application
of the Labor Code or the interpretation of the MOA and/or company personnel policies. Furthermore,
the company and the union cannot agree or compromise on the taxability of the gas allowance.
Taxation is the State’s inherent power; its imposition cannot be subject to the will of the parties.
Under paragraph 1, Section 4 of the NIRC, the CIR shall have the exclusive and original jurisdiction to
interpret the provisions of the NIRC and other tax laws, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance.
Consequently, if the company and/or the union desire/s to seek clarification of these issues, it/they
should have requested for a tax ruling from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Any revocation,
modification or reversal of the CIR’s ruling shall not be given retroactive application if the revocation,
modification or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, except in the following cases:

(a) Where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or any document
required of him by the BIR;
(b) Where the facts subsequently gathered by the BIR are materially different from the facts on which
the ruling is based; or
(c) Where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
On the other hand, if the union disputes the withholding of tax and desires a refund of the withheld
tax, it should have filed an administrative claim for refund with the CIR. Paragraph 2, Section 4 of the
NIRC expressly vests the CIR original jurisdiction over refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other tax matters. The union has no cause of action
against the company
Under the withholding tax system, the employer as the withholding agent acts as both the
government and the taxpayer’s agent. Except in the case of a minimum wage earner, every employer
has the duty to deduct and withhold upon the employee’s wages a tax determined in accordance with
the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, upon the CIR’s
recommendation. As the Government’s agent, the employer collects tax and serves as the payee by
fiction of law. As the employee’s agent, the employer files the necessary income tax return and remits
the tax to the Government.
Based on these considerations, we hold that the union has no cause of action against the
company.The company merely performed its statutory duty to withhold tax based on its interpretation
of the NIRC, albeit that interpretation may later be found to be erroneous. The employer did not
violate the employee's right by the mere act of withholding the tax that may be due the government.
Moreover, the NIRC only holds the withholding agent personally liable for the tax arising from the
breach of his legal duty to withhold, as distinguished from his duty to pay tax. Under Section 79 (B) of
the NIRC, if the tax required to be deducted and withheld is not collected from the employer, the
employer shall not be relieved from liability for any penalty or addition to the unwithheld tax.
Thus, if the BIR illegally or erroneously collected tax, the recourse of the taxpayer, and in proper
cases, the withholding agent, is against the BIR, and not against the withholding agent. The union's
cause of action for the refund or non-withholding of tax is against the taxing authority, and not against
the employer under Section 229 of the NIRC.
25. MONTERO vs TIMES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC

G.R. No. 190828. March 16, 2015
FACTS: In 1995, the rank-and-file employees of TTCI formed a union named as Times Employees
Union (TEU) which was later certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit within TTCI. Said
members went on strike but a return-to-work Order was issued by the Labor Secretary issued which
ended the strike and enjoined the parties from committing any other act that may intensify the
situation. The TTCI Board of Directors approved a resolution confirming the authority given to
respondent Santiago, TTCI President and Chairman of the Board of Directors, to gradually dispose
the assets of the TTCI as a result of its unabated increase of the cost of operations and losses for the
last two years. TTCI also adopted a company-wide retrenchment program. The sale of 25 buses of
TTCI, as well as the Certificates of Public Convenience for the operation of the buses, were likewise
approved and subsequently transferred to MENCORP. Thereafter, several union members received
notices that they were being retrenched TEU declared a strike against TTCI, but the latter merely
reiterated the earlier return-to-work order of the Labor Secretary. For disregarding the said return-to-
work order, Santiago issued two notices of termination terminating some 106 workers and a revised
list increasing the number of dismissed employees to 119, for participating in the illegal strike.
Santiago served to the DOLE Regional Office I a notice that TTCI would be closing its operations due
to heavy business losses. Petitioners then filed several complaints against TTCI and MENCORP
before the NLRC. However, this case was withdrawn on March 4, 1999 upon motion by the TEU’s
counsel which was given due course on March 22, 1999. Four years later, several complaints for
unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal with money claims, damages and attorney’s fees were filed
against TTCI, Santiago, MENCORP and its General Manager before the LA from June to July 2002.
In response, TTCI asserted that the petitioners’ cause of action had already been barred by
prescription because the complaints were filed only in June 2002 or after almost five years from the
date of their dismissal. MENCORP, on the other hand, raised the defense of lack of employer-
employee relationship since it never engaged the services of the petitioners when TTCI sold to them
its buses and the Certificates of Public Convenience. The LA rendered a Decision dismissing the
petitioners’ claim for unfair labor practice and money claims on the ground of prescription. However,
with regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, only the complaints of Montero, Ravina, Cabello, Genaro,
Madera, Gaano, Arsenio Donato and Estilong were dismissed for having been barred by prescription.
Disagreeing with the LA decision, all parties interposed an appeal before the NLRC. However, said
appeals have both been denied for non-perfection, particularly for failure of the petitioners to verify
their appeal, and for failure of the respondent to post the required cash or surety bond. In a Decision,
the NLRC vacated and set aside the findings of the LA, upon finding that the petitioners’ complaints
had already been barred by prescription. The NLRC observed that the LA had ignored the rule on
prescription, and chose to be selective in awarding relief to the 10 complainants by stating in his
decision that the period during which the labor cases were pending should be deducted from the
period of prescription. The NLRC added that the application of the principle of prescription should not
be done on a selective basis, especially when the dates of accrual of the causes of action and the
filing of the complaints readily show that prescription has set in.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ complaints for illegal dismissal have already prescribed?
RULING: Yes. The NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision in favor of the respondents. The CA acted in accord
with the evidence on record and case law when it dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed
decision and resolution of the NLRC. In the case at bar, October 26, 1997 and November 24, 1997
appear on record to be the dates when the petitioners’ employment were terminated by TTCI. The
antecedent facts that gave rise to the petitioners’ dismissal from employment are not disputed in this
case. There is no question about the fact that the petitioners’ complaints for unfair labor practice and
money claims have already prescribed Settled is the rule that when one is arbitrarily and unjustly
deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one’s
dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated upon an injury to the rights
of the plaintiff, as contemplated under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought
within four years. The petitioners contend that the period when they filed a labor case on May 14,
1998 but withdrawn on March 22, 1999 should be excluded from the computation of the four-year
prescriptive period for illegal dismissal cases. However, the Court had already ruled that the
prescriptive period continues even after the withdrawal of the case as though no action has been filed

at all. Article 1155 of the Civil Code which states that “although the commencement of a civil action
stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment
by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced
at all.” is applicable. In like manner, while the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, its voluntary withdrawal left the petitioners in exactly
the same position as though no complaint had been filed at all. The withdrawal of their complaint
effectively erased the tolling of the reglementary period. Hence, while the filing of the said case could
have interrupted the running of the four-year prescriptive period, the voluntary withdrawal of the
petitioners effectively cancelled the tolling of the prescriptive period within which to file their illegal
dismissal case, leaving them in exactly the same position as though no labor case had been filed at
all. The running of the four-year prescriptive period not having been interrupted by the filing of NLRC
RAB-I-01-1007, the petitioners’ cause of action had already prescribed in four years after their
cessation of employment on October 26, 1997 and November 24, 1997. Consequently, when the
petitioners filed their complaint for illegal dismissal, separation pay, retirement benefits, and damages
in 2002, their claim, clearly, had already been barred by prescription. Sadly, the petitioners have no
one but themselves to blame for their own predicament. By their own allegations in their respective
complaints, they have barred their remedy and extinguished their right of action

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JURISDICTION DIGEST

1. EVELYN TOLOSA vs NLRC

LA: awarded the damages

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 2 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 3 of 46

3. Eviota vs. Court of Appeals

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 5 of 46

4. DYNAMIC SIGNMAKER OUTDOOR ADVERTISING SERVICES, INC. VS. POTONGAN

5. METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION v. JOHNNY PASTORIN

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 7 of 46

6. YUSEN AIR AND SEA SERVICE PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED v. VILLAMOR

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 8 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 9 of 46

7. DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES vs MOJICA

8. EASYCALL COMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. vs. EDWARD KING

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 12 of 46

9. San Miguel Foods, Inc. v. San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 14 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 15 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 16 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 17 of 46

12. Patricia Halagueña Vs Katindig, et al.

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 19 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 20 of 46

13. Leslie Okol vs Slimmer’s World International

14. Hugo et. al., vs Light Rail Transit Authority

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 23 of 46

15. Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation vs Coros

16. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. LIM

ISSUE: Is respondent correct in filing a writ of habeas data in the RTC?

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 26 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 28 of 46

Second, the present controversy does not relate to intra-corporate dispute.

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 29 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 31 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 32 of 46

21. RAUL C. COSARE vs BROADCOM ASIA, INC.

Cosare appealed the LA decision to the NLRC. It reversed the LA decision.

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 34 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 35 of 46

22. Amecos Innovations, Inc. vs. Lopez

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 37 of 46

23. INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC. v. ENGR. SALVADOR ADVIENTO

Ruling: Yes, jurisdiction is within the regular courts.

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 39 of 46

In the case at bench, we find that such connection is nil.

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 40 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 41 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 42 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 43 of 46

25. MONTERO vs TIMES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 45 of 46

Case Pool of Better Friends//Page 46 of 46

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